.  .    .  • :  '•;".:  ^ 


/imiiciiiy\ 

f  LIBRARY 

VERSITY  OF 

\     CALIFORNIA 


COPYRIGHT   BY 

D.    APPLETON   AND    COMPANY, 

1878. 


EW7 


THIS   BOOK 

IS 
DEDICATED 

TO 
GOOD      SOLDIEE8      EVERYWHERE; 

BUT  ESPECIALLY  TO 
THE    SOLDIERS     OF    THE     SOUTH, 

AND 

TO      THE      SONS      OF      THE      MEN 
WHO    SUFFERED   IN   ITS   CAUSE. 


774 


PREFACE. 


A  BIOGRAPHY  of  ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  will  need  no  apol 
ogy  with  a  large  class  of  his  countrymen.  Many  discreet  men  have 
urged  upon  the  writer  that  his  duty,  both  as  son  and  citizen,  re 
quired  him  to  do  this  work.  They  believed  that  the  omission  of  a 
picture  of  this  heroic  life  would  leave  unfilled  an  important  panel 
in  the  gallery  of  American  history,  in  which  the  Civil  War  occupies 
so  large  a  space.  In  response  to  such  demand  this  memoir  has  been 
written. 

The  writer  would  gladly  have  devolved  his  task  on  some  more 
competent  and  disinterested  hand.  He  has  felt  keenly  the  restric 
tions  and  obligations  imposed  by  the  filial  relation.  Hostile  criti 
cism  can  always  begin  its  argument  with  the  charge  that  it  is  im 
possible  for  a  son  to  be  fair ;  and  the  writer's  own  heart  teaches  him 
how  difficult  it  is  to  be  always  and  perfectly  just.  A  writer  who 
strives  to  delineate  a  dear,  dead  father  will  not  mar  the  picture  by 
a  portrait  below  his  own  ideal,  though  it  may  well  fall  short  of  the 
heroic  proportions  of  the  original.  But  it  is  not  necessary  to  be 
impartial,  in  order  to  be  truthful ;  and,  without  love,  there  can  be 
no  correct  interpretation  of  character.  Knowing  that  he  has  made 
an  honest  effort  to  find  out  and  relate  the  truth  in  every  particular 
in  this  volume,  the  writer  trusts  that  much  will  be  pardoned  to  him. 

If  a  friend  could  have  been  found  fitted  by  preparation,  leisure, 
and  literary  enthusiasm,  for  so  heavy  a  charge,  it  would  have  been 
consigned  to  him  with  a  feeling  of  immeasurable  relief.  But  this 
was  not  to  be.  The  labor  promised  and  proved  to  be  very  great. 
The  very  sources  of  information  had  often  to  be  discovered,  and 
the  material  employed  has  been  gathered  from  quarters  remote  and 
obscure  ;  siftings  of  the  memories  of  the  aged  or  the  unwilling,  for 
many  of  those  best  qualified  to  speak  of  the  events  of  the  Civil  War 


vi  PREFACE. 

are  often  the  most  averse  to  recall  its  painful  experiences.  Then, 
too,  the  verification  of  the  facts  involved  processes  too  tedious  for 
any  one  not  animated  by  the  strongest  sense  of  personal  interest 
and  responsibility.  Hence  it  came  to  pass  that  the  writer  was  him 
self  compelled  to  discharge  this  duty. 

In  spite  of  these  serious  obstacles,  the  writer  has  had  some  pe 
culiar  facilities  for  the  successful  achievement  of  his  purpose.  A 
strong  call  from  within  and  from  without  has  urged  him  on.  The 
friendship  of  eminent  Confederates  and  the  sympathy  of  a  multi 
tude  of  worthy  people  have  encouraged  him  in  his  design  and  fur 
nished  him  with  valuable  information.  General  Johnston's  own 
papers  have  been  preserved  almost  entire  since  1836 ;  and  these, 
including  his  Confederate  archives,  complete,  have  supplied  ampler 
and  more  perfect  materials  than  most  biographers  enjoy.  Gentle 
men  who  were  opposed  to  him  in  the  late  Civil  War  have  been  both 
courteous  and  generous  in  affording  all  proper  information  ;  and,  in 
this  respect,  he  is  especially  indebted  to  the  Honorable  George  W. 
McCrary,  the  present  Secretary  of  War,  to  General  D.  C.  Buell, 
General  Fitz-John  Porter,  and  Colonel  George  H.  Elliott,  of  the 
Engineers,  and  to  other  gentlemen  to  whom  acknowledgments  are 
made  in  the  course  of  the  narrative. 

Such  frequent  and  important  services  have  been  rendered  in  the 
preparation  of  this  book  by  so  many  friends  that  their  recognition 
can  be  made  appropriately  only  in  the  same  way ;  and,  indeed,  a 
large  part  of  the  value  of  this  work  is  due  to  their  unselfish  aid. 
But  the  writer  cannot  omit  to  express  here  his  deep  obligations  to 
the  Honorable  Jefferson  Davis,  ex-President  of  the  Confederate 
States ;  to  the  late  General  Braxton  Bragg ;  to  Governors  I.  G. 
Harris,  John  C.  Brown,  and  James  D.  Porter,  of  Tennessee ;  to 
Colonel  Edward  W.  Munford,  General  William  Preston,  General 
W.  C.  Whitthorne,  General  William  J.  Hamby,  Dr.  William  M. 
Polk,  Colonel  A.  Eidley,  Captain  G.  W.  /rift,  and  Captain  1ST.  J. 
Eaton.  His  late  colleagues,  Prof.  Edward  S.  Joynes,  now  of  Yan- 
derbilt  University,  and  Prof.  Carter  J.  Harris,  of  Washington  and 
Lee  University,  have  given  him  most  acceptable  literary  assistance. 

In  addition  to  the  writer's  unusual  opportunities  for  arriving  at 
the  truth,  there  were  certain  exceptional  features  in  his  relations  to 


PREFACE.  yii 

General  Johnston,  not  often  found  between  father  and  son.  There 
was  the  utmost  confidence  and  intimacy  in  their  intercourse,  and 
yet  General  Johnston  sedulously  cultivated  the  independent  devel 
opment  of  his  children.  Further,  the  writer's  lines  of  life  and 
habits  of  thought  have  been  widely  remote  from  his  father's.  Hence 
lie  believes  that,  thus  unfettered  by  his  authority  yet  conversant 
with  his  ideas  and  affairs,  he  can  often  explain  better  than  any  one 
else  the  bearing  of  obscure  transactions. 

Nevertheless,  the  close  tie  between  the  biographer  and  his  sub 
ject  has  to  some  extent  marred  the  artistic  effect  of  this  book.  Not 
only  delicacy  but  a  sense  of  duty  to  the  intelligent  reader  has  dic 
tated  that  it  was  better  in  all  personal  matters  to  speak  in  the  lan 
guage  of  others,  wherever  it  was  possible  ;  and  yet  this  could  only 
be  done  at  some  sacrifice  of  brevity  and  of  apparent  unity.  Then, 
too,  in  the  discussion  of  controverted  points,  where  a  bias  might  be 
presumed  to  exist,  he  has  thought  it  proper,  while  frankly  stating 
his  own  conclusions,  to  give  the  evidence  on  which  they  rest.  Some 
original  documents  and  tables  of  military  statistics,  pertinent  to  the 
narrative,  have  been  published  with  it,  for  the  sake  of  their  his 
torical  value. 

There  has  been  no  effort  to  make  General  Johnston  the  central 
figure  of  his  times,  or  to  drag  into  his  biography  matters  extraneous 
to  his  career.  But  where  any  phase  of  life,  or  series  of  events,  was 
interwoven  with  it,  the  reader  is  not  assumed  to  be  acquainted  with 
unfamiliar  or  forgotten  facts.  Such  facts  are  recounted  as  succinctly 
as  the  matter  will  admit,  but  not,  it  is  hoped,  at  the  expense  of  ac 
curacy.  But,  though  he  has  been  diligent  in  seeking  to  be  exact, 
he  knows  the  difficulties,  and,  so  far  from  deprecating  judicious 
criticism,  he  invites  it,  in  the  interest  of  historical  truth. 

General  Johnston  was  singularly  tolerant  of  others,  though  him 
self  severe  in  principles  and  circumspect  in  conduct.  Hence  it  has 
not  been  thought  necessary,  for  the  most  part,  to  vindicate  his  opin 
ions  or  actions ;  since,  if  the  tenor  of  his  life  was  noble  and  good, 
its  errors  and  mistakes  may  well  be  left  standing  for  such  warning 
or  censure  as  the  moralist  shall  feel  compelled  to  employ.  Such 
would  have  been  his  own  wish.  But  the  integrity  and  sincerity  of 
the  man  permit  the  writer  to  use  an  uncommon  frankness  in  detail- 


PREFACE. 

ing  not  only  the  events  of  liis  public  career,  but  such  incidents  of 
his  domestic  life  as  may  serve  for  instruction  or  illustration.  The 
facts  of  a  life  are  the  best — perhaps,  the  only — apology  for  writing 
it ;  and  General  Johnston  was  so  truthful  and  simple  in  all  he 
said  and  did  that  the  fittest  tribute  to  his  memory  is  absolute  accu 
racy  in  whatever  relates  to  him.  K"o  ideal  of  what  a  hero  ought  to 
be  has  been  framed  herein ;  but  the  story  of  a  life  has  been  told, 
just  as  it  was  lived.  Sympathetic  spirits,  however  wide  the  differ 
ences  of  circumstance,  creed,  or  opinion,  may  learn,  in  its  adversities 
and  its  consolations,  some  lessons  of  fortitude  and  magnanimity. 

This  biography  recounts  a  stirring  theme.  The  most  casual 
reader  must  be  struck  with  the  dramatic  interest  of  the  career  of  a 
man  who,  with  small  share  of  wealth,  patronage,  or  political  arts, 
filled  so  large  a  sphere  by  mere  moral  and  intellectual  force.  It  is 
something  in  this  material  age  to  find  a  man  almost  wholly  above 
the  accidents  of  fortune.  In  some  respects  he  was  a  man  represent 
ative  and  typical  of  his  times,  his  country,  his  section  and  his  pro 
fession  ;  in  others  he  stood  apart  with  an  individuality  so  marked 
that  Marcus  Aurelius  might  have  welcomed  him  as  a  brother-stoic, 
or  the  Chevalier  Bayard  as  a  knightly  peer.  In  Albert  Sidney 
Johnston's  long  life  he  mingled  in  many  great  and  memorable 
events,  and  in  some  of  the  greatest  he  acted  the  chief  and  most  con 
spicuous  part.  In  all  of  them,  his  countrymen  accounted  him  a  fine 
example  of  civic  and  military  virtues.  His  death  was  not  only  the 
decorous  and  becoming  end  to  a  grand  life,  but  many  of  the  wisest 
and  ablest  leaders  believed  that  in  his  fall  a  national  tragedy  culmi 
nated,  which  ever  after  declined  toward  its  final  catastrophe.  Many 
of  the  most  judicious  have  declared  that  on  his  arm  rested  the  for 
tunes  of  the  Confederate  cause.  It  cannot  be  well  that  such  a 
figure  should  pass  into  utter  oblivion. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   I. 

PAGE 

FAMILY  AND  BOYHOOD  ........        1 

Birth  and  Family  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston.  His  Father.  His  Maternal  Grandfather.  Boy 
hood  and  Early  Friends.  Character  as  a  Boy.  Anecdote.  His  Schools.  Transylvania. 
Desire  to  eater  the  Navy.  Visit  to  Louisiana.  His  Brothers.  Vigor  of  Early  Settlers  of 
Kentucky.  Sketch  of  Josiah.  Stoddard  Johnston.  His  Distinguished  Career.  His  Gener 
osity  to  his  Brothers.  Return  of  A.  S.  Johnston  to  Transylvania.  Appointment  to  United 
States  Military  Academy.  Kindness  to  Animals.  Formation  of  Character.  Illustrative 
Anecdotes.  Captain  Eaton's  Account  of  Entrance  at  West  Point.  His  Conduct  there. 
Testimony  of  his  Fellow-Cadets.  Singular  Occurrence  at  his  Graduation.  Assignment  to 
Second  Infantry.  Intimacy  with  Leonidas  Polk.  His  Friends  at  West  Point. 

CHAPTER  II. 
EARLY  ARMY-LIFE      .........       14 

Furlough  passed  in  Kentucky.  Anecdote  illustrating  his  Benevolence.  Visit  to  Washington 
City.  Society  there,  in  1S26.  Mrs.  J.  S.  Johnston.  Brilliant  Offer  of  General  Scott  to  him 
declined.  Its  Influence  on  his  Career.  Ordered  to  Sackett's  Harbor.  Incident  in  Artil 
lery-Practice.  Ordered  to  Jefferson  Barracks.  Description  of  the  Post.  Expedition 
against  the  Winnebagoes.  Red  Bird.  Aversion  to  Letter-writing.  The  Angry  Flute- 
player.  General  Atkinson  and  his  Wife.  Johnston's  Standing  as  an  Officer.  A  Suicide. 
His  Charity  in  Judgment.  Religious  Belief.  St.  Louis  in  Old  Tunes.  Henrietta  Preston. 
Her  Family  Connections.  Governor  William  Clark.  Thomas  H.  Benton.  Miss  Preston's 
Education.  Marriage.  Mrs.  Johnston's  Character.  Early  Married  Life. 

CHAPTER  III. 
BLACK-HAWK  WAR     .........       25 

Causes  of  Indian  Wars.  Indian  Characteristics.  Justice  of  the  Army  toward  the  Indians. 
Reasons  for  introducing  this  Narrative.  Lieutenant  Johnston,  Chief  of  Staff,  and  the  Real 
Historian  of  the  War.  History  of  the  Sacs  and  Foxes.  Their  Conduct  in  the  War  with 
Great  Britain.  "  The  British  Band."  Keokuk.  Black  Hawk.  His  Character  and  Plans. 
Anecdotes  of  him.  Quarrels  about  the  Site  of  Rock  Island  Village.  Black  Hawk's  Con 
spiracy.  Lieutenant  Johnston's  Journal.  Movements  of  Troops.  General  Atkinson's 
Negotiations  for  Peace.  Pacific  Course  of  Keokuk  and  Wapello.  They  surrender  Crimi 
nals.  Movement  up  Rock  River  against  Black  Hawk,  who  declares  War.  Stillman's 
Defeat.  Arrangements  for  the  Campaign.  Savage  Butcheries  and  Skirmishes.  General 
Henry's  Engagement  at  Wisconsin  Heights.  Cholera  among  General  Scott's  Reenforce- 
ments.  March  from  Cosconong  to  Blue"  Mounds.  On  the  Trail.  Battle  of  the  Bad  Axe. 
Capture  of  Black  Hawk.  Losses  of  the  War.  Submission  of  the  Indians.  Report  of  the 
Secretary  of  War.  Kind  Treatment  to  Black  Hawk  and  his  Followers.  Changes  of  Half 
a  Century  in  the  Theatre  of  the  War. 


X  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER   IV. 

PAGE 

JEFFERSON  BARRACKS  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .45 

Zachary  Taylor.  Lieutenant  Johnston's  Military  Repute.  Anecdote.  Eebuke  to  a  Libertine. 
Cholera.  Sickness  in  his  Family.  Domestic  Happiness.  Discussion  of  Plan  of  Life. 
Consults  his  Brother,  J.  S.  Johnston,  about  resigning.  His  Reply.  Curious  Reflections 
of  a  Successful  Politician.  His  Premonitions  of  Civil  "War.  Another  Letter.  Death  of 
J.  S.  Johnston,  by  Steamboat  Explosion.  His  only  Son,  William.  1832-'33.  Mrs.  John 
ston's  Illness.  Malpractice  of  the  Times.  Pulmonary  Consumption  developed.  Lieuten 
ant  Johnston  resigns.  Visit  to  Mountains  of  Virginia  and  Atlantic  Coast.  Return  to 
Louisville.  Mrs.  Johnston's  Death.  Mrs.  Hancock's  Account  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston's 
Character.  He  retires  to  Farm,  near  St.  Louis.  Various  Plans  of  Life.  Brief  Visit  to 
Washington.  Determines  to  embark  in  the  Texan  Revolution. 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE  TEXAN  REVOLUTION         ........       56 

Discovery  by  Lasalle.  Disputed  Title  to  the  Territory.  Spanish  Occupation.  Early  His 
tory.  Philip  Nolan.  Boundary  Disputes.  Revolutionary  Measures.  Magee's  Expedi 
tion.  Mina's  and  Long's  Attempts.  Moses  Austin.  Stephen  F.  Austin.  His  Colony. 
The  Fredonian  War.  Federal  Constitution.  Mexican  Jealousy.  Bustamante's  Arbitrary 
and  Centralized  Government.  Oppression  of  Texas.  Colonel  Bradburn'e  Tyranny.  Re 
sistance  of  Colonists  in  1832.  Anahuac  Campaign.  Bradburn's  Defeat.  Piedras  compro 
mises.  Convention  of  San  Felipe.  Convention  of  1833.  Santa  Anna.  Austin's  Imprison 
ment.  Santa  Anna's  Revolution.  Population  of  Texas.  Santa  Anna's  Attempt  to  estab 
lish  Military  Despotism.  Resistance.  Moore's  Fight  on  the  Guadalupe.  Capture  of 
Goliad.  Bowie's  Combat  at  Conception  Mission.  Cos  surrenders  San  Antonio.  The 
General  Consultation  of  1835.  Provisional  Government.  Declaration  of  Independence. 
David  G.  Burnet.  Santa  Anna  invades  Texas.  Dissensions  of  Colonists.  Want  of  Prepa 
ration.  Mexican  Atrocities.  William  B.  Travis.  THE  ALAMO.  The  Thermopylae  of 
Texas.  Its  Fall.  Fannin's  Massacre.  Santa  Anna's  Advance.  Houston's  Retreat.  Con 
duct  and  Character  of  Houston.  Movements  of  the  Armies.  BATTLE  OP  SAN  JACINTO. 
Santa  Anna's  Personal  Danger.  His  Secret  Treaty  and  Release.  Sympathy  for  Texas  in 
the  United  States.  Houston  elected  President.  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  joins  in  the 
Texan  Revolution.  His  Motives. 


CHAPTER  VI. 
As  TEXAN  SOLDIER     .........      69 

Johnston's  Arrival  in  Texas.  Kills  a  Puma  single-handed.  Texan  Army.  Its  Composition 
and  Spirit.  Valor 'and  Insubordination.  Rusk  in  Command.  Lamar  appointed  General, 
but  not  allowed  to  take  Command.  Rusk  recommends  Felix  Huston  as  his  Successor. 
Johnston  joins  the  Army  as  a  Private  Trooper.  His  Appearance,  Habits,  and  Manners. 
Made  Adjutant-General.  Peculiar  Circumstances  of  his  Appointment.  Rapid  Promotion. 
Life  of  the  Camp.  Incidents.  Called  to  the  Seat  of  Government  as  Adjutant-General. 
Sent  to  New  Orleans.  Appointed  to  Command  of  the  Army.  Felix  Huston.  His  Career. 
His  Threats.  General  Johnston  takes  Command.  Huston's  Challenge.  Reply.  The 
Duel.  Reconciliation.  Huston  leaves  the  Army.  Johnston's  Magnanimity.  Grounds 
of  his  Action  in  the  Duel.  Huston's  Testimony.  Sufferings  from  the  Wounds.  Hostile 
Movements  of  Mexico.  Policy  of  Texas.  Letter  from  Felix  Huston.  Condition  of  the 
Army.  Rangers.  The  Whiskey  Riot.  Assassination  of  Teal.  Johnston  suffering  from 
Wound.  Asks  for  Furlough.  A  Letter  from  him.  President  Houston's  Letters.  Indian 
Policy.  Policy  toward  Mexico.  General  Johnston's  View.  Hostility  engendered  toward 
him  in  the  President.  Compliments  from  his  Army.  Visits  New  Orleans.  Effects  of  his 
Wound.  Visits  Kentucky.  Noticed  by  Jackson.  Henry  D.  Gilpin's  Letter  to  him.  Re 
turn  to  Texas.  Letter  to  Mr.  Hobbs.  Differences  with  the  Administration.  Indian  Nego 
tiations.  Essowakkeny,  the  Comanche.  Incident  with  General  Johnston.  The  "  Talk." 
Their  Treachery.  Treaty.  Indian  Cannibals.  "The  Little  Child's  Footprint."  Political 
Overtures.  Mexican  Invasion.  Extraordinary  Orders  to  General  Johnston.  His  Desper 
ate  Resolution.  Its  Success.  Furlough.  Annexation  Schemes.  Reaction  in  Public  Sen 
timent.  Lamar  elected  President.  General  Johnston  Secretary  of  War. 


CONTENTS.  xi 

CHAPTER   VII. 

PACE 

SECRETARY  OF  WAR  OF  TEXAS — CHEROKEE  WAR       .  .  .  .  .92 

Embarrassed  Condition  of  Texas  in  1839.  Scant  Material  Eesources.  Hopefulness  of  the 
Administration.  Mirabeau  B.  Lamar.  His  Policy,  Financial  and  Educational.  Vast  and 
Organized  Schemes  of  Fraud  arrested  by  the  Government.  Foreign  Relations.  Energetic 
Policy  toward  Mexico.  Letter  from  General  Johnston  on  the  Situation.  Attempt  to  create 
a  Diversion  by  Encouragement  to  the  Federalists.  The  Opposition  organized  under  Gen 
eral  Houston.  CHEROKEE  WAR.  General  Houston's  Resistance  to  it.  Vindication  of  the 
Good  Faith  of  the  Texan  Government.  Settlement  of  the  Cherokees  in  Texas.  The  Colo 
nists  no  Party  to  it.  Perfidious  Policy  of  Mexico  in  the  Matter.  Colonization  Act  of  1S25. 
Indian  Irruption  of  1S82-33.  Remonstrances.  Solemn  Declaration  of  the  Consultation.  • 
Houston's  Treaty  with  Indians.  Its  Nullity.  Houston's  Failure  to  get  it  ratified.  His 
Relations  with  the  Indians.  Bad  Faith  of  the  Indians.  Their  Conduct  in  the  Revolution. 
Kept  down  by  the  Presence  of  United  States  Forces.  Yoakum's  Testimony.  Secret 
Alliance  with  Mexico.  Continued  Hostilities.  Plan  for  a  General  Revolt  of  the  Indians. 
Their  Butcheries.  General  Johnston  organizes  Troops.  General  Edward  Burleson. 
Flores  killed.  Proofs  of  Alliance  between  Mexico  and  the  Cherokees.  The  Case  summed 
up.  How  the  Cherokee  Question  was  met.  Report  of  General  Johnston,  Secretary  of 
War.  Troops  sent  forward,  and  Unavailing  Negotiations.  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  NECHES. 
Pursuit.  Expulsion  of  Indians  from  Texas.  Redemption  of  all  Northern  Texas  from  the 
Savages.  General  Douglass  thanks  the  Yice-President  and  Secretary  for  Exertions  on 
the  Field.  Incident.  The  Fugitive  emboldened.  Joy  and  Gratitude  of  Texas.  Site  of 
the  Capital.  Austin  selected.  Laid  out  in  August,  1839.  Its  Frontier  Position.  The 
Comanches.  Their  Fierceness  and  Perfidy.  Alarm  of  the  Settlers.  A  Band  of  Co- 
manches  visits  San  Antonio.  Treaty.  SAN  ANTONIO  MASSACRE.  Its  Dramatic  and  Deadly 
Features.  Comanche  War.  Defeat  of  the  Indians. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

1840-1845      ..........     118 

Prepares  to  retire  from  Public  Life.  Reasons  for  doing  so.  Pecuniary  Embarrassments. 
Causes.  His  Education,  Temper,  Liberality,  Public  Sacrifices.  His  Impaired  Health. 
Dislike  of  Politics.  Unfriendly  Correspondence  with  General  Houston.  Its  Adjustment. 
Arcadian  Dreams,  A  Letter.  Resigns  Secretaryship  of  War.  Visits  United  States. 
Friends  try  to  make  him  a  Candidate  for  the  Presidency.  Houston  elected  President.  Re 
newal  of  Mexican  Invasions.  Vasquez  captures  San  Antonio.  Volunteers  assemble  to 
retaliate.  Disbanded  by  the  President.  Agents  sent  to  the  United  States  by  Houston. 
His  Proclamation  stigmatizing  General  Johnston.  General  Johnston's  Counter-Address. 
The  President's  Evasive  Reply.  Houston's  "Do-Nothing"  Policy.  Another  Mexican 
Invasion.  Woll  enters  San  Antonio  and  captures  the  Court  and  Bar.  Bill  passed  by  Con 
gress  for  the  Public  Defense,  killed  by  the  President's  "  Pocket  Veto."  Massacre  of  Daw- 
son's  Force.  General  Johnston  urged  to  become  a  Candidate  for  the  Presidency.  His  Pro 
phetic  Reply.  History  of  Annexation  Schemes.  Texas  enters  the  American  Union.  Mar 
riage  to  Miss  Eliza  Griffin.  Description  of  China  Grove  Plantation.  Purchase.  Conse 
quent  Embarrassments.  General  Johnston's  Friends.  Chess.  His  Intellectual  Habits. 

CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  MEXICAN  WAR    .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .131 

General  Taylor  occupies  Corpus  Christi.  Horsemanship  of  the  Texans.  Taylor  moves  to  the 
Rio  Grande.  Hostilities  by  the  Mexicans.  Battle  of  Palo  Alto.  Resaca.  Volunteering. 
General  Taylor's  Letter  in  Regard  to  General  Johnston.  Asks  him  to  join  the  Army.  He 
goes  on  Horseback  from  Galveston  and  joins  the  Army.  His  Letters  from  Point  Isabel, 
detailing  Military  Operations.  Elected  Colonel  of  First  Texas  Riflemen.  Pride  in  his 
Regiment.  Disbanded.  His  Bitter  Disappointment.  Anecdote,  the  Texan  Father.  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  Letter  describing  the  Battle  of  Monterey.  Letter  from  the  Hon.  Jefferson 
Davis  explaining  and  describing  it.  General  Johnston's  Extraordinary  Peril.  Rallies  the 
Ohio  Regiment.  General  Hooker's  Account  of  it.  Incident  with  General  Hamer.  Com 
plimented  and  recommended  for  Brigadier-General.  Overlooked.  Jefferson  Davis.  His 
Account  of  an  Incident  in  the  Capitulation  of  Monterey,  and  Estimate  of  General  John 
ston's  Character.  Anecdote  by  General  Johnston.  He  leaves  the  Army. 


xii  CONTEXTS. 

CHAPTER  X. 

PAGE 
PLANTATION-LIFE  ...  .145 

Eeception  at  Galveston.  Eeasons  for  retiring  from  the  Army.  Generosity  to  the  "Writer.  His 
Plantation,  China  Grove.  Texas  Coast  Scenery.  Game.  Ilia  family.  Occupation.  Man 
ual  Labor.  Warren  D.  C.  Hall.  The  Writer's  Boyish  .Reminiscences  of  China  Grove. 
General  Johnston's  Kelations  with  Children.  Irish  John.  Shooting.  Close  Observation  of 
the  Habits  of  Animals.  The  Crested  Wood-Duck.  The  Wounded  Eagle.  General  John 
ston's  Ideas  of  the  Conduct  of  Life  ;  of  Education.  His  Love  of  Justice  and  Breadth  of 
View.  Books.  Opinions  on  the  War  ;  of  Colonel  Eogers  ;  of  General  Taylor.  His  View 
of  how  the  Mexican  War  should  be  conducted.  Letter  to  Preston,  giving  his  Estimate  of 
General  Taylor.  .Reserve.  Gradual  Isolation  in  his  Solitude.  Almost  forgotten.  Excep 
tions.  Illustrations  of  his  Character  and  Plantation-Life  from  his  Letters.  Letters  giving 
his  Views  of  Education.  Preference  for  an  American  Training.  Notions  on  Ehetoric, 
Mathematics—  Eequirements  for  Legal  Success.  Lessons  of  Moderation.  Begins  to  lose 
Hope  and  Health.  His  Fortitude  and  Magnanimity.  General  Taylor's  Nomination  and 
Election.  Movements  of  General  Johnston's  Friends  to  advance  him.  His  Unexpected 
Conduct.  Letter  on  Office-Seeking.  Finally  appointed  a  Paymaster  in  the  Army. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

PAYMASTER  IN  UNITED  STATES  ARMY  .  .169 

Appointment.  Hope  of  Transfer  to  the  Line.  Headquarters  at  Austin.  Frontier  District. 
Yellow  Fever.  Duties.  Transportation  of  Funds.  Enlargement  of  District.  His  Mode 
of  Travel.  The  Indians.  Bad  Transportation.  His  Carefulness.  Character  of  Country. 
The  Excessive  Labor  required.  Letter  to  his  Daughter,  describing  his  Tours.  The  Writ 
er's  Tour  with  him.  Interesting  Topographical  Features  of  the  Country.  Its  Floral 
Beauty.  Hailstorms.  Northers.  Prairie  Dogs,  Birds,  Grasshoppers.  General  Johnston's 
Study  cf  Nature.  His  Buffalo-Hunt.  Patience  and  Unselfishness.  His  Providence,  Modes 
of  Thinking.  Topographical  Aptitudes.  His  Deep  Interest  in  Texas.  Know-Nothingism. 
Is  relieved  from  Debt.  Large  Losses  by  Bobbery.  Detection  of  Thief.  His  Punishment. 
Scrupulousness  in  Accounts.  Playful  Letter  to  his  Son,  on  coming  of  Age.  Familiar  Let 
ters.  Anecdotes  by  the  Eev.  Edward  Fontaine,  illustrating  his  Patience  and  Forbearance. 
Death  of  a  Child.  His  Eeligious  Views. 

CHAPTER  XII. 
THE  SECOND  CAVALRY  .  .  .  .  .  .  .183 

Pierce  elected.  Jefferson  Davis  Secretary  of  War.  Strength  of  the  Army.  Increase  of  Force 
asked.  Action  of  General  Johnston's  Friends.  Eecommended  by  Texas  Legislature. 
Senator  Eusk.  William  Preston.  Political  Appointments  the  Tradition.  Mr.  Davis  re 
verses  the  Eule.  General  Johnston  made  Colonel  of  the  Second  Cavalry.  No  Favoritisms. 
The  Appointments  tested.  Ben  McCulloch's  Disappointment.  General  Scott's  Opinion  of 
General  Johnston's  Appointment.  General  Johnston's  Acceptance.  Public  Honors  by  his 
Neighbors.  Enlistment  of  his  Eegiment.  March  to  Texas  with  the  Second  Cavalry.  Suf 
fering  from  Cold.  Northers.  Illness.  Letters.  Patriotic  Apprehensions  of  Disunion. 
Opposition  to  Abolitionism.  Administration  of  his  Military  Department.  Extraordinary 
Success  in  repressing  Indian  Outrage.  Activity  of  his  Command.  The  People  satisfied. 
Mode  of  dealing  with  the  Frontier  People.  His  Motives.  General  Johnston's  Influence 
with  Young  Men.  Two  Illustrations.  A  Duel  prevented.  A  Filibuster  overruled.  His 
Present  Estimate  of  General  Johnston's  Character. 


CHAPTER   XIIL 
THE  MORMON  REBELLION        .....  .195 

The  Eise  of  Mormonism.  Joseph  Smith.  His  Career.  Brigham  Young.  Nauvoo.  Salt 
Lake  City.  Utah.  Quarrels  with  Federal  Ofiicials.  The  Danites.  "  Eeformation "  of 
1S56.  A  Hideous  Fanaticism.  Buchanan's  Appointments.  Eevolt.  Young's  Proclama 
tion.  Mormon  Oratory.  A  Mountain  Stronghold.  Orders  to  the  Saints.  Mountain 
Meadows  Massacre.  A  Late  Eetribution. 


CONTENTS.  xiii 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

PAGE 

UTAH  CAMPAIGN         ..".......     207 

Federal  Policy  toward  the  Mormons.  Expedition  to  sustain  Civil  Officers.  General  Harney 
appointed  to  command  it.  General  Johnston  succeeds  him.  Army  Orders.  Start.  Celer 
ity.  Journey.  Mormon  Hostilities.  South  Pass.  Concentration.  Movements  of  Troops. 
Winter.  Efforts  to  reach  Winter-Quarters.  In  the  Snow-Drifts.  His  Defense  by  Mr. 
Davis.  General  Johnston's  Letters  detailing  the  Circumstances.  Eescue  of  the  Army. 
Arrival  at  Bridger.  The  Tests  of  Soldiership.  In  Winter- Quarters.  Fort  Bridger.  Major 
Porter's  Diary.  Brigharn's  Salt  Embassy.  Ornithology.  Conflicting  Policies.  Colonel 
Kane  the  Diplomatist.  Senatorial  Criticism  on  General  Johnston.  Trouble  with  Governor 
Gumming.  An  Icy  Spring.  Peace  Commissioners.  Submission  of  the  Mormons.  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  Eeply  to  Peace  Commissioners.  His  Proclamation.  Governor  Cumming's 
Protest.  Army  Matters  and  Orders.  Brevet  Brigadier-General.  Commendation  and 
Criticism.  General  Johnston's  Review  of  Strictures  on  Himself. 

CHAPTER   XV. 

CAMP  FLOYD    ..........     233 

Location.  Duties.  Disbanded  Volunteers.  Winter-Quarters.  Indian  Affairs.  Mormon 
Slanders.  Issue  with  Governor  Gumming.  Conflicts  of  Authority.  Governor's  Procla 
mation.  Ambiguous  Policy  of  the  Government.  General  Johnston's  Administration  of 
L'tah.  Relieved.  Letter  in  regard  to  personnel  of  the  Army.  Family  Affections.  Part 
ing  with  his  Army.  A  Gift  declined.  Attempt  to  bring  him  forward  for  the  Presidency. 
His  Letters  on  the  Subject.  His  Valuation  of  his  Citizenship.  A  Fleet-footed  Indian.  The 
Japanese.  A  Quartermaster-General  appointed.  Reunion  with  his  Family.  I860.  The 
Crisis  of  American  Destiny.  Assignment  to  Command  in  California. 

CHAPTER  XVI. 
THE  SOUTHERN  CONFEDERACY  ........     249 

Origin  of  the  Troubles.  Standpoint  of  the  Southern  People.  The  Slavery  Question.  Views 
of  the  Constitution.  Mr.  Lincoln's  Election.  Confederate  Government  organized.  Its 
Policy.  Opinion  in  the  South.  Virginia.  Lincoln  calls  for  Troops.  Revulsion  and  Seces 
sion  of  Border  States.  War.  Bethel.  Manassas.  Its  Results.  Comparative  Strength  of 
the  Sections.  Kentucky,  Missouri,  Maryland,  West  Virginia. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 
CALIFORNIA     ..........     256 

General  Johnston's  Ideas  of  Government.  The  Right  of  Resistance.  The  Alternative  present 
ed.  Resigns  and  is  relieved.  Imaginary  Plot.  Slander  refuted.  General  Buell's  Letter. 
Governor  Downey's  Statement.  General  Mackall's  Letter.  Incidents  of  Resignation. 
Attempted  Reparation  by  the  Administration.  Hon.  Montgomery  Blair's  Letter.  Los  An 
geles.  Advice  to  Citizens.  Writer's  Recollections.  General  Johnston's  Correspondence. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 
THE  DESERT  JOURNEY  .........     275 

Resignation  accepted.  Impending  War.  A  Dread  Alternative.  Cherished  Gift.  Surveillance 
and  Escape.  On  the  Road.  The  Desert.  The  Comet.  Tucson.  The  Pimos  Indians. 
Anecdote.  Federal  Troops.  Running  the  Gantlet.  An  Indian  Massacre.  The  Rio 
Grande.  Anecdote.  Escape  of  Moore  and  Lord.  Lynde's  Surrender.  Through  Texas. 
Anecdotes.  The  Journey  summed  up.  A  Nation's  Suspense  and  Joy.  Arrival  at  Rich 
mond. 

ITINERARY  091 


xiy  CONTEXTS. 


CHAPTER  XIX.  PAGE 

SITUATION  IN  THE  WEST        .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .291 

Demand  for  General  Johnston  in  the  West.  His  Orders.  Rank.  Command.  Missouri.  Its 
Politics.  Blair  and  Lyon.  Jackson  and  Price.  Camp  Jackson.  War.  Battle  of  Wilson's 
Creek.  Capture  of  Lexington.  Fremont  advances.  Price  retires.  Ilardee.  Kentucky. 
Her  People  and  Politics.  John  C.  Breckinridge.  Other  Leaders.  Simon  B.  Buckner. 
Political  Contest.  Duplicity.  Neutrality.  Secret  Union  Clubs.  Unionists  prevail. 
Camp  Boone.  Military  Preparations.  General  Eobert  Anderson.  General  George  H. 
Thomas.  Domination  of  the  Federals.  Peril  of  the  Southern  Party.  Humiliation  of 
Kentucky.  Seizure  of  Columbus  and  Paducah. 

CHAPTER  XX. 
MILITARY  SITUATION  IN  KENTUCKY    ......  .306 

General  Johnston's  Arrival  in  Nashville.  Personal  Reminiscences,  The  Defense  of  Tennessee. 
General  Johnston's  Resources  and  Theory.  Letter  to  President  Davis.  The  Confederate 
Line.  Zollicoffer  and  Buckner.  Buckner  seizes  Bowling  Green.  Federal  Alarm.  Con 
federate  Advance.  General  Johnston's  Proclamation.  Considerations  determining  the 
Line.  The  Theatre  of  War.  Strength  of  Armies.  Johnston  conceals  his  Weakness.  His 
Memoranda.  Federal  Plans.  Johnston's  Staff. 

CHAPTER  XXI. 
GENERAL  POLK  AND  COLUMBUS,  KENTUCKY    .  .  .  .  .  .318 

Leonidas  Polk.  His  Ancestry,  Birth,  and  Education.  Marriage,  Ordination,  and  Travels. 
Farmer,  Manufacturer,  and  Preacher.  Missionary  Bishop.  Bishop  of  Louisiana.  Pecu 
niary  Losses.  University  of  the  South.  Sugar  and  Cotton  Planting.  Visit  to  Richmond. 
Appointed  Brigadier-General.  The  Bishop-Soldier.  Appearance.  Anecdotes.  Command 
in  West  Tennessee.  Services.  Force.  Occupation  of  Columbus.  River-Defenses.  Folk's 
Subsequent  Career.  Governor  Reynolds's  Recollections  of  General  Johnston  at  Columbus. 
His  Plans.  Anecdotes.  Habits. 

CHAPTER  XXII. 

EFFORTS  TO  GET  ARMS  AND  TROOPS   .  .  .  .  .  .  .328 

Small  Resources  and  Powers.  Begging  fbr  Arms.  Scant  Results  and  Deficient  Armament. 
Recruiting  the  Army.  Concentration.  Requisitions  for  Troops.  Obstacles.  The  Ten 
nessee  Troops.  Condition  of  the  Men.  Embarrassments.  Twelve-Months'  Volunteers. 
Distant  Control.  Difficulties  of  the  Government.  Call  for  Militia.  General  Johnston's 
Urgency.  Letters  to  the  Southern  Executives.  Appeals  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  Mr. 
Benjamin's  Letters. 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 
BOWLING  GREEN         .........     349 

Confederate  Army  in  Kentucky. — Hardee's  Force,  brought  from  Arkansas.  Situation  in 
October.  Apathy  in  Kentucky.  Organization  of  the  Army.  Sketch  of  General  William 
J.  Hardee.  Hindman,  Cleburne,  Marmaduke,  and  Brown.  Zollicoffer's  Operations.  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  Views  of  that  Field.  Repulse  at  Wild  Cat.  General  Federal  Advance. 
Minor  Operations.  Eastern  Kentucky.  Anecdotes.  General  Johnston's  Difficulties. 
The  Western  District.  Its  Defense.  Delusive  Demonstrations.  Cleburne's  Reconnais 
sance.  Sherman  paralyzed.  Stampede  from  Wild  Cat.  East  Tennessee.  Insurrection. 
Bridge-Burning.  Anecdote.  General  Carroll  in  East  Tennessee. 

APPENDICES  ..........     365 

Federal  Strength. 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  BELMONT       .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .366 

Grant's  Claims.     Folk's  Dispatch.     Grant's  Report.     Grant's  Object.  Folk's  Preparation. 

Pillow's  Account  of  the  Opening  of  the  Battle.     Grant's  March.  The  Federal  Force. 


CONTENTS.  xv 

PAGE 

First  Engagement.  Confederate  Camps  captured.  Federal  Eetreat  and  Rout.  Folk's 
Eeenforcenient.  Grant's  Escape.  Confederate  Strength.  The  Losses.  Eesults.  Con 
gratulations. 

CHAPTER   XXV. 
THE  FALL  CAMPAIGN  .  .  .  .  .  .  .'...•  .     378 

Federal  Generals.  Buell.  Kentucky  Eefugees.  John  C.  Breckinridge.  The  Kentucky  Pro 
visional  Government.  Minor  Operations.  The  Cavalry.  Morgan  and  Duke.  Fight  at 
Woodsonville.  N.  B.  Forrest.  Texas  Eangers.  Fight  at  Sacramento.  Letters  to  the 
Secretary  of  War.  Anecdotes. 

CHAPTER  XXVI. 
BATTLE  OF  FISHING  CREEK    ........     390 

Situation  in  January.  "Western  Kentucky.  Eastern  Kentucky.  Humphrey  Marshall.  His 
Strength.  James  A.  Garfield.  His  Attack  at  Prestonburg.  Subsequent  Operations. 
Sketch  of  Felix  K.  Zollicoffer.  His  Character.  His  Movements  in  the  Autumn.  Mill 
Springs.  General  Johnston's  Warnings  disregarded.  Sketch  of  George  B.  Crittenden. 
A.  Schoepf.  Skirmishing.  Thomas's  Advance.  His  Force.  Mill  Spring.  Fishing  Creek. 
Confederate  Strength.  Crittenden's  Night-March.  Attack.  Walthall  and  Battle.  Curi 
ous  Incident.  Strenuous  Combat.  Zollicoffer's  Death.  The  Eetreat.  The  Federals  follow. 
Crittenden  gets  across  the  Eiver.  Deplorable  Plight  of  the  Confederates.  Their  Retreat. 
The  Losses.  Zollicoffer's  Body.  Slanders  on  Crittenden.  Disparity  in  Arms.  General 
Johnston's  Considerate  Treatment  of  Crittenden.  Thomas's  Movements. 

CHAPTER   XXVII. 
FORT  HENRY  .  .........     407 

Eiver-Defenses.  Location  of  Forts.  Strategic  Importance.  Topography.  Folk's  Eeport. 
General  Johnston's  Orders  and  Preparations.  Warning  to  Polk.  Major  Gilmer,  Chief- 
Engineer.  His  Operations.  Lloyd  Tilghman  in  Command.  Fortifications  projected  on 
the  Cumberland.  Difficulty  of  getting  Labor.  Gunboats.  Abortive  Attemps  at  Defense. 
Supreme  Efforts  of  the  North.  Their  Gunboats.  General  Johnston's  Warnings  and  Pre 
cautions.  Origin  of  Federal  Plan  of  Invasion.  Scott's  Share.  Sherman's  Picturesque 
Narrative.  Halleck  and  Buell's  Views.  Federal  Demonstrations.  Grant,  Smith,  and 
Foote.  Federal  Advance.  Eiver-Defenses.  Letter  of  Hon.  James  E.  Saunders.  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  Appeal  for  Eeenforcements.  Directions  for  Defense.  Floyd  detached. 
General  Johnston's  Strength.  Condition  of  Fort  Henry.  Gilmer's  Eeport.  Firing  on  the 
Fort.  Tilghman's  Strength.  Tilghman's  Telegrams.  Eeenforcements  sent.  Tilghman's 
Movements.  The  Attack  and  Bombardment.  Defense.  Surrender.  Loss.  Phelps  up 
the  Tennessee. 

CHAPTER  XXVIII. 
FORT  DONELSON  .........     433 

Preparations  for  Defense.  Concentration.  Federal  Strength.  Demoralization.  Military  Crit 
icism.  Encouragement.  Skirmish.  Strength  of  Position.  Plan  to  abandon  it.  General 
Johnston's  Orders.  Floyd's  Vacillation.  Explanation.  Floyd's  Plan.  General  Johnston's 
Plan.  Defenses  and  Topography.  Confederate  Troops.  Federal  Troops.  Design  of  Ad 
vance.  Delay.  Advance.  BATTLE  OF  THE  TRENCHES.  Apathy  of  Defenders.  Gunboat 
Disabled.  Death  of  Dixon.  BATTLE  OP  THE  GUNBOATS.  Eepulse.  Important  Order. 
Authority  and  Eesponsibility.  A  Quiet  Day.  Abortive  Sortie.  Divided  Counsels.  Fed 
eral  Eeenforcements.  Exaggerated  Eeports.  Discouragement.  Sortie  agreed  on.  BAT 
TLE  OF  DOVER.  The  Attack.  Federal  Strength.  Well-matched  Antagonists.  Fight  on 
the  Left.  Brown's  Assault.  Hanson's  Assault.  Wynn's  Eoad  cleared.  Cessation  of 
Conflict.  The  Critical  Moment.  Eecall  of  Troops.  Grant's  Advance.  Grant  and  Smith. 
Assault  by  Federal  Left.  Capture  of  Outwork.  Close  of  Battle.  Losses.  Confederate 
Victory  telegraphed.  Sortie  planned.  Forrest's  Eeconnaissance.  Council  of  War.  Dis 
cussion  of  Surrender.  Escape  of  Floyd  and  Pillow.  The  Breaking-up.  Prisoners.  Sur 
render.  Consequences.  Terms  of  Surrender.  Confederate  Strength  and  Losses.  Federal 
Strength  and  Losses.  Value  of  the  Fort.  Separation  of  Army.  News  of  Surrender.  Con 
gressional  Inquiry.  General  Johnston's  Inquiry.  Governor  Johnson's  Opinion. 

APPENDICES  .  .477 


xvi  CONTEXTS. 

CHAPTER  XXIX.  PAGE 

THE  KETREAT  FROM  BOWLING  GREEN  ......     484 

General  Johnston's  Strategy  discussed.  Mr.  Swinton's  Extraordinary  Statement.  Memoran 
dum  of  Conference  held  by  Generals  Johnston,  Beauregard,  and  Hardee.  Plan  of  Cam 
paign.  Military  Prophecy.  Colonel  Schaller's  Account.  Resolve  to  retreat.  Munford's 
Account.  John  C.  Brown.  Preparations  for  Retreat.  Protests  of  the  Kentuckians.  Colo 
nel  Woolley's  Account  of  General  Johnston's  Work  at  Bowling  Green.  Evacuation  of 
Bowling  Green.  The  March.  Kentucky  Brigade.  Precautions.  Donelson  surrendered. 
At  Nashville.  Munford's  Account.  Panic  and  Mob.  Floyd.  Ketreat.  Forrest.  Govern 
or  Harris.  Letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War. 

CHAPTER   XXX. 

FROM   MURFREESBORO   TO    CORINTH         .......       500 

Change  in  Plans.  Corinth  determined  on  as  a  Centre.  Letter  from  Beauregard.  Eeenforce- 
ments  and  Arms.  Power  of  Local  Demands.  General  Johnston's  Eeview  of  the  Situa 
tion.  Plan  of  Concentration.  Testimony  of  Preston,  Whitthorne,  Harris,  and  Tate. 
Choice  of  Koute.  A  Difficult  Eetreat.  Eeorganization  at  Murfreesboro.  The  Retreat. 
Morgan's  First  Raids.  The  March.  Public  Terror  and  Fury.  Exasperation  against  Gen 
eral  Johnston.  Demands  for  his  Removal.  The  Press.  Prominent  Officials.  President 
Davis's  Firmness.  Attacks  in  Congress.  General  Johnston's  Serenity.  Steadfast  Friends. 
Moral  Power  and  Confidence  of  Final  Success.  Floyd  and  Pillow  again.  Correspondence 
between  President  Davis  and  General  Johnston.  Success  the  Test  of  Merit.  Colonel 
Jack's  Account  of  President  Davis  and  General  Lee.  Concentration  completed. 

CHAPTER   XXXI. 
PITTSBURG  LANDING   .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .523 

The  War  in  Missouri.  Price  and  McCulloch.  Dissensions.  Tan  Dorn  put  in  Command. 
Curtis's  Army.  Battle  of  Elkhorn,  or  Pea  Ridge.  Beauregard  in  West  Tennessee. 
Evacuation  of  Columbus.  Island  No.  10.  Pope's  Expedition.  Grant's  Expedition  up 
the  Tennessee.  Plan  and  Movements.  Pittsburg  Landing.  The  Army.  Shiloh.  Its 
Strength.  Maps.  Aggressive  Purpose.  Overweening  Confidence.  Topography  of  the 
Country  and  of  the  Battle-field.  A  Natural  Stronghold.  What  Sherman  has  said  of  it. 
False  Security.  Campaign  concerted  between  Buell  and  Halleck.  Buell's  Movements. 
The  Federal  Strength.  Distances. 

APPENDIX     ......  ...     537 

CHAPTER  XXXII. 

CONCENTRATION  AT  CORINTH  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .538 

Strategic  Importance.      The  Concentration.     The  Initiative.     Johnston's  Objective  Point. 
Beauregard's  Plan  and  Letter.     Beauregard's  Report  of  Shiloh.    Yan  Dorn.     General 
Johnston's  Personal  Staff.    Braxton  Bragg.    Johnston's  Offer  to  Beauregard.    Governor 
Johnson's  Protest.    The  Resolve  to  attack.    General  R.  E.  Lee's  Letter.    Plan  of  Battle. 
Comments.    Johnston's  Telegram. 
APPENDIX         ...  .  .  .  .  .  .  .     555 

Orders. 

CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

BATTLE  OF  SHILOH — BEFORE  THE  BATTLE       .  .  .  .  .  .    489 

General  Johnston's  Prediction.  Anticipation  of  Battle.  Strength  of  Federal  Position.  Beau- 
regard's  Report.  Bragg's  Sketch  of  Preliminaries.  The  Resolve  to  attack.  Its  Origin. 
General  Lee's  Letter.  Preparations.  Attempt  to  employ  Negroes.  General  Johnston's 
Telegram.  Orders  of  March.  Enthusiasm  of  Troops.  The  Army  marches.  Field-Map. 
Distribution  of  Arms.  Bad  Roads.  Skirmish  on  April  4th.  Explanation  of  Orders.  Provi 
dential  Storm.  Under  Arms.  Reckless  Fusillade.  Careless  Pickets.  First  Lino  of  Battle. 
Personal  Movements  of  General  Johnston.  Morning  of  the  5th.  "  This  is  not  War ! " 
Delay.  Its  Causes.  Rawness  of  the  Army.  A  Majestic  Presence.  Encouraging  the 
Troops.  Address  to  Army.  The  Council  of  War.  Beauregard  for  Retreat.  Johnston's 


CONTENTS.  xvjj 

PAGE 

Decision,  and  Eeasons.  Confederate  Array.  Sherman's  Theory.  Reconnaissance.  False 
Security.  Was  it  a  Surprise  ?  Federal  Array.  The  Opponents. 

CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. — SUNDAY  : 

I.  MORNING  ..........     582 

A  Glorious  Dawn.    Exultation  of  the  Commander.    The  Issue  formulated.    Map.    "Winged 

Words.  Chieftain  and  Clansmen.  Valor  and  Enthusiasm.  The  First  Gun.  The  Start. 
Beauregard's  Summary.  Difficulties  of  Description.  Skirmishing.  The  First  Collision. 
The  Onset.  Hildebrand  routed.  Prentiss  driven  back.  The  Surprise.  Eeenforcements. 
Sherman's  Stronghold.  Cleburne's  Assault.  A  Eepulse.  General  Johnston  on  the  Eight. 
Eout  of  Federal  Front.  Sherman  broken.  Sherman  routed.  Confederate  Eight.  Fed 
eral  Left  turned.  Plan  of  Battle  discussed. 

II.  MID-DAY  .........     599 

New  Line  of  Battle.    Second  Engagement.    Polk  on  the  Centre.    Confederate  Alignment.   Ter 
rible  Fighting.    Grant's  Personal  Movements.    Grant  and  Buell.     Federal  Left  falls  back. 

The  Combat.  "  The  Hornet's  Nest."  Wallace  and  Prentiss.  Gibson's  Assaults.  Ander 
son's,  Folk's,  and  Cheatham's  Assaults.  Hardee  and  Sherman.  The  Kentuckians.  Cle 
burne's  Brigade.  Confusion  there.  Confederate  Centre  and  Eight.  .Hurlbut's  Position. 
The  Federal  Key.  Statham's  Attack.  Stubborn  Eesistance.  A  Memorable  Charge. 
Governor  Harris's  Account.  Breckinridge's  Eally.  General  Johnston  leads  the  Charge. 
Victory  and  Death.  Harris's  Narrative.  Incidents  of  Death.  Beauregard  in  Command. 

III.  AFTERNOON        .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .616 

Dislocation  of  Commands.    Eegularity  in  Development  of  Plan.    Duke'a  Comments.    Map 

(Third  Position).  Development  of  Plan.  Eegularity  and  Impetuosity.  Impulse  of  Lead 
ership.  Slaughter.  Momentum  of  Success.  The  Crisis.  Lull  along  the  Line.  Third 
Engagement.  Euggles  masses  Artillery.  Polk  and  Bragg  against  Wallace  and  Prentiss. 
Crushing  Assault— Wallace  killed,  Prentiss  captured.  Bragg's  and  Hardee's  Summaries. 
The  Field  swept.  The  Eout.  The  Last  Assault.  Buell  at  Pittsburg  Landing.  A  Eouted 
Army. 

IV.  A  VICTORY  LOST  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .627 

Beauregard's  Theory  of  Shiloh.     His  Eeport.    Fatal  Order  to  retire.    Jordan's  Statements. 

Errors  corrected.  The  Evidence — Governor  Harris.  Hardee  and  Cleburne.  Polk's  Ee 
port.  Bragg's  Eeport.  Bragg's  Sketch.  Jordan's  Statement.  Withers's  and  Euggles's 
Eeports.  Gibson's  and  Gilmer's  Letters.  Duke's  "Life  of  Morgan."  Jordan's  " Life  of 
Forrest.''  Chalmers's  Account.  Consequences  of  the  Mistake.  A  Fruitless  Field. 

CHAPTER  XXXV. 

I.  THE  NIGHT  OP  THE  6ra  ........     639 

The  Withdrawal.    Estimated  Losses.    Polk's  Position.    Bombardment  and  Tempest.    Beau- 
regard's  Headquarters.     Eeenforcements.    The  Eespite  improved.    Federal  Orders  for 
Attack.    Buell's  Statements.    The  Eemnant  of  Grant's  Army. 

II.  THE  BATTLE  OF  MONDAY  .  .  .  .  .  ,  .643 
Eenewal  of  Battle.    Federal  Alignment.    Confederate  Eight.     The  Attack  on  it.     The  Battle. 

Individual  Heroism.  Contradictory  Orders.  Buell's  Attack.  Battle  at  the  Centre.  At 
tack  by  Grant's  Army.  Polk's  Defense  at  Shiloh  Church.  Bragg  resists  Lew  .Wallace. 
The  Kentucky  Brigade.  Beauregard  retreats.  The  Eear-Guard.  Abortive  Pursuit. 
Forrest  repulses  Sherman.  The  Artillery.  Eev.  Eobert  Collyer's  Account.  Losses.  The 
Fiercest  Fight  of  the  War.  The  Consequences.  Grant,  Sherman,  and  Buell.  Amenities 
in  War.  End  of  the  Campaign. 

APPENDICES  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .661 

General  Beauregard's  Official  Eeport.  Killed,  Wounded,  and  Missing.  Field  Return  of  the 
Confederate  Forces  that  marched  from  Corinth  to  the  Tennessee  Elver.  Field  Eeturn  of 
the  Army  of  tha  Mississippi  after  the  Battle  of  Shiloh.  Field  Eeturn  of  the  Army  of  the 
Mississippi  before  and  after  the  Battle  of  Shiloh.  Organization  and  Casualties  of  the  Army 

2 


CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

of  the  Mississippi,  April  6  and  7, 1862.    Organization,  Strength,  and  Casualties,  of  Grant's 
Army  at  the  Battle  of  Shiloh.    United  States  Troops  engaged  at  Shiloh. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 
GENERAL  JOHNSTON  IN  THE  GRAVE    .  .  .  .  .  .  .688 

From  Shiloh  to  New  Orleans.  Sepulture  and  Public  Sorrow.  General  Beauregard's  Order. 
President  Davis's  Message.  Confederate  Congress.  Legislature  of  Texas.  Honors  at 
New  Orleans  and  Galveston.  Official  Brutality.  Honors  at  Houston,  Austin,  and  New 
Orleans. 

CHAPTER   XXXVII. 

THE  END         .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .715 

Not  reckless.  Estimates  of  Character  by  Colonel  Munford,  by  General  Preston,  by  Major  Hay- 
don,  Colonel  Jack.  Keminiscences  of  Eev.  E.  D.  Chapman,  of  Eev.  E.  Fontaine,  of  Dr.  D. 
W.  Yandell.  Description  in  Harper's  Weekly.  Estimate  by  Thomas  F.  McKinney,  by  the 
New  York  Times,  by  General  William  J.  Worth.  Eeminiscences  of  Eev.  Dr.  Galleher,  of 
Colonel  J.  W.  Avery.  Estimate  by  General  W.  C.  Whitthorne.  Anecdote  by  Lieutenant 
J.  M.  Fab-banks.  Scott  and  Davis  almost  agree.  Estimate  by  Judge  Ballinger,  by  Colonel 
W.  J.  Green,  by  Governor  I.  G.  Harris,  by  President  Jefferson  Davis,  by  Major  Alfriend,  by 
Professor  A.  T.  Bledsoe,  by  General  Eichard  Taylor.  Epitaph  by  John  B.  S.  Dimitry.  A 
Filial  Estimate.  The  End. 


INDEX  737 


LIFE 


GENEEAL  ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON. 


CHAPTER  I. 

FAMILY    AND    BOYHOOD. 

ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON  was  born  on  the  2d  of  February,  1803, 
in  the  village  of  Washington,  Mason  County,  Kentucky.  He  was  the 
youngest  son  of  Dr.  John  Johnston,  a  physician,  and  one  of  the  early 
settlers  of  that  town.  \  Dr.  Johnston's  father,  Archibald  Johnston,  was 
a  native  of  Salisbury,  Connecticut,  and  descended  from  a  Scotch  family 
of  some  property  and  local  influence,  settled  in  Salisbury.  John  John 
ston,  having  received  a  liberal  education  at  New  Haven,  and  at  the 
medical  school  at  Litchfield,  began  the  practice  of  his  profession  in  his 
native  town.  In  1783,  at  the  age  of  twenty-one,  he  married  Mary  Stod- 
dard,  by  whom  he  had  three  sons,  Josiah  Stoddard,  Darius,  and  Orra- 
mel.  In  1788  he  removed  to  Kentucky,  and  settled  at  Washington, 
where  he  remained  until  his  death  in  1831. 

Mason  County,  which  then  included  all  the  northern  and  eastern 
portion  of  Kentucky,  in  1790  contained  only  2,729  inhabitants,  while 
the  whole  population  of  the  Territory  of  Kentucky  was  less  than  74,000. 
The  country  still  suffered  from  Indian  incursions  across  the  Ohio,  and 
was  indeed  the  very  frontier  of  civilization.  But,  although  an  outpost, 
this  beautiful  and  fertile  neighborhood  already  enjoyed  the  benefits  of 
social  order,  and  was  fast  filling  up  with  substantial  and  educated  fami 
lies,  principally  from  Virginia  and  Maryland.  Dr.  Johnston's  skill  and 
worth  soon  secured  him  not  only  a  large  practice,  but  the  warm  friend 
ship  of  the  best  people, with  whom  he  continued  in  the  kindest  relations 
during  his  whole  life. 

Having  lost  his  first  wife  in  1793,  in  the  following  year  he  married 
Abigail  Harris,  the  daughter  of  Edward  Harris,  an  old  settler,  who,  with 


2  FAMILY  AND  BOYHOOD. 

his  wife,  had  emigrated  from  Newburyport,  Massachusetts,  and  whom 
a  venerable  citizen  describes  as  "  the  old  John  Knox  Presbyterian  of 
the  place  ;  "  adding,  "  anecdotes  are  still  told  of  the  spirit  and  courage 
with  which  he  defended  his  Church."  One  of  General  Johnston's  ear 
liest  recollections  was  of  his  grandfather  giving  him  money  to  buy  a 
catechism.  Edward  Harris  had  been  a  Revolutionary  soldier,  and  was 
appointed  military  storekeeper  and  postmaster  at  Washington,  Ken 
tucky,  by  President  Washington.  A  letter  to  the  Postmaster-General  is 
still  extant  in  which  he  resigns  the  latter  office,  because  some  new  postal 
arrangement  required  him  to  open  the  mail  on  Sunday,  which  he  could 
not  conscientiously  do.  The  letter  is  a  candid  expression  of  very  de 
cided  religious  convictions,  and  is  evidently  the  production  of  an  edn- 
cated  and  thoughtful  man.  Edward  Harris  died  in  1825,  aged  eighty- 
four  years.  He,  at  one  time,  owned  a  large  body  of  land  in  Ohio,  but 
lost  it  by  the  intrusion  of  squatters.  Dr.  Johnston's  second  wife  lived 
about  twelve  years  after  her  marriage,  and  died,  leaving  him  six  chil 
dren — John  Harris,  Lucius,  Anna  Maria,  Clarissa,  Albert  Sidney,  and 
Eliza.  Anna  Maria  married  Mr.  James  Byers,  Clarissa  remained  un 
married,  and  Eliza  married  John  A.  McClung,  distinguished  first  as  a 
lawyer  and  afterward  as  a  Presbyterian  minister.  Dr.  Johnston  subse 
quently  married  Mrs.  Byers,  a  widow  with  a  large  family  of  children, 
but  there  was  no  issue  from  this  marriage.  He  died  in  1831.  Wonder 
was  often  expressed  that  he  did  not  remove  to  a  city,  where  his  ac 
knowledged  skill  would  have  secured  adequate  reward  ;  but  it  may  be 
presumed  that  he  fairly  estimated  his  advantages,  and  was  satisfied  to 
be  able  to  maintain  and  properly  educate  so  large  a  family.  This  he 
did,  giving  all  his  children  the  best  education  that  the  times  afforded. 
Though  diligent  and  conscientious  in  his  profession,  he  was  not  anxious 
to  accumulate  money,  and  late  in  life  became  poor  from  the  payment 
of  security  debts.  To  discharge  these  he  voluntarily  gave  up  all  his 
property;  his  home  was  sold  at  public  sale,  but  it  was  bought  and 
restored  to  him  by  his  eldest  son,  who  had  then  become  eminent  and 
prosperous.  Mr.  J.  S.  Chambers,  from  whom  these  facts  were  obtained, 
adds: 

I  always  thought  General  Johnston  inherited  his  frank,  manly  nature  from 
his  father.  His  mother  was  a  gentle,  quiet  woman;  while  the  old  doctor  was 
bold  and  blunt  to  a  remarkable  degree.  He  had  no  concealments,  and  was 
physically  energetic,  and  mentally  bold  and  independent.  He  had  a  large  prac 
tice,  and  was  often  called  into  consultation  in  difficult,  or  rather  in  desperate, 
cases. 

All  the  old  citizens  of  Washington  bear  witness  to  his  industry, 
skill,  talents,  and  probity,  and  to  his  kind  and  genial  temper.  General 
Johnston's  mother  is  spoken  of  by  others  as  a  woman  of  handsome  per- 


BOYHOOD.  3 

son,  fine  intellect,  and  sterling  worth  ;  but,  whatever  traits  her  children 
inherited  from  her,  she  died  too  young  to  have  done  much  toward 
moulding  their  character. 

The  boyhood  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  was  a  fit  prelude  to  his 
after-life.  Though  his  father's  means  were  narrow,  yet  the  education 
which  he  had,  at  whatever  personal  inconvenience,  bestowed  upon  all 
his  children,  could  not  fail  to  exercise  a  liberalizing  influence  on  his 
household.  The  habits  of  all  classes  at  that  time  were  plain  and  unos 
tentatious  ;  but  this  family  was  necessarily  trained  to  a  Spartan  sim 
plicity  that  was  ever  after  the  rule  and  habit  of  life  most  congenial  to 
the  subject  of  this  memoir.  Captain  Wilson  Duke,  United  States 
Navy,  one  of  the  choice  friends  of  his  youth,  used  laughingly  to  tell 
how  he  tore  off  his  ruffled  shirt-collar  and  hid  his  shoes  on  the  road  to 
school,  from  fear  of  Albert  Johnston's  ridicule.  His  intimate  friends 
in  those  early  days  nearly  all  obtained  more  than  ordinary  positions  in 
after-life.  Among  them  were  :  Captain  Wilson  Duke,  the  father  of  the 
gallant  General  Basil  W.  Duke ;  Captain  William  Smith,  also  of  the 
United  States  Navy ;  Captain  William  Bickley,  of  the  United  States 
Army  ;  Hon.  John  D.  Taylor,  well  known  in  the  politics  and  jurispru 
dence  of  Kentucky;  Mr.  Charles  Marshall  (known  as  Black  Dan),  Mr. 
John  Green,  and  John  A.  McClung. 

Albert  Sidney  Johnston  was  endowed  by  nature  with  an  ardent  and 
enthusiastic  temperament ;  but  to  this  were  joined  a  solidity  of  judgment 
and  a  power  of  self-control,  that  early  held  it  in  check,  and  eventually 
so  regulated  it  that  it  was  only  displayed  in  resolutions  and  actions 
requiring  uncommon  loftiness  of  soul.  The  feature  of  his  character 
most  remarked  by  his  contemporaries  was,  in  his  early  boyhood,  an 
energy  that  made  him  an  acknowledged  leader  among  his  comrades  ; 
later,  it  was  a  self-contained  dignity  and  reserved  power  that  subjected 
affections,  will,  and  passions,  to  the  performance  of  duty. 

His  eldest  sister  saj-s  of  him  that,  when  he  was  a  boy,  he  was  fear 
less  and  impetuous  ;  but  kind,  affectionate,  and  just ;  amenable  to 
reason,  and  deferential  to  age. 

Mr.  J.  G.  Hickman,  of  Maysville,  writing  in  1869,  "after  consult 
ing  all  the  old  folk,"  says : 

My  aunt  and  Mr.  Lashbrooke  remember  General  Johnston  from  his  infancy; 
and  they  say,  as  indeed  all  say,  that  there  was  great  promise  about  him  from 
his  childhood.  He  was  a  handsome,  proud,  manly,  earnest,  and  self-reliant 
boy ;  and  his  success  and  distinction  in  after-life  were  only  what  were  expected 
of  him  by  those  who  knew  him  in  his  boyhood.  Mr.  Lashbrooke  says  he  went 
to  the  same  school  with  him,  in  1811,  to  Mann  Butler,  a  teacher  of  some  dis 
tinction  in  his  day.  He  was  distinguished,  too,  for  his  courage  in  boyhood  and 
early  manhood.  "While  he  was  a  born  gentleman,  as  they  all  say,  and  as  far 
from  being  a  bully  as  any  boy  in  the  world,  yet  he  was  one  whom  the  bullies 


4  FAMILY  AND   BOYHOOD. 

left  undisturbed.  Colonel  C.  A.  Marshall  told  me  of  one  fellow  about  Washing 
ton  who  was  proud  of  playing  the  bully,  but  who,  to  the  amusement  of  the 
town,  always  skipped  Albert  Johnston  and  Black  Dan  Marshall. 

General  Johnston  sometimes  told  an  anecdote  of  his  early  boyhood, 
from  which  he  was  wont  to  draw  many  a  valuable  moral.  Playing 
marbles  "for  keeps" — a  species  of  boyish  gaming — was  a  favorite 
sport  of  his  schoolboy  days  ;  and  he  was  so  skillful  and  successful  a 
marble-player  that  at  one  time  he  had  won  a  whole  jar  full  of  white 
alleys,  taws,  potters,  etc.  It  was  then  that  the  design  entered  his 
breast  of  winning  all  the  marbles  in  the  town,  in  the  State,  and  event 
ually  in  the  world.  Filled  with  enthusiasm  at  the  vastness  of  his 
project,  he  cast  about  for  the  means ;  and  finally  concluded,  as  the  first 
step,  to  secure  his  acquisitions  by  burying  them.  He  buried  his  jar 
very  secretly,  reserving  only  marbles  enough  "  to  begin  life  on."  Pur 
pose  lent  steadiness  to  his  aim,  so  that  again  he  beat  all  his  rivals  "  in 
the  ring,"  and  added  daily  to  his  store.  Only  one  competitor  stood 
against  him,  whose  resources  seemed  to  consist  not  so  much  in  skill 
as  in  an  exhaustless  supply  of  marbles,  that  were  sacrificed  with  a 
recklessness  arguing  unlimited  pocket-money.  At  last  he,  too,  suc 
cumbed,  and  the  victor  went  with  a  jar  larger  than  the  first,  to  add  it 
to  his  spoils.  To  his  dismay,  however,  he  found  his  hoard  plundered 
and  his  treasure  gone.  The  inferior,  but  desperate,  marble-player  had 
furtively  watched  him,  robbed  him,  and  then  staked  and  lost  his  ill- 
gotten  gains.  The  second  jar  contained  the  same  marbles  as  the  first, 
and  larceny  had  contended  for  empire  with  ambition.  General  Johnston 
said  that  he  felt  the  lesson  as  a  distinct  rebuke  to  his  avarice  and 
rapacity ;  the  plans  he  had  built  upon  success  vanished  ;  and  he  learned 
that  world-wide  renown  as  a  marble-player  was  merely  "  vanity  and 
vexation  of  spirit." 

Mr.  J.  S.  Chambers,  writing  in  January,  1873,  says : 

He  was  six  or  seven  years  my  senior,  yet  I  remember  him  with  great  'dis 
tinctness.  He  was  my  beau-ideal  of  a  manly,  handsome  boy.  He  went  to 
school  for  several  years  to  James  Grant,  about  one  mile  and  a  half  west  of 
Washington.  He  was  active  and  energetic  in  the  athletic  games  of  the  period, 
and  fond  of  hunting  on  Saturdays,  and  always  stood  well  in  his  classes,  having 
a  special  talent  for  mathematics.  He  was  grave  and  thoughtful  in  his  deport 
ment,  but,  when  drawn  out,  talked  well,  and  was  considered  by  his  associates 
and  teachers  as  a  boy  of  fine  capacity. 

When  he  was  nearly  fifteen  years  of  age  his  father  yielded  to  his 
wishes,  and  sent  him  to  a  school  in  Western  Virginia  ;  but  he  was 
disappointed  in  its  character,  and  remained  only  one  session.  He  was 
afterward,  for  a  short  time,  in  the  drug-store  of  Mr.  Thomas  Duke  ; 
but,  whether  with  the  intention  of  adopting  trade  or  medicine  as  a  line 
of  life,  we  are  not  informed.  Throughout  life  he  showed  an  uncommon 


EDUCATION.  5 

knowledge  of  physiology,  and  acquaintance  with  medical  practice  ;  due 
in  part,  perhaps,  to  this  apprenticeship,  but  probably  still  more  to  the 
informal  instruction  of  his  father. 

Colonel  C.  Marshall,  writing  with  reference  to  this  period  of  his  life, 
says  : 

His  dignified  bearing,  his  reserved  and  quiet  manners,  even  at  that  time,  I 
can  recall.  The  influence  he  always  possessed  with  the  young  men  of  his  own 
age,  and  his  habitual  interference  for  the  protection  of  the  smaller  and  weaker 
boys,  are  well  remembered. 

He  was  then  sent  to  Transylvania,  where  he  remained  a  session, 
the  room-mate  of  his  townsman,  John  D.  Taylor,  who  was  of  his  own 
age,  and  who  wrote  concerning  him : 

Nature  had  endowed  him  with  a  genius  and  fondness  for  mathematics, 
which  enabled  him  to  hold  a  high  position  in  his  class  at  Transylvania. 

He  studied  hard,  but  at  the  end  of  the  term  became  restless,  from 
a  desire  to  enter  the  navy.  The  gallant  achievements  of  the  American 
Navy  in  the  war  against  Great  Britain,  and  the  subsequent  daring 
exploits  of  Decatur  at  Algiers,  had  doubtless  inspired  him  with  the 
desire  to  emulate  these  high  examples.  His  friends  Duke  and  Smith, 
under  the  same  impulse,  sought  and  obtained  warrants  as  midshipmen. 
But  this  project  received  no  favor  at  home.  His  father  and  family 
opposed  it ;  and,  in  order  to  divert  his  mind  from  brooding  over  a  plan 
on  which  he  had  set  his  heart,  it  was  proposed  that  he  should  accom 
pany  his  sister,  Mrs.  Byers,  and  her  husband,  who  were  going  to  Loui 
siana.  In  the  autumn  of  1819  he  went  with  them  to  the  parish  of 
Rapides,  whither  all  his  brothers  had  preceded  him,  and  made  a  visit 
to  his  eldest  brother,  Josiah  Stoddard  Johnston.  This  visit  was 
attended  with  important  consequences  to  the  adventurous  youth, 
changing  the  theatre  of  his  ambition  from  sea  to  land.  Indeed,  as 
the  youngest  son,  the  Benjamin  of  the  household,  sent  to  this  new 
land  of  plenty  by  the  old  man,  his  father,  he  was  received  with  a 
double  portion  of  kindness  by  the  elder  brother,  who,  now  in  middle 
life,  had  already  achieved  a  conspicuous  position. 

It  will  not  be  inappropriate  here  to  give  a  brief  account  of  the 
brothers  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  since  a  strong  family  likeness  to 
"  the  old  man,  their  father,"  and  to  each  other,  serves  in  some  measure 
to  throw  light  upon  his  character.  It  has  been  already  mentioned  that 
the  immigration  to  Mason  County  had  brought  with  it  a  degree  of 
wealth,  culture,  and  social  order,  unusual  in  new  communities,  to  which 
was  joined  the  enterprise  that  had  peopled  the  wilderness.  The  intel 
lectual  vigor  of  the  settlers  is  evinced  in  the  "  Kentucky  Law  Reports  " 
of  an  early  period,  which  show  legal  ability  and  acumen  rare  in  any 


Q  FAMILY  AND  BOYHOOD. 

country.  Nowhere  were  the  characteristic  traits  of  Kentucky  people 
more  fully  displayed  than  in  Mason  County,  from  whose  pioneer  fami 
lies  proceeded  many  noted  men  ;  but  from  under  no  roof-tree  went 
forth  a  hardier  brood  than  from  that  which  sheltered  the  boyhood  of 
Albert  Sidney  Johnston.  First  among  his  brothers  in  age  and  emi 
nence  was  Josiah  Stodcfard  Johnston.  The  following  facts,  obtained 
from  a  sketch  of  him  by  Hon.  Henry  D.  Gilpin,  of  Philadelphia,  and 
from  other  sources,  will  give  some  idea  of  his  career. 

Born  in  Salisbury,  Connecticut,  November  24,  1784,  he  was  taken 
to  Kentucky  by  his  father  at  an  early  age.  When  twelve  years  old  his 
father  carried  him  to  New  Haven,  Connecticut,  to  school,  where  he 
remained  some  years  ;  but  he  completed  his  academic  education  at 
Transylvania  University,  Lexington,  Kentucky,  and  then  studied  law 
with  the  famous  George  Nicholas.X  His  acquirements  were  solid,  and 
his  reading  choice  and  various.  In  1805  he  emigrated  to  the  Territory 
of  Louisiana,  lately  acquired  from  the  French,  and  then  sparsely  set 
tled  by  a  rude  population.  Settling  at  Alexandria,  at  that  time  a 
frontier  village,  he  devoted  himself  to  the  practice  of  law,  and  rapidly 
gained  wealth  and  distinction.  His  firm  yet  gentle  temper  and  strong 
sense  of  justice  kept  him  free  from  the  personal  collisions  that  marked 
the  period  and  region,  and,  indeed,  enabled  him  to  maintain  the  hon 
orable  character  of  an  umpire  in  an  unorganized  society,  so  that  he 
was  called  "the  Peacemaker,"  while  his  education  and  talents  placed 
him  in  the  front  rank  of  the  leaders  of  public  opinion.  He  was  elected 
to  the  first  Territorial  Legislature,  and  continued  a  member  of  that 
body  until  Louisiana  became  a  State  in  1812.  He  held  the  position  of 
district  judge  from  1812  to  1821.  Toward  the  close  of  the  war,  when 
Louisiana  was  invaded  by  the  British,  he  was  elected  to  the  command 
of  a  regiment  of  volunteers,  which  he  had  aided  in  raising,  and  to 
equip  which  lie  had  from  his  own  means  bought  a  large  quantity  of 
arms  and  ammunition  ;  but,  though  they  joined  General  Jackson,  it 
was  too  late  to  share  in  the  decisive  victory  of  January  8,  1815.  In 
1814  he  married  Miss  Eliza  Sibley,  the  daughter  of  Dr.  John  Sibley, 
of  Natchitoches,  a  lady  of  rare  personal  and  intellectual  attractions. 
In  1821  he  was  elected  to  the  Seventeenth  Congress,  and  in  1823  to 
the  Senate  of  the  United  States ;  in  1825  he  was  reflected  ;  and  in 
1831  he  was  chosen  again  by  a  Legislature  opposed  to  him  in  political 
opinion.  These  successive  trusts  were  justified  by  the  fidelity  and  suc 
cess  with  which  they  were  discharged ;  and  his  last  election  was  due  to 
the  conviction  that  his  continuance  in  the  Senate  was  necessary  to  the 
welfare  of  the  State.  As  a  member  of  that  body,  though  he  did  not 
decline  to  take  part  in  the  exciting  political  contests  then  waged,  his 
chief  attention  was  directed  to  the  advancement  of  the  material  inter 
ests  of  the  country.  Although  not  a  brilliant  orator,  he  was  a  clear 


JOSIAH  STODDARD  JOHNSTOX.  7 

and  forcible  speaker,  and  always  commanded  the  ear  of  the  Senate. 
As  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Commerce,  and  as  a  member  of 
the  Committee  on  Finance,  he  brought  to  bear  an  untiring  industry 
that  mastered  the  details,  while  it  grasped  the  principles  of  whatever 
subjects  came  before  him ;  and  this  not  only  by  the  study  of  books, 
but  by  conference  with  practical  men  and  by  severe,  independent 
thought.  Hence  his  reports  and  speeches,  which  were  marked  by  the 
directness  of  his  mind  and  the  unselfishness  of  his  political  character, 
were  listened  to  with  respect  even  by  his  opponents,  while  his  amiabil 
ity  and  forbearance  secured  him  a  large  personal  influence.  He  enjoyed 
a  very  close  friendship  with  Mr.  Clay,  with  whom  he  was  in  political 
affiliation.  He  opposed  the  doctrine  of  Nullification,  and  was  a  leading 
advocate  for  a  carefully-guarded  protective  tariff  which,  by  a  judicious 
adjustment  of  duties,  should  advance  American  industry.  But,  while 
he  was  a  close  student  of  the  history  and  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  and  a  representative  diligent  in  the  protection  of  his  constitu 
ents,  his  position  in  reference  to  the  commerce  of  the  country  called 
his  attention  to  questions  of  even  wider  range.  It  is  to  his  credit  that, 
with  an  enlightened  benevolence  and  enlarged  view  of  international 
law,  he  strenuously  pressed  upon  the  Government  the  duty  of  seeking 
a  mitigation  of  the  laws  of  maritime  war.  To  this  end  he  urged  espe 
cially  that  neutral  vessels  should  protect  the  goods  on  board  to  whom 
soever  they  might  belong ;  and  that  articles  contraband  of  war  should 
be  limited  to  the  smallest  possible  number  of  such  as  are  of  direct  use 
and  essential  in  their  operations. 

Mr.  Johnston  was  somewhat  below  middle  size,  of  graceful  person, 
handsome  countenance,  and  most  winning  manners.  The  testimony  of 
his  contemporaries  represents  him  as  a  firm  yet  moderate  partisan ;  a 
statesman  of  singularly  disinterested  views ;  a  most  steadfast  and  loyal 
friend  ;  and  a  man  of  warm,  pure  affections,  cheerful,  generous,  and 
honorable.  The  happy  influence  of  such  a  character  and  career  upon  a 
band  of  younger  brothers  cannot  be  over-estimated,  especially  when  they 
saw  virtue  crowned  with  a  success  which  met  neither  check  nor  reverse 
from  its  beginning  in  1805  to  the  close  of  an  honored  life  in  1833.  He 
was  a  man  well  beloved,  and  well  deserving  the  love  of  his  fellow-men. 
His  conduct  toward  his  brothers  not  only  illustrates  the  warmth  of  his 
affections,  but  exerted  a  powerful  influence  over  the  destinies  of  his 
family.  As  they  approached  man's  estate  he  directed  and  aided  in 
their  education,  invited  them  to  his  home,  and  advanced  them  in  their 
professions. 

Darius  was  graduated  at  Transylvania,  and  studied  law  with  Hon. 
William  T.  Barry,  afterward  Postmaster-General.  Orramel  and  Harris 
were  thoroughly  trained,  under  the  eye  of  their  eldest  brother,  by  pri 
vate  tutors  ;  the  former  completing  the  study  of  medicine  in  New  Or- 


8  FAMILY  AND  BOYHOOD. 

leans,  and  the  latter  studying  law  with  Judge  Alexander  Porter,  an 
eminent  jurist.  Darius  and  Orramel,  however,  took  part  in  the  Mexi 
can  War  of  Independence  ;  and,  although  they  survived  to  return,  it 
was  with  constitutions  ruined  by  hardship,  fever,  and  imprisonment, 
so  that  the  former  soon  died,  and  the  latter  survived  only  a  few  years. 
Lucius,  who  was  said  to  possess  fine  oratorical  powers,  went  to  Louisi 
ana  with  the  view  of  becoming  a  planter  ;  but  in  the  second  year  of  his 
residence  succumbed  to  a  prevalent  malignant  fever,  when  only  twenty- 
four  years  old.  These  were  all  remembered  as  young  men  of  much 
promise.  John  Harris  Johnston,  with  better  fortune,  at  once  made  his 
way  at  the  bar,  and  was  also  several  times  elected  to  the  State  Legisla 
ture.  He  was  then  chosen  district  judge  ;  which  position,  after  some 
years,  he  resigned,  to  take  the  place  of  parish  judge,  which  he  held  un 
til  his  death  in  1838.  He  was  a  remarkably  handsome  man,  with  fine 
legal  abilities  and  great  industry,  and  with  the  same  amiability  that 
characterized  his  brothers.  As  Josiah  S.  Johnston  showed  to  his 
brothers  of  the  half-blood  the  same  affection  and  kindness  as  to  his  own 
brothers,  so  to  him  and  his  memory  were  returned  a  gratitude  and 
devotion  that  lost  none  of  their  warmth  by  lapse  of  years.  Not  many 
years  before  his  own  death,  General  Johnston  said  to  the  writer,  with 
great  feeling,  "  I  am  more  indebted  to  my  brother  Stoddard  for  what 
ever  I  am,  than  to  any  other  man."  He  taught  his  children  to  love  and 
revere  the  memory  of  this  generous  brother  and  his  good  wife. 

In  the  course  of  a  winter  passed  most  pleasantly  in  Louisiana,  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston  yielded  his  purpose  to  enter  the  navy,  in  deference  to 
his  brother's  advice,  and  consented  to  return  to  Transylvania  Universi 
ty.  Once  resolved,  he  reentered  with  ardor  and  steady  industry  on  his 
collegiate  course  at  Lexington,  where  he  remained  two  years.  Tran 
sylvania  University,  though  planted  almost  in  the  wilderness,  had  the 
good  fortune  to  be  under  able  direction,  and  had  thus  acquired  great 
reputation  as  a  seat  of  learning.  It  was  the  Alma  Mater  of  many 
illustrious  men,  among  whom  is  Jefferson  Davis.  In  his  own  reminis 
cences  of  his  college-life,  General  Johnston  spoke  with  great  respect 
of  the  eminent  talents  and  distinguished  urbanity  of  Dr.  Holley,  the 
president ;  and  with  affectionate  remembrance  of  Mr.  and  Mrs.  De- 
weese,  the  amiable  friends  with  whom  he  boarded,  and  by  whom  he 
was  treated  like  a  kinsman.  He  not  only  advanced  himself  in  his 
mathematics  during  his  stay  at  Transylvania,  but  obtained  a  very 
thorough  training  in  the  Latin  classics,  and  an  acquaintance  with  other 
branches  of  learning  that  were  useful  to  him  later  in  life.  Twenty-five 
years  afterward  he  read  and  construed  Sallust  with  considerable  facility. 
But  his  preference  was  for  mathematics  and  the  natural  sciences.  Mr. 
John  P.  Morton,  of  Louisville,  who  sat  next  him  in  class,  says,  "  He 
was  conspicuous  for  always  knowing  his  lessons." 


ANECDOTES.  9 

He  was  undoubtedly  a  hard  student,  and  he  met  his  reward  in  the 
form  he  most  desired.  After  the  check  given  to  his  wish  to  enter  the 
navy,  the  desire  to  become  a  soldier  had  entirely  supplanted  it ;  and  in 
this  hope  his  eldest  brother  had  indulged  him.  In  1822  Josiah  S. 
Johnston,  being  then  a  member  of  Congress  from  Louisiana,  procured 
for  him  an  appointment  to  the  Military  Academy  at  West  Point ;  and 
he  entered  on  his  preparation  for  the  military  career  with  an  enthusiasm 
that  had  in  it  almost  the  spirit  of  consecration.  His  sister,  Mrs.  Byers, 
supplies  a  little  anecdote  that  may  be  related  here.  He  had  a  beautiful 
riding-horse,  which  he  thought  of  selling  ;  but,  as  the  time  approached 
for  his  departure,  he  would  turn  his  favorite  out  of  the  stable,  and 
watch  his  graceful  movements  as  he  enjoyed  the  freedom  of  the  pasture. 
When  about  to  go,  he  gave  him  to  his  sister,  saying  :  "  I  cannot  sell 
that  horse ;  he  might  fall  into  hands  where  he  would  be  badly  treated  ; 
but  you  will  use  him  well."  Mrs.  Byers  says  :  "His  dog  and  his  horse 
he  always  treated  with  the  kindest  consideration.  I  have  often  known 
him  to  walk,  and  lead  his  horse,  when  it  had  become  fatigued."  This 
trait  grew  upon  him  with  years,  and  his  comrades  and  followers  can 
attest  the  benevolence  that  noted  and  regarded  every  sign  of  fatigue 
or  suffering  in  animals  under  his  control. 

The  writer  recalls  many  lessons  from  his  father  to  impress  upon  him 
that  a  man  has  no  right  to  inflict  upon  any  creature  of  God  unnecessary 
pain.  He  would  habitually  turn  aside  from  treading  upon  a  worm  in 
his  path  ;  but  there  was  no  morbid  sentimentality  in  this,  as  he  enjoyed 
field-sports  moderately.  He  preferred,  however,  not  to  injure  the  most 
insignificant  beings.  It  may  not  be  amiss  to  give  here  another  little 
anecdote,  that  shows  in  part  how  his  habits  of  self-control  were  formed. 
The  same  sister  tells  how,  when  he  was  a  lad  fourteen  years  old,  on 
one  occasion,  "though  not  in  the  habit  of  giving  way  to  anger,"  he 
entirely  lost  patience,  after  having  repeatedly  tried  in  vain  to  pull  on  a 
tight  boot,  and  at  last  threw  it  violently  out  of  the  window.  She  gave 
him  a  gentle  and  rather  playful  rebuke,  at  which  he  left  the  room  with 
a  look  of  quiet  defiance,  but  soon  returned  with  the  boot,  and  silently 
set  it  against  the  wall.  No  further  allusion  was  made  to  it.  When  ten 
years  later  he  visited  his  family,  Mr.  Byers  presented  him  with  a  fine 
rifle.  He  loaded  the  rifle  to  try  it ;  but,  on  attempting  to  shoot,  it 
snapped.  He  examined  it,  and  tried  again ;  again  it  snapped ;  and  so 
on  for  several  times.  At  last,  he  quietly  put  it  down,  saying,  "  This  is 
a  very  fine  rifle,  but  it  needs  oiling."  His  sister,  who  had  been  admir 
ing  his  patience  and  calmness,  said,  "  I  wonder  you  did  not  strike  it 
across  the  railing."  He  laughed,  and  replied:  "  You  remember  the  loot. 
I  have  not  forgotten  it  ;  but  I  have  learned  that  a  soldier  should  have 
perfect  control  of  himself,  to  be  able  to  control  others."  That  this  was 
not  a  young  man's  idle  boast,  subsequent  events  will  show. 


10  FAMILY  AND  BOYHOOD. 

Poets,  wits,  and  men  of  letters,  often  exhibit  precocious  signs  of 
coming  greatness ;  "  Pope  lisped  in  numbers,"  and  "  Poor  Goldsmith  " 
jested  as  a  boy ;  but  the  youth  of  men  of  action  is  usually  spent  in 
uneventful  preparation  for  the  work  before  them,  and  their  early  record 
is  generally  unmarked  by  interesting  incidents,  or  wise  and  witty  say 
ings.  The  chief  value  of  what  little  can  be  gathered  of  the  youth  of 
Albert  Sidney  Johnston  lies  in  its  entire  consistency  with  his  after-life. 
It  is  in  this  view  that  such  glimpses  of  his  boyhood,  and  life  at  West 
Point,  as  can  be  collected,  are  here  given.  On  his  way  to  West  Point 
he  first  met  Nathaniel  J.  Eaton,  with  whom  he  formed  a  friendship 
that  subsisted  for  nearly  forty  years.  The  steadiness  and  loyalty  of 
this  attachment  will  receive  ample  illustration  in  these  pages ;  but 
Captain  Eaton's  own  account  manifests  both  his  enthusiasm  and  the 
deep  and  earnest  nature  of  his  friend.  In  a  letter  of  January  1,  1873, 
he  says  : 

I  first  met  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  in  June,  1822,  on  board  the  little  steamer 
Fire-Fly,  on  the  North  River,  as  we  were  going  to  West  Point  to  be  examined 
for  admission  as  cadets  in  the  Military  Academy.  He  was  a  full-grown  man,  of 
commanding  figure  and  imposing  presence.  He  was  then  a  little  over  nineteen 
years  old ;  and  I  was  a  stripling  of  a  boy,  not  quite  fifteen  years  old,  and  as 
green  as  I  was  young.  The  notice  your  father  took  of  me,  and  his  kindness  of 
manner  toward  me,  made  a  deep  impression  on  my  heart;  and  now,  after  the 
lapse  of  more  than  half  a  century,  I  often  think  of  it  very  pleasantly.  "We 
arrived  at  West  Point  on  Saturday  evening ;  and  the  next  morning,  winch  was 
bright  and  beautiful,  as  your  father  and  I  stood  on  the  veranda  on  the  north  side 
of  the  old  "  South  Barracks,"  looking  at  the  parade  and  inspection  of  the  corps 
of  cadets,  and  listening  to  the  music  of  the  band,  he  laid  his  hand  on  my  head 
and  said  kindly,  "  Well,  my  young  friend,  what  do  you  think  of  that  ?  "  His 
manner  was  most  kind,  and  filled  the  measure  of  youthful  love,  respect,  and,  I 
may  say,  reverence,  that  I  had  for  him  ;  and  to  this  day  it  remains  as  fresh,  as 
bright,  and  as  pleasant  to  me  as  it  was  then.  But  it  was  many  years  after  that 
before  I  dared  to  hope  that  the  warm  regard  I  had  for  him  was  reciprocated. 
He  was  a  reticent  man,  as  you  know,  and  was  undemonstrative.  Besides,  he 
was  five  years  my  senior,  and  was  even  then  a  man  of  a  good  deal  of  culture. 
Hence  there  was  but  little  social  intercourse  between  us  while  we  were  together 
at  the  Academy.  But  on  joining  my  regiment  in  1827,  at  Jefferson  Barracks, 
the  gallant  old  Sixth  Infantry  of  glorious  memory,  I  was  cordially  greeted  by 
your  father,  who  had  been  assigned  to  that  regiment.  We  were  on  very  pleas 
ant  terms,  but  his  reticence  and  dignity  of  manners  prevented  me  from  knowing 
exactly  how  I  stood  with  him ;  and  it  was  not  until  I  took  leave  of  him,  when 
about  to  start  on  furlough  in  the  fall  of  1828,  that  I  was  able  to  penetrate  be 
neath  his  reserve  of  manner.  But  his  cordial  grasp,  as  I  shook  hands  with  him 
and  bade  him  good-byr  and  his  hearty  "  God  bless  you,  Eaton !  "  revealed  what 
I  had  for  years  yearned  to  know,  that  my  warm  feelings  for  him  were  recipro 
cated  ;  and  I  think  those  feelings  were  never  for  a  moment  alienated  ;  so  that, 
when  he  fell  at  Shiloh,  I  felt  as  if  I  had  lost  a  brother. 

That  the  friend  so  cherished  had  desired  and  valued  this  boyish 


WEST   POINT    LIFE.  H 

devotion  is  proved  by  a  letter  of  General  Johnston's  from  Utah,  in  1858. 
He  writes  to  Captain  Eaton  : 

I  have  known  you  long  ;  more  than  the  lifetime  of  a  generation.  I  remem 
ber  when  I  first  saw  you  on  North  River.  The  son  of  a  noble  patriot  could 
not  fail  to  attract  my  attention  ;  and,  although  you  were  much  my  junior,  I  felt 
a  desire  for  your  friendship,  which  in  the  course  of  time  I  acquired.  I  need 
not  say  that  it  was  reciprocal,  and  in  all  that  time  not  one  incident  has  oc 
curred  to  mar  a  friendship  purely  disinterested. 

To  many  a  veteran  soldier,  this  little  episode  will  serve  to  recall  like 
friendships,  prompted  by  the  same  scenes  and  similar  emotions,  and 
cemented  by  sincere  esteem  ;  and  to  none,  indeed,  can  the  spectacle 
be  altogether  indifferent  of  the  honorable  sympathy  of  young  and 
ardent  souls  ripening  into  enduring  regard. 

Colonel  N.  C.  Macrae,  who  was  his  classmate,  says : 

His  whole  career  at  West  Point  was  marked  by  a  staid  firmness,  not  always 
found  among  young  gentlemen.  He  commanded  the  respect  of  all  who  knew 
him. 

Colonel  William  H.  C.  Bartlett  says  : 

No  one  of  his  large  class  at  the  Academy  enjoyed  more  than  he  the  respect 
of  all  who  knew  him,  and  none  had  a  larger  share  of  the  affectionate  regards  of 
his  classmates.  His  nature  was  truly  noble,  and  untainted  by  anything  small  or 
contracted. 

Colonel  Edward  B.  White  says  : 

During  our  few  years  at  West  Point,  he  was  esteemed  by  us  all  as  a  high- 
minded,  honorable  gentleman  and  soldier,  for  whom  we  entertained  much  affec 
tion,  and  whose  death  was  unaffectedly  mourned  by  the  few  of  us  who  survive. 
He  was,  as  a  mark  of  his  good  conduct  and  soldierly  bearing,  a  non-commis 
sioned  and  commissioned  officer  of  the  corps  of  cadets,  I  think,  during  his 
whole  term  ;  a  distinction  much  valued  and  desired  by  all  of  us;  and,  during  the 
last  or  graduating  year,  was  adjutant  of  the  corps,  which  he  preferred  to  a  cap 
taincy,  which  my  contemporary  Bartlett  says  was  at  his  option. 

Hon.  Jefferson  Davis  says  : 

He  was  sergeant-major,  and  afterward  was  selected  by  the  commandant  for 
the  adjutancy,  then  the  most  esteemed  office  in  the  corps. 

And  adds  : 

He  was  not  a  hard  student,  though  a  fair  one.  His  quickness  supplied  this 
defect.  He  did  not  have  an  enemy  in  the  corps,  or  an  unkind  feeling  to  any 
one,  though  he  was  select  in  his  associates. 

The  testimony  of  others  might  be  adduced  to  the  same  purport ; 
suffice  it  to  say,  however,  that  he  pursued  the  prescribed  course  at  the 
Military  Academy  with  diligence  and  success. 


12  FAMILY  AND  BOYHOOD. 

The  struggles  of  the  South  American  republics  for  independence,  and 
the  revolt  of  Greece  against  Turkey,  had  excited  the  warmest  interest 
in  the  United  States  ;  and  the  poetry  of  Byron  and  the  eloquence  of 
Clay  found  an  echo  in  the  feelings  and  opinions  of  the  young  men  at  the 
Military  Academy.  Johnston  and  some  others  were  approached  by  the 
agents  of  the  revolutionary  governments.  The  era  of  profound  peace 
that  was  evidently  opening  before  the  United  States  was  contrasted  with 
other  arenas  which  seemed  to  offer  the  most  splendid  prizes  to  military 
talent  and  ambition  ;  and  it  was  seriously  discussed  among  the  more 
adventurous  cadets  whether  aid  to  the  nationalities  striving  for  liberty 
against  oppression  was  not  a  more  pressing  call  than  the  routine  service 
of  the  United  States  Army.  Fortunately,  prudent  counsels  prevailed ; 
but  General  Johnston,  many  years  after,  spoke  of  it  to  the  writer  as  a 
strong  temptation  wisely  resisted.  He  stated  that  this  incident  had 
directed  his  attention  to  the  careers  of  men  who  had  enlisted  in  a  for 
eign  army,  and  that  his  observation  was  that  the  greater  the  services 
rendered  by  them  the  more  jealously  were  they  regarded  by  the  native 
rulers,  and  that  this  prejudice  against  the  foreigner  was  sure  to  thwart 
their  ablest  efforts.  I  think  he  cited,  as  one  instance,  General  Woll, 
of  the  Mexican  Army,  a  Belgian,  whom  he  esteemed  as  its  best  soldier. 

The  circumstances  attending  the  graduation  of  Albert  Sidney  John 
ston  were  somewhat  unusual.  He  had  won  his  way  by  hard  labor  to  a 
grade  in  mathematical  attainment  only  excelled  by  W.  H.  C.  Bartlett, 
afterward  distinguished  as  a  professor  of  the  institution,  to  whom  he 
accorded  an  easy  eminence  ;  and  by  Mr.  Twiss,  who  was  inferior  to 
Bartlett  only.  Mr.  Davis  says : 

Johnston  did  not  highly  value  class-standing,  but  was  anxious  for  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  course. 

He  devoted  himself  earnestly  to  the  preparation  for  the  examina 
tion,  and  was  satisfied  with  his  mastery  of  the  whole  course  except  two 
problems  ;  but,  when  he  was  called  upon  to  come  forward,  the  subject 
presented  to  him  for  discussion  was  one  of  these  very  problems.  He 
was  compelled  to  decline,  hoping  for  better  fortune  next  time  ;  but, 
to  his  dismay,  by  a  coincidence  not  included  in  his  doctrine  of  chances, 
the  professor  gave  him  the  other  neglected  problem.  He  was  again 
obliged  to  say  that  he  was  unprepared.  He  was  ordered  to  take  his 
seat;  but,  feeling  that  his  reputation  and  future  standing  were  at 
stake,  he  briefly  yet  forcibly  stated  the  fact  that  these  were  the  only 
two  exceptions  to  his  knowledge  of  the  course.  The  superintendent 
sternly  ordered  him  to  take  his  seat,  which  he  did.  If  the  matter  had 
ended  here,  he  would  probably  have  lost  his  commission  as  well  as  his 
grade  ;  but,  as  soon  as  the  class  was  dismissed,  he  sent  a  written  com 
munication  to  the  examiners,  stating  the  facts,  and  challenging  the 


GRADUATION  AND   FRIENDS.  13 

most  rigorous  examination.  There  was  some  indisposition  to  grant 
the  reexamination  ;  but  it  was  finally  accorded  to  him,  through  the 
friendly  intervention  of  General  Worth,  then  commandant  of  the  Corps 
of  Cadets,  who  had  been  greatly  pleased  with  his  bearing  under  such 
difficult  circumstances,  as  well  as  with  his  previous  conduct  as  a  cadet. 
It  was  a  most  trying  ordeal.  The  board  took  him  at  his  word,  and 
gave  him  a  long  and  most  searching  examination  ;  after  which,  how 
ever,  in  spite  of  a  reduction  on  account  of  his  misadventure,  and  of  a 
want  of  skill  in  drawing,  he  was  graded  eighth  in  his  class.  He  was 
not  only  grateful  to  Worth  for  this  good  turn,  but  always  retained  an 
admiration  for  him  as  a  dashing  soldier.  Worth  had  a  large  measure 
of  knowledge  and  experience,  and  was  full  of  martial  spirit  and  gener 
osity,  which,  with  his  handsome  person  and  gallant  bearing,  made  him 
a  model  for  these  young  soldiers.  He  always  treated  Johnston  with 
marked  consideration  ;  and,  after  the  Mexican  War,  recommended  him 
as  leader  for  a  difficult  enterprise. 

When  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  was  graduated,  in  June,  1826,  he  was 
entitled,  by  virtue  of  his  rank  in  his  class,  to  select  which  arm  of  the 
service  he  preferred.  Had  a  cavalry  corps  then  existed,  his  tastes 
would  have  led  him  to  enter  it ;  but  as  between  the  artillery,  then 
generally  stationed  in  the  seaboard  fortresses,  usually  considered 
preferable,  and  the  infantry,  which  was  employed  in  more  active  service 
on  the  frontier,  he  chose  the  latter.  He  was  accordingly  assigned  to 
the  Second  Infantry,  with  the  rank  of  brevet  second-lieutenant,  to  take 
date  from  July  1, 1826,  with  a  furlough  until  the  1st  of  November.  He 
left  the  Military  Academy  with  very  kind  feelings  to  his  classmates, 
and  with  a  high  regard  for  the  institution,  which  he  retained  through 
life.  His  recollections  of  Prof.  Mcllvaine,  then  chaplain  at  West  Point, 
and  afterward  Bishop  of  Ohio,  were  especially  kindly.  Hon.  Jefferson 
Davis  says : 

Johnston  valued  one  feature  of  cadet-life  very  much,  the  opportunity  to 
select  one's  own  acquaintance  from  congeniality  of  tastes,  which  was  denied  to 
the  officer  in  barracks. 

The  subsequent  careers  of  his  friends  is  the  best  justification  of  his 
discrimination.  Leonidas  Polk,  of  Tennessee,  subsequently  Bishop  of 
Louisiana,  and  a  lieutenant-general  in  the  Confederate  service,  was  his 
room-mate  and  intimate  friend  ;  and  General  Johnston  never  slackened 
in  his  affection  for  him,  which  was  based  upon  a  perfect  confidence  in 
his  nobility  of  soul.  He  confirmed  the  reasonable  opinion  that  Polk's 
religious  development  was  the  natural  outgrowth  of  habits  and  beliefs 
cherished  as  a  cadet.  A  single  letter,  written  him  in  1827,  by  Polk, 
who  was  still  a  cadet,  remains.  It  is  that  of  one  intimate  friend  to 
another,  on  topics  personal  or  pertaining  to  the  Academy.  Robert 


14  EARLY  ARMY-LIFE. 

Anderson,  afterward  famous  for  his  defense  of  Fort  Sumter,  was 
another  close  friend  at  West  Point.  Some  of  their  correspondence  yet 
remains. 

Among  his  friends  at  the  Military  Academy  were  William  Bickley, 
his  townsman,  Daniel  S.  Donelson,  of  Tennessee,  afterward  a  gallant 
general  in  the  Confederate  service  ;  Berrien,  of  Georgia  ;  the  veteran 
Maynadier ;  Bradford,  a  grandson  of  the  first  printer  in  Kentucky ;  W. 
H.  C.  Bartlett,  already  mentioned ;  and  Lucien  Bibb,  the  son  of  Hon. 
George  M.  Bibb,  and  a  noble,  graceful  man  of  genius. 

His  most  intimate  friend  was  Bennett  H.  Henderson,  some  time 
assistant  professor  at  West  Point,  a  man  of  brilliant  talents,  who 
resigned  and  began  the  practice  of  the  law  in  St.  Louis,  but  met  an 
early  and  accidental  death.  Jefferson  Davis,  who  was  two  classes 
below  Johnston  in  the  Academy,  formed  with  him  a  fast  friendship, 
that  grew  and  strengthened,  and  knew  neither  decay  nor  end.  There 
were  others  for  whom  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  entertained  a  warm  and 
lasting  regard,  and  to  whom,  it  is  hoped,  these  pages  may  recall  pleas 
ant  passages  of  youthful  fellowship  and  happiness  ;  but  we  refrain 
from  further  detail.  It  was  a  society  of  young,  ardent,  and  generous 
spirits,  in  which  prevailed  general  good  feeling  and  little  bitterness — a 
generation  of  brave  spirits,  steadfast  and  reflective,  but  beyond  com 
parison  ardent  and  generous. 


CHAPTER  II. 

EARLY     AKMY-LIFE. 

LITTLE  of  general  interest  remains,  either  in  documentary  form  or 
in  the  memories  of  men,  respecting  the  early  years  of  Albert  Sidney 
Johnston's  army-life.  He  passed  the  furlough  granted  after  graduation 
in  Kentucky  with  his  father.  The  following  incident  of  this  visit  is 
related  in  a  letter  from  a  friend,  some  five  years  General  Johnston's 
junior,  and  still  living  in  Kentucky,  highly  respected : 

Our  intercourse  was  always  pleasant,  and  to  me  instructive  and  highly 
valued  and  sought  after.  At  that  time  the  social  life  of  young  men  in  Ken 
tucky,  more  I  think  than  at  present,  was  stained  with  the  vice  of  gaming,  which 
threw  them  into  associations  at  other  times  unwillingly  acknowledged.  I  did 
not  escape.  Your  father  on  one  occasion,  as  I  was  quitting  one  of  the  dens,  at 
that  day  open  at  all  hours,  joined  me,  and,  proposing  a  walk,  introduced  the 
subject  of  games  and  gaming,  not  as  a  mentor  or  moral  lecturer — for  against 
such  a  one  I  might  have  rebelled— but  with  many  anecdotes  of  his  early  friends, 


WASHINGTON   SOCIETY.  15 

whose  lives  had  been  marred,  and  in  some  instances  disgraced,  by  the  habit. 
He  turned  to  me :  "  Come,  my  friend,  I  wish  to  teach  you  a  game  more  intel 
lectual  than  whist  or  any  game  of  cards.  It  needs  no  betting  to  make  it  inter 
esting;  and,  indeed,  the  interest  would  be  spoiled  by  a  bet."  With  that,  we 
went  to  his  room  at  your  grandfather's,  and,  for  the  first  time,  he  introduced 
me  to  the  chess-board,  and  taught  me  the  game.  I  shall  never  forget  the 
patience  with  which  he,  an  accomplished  player,  instructed  me  in  the  moves 
and  principles  of  the  game  ;  and  frequently  in  after-life  I  have  felt  that  nothing 
but  a  desire  to  save  and  reform  me,  which  to  a  great  extent  was  effectual,  could 
have  prompted  his  action. 

This  kind  of  personal  effort  for  the  good  of  others  is  commonly 
given  more  grudgingly  than  advice,  or  even  than  money  ;  but  it  does 
more  good  than  either,  because  it  evinces  sympathy,  and  not  merely 
benevolence. 

In  explaining  to  the  writer  that  he  had  divested  himself  of  all  claim 
to  some  land  in  which  he  was  supposed  to  be  interested,  General  John 
ston  wrote,  December  20,  1858  : 

My  grandfather,  Edward  Harris,  gave  to  my  brother,  J.  II.  Johnston,  my 
sisters,  and  myself,  640  acres  of  land  in  Ohio.  When  I  came  of  age  I  gave  to 
Mr.  Byers  my  interest  in  this  land,  and  whatever  else  I  inherited  from  my 
father,  being  a  share  in  a  small  farm,  a  few  negroes,  and  a  homestead  of  small 
value.  It  was  not  much,  but,  whatever  it  was,  I  gave  it  all  for  the  benefit  of 
my  sisters. 

My  recollection  is,  that  my  father  told  me  that  his  brothers  united 
in  this  action. 

During  the  fall  of  1826  Lieutenant  Johnston  accepted  an  invitation 
from  his  brother,  then  in  the  United  States  Senate,  to  visit  him  at 
Washington  City.  Senator  Johnston  at  that  time  occupied  an  enviable 
position,  socially  and  politicall}',  at  the  seat  of  government.  As  the 
trusted  friend  of  Mr.  Clay,  then  Secretary  of  State,  he  gave  an  inde 
pendent  support  to  President  Adams's  Administration;  while  he  en 
joyed,  nevertheless,  very  cordial  relations  with  the  best  people  of  all 
parties.  Mrs.  Johnston  was  a  person  of  great  vivacity  and  amiability, 
and  her  grace  of  manner  and  social  tact  made  their  house  one  of  the 
most  attractive  at  the  capital.  In  a  letter  written  to  Lieutenant  John 
ston  that  winter  she  says  : 

Our  street  is  filled  with  members  and  their  families,  and  we  are  all  gay. 
Our  house  has  already  the  name  of  "  The  Neutral  Ground,"  where  all  parties 
meet,  and  must,  of  course,  be  polite  to  each  other.  Parties  innumerable,  wed 
dings,  and  grand  dinners,  fill  up  all  the  evening;  visits  and  visitors,  all  the 
morning. 

In  this  brilliant  and  polished  society,  in  which  moved  Clay  and 
Calhoun,  Webster,  Benton,  Everett,  and  Scott,  Lieutenant  Johnston 
had  his  first  experience  of  the  great  world  ;  but  it  made  slight  impres 
sion  on  a  soul  bent  upon  martial  enterprise,  and  impatient  for  strenu- 


16  EARLY  ARMY-LIFE. 

cms  action.  Mrs.  Johnston  exerted  herself  to  make  his  stay  agreeable, 
and  he  shared  in  all  the  pleasures  of  the  cultivated  society  in  which 
she  was  an  acknowledged  leader. 

The  following  popular  piece  of  verse,  written  in  her  honor  by  the 
Hon.  Warren  R.  Davis,  of  South  Carolina,  a  wit  and  a  poet,  as  well  as 
a  politician,  is  here  correctly  reproduced,  because  it  has  been  the  sub 
ject  of  considerable  literary  controversy  : 

A   FAMOUS   OLD    SONG. 
Air— "  Eoy's  Wife  of  AMivalloch." 

Johnston's  wife  of  Louisiana ! 

Johnston's  wife  of  Louisiana  ! 
The  fairest  flower  that  ever  bloomed 

In  Southern  sun  or  gay  savanna  ; 
The  Inca's  blood  flows  in  her  veins, 

The  Inca's  soul  her  bright  eyes  lighten  ; 
Child  of  the  Sun,  like  him  she  reigns 

To  cheer  our  hopes,  and  sorrows  brighten. 

Johnston's  wife  of  Louisiana ! 

Johnston's  wife  of  Louisiana ! 
The  fairest  flower  that%ver  bloomed 

In  Southern  sun  or  gay  savanna. 

Johnston's  wife  of  Louisiana ! 

Johnston's  wife  of  Louisiana  ! 
She  hath  a  way  to  win  all  hearts, 

And  bow  them  to  the  shrine  of  Anna ; 
Her  mind  is  radiant  with  the  lore 
Of  ancient  and  of  modern  story ; 
And  native  wit  in  richer  store 

Bedecks  her  with  its  rainbow  glory. 

Johnston's  wife  of  Louisiana ! 

Johnston's  wife  of  Louisiana ! 
She  hath  a  way  to  charm  all  hearts, 

And  bow  them  to  the  shrine  of  Anna. 

Johnston's  wife  of  Louisiana ! 

Johnston's  wife  of  Louisiana ! 
The  hapless  bard  who  sings  her  praise 

Now  worhips  at  the  shrine  of  Anna ! 
'Twas  such  a  vision,  bright  but  brief, 

In  early  youth  his  true  heart  rended ; 
Then  left  it,  like  a  fallen  leaf, 

On  life's  most  rugged  thorn  suspended. 

Johnston's  wife  of  Louisiana ! 

Johnston's  wife  of  Louisiana  ! 
The  hapless  bard  who  sings  her  praise 

Wept  tears  of  blood  for  such  as  Anna ! 


DECLINES    STAFF   APPOINTMENT.  17 

Lieutenant  Johnston  was  a  guest  at  the  White  House  and  at  Mr. 
Clay's,  and  a  favorite  in  the  gayer  circle  of  fashionable  life,  where  his 
handsome  person  and  winning  address  made  him  always  acceptable. 
Mr.  and  Mrs.  Johnston's  indulgent  partiality  sought  to  make  their 
house  his  permanent  home,  confident  that,  at  the  centre  of  political 
favor,  their  influence  and  his  own  merits  would  rapidly  advance  his 
fortunes.  A  way  was  unexpectedly  opened  by  an  offer  from  General 
Scott  to  make  him  his  aide-de-camp,  a  proposal  very  nattering  in  itself, 
and  opening  as  brilliant  a  career  as  could  be  desired  had  he  possessed 
the  temper  of  the  courtier.  The  temptation  of  rapid  promotion  and 
graceful  pleasures  would  have  proved  irresistible  to  many  minds,  and 
perhaps  most  men  would  have  acted  judiciously  in  accepting  the 
friendly  offer.  Senator  Johnston  and  his  wife  anxiously  wished  him  to 
accept  ;  the  latter  wrote  in  1870  as  follows : 

I  well  remember  my  disappointment  when,  as  a  very  young  and  handsome 
man,  lie  was  offered  the  position  of  aide  to  General  Scott,  and,  from  his  own 
judgment,  refused  it,  saying  that,  "  although  much  gratified  to  have  been  men 
tioned  by  General  Scott,  he  felt  that  the  life  of  inactivity  in  a  large  city  did  not 
accord  with  his  views,  and  that  he  preferred  to  go  off  to  the  far  West,  and  enter 
at  once  upon  the  duties  of  his  profession."  His  brother  did  not  think  it  right  to 
oppose  his  inclination,  although  General  Scott  was  our  particular  friend.  As  for 
myself,  I  fairly  scolded  and  Avept  at  this  determination. 

But  nothing  could  deter  him  from  his  resolution  to  enter  at  once  on 
the  rugged  duties  of  his  chosen  career,  and  to  owe  his  advancement  to 
meritorious  service,  not  patronage.  General  Johnston  always  believed 
and  regretted  that  his  seeming  indifference  to  an  overture  that  was 
intended  as  a  kindness,  and  certainly  was  a  compliment,  had  prejudiced 
him  in  the  good  opinion  of  General  Scott.  That  eminent  soldier  re 
garded  him  for  more  than  a  generation  with  a  certain  coolness,  and 
opposed  to  his  advancement  the  most  fatal  check  to  rising  merit — 
official  reluctance  and  the  discountenance  of  the  great.  There  was  no 
intentional  injustice,  however,  only  this  distrust  and  neglect  ;  and  it  is 
creditable  to  General  Johnston's  soundness  of  judgment  and  sobriety 
of  mind  that  he  felt  no  resentment  at  conduct  so  natural,  and  was 
always  able  to  do  full  justice  to  the  military  abilities  of  General  Scott. 
When,  in  his  later  years,  he  had,  through  other  agencies,  attained 
an  exalted  position,  and  had,  by  his  services,  compelled  the  entire 
respect  of  the  Commander-in-chief,  that  respect  was  exhibited  in  a  cor 
dial  and  unreserved  manner,  and  with  the  largest  measure  of  official 
approbation,  evincing  that  it  was  want  of  confidence,  not  of  magna 
nimity,  that  moved  General  Scott.  The  question  of  Lieutenant  John 
ston's  wisdom  in  declining  General  Scott's  tender  may  be  left  to  the 
verdict  of  others  ;  but  the  incident  illustrates  both  his  theory  of  life 
at  that  time  and  a  certain  independence  of  spirit  and  unwillingness  to 


18  EARLY  ARMY-LIFE. 

owe  aught  to  favor,  which  characterized  him  throughout  life.  He  cer 
tainly  chose  the  more  rugged  path,  in  which,  however,  he  was  sustained 
by  his  self-reliance  and  by  a  contempt  for  mere  rank  and  place,  except 
as  the  evidences  of  achievement. 

Lieutenant  Johnston  did  not  leave  without  regret  the  hospitable 
house  where  he  had  been  treated  with  such  fraternal  affection.  His 
sister-in-law  kept  up  a  correspondence  with  him  for  several  years  ; 
and,  although  they  did  not  meet  often  in  after-life,  he  always  grate 
fully  remembered  the  sisterly  interest  she  had  shown  toward  him  as  a 
youth.  He  left  the  capital,  not  to  visit  it  again  for  thirty  years,  except 
in  passing  through  it  rapidly  on  two  or  three  journeys.  In  an  era  when 
office-seeking  was  a  national  vice,  extending  even  to  the  army,  he  felt  a 
pardonable  pride  in  holding  aloof  from  the  source  of  preferment. 

His  formal  orders  to  proceed  to  Sackett's  Harbor,  on  Lake  Ontario, 
are  dated  December  22d  ;  but  he  had  probably  preceded  them  a  month 
or  more,  as  Mrs.  Johnston,  writing  to  him  at  that  point  on  the  26th, 
says  : 

"  We  are  pleased  to  hear  that  you  like  your  situation,  and  are  determined  to 
spend  your  time  usefully  and  agreeably."  And  adds  :  "I  heard  General  Brown 
speak  of  you  in  high  terms  to  a  young  military  gentleman  last  night." 

From  a  letter  of  his  friend  Folk's  it  appears  that  his  chief  employ 
ment  at  the  little  frontier  post  was  "  in  books  ; "  but  what  he  read  and 
what  he  did  there  are  things  forgotten. 

But  a  single  incident  is  preserved  of  General  Johnston's  winter  at 
Sackett's  Harbor.  This  he  sometimes  cited  as  an  illustration  of  the 
recklessness  of  youth.  He  was  engaged  with  some  fellow-officers  in 
artillery-practice  on  the  ice  of  Lake  Ontario,  when  a  wild  party  of 
sleighers  kept  dashing  across  the  line  of  fire,  near  the  target.  Mean 
ing  to  rebuke  this  bravado  writh  a  good  scare,  he  waited  for  the  rush 
of  their  Canadian  ponies  near  his  target,  and  then  fired.  He  succeeded 
so  well  that,  for  an  instant,  the  whole  party  was  enveloped  in  snow 
and  splintered  ice,  and  seemed  to  be  blotted  out.  A  moment  after 
they  emerged  from  the  frosty  spray  with  wild  yells  and  affrighted  gest 
ures,  and  returned  no  more.  He  felt  during  the  instant  of  suspense 
that  murder  had  been  done,  and  the  relief  of  the  revelers  at  their 
escape  was  not  greater  than  his  own.  He  accepted  the  adventure, 
however,  as  a  lesson  in  something  more  than  artillery-practice. 

The  President,  John  Quincy  Adams,  signed  his  commission  April  4, 
1827,  as  second-lieutenant  of  the  Sixth  Regiment  of  Infantry,  to  take 
date  from  July  1,  1826.  "  The  Sixth,"  commanded  by  brevet  Briga 
dier-General  Henry  Atkinson,  was  then  esteemed  the  "  crack  "  regi 
ment  ;  so  that  at  once  he  proceeded  rejoicing  to  its  headquarters  at 
Jefferson  Barracks,  where  he  arrived  on  the  1st  of  June. 


JEFFERSON   BARRACKS.  19 

This  post,  famous  in  the  traditions  and  cherished  in  the  affections 
of  the  old  Army,  was  his  home  for  the  next  six  or  seven  years.  It 
was  situated  on  the  bank  of  the  Mississippi,  nine  miles  from  St.  Louis, 
then  an  inconsiderable  but  promising  town  of  5,000  inhabitants. 
Lieutenant  Johnston  says,  in  a  letter  to  his  friend  Bickley  : 

The  position  is  a  good  one,  and  particularly  excellent  in  a  military  point  of 
view,  because  of  the  facility  of  transporting  troops  to  any  other  position  in  the 
West.  The  celerity  of  the  recent  movement  of  the  First  and  Sixth  Kegiments 
up  the  Mississippi  and  Wisconsin  sufficiently  attests  that.  .  .  .  The  site  of  the 
barracks  rises  gradually  from  the  river  and  swells  to  a  beautiful  bluff,  covered 
with  oak  and  hickory  trees,  almost  far  enough  apart  to  permit  military  manoeu 
vres,  and  with  no  undergrowth  to  interrupt  a  ride  on  horseback  in  any  direction. 

The  most  notable  event  with  which  Lieutenant  Johnston  was  con 
nected  in  the  year  1827  was  the  expedition  to  compel  the  Winnebago 
Indians  to  atone  for  outrages  upon  the  white  settlers.  This  tribe 
occupied  the  country  about  Lake  Winnebago  and  along  the  banks  of 
the  Wisconsin  River,  with  the  Menomonees  for  their  neighbors  on  the 
north  ;  the  Pottawattamies  dwelt  about  the  head-waters  of  Lake  Michi 
gan,  and  the  Sacs  and  Foxes  on  both  banks  of  the  Mississippi  in 
Northern  Illinois,  Southern  Wisconsin,  and  Iowa.  On  the  24th  of 
June  the  Winnebagoes  had  suddenly  put  to  death  some  white  people  ; 
and  seemed  disposed  to  break  out  into  open  war,  in  which  also  they 
endeavored  to  enlist  the  Pottawattamies.  As  the  Winnebagoes  num 
bered  some  600  or  700  warriors,  were  physically  large,  well  formed, 
and  strong,  and  were  the  most  indomitable  and  irreclaimable  savages 
on  that  frontier,  great  apprehensions  were  felt  of  a  cruel  warfare. 
They  refused  to  negotiate  with  General  Cass,  who  thereupon  turned 
the  matter  over  to  General  Atkinson.  The  expedition  left  Prairie  du 
Chien  on  the  29th  of  August,  and  returned  to  Jefferson  Barracks  Sep 
tember  27th.  The  letter  to  Bickley,  already  quoted,  describing  the 
movement  of  troops  to  preserve  peace  on  the  Northwestern  frontier, 
continues  as  follows  : 

The  detachment  of  the  Sixth  Regiment  which  left  this  place  was  accom 
panied  by  two  companies  of  the  Fifth  Regiment  from  St.  Peter's,  up  the 
Wisconsin  River  as  far  as  the  portage,  where  it  was  met  by  a  detachment  of  the 
Second  Regiment  from  Green  Bay,  under  the  command  of  Major  Whistler.  The 
Winnebagoes,  in  council,  agreed  to  deliver  up  the  leading  men  in.  the  several 
outrages  committed  against  the  whites.  Accordingly,  Red  Bird,  Le  Soleil,  and 
two  others,  the  son  and  brother-in-law  of  Red  Bird,  were  given  up,  there  ;  and 
two  more,  afterward,  at  Prairie  du  Chien,  belonging  to  the  Prairie  La  Crosse 
band.  They  bound  themselves  to  hold  a  council  in  the  spring  for  the  determi 
nation  of  the  boundary -line  ;  and  to  permit  the  miners  of  Fever  River  to  pro 
ceed  peaceably  in  their  "  diggings,"  till  the  true  boundary  was  determined. 

Although,  after  seeing  the  Sacs  and  Foxes,  Menomonees,  Sioux,  etc.,  my 
romantic  ideas  of  the  Indian  character  bad  vanished,  I  must  confess  that  I  con- 


20  EARLY  ARMY-LIFE. 

sider  Red  Bird  one  of  the  noblest  and  most  dignified  men  I  ever  saw.  Wlien  he 
gave  himself  up,  he  was  dressed,  after  the  manner  of  the  Sioux-of  the  Missouri, 
in  a  perfectly  white  hunting-shirt  of  deer-skin,  and  leggins  and  moccasins  of  the 
same,  with  an  elegant  head-dress  of  birds'  feathers ;  he  held  a  white  flag  in  his 
right  hand,  and  a  beautifully-ornamented  pipe  in  the  other.  He  said  :  "I  have 
offended.  I  sacrifice  myself  to  save  my  country,"  etc.  He  displayed  that  stoic 
indifference  which  is  wrongfully  attributed  to  the  Indian  character  alone.  Ill 
stop.  I  am  not  going  to  write  a  whole  letter  about  a  rascally  Indian. 

We  have  been  encamped  here  since  June,  but  expect  to  get  into  quarters  be 
fore  winter  sets  in.  I  could  say  a  great  deal  more,  but  I  am  almost  converted 
into  bacon,  already,  by  the  smoke  from  a  big  log-fire  before  my  tent.  I  am  on 
guard.  Yours  truly,  JOIIKSTOX. 

Six  companies  of  the  First,  six  of  the  Third,  and  the  Sixth  Regiment,  to  which 
I  belong,  are  stationed  here.  Plenty  of  sport.  I  am  in  excellent  health  and  fine 
spirits.  Present  my  respects  to  Marshall,  Taliaferro.  R.  and  J.  Taylor,  Hanne- 
gan,  Green,  and  Beattie.  Yours  truly,  J. 

Brown,  in  his  "  History  of  Illinois"  (New  York,  1844),  says  : 

Red  Bird  died  in  prison.  A  part  of  those  arrested  were  convicted,  and  a 
part  acquitted.  Those  convicted  were  executed  on  the  26th  of  December,  in 
the  following  year  (1828).  Black  Hawk  and  Kanonekan,  or  the  Youngest  of  the 
Thunders,  and  a  son  of  Red  Bird,  all  of  whom  had  been  charged  with  attacking 
the  boats,  were  acquitted.  Black  Hawk  was  confined  for  more  than  a  year  be 
fore  he  could  be  brought  to  trial ;  and  imprisonment  to  him  was  more  intoler- 
erable  than  any  punishment  which  could  have  been  inflicted.  .  .  .  Black  Hawk 
was  discharged  merely  for  want  of  proof,  not  for  want  of  guilt.  Although 
doubts  on  the  subject  were  once  entertained,  there  was  none  afterward.  His 
confessions,  which  he  had  sense  enough  to  withhold  till  after  his  acquittal,  were 
conclusive. 

From  this  time,  probably,  dated  Black  Hawk's  effort  to  organize  a 
league  that  should  unite  all  the  Western  tribes  from  the  lakes  to  Mex 
ico  in  war  against  the  encroaching  whites. 

The  remains  of  Lieutenant  Johnston's  correspondence,  belonging  to 
this  period,  are  meagre.  This  is  due,  in  part,  to  his  destruction  of  his 
papers  after  the  death  of  his  wife  in  1835,  and  in  part  to  his  repug 
nance  to  mere  friendly  letter-writing.  His  relations  and  friends  re 
proached  him  with  a  neglect  which  he  deprecated,  but  did  not  amend. 
He  shrank  from  the  platitudes  of  ordinary  correspondence,  and  profes 
sions  and  protestations  of  every  kind  were  distasteful  to  him.  He  was 
a  man  of  powerful  affections ;  yet  he  believed  in,  and  exercised,  self- 
restraint  in  their  expression.  He  had  a  very  exalted  ideal  of  friendship, 
and  a  great  contempt  for  mere  lip-service  ;  and,  although  he  was  aware 
that  there  was  another  side  to  the  question,  yet  he  could  never  fully 
overcome  his  aversion  to  writing,  without  a  special  object,  and  unless 
he  had  something  important  to  say.  But  this  aversion  did  not  extend 
to  official  or  business  correspondence,  in  which  he  was  prompt,  exact, 


THE  ANGRY   MUSICIAN.  21 

and  full ;  and,  indeed,  it  is  doubtful  whether  an  instance  can  be  pointed 
out  where  he  was  in  default  in  a  duty  of  this  sort. 

To  those  who  knew  the  grand  composure,  resulting  from  long  years 
of  self-control,  which  characterized  the  latter  years  of  General  Johnston, 
a  little  anecdote,  that  he  used  humorously  to  relate  of  the  impetuosity 
of  his  hot  youth,  may  serve  to  illustrate  the  power  of  will  that  wrought 
the  change.  During  his  sojourn  as  a  bachelor  at  Jefferson  Barracks, 
being  fond  of  music,  he  tried  to  learn  to  play  the  flute.  A  wide  differ 
ence  of  opinion  existed  between  himself  and  his  friends  as  to  his  musi 
cal  aptitudes.  He  persevered  in  spite  of  their  jests ;  until  these,  and 
the  resulting  doubts  in  his  own  mind,  rendered  him  somewhat  irritable 
on  the  score  of  his  skill.  One  day,  as  he  was  practising  in  his  room, 
he  heard  a  tapping  on  the  floor  above,  occupied  by  a  fellow-officer. 
Instantly  referring  this  to  his  music,  and  regarding  it  as  an  indecorum, 
he  nevertheless  continued  the  air ;  but,  when  it  occurred  again,  he 
stopped — and  the  tapping  stopped.  Waiting  a  moment  to  restrain  his 
rising  anger,  he  resumed  the  tune,  and  the  tapping  began  again.  This 
was  too  much  for  the  outraged  patience  of  the  angry  musician,  who, 
dashing  down  his  flute,  sprang  up  the  stairs,  determined  to  exact  satis 
faction.  To  a  thundering  knock  at  the  door,  a  friendly  voice  replied, 
inviting  him  to  come  in  ;  and,  when  he  strode  in,  he  found  his  neigh 
bor,  with  a  look  of  mild  inquiry  at  his  evident  excitement,  unsuspi 
ciously  cracking  walnuts  on  the  hearth.  With  a  brief  apology  for  his 
intrusion,  he  rushed  down-stairs  again,  mortified  at  his  own  hastiness 
and  loss  of  temper.  He  at  once  gave  up  the  flute  ;  for,  said  he,  u  I  did 
not  think  that  a  man  so  sensitive  about  his  skill  was  fit  for  a  flute- 
player." 

In  1828  Lieutenant  Johnston  was  selected  as  adjutant  of  the  regi 
ment  by  Brevet-General  Henry  Atkinson,  the  colonel  commanding. 
Atkinson  was  an  officer  of  fair  military  capacity  and  experience,  of  a 
bright  and  social  temper,  and  of  popular  manners.  General  Scott,  in 
his  autobiography,  calls  him  "  an  excellent  man  and  fine  soldier  ;  "  and 
this  opinion  expresses  fairly  the  army  estimate  of  him.  His  wife  was  a 
daughter  of  Alexander  Bullitt,  one  of  the  original  settlers  of  Louisville, 
Kentucky,  and  the  eldest  of  a  family  celebrated  for  beauty,  wit,  and 
charm  of  manner.  Mrs.  Atkinson,  aided,  after  the  lapse  of  some  years, 
by  her  brilliant  and  beautiful  sisters,  made  Jefferson  Barracks  some 
thing  more  than  a  mere  military  post  ;  it  was  a  delightful  and  elegant 
home  for  the  gay  and  gallant  young  soldiers  serving  here  their  appren 
ticeship  in  arms.  There  was  at  this  period  of  his  life  no  officer  more 
highly  regarded  in  the  regiment  than  the  adjutant.  Captain  Eaton 
says  of  him  that,  "while  no  man  was  more  approachable,  no  one 
could  remain  unimpressed  by  his  dignity  ;  "  and  Colonel  Thomas  L. 
Alexander,  who  joined  the  regiment  in  1830,  says  that,  "  possessing  in 


22  EARLY  ARMY-LIFE. 

an  extraordinary  degree  the  confidence,  esteem,  and  admiration  of  the 
whole  regiment,  he  was  the  very  beau-ideal  of  a  soldier  and  an  officer." 
How  early  he  began  to  exercise  that  forbearance  in  judging  his  fellow- 
men  w.nch  afterward  became  so  characteristic,  may  be  seen  in  a  letter 
to  Eaton,  written  in  this  period : 

Our  friend  and  fellow-soldier  has  destroyed  himself.  Being  entirely  unpre 
pared  for  such  an  event,  you  may  well  judge  that  \ve  were  greatly  shocked  and 
grieved  on  hearing  it.  Notwithstanding  the  manner  of  his  death,  let  us  mourn 
the  loss  of  a  chivalric  companion.  Let  us  not,  in  the  vigor  of  health  and  intel 
lect,  reproach  his  memory  for  committing  an  act  which  the  paramount  control 
of  reason  alone  can  prevent. 

Every  humane  and  fearless  nature  which  clearly  perceives  the  ills  of 
others — the  afflictions  of  feebleness,  sin,  and  pain — must  feel  tenderly 
toward  the  frailty  which  gives  way  before  the  temptation  of  a  great 
agony.  General  Johnston,  for  himself,  however,  seems  early  to  have 
adopted  the  theory  that,  while  we  are  irresistibly  swayed  by  an  over 
ruling  destiny,  yet  it  is  the  duty  of  a  man  manfully  to  oppose  to  ad 
verse  circumstances  or  fate  all  the  resources  he  can  command — a  some 
what  Promethean  philosophy,  but  not  unfruitful  of  mental  steadfastness 
and,  sometimes,  of  large  results.  He  quoted,  with  approbation,  the 
argument  against  suicide,  attributed  to  Napoleon,  that  "  suicide  is 
never  justifiable  while  hope  remains ;  but  that, Awhile  there  is  life,  there 
is  always  hope."  His  beliefs  ripened  in  after-years  into  a  profound 
faith  in  the  Supreme  God,  his  providence  and  his  mercy. 

Jefferson  Barracks  was  near  enough  to  St.  Louis  to  allow  the  young 
officers  to  mingle  freely  in  its  gay  and  hospitable  society,  in  which  the 
influence  of  the  old  French  element  was  still  predominant.  The  de 
scendants  of  the  first  settlers  had  preserved  in  their  colonial  isolation 
some  of  the  best  features  of  the  old  regime,  lost  even  in  France  itself 
through  the  Revolution.  To  innocent  sprightliness  was  joined  decorum, 
and  the  inherent  grace  and  polish  of  the  French  race  were  united  to  the 
cordiality  and  generous  freedom  of  intercourse  which  mark  a  young  and 
prosperous  community.  The  benefits  and  enjoyment  of  such  a  society 
xvere  very  great  to  the  young  officers,  whose  commissions,  in  that  happy 
day  of  the  republic,  accredited  them  to  the  best  society  everywhere. 
Lieutenant  Johnston,  without  allowing  himself  to  fall  into  fashionable 
dissipation  for  which  he  had  no  taste,  did  not  withdraw  himself  from 
the  pleasures  and  amusements  of  the  city,  and  found  in  St.  Louis 
attachments  which  lasted  all  his  life.  The  Gratiots,  the  Chouteaus,  the 
Mullanphys,  the  O'Fallons,  the  Clarks,  the  Bentons,  and  other  noted 
and  estimable  families,  were  among  his  chosen  and  remembered  friends. 

At  a  ball  at  Mr.  Chouteau's,  Lieutenant  Johnston  met  for  the  first 
time  Miss  Henrietta  Preston.  She  was  the  eldest  child  of  Major  Wil- 


HENRIETTA   PRESTON.— MARRIAGE.  23 

liam  Preston,  a  member  of  the  Virginia  family  of  that  name,  and  an 
officer  of  Wayne's  army,  who  had  resigned,  and  settled  at  Louisville, 
Kentucky.  He  was  remarkable  for  his  extraordinary  size  and  strength, 
and  likewise  for  his  wit.  He  is  yet  remembered  by  old  people  for 
these  traits.  He  died,  leaving  a  large  family  and  an  embarrassed  estate 
to  the  care  of  his  widow.  Mrs.  Caroline  Hancock  Preston  was  the 
daughter  of  Colonel  George  Hancock,  of  Fincastle,  Virginia  (an  aide  to 
Pulaski,  a  colonel  in  the  Revolutionary  War,  and  a  member  of  the 
Fourth  Congress),  and  belonged  to  a  family  distinguished  for  beauty 
and  talents.  By  her  ability  in  business  and  indomitable  courage,  she  re 
lieved  the  estate  from  its  incumbrances,  and  successfully  defended  it 
from  all  the  legal  assaults  so  common  in  the  early  history  of  Kentucky. 
At  the  same  time  she  gave  her  children  the  best  education  then  to  be 
had.  Her  best  monument  is  the  grateful  remembrance  of  the  poor  of 
Louisville. 

Mrs.  Preston's  youngest  sister  had  married  Governor  William  Clark, 
of  Missouri,  and  her  husband's  niece  was  the  wife  of  Thomas  H.  Ben- 
ton.  Governor  William  Clark  was  one  of  the  foremost  men  of  the 
West ;  a  younger  brother  of  the  great  George  Rogers  Clark,  he  shared 
his  boldness  and  sagacity  without  his  infirmities,  and  reaped  the  legiti 
mate  rewards  of  energy  and  intellect  from  which  unthrift  debarred  the 
hero.  He  had  early  in  life  obtained  great  celebrity  by  his  explorations, 
in  conjunction  with  Lewis,  of  the  sources  of  the  Columbia  River  and 
in  the  Far  West.  He  was  Governor  of  Missouri  for  many  years,  and, 
as  Indian  agent,  enjoyed  justly  the  confidence  of  his  Government  and 
of  the  Indian  tribes.  With  wealth,  intelligence,  virtue,  and  popular 
manners,  he  was  well  fitted  for  his  place  as  a  leader  in  a  young  repub 
lic.  His  first  wife,  Miss  Julia  Hancock,  was  a  woman  of  eminent 
graces  and  singular  beauty:  after  her  death  he  married  her  cousin, 
Mrs.  Radford.  His  descendants  and  collaterals  are  prominent  citizens 
of  St.  Louis  and  Louisville.  Thomas  H.  Benton  belongs  to  history. 
Counted  among  the  first,  when  Jackson,  Webster,  Calhoun,  and  Clay 
were  his  competitors,  his  name  reopens  a  page  illustrious  in  American 
annals.  His  wife  was  a  daughter  of  Colonel  James  McDowell,  of  Rock- 
bridge  County,  Virginia,  and  sister  of  the  eloquent  Governor  of  Vir 
ginia,  of  the  same  name.  She  was  the  niece  and  favorite  kinswoman 
of  Major  Preston  and  spent  four  or  five  years  in  his  house,  devoting 
herself  for  the  most  part,  as  a  matter  of  choice,  to  the  education  of  his 
daughter  Henrietta,  then  a  little  girl.  As  she  was  a  woman  of  fine 
accomplishments  and  uncommon  literary  culture,  as  well  as  of  a 
sprightly  temper  and  vigorous  intellect,  she  not  only  taught  her  pupil 
the  rudiments,  but  advanced  her  well  in  French  and  other  studies,  and 
imbued  her  especially  with  a  love  of  the  best  literature.  Henrietta, 
and  her  sisters  also,  received  instruction  from  a  private  tutor,  Mr. 


24  EARLY  ARMY-LIFE. 

Quinan,  a  scholar  versed  in  the  classics  and  devoted  to  his  occu 
pation.  After  this,  in  the  hospitable  house  of  her  aunt's  husband, 
Colonel  Nathaniel  Hart,  at  Spring  Hill,  in  Woodford  County,  Kentucky, 
she  was  well  taught  by  Mr.  Ruggles,  afterward  a  United  States  Senator. 
As  years  passed,  the  kinswomen  exchanged  the  relation  of  preceptor 
and  pupil  for  that  of  dear  friends,  which  was  severed  only  by  death. 

In  the  customary  interchange  of  hospitalities,  Miss  Preston  was  on 
a  visit  to  these  relations  when  she  met  Lieutenant  Johnston,  and  the 
interest  that  she  at  once  inspired  was  reciprocated.  This  mutual  at 
tachment  was  thorough  and  unbroken ;  and  Lieutenant  Johnston,  being 
sent  for  a  great  part  of  the  year  1828  on  recruiting  service  to  Louisville, 
Kentucky,  Miss  Preston's  home,  became  engaged  to  her.  They  were 
married  January  20, 1829.  There  were  many  points  of  resemblance  be 
tween  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  and  his  wife  ;  and  a  friend,  who  knew 
them  both  well,  has  told  me  that  he  never  knew  two  people  more  alike 
in  character.  Another,  a  relation,  says  they  were  often  mistaken  for 
brother  and  sister.  But  this  was  true  rather  as  to  the  outcome  of  char 
acter  in  similar  sentiments,  and  the  same  philosophy  of  life,  than  in 
their  original  traits  or  acquired  habits  of  mind.  The  affinity  was  one 
of  sympathy  in  feelings  and  aspiration ;  and  the  usual  law  of  attrac 
tion,  based  upon  contrast  of  character  and  community  of  tastes,  was 
reversed.  As  they  were  both  persons  of  most  loyal  natures,  these  coin 
cidences  increased.  Mrs.  Johnston  was  above  middle  size — five  feet  six 
inches  in  height — and  of  agreeable  person,  with  a  full  form,  a  brilliant 
color,  hazel  eyes,  dark  hair,  and  somewhat  irregular  but  pleasing  feat 
ures.  Her  voice  had  wonderful  harmony  in  its  modulations.  Her 
manner  was  full  of  dignity  and  ease,  but  vivacious  and  engaging,  and 
her  conversation  has  been  variously  characterized  as  piquant,  graceful, 
and  eloquent.  Mrs.  Johnston  was  a  woman  of  firm  yet  gentle  tem 
per,  and,  as  the  eldest  daughter  of  a  struggling  family,  the  confidante 
and  counselor  of  her  mother,  had  been  trained  to  a  severe  self-dis 
cipline.  She  was  eminently  benevolent  and  forbearing.  Gifted  with 
a  poetic  temperament,  and  very  fond  of  verse,  she  wrote  it  with  facility 
and  feeling  ;  while  her  husband,  rigorously  schooled  in  a  training 
almost  exclusively  mathematical,  and  loving  unrefracted  truth,  jocu 
larly  called  it  good  prose  spoiled.  With  these  traits,  with  high  literary 
culture,  and  with  strong  religious  impulses,  she  had  formed  a  lofty 
ideal  of  the  aims  and  duties  of  life  ;  and  this  ideal,  she  thoroughly 
believed,  was  realized  by  her  husband.  She  was  much  beloved  by  her 
family  and  friends,  and  the  feeling  she  awoke  in  her  husband  was  one 
of  chivalric  devotion.  He  told  me  that  "it  was  impossible  to  have 
felt  her  influence,  and  afterward  to  cherish  low  views  ;  that  to  her  he 
owed  the  wish  to  be  truly  great."  This  portraiture  will  show  that 
she  was  a  worthy  helpmate  for  the  man  of  whom  I  write. 


HALCYON  DAYS.  25 

The  married  life  of  this  happy  couple  was  the  simple  and  uneventful 
one  of  an  officer's  family.  Their  home  was  at  Jefferson  Barracks,  where 
their  plain  quarters,  furniture,  and  mode  of  life,  are  evidenced  by  their 
household  accounts  as  well  as  by  tradition.  Some  cut  glass  seems  to 
have  represented  the  splendor  of  their  little  establishment.  They  made 
occasional  visits  to  Mrs.  Johnston's  mother,  at  Louisville,  and  Lieuten 
ant  Johnston,  writing  from  that  city,  October  3,  1830,  says,  "The  last 
two  months  I  have  spent  pleasantly  and  quietly  in  the  country,  read 
ing,  shooting  the  rifle,"  etc. 

On  January  5,  1831,  his  eldest  son  was  born  at  Louisville,  and,  im 
mediately  afterward,  Lieutenant  Johnston  was  obliged  to  return  to 
Jefferson  Barracks.  His  family  rejoined  him  in  May,  and  remained 
there  until  the  fall  of  1832.  In  the  tranquil  flow  of  these  years,  he 
enjoyed  the  easy  routine  of  a  peace  establishment,  agreeable  social 
intercourse,  and  the  happiness  of  perfect  domestic  concord,  unbroken 
except  by  the  two  dire  episodes  of  the  Black-Hawk  War  and  the  cholera 
plague.  Suffice  it  to  say,  that  these  were  halcyon  days,  when  youth 
and  hope,  as  well  as  peace,  abode  with  them.  But  they  were  soon  to 
be  disturbed  by  the  rude  note  of  war,  whose  expectation  keeps  the 
professional  soldier  ever  on  the  alert  even  in  the  profoundest  calm. 


CHAPTER  III. 

BLACK-HAWK     WAR. 

THE  Black-Hawk  War,  which  occurred  in  1832,  following  a  pro 
found  peace  of  many  years,  agitated  not  only  the  Northwestern  fron 
tier  but  the  whole  country.  The  causes  and  conduct  of  the  war  were, 
in  its  day,  severely  criticised  both  by  partisan  politicians  and  philan 
thropists.  The  motives  of  the  latter  entitle  them  to  a  respectful  hear 
ing;  but  the  common-sense  of  the  people  has  always  sustained  the 
practical  view  that  the  first  duty  of  the  Government  in  its  relations 
with  the  Indians  is  to  protect  its  citizens  from  the  horrors  of  savage  war 
fare,  after  which  it  should  accord  the  most  generous  and  considerate 
treatment  to  the  aborigines. 

Unfortunately,  the  Government  has  sometimes,  from  mistaken  views 
of  economy,  chosen  to  forget  the  half-paternal  position  it  had  assumed 
toward  the  Indians,  and  has,  for  trifling  sums,  obtained  title  to  vast 
tracts  of  country.  Unfortunately,  too,  among  the  brave  and  good  men 
who  go  to  the  frontier  as  pioneers  there  are  never  wanting  so  many 
unprincipled  persons  and  outlaws,  who,  from  selfish  greed  of  gain,  are 


26  BLACK-HAWK  WAR. 

willing  to  brutalize  with  whiskey,  or  to  cheat,  oppress,  and  kill  the 
Indian,  that  the  latter  has  always  suffered  demoralization  from  contact 
with  the  vanguard  of  civilization,  and  has  had  only  too  just  grounds 
of  complaint  against  both  individuals  and  the  Government.  A  further 
source  of  discord  has  arisen  from  the  inability  of  the  Indians  to  distin 
guish  between  the  loose  verbal  promises  of  commissioners,  anxious  to 
secure  a  treaty,  and  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  itself.  The  Indians 
remember  and  claim  the  benefit  of  all  that  is  said  or  done  by  the  agents 
that  can  be  construed  to  their  advantage  ;  while  the  Government,  not 
knowing  or  recognizing  these  things,  merely  executes  the  treaty  on  its 
face.  Hence  mutual  distrust  and  collision  have  been  almost  inevitable. 

The  higher  tribes  of  Indians  were  formerly  full  of  the  martial  vir 
tues — courage,  enterprise,  fortitude,  sagacity,  scorn  of  servitude,  with 
an  occasional  though  unfrequent  loftiness  of  soul  and  heroic  generos 
ity  ;  but  they  were  restless,  prone  to  war,  cruel,  and  perfidious.  In  the 
contact  of  a  civilized  race  with  these  sons  of  the  forest,  a  wiser  and 
more  liberal  treatment  by  the  Government  might  have  averted  many 
evils  and  much  mutual  wrong  ;  but  with  these  wild  and  intractable 
savages  no  kindness  or  forbearance  could  have  prevented  quarrels  and 
violence  ending  in  war. 

Yet,  wheresoever  the  responsibility  may  originally  have  rested,  no 
blame  can  properly  be  laid  on  such  military  officers  as,  being  charged 
with  the  peace  of  the  frontier,  have  been  faithful  in  carrying  out  the 
orders  and  instructions  of  the  Government,  and  have  restrained  pre 
datory  bands  of  Indians  frcm  inflicting  injury  on  the  whites  and  on 
each  other.  This  duty  was  always,  with  very  rare  exceptions,  honestly 
discharged  ;  and  force  was  only  used  in  the  last  resort,  after  every 
measure  of  conciliation  had  failed.  The  best  proof  that  peace,  on  the 
basis  of  justice,  was  earnestly  sought  by  the  officers  of  Government  is 
that  it  lasted  so  long,  although  the  Indians  had  serious  causes  of  dis 
satisfaction,  which  were  said  to  have  been  fomented  by  British  agents 
on  the  frontier.  That  the  Indians  had  confidence  in  the  equity  and 
friendship  of  the  military  is  evinced  by  the  respect  they  paid  to 
soldiers,  even  at  a  time  when  they  were  engaged  in  actual  though 
secret  warfare  against  the  white  settlers.  They  had  some  notion 
that  the  soldiers  and  citizens  were  different  though  allied  tribes  ;  and 
a  blue  uniform  was  a  safe-conduct,  even  when  a  white  settler's  life  was 
not  worth  a  pin's  fee  with  them.  The  Hon.  Jefferson  Davis  related 
to  the  writer  how,  at  such  a  time,  with  only  three  men,  he  passed  from 
Rock  Island  to  Chicago  without  molestation,  and  with  only  a  single 
threatening  demonstration  from  the  Indians  he  met.  It  was  properly 
the  first  care  of  the  commanding  general  to  see  to  the  safety  of  the 
white  settlers  ;  and  he  was  compelled  to  act  upon  each  case,  as  it  arose, 
from  a  practical  standpoint.  Hence,  whether  the  Black-Hawk  War 


JOHNSTON'S  MILITARY  JOURNAL.  21 

was  a  necessary  consequence  of  the  policy  of  the  Government,  or  of 
Indian  fickleness,  it  is  believed  that  the  events  herein  narrated  will 
show  that  the  military  commander  pursued  the  only  course  open  to  him. 
A  brief  sketch  of  the  Black-Hawk  War  is  here  needful,  as  it  was 
directly  connected  with  Lieutenant  Johnston's  apprenticeship  in  the 
field.  But  a  more  extended  narrative  of  this  military  episode  seems 
fully  warranted,  since  not  only  are  all  the  official  documents  in  regard 
to  the  campaign  based  upon  Lieutenant  Johnston's  report,  as  assistant 
adjutant-general  of  General  Atkinson,  but  his  private  journal  fur 
nished  the  most  exact  and  authentic  a'ccount  of  the  transactions  against 
Black  Hawk.  Moreover,  although  his  military  rank  did  not  give  him 
a  conspicuous  place,  yet  his  office  and  his  personal  position,  as  the 
confidential  friend  of  the  commanding  general,  gave  him  a  certain 
influence  over  affairs.  Mr.  Chambers,  in  a  letter  heretofore  quoted, 
says  :  "  I  remember  hearing  an  officer  of  the  army  tell  my  father  that 
Johnston  had  more  influence  with  the  general  in  command  than  any 
body  else  in  the  army,  and  that  he  really  directed  the  movements  of 
the  army  in  that  war."  Although  this  was  the  opinion  of  a  highly- 
zealous  friend,  yet  it  is  evidence  that  his  part  was  one  that  called  for 
an  unusual  amount  of  energy  and  discretion.  Without  indulging  the 
popular  delusion  that  the  chief  of  staff  is  necessarily  keeper  of  his  com 
mander's  conscience,  it  is  plain  that  where  he  enjoys  his  confidence, 
and  has  fidelity  and  justness  of  perception,  he  is  eminently  fitted  to  be 
the  historian  of  a  campaign.  General  Atkinson's  own  opinion  of  the 
value  of  the  journal  may  be  inferred  from  the  following  extracts  from 
a  letter  of  his  to  Lieutenant  Johnston,  written  in  December,  1833,  after 
the  close  of  the  war,  in  reference  to  the  proposition  of  a  gentleman 
named  Russell  to  write  a  history  of  the  war: 

As  this  history  is  to  be  written,  I  could  but  feel,  as  you  may  readily  imagine, 
a  deep  interest  in  its  faithfulness.  ...  To  enable  me  to  give  him  the  best 
information  as  to  dates  and  facts,  I  have  to  request  that  you  will  send  me  the 
journal  you  kept  of  the  campaign. 

It  is  this  journal  which  forms  the  groundwork  of  the  present  sum 
mary,  and  as  copious  extracts  are  given  from  it  as  space  permits. 

Before  proceeding  to  narrate  the  transactions  of  the  Black-Hawk 
campaign,  which,  however  small  in  perspective,  shook  the  United 
States  with  excitement  at  the  time,  it  will  be  necessary  to  make  a 
rapid  survey  of  the  relations  of  the  United  States  Government  to  the 
Sac  and  Fox  nation,  and  of  the  condition  of  the  frontier  at  the  begin 
ning  of  the  outbreak.  In  the  eighteenth  century,  a  number  of  tribes,  of 
common  origin,  occupied  the  present  limits  of  Illinois,  and  were  united 
in  a  league,,  known  as  the  Minneway,  Linneway,  or  Illinois.  This 
confederacy  is  said  to  have  numbered,  in  1745,  four  thousand  warriors, 


28  BLACK-HAWK  WAR. 

noted  for  martial  prowess  and  inhuman  cruelty.  In  a  great  war,  said 
to  have  originated  in  the  murder  of  the  Sac  chieftain,  Pontiac,  the 
Illinois  tribes  were  overthrown  and  nearly  exterminated  by  a  rival 
confederacy,  composed  of  Sacs  and  Foxes,  Sioux,  Kickapoos,  Chippe- 
was,  Ottawas,  and  Pottawattamies,  from  the  North,  and  Cherokees 
and  Choctaws  from  the  South.  This  overthrow  occurred  between  1767 
and  1780  ;  and  in  1826  a  miserable  remnant  of  less  than  five  hundred 
souls  was  all  that  was  left  of  the  great  Illinois  nation. 

In  the  victorious  league,  the  Sacs  or  Osaukies,  and  the  Foxes  or 
Outagamies,  appear  to  have  been  the  leaders  and  principal  gainers. 
These  kindred  branches  of  the  great  Algonquin  nation  are  said  to  have 
been  driven  from  their  homes  on  the  St.  Lawrence  by  the  Iroquois 
before  the  year  1680,  and  to  have  settled  at  Green  Bay,  where  their 
weakness  compelled  them  to  unite,  so  as  to  form  one  people  with  only 
a  nominal  distinction  between  its  two  members.  After  the  destruction 
of  the  Illinois,  the  Sacs  and  Foxes  took  possession  of  their  most  desir 
able  hunting-grounds,  and  occupied  the  country  on  both  sides  of  the 
Mississippi,  from  the  present  southern  boundary  of  Iowa  to  the  pres 
ent  northern  boundary  of  Illinois,  with  their  most  populous  village  at 
Rock  Island. 

Other  tribes  of  Algonquin  or  Dakota  descent — Chippewas,  Ot 
tawas,  Pottawattamies,  Kickapoos,  Menomonees,  and  Winnebagoes,1 
pressed  upon  the  eastern  and  northern  limits  of  the  hunting-grounds 
of  the  Sacs  and  Foxes  ;  while  the  Sioux,  a  powerful  nation  of  fierce 
and  skillful  horsemen,  flanked  them  on  the  west  and  northwest.  In 
1779  the  Sacs  and  Foxes,  with  their  allies,  attacked  St.  Louis,  then  a 
village  of  less  than  five  hundred  people  ;  and,  encouraged  by  the  treach 
ery  of  the  commandant  of  the  Spanish  garrison,  would  have  destroyed 
it,  but  for  the  gallant  defense  of  the  French  inhabitants  and  its  timely 
relief  by  George  Rogers  Clark  with  an  American  force. 

After  this,  the  Sacs  and  Foxes  were  engaged  in  wars  with  the 
Osages  and  other  tribes,  but  especially  with  the  Sioux,  against  whom 
they  waged  a  deadly  feud.  Nevertheless  they  were  prosperous,  and  a 
leading  tribe  in  numbers ;  while  in  warlike  spirit,  sagacity,  polity,  and 
general  intelligence,  they  were  excelled  by  none  of  the  tribes  of  the 
Northwest.  In  1805  Lieutenant  Pike  represented  their  numbers  at 
4,600,  of  whom  1,100  were  warriors ;  but  Lewis  and  Clark  compute 
that  they  were  3,200  strong,  of  whom  800  were  warriors,  which  was 
probably  nearer  the  truth.  In  1825,  the  Secretary  of  War,  adopting 
the  estimate  of  Govern  or  William  Clark,  reckoned  their  entire  strength 
at  6,600,  with  a  force  of  1,200  or  1,400  warriors ;  thus  showing  a  rapid 
gain  in  strength  in  twenty  years. 

1  Winnebago  is  a  term  of  reproach,  signifying  "  Dirty-Water-People ; "  they  call 
themselves  "  Hochongalas,  or  Trout  Tribe." 


BLACK  HAWK  AXD  KEOKUK.  29 

General  St.  Clair,  Governor  of  the  Northwest  Territory,  made  the 
first  treaty  with  the  Sacs  and  Foxes  in  1789.  General  William  Henry 
Harrison  concluded  another  treaty  with  them,  November  3,  1804,  by 
which,  for  an  immediate  payment  of  $2,234.50,  and  an  annuity  of 
$1,000,  they  relinquished  all  their  lands  outside  certain  prescribed 
limits. 

In  1810,  when  war  was  impending  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain,  the  emissaries  of  the  latter  power  induced  a  hundred  or 
a  hundred  and  fifty  Sacs  to  visit  the  British  agent  on  the  island  of 
St.  Joseph,  in  Lake  Huron,  where  they  received  arms,  ammunition,  and 
other  presents,  and  most  probably  made  engagements  to  adhere  to  the 
British  cause  in  the  event  of  war.  In  1811,  however,  another  deputa 
tion  from  the  tribe  visited  Washington  City,  and  offered  their  services 
in  the  impending  war,  but  were  requested  by  the  President  to  remain 
neutral. 

In  1812  they  again  offered  to  assist  the  Americans,  but  were  told 
to  stay  peaceably  at  home,  to  which  command  the  greater  part  of  the 
tribe  reluctantly  submitted.  About  two  hundred  of  the  more  restless 
braves,  eager  for  blood  and  plunder,  joined  the  British,  and  shared  in  the 
military  operations  on  the  northwestern  frontier.  In  this  contingent, 
known  as  "  the  British  band,"  was  Black  Hawk.  In  September,  1815, 
the  United  States  commissioners  made  a  treaty  with  the  friendly 
bands  of  Sacs  arid  Foxes,  confirming  the  treaty  of  1804,  and  granting 
amnesty  for  all  offenses  committed  during  the  war ;  and,  on  May  13, 
1816,  they  made  a  like  treaty  with  the  British  band.  On  the  24th  of 
August,  1824,  General  William  Clark,  Indian  Agent,  purchased  for 
the  United  States  all  the  lands  claimed  by  this  tribe  in  Missouri.  In 
July,  1829,  in  furtherance  of  a  provisional  agreement  made  the  year 
before,  the  United  States  commissioners  bought  from  the  deputies  of 
the  Winnebagoes,  Chippewas,  Ottawas,  Pottawattamies,  Sioux,  Me- 
iiomonees,  and  Sacs  and  Foxes,  about  8,000,000  acres,  extending  from 
Lake  Michigan  to  the  Mississippi  River.  At  this  treaty,  Keokuk  and 
Morgan,  with  about  two  hundred  Sac  warriors,  were  present  and  for 
warded  the  negotiation. 

While  such  had  been  the  treaty  relations  with  the  Sacs  and  Foxes, 
two  rival  war-chiefs  divided  the  double  tribe  by  their  counsels,  and 
contended  for  the  first  place  in  authority  and  influence.  These  were 
Keokuk,  who  was  said  to  be  of  Fox  descent,  though  chief  of  the  Sac 
village  on  the  Des  Moines  River  ;  and  Black  Hawk,  chief  of  the  Sac 
village  near  Rock  Island.  Each  had  risen  to  his  position  by  courage 
and  talents.  Keokuk,  born  about  1780,  acquired  very  young  a  skill  in 
horsemanship  which  enabled  him,  at  fifteen  years  of  age,  to  slay  a  Sioux 
warrior,  and  thereafter  to  be  accounted  a  brave.  In  the  wars  with  the 
Sioux  he  was  distinguished  for  audacious  courage  and  military  strata- 


30  BLACK-HAWK  WAR. 

gem.  He  was  called  to  the  leadership  of  his  village,  when  about  thirty- 
three  years  of  age,  in  a  public  emergency  ;  and  gradually  won  the  con 
fidence  of  the  tribe  by  his  prudent  administration  and  persuasive  elo 
quence.  His  conduct  was  firm  yet  conciliatory,  both  in  the  internal 
management  of  the  tribe  and  in  his  relations  to  other  tribes  and  to  the 
white  people.  By  fidelity  to  his  engagements  and  steadfastness  of  pur 
pose,  he  was  able  to  preserve  a  peaceful  policy,  so  difficult  with  such  a 
restless  people,  and  to  save  his  followers  from  much  of  the  suffering  which 
fell  upon  others.  He  was  an  accomplished  warrior,  and  an  orator  of 
rare  tact,  grace,  and  vigor.  Keokuk's  temper  was  naturally  amiable 
and  kind,  as  well  as  politic.  He  was  somewhat  luxurious  for  an  Indian, 
fond  of  pomp,  and  given  to  the  use  of  ardent  spirits,  which  finally 
destroyed  him. 

Black  Hawk  was  thirteen  years  his  senior,  and  belonged  to  a  darker 
and  more  savage  type  of  the  Indian  character.  He,  too,  at  the  early 
age  of  fifteen,  won  the  rank  of  brave  by  killing  an  Osage  warrior,  and 
was  soon  noted  for  his  boldness  and  success  in  war.  In  1786,  at  the 
head  of  two  hundred  braves,  he  defeated  the  Osages  with  equal  num 
bers,  killing  one  hundred  of  the  enemy,  and  only  losing  nineteen  of  his 
own  men.  He  was  a  leader  in  the  wars  against  the  Cherokees,  Chip- 
pewas,  Kaskaskias,  and  Osages,  in  many  battles,  and  truthfully  claimed 
that  he  had  killed  many  foes  with  his  own  hand.  He  seems  from  the 
first  to  have  had  an  aversion  to  the  Americans,  and  to  have  cherished 
an  hereditary  friendship  for  the  British.  In  the  War  of  1812  he  had 
led  to  their  aid  about  two  hundred  of  his  own  tribe,  and  commanded  a 
band  numbering  in  all  about  five  hundred  warriors.  He  shared  in  the 
hostilities  against  the  Americans  in  that  war,  though  without  special 
distinction  ;  but,  at  its  close,  was  again  received  under  the  protection 
of  the  United  States,  according  to  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of 
Ghent,  and  of  the  treaty  of  1816  with  the  British  band. 

From  1816  to  1832  Black  Hawk  was  not  engaged  in  open  war 
against  the  United  States,  but  was  almost  certainly  an  accomplice  in 
the  Red  Bird  outrage,  and  in  other  secret  forays  on  the  white  people. 
He  frequently  visited  the  British  commander  at  Maiden  to  renew  the 
allegiance  of  the  past,  and  to  receive  presents  for  himself  and  band. 
His  early  prejudices  against  the  Americans  gradually  settled  into  an 
inveterate  rancor  ;  the  continually-increasing  contention  between  his 
own  people  and  the  whites  aroused  his  fierce  passions  ;  and  enforced 
peace  galled  his  unquiet  soul  like  a  fetter.  In  the  gloom  of  his  seclu 
sion,  superstition  stirred  his  wrath  to  frenzy  ;  and,  as  he  saw  the  shad 
ows  of  the  dead  summoning  him  to  vengeance  upon  the  race  that  had 
dispossessed  them  of  the  land,  he  brooded  over  vast  schemes  that 
should  rival  the  conspiracies  of  Pontiac  and  Tecumseh.  In  these  pro 
ject  she  was  encouraged  by  the  counsels  of  the  Prophet  Wabokieshiek, 


BLACK   HAWK'S   CONSPIRACY.  31 

or  White  Cloud,  a  chief  of  mixed  Sac  and  Winnebago  blood,  who  had 
a  village  on  Rock  River,  and  possessed  a  wide  influence  among  the 
Indian  tribes.  This  savage  charlatan,  who  combined  great  cunning 
with  a  love  of  intrigue,  was  the  evil  genius  of  Black  Hawk,  and  lent 
the  sanction  of  his  omens  and  auguries  to  attempts  which  had  no  other 
assurance  of  success. 

Black  Hawk  advocated  a  hostile  policy,  in  opposition  to  the  pacific 
course  of  Keokuk,  because  he  was  thus  enabled  to  divide  the  suffrages 
of  the  tribe,  and  to  allure  from  his  peaceable  rival  to  himself  a  follow 
ing  of  the  more  feverish  spirits.  He  is  said,  too,  to  have  suffered  per 
sonal  insults  and  wrongs  in  the  feuds  and  quarrels  that  arose  between 
his  village  and  its  white  neighbors,  and  to  have  once  been  beaten  with 
sticks  by  white  men,  which  indignity  ever  after  rankled  in  his  breast. 
Most  of  the  anecdotes  told  of  him,  however,  have  all  the  indication  of 
mythical  origin  ;  and  his  own  stories  were  always  exaggerated,  and 
often  evidently  false.  He  was  undoubtedly  a  man  of  lofty  and  un 
quenchable  spirit.  In  his  old  age,  after  his  defeat,  he  was  in  the  house 
of  a  man  with  whom  he  frequently  dined  ;  a  captain  in  the  army  came 
to  dinner,  and  the  host  intimated  to  Black  Hawk  that  he  should  come  to 
the  second  table.  Black  Hawk's  eye  glistened  with  anger  as  he  an 
swered  him,  raising  the  forefinger  of  one  hand  to  his  breast  to  repre 
sent  the  officer :  "  I  know  the  white  man  is  a  chief ;  but  I"  elevat 
ing  the  finger  of  the  other  hand  far  above  his  head,  "  was  a  chief, 
and  led  my  warriors  to  the  fight,  long  before  his  mother  knew  him ! 
Your  meat — my  dogs  should  not  eat  it !  "  He  was  the  husband  of  one 
wife  for  forty  years,  and  was  affectionate  to  her  and  his  children.  In 
this  haughty  warrior  we  see  some  of  the  best  and  worst  traits  of  the 
savage  character — intense  devotion  to  friends,  and  pitiless  cruelty  to 
foes. 

As  the  tide  of  emigration  poured  westward,  the  rich  lands  ceded 
by  the  Sacs  and  Foxes  in  the  treaty  of  1829  were  a  principal  point  of 
attraction  to  the  pioneers.  Keokuk  and  all  the  tribe,  except  the  band 
under  Black  Hawk  at  the  Rock  Island  village,  removed  to  the  west 
bank  of  the  Mississippi  River  ;  but  these  Indians  remained  deaf  to  the 
advice  of  the  agents  and  the  solicitations  of  Keokuk.  The  Govern 
ment,  assuming  that  it  had  acquired  a  valid  title  to  the  land  east  of 
the  Mississippi,  threw  it  open  to  entry  and  purchase  by  the  settlers, 
who,  naturally  looking  no  further  for  a  foundation  for  their  own  rights, 
selected  the  most  fertile  spots  for  their  locations.  Among  these  was 
the  land  on  which  stood  Black  Hawk's  village.  The  angry  chief 
viewed  their  intrusion  as  alike  an  injury  and  an  insult.  Of  all  those 
broad  acres,  why  select  the  site  of  his  wigwam  ?  A  contest  began  for 
the  actual  occupation  of  the  soil,  with  the  usual  consequences  of 
1  Drake's  "  Life  of  Black  Hawk." 


32  BLACK-HAWK  WAR. 

mutual  depredation,  violence,  and  strife.  To  put  an  end  to  this  state 
of  affairs,  the  United  States  Government  ordered  the  Indians  of  the 
Rock  Island  village  to  comply  with  the  treaty  of  1829,  surrender  the 
disputed  lands,  and  cross  the  Mississippi  River. 

Black  Hawk  and  his  party  denied  the  binding  force  of  the  treaties 
to  which  he  himself  had  assented,  and  also  the  construction  placed 
upon  them  by  the  United  States  Government,  and  induced  the  Sacs 
on  Rock  River  not  to  remove  from  their  village.  The  quarrel  between 
the  white  people  and  the  Indians  reached  such  a  point  that  in  May, 
1831,  Governor  Reynolds,  on  an  appeal  from  the  settlers,  called  out 
700  Illinois  militia  "  to  repel  the  invasion  of  the  State,"  as  he  styled 
the  refusal  to  move.  General  Gaines,  likewise,  at  his  request, 
assembled  ten  companies  of  United  States  troops  at  Fort  Armstrong, 
where,  on  the  7th  of  June,  he  held  a  council  with  the  chiefs  of 
the  Sacs  and  Foxes.  At  this  council  Black  Hawk  denied  that  they 
had  sold  their  lands,  and  refused  to  move.  General  Gaines,  to  avoid 
bloodshed,  and  hoping  to  effect  his  object  by  mere  show  of  force, 
assembled  1,600  mounted  militiamen  to  cooperate  with  his  troops  ; 
and,  on  the  25th  of  June,  took  possession  of  the  Sac  village  without  re 
sistance.  During  the  previous  night  the  Indians,  perceiving  the  hope 
lessness  of  resistance,  had  left  their  village,  and  encamped  near  by 
under  the  protection  of  a  white  flag.  Black  Hawk  and  the  other  chiefs 
then  came  into  a  council  with  General  Gaines,  in  which,  after  claiming 
that  the  land  could  not  have  been  ceded  in  1829,  because  it  belonged 
to  an  old  squaw,  whom  he  called  his  "  mother," *  he  declared  that  he 
yielded  to  force.  Nevertheless,  on  the  30th  of  June  they  signed  a 
treaty,  agreeing  to  submit  to  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  and 
to  remain  on  the  west  side  of  the  Mississippi. 

It  is  almost  certain  that  Black  Hawk  had  been  trying  for  some 
years  to  unite  the  Northwestern  Indians  in  a  league  against  the  whites, 
and  that  he  believed  that  he  had  secured  the  adhesion  of  nine  bands 
of  different  tribes ;  while  the  Prophet  also  promised  him  the  aid  of 
the  British.  When  he  found  himself  compelled  to  submit,  through 
the  failure  of  his  allies,  he  readily  attributed  the  miscarriage  to  their 
fickleness,  their  unreadiness,  and  their  want  of  organization,  and  post 
poned  his  plan  until  the  difficulties  could  be  removed.  Black  Hawk 
probably  made  the  treaty  of  1831  as  a  mere  blind,  with  no  intention  of 
remaining  on  the  west  side  of  the  Mississippi.  The  treaty  was  scarcely 
concluded  before  his  people  were  crossing  the  river  to  take  corn  from 
their  former  fields,  while  his  emissaries  were  busy  stirring  up  discon 
tent  in  his  own  and  other  tribes.  But  for  the  quiet  yet  resolute 
resistance  of  Keokuk,  and  the  resulting  apathy  of  the  majority  of  the 
Sacs  and  Foxes,  he  would  have  succeeded  in  organizing  a  wide-spread 
1  This  title  was  tribal,  not  domestic. 


BEGINNING   OF   THE   WAR.  33 

and  formidable  insurrection ;  as  it  was,  it  is  almost  certain  that  he  had 
many  allies,  who  only  waited  for  success  to  crown  his  earlier  efforts 
before  joining  him.  That  he  was  not  altogether  unsuccessful  in  his 
diplomacy  is  best  evinced  by  General  Scott's  statement  that  at  least 
eight  lodges  of  Winnebagoes,  and  many  Kickapoos,  Pottawattamies, 
and  other  Indians,  were  present  with  the  British  band  in  the  campaign 
of  1832.  The  contest  with  Black  Hawk,  however,  was  finally  precipi 
tated  before  the  maturity  of  his  conspiracy — not  by  direct  collision 
between  the  white  men  and  Indians,  but  by  one  of  those  bloody  out 
rages  of  one  tribe  upon  another,  so  frequent  in  savage  annals,  which 
the  United  States  Government,  as  supreme  conservator  of  the  peace, 
and  by  virtue  of  its  treaty  obligations,  was  compelled  to  punish. 

The  following  is  Lieutenant  Johnston's  account  of  the  occurrences 
of  the  war : 

On  the  1st  of  April,  1832,  Brigadier-General  Atkinson,  then  commanding 
the  right  wing,  "Western  Department,  received  an  order,  dated  17th  of  March, 
from  the  headquarters  of  the  army,  announcing  that  the  Sacs  and  Foxes,  in 
violation  of  the  Treaty  of  Prairie  du  Chien  of  1830,  had  attacked  the  Menomo- 
nees  near  Fort  Crawford,  and  killed  twenty-five  of  that  tribe,  and  that  the 
Menomonees  meditated  a  retaliation.  To  preserve  the  pledged  faith  of  the 
Government  unbroken,  and  keep  peace  and  amity  among  those  tribes,  he  was 
instructed  to  prevent  any  movement,  on  the  part  of  the  Menomonees,  against  the 
Sacs  and  Foxes,  and  to  demand  of  the  Sac  and  Fox  nation  eight  or  ten  of  the 
party  engaged  in  the  murder  of  the  Menomonees,  including  some  of  the  principal 
men.  For  these  purposes  he  was  empowered  to  employ  the  regular  force  on 
the  Mississippi,  or  so  much  as  could  be  dispensed  with  after  providing  for  the 
security  of  the  several  posts.  The  remote  position  of  Fort  Snelling,  at  the  Falls 
of  St.  Anthony,  surrounded  as  it  was  by  powerful  bands  of  Indians,  precluded 
the  possibility  of  drawing  any  portion  of  the  force  from  that  point.  The  force 
then  to  be  relied  on,  to  carry  into  effect  the  views  of  the  Government,  was 
such  of  the  troops  as  could  be  spared  from  the  slender  force  at  Prairie  du  Chien, 
the  troops  at  Fort  Winnebago  at  the  portage  of  the  Fox  and  Wisconsin  Rivers 
and  Fort  Armstrong  at  Rock  Island,  and  the  companies  of  the  Sixth  Regiment 
at  Jefferson  Barracks,  amounting  in  all  to  about  420  men. 

April  Sth. — In  obedience  to  the  above-mentioned  order,  General  Atkinson 
set  off  for  the  Upper  Mississippi,  with  six  companies  of  the  Sixth  Infantry  (220 
men),  which  were  embarked  at  Jefferson  Barracks,  Missouri,  in  the  steamboats 
Enterprise  and  Chieftain. 

April  10th. — Arrived  at  the  rapids  of  the  Des  Moines  about  2  P.  M.  Here 
the  commanding  officer  was  informed  that  the  British  band  of  Indians,  under 
Mucatah-mich-i-ca-Kaik '(Black  Hawk),  had  crossed  the  Mississippi  to  the  east 
bank,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Lower  Iowa  River.  This  band  consisted  of  four 
or  five  hundred  well-appointed  horsemen,  besides  men  and  boys,  employed  in 
transporting  the  canoes,  capable  of  bearing  arms,  making  an  active  and  effi 
cient  force  of  between  five  and  six  hundred:  the  -whole — men,  women,  and 
children — amounting  to  above  two  thousand  souls.  The  ultimate  intentions  of 
Black  Hawk  were  unknown ;  this  movement,  however,  was  in  direct  contraven- 

1  Spelled,  by  McKenny  and  Hall,  Ma-ka-tai-she-kia-kiak.     ("  Indian  Tribes,"  vol.  ii.) 


34  BLACK-HAWK  WAR. 

tion  of  a  compact  made  and  entered  into,  the  year  previous,  by  the  Sacs  and 
Foxes  and  the  United  States. 

The  troops  had  to  be  disembarked  and  marched  to  the  head  of  the 
rapids,  on  account  of  shallow  water,  and,  going  on  board  again  next 
day,  arrived  at  Rock  Island  on  the  12th. 

April  13th. — Black  Hawk's  band  was  reported  this  morning  to  be  passing 
up  on  the  east  side  of  Rock  River ;  some  canoes  were  also  seen  passing  up  Rock 
River.  Several  white  men  were  sent  among  these  Indians  to  obtain  informa 
tion  of  their  designs.  They  learned  nothing  of  their  destination ;  their  course 
indicates  that  their  movement  is  upon  the  Prophet's  village.  At  10  A.  M.  Gen 
eral  Atkinson  met  the  Sacs  and  some  of  the  Fox  chiefs  in  council. 

The  minutes  of  the  council,  in  Lieutenant  Johnston's  handwriting, 
give  the  speech  of  General  Atkinson,  stating  the  treaty  obligations  of 
the  parties  and  their  violation,  and  demanding  eight  or  ten  of  the  mur 
derers  of  the  Menomonees.  He  also  warned  them  to  stay  away  from 
Black  Hawk,  whom  he  intended  to  compel  to  recross  the  river.  The 
chiefs,  after  withdrawing  to  the  plain  to  deliberate,  returned,  prepared 
to  reply.  Keokuk  admitted  all  that  General  Atkinson  said  to  be 
true,  but  declared  his  inability  to  control  or  surrender  the  murderers, 
who  were  with  Black  Hawk.  He  concluded  : 

You  wish  us  to  keep  at  peace,  and  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  Rock  River 
Indians.  We  will  do  so.  In  token  of  our  intentions,  you  see  we  have  laid  our 
spears  there  together.  While  you  are  gone  to  Prairie  du  Chien,  we  will  en 
deavor  to  speak  to  Black  Hawk's  band,  and  try  to  persuade  them  to  go  back. 
If  we  do  not  succeed,  I  can  do  no  more  ;  then  we  will  go  home  and  try  to  keep 
our  village  at  peace.  The  one  who  has  raised  all  this  trouble  is  a  Winnebago, 
called  the  Prophet. 

Prince  (Wapello),  the  chief  of  the  Foxes,  spoke  to  the  same  effect, 
General  Atkinson  then  told  them  that,  in  justice  to  the  Menomonees, 
he  must  require  hostages  of  them.  Keokuk  declared  that  he  and  his 
friends  would  be  the  first  to  be  killed  by  Black  Hawk  if  he  had  the 
power.  The  speakers  also  informed  General  Atkinson  that  Black 
Hawk  was  eight  or  nine  miles  up  Rock  River,  with  500  warriors.  The 
council  was  then  adjourned  to  the  19th  of  April. 

General  Atkinson  then  proceeded  up  the  river,  and  made  arrange 
ments  with  the  commander  at  Prairie  du  Chien,  and  with  General 
Dodge  at  Galena,  relative  to  the  protection  of  their  districts,  and  the 
prevention  of  hostilities  by  the  Menomonees  and  Sioux  against  the 
friendly  Sacs  and  Foxes. 

On  his  return  to  Fort  Armstrong,  General  Atkinson  again  met  the 
friendly  Sacs  and  Foxes  on  the  19th.  They  brought  in  three  young 
men  who  had  been  engaged  in  the  murder  of  the  Menomonees.  In 
delivering  them  up,  Wapello  said  :  "  There  are  the  young  men,  who 


STILLMAN'S   DEFEAT.  35 

have  taken  pity  on  the  women  and  children.  There  are  three  of  them. 
These  are  my  chiefs.  These  are  the  men  who  went  into  the  braves' 
lodge  to  give  themselves  up.  Father,  I  have  received  these  young 
men  ;  I  now  deliver  them  to  you."  Keokuk  spoke  to  the  same  effect. 
General  Atkinson  expressed  himself  satisfied,  and  promised  generous 
treatment  to  the  young  men  who  had  given  themselves  up.  He  also 
promised  protection  to  the  friendly  Sacs  and  Foxes,  and  threatened 
punishment  to  Black  Hawk's  band.  The  journal  continues : 

April  24^.— General  Atkinson,  having  sent  several  persons  to  the  British 
band  of  Indians,  and  hearing  nothing  of  them,  resolved  to  dispatch  two  young 
Sacs  with  a  mild  talk. 

April  26th. — The  two  young  Sacs  returned  to-day  from  the  British  band, 
bringing  Black  Hawk's  answer,  which  was,  that  "  his  heart  was  bad,  and  that 
lie  was  determined  not  to  turn  back." 

On  April  27th  Mr.  Gratiot  brought  word  from  the  Prophet's  village 
that  Black  Hawk's  band  had  run  up  the  British  flag,  and  was  decidedly 
hostile.  General  Atkinson  now  made  arrangements  to  secure  the  co 
operation  of  the  Illinois  volunteers  with  the  regular  troops,  but  they 
were  not  concentrated  at  Rock  River  Rapids  before  the  9th  of  May. 
In  the  mean  time  emissaries  had  been  sent  to  the  Winnebagoes,  and 
other  measures  taken  to  secure  the  peace  of  the  frontier.  On  May 
10th  the  movement  up  Rock  River  was  begun. 

The  mounted  volunteers,  under  General  Whltesides,  marched  for  Dixon's 
Ferry.  The  United  States  and  Illinois  infantry  moved  by  water  to  the  same 
point,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Taylor,  First  Infantry.  The  provisions, 
etc.,  for  the  troops  were  transported  in  keels  by  the  infantry. 

On  the  14th  the  troops  arrived  at  and  burned  the  Prophet's  and 
Witticoe's  villages,  and  on  the  next  day  received  the  news  of  Stillman's 
defeat  at  Kishwarkee  (or  Sycamore)  Creek.  It  appears  that  Major  Still- 
man,  with  his  battalion  of  mounted  volunteers  from  the  command  of 
General  Whitesides,  who  was  in  advance,  had  volunteered  for  a  scout 
ing  expedition.  This  battalion  presented  the  unfortunate  combination 
of  an  incompetent  leader  and  an  armed,  disorderly  mob.  Proceeding 
without  due  caution  about  thirty  miles  in  advance,  they  fell  in  with 
some  Indian  scouts,  who,  according  to  Black  Hawk,  carried  a  white 
flag,  but  whom  the  whites  represent  as  defying  them  with  a  red  flag. 
The  militia  killed  two,  and  pursued  another  party  incautiously.  Before 
they  were  aware  they  found  themselves  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy, 
when  the  commander  ordered  an  immediate  retreat.  A  disgraceful 
flight  ensued,  which  lasted  for  thirty  miles,  and  only  terminated  at 
Dixon's  Ferry.  The  next  morning  fifty-two  men  were  reported  miss 
ing  ;  and  the  fugitives  represented  that  they  had  been  overpowered  by 
1,500  or  2,000  Indian  warriors,  after  a  desperate  conflict. 


36  BLACK-HAWK  WAR. 

Lieutenant  Johnston  remarks  in  his  journal  : 

The  truth  is,  there  was  no  action,  or  engagement,  between  the  troops  of 
General  Stillman  and  the  Indians.  From  the  incapacity  of  their  leader,  the 
total  absence  of  discipline  in  his  battalion,  and  consequently  a  want  of  confidence 
in  each  other,  these  troops,  that  might  under  different  circumstances  have  con 
tended  successfully  against  any  enemy,  had  not  the  courage  to  face  the  Indians 
at  Kishwarkee.  Facts  speak  for  themselves:  only  one  man  was  killed  near  the 
ground  where  they  met  the  Indians,  the  remainder  were  killed  in  flight  six 
miles  below,  at  or  below  a  small,  deep  creek,  now  called  Stillman's  Kun.  The 
whole  number  killed  was  eleven.  The  ladians  lost  three  or  four,  who  were 
probably  killed  before  the  main  body  was  discovered. 

The  Hon.  Jefferson  Davis  told  the  writer  that  the  Indians  now 
became  very  insolent.  They  said  contemptuously  "  they  wanted  more 
saddle-bags,"  Stillman's  men  having  thrown  away  a  good  many. 

The  Indians  then  spread  their  scouts  over  the  country,  who  killed  and 
plundered  the  settlers,  while  the  main  body  retired  up  Rock  River  to 
the  Four  Lakes.  In  the  mean  time,  Governor  Reynolds  was  obliged  to 
yield  to  the  clamors  of  Whitesides's  militia,  and  disbanded  them  on  the 
26th  of  May,  which  put  a  stop  for  a  time  to  the  campaign.  Abraham 
Lincoln  was  a  captain  in  Whitesides's  command,  and  is  said,  by  his 
biographer,  Lamon,  in  his  queer  narrative,  to  have  reenlisted  as  a 
private  in  an  independent  spy  company.  Jefferson  Davis,  who  was 
with  General  Gaines  in  his  operations  in  1831,  was  absent  on  furlough 
in  Mississippi  when  the  Black -Hawk  War  broke  out,  but  gave  up  his 
furlough,  and,  joining  his  company,  served  in  the  campaign.  Thus,  in 
early  life  and  with  small  rank,  met  as  co-workers  in  this  remote  field, 
three  men,  who,  forty  years  later,  measured  arms  on  an  arena  whose 
contest  shook  the  world.  Lieutenants  Johnston,  Eaton,  and  Robert 
Anderson,  received  commissions  as  colonels  on  the  staff  of  the  Governor 
of  Illinois,  dated  May  9th.  This  militia  rank  was  given,  in  order  to 
secure  the  ready  obedience  of  the  Illinois  officers,  who  refused  to  obey 
orders  received  through  staff-officers  of  less  rank  than  their  own,  and 
it  proved  a  successful  device. 

On  May  29th,  Governor  Reynolds,  upon  the  requisition  of  General 
Atkinson,  ordered  3,000  militia  to  assemble  June  10th.  To  provide  for 
and  expedite  their  arming,  equipment,  and  subsistence,  General  Atkin 
son  dispatched  his  staff-officers  to  points  where  they  were  required. 
Lieutenant  Johnston  was  sent  to  Jefferson  Barracks,  where,  during 
his  absence,  his  eldest  daughter,  Henrietta  Preston,  had  been  born. 
After  passing  a  few  days  at  home,  between  the  1st  and  10th  of 
June,  he  was  at  his  post  in  time  to  assist  in  the  organization  of  the 
militia,  for  whom  General  Atkinson,  by  extraordinary  diligence,  had 
prepared  whatever  was  necessary  to  begin  the  campaign.  Three  bri 
gades  were  organized  at  the  Rapids  of  the  Illinois,  under  the  command 


MOVEMENTS   OF   TROOPS.  37 

of  Generals  Posey,  Alexander,  and  Henry  ;  but  it  was  not  until  the 
25th  of  June  that  they  were  able  to  move  from  Dixon's  Ferry.  Gen 
eral  Posey  marched  toward  Galena,  to  cooperate  with  General  Dodge. 
General  Alexander  was  detached  in  the  direction  of  the  Plum  River, 
to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  enemy,  who  were  reported  to  be  march 
ing  toward  the  Mississippi.  The  rest  of  the  command,  under  Gen 
eral  Brady,  United  States  Army,  moved  up  Rock  River,  with  seven 
ty-five  Pottawattamies,  under  their  chief  Chaboni,  as  guides.  The 
time  will  not  appear  long  in  which  these  levies  were  assembled,  or 
ganized,  equipped,  and  moved  to  the  scene  of  action,  if  we  consider 
the  condition  of  the  country  at  that  day,  the  want  of  facilities  for 
transportation,  and  the  distance  from  which  supplies  were  drawn.  In 
the  mean  time,  however,  every  express  brought  intelligence  of  new 
outrages  and  disaster,  the  slaughter  and  scalping  of  citizens,  and  the 
defeat  of  small  bodies  of  soldiers. 

Lieutenant  Johnston,  in  his  private  journal,  after  complimenting  the 
zeal  and  energy  of  the  quartermaster's  and  commissary  departments, 
says  : 

N"o  time  was  to  be  lost.  An  active  and  cruel  enemy  was  now  busy  in  the 
work  of  death  and  devastation,  since  the  last  levy  was  disbanded.  Their  mode 
of  warfare  is  such  that,  while  you  keep  a  sufficient  force  in  motion  against 
them  to  contend  with  their  main  body,  you  must  necessarily  keep  troops  at 
every  assailable  point  on  the  frontier  to  hold  in  check  small  parties,  which  it  is 
their  custom  to  detach  to  a  great  distance.  Thus  military  men,  acquainted  only 
with  the  warfare  of  civilized  nations,  are  surprised  that  so  many  troops  are 
called  into  the  field  to  subdue  a  comparatively  small  body  of  savages.  Great 
allowance,  in  estimating  for  a  militia  force,  must  be  made  for  the  probable 
daily  diminution,  or  actual  loss  of  strength,  from  a  variety  of  causes,  which  do 
not  affect  a  regular  force  in  the  least;  this,  in  addition  to  what  is  said  of  the 
enemy,  will  explain  the  reason  why  so  large  a  militia  force  is  usually  called  out. 

The  journal  relates  a  number  of  instances  in  which  marauding  bands 
of  Indians  surprised  and  butchered  solitary  families  and  small  parties. 
It  also  gives  a  detailed  account  of  "  General  Dodge's  affair  with  the 
Sacs  on  the  Peketolica  ;  in  which,  with  the  loss  of  one  killed  and  two 
dangerously  wounded,  he  succeeded  in  destroying  the  whole  party, 
thirteen  in  number."  This  was  a  very  gallant  skirmish  with  a  ravaging 
band.  Dodge,  with  eighteen  men,  attacked  the  Indians  in  a  swamp. 
Under  cover  of  the  high  bank  of  a  small  lake  they  wounded  two  of  his 
men  ;  but  the  rest  charged  them,  and,  in  a  hand-to-hand  encounter,  in 
a  space  scarcely  forty  feet  square,  killed  all  the  Indians  except  two,  who 
were  shot  trying  to  swim  the  lake. 

On  the  2d  and  3d  of  July  the  main  body  encamped  one  and  a  half 
mile  from  Lake  Cosconong,  where  the  Indians  had  evidently  remained 
some  time.  Fresh  signs  were  discovered  of  small  parties ;  but  the 


38  BLACK-HAWK  WAR. 

main  trail  was  toward  the  head  of  Rock  River.  General  Brady  was 
here  obliged,  by  sickness,  to  turn  over  the  command  to  General  Atkin 
son.  By  the  6th  of  July,  Generals  Dodge,  Alexander,  Posey,  and  Hen 
ry,  were  brought  into  concert  on  both  banks  of  Rock  River,  near  the 
mouth  of  White  Water  Creek,  with  an  almost  impassable  country  be 
fore  them.  Reconnoitring  parties  of  soldiers  and  friendly  Indians  ad 
vanced  many  miles,  and  reported  access  as  very  difficult,  by  reason  of 
undergrowth  and  swamps. 

Lieutenant  Johnston  says  in  his  journal  : 

The  volunteers  having  been  for  several  days  in  great  need  of  provisions,  and 
not  knowing  when  supplies  would  arrive,  the  commanding  general  ordered 
Alexander's  and  Henry's  brigades  and  Dodge's  battalion,  to  march  to  Fort 
Winnebago  (a  distance  of  thirty -six  miles),  and  Posey  to  Fort  Hamilton  (a  dis 
tance  of  forty-five  miles).  He  directed  General  Posey  to  remain  with  his 
brigade  at  Fort  Hamilton.  Alexander,  Henry,  and  Dodge,  were  to  return  to 
Fort  Cosconong,  as  soon  as  provisions  were  procured.  He  gave  verbal  instruc 
tions  to  pursue  the  trail  of  the  enemy,  if  it  was  met  with  in  going  or  returning. 

The  troops  were  now  in  a  country  almost  totally  unknown,  and  in 
great  want  of  provisions.  Hence  the  necessity  of  sending  this  heavy 
detachment  to  procure  them.  The  Indians  were  supposed  to  be  at  "  the 
Four  Lakes,"  now  the  site  of  the  nourishing  town  of  Madison,  Wiscon 
sin,  and  to  be  about  to  move  westward  for  the  Mississippi  River.  The 
line  of  march  of  flie  volunteers  to  Fort  Winnebago  left  the  Four  Lakes 
to  the  right  ;  and,  therefore,  in  going  or  returning,  would  necessarily 
cross  the  trail  of  the  Indians,  if  they  had  moved  as  was  expected.  In 
returning  from  Fort  Winnebago  the  detachment  fell  in  with  the  trail 
of  the  Indians  ;  and  General  Henry,  in  obedience  to  his  verbal  instruc 
tions,  sent  forward  his  provisions  with  a  small  guard,  and  pursued  the 
Indians  with  his  main  body.  He  overtook  them  on  July  21,  1832,  and 
successfully  engaged  them  at  what  was  known  as  Wisconsin  Heights,  a 
crossing  of  the  Wisconsin  River,  twenty  miles  below  Fort  Winnebago. 

A  letter  from  Mrs.  Johnston  to  her  mother  gives  the  following 
account  of  the  fight,  as  received  from  her  husband  : 

Generals  Dodge  and  Henry,  with  their  mounted  men,  overtook  the  retreat 
ing  Indians  at  a  point  on  the  Wisconsin  River  fifteen  miles  above  Blue  Mounds. 
The  Indians  rose  the  crest  of  a  hill  on  horseback,  set  up  a  yell,  and  fired,  when 
they  discovered  the  whites.  The  mounted  men  formed,  yelled  as  dreadfully  as 
the  enemy,  dismounted,  and  charged  on  -them.  There  was  one  man  killed,  and 
eight  wounded,  but  none  badly.  Between  thirty-five  and  forty  Indians  were 
killed,  and  it  was  supposed  that  numbers  were  wounded.  They  were  pursued 
till  night,  when  they  escaped,  much  shattered,  to  an  island  in  the  Wisconsin ; 
leaving  (as  Captain  Smith  writes)  many  old  men,  and  sick  and  dead  children, 
on  their  march.  They  also  abandoned  all  their  heavy  baggage.  The  whites 
had  but  one  day's  provisions,  and  were,  consequently,  compelled  to  return  for 
more. 


WAR,   PESTILENCE,  AND   FAMINE.  39 

Though  the  volunteers  had  marched  that  day  forty  miles,  and  were 
drenched  with  a  six  hours'  rain,  they  attacked  the  Indians  with  great 
spirit.  Black  Hawk,  however,  made  a  gallant  stand,  to  enable  his 
women  and  children  to  get  across  the  river,  which  they  succeeded  in 
doing;  and  his  band  made  their  escape  during  the  night  in  bark 
canoes.  He  was  said  to  have  lost  sixty-eight  men,  but  this  number 
probably  included  those  fugitives  killed  and  captured  by  Lieutenant 
Ritner.  The  volunteers  fell  back  to  Blue  Mounds,  where  they  arrived 
on  the  evening  of  the  23d,  and  were  joined  next  day  by  the  main 
body. 

During  the  campaign,  Black  Hawk's  people  had  suffered  much  from 
want  of  provisions  ;  many  subsisted  on  the  roots  and  bark  of  trees, 
and  some  starved  to  death.  On  the  14th  of  July  several  families  of 
Winnebagoes  came  into  camp,  much  in  need  of  provisions.  July  16th, 
General  Atkinson  received  dispatches  from  General  Scott.  He  speaks 
of  "the  deplorable  condition  of  his  command  of  regular  troops  at 
Chicago  and  elsewhere  on  the  lakes,  as  far  as  Detroit,  produced  by 
Asiatic  cholera."  So  formidable  was  the  outbreak  of  the  British  band 
considered  by  the  Government,  and  so  imminent  seemed  an  insur 
rection  of  the  Northwestern  tribes,  that  all  the  available  forces  on  the 
seaboard  were  hurried  toward  the  scene  of  action,  under  the  command 
of  General  Scott.  But,  in  their  progress  across  the  lakes,  the  cholera 
broke  out  ;  and,  of  the  1.500  regular  soldiers  in  his  command,  over  200 
died,  many  were  prostrated  by  disease,  a  large  number  deserted,  and 
nearly  all  were  demoralized.  Under  these  circumstances,  and  for  fear 
of  spreading  the  infection,  General  Scott  prudently  and  properly  held 
aloof  from  the  campaign.  As  it  turned  out,  his  contingent  was  not 
needed  to  finish  the  pursuit  of  the  starving  Indians,  who  were  now,  in 
reality,  fugitives. 

The  troops  having  received  provisions,  and  many  of  the  volunteers 
being  dismounted  and  broken  down,  the  main  body  was  moved  back 
to  Lake  Cosconong  on  July  20th  ;  but,  in  consequence  of  information 
received  from  Generals  Henry  and  Dodge,  the  command  was  marched, 
on  July  21st,  toward  Blue  Mounds,  one  hundred  miles  distant,  where 
a  junction  was  effected  on  the  24th  with  -General  Henry,  who  had  fallen 
back  there  for  provisions.  In  their  forced  march  along  a  ridge, 
through  a  swampy  and  flooded  country,  the  troops  suffered  from 
storms,  want  of  drinking-water,  and  dysentery,  caused  by  the  raw  pork 
and  dough,  which  was  their  only  food.  On  the  25th,  the  regulars, 
with  Alexander's  and  Henry's  brigades,  moved  to  within  three  miles 
of  the  Wisconsin  River. 

In  Mrs.  Johnston's  letter,  already  quoted,  occurs  the  following  : 

We  got  letters  again  last  night,  dated  the  27th.  Our  men  had  hurried  on  to 
the  scene  of  action,  as  soon  as  the  express  arrived,  leaving  their  sick  and  bag- 


40  BLACK-HAWK  WAR. 

gage  at  Blue  Mounds.  They  were  constructing  rafts,  to  cross  the  Wisconsin  at 
that  point,  for  it  was  much  swollen  with  late  rains.  They  expected  to  get  over 
that  day.  Captain  Rogers  [Sixth  Infantry]  thought  it  impossible  for  foot- 
soldiers  to  overtake  the  mounted  Indians;  but  Mr.  Johnston  was  more  sanguine. 
His  letter  is  not  here.  I  was  requested  to  send  it  to  town,  or  I  could  be  even 
more  particular,  certainly  much  more  graphical  than  I  am.  He  hoped  for  a 
speedy  termination  of  these  affairs,  as  the  enemy  are  now  making  for  the  Chip- 
pewa  country,  or  will  try  to  cross  the  Mississippi  at  Prairie  du  Chien.  Mr. 
Johnston  thinks  they  will  be  overtaken  before  they  reach  either  place.  They 
are  nearly  starved,  subsisting  on  the  bark  of  trees,  dogs,  and  their  horses. 

Lieutenant  Johnston's  journal  contains  the  following  record  : 

July  27th. — Many  of  tho  horses  having  failed  .  through  fatigue  and  insuffi 
ciency  of  proper  food,  General  Atkinson  selected  about  900  of  the  best  mounted 
volunteers  to  cross  the  Wisconsin  and  pursue  the  enemy,  in  conjunction  with 
the  regular  troops.  The  remainder  of  the  several  volunteer  corps  was  ordered 
to  Fort  Hamilton.  Generals  Henry,  Posey,  Alexander,  and  Dodge,  commanded 
the  volunteers,  whom  they  had  selected  from  their  several  commands  for  this 
duty.  Colonel  Zachary  Taylor,  First  Infantry,  commanded  the  regular  troops, 
about  400  infantry. 

July  28th. — The  troops,  having  all  passed  the  river,  moved  up  the  Wisconsin  ; 
and,  having  advanced  three  or  four  miles,  the  trail  of  the  enemy  was  discovered, 
bearing  in  the  direction  of  the  Ocooch  Mountains.  The  columns  were  turned 
to  the  left,  and  pursued,  on  the  trail,  ten  or  twelve  miles,  and  encamped.  At 
this  point  the  trail  turned  up  a  deep  creek.  The  same  kind  of  ancient  fortifica 
tions  were  observed  at  this  gap  of  the  hills  as  we  had  noticed  on  Rock  River. 

July  29^. — The  trails  of  the  enemy  were  pursued  with  activity  to-day.  Wo 
passed  several  of  the  Sac  encampments ;  they  are  hard  pressed  for  provisions, 
and  forced  to  kill  their  horses  for  subsistence.  The  country  is  rough  and 
mountainous,  with  a  rich  soil;  dense  forests,  with  thick  underwood,  cover  the 
whole  country,  which  affords  no  grass.  The  troops  encamped  on  a  high  hill ; 
the  horses  were  tied  up  without  food. 

July  30£/i.— The  march  was  continued  to-day.  The  face  of  the  country 
bears  the  same  character  as  that  passed  yesterday.  The  general  course  of  the 
trail  is  northwest.  Encamped  this  evening  in  a  deep,  narrow  valley,  near  a 
small  stream  running  westward ;  the  water  was  remarkably  cold.  Small  sap 
lings  of  maple  and  elm  were  cut  down  for  the  horses  to  feed  on ;  they  had  suf 
fered  much  for  want  of  grass. 

July  31st. — After  a  hard  day's  march,  the  troops  encamped  near  the  Kickapoo 
River — a  small  stream  flowing  into  the  Wisconsin. 

August  1st. — Passed  the  Kickapoo  to-day  at  a  shallow  ford.  Here  com 
mences  a  prairie  country,  with  scattering  groves  of  oak,  quite  as  rough  as  that 
we  had  passed  over.  This  was  a  long  day's  march  for  the  infantry,  who  found 
no  difficulty,  however,  in  keeping  pace  with  the  mounted  men,  whose  horses 
were  exhausted  for  want  of  food.  The  troops  encamped  after  dark.  The  ap 
pearance  of  the  trail  indicated  the  proximity  of  the  enemy,  who  were  supposed 
to  be  at  the  Mississippi,  which  was  conjectured  to  be  within  a  short  march. 
The  commanders  of  the  several  corps  were  directed  to  hold  them  in  readiness  to 
march  at  two  o'clock  the  following  morning.  This  order  was  not  communicated 


BATTLE   OF  THE  BAD   AXE.  41 

to  the  brigades  of  Generals  Alexander  and  Henry  before  their  horses  were 
turned  out  to  graze. 

August  2d. — At  two  o'clock  this  morning  the  troops  turned  out ;  and,  having 
made  hasty  preparation,  were  on  the  route  of  the  enemy  before  sunrise,  except 
Henry's  and  Alexander's  brigades,  for  reasons  before  mentioned.  About  one 
hour  after  sunrise,  a  small  body  of  spies,  under  the  command  of  Captain  Dixon, 
thrown  in  advance  from  Dodge's  battalion,  brought  information  that  the  enemy 
were  drawn  up  in  position  on  the  route,  and  near  at  hand.  We  had  previous 
notice  of  our  proximity  to  the  Mississippi,  from  having  seen  the  fog  over  it, 
distant  probably  five  or  six  miles. 

General  Dodge  instructed  his  spies  to  reconnoitre  the  enemy,  and  occupy  his 
attention ;  the  spies  advanced  as  ordered,  and  succeeded  in  killing  eight  Indians, 
while  they  retired  through  the  woods.  In  the  mean  time,  General  Dodge's  bat 
talion  was  drawn  up  in  line,  and  a  report  was  made  to  the  commanding  general. 
The  regulars  and  mounted  volunteers  were  ordered  forward.  The  regulars, 
being  immediately  in  rear  of  Dodge's  battalion,  moved  forward  and  formed  in 
extended  order  on  his  right ;  Dodge's  battalion,  having  dismounted,  was  also 
formed  in  extended  order ;  the  whole  advanced  in  this  order  for  some  minutes 
before  General  Posey's  command  came  up.  Generals  Henry  and  Alexander 
promptly  obeyed  the  order  to  advance,  and  came  up  in  good  time  to  take  the 
position  assigned  to  them  by  the  commanding  general. 

General  Posey  was  posted  on  the  right  of  the  regulars,  and  General  Alexan 
der  on  the  right  of  General  Posey.  The  troops  by  this  time,  in  following  the 
movements  of  the  retiring  enemy,  had  been  drawn  considerably  to  the  right  of 
the  trail.  The  commanding  general,  apprehending  this  to  be  a  feint  intended  to 
divert  him  from  his  purpose  and  to  gain  time,  ordered  General  Henry  to  pursue 
the  trail  quite  to  the  river.  At  the  same  time,  General  Alexander  was  ordered 
to  move  down  a  deep  ravine  to  the  river. 

The  centre  passed  down  a  steep  declivity  and  ravine.  In  taking  possession 
of  these  only  accessible  approaches  to  the  plain,  or  rather  swamp  lying  below, 
the  right  and  left  were  necessarily  two  miles  or  more  apart.  General  Henry  in 
pursuing  the  trail,  which  followed  the  easiest  descent,  was  brought  in  contact 
with  the  position  of  the  enemy  sooner  than  either  of  the  other  corps.  He 
reached  the  plain  in  advance  of  the  centre,  and  attacked  the  enemy. 

The  regulars  and  Dodge's  and  part  of  Posey's  command  promptly  moved  to 
the  support  of  the  left.  The  enemy  then  retired,  disputing  the  ground  step  by 
step,  which  they  had  done  from  the  beginning.  Many  of  them,  men,  women, 
and  children,  fled  to  the  river,  and  endeavored  to  escape  by  swimming.  In  this 
situation  our  troops  arrived  on  the  bank,  and  threw  in  a  heavy  fire,  which  killed 
great  numbers,  unfortunately  some  women  and  children  among  the  warriors,  an 
event  deeply  deplored  by  the  soldiers.  The  enemy,  in  retiring,  had  taken  some 
strong  positions  at  the  foot  of  an  island,  from  which  they  were  driven  by  the 
repeated  charges  of  the  regulars,  and  the  volunteers  under  Dodge. 

They  were  now  completely  overthrown  and  beaten,  with  the  loss  of  one  hun 
dred  and  fifty  killed,  forty  women  and  children  taken  prisoners,  their  baggage 
captured,  and  about  one  hundred  horses  killed  or  captured.  The  loss  on  our 
part  was  five  regulars  killed  and  four  wounded ;  six  of  Henry's  wounded,  one 
mortally ;  and  one  of  Posey's  brigade.  This  action  was  decisive ;  the  remnant 
of  the  band  fled  to  the  west  of  the  Mississippi,  and,  after  having  suffered  almost 


42  BLACK-HAWK  WAR. 

beyond  endurance,  reached  their  own  country,  and  were  given  up  by  Keokuk 
and  other  influential  friendly  Sacs  to  the  whites. 

The  losses  of  the  campaign  in  encounters  and  skirmishes,  and  in  the 
heavy  fight  at  Wisconsin  Heights,  had  greatly  weakened  Black  Hawk's 
force,  which  had  been  further  diminished  by  the  desertion  of  his  Indian 
allies,  as  the  tide  of  war  turned  against  him.  Moreover,  after  the  affair 
at  Wisconsin  Heights  too,  a  detachment,  under  Lieutenant  Ritner,  sent 
from  Prairie  du  Chien,  intercepted  a  party  of  the  Sacs  attempting  to 
descend  the  Wisconsin,  and  killed  fifteen  men  and  captured  four  men 
and  thirty-two  women  and  children. 

When  Black  Hawk  reached  the  Mississippi,  and  was  preparing  to 
effect  its  passage  on  the  1st  of  August,  he  found  the  steamboat  War 
rior  ready  to  dispute  the  crossing.  This  boat,  with  a  detachment  of 
troops  and  a  cannon,  had  been  interposed,  under  orders  from  General 
Atkinson,  to  cut  off  his  retreat ;  and  a  sharp  skirmish  ensued,  with  the 
effect,  at  least,  of  retarding  his  flight  until  the  assault  of  the  main 
body  on  August  2d. 

The  fight  on  that  day,  known  as  the  battle  of  the  Bad  Axe,  from  a 
stream  near  by,  effectually  crushed  the  power  of  the  British  band.  The 
exhausted  condition  of  the  victors,  but  still  more  the  desire  to  stop  the 
effusion  of  blood,  induced  General  Atkinson  to  desist  from  the  pursuit 
of  the  miserable  remnant  who  fled  across  the  Mississippi.  But  the  pur 
suit,  which  was  thus  abandoned  by  the  whites,  was  taken  up  by  the 
Indians  in  alliance  with  the  United  States  so  eagerly  that  it  is  believed 
that  not  one  of  the  fugitives  escaped  death  or  capture.  Those  who 
reached  the  west  bank  of  the  river  were  attacked  by  their  foes,  the 
Sioux,  and  were  either  killed,  or  taken  prisoners  and  surrendered  to  the 
United  States  authorities.  Among  those  thus  given  up  was  Naopope, 
Black  Hawk's  second  in  command. 

Black  Hawk,  with  the  Prophet  and  other  chiefs,  escaped  from  the 
combat,  and  took  refuge  on  some  islands  above  Prairie  du  Chien,  whence 
they  were  routed  by  a  detachment  of  regulars  under  Lieutenant  Jeffer 
son  Davis.  In  despair  they  gave  themselves  up  to  two  Winnebago 
Indians,  Decorie  the  one-eyed  and  Chaetar,  who  claimed  to  have  cap 
tured  them,  and  delivered  them  to  Colonel  Taylor  and  the  Indian  agent, 
General  Street,  at  Prairie  du  Chien,  with  a  false  and  fulsome  speech. 
The  other  captives  were  released  ;  but  Black  Hawk  and  his  two  sons, 
the  Prophet,  Naopope,  and  nine  other  chiefs  of  the  hostile  band,  were 
retained  as  hostages. 

Four  or  five  hundred  Indians  and  about  two  hundred  white  people  had 
lost  their  lives  in  the  Black-Hawk  War,  and  an  expenditure  of  $2,000,000 
had  been  incurred.  Whether  the  war  might  not  have  been  averted  by 
foresight  and  timely  generosity  on  the  part  of  the  Government  is  a  ques- 


PUBLIC    GRATIFICATION   AT    RESULT.  43 

tion ;  but,  when  the  savage  chief  and  his  band  were  once  upon  the  war 
path,  any  other  than  the  promptest  and  severest  measures  of  repression 
would  have  been  construed  by  these  rude  warriors  as  an  evidence  of 
timidity,  and  any  partial  display  of  military  strength  as  a  confession  of 
weakness.  The  Winnebagoes,  Pottawattamies,  and  other  disaffected 
tribes,  would  probably  have  seized  the  opportunity  and  bathed  the  fron 
tier  in  blood.  Hence  the  necessity  for  a  large  force  and  for  decisive  action. 
Indeed,  but  for  the  unfortunate  defeat  of  Stillman,  which  was  precipi 
tated  by  the  rashness  and  disorganization  of  his  command,  it  is  quite 
possible  that  Black  Hawk  might  have  submitted,  in  the  presence  of  an 
overpowering  force,  to  General  Atkinson,  as  he  had  yielded  to  General 
Gaines  the  year  previous.  But,  after  this  first  act  of  overt  war,  the 
cruel  atrocities  of  the  Indians  upon  the  white  settlers  made  impossible 
any  other  solution  than  such  swift  and  heavy  retribution  as  would  pun 
ish  the  guilty,  warn  the  wavering,  and  thenceforth  deter  the  discon 
tented  from  similar  attempts. 

The  whole  country  felt  great  relief  at  the  termination  of  a  war 
which  threatened  to  assume  such  proportions  ;  but  in  the  border  settle 
ments,  where  the  lives  of  the  women  and  children  were  at  stake,  there 
was  heart-felt  rejoicing. 

The  Secretary  of  War  addressed  the  following  letter  to  General 
Atkinson  : 

DEPARTMENT  OF  WAR,  October  24, 1S32. 

SIR  :  The  return  of  the  President  to  the  seat  of  government  enables  me  to 
communicate  to  you  his  sentiments  in  relation  to  the  operations  and  results  of 
the  campaign,  recently  conducted  under  your  orders,  against  the  hostile  Indians ; 
and  it  is  with  great  pleasure  I  have  received  his  instructions  to  inform  you  that 
he  appreciates  the  difficulties  you  had  to  encounter,  and  that  he  has  been  highly 
gratified  at  the  termination  of  your  arduous  and  responsible  duties.  Great  pri 
vations  and  embarrassments  necessarily  attend  such  a  warfare,  and  particularly 
in  the  difficult  country  occupied  by  the  enemy.  The  arrangements  which  led 
to  the  defeat  of  the  Indians  were  adopted  with  judgment  and  pursued  with 
decision,  and  the  result  was  honorable  to  yourself,  and  to  the  officers  and  men 
acting  under  orders.  I  will  thank  you  to  communicate  to  the  forces  that  served 
with  you,  both  regulars  and  militia,  the  feelings  of  the  President  upon  this  occa 
sion.  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

LEWIS  CASS. 

To  General  H.  ATKINSON,  Jefferson  Barracks,  Mo. 

The  favorable  opinions  of  the  President,  General  Jackson,  and  of 
General  Cass,  on  the  conduct  of  the  war,  carry  more  weight  than  the 
ordinary  bestowal  of  official  compliments,  as  they  were  both  well  ac 
quainted  with  the  nature  of  the  service  from  actual  experience. 

The  Secretary  of  "War,  in  his  report  for  1832,  says  : 

The  arrangements  of  the  commanding  general,  as  well  in  the  pursuit  as  in 


44:  BLACK-HAWK  WAR. 

the  action,  were  prompt  and  judicious,  and  the  conduct  of  the  officers  and  men 
was  exemplary. 

President  Jackson,  in  his  annual  message,  approves  of  the  action  of 
the  military  authorities,  thus  : 

The  hostile  incursions  of  the  Sac  and  Fox  Indians  necessarily  led  to  the  inter 
position  of  the  Government.  A  portion  of  the  troops  under  Generals  Scott  and 
Atkinson,  and  of  the  militia  of  the  State  of  Illinois,  were  called  into  the  field. 
After  a  harassing  warfare,  prolonged  by  the  nature  of  the  country  and  by  the 
difficulty  of  procuring  subsistence,  the  Indians  were  entirely  defeated,  and  the 
disaffected  band  dispersed  or  destroyed.  The  result  has  been  creditable  to  the 
troops  engaged  in  the  service.  Severe  as  is  the  lesson  to  the  Indians,  it  was  ren 
dered  necessary  by  their  unprovoked  aggressions ;  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  its 
impression  will  be  permanent  and  salutary.  This  campaign  has  evinced  the  effi 
cient  organization  of  the  army,  and  its  capacity  for  prompt  and  active  service. 
Its  several  departments  have  performed  their  functions  with  energy  and  dis 
patch,  and  the  general  movement  was  satisfactory. 

The  best  proof  of  the  influence  of  the  Black-Hawk  campaign  is  to 
be  found  in  the  quiet  acquiescence  of  the  Indian  tribes  in  the  measures 
taken  immediately  thereafter  by  the  Government  for  their  removal 
westward,  and  in  the  permanent  peace  established  on  that  frontier. 

Black  Hawk  and  his  associates  were  treated  with  generosity  by 
the  Government.  They  were  retained  in  mild  captivity  at  Jefferson 
Barracks  long  enough  to  break  their  power  and  destroy  their  prestige 
with  their  tribe,  and  to  allow  their  own  heated  passions  to  cool  under 
the  genial  influence  of  kindly  intercourse  with  their  captors.  They 
were  then  carried  through  the  principal  cities  of  the  East,  that  they 
might  view  the  numbers,  wealth,  and  resources,  of  their  recent  antag 
onist,  and  realize  the  folly  of  such  an  unequal  struggle ;  after  which 
they  were  released  and  dismissed  to  their  homes.  In  the  tour  among 
the  Atlantic  cities  Black  Hawk  was  treated  more  like  a  popular  favorite 
than  a  merciless  foe  ;  and  a  respect  was  paid  him  that  was  measured 
rather  by  the  trouble  he  had  given  than  by  the  greatness  of  his  talents. 
The  Indians  who  had  followed  him  in  his  last  campaign  represented  the 
Prophet  as  the  mover  of  the  strife  and  the  most  cunning  in  counsel;  to 
Naopope  was  given  the  credit  of  the  highest  military  skill ;  while  the 
preeminence  of  Black  Hawk  was  ascribed  not  so  much  to  sagacity  or 
warlike  genius  as  to  the  force  of  his  relentless  will,  the  intensity  of  his 
passions,  and  the  singleness  of  his  purpose. 

Hon.  Jefferson  Davis  informed  the  writer  that  Black  Hawk  told  him, 
while  he  was  in  his  custody  at  Jefferson  Barracks,  that  he  crossed  the 
Mississippi  to  join  the  Prophet ;  that  his  engagement  was  to  give  up 
Rock  Island  village  ;  and  that  there  was  no  engagement  not  to  join 
the  Prophet.  Mr.  Davis  said  Keokuk  was  a  politic  man  ;  but  that 


TRIUMPHS  OF  CIVILIZATION.  45 

Black  Hawk  was  a  proud,  silent  savage.    He  bore  himself  with  dignity 
in  his  confinement,  and  thanked  Mr.  Davis  for  his  kindness  to  him. 

Black  Hawk  saw  his  power  pass  to  his  rival ;  but  he  could  scarcely 
envy  the  self-indulgence  enjoyed  by  Keokuk  as  the  pensioner  and  place 
man  of  a  people  whom  he  had  himself  defied  in  arms.  The  short 
remnant  of  his  old  age  was  worn  out  in  sullen  submission  to  the  con 
queror  ;  his  enemy,  Keokuk,  became  the  slave  of  drink,  died,  and  is 
almost  forgotten  ;  and  now  no  trace  of  the  stern  warrior,  of  his  more 
politic  opponent,  or  of  the  red  clansmen  who  followed  them  in  war  or 
in  the  chase,  is  found  in  all  their  broad  domain,  except  in  a  few  isolated 
geographical  names.  Perhaps  the  most  striking  commentary  on  the 
events  which  supplanted  roaming  savages  with  a  civilized  people  is 
seen  in  the  change  that  less  than  half  a  century  has  wrought  in  the 
theatre  of  war.  The  very  region  where  a  moving  column  of  less  than 
3,000  soldiers  was  compelled  to  carry  its  provisions,  and  1,000  Indians 
endured  the  pangs  of  famine,  is  now  one  of  the  greatest  grain-produc 
ing  centres  in  the  world ;  while  the  territory  east  of  the  Mississippi, 
within  a  hundred  and  fifty  miles  of  Rock  Island,  for  which  the  British 
band  contended,  now  supports  an  intelligent  and  prosperous  popula 
tion,  numbering  more  than  1,250,000  souls. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

JEFFERSON   BAEKACKS. 

As  soon  as  it  was  manifest  that  Black  Hawk  and  the  British  band 
were  utterly  crushed,  General  Atkinson  disbanded  the  volunteers,  and 
distributed  the  regulars  according  to  the  exigencies  of  the  service. 
That  officer  had  concluded  the  campaign,  which  was  really  creditable 
to  him,  with  an  enhanced  military  reputation.  Colonel  Zachary  Taylor, 
who,  after  the  departure  of  General  Brady,  was  the  second  in  command, 
now  belongs  to  history  as  a  victorious  general  in  the  Mexican  War,  and 
as  the  twelfth  President  of  the  United  States.  His  character  and  deeds 
have  been  weighed  and  recorded  ;  and,  in  this  connection,  therefore,  it 
is  only  necessary  to  state  the  impression  he  made  upon  the  subject  of 
this  memoir.  It  is  true  that  circumstances  contributed  to  a  very  favor 
able  estimate  of  Colonel  Taylor  by  Lieutenant  Johnston  ;  but,  as  a  life 
long  acquaintance  and  his  matured  judgment  confirmed  this,  it  may 
not  be  without  interest  as  one  soldier's  opinion  of  another.  Lieutenant 
Johnston  was  probably,  from  the  first,  kindly  disposed  to  Colonel 
Taylor,  because  he  was  a  kinsman  of  Mrs.  Johnston's  mother  ;  which 


46  JEFFERSON  BARRACKS. 

tie  had  been  strengthened  by  long  acquaintance,  good  neighborhood, 
and  mutual  kind  offices.  Colonel  Taylor  had  shown  an  earnest  and 
active  friendship  for  Mrs.  Preston  and  her  family,  when  circumstances 
rendered  it  peculiarly  acceptable,  especially  as  surety  in  settling  Major 
Preston's  estate.  Moreover,  he  was  always  cordial  and  appreciative  to 
Lieutenant  Johnston,  both  in  social  and  military  intercourse  ;  and  this 
conduct  had  the  more  weight  as  he  was  a  bold,  open  man,  whose 
offices  outran  his  professions.  His  popular  title  of  "  Rough  and 
Ready  "  only  did  him  half  justice  ;  for  his  ruggedness  was  that  of  the 
oak,  and  he  was  as  ready  to  help  a  friend  as  to  strike  a  foe.  Under 
blunt  manners  he  concealed  a  warm  heart.  He  was  an  expert  in  the 
practical  routine  of  his  profession,  and  handled  his  army  like  a  machine 
with  which  he  was  perfectly  familiar.  He  was  well  acquainted  with 
English  history ;  Hume  was  his  favorite  author.  General  Johnston's 
sincere  and  lasting  attachment  for  General  Taylor  was  based  upon 
genuine  esteem.  He  had  a  high  opinion  of  General  Taylor's  military 
ability  ;  and  told  the  writer,  when  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista  was  im 
pending,  that  no  man  had  better  military  instincts,  or  a  more  stubborn 
resolution  under  adverse  circumstances.  He  saw  in  him  a  strong, 
single-minded,  faithful,  upright  man.  General  Taylor  lacked  power  of 
verbal  expression,  and  was  impatient  of  homage  and  conventionalities. 
He  was  tenacious  of  opinions,  purposes,  and  affections  ;  clear  in  his 
perceptions  of  familiar  subjects ;  and  prompt,  decided,  and  thorough, 
in  his  actions.  Lieutenant  Johnston  was  greatly  drawn  toward  a 
character  so  perfect  in  its  massiveness,  integrity,  and  simplicity. 

In  the  Black-Hawk  War  Lieutenant  Johnston  was  thrown  into  the 
intimate  relations  of  camp-life  with  his  brother  officers ;  and  the  favor 
in  which  he  was  before  held  by  them  was  increased  by  his  share  in  the 
campaign.  In  a  letter  to  the  writer,  from  Major-General  George  H.  Cros- 
man, United  States  Army  (retired),  written  in  1873,  occurs  the  following, 
giving  voice  to  this  opinion :  "  Your  father  acquired  a  very  high  repu 
tation  for  his  wise  and  successful  conduct  during  the  Black-Hawk  War." 

Captain  Eaton  relates  a  little  anecdote  of  the  Black-Hawk  War, 
which  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  give  in  his  own  language : 

On  the  same  campaign  an  incident  happened,  illustrating  Lieutenant  John 
ston's  keen  sense  of  propriety,  his  respect  for  female  virtue,  and  his  power  of 
rebuke.  One  evening,  as  a  group  of  officers  were  talking  in  the  tent  of  one  of 

them,  a  Lieutenant ,  who  was  of  a  coarse  and  vulgar  nature,  and  who  was 

eventually  dismissed  from  the  service,  said  he  did  not  believe  in  female  virtue. 

Lieutenant  Johnston  at  once  arose  and  said:  "Mr. ,  you  have  a  mother: 

and,  I  believe,  you  have  a  sister."    He  made  no  other  remark ;  but  the  rebuke 

silenced  Lieutenant ,  and,  vulgar  as  he  was,  he  hung  his  head  in  shame 

and  confusion.  I  never  knew  a  man  who  could  give  a  rebuke  with  more 
crushing  effect  than  Albert  Sidney  Johnston. 


SICKNESS.  47 

His  power  of  rebuke  lay  in  his  serenity  and  benignity.  It  was 
clearly  seen  that  it  was  the  sentiment,  not  the  person,  that  was  con 
demned. 

General  Atkinson  dropped  down  the  river  to  Prairie  du  Chien,  on 
August  3d  ;  and,  having  delayed  there  until  the  25th,  proceeded  to 
Rock  Island.  In  consequence  of  the  movement  of  cholera-infected 
troops  from  Chicago  to  that  point  the  pestilence  broke  out  there,  and 
carried  off  a  number  of  victims.  Lieutenant  Johnston  was  attacked, 
but  recovered  after  severe  suffering.  Lying  upon  the  floor,  he  was 
wrapped  in  heavy  blankets,  drenched  with  vinegar  and  salt,  and  then 
dosed  with  brandy  and  Cayenne  pepper;  the  Faculty  must  decide 
whether  he  recovered  in  consequence  or  in  spite  of  the  treatment.  The 
doctors  yet  disagree  as  to  the  mode  of  cholera  propagation.  Lieutenant 
Johnston,  from  his  own  observation,  inclined  to  the  belief  that  cholera 
might  be  averted,  from  isolated  places  at  least,  by  strict  quarantine. 

Lieutenant  Johnston,  on  his  return  to  Jefferson  Barracks,  found 
that  the  absence  which  had  proved  so  fruitful  to  him  in  professional 
experience  had  been  a  season  of  sore  trial  to  his  wife,  whose  delicate 
nervous  organization  had  been  too  severely  taxed  for  her  strength.  An 
infant  daughter,  born  in  April,  was,  as  the  mother's  record  has  it, 
"on  June  28th,  supposed  to  be  dead,  but  was,  by  God's  mercy,  restored 
to  us."  The  child  was  in  her  coffin  ;  but  Mrs.  Benton,  thinking  she 
detected  signs  of  life,  by  a  hot  bath  and  other  remedies  brought  her 
to  life,  and  she  still  lives.  The  following  extract,  from  a  letter  to  her 
mother,  explains  how  the  seeds  of  the  malady  that  cost  Mrs.  Johnston's 
life  were  sown : 

I  am  still  afflicted  with  the  sickness  of  both  my  children.  Between  physi 
cal  fatigue  and  mental  anxiety  for  my  children,  for  you,  and  for  my  good  hus 
band,  I  am  scarcely  myself.  I  try  to  be  cheerful.  God  alone  knows  how  it 
will  all  terminate!  I  have  been  busy  to-day,  making  up  flannel  for  my  hus 
band,  and  writing  to  him.  I  have  so  bad  a  cold  that  I  can't  be  heard  when  I 
speak,  and  I  am  often  fatigued  and  sick. 

Her  husband's  return,  safe  from  the  war  and  the  epidemic,  the  re 
covery  of  her  children,  and  the  soothing  hope  of  a  less  exciting  life, 
relaxed  this  grievous  mental  strain.  Mrs.  Johnston's  constitution  was 
naturally  good  ;  but,  in  the  change  from  the  mountains  of  Virginia, 
where  she  was  born  and  passed  a  good  deal  of  her  girlhood,  to  the 
neighborhood  of  Louisville,  then  in  bad  repute  for  malarial  fevers, 
her  health  had  been  injured,  and  again  still  more  by  a  three  years' 
residence  on  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi.  But,  although  her  enfee 
bled  system  was  thus  laid  open  to  the  inroads  of  disease,  its  approaches 
were  so  insidious  that  the  apprehensions  which  had  been  aroused  were 

lulled  into  a  fatal  security.     In  the  happy  illusions  of  the  moment  her 
5 


48  JEFFERSON  BARRACKS. 

imagination  pictured  a  long  and  tranquil  existence,  in  which  the  alarms 
of  war  should  be  exchanged  for  the  peaceful  delights  of  a  country- 
home.  She  urged  her  husband  to  resign  from  the  army  ;  and  her 
lively  and  affectionate  representations  would  easily  have  effected  their 
purpose  but  for  a  conflict  of  duties  and  sentiments  that  alternately 
swayed  him.  No  traits  were  more  strongly  marked  in  the  character  of 
Albert  Sidney  Johnston  than  his  powerful  domestic  affections  arid  his 
love  for  Nature  in  all  her  aspects,  but  especially  as  seen  through  the 
coloring  of  a  rural  life.  On  the  other  hand — so  strangely  are  our  quali 
ties  mingled — he  felt  the  desire,  the  power,  and  the  call,  to  achieve 
something  great,  useful,  and  memorable.  Never  was  a  man  more 
deeply  conscious  that  he  was  born  into  the  world  not  for  himself,  but 
for  others ;  and  that,  whosoever  else  might  fail,  on  him,  at  least,  lay  an 
obligation  of  public  duty,  to  which  self  must  be  sacrificed.  He  recog 
nized  the  duty  to  return  in  service  the  gift  of  an  education  received  at 
West  Point.  He  saw,  too,  that  the  habits  of  life  and  thought,  the 
associations,  studies,  and  aspirations  of  ten  years,  wrould  be  difficult  to 
lay  aside.  As  no  public  emergency  required  his  services,  and  as  the 
call  of  domestic  duties  seemed,  therefore,  the  more  urgent,  his  conclu 
sion  was  to  yield  to  the  wishes  of  his  wife,  and  choose  some  other 
occupation,  in  which  he  would  not  be  separated  from  her.  Yet,  con 
senting,  he  delayed,  for  it  was  hard  to  abandon  his  chosen  career.  In 
this  state  of  mind  he  took  counsel  with  his  eldest  brother,  on  whose 
prudence  and  good  feeling  he  knew  that  he  could  rely. 

The  reply  of  Senator  Johnston  is  written  in  the  most  affectionate 
strain,  and  discusses  the  subject  in  all  its  bearings,  but  space  permits 
only  a  few  extracts,  which,  as  indications  of  the  writer's  character,  as 
well  as  for  their  general  value,  may  prove  interesting  : 

WASHINGTON,  January  12, 1S33. 

MY  DEAR  BROTHER  :  I  received  your  letter  with  great  pleasure,  since  it  re 
news  a  correspondence  that  had  been,  on  your  part,  for  a  considerable  time  neg 
lected. 

I  am  very  happy  to  hear  of  your  -wife,  and  the  interesting  family  growing 
up  around  you,  and  of  the  fortunate  circumstances  of  your  life.  You  have  no 
reason  to  regret  your  profession,  or  the  military  career  you  have  run,  since  you 
have  been  entirely  successful,  and  as  useful  and  distinguished  as  the  nature  of 
the  service  permits.  It  has,  besides,  led  you  to  a  happy  union,  and  has  given  a 
fortunate  direction  to  your  pursuits. 

If  you  should  retire  now,  as  you  may  do  under  the  most  favorable  and  flat 
tering  circumstances,  you  will  carry  with  you  your  military  character  and  ser 
vices,  which  will  always  be  a  source  of  pride  and  pleasure,  as  well  as  of  proper 
consideration,  among  your  friends  and  countrymen.  In  the  event  of  war,  which 
is  not,  however,  probable  at  present,  you  will  be  called  into  service  with  much 
higher  rank.  If  you  should  aspire  to  political  life,  your  past  career  will  be  the 
highest  claim  to  public  confidence  and  favor.  Wherever  you  go  and  whatever 


J.  S.  JOHNSTON'S  LETTERS  AND  DEATH.  49 

you  do,  you  will  find  that  it  will  exert  a  favorable  influence  in  your  intercourse 
with  society. 

In  all  these  respects  you  have  gained  more  than  you  would  in  any  other  pro 
fession  in  the  same  time  ;  and,  taking  all  the  chances  of  life,  you  are  eminently 
successful  in  all  that  constitutes  our  happiness  here. 

After  suggesting  the  various  inducements  to  different  occupations, 
Mr.  Johnston  advises  farming,  and  adds  : 

You  might  connect  this  with  some  other  pursuits,  such  as  those  of  a  literary 
or  political  kind.  The  former  is  full  of  interest  and  pleasure,  but  the  country- 
life  lacks  excitement  to  keep  it  up  ;  as  to  the  latter,  it  is  replete  with  disgust 
and  disappointment. 

This  last  sentence  is  remarkable,  as  the  utterance  of  a  man  of  cheer 
ful  temper,  who,  from  early  manhood  to  the  day  of  his  death,  continu 
ally  advanced  in  popular  favor  without  a  single  reverse. 

After  discussing  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  planting  in 
Louisiana,  the  strong  fraternal  feeling  and  confident  spirit  of  the  man 
break  out  thus  : 

I  can  only  say  I  shall  be  most  happy  to  render  you  any  assistance;  and  that, 
with  the  support  of  Harris  and  myself,  you  could  not  fail  in  any  enterprise. 

He  continues  : 

You  think  you  are  too  old  to  study  a  profession.  That  is  a  mistake ;  you 
could  never  read  with  greater  advantage.  If  you  could  devote  all  your  leisure 
to  law,  history,  and  literature,  it  would  not  only  give  you  excellent  habits,  good 
taste,  and  much  valuable  information,  but  would  qualify  you  for  any  duty  to 
which  you  may  be  called.  I  can,  from  my  own  experience,  say  that  books  are 
the  source  of  the  purest  and  most  rational  pleasures.  They  are  the  most  dur 
able,  and,  unlike  almost  all  others,  increase  with  age,  as  the  taste  for  others 
diminishes.  To  a  gentleman  this  taste  is  essential ;  in  the  country  it  is  neces 
sary,  to  avoid  ennui  and  tedium  of  life ;  and  this  is  equally  true  of  both  sexes. 
.  .  .  Military  talents  are  held  in  high  estimation  all  over  the  world,  less  perhaps 
than  they  deserve  in  this  country ;  but  no  one  knows  how  long  we  shall  be 
peaceful  neighbors.  You  may  lite  to  see  not  only  war  among  the  States,  but 
civil  and  perhaps  servile  war,  in  which  all  your  military  skill  and  experience 
may  be  put  in  requisition. 

This  seems  written  in  the  spirit  of  prophecy,  but  it  was  only  the 
calm  reading  of  the  signs  of  the  times  by  the  experienced  eye  of  a  vet 
eran  statesman. 

There  are  several  other  letters  indicating  Mr.  Johnston's  natural 
desire  that  his  brother  should  cast  his  lot  in  the  community  where  he 
himself  had  been  so  fortunate  and  so  much  honored  ;  still  this  is  not 
urged  upon  him  unduly.  The  following  extracts  are  from  his  last  letter 
to  Lieutenant  Johnston  : 


50  JEFFERSON  BARRACKS. 

April  25,  1S33. 

MY  DEAE  BEOTHEE:  I  am  now  on  board  the  Homer  on  my  way  to  Louisiana, 
with  my  son  William.  The  indisposition  of  my  wife  detained  me  until  the  13th, 
when  she  was  so  far  recovered  as  to  permit  me  to  leave  her. 

Since  the  pacification,  all  parties  seem  reconciled  to  the  terms  of  the  com 
promise.  The  South  is  content,  and  the  manufacturers  are  perfectly  satisfied. 
The  country  enjoys  at  this  moment  an  unexampled  degree  of  prosperity,  and  we 
can  foresee  nothing  likely  to  interrupt  it  for  many  years.  Everything  is  appre 
ciating  in  value — stocks  of  all  kinds,  lands,  lots,  houses,  manufactures,  rents, 
etc.  Property  in  cities  and  towns  is  rising  in  value.  I  was  glad  to  see  Louis 
ville  partaking  of  the  general  prosperity ;  it  gives  indications  of  considerable 
improvement,  and  will  doubtless  become  a  flourishing  place.  ...  It  is  impos 
sible  for  one  person  to  advise  another  wisely  with  regard  to  his  vocation  and 
pursuits  in  life.  We  cannot  enter  fully  into  each  other's  views  and  feelings.  If 
money  was  your  chief  object,  you  would  accomplish  your  purpose  most  rapidly 
in  Louisiana  ;  but  the  climate  and  slave-property  are  objections.  .  .  . 

I  duly  received  the  account  of  General  Atkinson's  expedition.  He  pursued 
a  wise  and  prudent  policy.  If  he  had  hurried  on  and  been  defeated,  the  whole 
frontier  would  have  been  exposed,  while  the  timid  and  wavering  Indians  would 
have  joined  Black  Hawk,  and  gained  possession  of  the  country.  It  would  then 
have  required  another  year,  a  more  formidable  force,  and  a  greater  expenditure 
of  money,  to  conquer  them. 

I  had  a  conversation  with  the  President,  at  the  meeting  of  Congress.  He 
was,  I  believe,  satisfied  with  the  final  results.  He  thought  the  general  might, 
in  the  first  instance,  have  felt  the  force  of  the  Indians,  and,  having  done  so,  he 
would  have  found  himself  able  to  defeat  them.  Caution  is  no  part  of  his  policy. 
The  general  was  placed  in  a  position  either  to  suffer  defeat  by  a  prompt  move 
ment,  or  censure  by  a  prudent  one.  The  country  is  entirely  satisfied.  It  must 
have  been  a  very  arduous  service,  in  which  you  had  your  share  of  labor  and 
responsibility. 

You  will  please  make  my  affectionate  regards  to  your  wife.  Affectionately, 

J.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

The  next  tidings  brought  the  distressing  intelligence  of  this  broth 
er's  sudden  death,  by  the  explosion  of  the  steamboat  Lioness.  The 
following  extracts  from  a  letter  of  Judge  John  Harris  Johnston  to 
Albert  Sidney  Johnston  sufficiently  narrate  the  sad  event  : 

MY  DEAE  BEOTHER:  Detailed  accounts  of  the  dreadful  disaster  on  board  the 
Lioness,  in  Red  Pviver,  will  have  reached  you  before  this  time,  confirming  the 
melancholy  loss  of  life.  The  explosion  occurred  on  May  19th,  at  5  A.  M.,  at  the 
Recollet  Bon  Dieu,  on  Red  River.  Among  others  who  perished  was  our  much- 
beloved  brother,  who,  with  William,1  had  taken  passage  the  evening  before  for 
i^atchitoches.  In  one  instant,  when  all  on  board  were  unsuspecting,  the  boat 
was,  by  some  unaccountable  accident,  blown  to  atoms  by  gunpowder,  and  be 
tween  fifteen  and  twenty-five  persons  were  destroyed.  Our  brother  was  in 
stantly  killed,  and  his  body  was  not  found  for  several  days.  William,  who 
occupied  the  upper  berth  in  the  same  state-room,  was  thrown  to  the  middle  of 

1  Senator  Johnston's  only  son. 


FAMILY   MISFORTUNES.  51 

the  river,  and  saved  himself  on  a  plank  or  door.  He  was  severely  injured,  and 
confined  to  his  bed  for  twelve  or  fifteen  days.  He  is  now  restored,  and  able  to 
walk  out. 

Thus  perished,  in  the  fullness  of  his  honors  and  usefulness,  a  man 
who  was,  in  his  generation,  a  diligent  and  unselfish  public  servant,  and 
who  left  a  name  without  reproach.  From  a  notice  of  his  death  in  the 
New  Orleans  Argus,  the  following  is  a  brief  extract : 

Those  who  only  knew  him  as  a  public  man  will  regret  his  loss ;  those  who 
knew  him  intimately  will  mourn  it.  It  will  be  long  again  before  they  can 
meet  with  the  same  warm  heart  and  cool  head;  the  same  absence  of  and  con 
tempt  for  profession  and  pretense  ;  and  the  same  ready  performance  of  all  the 
duties  which  friendship  imposes. 

Niles's  Register  says  that  he  was — 

An  able  statesman  and  one  of  the  most  useful  members  of  the  Senate.  He 
was  a  gentleman  of  rare  accomplishments — generous,  faithful,  and  kind,  of 
very  courteous  manners,  and  possessed  of  the  most  liberal  feelings  ;  a  fast 
friend,  and  an  honorable  opponent. 

His  son  William,  mentioned  in  the  foregoing,  was  graduated  at 
Yale  College  ;  and,  having  begun  to  practise  law  at  Alexandria,  was, 
at  the  age  of  twenty-two,  selected  for  the  lucrative  office  of  parish 
judge,  vacated  by  the  death  of  his  uncle,  John  Harris  Johnston.  A 
year  later  he  fell  a  victim  to  the  climate,  leaving  a  widow  and  one  son. 
In  talents,  character,  and  industry,  his  promise  was  worthy  of  his 
father.  Seven  years  after  Josiah  Stoddard  Johnston's  death,  and  thirty- 
five  years  after  his  first  settlement  in  Louisiana,  not  a  single  scion  of 
all  his  hardy  race  remained  upon  the  soil  of  that  State.  Death  and 
emigration  had  done  the  work. 

If  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  entertained  any  serious  purpose  of  mak 
ing  a  home  in  Louisiana,  the  shock  of  his  brother's  untimely  end 
turned  him  from  it.  In  the  winter  of  1832-'33  great  commercial  distress 
in  Louisville  would  have  prevented  the  sale  of  real  estate  for  such  in 
vestment.  Mrs.  Johnston  seemed  to  be  recovering  her  wonted  health, 
and  the  spring  and  summer  of  1833  were  passed  happily  at  Jefferson 
Barracks,  with  no  greater  anxiety  than  "  a  little  cholera  in  St.  Louis," 
of  which  Lieutenant  Johnston  writes  to  his  friend,  E.  D.  Hobbs,  of 
Louisville,  "  As  we  have  seen  it  before  in  its  worst  form,  we  will 
meet  it  now  with  a  steady  front."  This  brief  and  touching  minute,  in 
Mrs.  Johnston's  handwriting,  records  the  beginning  of  her  final  malady  : 

I  was  taken  ill  on  September  19,  1833,  at  Jefferson  Barracks,  Missouri. 
Came  to  Louisville  October  4th.  Maria  Preston  Johnston  was  born  October  28, 
1833,  and  returned  to  her  Maker  the  10th  of  the  following  August.  "  The  Lord 
gave  and  the  Lord  hath  taken  away.  Blessed  be  the  name  of  the  Lord." 


52  JEFFERSON  BARRACKS. 

In  Louisville  the  physicians  pronounced  Mrs.  Johnston's  lungs  af 
fected,  and,  according  to  the  prevailing  practice,  bled  her  freely  and 
often,  and  confined  her  diet  to  such  insufficient  nourishment  as  goafs- 
milk  and  Iceland  moss.  Of  course,  no  more  effectual  way  could  have 
been  adopted  to  produce  pulmonary  consumption  in  an  enfeebled  con 
stitution.  She  was  carefully  and  tenderly  nursed  by  her  mother  and 
friends  in  Louisville,  and  her  husband  deceived  himself  with  the  hope 
that  travel  and  a  change  of  climate,  and  his  own  untiring  care,  might 
restore  her.  Accordingly,  on  March  4,  1834,  they  made  a  journey  to 
New  Orleans,  from  which  they  returned  the  8th  of  May.  During  their 
stay  in  New  Orleans  they  were  the  guests  of  Dr.  Davidson,  an  eminent 
physician.  While  in  New  Orleans,  Lieutenant  Johnston  took  the  step 
at  which  he  had  hesitated  for  eighteen  months,  and  on  April  24,  1834, 
forwarded  his  resignation  of  his  commission  as  second-lieutenant  in 
the  United  States  Army.  Mrs.  Johnston's  failing  health  made  her  long 
for  the  secure  quiet  of  a  permanent  home ;  and  her  husband,  anxious  to 
soothe  and  encourage  her,  in  order  to  gratify  the  cherished  wish  of  her 
heart,  bought  a  farm  near  St.  Louis,  with  the  purpose  of  engaging  in 
its  cultivation.  That  he  did  not  quit  the  army  without  a  severe  strug 
gle  is  evident  from  his  letters  and  actions.  He  writes  to  Eaton  : 

I  have  this  day  mailed  my  resignation,  the  acceptance  of  which  will  be  noti 
fied  to  you  almost  as  soon  as  this  will  reach  you.  That  I  felt  some  little  pain 
at  seeing  my  letter  glide  into  the  letter-box  you  may  judge.  I  hope,  although 
we  shall  be  separated,  we  shall  not  be  estranged.  I  quit  my  profession  and  my 
regiment  with  lively  interest  for  the  welfare  of  all,  and  the  recollection  of 
strong  friendship  for  very  many  of  the  officers  of  the  regiment. 

Dr.  John  Pintard  Davidson,  who  was  then  living  with  his  father., 
says  the  letter  of  resignation  was  reluctantly  written  and  placed  in  his 
hands  "to  mail  at  noon,  if  not  recalled  before  that  hour,"  and  that 
Lieutenant  Johnston  showed  all  the  signs  of  great  regret  in  performing 
this  act. 

On  their  return  to  Louisville,  in  obedience  to  medical  advice  they 
undertook  a  journey  to  the  Virginia  Springs  and  the  seaboard.  On 
July  15th  they  embarked  on  the  steamboat  Hunter  for  Guyandotte, 
with  their  son,  a  nurse,  a  driver,  and  a  carriage  and  pair  of  stout 
horses.  From  Guyandotte  the  journey  was  pursued  in  the  carriage. 
After  visiting  the  Red  Sulphur  Springs,  esteemed  salutary  in  lung- 
diseases,  they  made  the  round  of  the  watering-places  in  the  mountains, 
relying  more  upon  exercise  in  the  open  air  than  upon  the  mineral  wa 
ters.  They  also  visited  some  of  Mrs.  Johnston's  relations  in  that  re 
gion,  especially  Colonel  James  McDowell,  in  Rockbridge  County. 
During  this  distant  tour  he  paid  a  visit  to  Mrs.  Edmonia  Preston,  at 
Lexington.  The  writer  then  visited  a  house  which  forty  years  later  he 


MRS.  JOHNSTON'S  DEATH.  53 

occupied  as  a  residence  for  a  time.  Lieutenant  Johnston  visited  the 
Peaks  of  Otter  with  John  T.  L.  Preston,  who  later  in  life  was  of  Stone 
wall  Jackson's  staff. 

Leaving  Cherry  Grove,  the  residence  of  Colonel  McDowell,  on  the 
8th  of  September,  they  traveled  by  carriage,  passing  through  Freder- 
icksburg  on  the  llth,  and  reaching  Baltimore  on  the  14th.  They  spent 
several  days  in  Philadelphia,  in  order  to  consult  the  eminent  Dr.  Phys- 
ick ;  and,  after  visiting  New  York,  returned  to  Louisville,  where  they 
arrived  on  the  21st  of  October.  During  their  absence  their  youngest 
child  had  died.  Mrs.  Johnston  says  :  "  After  much  traveling  and  fa 
tigue  I  am  here  again.  My  babe  is  in  her  place  of  rest,  and  my  dear 
grandmother  1  living  long  enough  to  bless  us  once  more — and  die." 

Mr.  Johnston  devoted  the  autumn  and  winter  to  the  care  of  his 
invalid  wife,  whom  he  tenderly  nursed  through  an  almost  painless 
decline.  In  the  spring  they  removed  to  Hayfield,  about  five  miles  from 
Louisville,  the  country-home  of  Mr.  George  Hancock,  Mrs.  Johnston's 
uncle.  Mr.  Hancock  and  his  newly-wedded  wife  did  all  in  their  power 
to  cheer  these  last  sad  hours.  In  this  kind  home,  soothed  by  the  un 
wearying  affection  of  her  husband,  by  her  confident  religious  hopes, 
and  by  the  ministrations  of  the  Episcopal  Church,  and  invoking  bless 
ings  on  all  her  loved  ones,  Henrietta  Preston  Johnston  gradually  passed 
away.  She  died  on  the  12th  of  August,  1835. 

The  introduction  of  the  following  letter  from  Mrs.  Hancock,  who 
was  a  daughter  of  Dr.  Davidson,  and  a  very  constant  and  cherished 
friend  of  General  Johnston,  needs  no  apology.  As  a  skillful  chess 
player  and  an  enthusiastic  florist,  she  naturally  touches  upon  those 
points  of  sympathy : 

The  long  and  intimate  acquaintance  with  your  father,  dating  back  to  my  girl 
hood,  and  the  double  tie  of  kinship  (his  brother,  Judge  Johnston,  having  mar 
ried  my  sister),  gave  me  an  opportunity  to  know  him  well,  and  to  study  the 
many  noble  qualities  of  his  nature.  I  am  glad  the  history  of  one  so  noble  will 
be  given  to  the  world  ;  and  I  wish  I  could  do  justice  to  the  many  beauties  of  his 
character,  that  you  might  place  my  impression  of  them  on  record. 

I  saw  him  for  the  first  time  in  the  spring  of  1834,  when  he  came  to  'Sew 
Orleans  with  your  mother  for  the  benefit  of  the  climate  to  her  feeble  health. 
While  the  guest  of  my  father,  I  was  struck  with  his  tender  devotion  to  Ins  wife, 
which  caused  him  soon  to  resign  his  position  in  the  army,  that  he  might  the  bet 
ter  add  to  her  comfort  for  the  few  remaining  months  allotted  her  on  earth ;  the 
fulfillment  of  which  I  saw  most  devotedly  carried  out,  for  she  died  at  my  house 
in  the  August  of  the  following  year. 

He  impressed  me  at  first  as  an  austere  man,  but  I  found  him  the  kindest  and 
gentlest  of  friends ;  a  stoic,  yet  he  had  the  tenderest  nature,  so  mindful  of  others' 
feelings,  so  fearful  of  saying  aught  that  might  offend.  In  bringing  one's  duties 

1  Mrs.  Margaret  Strother  Hancock,  who  died  about  this  time,  at  a  very  advanced  age. 


54:  JEFFERSOX   BARRACKS. 

before  a  person,  it  was  done  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  him  feel  that  it  was  sug 
gested  by  his  own  sense  of  right.  He  was  a  close  observer  of  Nature — no  one 
loved  its  beauties  more  than  he  did.  His  love  for  flowers  was  remarkable— the 
tiniest  one  did  not  escape  his  observation  and  admiration.  I  owe  much  of  my 
knowledge  of  them  to  him,  and  it  is  now  a  pleasant  thought  with  me  to  have 
him  connected  in  my  memory  with  what  I  so  admire  and  enjoy.  We  often 
played  chess  together— his  knowledge  of  the  game  was  very  thorough.  When 
ever  I  was  so  fortunate  as  to  be  the  winner,  he  would  fight  on  to  the  last,  though 
perhaps  the  fate  of  the  game  might  have  been  long  decided,  saying,  "  While  I 
have  a  man  left  I  will  not  despair."  Doubtless  so  he  felt  in  the  sacrifice  of  his 
life  for  his  country.  I  feel  assured  it  was  not  given  without  due  reflection  and 
knowledge  of  right ;  for,  in  all  his  actions,  right  prompted  him,  and  they  were 
the  result  of  deep  reflection.  In  the  smallest  as  in  the  greatest  affairs  of  his 
life,  he  took  time  to  deliberate  before  acting.  I  was  struck  with  an  observation 
of  his  (which  goes  to  prove  this),  when  I  remarked  that  he  took  a  good  while 
to  write  a  letter.  "  Yes,"  said  he,  "I  do,  for  I  never  put  on  paper  what  I  am  not 
willing  to  answer  for  with  my  life."  So  also,  in  conversation,  he  considered 
well  before  he  spoke. 

After  the  death  of  his  wife,  Mr.  Johnston  first  went  to  his  farm  near 
St.  Louis,  making  the  home  he  had  prepared  in  anticipation  of  happi 
ness  his  refuge  in  affliction.  He  was  a  man  who,  alike  from  tempera 
ment  and  philosophy,  shrank  from  the  exhibition  or  indulgence  of  great 
emotion ;  and  to  such,  in  the  season  of  grief,  solitude  is  the  most  ac 
ceptable  friend.  General  Crosman,  who  was  as  much  in  his  confidence 
as  any  man,  says  that  lie  was  in  great  distress  of  mind.  He  had  left 
his  children,  who  were  so  young  as  to  require  female  care,  in  charge  of 
their  grandmother,  Mrs.  Preston,  at  Louisville,  with  a  vague  intention 
of  carrying  out,  at  whatever  cost  of  feeling,  designs  formed  under  such 
different  auspices.  But  though  his  habits  of  self-restraint  enabled  him 
to  enter  mechanically  upon  this  career,  they  could  not  counteract  the 
restlessness  that  urged  him  toward  a  life  in  which  activity  would  pro 
duce  oblivion.  In  October,  he  wrote  that  he  was  thinking  of  building, 
but  that  he  believed  that  it  would  suit  him  better  to  go  farther  West ; 
indeed,  he  seems  to  have  contemplated  establishing,  with  the  consent 
of  the  Government,  a  colony  in  the  country  of  the  Sioux.  The  next 
spring  this  consent  was  refused,  and  the  project  finally  abandoned.  His 
wife's  family,  with'  kindly  solicitude,  tried  to  induce  him  to  return  to 
Louisville  and  engage  in  business,  and  friends  proposed  various  occupa 
tions  there.  He  yielded  at  last  to  their  representations,  and  went  to 
Louisville  in  the  earlv  part  of  1836.  His  farm,  which  had  served  as  a 
retreat,  had  become  distasteful  to  him  as  a  home  and  painful  as  a  resi 
dence.  His  plan  of  life  was  shattered,  and  he  cast  about  him  for  some 
new  avenue  for  energies  that  would  not  be  repressed.  Had  reentrance 
into  the  United  States  Army  been  possible,  his  way  was  plain  ;  but  the 
only  method  of  reinstatement  open  to  him  was  by  the  use  of  political 


A  NEW  CAREER.  55 

influence,  of  which  he  would  not  avail  himself.  His  friends  urged  upon 
him  various  commercial  or  manufacturing  employments,  and  his  desire 
to  be  with  his  children  induced  him  to  weigh  well  their  arguments  and 
schemes,  but  he  concluded  that  he  was  unsuited  to  such  a  life.  He 
felt  that  his  education,  habits,  and  native  qualities,  fitted  him  for  a  sol 
dier  ;  and,  in  default  of  that  career,  he  was  inclined  to  pursue  whatever 
most  nearly  resembled  it.  In  April  he  made  a  journey  to  Washington 
City  to  obtain  the  consent  of  the  Government  to  his  enterprise  in  the 
Sioux  country.  He  spent  two  or  three  days  in  Washington  ;  but,  as 
has  been  stated,  his  request  was  refused.  In  a  letter  to  his  brother-in- 
law,  William  Preston,  he  says : 

I  had  the  good  fortune  on  Monday  to  hear  many  of  our  most  distinguished 
Senators  address  the  Senate  on  the  expediency  of  employing  railroads  for  the 
transportation  of  the  mail,  etc.,  under  the  provisions  of  the  bill  reported  by  Mr. 
Grundy,  who  supported  it  in  a  speech  of  some  length.  The  remarks  of  Messrs. 
Webster,  Clay,  Calhoun,  and  Buchanan,  of  Pennsylvania,  were  brief,  but  long 
enough  for  a  stranger,  who  only  wished  to  gratify  a  curiosity  with  regard  to  their 
different  styles.  .  .  .  The  more  I  see  of  great  men,  the  more  I  am  convinced 
that  they  owe  their  eminence  to  a  fortunate  combination  of  circumstances,  rather 
than  to  any  peculiar  adaptation  or  fitness  for  their  stations.  There  is  not  that 
wide  difference  in  mental  endowment  .that  most  persons  are  apt  to  conceive; 
and  hence  every  young  man  of  moderate  ability  may  hope  for  the  same  distinc 
tion,  and  should  struggle  to  attain  it. 

Mr.  Johnston  returned  to  Louisville  still  doubtful  as  to  his  future, 
when  an  opportunity  offered  that  seemed  to  open  to  him  such  a  career 
as  he  desired.  In  March,  Stephen  F.  Austin,  commissioner  from  Texas 
to  the  United  States,  had  arrived  in  Louisville,  and  made  there  his 
great  speech,  which  served  as  the  key-note  for  the  appeals  in  behalf  of 
Texas.  Through  him  General  Johnston's  interest  was  first  fully  awak 
ened.  Subsequently  Mr.  Dangerfield,  the  agent  of  the  young  republic 
of  Texas,  and  an  enthusiast  in  that  cause,  approached  him  with  rep 
resentations  of  the  heroism  and  sufferings  of  the  emigrants  from  the 
United  States  to  that  country,  and  speedily  enlisted  his  svmpathies. 
He  gave  freely  from  his  means  to  assist  the  revolutionary  party  in  that 
republic,  and,  after  debating  with  himself  the  whole  matter,  resolved  to 
throw  his  sword  into  the  cause  of  Texan  independence,  in  which  the 
stake  was  the  destiny  of  a  people  struggling  for  their  birthright  of 
freedom. 


56  THE   TEXAN   RE  VOLUTION. 

CHAPTER  V. 

THE   TEXAN    REVOLUTION. 

ON  February  18, 1685,  the  adventurous  LaSalle,  looking  for  a  mouth 
of  the  Mississippi,  which  he  had  discovered  in  1682,  landed  in  Mata- 
gorda  Bay.  Six  miles  up  the  Lavaca  River  he  built  Fort  St.  Louis. 
This  was  the  first  settlement  in  Texas.  Two  years  afterward,  in  at 
tempting  to  pass  by  land  from  Lavaca  to  the  French  colony  in  Illinois, 
he  was  murdered  near  the  river  Neches  by  his  own  men  ;  and  in  a  few 
years  the  little  post  on  the  Lavaca  was  destroyed  by  disease,  Indian  as 
saults,  and  Spanish  hostility.  The  claim  to  this  territory  was  disputed 
between  France  and  Spain,  but  the  latter  power  practically  settled  the 
question  in  1715  by  founding  the  missions,  which  were  the  first  perma 
nent  colonies  in  the  country.  Called  at  first  the  New  Philippines,  it 
took  its  name,  Texas,  from  Tejas,  a  word  meaning  frien ds.  In  1744, 
and  again  in  1765,  the  Spanish  population  was  estimated  at  750,  and 
the  domiciliated  Indians  at  the  same  number.  On  September  3,  1762, 
France  ceded  Louisiana  to  Spain.  After  this,  though  the  seaports  of 
Texas  were  closed  by  Spanish  jealousy,  the  trade  across  the  country 
between  Mexico  and  Louisiana,  possessions  of  the  same  power,  gave 
some  impulse  to  the  settlement  and  growth  of  the  country,  though 
these  again  were  retarded  by  the  increased  hostility  of  the  Indians. 

In  1800  Philip  Nolan,  with  twenty  men,  made  an  expedition  into 
Texas,  as  is  said,  in  the  interests  of  Burr  and  Wilkinson.  He  claimed 
to  be  in  search  of  horses.  He  was  attacked  by  150  Spaniards,  who 
killed  him  and  some  of  his  men,  and  made  prisoners  of  the  others. 
Ellis  Bean,  the  second  in  command,  was  held  a  prisoner  eleven  years. 

In  1800  Louisiana  was  restored  by  Spain  to  France,  and  in  1803 
ceded  by  France  to  the  United  States.  Under  this  cession  the  United 
States  set  up  some  claim  to  Texas,  and  the  boundary -line  itself  between 
Texas  and  Louisiana  was  left  undetermined.  Hostilities  seemed  im 
pending  in  1806,  but  were  averted  by  compromise.  In  the  same  year 
Lieutenant  Pike  explored  Red  River  and  the  Arkansas,  evading  the 
Spaniards  sent  to  capture  him,  until  he  was  arrested  on  the  Rio  Grande 
and  sent  prisoner  to  Chihuahua.  The  population  of  Texas  was  at  that 
time  estimated  at  7,000,  of  whom  2,000  were  at  San  Antonio  and  500 
at  Nacogdoches,  including  a  good  many  Americans. 

The  first  revolutionary  movements  in  Mexico  were  in  1808.  Whon 
Joseph  Bonaparte  took  the  throne  of  Spain  in  that  year,  the  Spaniards 
in  Mexico,  adhering  to  their  hereditary  sovereign,  established  a  regency. 


REVOLUTIONARY  EXPEDITIONS.  57 

Availing  themselves  of  the  confusion  arising  from  these  events,  the 
natives,  who  had  long  groaned  under  the  despotism  of  the  Spaniards, 
tried  to  throw  off  the  yoke.  The  patriot  cause,  led  by  Miguel  Hidalgo, 
was  at  first  eminently  successful ;  but,  having  suffered  some  defeats, 
Hidalgo  was  betrayed  to  the  enemy  in  March,  and  executed  on  July 
27,  1811. 

In  1812  Don  Bernardo  Gutierrez  organized  an  attempt  to  revolu 
tionize  Texas  and  establish  an  independent  government,  in  conjunction 
with  Lieutenant  Augustus  W.  Magee,  a  native  of  Massachusetts  and 
graduate  of  West  Point,  who  resigned  from  the  United  States  Army  to 
take  military  command  of  the  expedition.  The  forces  were  mainly 
composed  of  restless  young  men  of  good  families  in  Kentucky  and 
Louisiana,  but  a  body  of  outlaws,  who  infested  the  neutral  ground,  were 
accepted  as  auxiliaries.  The  movement  was  made  in  sympathy,  though 
not  in  concert,  with  Morales,  the  patriot  chief  west  of  the  Rio  Grande. 
Magee  invaded  Texas  with  365  men,  and  defeated  very  superior  forces 
of  the  Spaniards  wherever  he  met  them.  He  was  a  man  of  military 
capacity  and  daring.  He  died  of  consumption  during  the  expedition  ; 
but  his  successor,  Colonel  Samuel  Kemper,  completed  the  conquest  of 
the  country,  taking  prisoner,  at  San  Antonio,  General  Salcedo  and 
many  others  of  note.  Gutierrez,  under  some  plea  of  retaliation,  had 
General  Salcedo  and  thirteen  other  prisoners  put  to  death  in  cold 
blood,  which  caused  part  of  the  Americans  to  withdraw,  and  the  re 
mainder  to  depose  Gutierrez  and  select  as  his  successor  General  Toledo, 
a  Spanish  republican  exile. 

After  victory  had  been  secured,  the  inherent  difficulties  of  all  such 
enterprises  came  in  to  disconcert  the  plans  of  the  adventurers  and  pre 
vent  a  successful  issue.  Mexican  jealousy  of  their  Spanish  leader  and 
Anglo-American  allies,  American  distrust  of  Mexican  valor  and  fidelity, 
insubordination,  discord,  collision  of  authority,  and  other  causes,  led  to 
the  defeat,  on  the  banks  of  the  Medina,  of  400  Americans  and  700 
Mexicans,  by  General  Arredondo  with  10,000  royalists.  The  revolu 
tion  was  disastrously  crushed,  and  the  unfortunate  adventurers  who 
survived  expiated  their  temerity  by  all  the  sufferings  that  Spanish  ar 
rogance  and  vindictiveness  could  inflict.  Albert  Sidney  Johnston's 
brothers,  Darius  and  Orramel,  shared  in  the  hazards,  the  hardships,  the 
victories,  and  the  calamitous  consequences  of  this  expedition.  Fever, 
privation,  and  Spanish  prisons,  brought  them  to  early  graves. 

In  1817  General  Mina,  a  Spanish  republican,  made  another  gallant 
but  unsuccsesful  attempt  to  revolutionize  Texas,  but  was  finally  capt 
ured  and  shot.  Again,  in  1819,  Colonel  Long  with  200  or  300  Ameri 
cans  made  two  attempts,  which  ended  in  their  own  destruction.  After 
the  separation  of  Mexico  from  Spain,  in  1821,  the  changes  in  the  Cen 
tral  Government  merely  changed  the  masters  who  oppressed  this  distant 


58  THE   TEXAN  REVOLUTION. 

and  suspected  province,  until  1823-'24,  when  the  constituent  Cortes 
created  the  Federal  Union  of  the  Mexican  Republic,  and  constitutional 
liberty  seemed  about  to  dawn  on  that  unhappy  land. 

In  the  mean  time,  however,  Texas  had  taken  a  step  forward  that 
rapidly  led  to  unforeseen  results.  The  establishment  of  the  boundary 
of  the  Sabine  had  removed  a  constant  source  of  suspicion  against  the 
United  States,  and  the  increasing  hostility  of  the  Comanches  and  other 
Indians  required  the  interposed  barrier  of  a  hardy  people,  who  would 
withstand  and  chastise  their  incursions.  Hence  ensued  a  change  in  the 
policy  of  the  Government,  which  had  hitherto  sought  to  keep  Texas  a 
desert. 

In  1821  Moses  Austin,  a  native  of  Connecticut  and  resident  of  Mis 
souri,  obtained  from  the  Mexican  Government  a  contract  for  the  intro 
duction  of  a  colony  of  300  families  into  Texas.  Each  family  was  to 
receive  an  allotment  of  land,  and  the  empresario,  or  contractor,  was  to 
receive  a  large  premium,  also  in  land.  He  died,  however,  before  com 
pleting  his  arrangements,  leaving  the  execution  of  his  scheme  to  his 
son,  Stephen  F.  Austin. 

Stephen  Austin,  like  his  father,  was  a  man  of  large  designs  and  ex 
cellent  administrative  ability.  Though  an  enthusiast,  he  was  prudent, 
moderate,  benevolent,  and  unselfish,  and  devoted  himself  to  his  work 
with  an  eye  single  to  its  success.  It  was  only  after  all  the  delays  inci 
dent  to  Mexican  law  and  legislation,  and  a  year's  residence  at  Mexico, 
that  he  obtained  a  confirmation  of  his  contract.  The  large  civil  powers 
granted  to  empresarios  were  exercised  by  Austin  in  the  interests  of  the 
colonists,  and  his  high  qualities  as  a  man  gave  to  his  enterprise  a  suc 
cess  not  achieved  by  others.  Nevertheless,  others,  following  his  ex 
ample,  introduced  a  large  number  of  excellent  people  into  Texas. 
Though  most  of  the  colonists  were  poor,  some  were  persons  of  substance, 
and  very  many  were  of  high  character  and  superior  talents.  This  is 
evidenced  by  the  stability  with  which  many  of  the  original  families  have 
maintained  their  respectability  and  influence  through  the  vicissitudes 
of  more  than  half  a  century.  Of  course,  many  men  of  stained  repu 
tation  found  refuge  in  that  vast  and  sparsely-settled  territory  ;  but 
malefactors,  when  known,  were  expelled  by  the  colonists,  and  the  foun 
dations  of  the  future  republic  were  solidly  laid.  In  June,  1825,  Mr. 
Austin  contracted  for.  the  introduction  of  500  families ;  and  Texas 
seemed  destined  to  advance  rapidly  in  her  career  of  progress. 

In  1826  an  abortive  insurrection,  known  as  the  Fredonian  War, 
occurred  at  Nacogdoches,  in  which  Austin  and  his  colony  did  not  sym 
pathize.  It  had,  however,  the  effect  of  arousing  the  suspicions  of  the 
Mexican  Government,  which  gradually  set  on  foot  a  more  rigorous 
course  of  policy.  Indeed,  the  growing  wealth  and  numbers  of  an 
Anglo-American  State  on  her  borders  were  enough  to  excite  the  narrow 


MEXICAN  DESPOTISM.  59 

jealousy  of  that  republic.  The  eagerness  of  the  United  States  Gov 
ernment  to  purchase  the  Territory  still  further  stimulated  this  feeling. 
When  the  Mexican  States  had,  in  1824,  adopted  a  Federal  Constitu 
tion,  based  on  that  of  the  United  States,  Texas  alone,  of  all  the  con 
stituent  members,  thoroughly  understood,  heartily  embraced,  and  really 
meant  to  fulfill  the  solemn  pledge  engrafted  in  the  Constitution,  "  to 
obey  and  sustain,  at  all  hazards,  the  Supreme  Federal  powers,  and  its 
own  union  with  the  rest  of  the  States,  and  the  constitutional  indepen 
dence  of  all  and  each  of  them"  Whatever  was  meant  by  others,  the 
American  settlers  were  in  dead  earnest,  and  intended  to  adhere  to  a 
Constitution  that  guaranteed  self-government.  Coahuila  and  Texas 
were  temporarily  united  under  the  terms  of  this  compact.  In  the  vicis 
situdes  of  Mexican  politics,  which  usually,  however,  did  not  affect 
greatly  "the  men  between  the  plough-handles"  who  were  settling 
Texas,  General  Bustamante,  a  vainglorious  despot,  attained  the  Ex 
ecutive  power  of  Mexico  by  force,  and  tried  to  establish  a  centralized 
government  by  proscription  and  terror.  Texas  naturally  fell  under  his 
displeasure  ;  and,  by  a  decree  of  April  6,  1830,  he  initiated  measures 
for  the  complete  subjection  of  that  State.  He  suspended  the  coloni 
zation  contracts,  prohibited  immigration  from  the  United  States,  and 
prepared  to  make  a  penal  colony  of  Texas  by  the  transportation  thith 
er  of  convicts.  Ths  custom-house  regulations  were  also  made  more 
stringent  and  onerous,  and  in  the  administration  of  the  laws  the  Mexi 
can  officials  practised  the  most  invidious  discrimination  between  citi 
zens  of  Mexican  and  of  American  birth.  To  enforce  these  rigorous 
measures,  the  garrisons  were  reenforced  with  the  lowest  and  most  de 
bauched  of  the  mercenaries  who  propped  the  despotism  on  their  bayo 
nets.  Immigration  from  the  United  States  had  raised  the  number  of 
the  colonists  to  20,000 ;  and  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  men  born  free, 
of  the  high-spirited  Anglo-Saxon  race,  and  not  the  most  tractable  of 
that  race,  who  had  faced  the  perils  of  an  Indian  frontier  and  an  un 
tried  wilderness,  would  patiently  submit  to  spoliation  and  oppression. 

The  first  collision  between  the  military  forces  and  the  colonists  was 
brought  about  by  the  arbitrary  acts  of  Colonel  Bradburn,  commandant 
at  Anahuac,  an  American  in  the  service  of  the  Central  Government. 
In  1830  Bradburn  undertook  to  govern  the  country  by  military  law, 
arresting  citizens,  abolishing  the  municipalities  by  force,  and  otherwise 
overriding  the  law  of  the  land,  in  a  way  then  deemed  intolerable  by 
men  of  Anglo-American  descent.  Finally,  in  1832,  a  struggle  ensued 
which  has  passed  into  the  annals  of  the  country  under  the  name  of  the 
Anahuac  Campaign.  Bradburn  arrested  William  B.  Travis,  Patrick  C. 
Jack,  and  other  leading  citizens,  under  various  pretexts,  without  war 
rant  of  law,  and  refused  to  release  them,  or  allow  them  a  trial.  But 
those  were  days  when  life  without  liberty  was  disdained  by  Americans. 


60  THE   TEXAN  REVOLUTION. 

An  armed  force  of  colonists  was  collected  and  besieged  his  fort,  when 
he  agreed,  if  they  would  retire,  to  release  the  prisoners.  Perfidiously 
availing  himself  of  their  compliance,  he  brought  in  a  quantity  of  mili 
tary  stores,  and  then  retracted  his  promise.  He  was  again  besieged ; 
and  a  force  was  sent,  under  Captain  John  Austin,  to  prevent  Colonel 
Ugartechea,  commandant  at  Velasco,  from  assisting  him.  The  con 
ference  with  Ugartechea  resulted  in  an  assault  on  his  fort  by  the 
Texans.  After  a  hot  fight  of  one  day,  the  garrison,  125  strong, 
having  lost  half  their  strength,  capitulated.  The  Texan  loss  was  23 
killed  and  mortally  wounded,  and  40  wounded,  out  of  a  force  of  112 
men.  The  loss  attests  the  valor  of  both  parties. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  colonists,  300  strong,  intercepted  Colonel 
Piedras,  advancing  from  Nacogdoches  to  aid  Anahuac  ;  and  he  was 
glad  to  compromise,  by  superseding  Bradburn  and  releasing  the  pris 
oners.  In  order  to  give  legal  color  to  proceedings  that  might  appear 
revolutionary  to  the  Mexicans,  and  to  secure  the  aid  of  one  of  the  rival 
factions,  the  colonists  declared  their  adhesion  to  the  Plan  of  Vera  Cruz, 
a  movement,  projected  by  General  Santa  Anna,  in  favor  of  the  Consti 
tution  of  1824,  against  the  despotic  system  of  Bustamante.  General 
Mejia,  Santa  Anna's  lieutenant,  was  glad  to  accept  the  explanation, 
and  withdraw  such  soldiers  as  would  go  with  him,  the  colonists  expelling 
the  remainder. 

In  1832  Texas  suffered  under  the  double  calamity  of  Indian  aggres 
sions  and  cholera.  In  October,  1832,  the  people  assembled  in  conven 
tion  at  San  Felipe,  and  memorialized  the  Central  Government  for  the 
separation  of  Texas  from  Coahuila,  and  for  the  repeal  of  the  invidious 
law  of  April  6,  1830.  The  request  for  a  separate  government  was  not 
unreasonable,  as  the  State  capital  was  500  miles  beyond  its  limits. 
The  convention  adjourned,  to  assemble  again  the  1st  of  April,  1833,  for 
the  formation  of  a  constitution,  and  to  pray  for  the  admission  of  Texas 
into  the  Mexican  Union  as  a  State.  This  was  done  in  April,  1833;  and 
Stephen  F.  Austin,  Erasmo  Seguin,  and  John  B.  Miller,  were  delegated 
to  represent  their  grievances  and  urge  their  requests.  Austin,  though 
not  strictly  in  harmony  with  this  movement,  recognized  its  essential 
justice,  and  faithfully  performed  the  duties  of  his  trust. 

Apparently,  no  time  could  have  been  more  propitious  for  his  mis 
sion,  as  the  inauguration  of  Santa  Anna,  as  President,  on  May  15, 1833, 
seemed  to  be  the  triumph  of  the  federal  system  over  the  centralized  des 
potism  of  Bustamante.  But  Austin  found  that  these  plans  and  plat 
forms  had  no  real  meaning  in  Mexican  politics,  and  were  but  the  war- 
cries  of  ambitious  leaders.  Mexico  was  in  revolutionary  turmoil:  Santa 
Anna,  the  legal  President,  intriguing  for  a  dictatorship;  Gomez  Farias, 
the  acting  President,  projecting  radical  reform's;  and  various  military 
chiefs  in  open  revolt;  but  in  all  he  found  a  like  jealousy,  hatred,  and 


SANTA  ANNA'S  SUCCESSES.  61 

ignorant  contempt  for  the  frontier,  half-Americanized  province  of 
Texas.  After  waiting  in  vain  from  April  till  October,  he  wrote  to  the 
municipality  of  Bexar,  advising  the  organization  of  a  local  State  gov 
ernment,  "  even  should  the  Supreme  Government  of  Mexico  refuse  its 
consent."  This  letter  led  to  his  arrest  and  strict  imprisonment  for 
many  months;  and,  indeed,  his  detention  did  not  end  until  September, 
1835,  when  he  returned  to  Texas  after  an  absence  of  two  years  and  a 
half. 

On  May  13,  1834,  Santa  Anna  dissolved  Congress  by  force  and 
assumed  dictatorial  powers,  and  in  January,  1835,  assembled  a  Con 
gress  which  destroyed  the  Federal  Constitution  and  erected  a  central 
government  on  its  ruins.  The  colonists  of  Texas,  though  greatly  dis 
turbed  by  the  refusal  of  their  request,  and  by  the  anarchy  arising  from 
the  failure  to  elect  State  officers,  remained  at  peace,  not  wishing  to  in 
volve  themselves  in  Mexican  politics,  unless  their  own  rights  were 
trampled  upon. 

Colonel  Almonte,  special  commissioner  to  inspect  Texas  in  1834, 
estimated  its  whole  population  at  21,000  civilized  inhabitants  and 
15,300  Indians,  of  whom  10,800  were  hostile  nomads.  Kennedy  places 
the  civilized  population  at  30,000  whites  and  2,000  negroes. 

The  northern  States  of  Mexico  were  strongly  republican;  and  the 
people  of  Puebla,  Oaxaca,  Jalisco,  and  other  States,  were  also  opposed 
to  a  change  of  government;  but  Santa  Anna  easily  put  down  all  oppo 
sition  by  force.  Garcia,  Governor  of  Zacatecas,  tried  the  issue  with 
arms,  and  was  defeated  with  a  loss  of  2,700  men.  A  feeble  and  irreso 
lute  attempt  at  resistance  was  made  by  the  State  authorities  of 
Coahuila,  under  their  Governor,  Viesca;  but  he  was  defeated  by  Santa 
Anna's  brother-in-law,  General  Cos,  captured  and  imprisoned.  The 
Legislature  was  then  deposed,  and  Santa  Anna's  authority  fully  estab 
lished. 

As  the  State  government  of  Coahuila  had  corruptly  and  lavishly 
alienated  the  public  domain  of  Texas,  the  people  of  Texas  disregarded 
Viesca's  appeals,  and  refused  to  make  common  cause  with  him. 

Though  Santa  Anna  tried  to  soothe  the  Texans  with  friendly  decla 
rations,  they  could  not  be  deceived,  as  his  theory  of  government  was 
avowed,  and  he  continued  to  assemble  troops  to  carry  it  out.  Austin, 
whose  familiarity  with  Mexican  affairs  enabled  him  to  penetrate  the 
designs  of  its  rulers,  threw  off  his  habitual  caution,  and  submitted  to 
the  people  the  question  whether  they  would,  by  assenting  to  the 
change  from  a  federal  to  a  central  government,  surrender  the  vested 
rights  and  State  sovereignty  secured  to  them  by  the  Constitution  of 
1824;  and  he  recommended  a  general  consultation  of  the  people  of 
Texas  to  decide  this  question.  In  this  movement  he  had  the  advice  and 
countenance  of  Don  Lorenzo  de  Zavala,  a  sincere  republican,  who  had 


62  THE   TEXAN   REVOLUTION. 

been  Governor  of  Mexico,  Secretary  of  Finance,  and  minister  to 
France.  Santa  Anna  issued  orders  for  their  arrest,  and  for  the  disarm 
ing  of  the  citizens;  and  General  Cos  moved  toward  San  Antonio,  de 
claring  his  intention  to  establish  military  rule  in  Texas. 

The  issue  between  military  despotism  and  constitutional  govern 
ment  was  now  squarely  made.  Committees  of  safety  were  organized, 
which  determined  to  repel  invasion  by  force.  The  first  shock  of  arms 
.  occurred  on  the  banks  of  the  river  Guadalupe  on  the  20th  of  Septem 
ber,  1835.  Eighteen  Texans  of  Gonzales,  under  Captain  Martin,  re 
pulsed  a  body  of  200  Mexican  cavalry,  who  attempted  a  passage  of  the 
river.  On  the  1st  of  October,  168  volunteers  from  the  Guadalupe,  un 
der  Colonel  John  H.  Moore,  without  loss,  defeated  General  Castaneda 
and  a  large  Mexican  force.  This  success  inspirited  the  colonists  ;  and 
Austin  took  command  in  the  west,  and  Sam  Houston  at  Nacogdoches. 

On  October  8th  Captain  Collinsworth  captured  Goliad  with  $10,000 
worth  of  stores,  and  300  stand  of  arms.  Benjamin  R.  Milam,  who  had 
just  escaped  from  Mexico,  shared  in  this  assault  as  a  volunteer.  On 
October  28th  Colonel  James  Bowie,  with  92  men,  having  approached 
within  a  mile  and  a  half  of  San  Antonio,  found  his  little  troop  sur 
rounded  at  the  Conception  Mission  by  a  large  force  of  Mexicans,  which 
had  moved  out  under  cover  of  a  dense  fog.  He  engaged  the  enemy 
briskly,  captured  a  cannon,  and  killed  and  wounded  100  Mexicans,  with 
the  loss  of  only  one  man.  A  number  of  other  engagements  resulted 
favorably  to  the  colonists.  General  Cos  had  strongly  fortified  San  An 
tonio,  and  intrenched  himself  there  with  an  army  of  about  2,000  men. 
General  Burleson,  who  then  had  command  in  the  west,  permitted  Colo 
nel  Milam  to  lead  300  volunteers  to  the  assault  of  this  position  on 
December  5th.  The  Texans  effected  a  lodgment,  and  fought  their  way 
from  house  to  house  until  they  got  possession  of  the  public  square.  On 
the  9th  Cos  sent  in  a  flag  of  truce,  and  on  the  llth  capitulated,  his 
force  being  allowed  to  retire  beyond  the  Rio  Grande,  on  condition  that 
they  should  not  again  serve  against  Texas.  In  the  third  day's  fight, 
Milam  fell,  with  a  rifle-ball  through  his  head.  His  death  was  a  great 
loss,  as  he  was  a  man  of  resources,  daring,  and  experience.  The  first 
campaign  thus  ended  with  the  complete  success  of  the  colonists. 

The  General  Consultation  of  Texas  met  on  the  3d  of  November, 
1835,  and  chose  Branch  S.  Archer  as  president.  This  body  put  forth  a 
declaration  stating  that  the  people  of  Texas  had  armed  in  defense  of 
their  just  rights  and  liberties,  and  of  the  republican  principles  of  1824. 
A  provisional  government  was  formed,  and  Henry  Smith  was  elected 
Governor,  with  ample  executive  powers.  Sam  Houston  was  chosen 
commander-in-chief  ;  and  Stephen  F.  Austin,  Branch  S.  Archer,  and 
William  H.  Wharton,  were  appointed  commissioners  to  the  United 
States,  with  authority  to  borrow  $1,000,000.  Arrangements  were  made 


PROVISIONAL  GOVERNMENT.  63 

for  an  army  and  navy,  and  for  all  the  functions  of  civil  government, 
and  inducements  were  offered  to  volunteers  to  join  their  standard.  In 
January,  1836,  Austin  wrote,  advising  a  declaration  of  independence ; 
and,  on  the  1st  of  February,  delegates  in  favor  of  that  measure  were 
elected  to  a  national  convention,  which,  on  the  2d  day  of  March, 
1836,  declared  Texas  a  free,  sovereign,  and  independent  republic.  On 
the  17th  of  March  a  constitution  was  adopted,  and  an  executive  gov 
ernment,  ad  interim,  appointed — of  which  David  G.  Burnet  was  Presi 
dent  ;  Lorenzo  de  Zavala,  Vice-President ;  Thomas  J.  Rusk,  Secretary 
of  War ;  and  other  distinguished  Texans  chiefs  of  the  usual  bureaux. 
The  President  was  a  man  of  noble  character — temperate  but  firm  in 
opinion,  tenacious  of  principles,  diligent  in  business,  pure,  patriotic, 
and  enlightened.  He  was  a  native  of  New  Jersey,  the  son  of  a  Revolu 
tionary  patriot,  and  had  long  been  a  resident  of  Texas.  Yet,  such  was 
his  sensibility  that  he  felt  a  slight  as  if  it  were  a  stain,  and  this  ren 
dered  him,  even  when  most  useful,  most  unhappy.  His  colleagues  were 
men  of  like  patriotism  and  fine  abilities. 

In  the  mean  time  events  had  moved  rapidly.  Santa  Anna  had  set 
out  on  the  1st  of  February  from  Saltillo,  with  his  grand  army  of  inva 
sion,  computed  at  7,500  men.  On  the  16th  he  crossed  the  Rio  Grande, 
and  on  the  23d  appeared  before  San  Antonio.  Instead  of  finding  this 
stronghold  of  the  wrest  fortified,  garrisoned,  and  provisioned  against 
his  advance,  it  was  occupied  by  a  small  detachment,  which,  at  his  ap 
proach,  retired  to  the  Alamo,  a  mission  which  had  been  turned  into  a 
barrack.  Two  months  and  a  half  had  completely  changed  the  condition 
of  affairs  in  Texas.  The  colonists,  present  at  the  fall  of  San  Antonio, 
had  retired  to  their  homes  immediately  after  that  event ;  and  the  volun 
teers,  who  remained,  weary  of  inaction,  eagerly  entered  upon  an  expe 
dition,  projected  against  Matamoras,  and  said  to  have  been  approved 
by  the  Government  and  General  Houston.  Some  400  started,  leaving 
only  about  sixty  men  as  a  garrison. 

The  civil  Government  had  split  into  two  hostile  factions ;  the  Coun 
cil  on  one  side,  and  Governor  Smith  and  General  Houston  on  the  other: 
and  the  defenders  of  the  frontier  were  perplexed,  and  eventually  sacri 
ficed,  by  the  contradictory  orders  and  neglect  of  preparation  of  these 
opposing  heads.  Clothing  and  munitions  came  in  from  friends  in  the 
United  States,  and  a  considerable  number  of  volunteers  also  arrived ; 
but,  directed  by  no  competent  common  authority,  the  energies  of  these 
valiant  and  enthusiastic  men  were  wasted  for  the  purposes  of  defense, 
and  their  blood  served  only  to  immortalize  their  own  heroism,  and  to 
consecrate  the  cause  to  which  it  was  devoted. 

Thus,  while  Santa  Anna  was  assembling  his  army,  and  making  his 
preparations  for  invasion,  the  hardy  but  undisciplined  militia  remained 
at  home.  If  a  man  with  the  true  instincts  of  leadership  had  been  at 


64:  THE   TEXAN   REVOLUTION. 

this  juncture  at  the  head  of  affairs,  he  could  have  confronted  Santa 
Anna  at  San  Antonio,  or  on  the  banks  of  the  Colorado,  with  3,000 
or  4,000  men,  defeated  him,  and  carried  the  Texan  arms  far  enough 
into  Mexico  to  have  settled  the  question  of  independence  forever. 
As  it  was,  massacre  and  wide-spread  desolation,  from  the  Rio  Grande 
to  the  Brazos,  marked  the  path  of  the  invader.  While  the  main 
force  of  Santa  Anna  marched  on  San  Antonio,  a  column  under  General 
Urrea  swept  up  the  coast-lands,  laying  waste  the  country,  and  surpris 
ing  and  destroying  several  detachments  of  volunteers.  Urrea  slaugh 
tered  his  prisoners,  and  omitted  no  circumstance  of  outrage  and  cru 
elty. 

Santa  Anna  entered  San  Antonio  without  resistance  ;  the  command 
ant,  Colonel  William  B.  Travis,  retiring  with  a  little  band  to  the  unten 
able  position  of  the  Alamo.  He  sent  several  appeals  for  relief,  and  re- 
enforcements.  On  the  24th  of  February  he  sent  "an  address  to  the 
people  of  Texas."  He  says  :  "  I  am  besieged  by  a  thousand  or  more 
Mexicans.  ...  I  shall  never  surrender,  or  retreat.  .  .  .  Victory  or 
death  ! "  He  received  no  aid,  except  33  men  from  Gonzales,  who  broke 
through  the  enemy,  to  die  with  him.  From  the  23d  of  February  to 
the  6th  of  March,  156  resolute  men  kept  at  bay  4,000  Mexican  troops, 
of  whom  at  least  500  were  killed  and  wounded.  When  the  final 
assault  was  made,  the  defenders,  worn  down  in  strength,  but  erect  in 
spirit,  met  it  with  unshrinking  front.  They  perished  with  their  slain 
around  them — Travis,  Bowie,  Crockett,  Bonham,  and  all  that  heroic 
band.  It  is  said  that  one  man  escaped  in  the  smoke  of  the  fray,  but 
no  other  sought  to  do  so  ;  they  were  a  willing  sacrifice.  The  bodies 
of  the  dead  were  savagely  mutilated,  thrown  into  a  heap,  and  burned. 
This  was  the  fall  of  the  Alamo. 

Another  calamity,  more  destructive  still,  soon  after  befell  the  unfor 
tunate  volunteers.  Fannin  had  collected  at  Goliad  about  500  men  ; 
from  whom  he  detached  Lieutenant  King,  with  14  men,  to  remove  the 
families  at  Refugio.  King  sent  an  express  to  say  that  he  was  sur 
rounded  ;  and  Fannin  dispatched  120  men,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Ward,  to  his  succor.  Both  detachments  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy,  and  were  savagely  butchered.  Fannin,  having  received  orders 
from  General  Houston,  on  March  14th,  to  retreat,  delayed  until  the 
18th,  with  the  generous  hope  that  he  might  be  able  to  render  aid  to 
his  detachments.  At  last,  when  he  left  Goliad,  it  was  too  late.  He 
was  overtaken  and  surrounded  on  the  open  prairie  by  Urrea's  army,  1,700 
strong.  Three  charges  of  the  Mexicans  were  repulsed,  with  heavy  loss 
to  the  assailants.  After  nightfall,  the  Indian  skirmishers  of  the  enemy 
killed  and  wounded  54  of  the  Texans.  Daylight  showed  that  Urrea 
had  been  largely  reenforced  with  artillery  and  infantry.  After  some 
negotiation,  Fannin  surrendered  his  command  as  prisoners  of  war.  Out 


INVASION  OF  TEXAS.  65 

of  365  prisoners  captured  with  Fannin,  27  escaped,  eight  surgeons  and 
attendants  were  spared,  and  330  were  led  out  and  shot,  in  cold  blood, 
on  Palm- Sunday.  Fannin,  wounded  as  he  was,  put  aside  the  hand  that 
would  have  blindfolded  him,  and  received,  like  a  soldier,  the  death-shots 
in  his  breast. 

Santa  Anna  now  regarded  the  conquest  of  Texas  as  complete,  and 
was  with  difficulty  dissuaded  from  returning  to  Mexico  and  leaving 
the  occupation  of  the  country  to  his  subordinates.  Having  finally 
resolved  to  finish  his  work,  he  proceeded  to  it  with  that  celerity  which 
was  his  sole  military  virtue.  With  presumptuous  infatuation,  he  de 
tached  from  his  army  three  columns  of  about  800  men  each,  directing 
Gaona  to  move  by  Bastrop  across  the  country  to  Nacogdoches,  Urrea 
to  march  by  Matagorda  along  the  coast,  and  Sesma  to  precede  the  main 
body  in  the  direction  of  San  Felipe ;  thus  exposing  his  force  to  be  de 
stroyed  in  detail.  General  Houston  remained  from  March  18th  to  March 
27th  at  Beeson's  Ferry  on  the  Colorado,  with  a  force  of  over  1,500  volun 
teers,  eager  for  combat ;  and  it  has  never  been  satisfactorily  explained 
why  he  did  not  attack  and  crush  Sesma's  inferior  force  within  easy  strik 
ing  distance,  and  follow  up  the  advantage  by  giving  battle  to  Santa 
Anna's  main  body.  His  army  was  rapidly  augmenting  by  the  arrival 
of  considerable  bodies  of  men,  anxious  to  protect  their  homes,  and 
avenge  the  inhuman  butchery  of  their  comrades.  Nevertheless,  he  re 
treated  precipitately,  without  an  avowed  policy,  leaving  the  Colorado 
and  Brazos  countries  open  to  the  ravages  of  the  enemy.  His  army 
melted  away ;  so  that,  notwithstanding  considerable  accessions,  it  only 
numbered  783  men  at  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto.  The  colonists  could 
not  leave  their  families  at  the  mercy  of  a  ruthless  invader,  who  spared 
neither  age  nor  sex. 

General  Houston's  conduct  and  motives  have  been  severely  censured 
by  eminent  and  honorable  men  ;  but  it  is  a  sufficient  explanation  to  say 
that  his  talents  were  essentially  popular,  not  military.  His  apology 
for  his  retreat  was,  that  it  drew  the  enemy  from  his  base,  and  would,  if 
continued  farther,  have  enabled  reinforcements  from  the  United  States 
to  join  the  Texan  army.  That  this  is  not  a  sufficient  reply  is  evident, 
because  the  Mexican  army  was  living  on  the  country,  while  the  Texans 
grew  weaker  daily  by  desertion.  One  all-sufficient  answer,  however, 
was  held  as  an  ample  justification  in  all  his  subsequent  political  con 
tests  and  personal  controversies — the  result  of  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto  ; 
the  splendid  success  of  the  Texan  army  condoning  any  previous  mis 
takes  or  subsequent  errors  of  the  commander.  Houston,  though  desti 
tute  of  military  capacity  and  the  knowledge  which  sometimes  makes  par 
tial  amends  for  it,  and,  in  the  opinion  of  the  writer,  slenderly  endowed 
with  administrative  talents  or  political  wisdom,  had  all  the  qualities 
that  go  to  make  a  popular  leader.  He  was  a  man  of  imposing  pres- 


66  THE    TEXAN    REVOLUTION. 

ence,  an  agreeable  orator,  with  an  uncommon  gift  of  political  tact.  His 
manners  were  free  and  persuasive,  and  he  possessed  that  self-assertion 
so  impressive  to  the  multitude.  He  was  a  friendly  man,  too,  when 
there  was  no  possible  chance  of  a  conflict  of  interests  ;  but  vigilant  and 
far-seeing  to  prevent  the  rise  of  any  who  would  not  subserve  his  ends. 
He  really  believed  himself  born  to  command,  and  was  imperious  in  the 
exercise  of  power.  Altogether,  if  neither  a  wise  nor  a  great  man,  he 
was  an  able  politician. 

On  the  28th  of  March  Houston  reached  San  Felipe  ;  and,  on  the 
29th,  Groce's  Ferry  on  the  Brazos.  Santa  Anna  pushed  forward  Ses- 
ma's  column,  followed  by  Filisola  with  the  main  body.  On  the  13th  of 
April  he  crossed  the  Brazos  with  Sesma's  division  and  arrived  at  Har- 
risburg  on  the  15th,  and  at  Lynchburg  on  the  16th.  Filisola  was  now 
low  down  the  Brazos,  the  lowlands  of  which  were  flooded  and  nearly 
impassable  ;  and  Santa  Anna  was  within  the  reach  of  a  force  of  Texans 
not  much  inferior  to  his  own.  General  Houston  seemed  to  entertain  a 
design  to  retreat  beyond  the  Trinity,  where  he  expected  to  receive  re- 
enforcements  ;  but  the  voice  of  his  army  compelled  him  to  confront  the 
enemy,  which  he  did  on  the  19th,  on  the  San  Jacinto  River.  On  the  20th 
the  cavalry,  under  Colonel  Sherman,  engaged  the  enemy ;  but  the  ardor  of 
the  Texan  army  was  restrained  by  their  commander  until  the  afternoon 
of  the  21st  of  April.  On  that  morning  the  enemy  were  reenforced  by 
500  men  under  General  Cos.  At  half-past  three,  the  Texans  moved 
forward  in  line  of  battle.  Colonel  Burleson  commanded  the  centre  ; 
Colonel  Sherman,  the  left  ;  Colonel  Hockley,  the  artillery  on  the  right ; 
and,  on  his  flank,  Colonel  M.  B.  Lamar,  a  troop  of  61  cavalry.  Sherman 
first  encountered  the  enemy  ;  and  then  the  whole  line  burst  impetu 
ously  upon  the  slight  intrenchments  thrown  up  by  the  Mexicans,  with 
the  war-cry :  "  Remember  the  Alamo  !  Goliad  and  the  Alamo  ! " 
The  combat  lasted  only  eighteen  minutes.  It  was  a  rout,  not  a  battle. 
The  Texans  lost  two  killed  and  21  wounded,  six  of  them  mortally. 
The  Mexican  loss  was  630  killed,  208  wounded,  and  730  prisoners, 
among  whom  were  Santa  Anna,  Cos,  Almonte,  and  others  of  note. 
General  Houston  was  wounded  in  the  ankle. 

The  opinion  of  the  army  favored  the  execution  of  the  butcher  of 
the  Alamo  and  of  Fannin's  men ;  and,  surely,  he  had  forfeited  his  right 
to  mercy  by  these  crimes  and  by  the  devastation  of  the  land.  It  was 
thought  more  politic,  as  well  as  more  humane,  to  spare  his  life;  in  con 
sideration  of  which  he  agreed  to  a  convention,  by  which  Filisola  and 
Gaona  were  to  retire  to  San  Antonio,  and  Urrea  to  Victoria.  Accord 
ing  to  Filisola,  such  was  the  condition  of  his  army,  from  the  weather, 
starvation,  dysentery,  and  demoralization,  that,  but  for  this  convention, 
it  would  have  fallen  an  easy  prey  to  the  victorious  Texans.  As  it  was, 
the  Mexican  army  gladly  retreated  not  only  to  the  points  stipulated, 


TEXAN  INDEPENDENCE.  67 

but  beyond  the  Rio  Grande;  not,  however,  without  a  violation  of  the 
articles  of  the  convention,  by  dismantling  the  Alamo.  On  the  14th  of 
May  the  Government,  by  General  Houston's  advice,  agreed  to  release 
Santa  Anna  and  the  Mexican  prisoners,  on  condition  that  the  Texas 
prisoners  should  be  released  and  that  hostilities  should  cease.  Santa 
Anna  also  stipulated  secretly  for  the  reception  of  a  mission  from  Texas, 
for  a  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce,  and  for  the  Rio  Grande  as  the 
boundary  between  the  two  republics.  On  June  1st  Santa  Anna  was 
embarked,  but  on  the  3d  the  Government  was  compelled  by  the  sol 
diers  to  bring  him  ashore  again,  and  his  execution  was  strongly  urged. 
The  hope  was  soon  dispelled  that  his  release  would  effect  anything 
favorable  to  Texas.  Already,  on  the  20th  of  May,  the  Mexican  Senate 
had  annulled  his  stipulations,  and  preparations  were  begun  for  a  more 
formidable  invasion  of  Texas.  It  was  not  until  December,  1836,  that 
Santa  Anna  was  dismissed  to  the  United  States,  when  he  illustrated  his 
perfidy  by  solemnly  denying  and  repudiating  all  the  engagements  he 
had  made  while  in  captivity. 

The  massacre  of  Fannin's  men,  the  fall  of  the  Alamo,  and  the 
other  crimes  of  the  Mexicans  against  humanity,  had  aroused  the  warm 
est  sympathy  for  Texas  in  the  people  of  the  United  States.  The 
appeals  of  the  agents  of  Texas  stirred  the  heart  of  the  South,  and 
volunteers  poured  in,  singly  and  in  companies,  to  aid  the  cause  of  in 
dependence.  San  Jacinto  virtually  settled  that  question;  but  this  was 
not  then  apparent,  in  view  of  the  threatening  attitude  of  Mexico  with 
its  8,000,000  inhabitants. 

Mr.  Clay  made  a  brilliant  speech  in  favor  of  the  independence  of 
Texas,  and  on  June  18th  made  a  report  in  the  United  States  Senate 
in  favor  of  its  recognition,  to  which  effect  both  Houses  of  Congress 
passed  resolutions.  On  June  27th  the  Senate,  on  motion  of  Mr.  William 
C.  Preston,  of  South  Carolina,  adopted  a  resolution  for  sending  a  com 
missioner  to  Texas;  and  the  President,  General  Jackson,  was  known  to 
be  favorable  to  its  annexation  to  the  United  States. 

In  September,  General  Houston  was  elected  President  over  Stephen 
F.  Austin,  the  known  friendship  of  General  Jackson  contributing  not 
less  powerfully  than  the  eclat  of  San  Jacinto  to  his  success.  General 
Mirabeau  B.  Lamar  was  elected  Vice-President.  The  constitution  was 
ratified,  and  a  declaration  given  in  favor  of  annexation  to  the  United 
States  by  a  vote  of  the  people.  Congress  met  on  October  3d. 

Albert  Sidney  Johnston  shared  in  the  general  sympathy  with  the 
Texan  cause,  but  there  were  personal  reasons  which  increased  the 
intensity  of  his  own  feelings.  In  early  youth,  as  has  been  mentioned, 
he  had  spent  some  time  in  Alexandria,  Louisiana,  then  a  border  village, 
and  consequently  had  familiar  recollections  of  many  from  that  region 
who  were  now  earnest  actors  in  the  events  of  the  revolution.  His 


68  THE   TEXAN   REVOLUTION. 

brothers,  too,  had  taken  part  in  Magee's  expedition  in  1812,  and  the  re 
membrance  of  their  extraordinary  sufferings  may  have  further  influenced 
him.  It  is  now  difficult  to  estimate  how  far  mental  disquietude  and  the 
spirit  of  adventure  may  have  entered  into  his  motives.  He  was  un 
happy,  he  was  unemployed,  and  here  was  a  field  open  alike  to  his 
energies,  his  patriotism,  and  his  philanthropy. 

It  was  the  cause  of  a  community  struggling  for  self-government 
against  a  central  despotism,  for  the  maintenance  of  guaranteed  and 
vested  rights  against  a  military  usurpation,  for  constitutional  freedom 
against  chronic  anarchy.  It  was  a  contest  between  20,000  Americans, 
kindred  in  race  and  sentiment,  who  had  been  invited  by  Mexico  to  take 
possession  of  the  soil,  and  8,000,000  alien  Mexicans,  incapable  of  sta 
ble  government.  It  was  the  weak  against  the  strong,  order  against 
political  confusion,  Americans  against  a  foreign  enemy.  The  men  of 
that  day  had  been  bred  in  republican  ideas  and  nurtured  with  visions  of 
the  greatness  and  the  expansive  force  of  our  people,  and  they  were 
willing  to  lay  down  fortune  and  life  to  forward  these  mighty  ends. 

Albert  Sidney  Johnston  was  a  republican  from  the  bottom  of  his 
heart,  and,  though  not  a  propagandist  in  either  temper  or  sentiment,  he 
was  a  sincere  believer  in  the  blessings  of  regulated  liberty  and  the 
supremacy  of  law.  With  these  ideas  of  public  right,  and  with  the  con 
viction  of  his  call  to  render  public  service,  he  thought  his  talents  could 
not  be  put  to  better  use  than  in  aiding  to  secure  their  liberties  to  men 
of  his  own  race,  who  were  ready  to  sacrifice  all  else  to  achieve  them. 
Originally,  however,  the  most  potent  motive  that  urged  him  to  enlist  in 
this  enterprise  was  the  hope  that,  Texas  having  been  freed,  he  might 
promote  its  annexation  to  the  United  States;  and,  since  readmission 
into  the  army  was  impossible,  that  he  might  employ  the  sword,  for 
which  his  country  deemed  she  had  no  need,  in  laying  an  empire  at  her 
feet.  Of  course,  after  he  had  devoted  himself  to  the  cause  of  Texas, 
her  interests  became  paramount;  but  he  frequently  admitted  that,  in 
the  first  instance,  he  was  in  large  measure  animated  by  the  desire  of 
assisting  to  add  another  star  to  the  American  constellation.  Indeed, 
strong  as  were  his  feelings  in  behalf  of  the  infant  nation,  he  did  not 
consummate  his  resolution  to  enter  its  service  until  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  had  recognized  its  independence.  With  this  sanction 
he  felt  no  further  hesitation,  and  threw  himself  into  the  cause  with  all 
the  ardor  of  his  nature. 


MR.   JOHNSTON  KILLS  A  PUMA.  69 

CHAPTER   VI. 

AS     TEXAN     SOLDIER. 

IN  spite  of  the  brilliant  victory  of  San  Jacinto,  it  was  soon  appar 
ent  that  Mexico  had  not  abandoned  her  plans  of  subjugation,  and  that 
Texas  needed  every  man  she  could  draw  to  her  standard.  Mr.  John 
ston,  leaving  Louisville,  proceeded  by  way  of  New  Orleans  to  Alexan 
dria,  Louisiana.  After  staying  a  few  days  with  his  brother,  Judge 
Johnston,  he  started  on  horseback  for  the  camp  of  the  defenders.  His 
companions  were  Leonard  Groce  and  brother,  and  Major  Bynum,  of 
Rapides.  Crossing  the  Sabine  on  the  13th  of  July,  he  arrived  on  the 
loth  at  Nacogdoches,  where  he  met  General  Sam  Houston,  the  com- 
mander-in-chief,  then  in  the  full  flush  of  his  popularity.  From  Nacog 
doches  he  went  with  Leonard  Groce  to  his  plantation,  on  the  river 
Brazos,  where  an  adventure  befell  him  that  has  been  told  in  various 
ways,  but  of  which  the  following  is  the  true  version.  Hearing  a  great 
uproar  near  the  house,  Mr.  Johnston  seized  his  gun  and  hurried  with 
Mr.  Groce  to  the  spot,  where  they  found  the  dogs  fighting  a  puma  or 
American  lion.  The  lion  was  playing  havoc  with  the  dogs,  scalping 
one,  crippling  another,  and  disemboweling  a  third.  Mr.  Johnston 
immediately  shot  the  puma,  the  ball  breaking  the  jaw,  but  not  disa 
bling  the  animal,  which  continued  the  slaughter  of  the  pack  with  the 
tearing  wounds  of  its  terrible  claws.  Mr.  Groce,  much  excited  at  the 
loss  of  his  favorites,  cried  out,  "  Save  the  dogs  !  save  the  dogs  !  "  Mr. 
Johnston  then  clubbed  his  gun,  which  was  a  heavy  German  Yager  rifle, 
and,  springing  into  the  melee,  dispatched  the  beast  by  blows  over  the 
head.  His  rifle-stock  was  splintered,  and  the  barrel  much  bent.  He 
escaped  without  a  scratch,  but  no  one  could  tell  how.  The  puma  was 
one  of  the  largest  of  its  kind,  and  very  fierce.  Mr.  Groce  had  the 
skin  stuffed,  and  long  kept  it  as  a  memento  of  the  event.  He  was 
ever  afterward  a  warm  friend  of  General  Johnston.  From  Mr.  Groce's 
Mr.  Johnston  proceeded  to  the  headquarters  of  the  army,  which  were 
then  on  the  river  Coleto,  about  fifteen  miles  east  of  Goliad. 

Although  Mr.  Johnston  bore  with  him  the  highest  testimonials  to 
his  personal  worth  and  military  ability,  in  the  form  of  letters  of  intro 
duction  from  persons  of  distinction  in  the  United  States  to  the  leading 
men  of  Texas,  he  forbore  to  deliver  them.  General  Atkinson  had  sent 
him  a  letter  to  Stephen  F.  Austin,  couched  in  language  of  the  highest 
eulogy  ;  and  personal  friends  of  Houston,  Rusk,  and  others,  had  also 
given  him  letters  that  would  have  secured  him  a  cordial  welcome  at 


70  AS  TEXAN  SOLDIER. 

their  hands  ;  but,  with  that  peculiar  combination  of  pride  and  conscien 
tiousness  which  made  him  unwilling  to  receive  advancement  as  a  favor, 
and,  it  may  be,  somewhat  in  the  spirit  of  knight-errantry,  he  preferred 
to  reach  his  destination  unannounced,  and  then  enlisted  as  a  private  in 
the  ranks. 

The  Texan  army  was  at  that  time  under  the  command  of  General 
Thomas  J.  Rusk,  who  was  distinguished  both  in  council  and  in  the 
field  during  the  republic,  and  afterward  as  a  United  States  Senator, 
and  whose  career  belongs  to  the  history  of  the  country.  When  Mr. 
Johnston  reached  the  Texan  camp  he  found  himself  in  a  situation  suf 
ficiently  novel  to  one  who  had  been  trained  in  and  accustomed  to  the 
exact  discipline  and  routine  of  a  regular  army.  The  call  of  Texan 
independence,  the  liberal  bounty  of  land  to  the  soldiers,  the  prospect 
of  booty  or  license,  the  realization  of  political  theories  or  philanthropic 
aspirations,  all  the  motives  that  impel  men  to  desperate  enterprises,  had 
assembled  a  mixed  multitude  of  restless  spirits  under  the  banner  of  the 
Lone  Star.  Here  were  gathered  those  indomitable  men  of  battle  whom 
Santa  Anna  pointedly  characterized  as  the  tumultuario  of  the  Missis 
sippi  Valley  ;  the  ardent  youth  of  the  South,  burning  for  glory  and 
military  enterprise.  Here  enthusiasts  of  constitutional  freedom  were 
mingled  with  adventurous  soldiers  from  Europe  ;  and  souls  as  knightly, 
generous,  and  unstained  as  Bayard's,  with  outlaws  and  men  of  broken 
and  desperate  fortunes.  Some  of  the  best  and  some  of  the  worst  peo 
ple  in  the  world  were  thrown  into  contact  ;  but  in  one  quality  all  were 
alike,  a  hardihood  that  no  danger  could  check. 

Never  was  an  army  collected  in  which  the  spirit  of  combat  was 
more  supreme.  Manhood  and  personal  prowess  were  the  standards  of 
superiority  among  these  men,  and  they  followed  their  chosen  leaders 
with  a  fidelity  and  reckless  devotion  that  had  neither  stint  nor  meas 
ure.  They  would  have  marched  unmurmuringly  into  the  open  jaws  of 
death,  rather  than  yield  a  point  of  pride,  or  of  their  idea  of  honor.  It 
was  a  handful  that  a  soldier  might  have  rejoiced  to  lead  against  a  host. 
But  they  were  without  discipline,  subordination,  or  effective  organiza 
tion,  so  that  obedience  was  a  mere  matter  of  choice.  Released  from 
such  necessary  restraints,  these  fiery  bands  were  easily  stirred  to  tur 
bulence  and  mutiny  by  the  demagogues  of  the  camp. 

Republican  habits  of  self-government  and  the  conservative  influ 
ence  of  an  instinctive  tendency  toward  order  have  a  powerful  hold  on 
the  American  intellect ;  but  this  little  army,  for  lack  of  an  organizing 
mind,  seemed  destitute  of  all  coherence,  and  threatened  to  become 
more  terrible  to  the  republic  than  to  its  enemies.  It  had  wrested 
Santa  Anna  from  the  custody  of  the  Executive,  and  put  him  in  irons, 
thus  furnishing  him  with  a  pretext  for  his  perfidy ;  and  it  had  even 
sent  a  body  of  men  to  seize  the  person  of  President  Burnet  in  order  to 


APPEARANCE  AND   CHARACTER.  71 

compel  compliance  with  the  army  sentiment,  thereby  indicating  a  pur 
pose  of  military  revolution. 

After  the  battle  of  San  Jacinto  General  Rusk  had  assumed  com 
mand  of  the  army  in  the  absence  of  General  Sam  Houston,  who  had 
taken  a  furlough  on  account  of  his  wound.  About  the  1st  of  July  the 
contending  factions  in  the  army  had  reached  such  a  point  that  the 
Government  thought  the  best  way  to  reconcile  them  was  to  appoint  as 
major-general  the  gallant  and  eloquent  Lamar;  who  had  won  distinc 
tion  at  San  Jacinto,  and  was  popular  with  both  soldiers  and  citizens. 
On  his  arrival  at  the  army  he  found  it  greatly  excited  and  a  strong 
opposition  organized  against  him.  He  made  a  persuasive  speech  to  the 
soldiers,  and  then  appealed  to  a  vote,  which,  proving  largely  against 
his  taking  the  command,  he  was  constrained  to  retire,  General  Rusk 
remaining  in  command. 

Rusk  soon  found  that  Felix  Huston,  who  had  been  chairman  of  the 
organization  that  resisted  and  finally  rejected  Lamar,  had  superseded 
him  in  the  suffrages  of  the  army;  and,  though  brave  and  able,  yet 
being  an  easy-tempered  man,  he  readily  yielded  the  point,  and  recom 
mended  that  Huston  should  be  appointed  major-general,  and  receive 
the  chief  command.  The  expectation  of  an  expedition  against  Mata- 
moras  about  this  time,  however,  occupied  the  attention  and  thus  al 
layed  the  discontents  of  the  camp ;  and,  General  Huston  having  been 
temporarily  detached  with  his  command  to  San  Patricio  on  the  Nueces, 
Rusk's  recommendation  was  not  favorably  considered  by  the  Govern 
ment.  In  the  mean  time  Rusk  was  anxious  to  avail  himself  of  any 
opportunity  to  bring  his  mutinous  troops  into  some  sort  of  order  and 
discipline.  It  was  at  this  juncture  that  Mr.  Johnston  arrived  at  the 
camp  on  the  Coleto  ;  and,  being  the  fortunate  possessor  of  a  horse, 
joined  as  a  private  trooper  the  little  body  of  mounted  men  that  rep 
resented  the  cavalry  of  the  army. 

Mr.  Johnston's  appearance  at  this  period  of  his  life  is  described  as 
both  commanding  and  attractive.  In  some  respects  the  bust  of  Alex 
ander  Hamilton  is  the  best  extant  likeness  of  him,  a  resemblance  very 
frequently  remarked.  His  cheek-bones  were  rather  high,  and  his  nose 
somewhat  irregular,  which,  with  his  clear,  white-and-red  complexion, 
gave  him  a  very  Scotch  look.  His  chin  was  delicate  and  handsome  ;  his 
teeth  white  and  regular  ;  and  his  mouth  square  and  firm.  In  the  por 
trait  by  Bush,  taken  about  this  time,  his  lips  seem  rather  full ;  but,  as 
he  is  best  remembered,  they  were  somewhat  thin  and  very  firmly  set. 
Brown  hair  clustered  over  a  noble  forehead,  and  from  under  heavy 
brows  his  deep-set  but  clear,  steady  eyes  looked  straight  at  you  with  a 
regard  kind  and  sincere,  yet  penetrating.  With  those  eyes  upon  him 
any  man  would  have  scrupled  to  tell  a  lie.  In  repose  his  eyes  were  as 
blue  as  the  sky,  but  in  excitement  they  flashed  to  a  steel-gray,  and 


72  AS  TEXAN  SOLDIER. 

exerted  a  wonderful  power  over  men.  He  was  six  feet  and  an  inch  in 
height,  weighing  about  180  pounds,  straight  as  an  arrow,  with  broad, 
square  shoulders  and  a  massive  chest.  He  was  strong  and  active,  but 
his  endurance  and  vital  power  seemed  the  result  rather  of  nervous  than 
of  muscular  energy,  and  drew  their  exhaustless  resources  from  the 
mind  more  than  the  body.  His  bearing  was  essentially  military,  and 
dignified  rather  than  graceful ;  and  his  movements  were  prompt,  but 
easy  and  firm.  He  was,  indeed,  in  appearance  a  model  for  the  soldier. 

Sidney  Johnston's  skill  in  arms  was  but  moderate,  for,  though  his 
eye  was  quick  and  his  hand  steady,  yet  he  lacked  the  dexterity  that 
comes  from  predilection  and  practice.  He  was  not  only  cautious  him 
self  in  handling  fire-arms,  but  often  recommended  the  same  carefulness 
to  others,  playfully  quoting  a  saying  of  John  Rowan,  the  dead-shot  of 
Kentucky,  "  Never  point  a  pistol  at  a  man  unless  you  intend  to  shoot 
him."  He  was  a  graceful  and  excellent  rider,  and  no  man  presented  a 
grander  or  more  martial  appearance  on  horseback.  It  was  remarked  of 
him  by  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis,  who  saw  him  at  the  battle  of  Monterey, 
that  "  in  combat  he  had  the  most  inspiring  presence  he  ever  saw." 

Substantially  the  same  remark  was  many  times  made  by  others. 
There  were  in  his  action  a  certain  vigor  and  decision,  in  his  manner  a 
winning  frankness  and  kindness,  and  in  his  whole  thought  and  life  a  sim 
plicity  and  directness,  that  were  generally  irresistible.  His  deference 
to  and  dignified  sympathy  with  women,  his  tenderness  to  children,  his 
reverence  for  old  age,  and  his  forbearance  with  every  form  of  weakness, 
were  genuine  and  unvarying — habits  as  well  as  principles.  A  sensitive 
interest  and  the  finest  judgment  were  united  in  his  intercourse  with 
children.  His  indulgence  seemed  unlimited,  and  yet  they  rarely  abused 
it.  He  observed  toward  them  a  careful  respect ;  and  many  younger 
friends  will  remember  the  benign  and  ennobling  influence  of  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston  on  their  lives. 

General  Rusk  told  Mr.  Jefferson  Davis  that  he  was  first  attracted 
to  Mr.  Johnston,  a  few  days  after  he  joined  his  army,  by  his  bearing  as 
a  soldier  and  the  way  he  sat  his  horse.  He  made  inquiries  about  him, 
and,  learning  that  he  had  been  an  officer  of  experience  and  high  repu 
tation,  he  was  glad  to  seek  him  out.  He  called  on  him,  and,  after  a 
brief  interview,  offered  him  the  place  of  adjutant-general  of  the  army. 
He  told  him,  however,  that  there  were  several  aspirants  who  thought 
themselves  entitled  to  the  office,  and  who  would  probably  require  him 
to  fight  if  he  took  the  position.  Mr.  Johnston  said  he  felt  qualified  for 
the  office  ;  and,  if  General  Rusk  appointed  him,  he  was  not  concerned 
as  to  how  these  young  gentlemen  might  regard  it.  General  Rusk  ap 
pointed  him,  and  the  young  gentlemen  concluded  not  to  trouble  him. 

On  the  same  day,  the  5th  of  August,  on  which  Rusk  appointed  him 
adjutant-general  of  the  army,  with  the  rank  of  colonel,  President 


PROMOTION  AND   CAMP-LIFE.  73 

Burnet,  who  had  learned  through  other  sources  of  his  arrival  in  the 
country,  appointed  him  a  colonel  in  the  regular  army,  and  assigned 
to  him  the  duties  of  adjutant-general  of  the  republic.  General  Sam 
Houston,  the  commander-in-chief,  who  had  seen  him  as  he  passed 
through  Nacogdoches,  also  sent  to  him  from  that  point,  on  the  9th  of 
August,  a  commission  as  aide-de-camp,  with  the  rank  of  major.  These 
repeated  marks  of  confidence  show  the  interest  created  in  all  quarters 
by  his  arrival  in  the  country.  Colonel  Johnston  at  once  undertook  the 
organization  and  tactical  instruction  of  the  army,  with  an  address  that 
gained  the  good-will  of  the  troops,  and  a  success  that  secured  the 
gratitude  and  friendship  of  General  Rusk,  which  were  afterward  evinced 
on  all  proper  occasions. 

The  following  incidents  go  to  illustrate  the  life  of  the  camp.  The 
first  is  a  reminiscence  told  by  General  Johnston  ;  the  names  are  sup 
pressed  in  both,  for  obvious  reasons :  He  used  to  relate  that,  one  day 
as  he  was  resting  on  his  blanket,  a  colonel,  a  very  fine  fellow,  stepped 
up  to  him,  with  a  cocked  pistol  in  his  hand,  and  said :  "  Colonel,  my 

friend  here,  Major ,  and  I,  have  had  a  difference.  Will  you  oblige 

us  by  observing  that  its  settlement  is  entirely  fair  ?  "  Before  he  could 
rise  to  expostulate,  one  of  the  duelists  gave  the  word,  "  Are  you  ready  ?  " 
the  other  replied,  "  Ready  !  "  Both  fired,  and  one  fell  severely  wounded. 
This  was  hot  blood,  indeed. 

The  second  incident  is  here  given  in  the  words  of  a  letter  written 
to  General  Johnston  twenty-five  years  after  the  occurrence  : 

It  has  been  so  many  years  since  I  had  the  pleasure  of  seeing  you  that  I  am 
almost  afraid  you  have  forgotten  me  altogether.  Do  you  remember  the  judge- 
advocate  of  the  army  in  Texas,  when  you  were  in  command  as  colonel  on  the 
Lavaca  Pdver  in  1836?  If  you  do  not,  I  can  possibly  recall  myself  to  your  re 
membrance  by  mentioning  a  circumstance  that  may  not  have  entirely  escaped 

you.     One  morning,  at  General  Green's  tent,  Major  V and  I  got  into  an 

accidental  quarrel.     He  insulted  me  and  I  struck  him,  whereupon  he  drew  out 

a  bowie-knife  upon  me  and  I  a  pistol  upon  him,  which  Major  D ,  who  was 

standing  by  my  side,  wrenched  suddenly  out  of  my  hand.     V then  drew 

a  pistol  upon  me,  and,  just  as  he  was  in  the  act  of  shooting  me,  you  came 
thundering  by,  with  your  spurs  in  your  horse's  sides,  and,  with  a  tremendous 
grab,  jerked  his  pistol  out  of  his  hand,  which  was  all  that  saved  my  life.  But 
for  you,  I  should  long  ago  have  been  eaten  up  by  worms  on  tbe  banks  of  the 
Lavaca.  Can  you  wonder,  therefore,  that  I  have  since  retained  the  most  grate 
ful  remembrance  of  you,  and  rejoiced  at  all  calculated  to  promote  your  happi 
ness  as  well  as  your  fame  ? 

Colonel  Johnston's  success  in  organizing  and  disciplining  the  army 
was  so  great  that  he  received  the  highest  commendations  in  every 
quarter.  But  he  was  not  permitted  to  remain  long  enough  to  perfect 
the  work  he  had  begun.  What  he  did  accomplish  was  under  the  most 


74  AS  TEXAN   SOLDIER. 

disadvantageous  circumstances,  as  he  suffered  from  the  fever  of  the 
country,  and  was  greatly  reduced  in  strength.  The  Government  felt 
the  need  of  his  services  at  the  capital ;  and  the  Hon.  John  A.  Whar- 
ton,  Secretary  of  War,  summoned  him  thither  by  an  order,  dated 
September  17,  1836,  requiring  him  to  discharge  the  duties  of  his 
office  at  that  place.  The  Secretary's  letter  represents  the  greatest  con 
fusion  as  existing  in  the  bureau,  and  relies  upon  Colonel  Johnston's 
efforts  to  introduce  better  system  and  method.  Proceeding  with 
General  Rusk,  early  in  October,  to  Columbia,  where  the  Congress  was 
assembling,  he  entered  upon  his  duties  shortly  before  the  inauguration 
of  General  Sam  Houston  as  President  of  the  Republic.  Here  he  ex 
ercised  the  functions  of  his  office  satisfactorily  until  the  16th  of  Novem 
ber,  when  he  went  to  New  Orleans,  on  a  nominal  furlough  of  three 
months,  but  really  in  the  interests  of  the  Texan  Government.  On 
December  22d  President  Houston  wrote  him  that  he  had  put  him  in 
nomination  as  senior  brigadier-general  of  the  army,  and  his  com 
mission  bears  that  date.  He  was  notified  of  this,  January  llth,  but 
was  detained  in  New  Orleans  by  business  ;  so  that  it  was  not  until 
January  31st  that  he  was  ordered  to  assume  command  of  the  army. 
General  James  Hamilton,  of  South  Carolina,  had,  on  December  22d, 
been  tendered  the  post  of  major-general  and  the  command  of  the  army, 
but  had  declined  on  account  of  private  business. 

General  Johnston's  appointment  to  command  led  to  an  affair  that 
resulted  in  great  suffering  to  himself;  but,  fortunately,  in  no  injurious 
consequences  to  the  republic.  About  the  time  Johnston  withdrew 
from  the  army,  Rusk,  having  grown  tired  of  the  mingled  sedition  and 
intrigue  that  continually  annoyed  him,  had  abandoned  the  command  to 
Felix  Huston,  who  has  already  been  mentioned.  Huston  was  a  Ken- 
tuckian,  who  had  emigrated  to  Mississippi,  where  he  had  practised  law 
and  engaged  largely  in  politics.  He  was  a  large,  fine-looking  man,  of 
great  personal  gallantry,  a  good  speaker,  and  endowed  with  popular 
qualities.  He  was  extremely  ambitious  and  self-confident,  and  over 
bearing  and  turbulent,  though  not  ungenerous,  in  temper.  Without 
military  education  or  experience,  though  not  without  good  military  in 
stincts,  he  had,  nevertheless,  so  often  seen  civilians  employ  a  brief  mili 
tary  career  as  the  stepping-stone  to  political  preferment  that  he  was 
justified  in  hoping  to  win  this  double  distinction  on  so  fair  a  field  as 
Texas.  He  had  been  disappointed  in  arriving  too  late  to  share  in  any 
of  the  combats  of  the  revolution  ;  but  he  thought,  nevertheless,  that 
the  contingent  recruits  that  he  brought  to  the  defense  of  the  frontier 
entitled  him  to  the  command  of  the  army.  The  force  Huston  brought 
to  the  army  is  usually  put  at  500  men.  Colonel  Charles  De  Morse, 
then  the  adjutant-general,  informs  the  writer,  in  a  letter  of  January 
25,  1875,  that  Huston  did  not  bring  more  than  100  or  125  men.  He 


CHALLENGE  FROM  FELIX  HUSTON.  75 

says  he  recollects  only  three  officers,  none  of  them  of  the  rank  of  cap 
tain,  and  that  none  of  the  men  were  specifically  organized  in  companies. 
It  was  enough,  however,  to  found  a  claim  upon ;  and,  as  he  soon  won  the 
suffrages  of  the  soldiers  by  his  audacity  and  popular  manners,  it  was 
not  long  before  he  spoke  of  the  troops  as  "  my  army,"  and  really  felt 
that  such  was  the  case. 

After  the  rejection  of  Lamar  by  the  army  vote,  and  the  resignation 
of  Rusk,  he  felt  indisposed  to  allow  the  command  that  Fortune  had 
placed  in  his  hands  to  pass  to  another;  and  his  public  declarations  that 
the  officer  who  attempted  to  supersede  him  in  the  command  of  his  army 
would  do  so  at  his  peril,  as  well  as  his  notoriety  as  a  skillful  duelist, 
were  not  without  effect  in  checking  the  pretensions  of  a  certain  class  of 
aspirants.  So  restless  and  uncompromising  a  politician  was  little  likely 
to  be  acceptable  to  the  leaders  of  any  party ;  and,  in  view  of  the  for 
midable  invasion  then  threatened,  it  was  natural  enough  for  the  Presi 
dent  to  prefer,  as  commander,  a  trained  soldier,  like  Johnston,  whose 
ambition  was  solely  military,  and  to  whom  the  army  was  indebted  for 
all  the  organization  and  discipline  it  had.  Accordingly,  he  was  ap 
pointed  senior  brigadier-general,  with  command  of  the  army;  and 
Felix  Huston  was  appointed  junior  brigadier-general,  and  assigned 
the  second  place.  Whatever  were  the  motives  that  led  to  his  appoint 
ment,  General  Johnston,  who  had  held  aloof  from  all  political  compli 
cations,  regarded  it  from  a  purely  military  point  of  view  ;  and,  though 
duly  informed  of  General  Huston's  threats,  was,  of  course,  not  deterred 
thereby  from  accepting  the  command. 

Mr.  Norvall,  who  was  then  in  the  Texan  army  there,  gives  some  en 
tertaining  reminiscences  in  an  article  in  the  New  York  Sun,  March  7, 
1877;  and,  in  correspondence  with  the  writer,  Norvall  says  General 
Johnston's  appointment  was  bitterly  resented  by  Huston's  adherents, 
who  now  made  a  large  majority  of  it.  The  supersedure  of  "  Old  Long- 
shanks,"  or  "  Old  Leather-Breeches,"  as  Huston  was  affectionately  nick 
named,  roused  the  anger  of  his  friends,  and  this  feeling  was  fanned  until 
there  was  a  dangerous  state  of  mind  in  the  camp. 

On  General  Johnston's  arrival  at  camp,  February  4th,  he  was  received 
civilly  by  General  Huston,  who,  however,  thought  proper  on  the  same 
day  to  address  him  the  following  letter : 

HEADQUARTERS  CAMP  INDEPENDENCE,  February  4, 1S3T. 

SIR  :  From  the  acquaintance  I  have  had  with  you,  and  your  high  reputation, 
I  wish  to  tender  you  my  regards  as  a  gentleman  and  soldier. 

Your  assuming  the  command  of  the  army  would  have  excited  in  me  no 
feelings  but  those  of  respect  and  obedience  to  you,  as  my  superior  officer,  were 
it  not  for  the  fact  that  your  appointment  was  connected  with  a  tissue  of  treach 
ery  and  misrepresentation,  which  was  intended  to  degrade  me  and  blast  my 
prospects  in  the  Texian  [army]. 


76  AS  TEXAN  SOLDIER. 

You,  in  assuming  the  command  under  an  appointment  connected  with  the 
attempt  to  ruin  my  reputation  and  inflict  a  stigma  on  my  character,  of  course 
stand  in  an  attitude  of  opposition  to  myself. 

This  situation  might  not,  in  ordinary  cases,  lead  to  serious  results.  But  as  I 
have  not  made  up  my  mind  to  leave  the  service,  and  cannot,  consistently  with 
honor,  submit  to  be  overslaughed  under  humiliating  circumstances,  I  prefer 
taking  a  plain  and  direct  course,  to  one  which  would  lead  to  a  similar  result  from 
the  mere  force  of  circumstances. 

I  do  this,  as  I  really  esteem  your  character,  and  know  that  you  must  be 
sensible  of  the  delicacy  of  my  situation. 

I  therefore  propose  a  meeting  between  us,  in  as  short  a  period  as  you  can 
make  convenient.  My  friend  Major  Ross  has  authority  to  make  all  necessary 
arrangements.  Reiterating  my  respects  and  regards,  I  am 

Your  most  obedient,  humble  servant, 

FELIX  HUSTON. 

To  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

General  Johnston's  reply  was  as  follows  : 

HEADQUARTERS  CAMP  INDEPENDENCE,  February  4th. 

SIR  :  I  have  had  the  honor  of  receiving  your  note  of  this  evening.  After 
reciprocating  the  sentiments  of  respect  and  esteem  which  you  have  been 
pleased  to  express  toward  me,  it  only  remains  to  accord  to  you  the  meeting 
proposed.  I  have  designated  7  o'clock,  A.  M.,  to-morrow.  My  friend  Colonel 
Morehouse  is  authorized  to  make  the  necessary  arrangements. 

Your  most  obedient  servant,  A.  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON. 

To  Brig-adier-General  FELIX  HUSTON. 

It  was  found  that  no  dueling-pistols  were  to  be  had  in  camp,  and  it 
was  proposed  to  use  General  Huston's  horse-pistols.  Hon.  Jefferson 
Davis  calls  them  "  crook-handled  pistols,  twelve  inches  in  the  barrel." 
Mr.  Davis  says  General  Johnston  was  a  very  good  shot  with  ordinary 
pistols,  and  the  writer  knows  that  such  was  the  case  subsequently ;  but 
Captain  Eaton  says  he  had  been  quite  disused  to  them  for  several 
years,  and  was  a  poor  shot  with  them,  though  a  skillful  marksman  with 
the  rifle. 

Mr.  Norvall  says  Huston's  unrivaled  skill  with  the  pistol  was  so  well 
known  that  astonishment  was  expressed  that  Johnston  did  not  choose 
rapiers,  with  which  he  would  have  had  an  advantage.  This  was  prob 
ably  the  reason  he  did  not  choose  them.  The  advantage  he  was  striving 
for  was  a  moral  one.  Mr.  Norvall  gives  the  following  version  of  the 
report  set  afloat  at  the  time : 

General  Johnston  arrived  a  few  days  after  his  appointment  was  announced. 
He  at  once,  without  communicating  with  General  Huston,  directed  the  adjutant- 
general  to  have  the  army  paraded  and  the  general  order  read.  This  was  too 
much  for  Huston,  already  boiling  over  with  rage.  He  sat  down,  wrote  a. per 
emptory  challenge  to  mortal  combat,  and  handed  it  to  his  friend  Colonel  Rogers, 
with  instructions  to  deliver  it  at  once  and  accept  of  no  delay. 


THE  DUEL.  77 

It  so  happened  that  this  was  a  matter  discussed  by  both  parties 
•with  the  Hon.  Jefferson  Davis,  who  makes  the  following  statement  to 
the  writer:  He  says  that  Huston  told  him  that  "General  Johnston 
came  on  the  drill-ground  and  had  the  order  read  superseding  him,  and 
that  that  was  pretext  enough  for  him'  that  he  could  not  fight  the 
President,  Sam  Houston,  and  he  was  glad  to  have  a  gentleman  to  hold 
responsible." 

General  Johnston  told  Mr.  Davis  that  "  it  was  true  that  the  order 
was  read  by  the  adjutant-general  of  the  army,  but  not  by  his  direction 
or  intention;  that  he  was  present  merely  to  observe  the  drill." 

My  father  made  the  same  statement  to  me.  It  must  be  observed 
that  Huston  does  riot  base  his  challenge  upon  this  ground,  which,  even 
if  not  an  after-thought,  did  not  really  amount  to  an  offense. 

Mr.  Norvall,  in  a  letter  to  the  writer,  says :  "  Everybody  understood 
the  real  cause  of  the  trouble  to  be  the  fact  that  Huston  had  been 
superseded."  Mr.  Norvall  also  says  that  an  arrangement  was  made  be 
tween  the  seconds,  at  the  suggestion  of  General  Johnston's  friend,  to 
fire  with  the  butt  of  the  pistol  resting  against  the  hip,  in  order  to 
equalize  the  skill  of  the  parties  ;  and  that  General  Johnston  responded 
on  learning  this,  "  I  am  not  sure  I  could  hit  the  side  of  a  house  in  firing 
from  the  hip ; n  and  that  the  duel  was  thus  fought. 

The  writer  doubts  the  accuracy  of  the  anecdote ;  but,  if  true,  it  gave 
the  expert  an  additional  advantage  over  the  novice.  Norvall  says  that, 
accompanied  by  their  friends,  they  forded  the  Lavaca  on  horseback,  and, 
after  passing  through  the  forest,  met  on  an  open,  grassy  spot,  on  the 
edge  of  the  prairie. 

Colonel  Morehouse  objected  that  General  Huston  was  familiar  with, 
and  expert  in  the  use  of,  these  weapons,  and  that  General  Johnston  had 
never  handled  one  in  his  life.  But  the  latter,  willing  to  yield  every  ad 
vantage  to  his  adversary,  waived  the  objection.  Mr.  Norvall  thinks 
there  were  very  few  witnesses.  The  writer  believes  from  other  infor 
mation  there  were  a  considerable  number  present,  to  which,  for  obvious 
reasons,  neither  party  was  averse.  The  contest,  though  deadly  in  inten 
tion,  was  chiefly  one  for  the  moral  control  of  these  very  men;  and  their 
presence  was,  therefore,  equally  desired  by  the  antagonists. 

If  General  Johnston,  for  the  sake  of  dramatic  effect,  deviated  some 
what  from  that  perfect  simplicity  so  eminently  his  characteristic,  it  is 
believed  to  be  the  only  juncture  of  which  this  can  be  recorded;  and 
allowance  must  be  made  for  the  character  of  the  witnesses,  the  antag 
onist,  and  the  occasion  that  brought  him  to  the  field. 

General  Huston,  according  to  the  custom  of  practised  duelists,  who 
wish  to  present  as  inconspicuous  a  mark  as  possible  to  the  aim  of  an 
opponent,  closely  buttoned  his  coat  as  he  took  his  position.  General 
Johnston,  on  the  contrary,  laid  aside  his  coat  and  vest,  and  bound  his 


78  AS  TEXAN  SOLDIER. 

sash  around  his  waist,  thus  offering  his  body,  clad  in  a  white  shirt,  as 
an  almost  certain  target.  When  Huston  perceived  this,  not  wishing  to 
be  outdone  in  audacity,  he  somewhat  angrily  followed  his  example. 
Mr.  Norvall  says  in  a  letter,  with  the  ndivetb  of  an  old  Texan,  "  It  was 
quite  natural  that  he  should  do  so,  as  the  morning  was  warm  enough 
for  such  an  act." 

General  Johnston  was  perfectly  aware  of  the  disadvantage  at  which 
he  stood,  and  had  calmly  resolved  on  a  course  of  action  which  would 
lessen  his  disparity  with  his  opponent.  He  knew  he  stood  no  chance 
with  the  weapons  employed  if  General  Huston  was  ever  able  to  take  aim 
at  him.  It  is  known,  to  those  familiar  with  the  use  of  the  hair-trigger, 
that,  if  the  finger  is  allowed  to  touch  it,  the  report  of  another  pistol  will 
almost  always  produce  a  sufficient  involuntary  muscular  contraction  of 
the  finger  to  cause  a  premature  discharge.  Availing  himself  of  this 
fact,  General  Johnston  raised  his  pistol  quickly,  and,  with  his  eye  on 
his  opponent's  finger,  just  anticipated  him  enough  to  succeed  in  "  dra\v- 
ing  his  fire  "  before  he  could  cover  him  with  his  pistol.  He  repeated 
this  five  times  with  the  same  result,  much  to  Huston's  discomfiture, 
whose  reputation  as  a  "dead-shot"  was  at  stake.  Huston  declared 
years  afterward  that  he  did  not  wish  to  kill  Johnston ;  but  that  a  shot, 
through  his  hair  and  grazing  his  ear,  admonished  him  that  it  was  neces 
sary  in  order  to  save  himself.  This  is  not  probable,  as  he  had  the 
privilege  at  any  time  to  express  himself  satisfied,  and  end  the  contest, 
a  right  not  accorded  to  the  challenged.  At  the  sixth  shot  Huston's 
superior  skill  prevailed,  and  General  Johnston  fell,  with  a  ball  through 
his  hip.1 

Huston  at  once  asked  leave  to  approach  him,  and  expressed  his 
regret,  and  his  willingness  to  serve  under  him.  Mr.  Norvall  makes  the 
•following  statement,  as  of  his  own  knowledge : 

The  surgeon  declared  the  wound  so  dangerous  as  to  leave  little  hope  of  re 
covery,  and  the  injured  man  was  removed  to  the  little  hamlet  of  Texana,  where 
he  lay  for  weeks  at  the  point  of  death.  Huston  mounted  his  horse  and  rode 
back  to  camp  with  a  pale,  agitated  face.  A  thousand  soldiers  rushed  forward  to 
congratulate  him  as  he  crossed  the  lines,  but  he  waved  them  off  sadly,  and  rode 
straight  to  his  quarters.  That  afternoon  I  saw  him  pacing  up  and  down  in  the 
chaparral,  and  looking  so  miserable  that,  even  at  this  distant  day,  I  cannot  think 
of  him  without  pity. 

He  adds :  "  One  circumstance  I  remember  distinctly,  which  surprised 
me,  a  mere  boy  at  the  time,  and  occasioned  remark.  This  was  that 

1  There  is  a  question  whether  there  were  five  or  six  shots.  The  writer  believes  the 
above  account  to  be  correct. 


RECONCILIATION.  79 

a  ration  of  whiskey,  a  most  unusual  thing,  was  issued  that  morning.  I 
believe  to  this  day  that,  if  Huston  had  been  killed  or  seriously  wounded, 
there  would  have  been  an  irrepressible  riot  in  the  camp."  This  act 
meant  mischief;  but  the  writer  has'  no  idea  that  General  Huston  was 
aware  of  it. 

While  he  remained  with  the  army,  Huston  acted  in  good  faith 
as  a  subordinate  officer;  but  the  combined  loss  of  command  and  in 
fluence  soon  rendered  his  situation  distasteful  to  him.  His  loss  of 
influence  was  the  natural  sequence  of  the  events  mentioned.  General 
Johnston  tried  to  mitigate  his  discomfort,  by  detaching  him  with  a 
command  toward  the  Nueces,  to  observe  the  enemy;  but,  not  having 
cavalry  to  support  him,  was  compelled  to  reunite  his  detachment  with 
the  main  army.  General  Huston,  after  a  time,  withdrew  from  the  army, 
and  eventually  returned  to  the  United  States. 

It  is  characteristic  of  General  Johnston  that  he  never  felt  any  re 
sentment  toward  Huston,  as  is  evident  from  his  correspondence  and 
from  all  subsequent  references  to  him  in  conversation.  Huston^  in  like 
manner,  confiding  entirely  in  General  Johnston's  magnanimity,  was 
writing  to  him  in  a  most  unreserved  and  confidential  strain  only  a  few 
weeks  after  the  duel. 

It  is  stated,  and,  I  believe,  on  good  authority,  that  when  the 
surgeons  announced  their  fears  that  General  Johnston's  wound  was 
mortal,  "  his  friend  and  second,  thinking  that  he  was  dying,  muttered 
that  the  matter  should  not  rest,  for  that  he  would  avenge  it.  Johnston 
turned  to  him  and  said,  *  It  is  my  request,  in  the  event  of  my  death, 
that  you  shall  yield  obedience  to  my  second  in  command,  General 
Huston,  and  I  trust  you  will  not  by  such  conduct  promote  a  spirit  of 
insubordination.' "  I  remember,  when  I  was  a  little  boy,  asking  my 
father  "  if  he  did  not  hate  Felix  Huston."  He  replied,  "  No,"  and  then 
I  asked  him  what  he  would  do  if  he  were  to  meet  him  then.  He 
laughed,  and  answered,  amusedly,  "  As  he  would  be  a  stranger  here,  I 
would  ask  him  to  dinner."  I  thought  a  good  deal  about  this  before  I 
could  reconcile  it  to  my  sense  of  right. 

The  aim  of  this  memoir  is  biographical,  not  apologetic,  and  a  mere 
statement  of  the  facts  may  probably  be  deemed  sufficient ;  yet,  since 
General  Johnston's  motives  are  entitled  to  be  considered,  it  may  be  well 
to  state  the  grounds  of  his  action.  In  every  society  there  are  persons 
who,  in  their  judgment  of  human  conduct,  hold  the  rules  of  action  to  be 
so  inflexible  as  to  admit  of  no  modification,  and  who,  hence,  make  no 
allowance  for  the  conditions  by  which  a  man  is  surrounded  and  the  cir 
cumstances  in  which  he  is  placed.  But  people  in  general  recognize  their 
constraining  influence.  Such  will  appreciate  the  change  of  sentiment 
in  regard  to  dueling  in  the  last  forty  years,  and  the  absence  of  legal 
restraint  and  protection,  at  the  time  and  place  mentioned,  which  com- 


80  AS  TEXAN  SOLDIER. 

pelled  a  man  to  abandon  his  rights,  or  to  protect  them  himself  by  wager 
of  battle. 

Captain  Eaton  says :  "  The  first  time  I  saw  General  Johnston  after 
the  duel  I  asked  him  how  he  came  to  fight  Huston  ;  arid  he  answered 
that  he  did  it  as  a  public  duty.  ...  He  had  but  little  respect  for  the 
practice  of  dueling."  His  view,  as  detailed  to  the  author,  was  that 
the  safety  of  the  republic  depended  upon  the  efficiency  of  the  army ; 
and  that,  again,  upon  the  good  discipline  and  subordination  of  the 
troops,  which  could  only  be  secured  by  their  obedience  to  their  legal 
commander.  General  Huston  embodied  the  lawless  spirit  in  the  army, 
which  had  to  be  met  and  controlled  at  whatever  personal  peril.  Inde 
pendent  of  personal  feeling,  the  point  was  a  vital  one  to  the  country  ; 
and,  whatever  the  issue  of  the  duel,  General  Huston  would  be  rendered 
harmless  in  consequence  of  it.  Moreover,  he  could  not  have  held  the 
command  an  hour,  if  he  had  shown  the  least  hesitation  in  meeting 
General  Huston's  challenge.  In  view  of  the  character  of  the  army, 
it  was  necessary  to  allow  neither  time,  nor  obstacle,  nor  military  subor 
dination,  nor  any  disadvantage,  to  prevent  him  from  fighting  at  once. 
While  quite  willing  to  admit  that,  in  an  organized  society,  dueling 
was  not  defensible  in  ethics,  in  this  case  he  saw  no  alternative,  ex 
cept  to  surrender  his  military  efficiency  and  career,  and  the  interests  of 
the  country. 

The  effect  of  the  duel  was  a  complete  revolution  in  the  sentiment  of 
the  army  ;  and  the  excitable  feelings  of  the  troops  were  warmly  enlisted 
for  his  recovery.  Huston  then,  and  always  afterward,  declared  that 
"  he  was  the  coolest  and  the  bravest  man  he  had  ever  known."  At 
first,  his  wound  wras  pronounced  mortal ;  the  ball  passed  through  the 
orifices  of  the  pelvis,  not  breaking  the  bone,  but  so  as  to  injure  the  sci 
atic  nerve  severely.  His  recovery  was  slow  and  painful;  and  his  suf 
fering  was  increased  by  the  performance  of  his  duties,  which  it  did  not 
suit  him  to  devolve  upon  another.  He  bore  great  torture  with  the  stoi 
cism  that  he  regarded  as  essential  to  the  soldierly  character,  and  did 
not  permit  his  pain  to  interfere  with  measures  of  preparation  against 
the  threatened  invasion.  Though  he  could  soon  walk,  he  was  not  able 
to  mount  his  horse  for  a  long  time.  Yet,  meanwhile,  he  made  a  marked 
improvement  in  the  condition  of  the  troops ;  so  that  the  Secretary  of 
War,  Colonel  William  S.  Fisher,  wrote  him  March  28th,  "The  Presi 
dent  is  much  gratified  at  the  favorable  report  made,  on  my  return,  of 
the  state  of  the  army." 

General  Johnston  received  from  the  President  and  Secretary  of  War 
official  reprimands  of  a  somewhat  perfunctory  character  for  fighting  a 
duel,  together  with  assurances  of  complete  confidence  and  esteem ;  and 
the  President  sent  the  surgeon-general  and  Dr.  Jones  to  afford  him 
the  best  medical  aid.  It  was  not  in  the  power  of  the  surgeons,  however, 


MANAGEMENT   OF  THE   ARMY.  gl 

to  give  him  relief,  which,  they  informed  him,  could  only  be  obtained  by 
rest. 

The  situation  of  Texas  at  this  time  was  very  critical.  Confiden 
tial  communications  to  the  President,  from  Matamoras,  through  Mr. 
John  Ricord,  confirmed  for  the  most  part  by  Colonel  Seguin  at  San  An 
tonio,  reported  with  certainty  the  enemy's  force,  January  26th:  in  Mat 
amoras,  2,855  men  ;  and  with  Bravo,  at  Saltillo,  2,500  men  ;  amounting, 
including  detachments,  to  5,500  soldiers,  with  28  cannon  and  two  mor 
tars.  This  force  was  augmented,  until,  in  March,  it  was  estimated  at 
8,000  Mexicans  and  a  large  body  of  Indian  auxiliaries,  who  occupied 
the  country  between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande.  A  combined  at 
tack  by  sea  and  land  was  intended  ;  and  a  naval  blockade  was,  in  fact, 
established,  which  inflicted  several  severe  blows  on  the  republic  by  the 
capture  of  vessels  and  supplies.  But,  though  an  invasion  at  one  time 
seemed  imminent,  civil  commotions  at  home  soon  divided  the  attention 
and  dispersed  the  armies  of  Mexico. 

How  far  they  were  checked  in  their  enterprise  by  the  resolute  atti 
tude  of  the  little  army  of  1,800  men  in  their  front  it  is  needless  now 
to  consider  ;  it  is  certain,  however,  that  their  advance  would  have  been 
welcomed  equally  by  the  Texan  army,  eager  for  combat,  and  by  its 
wounded  leader.  Inaction,  a  source  of  disorganization  in  any  army, 
was  especially  injurious  to  men  so  adventurous.  General  Johnston 
believed  that  safety  lay  in  boldness,  and  that  the  true  policy  to  secure 
peace  was  to  inflict  rather  than  to  suffer  invasion.  Felix  Huston,  who 
agreed  with  him  in  this  view,  wrote  to  him,  March  28th,  from  the  seat 
of  Government  : 

I  hope  little  from  the  war  policy  of  the  Administration.  The  facility  of 
arriving  at  the  same  conclusions  from  the  most  opposite  states  of  fact  renders 
it  entirely  useless  to  argue  or  reason  with  the  President  on  this  subject.  .  .  . 
As  to  our  waging  active  war,  he  will  not  hear  of  it.  I  am  in  very  low  spirits  as 
to  our  prospects,  and  deem  Texas  in  a  very  critical  situation. 

Huston  was  then  on  his  way  to  New  Orleans  to  try  to  raise  men 
and  supplies.  Though  the  best-informed  of  his  contemporaries  denied 
his  fitness  for  command,  he  had  a  certain  audacity  that,  under  proper 
direction,  might  have  gained  him  the  distinction  which  he  craved  al 
most  morbidly.  Though  somewhat  "  splenetive  and  rash,"  his  charac 
ter  was  broad  and  manly. 

From  the  time  he  took  command,  General  Johnston  tried  with 
good  results  to  improve  the  discipline  of  the  army  by  drill  and  occupa 
tion  in  other  military  duties;  and  the  troops  were  kept  as  much  in 
motion  as  was  safe  and  practicable.  The  army  was  increased  from  1,500 
to  nearly  2,000  men  by  the  arrival  of  recruits,  for  whose  enlistment 


82  AS  TEXAN   SOLDIER. 

General  Johnston  had  provided  while  in  New  Orleans.  Under  the  in 
structions  of  the  Government,  with  insufficient  munitions,  transporta 
tion,  and  supplies,  and  with  scarcely  any  cavalry,  the  army  was  neces 
sarily  merely  one  of  observation.  The  consequent  dissatisfaction  was 
increased  by  want  of  proper  rations.  The  troops  soon  consumed  the 
scanty  supplies  of  the  country,  reducing  the  sparse  inhabitants  to  ab 
solute  want.  The  army  was  fed  from  hand  to  mouth  ;  and  often  only 
two  or  three  days'  supplies  remained  in  depot.  At  times,  half -rations 
of  beans  and  flour  only  were  issued  on  alternate  days,  and  frequently 
the  men  were  without  meat.  The  most  rigid  economy  and  system  were 
practised,  however,  so  that  no  actual  suffering  occurred. 

General  Johnston  was  aware  of  the  difficulties  of  the  Government ; 
but,  nevertheless,  felt  that  its  energy  was  not  commensurate  with  the 
importance  of  the  issues  at  stake.  Another  serious  embarrassment 
arose  from  want  of  sufficient  cavalry.  General  Johnston  urged  the 
expediency  of  employing  a  larger  force  of  mounted  men  to  watch  the 
enemy,  guard  against  forays  by  the  Indians,  and  aid  in  collecting  pro 
visions.  The  President  frequently  promised  him  this  aid  ;  but,  on  the 
31st  of  March,  wrote,  "  All  my  efforts  to  get  you  cavalry  appear  to  be  in 
vain."  The  small  force  of  this  arm  at  General  Johnston's  disposal  was 
kept  actively  employed  watching  the  roads.  Wells,  Seguin,  Cook,  and 
Karnes,  with  small  parties  of  rangers,  reconnoitred  the  frontiers  with 
vigilance  and  secrecy ;  and  that  daring  partisan,  Deaf  Smith,  pene 
trated  to  the  Rio  Grande  with  twenty  men,  and  defeated  a  superior 
force  of  the  enemy  near  Laredo. 

A  secret  traffic  in  ardent  spirits  added  greatly  to  the  difficulty  of 
enforcing  discipline.  President  Houston  was  very  uneasy  on  this  point, 
and  issued  stringent  orders  for  the  destruction  of  liquor  intended  for 
the  camps.  General  Johnston  shared  in  the  President's  solicitude,  and 
wrote  that  he  would  enforce  .his  orders  to  the  letter.  Having  appre 
hended  and  confined  some  men,  while  they  were  attempting  to  intro 
duce  liquor  into  the  camp,  a  mutiny  arose ;  and  about  fifty  men  rushed 
upon  the  guard  at  midnight,  and  rescued  the  prisoners,  so  that  the  camp 
became  the  scene  of  riot  and  confusion.  The  next  day  seven  of  the 
ringleaders  were  arrested,  and  quiet  was  restored.  Not  long  after, 
Colonel  Teal,  a  gallant  and  useful  officer,  was  assassinated ;  and  both 
public  opinion  and  the  suspicions  of  the  President  pointed  to  an  officer 
of  high  rank  as  the  instigator  of  the  deed. 

All  these  circumstances  indicate  the  difficulties  of  General  Johnston's 
position ;  but,  sustained  by  the  hope  of  meeting  the  enemy  with  these 
valiant  though  unruly  warriors,  he  endured  the  pain  of  his  wround  and 
the  vexations  of  his  command,  and  continued  to  perform  the  duties 
devolving  on  him.  As  this  hope  gradually  vanished,  and  the  torment 
from  the  injured  nerve  became  more  acute  with  the  increasing  heat,  he 


•  RELATIONS  WITH  PRESIDENT   HOUSTON.  83 

was  forced  to  consider  the  question  of  his  resignation.     He  wrote  from 
Texana,  April  22d,  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  as  follows : 

DEAE  SIR  :  The  state  of  my  health  has  been  a  source  of  great  embarrassment 
and  anxiety  to  me.  During  the  first  period  of  my  confinement  I  was  buoyed 
up  with  the  hope  of  soon  being  able  to  resume  the  active  duties  of  my  station, 
believing  that  the  healing  of  my  wound  would  be  the  period  of  relief  from  pain 
and  of  my  restoration.  But  I  have  been  greatly  disappointed ;  my  attempts  to 
take  exercise  on  horseback  have  proved  exceedingly  injurious,  and  I  am  com 
pelled  to  refrain ;  and,  of  course,  am  greatly  discouraged,  as  my  suffering  is 
without  intermission. 

ATy  situation  requires  repose  and  suspension  from  fatigue.  I  do  not  ask  it, 
nor  do  I  wish  it,  at  this  time,  but  the  public  interest  requires  that  all  the  duties 
of  the  commander  should  be  energetically  performed  by  a  competent  officer  ;  to 
do  which,  his  presence  at  every  point  is  necessary.  The  office  of  major-general 
is  vacant.  Let  an  appointment  be  made.  I  should  be  wanting  in  honor  were 
I  to  conceal  from  you  that  I  am  unable  to  discharge  all  my  duties,  and  have  been 
restrained  until  this  time  from  reporting  it  by  the  hope  of  recovery,  which  I  do 
not  now  believe  will  be  soon.  My  physicians  commend  my  case  to  time. 

I  have  recommended  the  appointment  of  a  major-general.  Should  any  other 
arrangement  be  deemed  more  conducive  to  the  public  interest,  let  no  motive  of 
consideration  for  me  interfere.  I  feel  the  most  ardent  desire  to  serve  the  coun 
try,  and  whatever  ability  I  may  have  shall  be  devoted  to  it. 

The  President  and  Secretary  earnestly  opposed  any  change,  and 
urged  General  Johnston  to  retain  command.  He  did  so  until  May  7th, 
when,  worn  down  by  care,  fatigue,  and  physical  suffering,  he  took  the 
advice  of  his  physicians,  and  turned  over  the  command  to  Colonel  Rog 
ers.  On  the  18th  of  the  same  month,  the  President  furloughed  about 
two-thirds  of  the  men,  thus  virtually  disbanding  the  army;  while  the 
Mexican  navy  swept  triumphantly  along  the  coast,  and  the  Indians  pur 
sued  their  cruel  warfare  upon  the  border  with  but  faint  resistance. 

As  President  Houston  and  General  Johnston  subsequently  became 
unfriendly,  it  is  proper  to  state  that  there  is  no  evidence  of  such  a  feel 
ing  during  this  period. 

The  President's  letters  on  public  affairs  are  full  and  frank.  Occa 
sionally,  his  language  is  imperious  ;  and  he  conveys  rudimentary  in 
struction  in  the  military  art  after  a  fashion  that  might  have  wounded 
the  self-love  of  a  trained  soldier  less  tolerant  of  human  foibles  than  Gen 
eral  Johnston  ;  but  he  accepted  all  proper  suggestions  with  cheerful 
ness,  and  responded  to  others  with  calmness  and  dignity.  In  a  letter 
of  April  4th  General  Johnston,  in  view  of  the  possibility  of  a  forced  re 
treat,  says  : 

I  agree  with  you  that  the  Colorado  is  the  proper  line  of  defense,  having 
more  strength  than  any  other,  and  affording  more  facility  of  cooperation  with 
the  militia,  and  of  supply. 


84  AS  TEXAN  SOLDIER. 

To  a  rebuke  from  the  President  for  writing  to  him  in  general  terms, 
and  an  order  requiring  him  to  conform  to  the  regulations  in  making  re 
turns,  etc.,  he  replies  that  all  that  the  President  conceives  to  have  been 
omitted  has  been  done,  and  that  "the  detailed  information  he  desires  is 
on  the  files  of  the  War  Department." 

These,  however,  were  minor  matters,  and  led  to  no  personal  ill- 
feeling.  But  the  conduct  of  affairs  by  the  Administration  certainly  im 
paired  General  Johnston's  confidence  in  its  wisdom  and  energy.  The 
President,  from  his  antecedents,  was  naturally  inclined  to  attach  undue 
importance  to  treaties  with  the  Indians,  and  to  depend  upon  them  for 
succor  in  emergencies.  General  Johnston,  on  the  other  hand,  though 
quite  ready  to  treat  with  or  subsidize  them,  regarded  them  as  utterly 
faithless,  and  placed  no  reliance  upon  their  promises.  In  accordance 
with  the  tenor  of  his  instructions,  he  made  a  treaty  with  the  Comanches 
on  the  25th  of  April.  President  Houston  was  satisfied  with  a  do-noth 
ing  policy  toward  Mexico.  He  was  content  to  allow  an  annual  invasion 
from  that  country,  if  the  independence  of  Texas  was  not  put  in  too  im 
minent  peril  thereby. 

The  time  has  passed  for  party-feeling  about  these  matters;  the  act 
ors  are  in  their  graves,  and  new  issues  have  arisen  of  more  vital  im 
portance  to  this  generation  ;  but,  as  the  subject  belongs  to  history,  it 
seems  appropriate  to  state  the  objections  to  this  policy  which  for  the 
most  part  controlled  Texas,  until  it  drifted  into  annexation.  It  was 
not  defensive,  as  claimed;  because  it  took  no  adequate  steps  to  resist 
or  punish  aggression  by  Mexico  or  her  Indian  allies,  who  harassed  the 
frontier.  But,  if  it  had  been  able  to  resist  this  aggression,  still  it  fell 
short  of  measures  essential  to  the  security  of  Texas.  Annexation  to 
the  United  States  was  the  general  wish ;  and,  if  this  could  not  be  ob 
tained,  then  independence,  guaranteed  by  England  or  France.  In  either 
case  a  large  immigration  was  desired  by  all  Texans. 

Before  any  of  these  results  could  be  calculated  upon,  it  was  neces 
sary  for  Texas  to  prove  herself  able  to  protect  her  own  borders.  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  with  the  more  energetic  spirits,  believed  that  Texas  had 
the  men  for  an  army  of  invasion,  and  could  dictate  a  peace  better 
within  the  boundaries  of  Mexico  than  beyond  them ;  and  that  these 
men,  admirable  for  offensive  warfare,  were  a  burden  while  idle.  Five 
times  as  many  men  would  have  been  required  to  guard  the  frontier 
securely  as  to  invade.  He  thought  a  forward  movement  would  attract 
a  large  number  of  adventurers,  and  that  the  removal  of  the  pressure 
upon  the  frontier  would  invite  an  immigration  of  hardy  colonists,  who, 
in  time,  would  form  a  sufficient  bulwark.  With  the  men  of  the  border, 
he  resented  the  idea  that  Mexico  should  be  allowed  annually  to  assert 
her  eminent  domain  by  an  incursion  of  rancheros  and  convicts,  while 
the  pioneer  was  to  be  left  unaided  to  the  mercy  of  the  savage. 


MILITARY  POLICY  OF  TEXAS.  85 

That  these  sentiments  were  not  his  alone  is  manifest  from  the  letter, 
already  quoted,  of  General  Felix  Huston.  Colonel  W.  S.  Fisher,  after 
retiring  from  the  War  Department,  writes  February  6,  1838  :  "  The 
people  have  lost  faith  in  the  Administration.  They  consider  that  the 
tendency  of  the  whole  of  its  measures  is  to  prolong  the  war  to  an  in 
definite  period,  and  they  cry  aloud  for  action  and  decided  measures  that 
will  put  an  end  to  the  harassing  state  of  incertitude  in  which  they  now 
stand."  Other  testimony  might  be  cited. 

General  Johnston  did  not  feel  it  incumbent  on  him  to  arraign  the 
Administration  for  inefficiency,  though  he  chafed  under  what  he  consid 
ered  lost  opportunities  for  the  country.  These  adverse  views  gradually 
led  to  a  bitter  hostility  in  the  breast  of  the  President,  who  eventually 
came  to  regard  him  as  a  man  to  be  crushed,  at  whatever  cost.  The 
vehemence  of  this  dislike  was  the  more  singular,  as  General  Johnston 
at  no  time  in  his  life,  even  to  his  intimate  friends,  allowed  himself  to 
show  resentment  at  the  ill  offices  done  him,  and  generally  forbore  to 
speak  when  he  could  not  commend.  At  this  time,  however,  there  was 
no  rupture  of  friendly  relations,  and  none  would  have  occurred  had 
others  shown  the  same  reserve  in  criticism  of  General  Johnston  that  he 
exhibited  toward  them. 

After  General  Johnston  left  the  army,  a  meeting  of  officers  voted 
him  an  address  of  confidence  and  regard.  He  received  a  furlough,  May 
17th,  to  visit  the  United  States,  and  proceeded  to  New  Orleans  to  con 
sult  his  friend  Dr.  Davidson,  and  Dr.  Luzenberg,  an  eminent  surgeon  of 
that  city.  These  skillful  medical  authorities,  after  a  month's  attention 
to  his  case,  confirmed  the  view  of  the  army-surgeons,  and  recommended 
absolute  repose.  They  also  laid  down  a  course  of  treatment  which,  in 
time,  almost  entirely  restored  him.  In  later  life  he  was  troubled  with  a 
slight  lameness  after  any  severe  fatigue,  and  with  numbness  and  occa 
sional  pain  in  one  foot;  there  was  also  some  shrinkage  of  the  muscles. 
He  was  so  much  discouraged  by  the  disbanding  of  the  army,  and  by  the 
opinions  of  his  physicians  as  to  his  wound,  that  on  the  27th  of  June  he 
wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  again  tendering  his  resignation,  which 
was  again  declined, 

By  the  advice  of  his  surgeons,  General  Johnston  spent  the  summer 
cind  fall  in  Kentucky.  His  correspondence  shows  that  the  friends  of 
Texas  deemed  his  services  of  the  first  importance  to  the  republic. 
Colonel  Hockley,  eminent  in  the  struggle  for  independence,  whom 
General  Johnston  characterizes  as  "one  of  the  best  officers  and  patriots 
in  the  army,"  writes  from  Nashville,  November  5,  1837:  "I  have  just 
returned  from  the  Hermitage,  where  I  spent  all  last  week,  and  have 
had  many  and  long  conversations  with  the  old  chief  in  relation  to  the 
next  campaign.  He  will  be  pleased  to  see  you,  if  you  can  make  it  con 
venient  to  pass  this  way." 


80  AS  TEXAN  SOLDIER. 

Hon.  Henry  D.  Gilpin,  the  Attorney-General,  and  a  confidential 
friend  of  President  Van  Buren,  had  married  the  widow  of  Senator 
Johnston.  He  wrote  to  General  Johnston,  August  13th,  kindly  urging 
him  to  visit  him  at  Washington.  He  says :  "  It  is  very  evident  the 
annexation  of  Texas  to  our  Union  is  to  form  a  subject  of  importance 
and  of  contest  too ;  I  am  sure  your  presence  and  information  might 
often,  very  often,  be  of  service."  He  adds :  "  When  we  saw  you  at 
the  head  of  the  army,  we  began  to  think  of  Cortes  and  De  Soto ;  and 
conjectured  that  you  would  have  as  many  toils  among  swamps,  moun 
tains,  and  prairies,  as  the  one,  to  end  in  your  putting  a  new  flag  on  the 
same  walls,  as  the  other."  In  view  of  the  intimate  relations  between 
the  writer  and  the  President,  there  is  suggestion  at  least  in  the  forego 
ing.  From  traits  in  General  Johnston's  character,  already  sufficiently 
manifest,  including  a  certain  impatience  of  patronage  not  altogether 
judicious,  he  declined  to  avail  himself  of  these  favorable  opportunities 
of  introduction  to  powerful  party  chiefs,  and  of  familiar  intercourse  with 
them.  Having  spent  his  furlough  with  his  children  and  friends  in 
Louisville,  he  returned,  as  soon  as  he  was  able,  in  December,  to  Texas. 

His  naturally  buoyant  temper  had  aided  in  his  recovery,  and  he  now 
reentered  upon  the  scene  of  his  former  labors  with  high  and  cheerful 
purpose.  The  following  extract  is  given  not  only  as  an  index  of  his 
own  spirit,  but  of  that  of  the  Texan  people ;  and,  also,  as  exhibiting  the 
condition  of  the  country,  at  the  mercy,  not  only  of  invasion,  but  even 
of  the  rumor  of  invasion.  It  is  from  a  letter  to  Mr.  Edward  D.  Hobbs, 
of  Louisville : 

CITY  OF  HOUSTON,  December  31, 1S37. 

MY  DEAR  SIE  :  A  few  hours  after  my  arrival  at  this  place,  news  reached  us 
from  San  Antonio  of  the  approach  and  investment  of  that  devoted  town  by 
a  large  body  of  the  enemy's  cavalry.  Immediate  measures  were  taken  by  the 
people,  here  and  elsewhere,  to  organize  the  whole  available  force  of  the  country, 
and  aid  the  Government  in  every  possible  manner.  The  greatest  enthusiasm 
was  manifested  in  our  public  meetings,  and  a  determination  to  meet  the  enemy 
and  drive  him  from  our  country.  Our  scanty  means  were  fully  known  to  all, 
being  almost  destitute  of  munitions  and  provisions;  yet  this  did  not  abate  the 
ardor  of  their  devotion  to  the  cause.  Yesterday  an  express  arrived  from  San 
Antonio,  which  informs  us  that  the  rumor  was  caused  by  the  sudden  irruption 
of  a  marauding  party  of  fifty  Mexicans  for  the  purpose  of  stealing  horses,  in 
which  they  partly  succeeded.  The  alarm,  I  hope,  will  act  as  a  solemn  admoni 
tion  to  the  Government  to  commence  preparations  for  the  renewal  of  the  war 
in  the  most  energetic  manner.  The  commander  of  San  Antonio  says  that 
"things  bear  a  threatening  aspect  in  that  region; "  and  information  from  differ 
ent  sources  confirms  the  reported  movements  of  the  enemy ;  indeed,  we  may  say 
that  a  heavy  column  has  already  crossed  the  Rio  Grande.  It  is  now  too  late  to 
lament  that  ample  preparation  has  not  been  made ;  we  must  be  up  and  doing, 
with  such  force  and  such  means  as  we  have.  Texas  is  now  free,  and  will  always 
be,  while  her  citizens  are  faithful ;  and  in  this  they  will  never  be  found  wanting. 


HOUSTON'S  PEACE  POLICY.  gf 

I  shall  leave  this  evening  for  the  west.  I  will  take  charge  of  200  mounted  men 
at  the  Colorado,  and  proceed  with  them  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  reconnais 
sance.  The  information  I  shall  gain  will  enable  the  Government  to  act  promptly 
and  energetically,  if  need  be.  I  am  ordered  to  take  charge  of  the  military  op 
erations.  I  hope  to  render  a  good  account  if  the  war  goes  on. 

A  letter  to  the  same  gentleman  explains  the  conclusion  of  this 
affair : 

MERCEB'S  FERRY,  COLORADO  RIVER,  January  17,  1833. 

DEAR  SIR  :  I  wrote  you  in  my  last  of  my  intention  of  going  to  San  Antonio 
de  Bexar  with  a  small  force,  for  the  purpose  of  reconnaissance  on  the  frontier, 
with  the  view  of  ascertaining  the  strength  and  composition  of  the  enemy's 
forces,  and  how  far  they  have  been  pushed  on  this  side  of  the  Rio  Grande. 
Thus  far  I  have  been  unable  to  raise  the  force  I  anticipated,  the  excitement  of 
the  false  report  of  the  investment  of  Bexar  having  subsided.  I  think  it  prob 
able  I  shall  have  to  advance  with  one  company  of  forty  men,  or  relinquish  the 
undertaking,  which  I  would  not  do  were  all  the  powers  of  Mexico  in  full  array 
on  our  territory.  [Confidential. — Our  Government  wants  energy  and  prudent 
foresight,  which  those  intrusted  with  the  liberties  of  a  people  should  possess.] 

I  leave  to-morrow  for  the  Navidad,  thence  for  Bexar,  thence — I  will  deter 
mine  when  I  get  there.  Salutations  to  all  friends,  Prentice  in  particular. 

Very  truly  your  friend, 

A.  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON. 

The  sentence  marked  "  Confidential,"  in  this  letter,  will  not  be  con 
sidered  incautious,  or  censorious,  when  it  is  remembered  that  it  was 
addressed  to  a  most  intimate  and  trustworthy  friend,  not  in  Texas.  It 
is  given  to  show  the  drift  of  General  Johnston's  opinions  at  that  time. 
A  little  later,  if  he  had  chosen  to  give  expression  to  them,  they  would 
have  been  more  emphatic  in  tone. 

On  the  20th  of  January  the  Secretary  of  "War,  Barnard  E.  Bee,  remarks 
in  a  friendly  letter,  that  it  would  be  useless  to  get  men  together  with 
out  supplies ;  and  adds,  "  The  nakedness  of  the  land  you  will  be  struck 
with."  On  the  27th  of  January  he  informs  General  Johnston  that  the 
President  is  opposed  to  his  making  his  headquarters  beyond  San  An 
tonio.  On  February  26th  H.  McLeod  writes  very  emphatically,  "  The 
President  will  not  change  the  frontier  line,  or  reenforce  General  John 
ston  with  militia."  On  the  same  day  the  Secretary  of  War  writes, 
u  As  we  have  not  a  dollar  in  the  Treasury,  we  must  be  content  to  fold 
our  arms;"  and  again,  on  another  occasion,  he  says:  "The Treasury  is 
drained.  Not  a  dollar  is  to  be  had." 

As  the  winter  and  spring  dragged  on,  it  became  evident  that  Mex 
ico,  busied  with  her  own  civil  wars,  would  not  attempt  the  conquest  of 
Texas,  but  would  limit  her  attacks  to  predatory  raids  and  the  stirring 
up  of  Indian  hostilities  ;  and  Texas  was  again  saved  more  by  the  faults 
of  the  enemy  than  by  her  own  vigor.  On  the  13th  of  March  General 


88  AS  TEXAN  SOLDIER. 

Johnston  addressed  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  which  he  says: 
"  Although,  from  the  distracted  condition  of  Mexico,  which  is  confirmed 
by  reports  from  every  source,  it  will  not  be  possible  for  that  Govern 
ment  to  carry  on  the  war  this  year  against  the  republic  ;  and  although 
the  enemy  is  unable  to  make  any  serious  movement  against  this  country, 
we  should  not  forget  that  our  frontier  is  in  a  most  feeble  situation,  and 
incapable  of  defense  against  even  predatory  parties.  It  is  unnecessary 
for  me  to  say  to  you  that  on  the  northern  frontier  there  is  no  force 
whatever,  and  on  the  western  there  will  not  be  a  mounted  man  after 
the  3d  of  April."  The  letter  goes  on  to  urge  not  only  the  duty  but 
the  expediency  of  protecting  the  settlers,  and  recommends  the  organi 
zation  of  a  regiment  of  cavalry  for  frontier  defense.  The  Government, 
however,  took  no  measures,  except  to  advise  a  renewal  of  the  treaty 
with  the  Comanches,  the  preliminaries  of  which  General  Johnston, 
after  much  negotiation,  finally  arranged. 

In  1854  I  took  notes  of  some  conversations  with  General  Johnston, 
among  which  I  find  the  following  account  of  these  transactions.  The 
Comanches  had  committed  great  depredations,  but  now  sent  in  word 
that  they  were  willing  to  treat  for  peace.  General  Johnston  knew  that 
there  could  be  no  satisfactory  peace  until  the  limits  of  the  two  races 
were  definitively  settled,  and  each  was  restrained  within  its  own  territo 
ry  J  but  the  difficulty  was,  that  the  Spanish  law  had  recognized  no  right 
to  the  soil  in  the  Indians,  and  Texas  still  held  to  this  doctrine.  Could  a 
territory,  then,  be  marked  out  for  the  Comanches?  As  General  John 
ston's  authority  to  assign  a  territory  to  them  was  at  least  doubtful,  and 
he  was  unwilling  to  transcend  his  legitimate  powers,  he  sent  an  officer 
to  the  President  to  inquire  how  this  question  should  be  disposed  of ; 
but  Houston  made  no  reply.  General  Johnston  determined,  therefore, 
merely  to  hold  a  friendly  talk  with  the  Indians,  avoiding  all  disputed 
points. 

After  a  delay  of  some  two  months  a  band  of  about  150  Comanches, 
led  by  two  chiefs,  Essovvakkenny  and  Essomanny,  came  in  to  hold  the 
"talk."  The  chiefs  were  about  twenty-seven  or  twenty -eight  years 
old,  and  about  five  feet  eight  inches  in  height ;  Essomanny  was  rather 
a  bull-headed  fellow,  with  a  firm  and  sensible  expression  ;  Essowak- 
kenny  had  a  more  intelligent  countenance. 

It  had  been  the  immemorial  custom  of  the  Comanches,  after  plun 
dering  the  country,  to  ride  down  at  their  pleasure  to  San  Antonio  to 
trade^.xeceive  presents,  and  offer  prisoners  for  ransom.  On  such  occa 
sions,  to  relieve  themselves  from  the  care  of  their  horses,  these  fierce 
warriors  condescendingly  committed  their  cdballado  to  the  custody  of 
the  commandant,  from  whom  they  required  a  scrupulous  return  of  their 
chattels  when  they  should  be  ready  to  leave.  On  this  occasion,  Esso- 
wakkenny,  on  meeting  General  Johnston,  waved  his  hand  with  a  lordly 


COMANCHE  DIPLOMACY.  80 

gesture  toward  his  horses,  saying :  "  There  is  our  caballado.  Take  care 
of  it."  "  Yes,"  replied  General  Johnston,  looking  at  him  steadily,  "  I 
see  your  caballado.  You  ride  good  ponies.  I  advise  you  to  watch 
them  well.  All  white  men  are  not  honest.  I  take  good  care  of  my 
own  horses.  Take  care  of  yours."  General  Johnston  told  the  writer 
that  he  meant  to  teach  the  Comanches  that  he  was  not  "  a  Mexican  hos 
tler  in  uniform."  The  chief  understood  the  irony,  and  that  he  had  to 
deal  with  a  warrior  ;  he  smiled  grimly,  and  detailed  some  of  his  own 
men  to  watch  the  grazing  herd. 

A  "  big  talk  "  was  held.  General  Johnston  told  them  of  the  great 
advantages  of  peace,  and  that  the  Texans  wished  to  be  friendly  with 
them  ;  to  which  they  replied  that  they  also  wished  for  peace.  General 
Johnston  told  them  that,  if  they  were  better  acquainted  with  the  white 
people,  they  might  like  them  better ;  and  that,  if  they  desired  it,  trad 
ing-posts  would  be  established  in  their  country.  Essowakkenny  rose, 
and  said  that  the  Comanches  had  noticed  that  trading-posts  always 
seemed  to  frighten  the  buffalo  away,  so  that  they  did  not  want  any  in 
their  country  ;  but  that  they  did  not  object  to  a  line  of  posts  along  the 
border  of  their  country — drawing  an  imaginary  line  with  his  hand,  so 
as  to  indicate  a  distance  of  about  three  miles  from  San  Antonio.  Not 
caring  to  discuss  the  delicate  subject  of  the  boundary,  General  John 
ston,  without  alluding  to  the  trading-posts  again,  dilated  upon  tho 
benefits  of  peace.  Essowakkenny  rejoined  that  his  people  had  made 
peace  with  the  Mexicans.  General  Johnston  said  that  he  was  glad  of 
it  ;  although  the  Mexicans  were  not  his  friends,  it  was  good  for  the 
Comanches  to  be  at  peace  with  everybody.  Essowakkenny  added,  with 
a  humorous  look,  that  he  did  not  make  peace  with  the  Mexicans  until 
he  had  stolen  all  their  horses  !  To  General  Johnston's  request  that  he 
would  visit  the  President  at  Houston,  Essowakkenny  replied  that  he 
could  not  go,  but  that  his  brother,  Essomanny,  who  was  a  braver  man 
than  himself,  would  go.  He  then  declared  sentiments  of  the  strongest 
friendship.  General  Johnston  gave  them  presents  of  considerable  val 
ue,  and  dismissed  them,  not  only  well  pleased,  but  delighted,  with  their 
reception. 

Karnes,  on  the  strength  of  this  talk,  took  a  quantity  of  goods  and 
traded  with  them.  He  was  well  treated,  and  made  much  money.  En 
couraged  by  these  results,  a  party  of  thirteen  men  started  with  goods 
to  trade  with  them  ;  but,  as  they  were  never  heard  of  again,  it  was 
supposed  that  they  were  treacherously  murdered  by  the  Comanches. 
President  Houston  concluded  a  treaty  with  them  in  May,  1838,  which 
they  observed  with  their  usual  bad  faith  ;  and  we  find  them,  during  the 
summer  and  fall,  raiding,  robbing,  and  scalping  ;  so  that,  in  the  language 
of  Yoakum,  "  the  frontier  was  lighted  up  with  the  flames  of  savage  war." 
This  author  ascribes  these  outrages  to  the  opening  of  the  land-office  •, 


90  AS  TEXAN  SOLDIER. 

but  they  should  rather  be  imputed  to  the  secret  negotiations  between 
Mexico  and  the  Indians,  and  to  the  defenseless  condition  of  the  frontier. 

General  Johnston  used  to  relate  that,  while  pursuing,  with  friendly 
Tonkaways,  some  Lipan  horse-thieves,  they  came  upon  a  gigantic  brave, 
who,  on  foot,  long  outstripped  his  pursuers.  At  length,  finding  his 
enemies  closing  round  him,  he  turned,  confronted  them,  and  defiantly 
shouting,  "  Lipan  !  "  rushed  among  them  to  certain  death.  General 
Johnston  said  he  would  gladly  have  saved  him,  but  was  unable  to  do 
so.  Next  day,  his  Indian  allies  told  him  they  had  cooked  the  Lipan, 
and  asked  him  to  dinner  ;  nor  could  they  be  made  to  understand  his  ab 
horrence  at  feasting  on  the  flesh  of  an  enemy.  This  is  mentioned  be 
cause  it  has  been  doubted  whether  the  Texas  Indians  were  cannibals. 

On  another  occasion,  he  was  following  the  trail  of  some  hostile  In 
dians,  when  he  found,  among  other  tracks  in  the  sand,  the  footprint  of 
a  little  child.  He  halted  his  men,  pointed  it  out  to  them,  and  told  them 
they  must  spare  the  party  for  the  sake  of  the  little  child.  The  rude 
frontiersmen,  equally  open  to  emotions  of  revenge  or  generosity,  read 
ily  agreed  to  forego  the  pursuit.  He  had  a  great  reverence  for  the 
innocence  of  childhood, 

During  the  spring  General  Johnston  was  much  urged  to  allow  him 
self  to  be  nominated  for  President  of  the  Republic  ;  and  it  was  stated 
that  Rusk  would  allow  his  name  to  be  used  as  a  candidate  for  Vice-Pres- 
ident,  on  this  condition,  but  on  no  other.  He,  however,  steadily  rejected 
all  overtures,  in  which  course  he  was  fully  confirmed,  when  General 
Mirabeau  B.  Lamar  and  Hon.  Peter  W.  Gray  son,  both  personal  friends, 
appeared  as  rival  candidates. 

On  the  8th  of  April  the  Government  was  startled  by  information, 
five  days  only  from  Matamoras,  that  a  heavy  column  of  invasion  was  al 
ready  in  motion  in  the  direction  of  San  Antonio.  The  dispatch  from 
the  Secretary  of  War,  conveying  this  intelligence  to  General  Johnston, 
concludes : 

I  communicate  with  you  by  express,  and  at  the  instance  of  the  President, 
who  has  but  just  returned.  He  wishes  you  to  avail  yourself  of  every  possible 
means  of  defense ;  and,  if  necessary,  consult  with  the  Comanches,  who  will 
doubtless  render  you  every  assistance;  your  force  is  so  inadequate  that  I  can 
scarcely  do  more  than  say  I  know  all  that  bravery  can  achieve  will  be  accom 
plished. 

As  the  Mexican  force  was  reported  at  1,500  or  2,000  men,  and  Gen 
eral  Johnston  had  only  forty  men  at  his  disposal,  he  might  well  have 
disregarded  an  order  the  tenor  of  which,  in  its  plain  construction, 
seemed  to  require  him  to  contest  the  advance  of  the  invaders  with  the 
force  at  his  command.  Though  he  did  not  suspect  any  deliberate  pur 
pose  to  sacrifice  him,  he  felt  a  deep  indignation  at  the  terms  in  which 


HIS  BOLDNESS.  91 

the  order  was  drawn,  which,  according  to  his  construction,  left  him  no 
liberty  of  action.     The  next  day  he  replied : 

You  are  aware  of  the  very  limited  means  of  defense  at  my  disposal ;  but, 
such  as  they  are,  you  may  rely  upon  their  being  employed  to  the  best  advantage. 

The  direction  to  call  upon  the  Indians  for  aid  was  a  proposition  not 
to  be  considered.  It  is  probable  that  the  Administration  only  meant 
that  he  must  run  away  judiciously;  but  he  was  hardly  of  a  temper  so 
to  construe  "  all  that  bravery  can  achieve"  He  resolved  that  he  would 
not  retreat,  and  that,  if  a  Thermopylae  or  an  Alamo  were  required  of 
him,  he  would  not  involve  San  Antonio  in  his  destruction.  He  there 
fore  advanced  to  meet  the  enemy  and  contest  with  him  the  passage  of 
the  streams.  The  result  proved  the  wisdom  of  his  action,  the  safety  of 
which  lay  in  its  boldness.  The  Mexicans,  apprehending  that  his  little 
troop  was  but  the  advance-guard  of  an  army,  hastily  recrossed  the  Rio 
Grande;  and,  in  furtherance  of  some  other  political  project,  were  soon 
diverted  into  distant  quarters,  thus  freeing  the  frontier  from  present 
danger.  Thus  was  this  official  death-warrant  annulled  by  Providence. 
The  coast  of  Texas  was  about  the  same  time  relieved  from  the  depre 
dations  of  the  enemy  by  the  French  blockade  of  the  ports  of  Mexico. 

General  Johnston,  having  no  troops  to  command  and  no  present  oc 
cupation,  again  wished  to  resign,  but  was  so  strongly  dissuaded  that,  in 
June,  he  accepted  a  furlough  and  went  to  Kentucky.  Colonel  Hockley, 
who  had  succeeded  Mr.  Bee  as  Secretary  of  War,  informed  General 
Johnston,  August  21st,  of  Cordova's  revolt,  which  ended  in  smoke,  how 
ever;  and,  apprising  him  that  he  was  authorized  to  retain  such  officers 
as  were  necessary,  added,  "  You  hold  your  rank,  and  are  wanted" 

Most  of  the  emigrants  to  Texas  had  gone  thither  with  the  hope  of 
seeing  it  ultimately  admitted  as  a  State  into  the  Federal  Union.  When 
they  saw  the  possibilities  of  greatness  in  its  vast  territory  and  wonder 
ful  natural  advantages,  they  felt  assured  that  in  its  annexation  the 
United  States  would  gain  even  more  than  Texas.  When,  then,  in  the 
Northern  States  the  opposition  to  annexation  found  vent  in  a  torrent  of 
insult  and  invective,  a  great  revulsion  of  feeling  occurred  in  Texas. 
President  Houston  withdrew  the  offer  of  annexation,  and  public  atten 
tion  was  directed  toward  the  maintenance  of  independence,  with  free 
trade  and  closer  relations  with  England. 

In  letters  to  General  Johnston  from  prominent  Texans,  former  en 
thusiasts  for  annexation,  the  opinion  prevails  that  "  perhaps  it  is  better 
thus."  Others  went  further,  disappointment  adding  bitterness  to 
alienation.  President  Lamar,  in  his  inaugural  address,  says  with  his 
usual  fervor:  "The  step,  once  taken,  would  produce  a  lasting  regret, 
and  ultimately  prove  as  disastrous  to  our  liberties  and  hopes  as  the  tri 
umphant  sword  of  the  enemy."  General  Johnston  shared  the  common 
sentiment  that  national  dignity  and  manifest  policy  both  demanded  the 
withdrawal  of  the  offer  of  annexation.  It  was  evidently  unfair  to 


92  SECRETARY   OF  WAR. 

Texas  to  leave  the  option  open  to  a  hesitating  suitor;  and,  indeed,  the 
shortest  road  to  annexation  was  to  compel  the  United  States  to  con 
sider  the  alternative  of  a  European  protectorate.  A  few  years'  delay 
enabled  Texas  to  make  a  much  better  bargain,  and  the  United  States 
reenacted  the  purchase  of  the  sibylline  books.  It  is  a  curious  problem 
how  a  final  rejection  of  Texas  by  the  United  States  might  have  affected 
the  events  of  the  last  twenty  years — possibly  not  as  the  opponents  of 
annexation  would  have  wished. 

Mirabeau  B.  Lamar  was  elected  President,  and  David  G.  Burnet 
Vice-President,  September  3,  1838,  and  they  were  inaugurated  on  the 
9th  of  December.  On  December  22d  General  Johnston  was  appointed 
Secretary  of  War.  Louis  P.  Cook  was  made  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
and  Dr.  James  H.  Starr  Secretary  of  the  Treasury;  and  the  Department 
of  State  was  filled  in  rapid  succession  by  Hon.  Barnard  E.  Bee,  Hon. 
James  Webb,  and  Judge  Abner  S.  Lipscomb ;  Judge  Webb  becoming 
Attorney-General.  General  Johnston  lived  on  terms  of  great  harmony 
and  kindness  with  his  colleagues. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

THE  outlook  of  Texas  seemed  anything  but  bright  at  the  beginning 
of  Lamar's  administration.  Fortune,  which  at  first  appeared  to  smile 
upon  the  rising  republic,  finding  her  favors  neglected,  had  now  begun 
to  turn  away  her  face.  Nearly  three  years  had  passed  since  San 
Jacinto,  and  yet  no  government,  except  the  United  States,  had 
acknowledged  the  independence  of  Texas.  The  European  powers 
refused  recognition,  and  pointed  to  the  claim  of  title  maintained  by 
Mexico,  with  an  annual  invasion  that  disputed  possession  of  the  soil 
and  pretended  to  imperil  the  national  existence.  The  navy,  created  by 
the  Texan  Congress  in  1836,  had  disappeared  in  1837:  of  its  four  ves 
sels,  two  had  gone  down  at  sea,  one  had  been  sold,  and  one  captured. 
The  army  had  been  disbanded,  and  Mexican  machinations  had  been 
allowed  to  mature,  drawing  the  wild  tribes  and  the  Cherokees  into  an 
alliance  which  was  drenching  the  defenseless  border  in  blood,  and  now 
loomed  up  into  the  larger  proportions  of  a  general  war.  The  whole 
policy  of  President  Houston  had  been  to  postpone  the  evil  day,  and  to 
evade  difficulties  instead  of  meeting  them.  Time  is  so  important  an 
element  in  setting  straight  the  crooked  things  of  this  world,  and  was, 
especially,  of  such  moment  in  the  affairs  of  Texas,  that  the  President's 


LAMAR'S  ADMINISTRATION.  93 

procrastination  appears  pardonable ;  but  its  sole  advantage  turned  out 
to  be  the  personal  one  of  shifting  the  accumulated  burden  upon  his  suc 
cessor.  Yet  Providence  had  supplied  the  defects  of  human  foresight, 
and  stood  friend  to  the  struggling  young  nation. 

In  1837  the  Mexican  army  of  invasion,  after  surveying  the  attitude 
of  the  Texan  force  on  the  Coleto  under  General  Johnston,  concluded  to 
retire  ;  and  in  1838  it  retreated,  as  has  been  narrated,  before  a  shadow. 
In  the  same  year  the  French  blockade  of  the  Mexican  ports  ended  the 
Mexican  blockade  of  the  coast  of  Texas,  and  supplied  the  loss  of  the 
fleet;  but  on  the  9th  of  March,  1839,  the  French  blockade  was  raised  by 
the  peace  between  France  and  Mexico.  The  Treasury  was  empty,  the 
paper-money  much  depreciated,  and  public  credit  gone.  No  army,  no 
navy,  no  money,  no  credit,  and  no  national  recognition;  with  Mexico 
relieved  of  French  invasion,  and  an  Indian  war  ready  to  burst  upon  the 
country — what  was  left?  Hope,  God's  gift  to  the  young — men  or 
nations — hope,  destined  to  many  disappointments,  but  still  buoying 
them  up. 

The  youthful  statesmen  who  now  guided  the  republic  fortunately  felt 
an  enthusiasm  that  was  neither  turned  aside  by  obstacles  nor  dismayed 
by  dangers.  The  future  greatness  of  the  country  inspired  them,  and 
they  opposed  to  the  odds  against  them  the  intrepidity,  the  energy,  and 
the  intellectual  resources,  of  the  martial  race  they  represented.  Imagina 
tion,  displaying  itself  in  action,  lent  a  certain  grandeur  to  the  designs 
of  the  President  and  cabinet — heroic  wills  grappling  with  an  adverse  fate. 

General  Johnston,  writing  to  Mr.  George  Hancock,  from  Houston, 
April  21,  1839,  says,  "  There  is  now  nothing  doubtful  in  the  stability 
of  our  institutions  or  in  our  ultimate  success  in  the  establishment 
of  the  independence  of  the  country  upon  a  most  auspicious  basis." 

Mirabeau  B.  Lamar  was  born  in  Jefferson  County,  Georgia,  August 
16,  1798.  He  was  of  Huguenot  stock,  and  of  a  family  which  has  pro 
duced  men  of  note  as  orators  and  statesmen.  He  was  already 
distinguished  for  eloquence  when  he  came  to  Texas,  in  1835,  to  aid  the 
constitutional  cause ;  and  is  said  to  have  been  the  first  to  declare 
publicly  for  independence.  He  was  not  less  ardent  as  a  soldier  than  as 
a  speaker;  and,  in  the  cavalry-skirmish  on  the  day  before  the  battle  of 
San  Jacinto,  saved  the  life  of  General  Rusk  by  a  free  exposure  of  his 
own.  He  was  conspicuous  for  gallantry  at  San  Jacinto,  was  soon  after 
appointed  Secretary  of  War  by  President  Burnet,  and  was  elected  Vice- 
President  in  1836.  His  impetuous  valor,  enthusiastic  temper,  and  un 
selfish  aspirations  for  the  honor  and  welfare  of  his  country,  made  him 
the  fit  choice  of  Texas  as  her  President.  Lamar  was  a  man  of  high, 
unbending  honor;  his  native  gifts  were  fine — largeness  and  brilliancy  of 
conception,  fancy,  eloquence,  readiness,  and  courage.  Though  ardent, 
impulsive,  and  open  to  present  impressions,  sometimes,  especially  in 


94:  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

seasons  of  ill-health,  he  gave  way  to  the  reaction  that  displays  itself  in 
waywardness,  dejection,  and  lassitude.  But  he  was  brave,  affectionate, 
open  as  the  day,  lofty,  and  magnanimous.  Among  his  chosen  friends 
and  counselors  were  ineri  of  purpose  as  high  as  his  own,  and  of  more 
exact  modes  of  thought.  Judge  Lipscomb  and  Mr.  Webb  were  able 
lawyers,  Cook  was  a  man  of  fine  talents,  and  Dr.  Starr  has  through  a 
long  life  justified  both  his  financial  ability  and  his  perfect  uprightness. 

The  Administration  accepted  the  trust  imposed  upon  it,  with  the 
full  purpose  and  reasonable  expectation  of  carrying  out  a  broad  plan 
for  the  security  and  greatness  of  the  country.  It  achieved  much;  and 
even  where  it  fell  short  of  the  design,  as  is  apt  to  be  the  case  in  a  free 
government  whose  legislation  is  based  upon  compromise,  it  laid  the 
foundation  of  future  power  and  progress  for  the  State.  The  finan 
cial  policy  proposed  by  the  President  was  rejected  by  Congress. 
While,  of  course,  it  cannot  be  asserted  that  a  national  bank,  which  he 
recommended,  with  its  credit  based  upon  the  public  domain  and  the 
public  deposits,  would  have  created  financial  confidence  and  maintained 
values  in  those  distressed  times,  still  the  adherence  to  a  system  of  un 
limited,  unguaranteed,  irredeemable  issues  was  not  the  device  nor  the 
choice  of  this  Administration.  Bankruptcy  could  not  be  arrested  by  it, 
and  indeed  was  certain  under  it.  It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether  any 
prudence  or  wisdom  could  have  averted  the  result.  The  recommenda 
tion  of  a  national  bank  was,  however,  used  as  a  handle  of  prejudice 
among  those  who,  under  entirely  different  circumstances,  had  learned  to 
distrust  the  United  States  Bank. 

To  the  eloquent  appeals  of  Lamar  are  due  the  foundation  of 
the  educational  system  of  Texas,  and  the  consecration  of  noble  grants 
of  public  lands  to  the  School  and  University  Funds.  By  him,  too,  a 
great  tide  of  corruption  and  public  plunder  was  suddenly  stopped.  An 
Auditorial  Court  had  been  established,  which  by  some  legislative  inad 
vertence  was  almost  compelled  to  approve  all  claims  presented,  on  the 
flimsiest  proof.  The  court  was  overwhelmed  with  fabricated  claims 
against  the  Government,  when  it  was  suspended  by  the  President  until 
the  meeting  of  Congress,  which  ratified  his  action  and  corrected  the 
evil.  The  existence  of  an  organized  system  of  public  robbery  was  dis 
covered,  by  which  a  vast  number  of  fraudulent  land-certificates  had 
been  issued  and  circulated,  evidently  through  the  collusion  of  dishonest 
local  land  commissioners.  The  President  again  interposed  to  check 
this  manufacture,  and  end  the  reign  of  bribery,  perjury,  and  forgery  ; 
and,  on  his  recommendation,  Congress  took  such  action  as  broke  up  the 
system  and  saved  the  republic  from  enormous  losses.  The  land-pirates 
and  bogus-claim  swindlers,  forming  a  numerous  and  adroit  class,  were 
roused  into  an  active  and  bitter  hostility,  which  was  not  without  effect 
in  hampering  the  measures  of  the  Administration. 


VIEWS   OF  MILITARY  POLICY.  95 

The  foreign  relations  of  Texas  were  now  put  upon  an  entirely  new 
footing.  Her  independence  was  acknowledged  by  France,  England, 
Belgium,  and  Holland ;  treaties  of  amity  and  commerce  were  made,  and 
diplomatic  relations  were  established  which,  by  alternately  piquing  the 
pride  and  the  interest  of  the  great  powers,  eventually  led  to  annexation 
to  the  United  States.  The  two  subjects  most  pressing,  however,  were 
the  defense  of  the  frontier  and  the  settlement  of  the  Indian  question. 
A  navy  was  put  upon  the  Gulf,  which  not  only  secured  the  coast  of 
Texas  but  annoyed  that  of  Mexico,  lent  aid  to  her  rebels,  and  helped 
to  embarrass  her  counsels.  By  judicious  encouragement  to  the 
Federalists,  and  by  letting  loose  upon  her  the  more  restless  spirits  of 
the  border,  Mexico  was  kept  busy  in  defense  of  her  own  soil,  so  that, 
during  this  Administration,  Texas  was  not  invaded  by  land  or  sea — the 
best  justification  of  its  foreign  policy.  This  energetic  line  of  action 
was  stigmatized  as  a  war  policy ;  but  it  was,  in  fact,  the  only  true  peace 
policy,  since  it  transferred  the  theatre  of  war  to  the  enemy's  territory, 
gave  to  foreign  countries  an  assurance  of  strength,  and  by  an  exhibition 
of  internal  security,  unknown  before,  invited  capital  and  population. 
Moreover,  Texas  showed  an  earnest  desire  for  peace,  seeking  the  media 
tion  of  friendly  nations,  and  sending  Mr.  Bee  as  envoy  to  Vera  Cruz  to 
try  to  open  negotiations.  Though  spurned  by  Mexico,  these  overtures, 
seconded  by  warlike  preparations,  helped  to  gain  the  respect  of  civil 
ized  peoples. 

The  conduct  of  military  affairs  was  intrusted  by  the  President  to 
the  Secretary  of  War,  whose  wish  was  to  raise  a  small  regular  force, 
which,  thoroughly  armed,  drilled,  and  disciplined,  would  serve  as  the 
nucleus  and  example  for  a  volunteer  army.  General  Johnston's  views 
to  this  effect  were  laid  before  the  President  in  the  following  letter : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  December  18,  1S3S. 

I  have  the  honor  herewith  to  submit  for  your  consideration  views  with 
reference  to  the  measures  which,  in  my  opinion,  should  be  adopted  to  maintain 
the  attitude  assumed  by  this  republic,  and  lead  to  a  prompt  adjustment  of  the 
difficulties  existing  with  the  Government  of  Mexico,  and  to  more  amicable  rela 
tions  with  the  Indians  on  the  northern  frontier.  Menaced  by  powerful,  vin 
dictive,  and  unrelenting  enemies,  the  wisdom  of  experience  dictates  that  the 
preparations  should  be  ample  and  adequate  in  all  respects  to  meet  all  emergen 
cies.  In  the  previous  invasions  by  the  enemy  this  country  presented  everywhere 
abundant  resources  for  the  subsistence  of  troops  and  for  mounting  and  equip 
ping  them,  which  do  not  now  exist.  They  have  long  since  been  exhausted,  and 
it  is  believed  that  they  do  not  exceed  the  wants  of  the  inhabitants.  In  former 
emergencies  the  vast  means  always  available  facilitated  the  rapid  concentration 
of  the  force  of  the  country,  and  enabled  it  to  meet  the  enemy  with  promptitude 
in  advance  of  the  frontier.  With  the  same  patriotic  devotion  and  zeal  for 
the  cause,  with  the  same  eager  desire  to  turn  out  for  defense  with  which  they 
were  inspired  on  former  occasions,  is  it  not  manifest  that,  without  depots  of  pro- 


96  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

visions  and  military  stores,  without  means  of  transportation  of  any  kind,  the  call 
for  aid  in  defense  must  be  feebly  responded  to?  There  is  another  consideration 
which  will  contribute  powerfully  to  render  this  resource  for  defense  precarious, 
which  should  under  favorable  circumstances  constitute  the  main  dependence  of 
the  Government.  It  is  the  apprehension  of  attack  from  hostile  Indians,  founded 
in  evidence  which  they  caunot  reject.  The  advance  of  a  Mexican  army  would 
be  the  signal  for  the  active  cooperation  of  the  unfriendly  tribes ;  and,  whether 
it  took  place  or  not,  the  anticipation  of  such  an  event  among  a  sparse  popu 
lation,  feeling  the  necessity  of  the  utmost  vigilance  and  activity  for  their  own 
protection,  would  produce  the  same  result — a  strong  diversion  in  favor  of  the 
enemy,  which  our  knowledge  of  the  Indian  character  inclines  us  to  believe 
would  not  be  the  case  if  we  had  an  army  in  position  on  the  border.  If  this  be 
the  true  condition  of  things,  and  I  think  no  one  informed  on  the  subject 
will  differ  with  me,  I  should  ill  discharge  the  high  obligations  of  duty  were  I  to 
delay  making  them  known,  or  deserve  the  confidence  of  the  intelligent,  bold, 
and  patriotic  population  of  the  republic,  who  do  not  desire  to  be  flattered  with 
deceptive  accounts  of  their  power  where  circumstances  prevent  its  efficient  ap 
plication,  or  with  illusive  hopes  of  peace  founded  on  no  just  expectations.  "We 
cannot  conceal  from  ourselves  that  we  are  at  war  with  a  powerful  nation,  how 
ever  much  leisure  his  supineness  has  left  us  for  the  pursuits  of  peace.  The  ex 
ample  of  all  nations  teaches  the  necessity  of  active,  vigorous  and  unremitted 
preparation  till  the  termination  of  the  contest ;  the  greatest  and  most  powerful 
nations  do  not  disdain  it.  I  do  not  hesitate,  therefore,  from  the  conviction  that 
peace  will  be  most  easily  and  readily  obtained  by  making  ample  preparations  for 
war,  to  recommend  that,  besides  the  measures  in  progress  for  the  defense  of  the 
coast,  the  force  authorized  by  the  act  to  fix  and  establish  the  military  force 
of  the  republic,  of  November,  1836,  be  raised  and  equipped  for  immediate  ser 
vice,  with  such  additional  force  as  may  be  found  necessary.  I  also  recommend 
that  the  officers  and  soldiers  now  on  the  rolls  of  the  army,  except  those  of  the 
regiment  recently  authorized  for  the  protection  of  the  frontier  and  of  the 
advance  corps,  be  disbanded  in  anticipation  of  the  new  organization  which  I 
have  the  honor  to  suggest.  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  great  respect,  your  Ex 
cellency's  obedient  servant,  A.  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON, 

Secretary  of  War. 

To  his  Excellency  MIRABEATT  B.  LAMAE,  President  of  the  Eepublic  of  Texas. 

It  was  proposed  then  to  cross  the  Rio  Grande,  in  aid  of  the  Feder 
alists,  who  sought  the  alliance,  until  that  party  prevailed  throughout 
Mexico,  or  at  least  established  an  independent  republic  of  its  northern 
States,  which  would  interpose  a  friendly  nation  as  a  barrier  to  central 
ist  aggression.  This  hope  does  not  seem  chimerical,  when  we  recollect 
how  near  the  Federalists  were  to  success  ;  nor  does  there  seem  much 
reason  why  such  an  army,  under  an  able  leader,  might  not  in  such  an 
undertaking  have  dictated  the  terms  of  peace  in  the  city  of  Mexico. 
There  was  no  wish  or  intention,  however,  to  form  any  political  union 
with  any  Mexican  State.  When  this  was  strongly  urged  by  General 
Anaya,  the  Federalist  envoy,  upon  the  consideration  of  General  John- 


OPPOSITION   UNDER  HOUSTON.  97 

ston,  on  the  ground  that  all  republics  ought  to  be  federal  in  their  or 
ganization,  General  Johnston  replied  that  "  every  nation  ought  to  choose 
its  own  form  of  government,  and  be  a  good  neighbor;  that  Texas 
could  exist  alongside  a  monarchy  if  it  treated  her  well." 

To  carry  out  so  large  a  plan  as  the  invasion  of  Mexico  would  have 
required  great  unanimity  of  sentiment  among  the  people  in  favor  of 
aggressive  war  ;•  in  fact,  a  vigorous  and  undivided  national  feeling. 
Without  this,  it  was  vain  to  hope  that  the  Government  could  obtain 
the  men  and  means  at  home,  or  the  credit  abroad,  necessary  to  prose 
cute  it  with  energy.  But  for  the  first  time  an  opposition  was  organ 
ized  against  the  Administration.  President  Houston  had  been  able 
to  tide  over  his  two  years  of  office  without  encountering  one.  Though 
he  had  his  embarrassments,  it  was  from  independent  resistance  to  par 
ticular  measures,  and  not  in  the  desire  to  thwart  or  impede  his  execu 
tive  action.  There  was  at  that  time  neither  the  material  nor  the  temper 
for  an  opposition.  Everybody  wished  to  make  the  best  of  what  hap 
pened  ;  errors  and  faults  were  condoned  ;  and  the  power  of  patriotism 
and  good  feeling  in  the  first  flush  of  victory,  together  with  the  prestige 
of  San  Jacinto,  prevented  any  combination  to  thwart  the  Executive.  A 
negative  policy,  if  it  effected  nothing,  at  least  offered  nothing  tangible 
to  resist ;  so  that,  if  there  was  much  to  complain  of,  there  was  little  to 
undo  or  overthrow,  and  dissatisfaction  effervesced  in  grumbling.  Now, 
however,  it  was  different.  Opinions  had  crystallized,  and  politics  was 
becoming  a  profession.  The  elements  of  party,  personal,  local,  and  sec 
tional  considerations,  as  well  as  those  springing  from  honest  differences 
of  opinion,  only  waited  the  call  of  a  leader  to  marshal  in  strong  array. 
Such  a  leader  was  soon  found  in  the  late  President.  Whatever  view 
may  be  taken  of  General  Houston  in  other  respects,  it  is  idle  to  deny 
him  superior  talents  in  the  management  of  men.  His  temper  was  not 
such  as  to  be  satisfied  with  a  subordinate  position  ;  and  he  beheld  with 
impatience  and  anger  a  course  of  proceeding  which,  reversing  his  own, 
seemed  a  tacit  rebuke  to  him,  which,  if  successful,  would  eclipse  San 
Jacinto,  and  if  it  failed  would  injure  the  country.  With  such  alter 
natives,  he  was  unwilling  it  should  be  tried.  He  soon  gathered  all  the 
discontented  into  a  well-knit  party,  who  made  his  name  its  watchword. 
All  who  differed  with  the  Administration  were  taught  where  they  would 
find  sympathy  for  their  opinions  and  their  grievances  ;  and  following 
these  was  a  mighty  contingent  of  the  inert,  the  timid,  and  the  short-sight 
ed,  who  were  willing  to  trust  all  to  chance,  to  whom  was  added  the  com 
pact  phalanx  of  land-swindlers  and  claim-forgers,  eager  for  revenge.  Of 
course  the  body  of  the  party  was  honest ;  but,  whatever  its  material,  or 
motives,  it  hung  with  such  a  dead  weight  upon  the  measures  of  the  Ad 
ministration  as  to  prevent  the  realization  of  its  plans. 

But  the  event  which  gave  General  Houston  the  deepest  offense,  and 


98  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

most  sorely  wounded  at  once  his  self-love  and  his  affections,  was  the 
Cherokee  War.  After  that,  reconciliation  was  impossible ;  and  he  always 
cherished  the  bitterest  hostility  to  the  authors  and  principal  actors  in 
it.  Whoever  else  made  their  peace  with  him,  he  never  forgave  General 
Johnston.  It  was  natural,  and  not  discreditable  to  General  Houston, 
that  he  should  resent  a  line  of  conduct  which  reversed  his  Indian  poli 
cy,  and  treated  as  enemies  a  tribe  to  which  he  was  under  the  deepest 
personal  obligations.  It  was  not  in  his  nature  to  discriminate  between 
his  personal  relations  and  the  public  policy,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  he  felt  the  warmest  indignation  at  the  repudiation  of  his  acts, 
which  he  identified  with  those  of  the  republic. 

The  causes  which  led  to  the  Cherokee  War,  as  well  as  an  outline  of 
the  events,  will  be  related  here ;  not  only  because  General  Johnston, 
as  Secretary  of  War,  made  the  issue  with  the  Indians  and  superintended 
the  conduct  of  the  campaign,  but  because  it  is  necessary  to  the  vindi 
cation  of  a  whole  people,  to  whom  it  has  been  imputed  as  a  national 
crime,  to  be  pardoned,  however,  in  view  of  the  strong  temptations  to 
which  they  were  subjected.  This  seems  to  be  the  view  of  Yoakum, 
their  most  elaborate  historian,  who,  representing  the  opinions  and  jus 
tifying  the  action  of  General  Houston,  has  so  recorded  the  events,  and 
with  such  inferences  as  to  lead  to  the  most  erroneous  conclusions.  As 
the  whole  matter  is  a  question  of  good  faith,  which  must  be  kept  sacred 
with  savages  as  well  as  with  others,  the  reader  will  pardon  a  complete 
though  succinct  statement  of  all  the  facts,  cleared  from  the  confusion 
of  outside  considerations. 

A  small  band  of  Cherokees,  led  by  Richard  Fields,  a  half-breed,  emi 
grated  from  the  United  States  to  Texas  in  1822.  They  easily  extorted 
a  permission  to  settle  from  the  Mexicans  of  Nacogdoches,  who  had  been 
dispersed  and  cowed  by  the  recent  invasions  of  Colonel  Long.  Fields 
is  said  to  have  visited  the  city  of  Mexico  to  obtain  a  grant  of  lands,  and 
to  have  returned  satisfied  with  some  vague  and  illusory  promises.  In 
1825  he  was  joined  to  John  Hunter,  a  white  man,  who,  whether  fanatic 
or  impostor,  had  varied  experience  and  much  address,  and  who  went  to 
Mexico  on  the  same  mission.  The  constitutional  right  to  make  such  a 
grant  residing  in  the  State,  and  not  in  the  Federal  Government,  his  re 
quest  was  refused.  Fields  and  Hunter  made  a  treaty  with  the  "  Fre- 
donian  "  insurgents,  in  the  winter  of  1826 ;  but  a  rival  faction  of  the 
Cherokees  murdered  Hunter,  and,  led  by  Bowles,  aided  in  putting  down 
the  revolt.  Bowles  became  the  war-chief  of  the  Cherokees,  and  the 
leading  spirit  of  the  Texas  Indians. 

The  first  concession  by  the  Government  to  the  Cherokees  was  an 
order,  made  August  15,  1831,  to  the  local  authorities,  to  offer  them  an 
establishment  on  a  fixed  tract  of  land,  which  the  Political  Chief  at  Bexar 
afterward  reported  that  they  had  selected.  When  it  is  borne  in  mind 


INTRUSION  OF  UNITED  STATES  INDIANS.  99 

that  the  chief  motive  of  Mexico,  in  the  colonization  of  Texas,  had  been 
to  oppose  the  organization  and  valor  of  white  men  as  a  barrier  between 
the  restless  and  predatory  Indians  and  interior  Mexico,  it  seems  a  curi 
ous  coincidence  that  the  Government  should  begin  to  accord  rights  and 
privileges  to  savages,  just  when  it  was  denying  them  to  white  men. 
The  usurping  Central  Administration  of  Bustamante  had,  on  April  6, 
1830,  absolutely  forbidden  the  immigration  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  and  was  then  trying  to  carry  out  its  plan  of  arbitrary  govern 
ment  in  Texas. 

On  the  22d  of  March,  1832,  Colonel  Piedras  was  commissioned  "  to 
put  the  Cherokee  families  into  individual  possession  of  the  lands  they 
possessed  ; "  so  natural  is  it  for  despotism  to  ally  itself  with  barbarism, 
and  to  seek  to  depress  its  intelligent  opponents  by  the  aid  of  an  inferior 
race.  That  the  order  to  Piedras  was  obeyed,  either  technically  or  sub 
stantially,  is  not  probable,  as  the  Indians  would  not  have  been  satisfied 
with  an  allotment  of  lands  in  severalty  in  lieu  of  the  range  of  country 
which  they  hunted  over.  It  served  the  purpose  intended,  however ;  and 
50  or  100  Shawnees  and  Cherokees  followed  Piedras,  the  next  June,  to 
aid  Bradburn,  at  Anahuac,  against  Austin's  colonists.  In  the  Declara 
tion  of  Grievances,  by  the  Ayuntamiento  of  Nacogdoches,  the  colonists 
complained  that  "  Colonel  Piedras  had  called  in  and  employed  Indians, 
in  his  meditated  warfare  on  their  rights  ;"  and  "had  insulted  them  by 
saying  that  he  held  Americans  and  Indians  in  the  same  estimation,  and 
as  standing  on  the  same  footing."  1 

The  Colonization  Act  of  March  24,  1825,  admitted  Indians  as  set 
tlers,  "  when  any  of  them,  after  having  first  declared  themselves  in  fa 
vor  of  our  religion  and  institutions,  wish  to  establish  themselves  in  any 
settlements  that  are  forming."  It  has  been  pretended  that  the  emigrant 
United  States  Indians  were  entitled  to  lands  as  colonists  under  this 
act ;  but,  when  we  consider  that  its  intention  was  to  induce  white  men 
to  come  in  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  Indians  out,  it  cannot  be  con 
sidered  an  invitation,  but  a  conditional  permission,  to  a  certain  class  of 
Indians.  It  was  framed  in  a  spirit  of  equity,  and  plainly  intends  the 
case  of  Indians  willing  to  become  civilized  and  to  settle  in  the  colonies 
of  Austin  and  other  empresarios.  The  Cherokees  did  not  comply  with 
either  the  legal  formalities  or  other  prescribed  conditions ;  nor,  indeed, 
did  they  wish  to  acquire  any  rights  under  the  law.  In  point  of  fact, 
the  republic  of  Texas,  in  1839,  would  not  have  denied  reasonable  allot 
ments  of  land  to  any  resident  Indians  wishing  in  good  faith  to  try  the 
experiment  of  civilization. 

Up  to  1832  the  intruding  Indians  had  been  stragglers  or  discontent 
ed  bands,  which  had  broken  away  from  the  great  tribes  in  the  United 
States.  Now,  however,  under  the  aggressive  policy  of  that  Govern- 
1  "Texas  Almanac,"  1869,  p.  39. 


100  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

ment,  forcing  them  westward,  the  emigration  assumed  a  new  phase.  In 
spite  of  treaty  stipulations  to  the  contrary  between  the  United  States 
and  Mexico,  a  formidable  body  of  Cherokees,  Shawnees,  Kickapoos,  Del- 
awares,  and  Quapaws,  numbering  1,530  warriors  and  five  times  as  many 
souls,  entered  Texas  in  the  winter  of  1832-'33 — about  the  time  of  Gen 
eral  Houston's  arrival  in  the  State. 

No  people  could  suffer  such  an  invasion  without  disquietude ;  and 
accordingly  we  find  that  the  empresarios,  Messrs.  Austin,  Milam,  and 
Burnet,  early  in  1833,  addressed  a  memorial  to  General  Bustamante, 
calling  attention  to  the  facts.  Colonel  Bean,  too,  commanding  the 
Eastern  Department,  made  a  similar  complaint  to  General  Cass,  United 
States  Secretary  of  War,  remonstrating  against  this  breach  of  the 
treaty  of  1831,  by  which  "  both  parties  bind  themselves  expressly  to 
restrain  by  force  all  hostilities  and  incursions  on  the  part  of  the  Indians 
living  within  their  respective  boundaries."  It  is  hard  to  see  how  any 
rights  accrued  to  these  Indians,  constituting  fifteen-sixteenths  of  the 
intruding  bands,  from  their  incursion,  when  colonists  and  authorities 
alike  attempted  to  prevent  it.  The  centralists  wanted  a  sprinkling  of 
savages,  not  a  deluge;  the  colonists  objected  to  their  neighborhood 
altogether. 

Here  the  matter  seems  to  have  rested  until  September  11,  1835, 
when  Colonel  Bean  addressed  another  letter  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  referring  to  his  former  communication,  and  the  frequent 
breaches  of  the  treaty  already  mentioned  ;  adding,  "  The  annoyance  to 
the  community,  as  well  as  the  danger,  which  has  resulted  from  the  fact 
of  their  incursion,  was  clearly  anticipated  at  the  time  of  my  letter  to  the 
Secretary  of  War."  He  then  requests  that  the  Government  will  pre 
vent  the  execution  of  a  contract  for  the  introduction  of  24,000  Creeks 
into  Texas. 

On  the  same  day,  the  Committee  of  Vigilance  for  Nacogdoches  also 
wrote  to  President  Jackson,  giving  the  details  of  the  aforesaid  contract, 
pointing  to  its  violation  of  the  treaty  of  1831,  and  soliciting  the  inter 
ference  of  the  United  States  Government ;  praying  that  "  a  sparse  and 
defenseless  population  be  protected  from  the  evils  that  were  so  tragi 
cally  manifested  on  the  frontiers  of  Georgia  and  Alabama."  l  This  let 
ter  was  signed  by  Sam  Houston  and  five  others.  Mr.  Castello,  Mexi 
can  charge  d'affaires,  offered  the  same  remonstrance,  October  14, 1835. 
President  Jackson  took  the  steps  necessary  to  prevent  the  threatened 
irruption. 

In  the  beginning  of  the  Texan  Revolution,  the  Consultation,  a  pro 
visional  government,  representing  the  municipalities,  met  November  3, 
1835.  On  November  13th,  on  the  motion  of  Sam  Houston,  it  made 
a  "  solemn  declaration "  to  the  Indians,  "  that  we  will  guarantee  to 
1  "  Niles's  Register,"  vol.  xlix.,  p.  160. 


THE  TREATY  WITH  THE   CHEROKEES.  101 

them  the  peaceable  enjoyment  of  their  rights  to  their  lands,  as  we  do 
our  own.  We  solemnly  declare  that  all  grants,  surveys,  or  locations  of 
lands,  within  the  bounds  hereinbefore  mentioned,  made  after  the  settle 
ment  of  said  Indians,  are,  and  of  right  ought  to  be,  utterly  null  and 
void."  Lieutenant-Governor  Robinson,  a  member  of  the  committee  that 
reported  this  declaration,  says  that  General  Houston  assured  the  com 
mittee  that  he  had  himself  seen  the  grant  from  the  Mexican  Government 
to  the  Cherokees,  and  that  it  was  in  the  hands  of  Captain  Rogers,  at  Fort 
Smith,  in  Arkansas ;  and  avers  that  these  assurances  constrained  the 
committee  to  unite  in,  and  the  Consultation  to  adopt,  the  report.  Judge 
Waller,  another  member,  confirms  Lieutenant-Governor  Robinson's 
statement.  It  is  not  now  pretended  that  there  was  any  such  grant 
extant.1 

Sam  Houston,  John  Forbes,  and  John  Cameron,  were  appointed 
commissioners  to  negotiate  with  the  Cherokees.  But  the  Legislative 
Council,  apparently  distrusting  this  action,  passed  a  resolution,  Decem 
ber  26th,  instructing  the  commissioners  "in  nowise  to  transcend  the 
declaration,  made  by  the  Consultation  in  November,  in  any  of  their  ar 
ticles  of  treaty  ;  .  .  .  .  and  to  take  such  steps  as  might  secure  their" 
(the  Indians')  "  effective  cooperation  when  it  should  be  necessary  to 
summon  the  force  of  Texas  into  the  field." 2  Houston  and  Forbes  made 
a  treaty,  February  23,  1836,  ceding  to  the  Indians  a  large  territory. 

It  has  been  objected  to  the  Declaration  that  "  it  was  an  ill-advised, 
disingenuous,  if  not  subtle  and  sinister  measure,  null  and  void  for  want 
of  fundamental  authority,  of  no  moral  or  political  obligation,  and  only 
calculated  to  embarrass  any  future  transactions  with  these  obtruding 
savages."5  Vice-President  Burnet,  acting  Secretary  of  State,  says 
that  the  provisional  government  was  acting  outside  the  sphere  of  its 
legitimate  power,  "and  could  not,  in  a  matter  so  extraneous  to  the 
avowed  purposes  of  its  creation,  impose  any  moral  or  political  obliga 
tion  upon  the  independent  and  separate  Government  of  Texas."  4  It  will 
be  observed  that  the  Consultation,  by  its  very  name,  was  provisional, 
and  professed  to  act  under  the  Mexican  Federal  Constitution  of  1824. 
That  its  powers  were  considered  merely  provision al  seems  evident  from 
the  action  of  General  Houston,  who,  having  been  appointed  commander- 
in-chief  by  it,  demanded  another  election  when  the  convention  met  in 
the  following  March. 

It  was  also  charged  that  the  commissioners  transcended  their  pow 
ers,  ceding  a  vast  and  undefined  territory  to  the  Indians,  "without 
securing  their  effective  cooperation,"  according  to  the  restriction  of  the 
Council  in  their  instructions  to  the  agents.  Vice-President  Burnet  fur- 

1  "Texas  Almanac,"  1860,  p.  44.     2  Kennedy,  "  History  of  Texas,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  159. 

3  "Texas  Almanac,"  1859,  p.  18. 

4  Dispatch.  May  30,  1839,  to  General  Dunlap,  Texan  minister  to  the  United  States. 


102  SECRETARY   OF  WAR. 

ther  says  : *  "  That  pretended  treaty  was  never  ratified  by  any  competent 
authority  on  the  part  of  Texas.  On  the  contrary,  when  it  was  sub 
mitted  to  the  Senate  of  the  republic,  which  was  the  only  power  author 
ized  to  confirm,  it  was  rejected  by  a  decisive  vote  of  that  body,  and  no 
subsequent  action  of  the  Government  has  been  had  upon  it." 

General  Houston  tried  once  and  again  to  secure  the  constitutional 
approval  to  his  action  ;  but  even  his  great  personal  popularity  and  po 
litical  power  failed  in  this.  It  is  not  improbable  that  his  peculiar  rela 
tions  to  the  Cherokees  had  something  to  do  with  the  rejection  of  the 
treaty  by  the  Senate.  A  friendly  biographer  says  that  he  passed  "  the 
moulding  period  of  his  life,"  between  fourteen  and  eighteen,  with  the 
Cherokees.  When  he  abandoned  his  family,  his  home,  his  high  office, 
in  Tennessee,  and  the  habits  of  civilized  life,  in  1829,  it  was  to  seek  a 
refuge  in  this  tribe,  which  adopted  him  into  full  citizenship.  He  lived 
with  them,  as  an  Indian,  three  years,  and  is  supposed  to  have  entered 
Texas  on  some  mission  connected  with  their  interests.  He  then  located 
himself  at  Nacogdoches,  near  the  Texas  branch  of  the  Cherokees,  and 
always  showed  for  them  an  interest  and  affection  which,  if  it  clouded 
his  judgment,  was  at  least  creditable  to  his  heart. 

When  this  treaty  was  made  Texas  was  still  nominally  a  State  of 
Mexico,  and  Houston  was  still  a  Cherokee,  if  indeed  he  ever  renounced 
that  affiliation.  Such  complicated  relations  unfitted  him  to  act  as 
agent  where  the  parties  had  conflicting  interests ;  but  he,  nevertheless, 
showed  an  eagerness  to  complete  this  negotiation,  that  induced  him, 
while  commander-in-chiei,  to  leave  Refugio  for  that  purpose,  as  the 
enemy  was  advancing.  Thus  the  same  day  witnessed  the  conclusion  of 
the  treaty  and  the  appearance  of  Santa  Anna  before  San  Antonio;  and 
this  ill-omened,  futile,  and  wasteful  compact  was  linked  with  the  fall  of 
the  Alamo  and  the  massacre  of  Fannin's  men.  Thus,  too,  it  came  to  be 
regarded  as  General  Houston's  personal  act,  and  as  an  agreement  not 
binding  on  the  State. 

The  treaty,  which  was  to  have  engaged  the  effective  cooperation  of 
the  Indians,  is  claimed  by  Yoakum  to  have  secured  their  neutrality  at 
least,  thus  imposing  a  moral  obligation  upon  Texas  to  perform  it;  but 
his  own  pages  dispel  this  slender  claim.  J.  H.  Sheppard  says  a  that  on 
the  retreat  in  April,  1836,  he  was  sent  by  General  Houston  to  summon 
the  Coshatties  to  his  aid.  Though  long  domiciled  in  Texas,  and  the 
most  friendly  of  all  the  tribes,  they  would  not  even  consider  the  request. 
It  may  be  assumed  that  General  Houston  did  not  spare  even  more 
strenuous  efforts  to  enlist  the  powerful  Cherokees,  with  whom  he  was 
familiar.  Though  the  Coshatties  stood  aloof  and  were  sometimes 

Dispatch,  May  30,  1839,  to  General  Dunlap,  Texan  minister  to  the  United  States. 
2  "Texas  Almanac,"  1872,  p.  101. 


INDIAN  HOSTILITY  AND  PERFIDY.  103 

implicated  in  acts  of  hostility,  yet,  because  their  rights  were  pre 
scriptive,  they  were  treated  with  indulgence  and  allowed  to  retain  their 
foothold  when  the  immigrant  Indians  were  expelled. 

Of  the  Cherokees,  Shawnees,  Kickapoos,  etc.,  "recent  intruders,"  it 
is  said  "they  were  restless  and  discontented,"  and  in  1836  "they  gave 
unmistakable  signs  of  hostility  to  the  colonists  by  acts  of  depredation 
and  murder."  l  Yoakum  says  that  the  Indians  were  kept  quiet  by  the 
assurances  of  the  committees  of  San  Augustine  and  Nacogdoches, 
September  18,  1835,  that  their  just  and  legal  rights  would  be  re 
spected,  and  that  "no  white  man  should  interrupt  them  on  their 
lands."  a  Yet  a  different  inference  might  be  drawn  from  one  of  his 
anecdotes.  He  says  that  (in  October  or  November,  1835)  "the  ap 
pearance  of  Breese's  company  at  Nacogdoches  had  a  fine  effect  on 
the  Cherokee  Indians,  a  large  number  of  whom  were  then  in  town. 
Their  fine  uniform  caps  and  coats  attracted  the  notice  of  the  chief 
Bolles.  He  inquired  if  they  were  Jackson's  men.  'Certainly  they 
are,'  said  Stern.  'Are  there  more  coming?'  'Yes,'  was  the  reply. 
'  How  many  more? '  asked  Bolles.  Stern  told  him  to  count  the  hairs  on 
his  head  and  he  would  know.  In  twenty  minutes  the  Indians  had  all 
left  town."  3 

It  is  quite  evident  indeed  from  Yoakum's  own  account  that  the 
Indians  were  not  restrained  by  treaty  obligations,  but  by  the  presence 
of  a  competent  force,  and  that  the  cause  of  Texan  independence  was 
put  to  the  utmost  hazard  from  the  necessity  of  retaining  troops 
to  watch  them.  Both  Texans  and  Indians  knew,  in  April,  1836,  that 
General  Gaona,  one  of  Santa  Anna's  lieutenants,  with  a  well-ap 
pointed  column,  was  moving  on  Nacogdoches  under  orders  to  kill  or 
drive  out  the  colonists. 

Yoakum  says :  "  The  country  through  which  he  marched  was 
thronged  with  Indians,  already  stirred  up  by  the  emissaries  of  the 
Mexicans,  and  naturally  disposed  to  join  them.  .  .  .  The  people  of 
Eastern  Texas  then  felt  that  their  danger  was  imminent.  This 
apparent  danger  was  increased  by  the  threats  and  movements  of  the 
Indians.  To  ascertain  the  facts,  the  Committee  of  Vigilance  at  Nacog 
doches  dispatched  agents  to  the  Indians.  C.  H.  Sims  and  William 
Sims,  who  were  sent  to  the  Cherokees,  reported  them  to  be  hostile  and 
making  preparations  for  war ;  that  they  were  drying  beef  and  preparing 
meal,  and  said  they  were  about  sending  off  their  women  and  children ; 
that  they  had  murdered  Brooks  Williams,  an  American  trader  among 
them ;  that  they  said  a  large  body  of  Indians,  composed  of  Caddoes, 
Keechies,  Ionics,  Tawacanies,  Wacoes,  and  Comanches,  were  expected 
to  attack  the  American  settlements;  that  the  Cherokees  gave  every 

1 "  Texas  Almanac,"  1858,  p.  174.       2  Yoakum,  "  History  of  Texas,"  vol.  i.,  p.  358. 
3  Ibid.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  23. 


104:  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

indication  of  joining  them ;  that  the  number  of  warriors  embodied  on 
the  Trinity  was  estimated  at  1,700 ;  and  that  Bolles,  the  principal 
Cherokee  chief,  advised  the  agents  to  leave  the  country,  as  there  was 
danger.  M.  B.  Menard,  who  was  sent  to  the  Shawnee,  Delaware,  and 
Kickapoo  tribes,  reported  that,  while  these  tribes  were  friendly,  they 
had  been  visited  by  Bolles,  who  urged  them  to  take  up  arms  against 
the  Americans." 

In  consequence,  .three  companies,  numbering  220  men,  were  de 
tained,  and  three  more  were  delayed  in  completing  their  organization, 
until  it  was  too  late  to  aid  the  retreating  army  under  Houston.  The 
women  and  children  were  hurried  across  the  Sabine,  and  a  panic 
paralyzed  the  action  of  these  hardy  men.  The  detention  of  the  volun 
teers,  General  Gaona's  change  of  route  and  failure  of  support,  and 
especially  the  presence  and  attitude  of  United  States  troops,  repressed 
the  rising  of  Bowles  and  his  followers.  General  Gaines,  with  fourteen 
companies  of  United  States  troops,  took  position  on  the  Sabine,  under 
orders  to  execute  the-  treaty  of  1831,  and  prevent  hostilities  by 
the  emigrant  United  States  Indians.  A  hearty  sympathizer  with 
Texas,  he  used  with  energy  his  influence  and  power  to  keep  the 
Indians  peaceable.  He  sent  Lieutenant  Bonnell  to  inform  them  of  his 
instructions,  and  of  his  intention  to  use  force  if  necessary  to  carry 
them  out.  Bonnell  found  that  Manuel  Flores,  a  Mexican  agent,  had 
been  among  them,  exerting  every  effort  to  induce  them  to  declare  war 
on  Texas.2 

"General  Gaona,  at  the  head  of  a  motley  host  of  Mexicans  and 
Indians,  did  not  debouch  from  the  forests  of  the  Upper  Trinity, 
but  was  making  his  way  from  Bastrop  to  San  Felipe.  Bolles, 
the  Cherokee  chief,  indignant  at  the  supposed  suspicion  of  his  good 
faith  and  pacific  intentions,  sent  in  his  denial."  Yoakum  adds  (vol. 
ii.,  page  170):  "There  is  no  doubt  but  that  the  savages  were  collected 
in  large  numbers  on  the  frontier,  were  greatly  excited,  and  that  noth 
ing  but  the  defeat  of  the  Mexicans  prevented  them  from  making  an 
attack  upon  the  settlements.  As  it  was,  they  did  not  disperse  without 
committing  an  act  of  barbarism."  He  then  narrates  the  massacre 
of  the  settlement  at  Fort  Parker,  May  19,  1836.  This  plain  summary 
shows  that  the  treaty  was  entered  into  by  the  Indians  with  no 
intention  of  performing  it,  and  while  they  were  under  conflicting 
engagements  with  the  Mexicans ;  that  it  served  merely  as  a  cloak  to 
cover  their  hostile  designs,  and  was  perfidiously  violated  in  letter  and 
spirit;  and  hence  that  it  was  not  binding  in  conscience  on  the  people 
or  Government  of  Texas. 


1  Yoakum,  "History  of  Texas,"  vol.  ii.,  pp.  125-1 2  Y. 
a  Ibid.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  167.  3  Ibid.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  157. 


INDIAN  LEAGUE  WITH  MEXICO.  105 

The  Indians  continued  in  this  hostile  disposition.  Yoakum  says: 
"  The  frontiers  of  Texas,  during  the  winter  and  spring  of  1837,  had 
been  unsettled.  The  Indians,  actuated  by  the  persuasions  of  Mexican 
agents,  and  the  imprudence  of  many  white  people  living  near  them, 
kept  up  a  very  annoying  predatory  warfare.  They  began  their  depre 
dations  by  the  murder  of  three  men  on  the  Trinity  at  Fort  Houston ; 
then  by  the  murder  of  two  more  on  the  Neches;  and  these  were 
followed  by  numbers  of  others  along  the  frontier.  Besides  these  out 
rages,  many  horses  were  stolen.  The  Government  did  what  it  could  to 
make  treaties  with  the  savages,  and  to  keep  up  a  vigilant  ranging  ser 
vice,  but  still,  while  the  Mexican  emissaries  were  among  them,  they 
could  not  be  quieted."  Though  these  outrages  were  attributed  to 
the  prairie  Indians,  they  were  committed  on  the  edge  of  the  Cherokee 
district,  and  pointed  suspicion  to  that  tribe.  "  Every  day  or  two,  dur 
ing  the  year  1837,  some  murdered  citizen  or  stolen  property  attested 
their  hostile  feeling."  2  The  Mexican  emissaries  promised  the  Indians 
"  arms,  ammunition,  and  the  plunder  and  prisoners — women  and  chil 
dren  included — taken  during  the  war;  also  the  peaceable  possession  of 
the  country  then  held  by  them." 

In  August,  1838,  "  Cordova's  Rebellion"  occurred.  In  this  abortive 
insurrection  the  Mexicans  about  Nacogdoches  disclaimed  their  allegi 
ance  to  Texas,  and  collected  a  force  reported  600  strong,  three-fourths 
of  whom  were  Indians ;  but  on  the  approach  of  the  Texan  volunteers 
under  Rusk  they  retreated  to  the  Cherokee  country,  and  thence,  when 
pressed  by  him,  to  the  Upper  Trinity,  whence  they  dispersed.  The 
Indians  continued  their  hostilities,  and  later  in  the  season,  October  16th, 
General  Rusk  had  a  sharp  combat  with  them  at  Kickapoo  Town.  Yoa 
kum  says  the  Mexican  Government  had  commenced  a  system  whose 
"  object  was  to  turn  loose  upon  Texas  all  the  Indian  tribes  upon  her 
borders  from  the  Rio  Grande  to  Red  River.  Of  this  fact  the  Texan 
Government  had  undoubted  evidence."  3  This  secret  league  against 
the  Texans  seems  to  have  existed  at  least  as  early  as  1835,  and  to  have 
continued  unbroken. 

The  United  States  Government  received  information  from  Colonel 
Mason,  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  in  July,  1838,  confirmed  by  General  Gaines, 
that  the  Cherokees  were  arranging  for  a  council  of  all  the  tribes  on  the 
frontier,  "  preparatory  to  striking  a  simultaneous  blow  upon  the  settle 
ments  of  Arkansas  and  Missouri,  from  Red  River  to  the  Upper  Missis 
sippi,"  instigated  and  organized  by  the  agents  of  Mexico.  One  of  these 
emissaries,  Don  Pedro  Julian  Miracle,  was  killed  near  the  Cross  Tim 
bers,  in  Texas;  and  his  journal  also  confirmed  the  suspicions  of  the 
conspiracy  against  Texas  at  least.  The  Cherokees  and  Caddoes  visited 

1  Yoakum,  "History  of  Texas,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  213.  8  Ibid.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  228. 

3 Ibid.,  vol.  ii.,  p.  257. 


106  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

Matamoras  in  June,  and  obtained  large  quantities  of  ammunition  from 
the  authorities  there.1 

On  November  26,  1838,  Mr.  Jones,  Texan  minister,  complained  to 
the  United  States  Government  of  the  continual  removal  of  discontented 
Indians  from  Arkansas  to  Texas,  and  of  their  marauding  war.  Under 
instructions  from  the  Administration  of  President  Houston,  he  repre 
sented  that  "  murders  and  other  hostile  aggressions  were  committed  by 
these  Indians,  and  that  a  combination  is  now  formed  between  most  of 
these  tribes  ....  for  the  purpose  of  commencing  a  general  warfare. 
For  this  object  large  numbers  of  Caddoes,  Kickapoos,  Choctaws,  Co- 
shatties,  Cherokees,  Tawacanies,  and  a  few  from  several  other  tribes, 
are  now  collected  upon  the  river  Trinity,  from  which  point  they  are 
preparing  to  assail  the  settlements  of  the  whites."  In  November,  1838, 
General  Rusk  felt  obliged  to  raise  a  force  in  Eastern  Texas,  disarm  the 
Caddoes,  numbering  about  300  warriors,  and  force  them  to  return  to 
the  United  States. 

Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  by  the  Senate, 
and  the  Indian  havoc  on  the  border,  President  Houston,  in  the  fall  of 
1838,  directed  Colonel  Alexander  Horton  to  run  the  lines  he  had  desig 
nated  in  the  treaty.  As  it  was  an  act  of  arbitrary  authority  on  the 
part  of  the  Executive,  and  in  defiance  of  legislative  action,  it  was  clearly 
null.2 

Affairs  stood  thus  when  Lamar  was  inaugurated.  The  Hon.  James 
Webb,  Secretary  of  State,  writing  to  the  Texan  minister  at  Washing 
ton,  March  13,'  1839,  says :  "  The  report  of  Major-General  Rusk,  to 
gether  with  the  accompanying  affidavit  of  Mr.  Elias  Vansickles,  will 
show  that  the  Cherokees,  Delawares,  Shawnees,  Choctaws,  Coshatties, 
Boluxies,  and  Hawanies,  have  all  either  been  directly  engaged  in  com 
mitting  murders  and  other  depredations  in  Texas,  or  are  contemplating 
a  war  on  the  country  and  making  preparations  for  it."  Early  in  Jan 
uary  a  series  of  butcheries  on  the  border  called  attention  to  the  Indians. 
General  Johnston,  who  was  now  Secretary  of  War,  at  once  undertook  a 
more  thorough  organization  of  the  frontier  troops,  and  new  vigor  was 
imparted  to  their  operations.  The  prairie  Indians  were  severely  pun 
ished  in  a  series  of  combats,  in  the  most  memorable  of  which  Burle- 
son,  Moore,  Bird,  and  Rice,  were  the  leaders. 

General  Edward  Burleson  was  born  in  North  Carolina,  in  1798.  He 
married  at  seventeen,  tried  farming  in  several  States,  and  finally  re 
moved  to  Texas  in  1830.  Though  a  farmer,  his  tastes  and  aptitudes 
were  all  for  military  life ;  and  he  was  constantly  called  to  high  com 
mand  in  repelling  the  Mexicans  and  Indians,  in  which  service  he  always 
acquitted  himself  well.  He  had  the  qualities  that  make  a  successful 

1  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  State  (Texas),  November,  1839,  p.  22. 

2  Ibid.,  November,  1839,  Document  A,  p.  13. 


THE   CASE  STATED.  107 

partisan  leader — promptness,  activity,  endurance,  enterprise,  and  heroic 
courage.  His  manners  and  habits  were  simple  and  unpretending,  yet 
marked  by  native  dignity.  He  filled  many  important  stations,  and  in 
1841  was  elected  Vice-President  of  Texas. 

In  the  active  campaign  under  Burleson  against  the  prairie  Indians  the 
line  of  communication  was  cut  between  Mexico  and  the  Cherokees,  and 
the  noted  emissary  Manuel  Flores  was  killed  and  his  papers  captured. 
These  contained  convincing  proofs  of  the  alliance  between  the  Mexicans 
and  Cherokees.  Yoakum  infers  that  the  acquaintance  between  them 
was  slight,  because  General  Canalize  addresses  Big  Mush  as  the  "  Chief 
Vixg  Mas"  and  Bowles  as  "  Lieutenant-Colonel  Vul"  when  Bowles,  as 
war-chief,  was  so  much  more  important  than  the  civil  chief.  But  the 
Mexican  spelling  and  pronunciation  of  the  names  count  for  nothing  as 
an  argument  ;  and  General  Douglass,  the  Texan  commander,  styles  the 
Cherokee  chief  Colonel  Bowles.  Then,  too,  among  nations  with  crude 
ideas  of  civil  liberty,  there  is  no  inconsistency  in  the  supreme  power 
being  lodged  in  some  military  underling,  the  chief  civil  functionary 
being  subordinated  in  fact  to  a  lieutenant-colonel  or  a  lieutenant- 
general,  as  the  case  may  be. 

The  case,  then,  stands  thus:  The  Cherokees,  originally  intruders, 
show  no  evidence  of  title  prior  to  General  Houston's  treaty,  except  cer 
tain  promises  by  Centralist  commanders,  as  inducement  or  reward  for 
services  against  the  Texan  colonists.  They  themselves  were  in  no 
sense  colonists,  but  a  host  of  invading  savages,  who  entered  the  Terri 
tory  against  the  wishes  and  remonstrances  of  the  inhabitants,  and  main 
tained  possession  by  the  show  of  force.  They  had  no  equity  of  long 
residence,  for,  with  the  exception  of  the  pioneer  band  under  Fields,  far 
the  greater  part  had  immigrated  since  1832,  against  the  protests  of  the 
inhabitants.  The  treaty  of  1836  was  held  void  for  want  of  authority 
in  the  Consultation,  for  want  of  verity  in  the  "  Solemn  Declaration,"  for 
want  of  propriety,  want  of  consideration,  and  overstepping  of  the  powers 
delegated,  in  the  execution  of  its  articles.  It  was  rejected  by  the  Sen 
ate,  the  constitutional  tribunal  for  its  ratification.  But,  had  it  been 
valid,  the  steadfast  friendship  of  the  Indians  was  its  condition,  and  this 
condition  was  broken  as  soon  as  made.  Indeed,  the  treaty  was  used  as 
a  mere  cover  for  warlike  preparation  and  a  secret  league  with  the 
enemy.  Instead  of  adhering  to  Texas,  they  were,  at  the  crisis  of  San 
Jacinto,  the  clandestine  ally  of  the  foe,  only  awaiting  his  appearance  to 
strike,  and  requiring  the  whole  strength  of  Eastern  Texas  and  the  inter 
ference  of  the  United  States  Army  to  keep  them  in  check.  Afterward, 
with  a  settled  purpose  of  eventual  war,  they  had  continually  instigated 
and  often  enacted  hostilities  and  outrages  against  the  whites.  They 
now  laid  claim  to  exclusive  political  sovereignty  over  Northern  and 
Central  Texas,  and  prepared  to  maintain  it  by  force  of  arms.  Had  the 


108  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

treaty  been  ratified  with  the  most  solemn  sanctions  known  to  interna 
tional  law,  the  failure  of  every  consideration,  the  breach  of  every  con 
dition,  and  the  utter  disregard  by  the  Indians  of  its  letter  and  spirit, 
would  have  absolved  Texas  from  its  performance.  But  it  was  a  dead 
letter  from  the  beginning.  The  "  legal  and  equitable  title  "  of  the  Cher- 
okees  to  the  heart  of  Texas,  summoned  into  being  by  General  Hous 
ton,  and  incorporated  into  history  by  Yoakum,  vanishes  into  thin  air. 

President  Lamar's  Administration  found  a  host  of  haughty  and  cun 
ning  savages,  occupying  and  claiming  the  best  part  of  the  republic, 
engaged  in  actual  hostilities  against  Texas,  and  threatening  a  devas 
tating  war.  Whatever  might  have  been  their  original  rights,  the  law 
of  necessity  and  self-preservation  must  finally  have  led  to  their  expul 
sion;  but,  in  truth,  they  were  treated  with  forbearance,  though  with 
firmness ;  and,  if  the  present  possessors  of  the  soil  have  a  title  adjudi 
cated  by  the  sword,  yet  this  remedy  was  tried  only  when  all  others 
failed.  How  the  Cherokee  question  was  met  will,  perhaps,  be  best  ex 
plained  in  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  November,  1839  : 

The  reason  for  the  adoption  of  more  summary  measures  in  the  settlement 
of  the  Cherokee  question,  than  was  originally  intended,  is  found  in  the  knowl 
edge  of  the  facts  (displaying  their  settled  hostility  and  treachery  toward  this 
Government)  acquired  since  the  mild  course  intended  to  be  pursued  toward 
them  was  fixed  upon. 

During  the  summer  and  fall  of  1838  many  of  the  inhabitants  residing 
among  and  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Cherokee  settlements  were  murdered  and 
plundered,  and  in  one  instance  a  family  of  eighteen  persons,  consisting  of  men, 
women,  and  children,  was  barbarously  massacred  by  them,  which,  by  their  cun 
ning  representations,  were  supposed  to  be  the  acts  of  the  Indians  of  the  prai 
ries  and  malcontent  Mexican  citizens ;  but  circumstances  have  since  been  made 
known  which  leave  no  doubt  that  the  Cherokees  themselves  were  the  perpe 
trators  of  these  atrocities.  Also,  early  in  December  last,  evidence  of  an  un 
doubted  character  was  placed  on  file  in  the  War  Department  that  the  Cherokees 
had  held  constant  correspondence  with  the  Mexican  Government  since  the  com 
mencement  of  our  revolution,  and  during  that  time  had  made  treaties,  offensive 
and  defensive,  with  that  Government.  With  a  knowledge  of  these  things,  it 
became  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  watch  narrowly  the  movements  of  the 
Cherokees,  and  to  preserve,  if  possible,  peaceable  relations  with  them,  and  to 
prevent  the  destruction  of  the  lives  and  property  of  the  citizens  living  in  their 
neighborhood,  until  the  wisdom  of  Congress  should  devise  the  best  method  of 
relieving  them  from  their  annoying  and  dangerous  proximity.  Accordingly, 
under  your  instructions,  in  the  month  of  February  last,  Martin  Lacy  was  ap 
pointed  agent  for  the  Cherokees  and  other  tribes  of  that  district  of  country, 
with  instructions  to  preserve  friendly  relations  between  the  Cherokees  and 
whites  until  the  peculiar  situation  of  the  Cherokees  could  be  brought  under  the 
consideration  of  Congress. 

In  furtherance  of  these  intentions  Major  Walters  was  authorized  to  raise 
two  companies  of  six-months'  men  to  occupy  the  Saline  of  the  Neches.  At 


GENERAL  JOHNSTON'S  REPORT.  109 

tliis  point  it  was  tli ought  that  all  intercourse  might  be  cut  off  between  the 
Cherokees  and  the  Indians  of  the  prairies,  who  were  known  to  be  hostile;  and 
that  the  adoption  of  this  measure  would  give  protection  to  that  portion  of  the 
frontier,  and  leave  no  pretext  for  attributing  any  depredations  committed  to  the 
Indians  of  the  prairies,  while  it  would  be  no  inconvenience  to  the  Cherokees. 
Having  raised  one  company,  Major  Walters  marched  to  the  Saline.  On  his 
arrival  he  was  informed  by  Bowles,  through  the  agent,  that  any  attempt  to 
establish  the  post  in  obedience  to  his  orders  would  be  repelled  by  force.  Under 
the  advice  of  the  agent,  as  he  conceived  his  force  too  small  to  make  the  attempt, 
he  crossed  to  the  west  bank  of  the  Neches  and  there  established  his  post.  This 
assertion  of  claim  to  exclusive  jurisdiction  could  not  be  disregarded,  when  con 
sidered  in  connection  with  the  abundant  evidence  in  possession  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  the  treacherous  and  unfriendly  designs  of  that  tribe  and  their  associate 
bands.  Colonel  Burleson,  who  was  then  organizing  a  force  on  the  Colorado  to 
march  against  the  hostile  Indians  on  the  Brazos  and  Trinity,  was  therefore 
ordered  to  direct  his  march  lower  down  the  country,  after  crossing  the  Brazos, 
so  as  to  be  in  position  to  enter  the  territory  claimed  by  the  Cherokees  on  the 
shortest  notice.  A  few  days  after  these  orders  were  transmitted  a  dispatch  was 
received  from  Colonel  Burleson  announcing  the  interception  of  letters  from 
General  Canalizo,  commander  of  the  Central  forces  at  Matamoras,  to  the  chiefs 
of  the  Seminoles,  Caddoes,  Biloxies,  Kickapoos,  and  to  Bowles  and  others,  with 
instructions  for  them  and  the  plan  of  operations  to  be  pursued  against  the 
Texans,  which  intercepted  letters  were  at  the  same  time  forwarded  to  the  De 
partment. 

On  their  reception.  Colonel  Burleson  was  instructed  to  raise  his  force  to 
400  men,  and  to  march  into  the  Cherokee  district.  He  was  advised  at  the 
same  time  that  a  volunteer  force  had  been  called  for  in  the  eastern  counties  to 
act  with  him.  Some  greater  delay  took  place  before  the  troops  under  the  com-, 
niand  of  Colonel  Burleson  took  the  route  for  the  Cherokee  district  than  was  an 
ticipated  by  him,  which  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  mention,  as  no  embarrassment 
was  occasioned  by  it  in  the  subsequent  operations.  He  was  not  able,  however, 
to  cross  the  Heches  until  about  the  14th  of  July ;  about  which  time  the  regi 
ment  of  Landrum  arrived  from  the  counties  of  Harrison,  Shelby,  Sabine,  and 
San  Augustine.  The  regiment  from  Nacogdoches,  which  was  under  the  com 
mand  of  General  Rusk,  had  arrived  some  days  before  and  taken  a  position  near 
the  camp  of  the  Cherokees.  The  promptitude  with  which  these  movements 
were  executed  at  that  season  of  the  year  (early  in  July),  and  the  spirit  mani 
fested  on  all  occasions  by  the  troops,  claim  the  greatest  praise.  On  the  arrival 
of  the  regiments  of  Burleson  and  Landrum,  the  whole  force  was  placed  under 
the  orders  of  Brigadier-General  Douglass. 

Pending  these  movements,  Commissioners  Hon.  David  G.  Burnet,  Thomas 
J.  Rusk,  J.  W.  Burton,  James  S.  Mayfield,  and  myself,  appointed  at  the  instance 
of  Bowles,  had  been  engaged  for  several  days  in  endeavoring  to  bring  about  an 
arrangement,  under  your  instructions,  on  an  equitable  basis  for  the  peaceable 
removal  of  the  Cherokees.  We  had  been  instructed  to  allow  a  fair  compensa 
tion  for  their  improvements,  to  be  ascertained  by  appraisement,  and  to  be  paid 
for  in  silver  and  goods  before  their  removal.  The  commissioners,  in  several 
talks  held  with  them,  essayed  every  means  to  effect  a  friendly  negotiation,  but 
without  success,  and  at  noon  on  the  15th  of  July  announced  their  failure. 


110  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

Orders  were  immediately  given  by  me  to  General  Douglass  to  put  the 
troops  in  motion  and  to  march  against  the  camp  of  the  Cherokees,  but  not  to 
attack  them  until  they  had  been  summoned  to  submit  to  the  terms  proposed 
by  the  Government  for  their  removal,  and  had  refused.  On  the  arrival  of  ^he 
troops  at  their  camp  it  was  found  that  they  had  retreated  from  it  some  hours 
previous.  Their  route  was  taken,  and  in  the  evening  they  were  discovered  in  a 
strong  position  near  a  Delaware  village,  from  which  they  fired  on  the  advanced 
^uard.  They  were  immediately  attacked  and  beaten.  The  next  morning,  July 
16th,  the  troops  were  marched  in  pursuit,  and  near  the  Neches  another  conflict 
ensued  in  which  the  Cherokees  and  their  allies  were  again  defeated  and  driven 
from  the  field ;  for  the  particulars  of  which  engagements  I  refer  you  to  the 
extracts  from  the  official  reports  of  the  commanding  general,  marked  8  and 
16.  After  the  affair  of  the  Neches  the  Cherokees  made  no  stand  against  our 
troops,  but  fled  with  great  precipitation  from  the  country,  thus  terminating  this 
vexed  question  of  claims  to  soil  and  sovereignty,  which  our  laws  do  not  in  any 
wise  concede  to  any  Indian  tribe  within  the  limits  of  the  republic. 

The  Hon.  Thomas  J.  Rusk  and  James  S.  Mayfield,  Esq.,  were  appointed 
commissioners  to  arrange  for  the  removal  of  the  Shawnees.  Stipulations  on 
the  same  just  basis  as  those  made  to  the  Cherokees  were  agreed  upon,  and  they 
have  received  the  compensation  for  their  improvements  and  have  been  removed 
in  accordance  with  the  agreement  entered  into  between  the  commissioners  and 
their  chiefs. 

Dr.  Starr,  explaining  these  transactions,  says: 

The  Government  at  once  resolved  to  remove  them.  To  this  end  means 
were  provided  to  purchase  from  these  Indians  whatever  personal  property  they 
might  wish  to  dispose  of,  and  troops  were  assembled  to  enforce,  if  need  be, 
the  measures  of  the  Government.  To  insure  success,  and  at  the  same  time 
avoid  harshness  in  the  character  of  the  proceedings,  General  Johnston,  aided  by 
Vice-President  Burnet,  took  personal  supervision  of  their  removal  and  pro 
ceeded  to  the  Indian  country  with  the  Government  forces.  In  a  friendly  but 
firm  manner  he  made  known  to  the  chiefs  the  object  of  his  visit.  .  .  .  The 
Cherokees  attempted  diplomacy,  with  a  view  to  procrastination  and  ultimate 
resistance.  Their  civil  chief,  Big  Mush,  favored  removal;  but  Bowles,  a  half- 
breed,  who  had  long  held  the  first  position  of  his  tribe  as  war-chief,  a  cunning, 
bad  man,  relying  upon  expected  aid  from  Mexico  and  the  Indians  of  the  prai 
ries,  to  whom  he  had  sent  runners,  prevaricated  and  resorted  to  many  ingenious 
excuses  and  devices  to  gain  time.  The  magnanimity  of  the  Secretary  of  War 
indulged  the  chiefs  for  a  few  days,  hoping  to  avoid  bloodshed ;  but  this  lenity 
was  probably  construed  into  timidity  by  Bowles,  and  it  soon  became  apparent 
that  he  must  be  undeceived.  A  peremptory  demand  for  immediate  removal  was 
made ;  no  response  came,  and  our  troops  moved  forward. 

In  the  rough  draft  of  the  report  of  the  commissioners,  part  of  which 
is  now  in  the  writer's  possession,  it  is  stated  that  on  the  morning  of  the 
9th  of  July  they  dispatched  from  Kickapoo  Town  Colonel  McLeod,  John 
N.  Hensford,  Jacob  Snively,  David  Rusk,  Colonel  Len  Williams,  Moses 
L.  Patton,  and Robinson,  with  a  communication  to  Bowles.  The 


BATTLE   OF  THE  NECIIES.  HI 

party  was  directed  to  carry  a  white  flag  and  proceed  to  the  Indian 
camp,  fifteen  or  twenty  miles  distant  ;  but,  "  about  five  miles  from  the 
Indian  encampment  they  met  Bowles  and  twenty-one  of  his  warriors, 
who  came  up,  whooping  and  painted,  and  surrounded  the  messengers." 
While  Bowles  and  his  warriors  were  conversing  with  the  messengers, 
six  more  Indians  joined  them  and  announced  the  advance  of  General 
Rusk's  regiment — "upon  which  the  whole  party  of  Indians  rallied 
around  our  messengers  in  a  hostile  attitude,  and  deliberated  some  time 
whether  they  would  or  would  not  kill  them.  The  result  of  the  inter 
view,  however,  was  that  Bowles  and  his  head-men  would  meet  the  Indi 
an  commissioners  next  day  at  a  creek  about  two  miles  above  Debard's." 
When  the  commissioners  arrived  at  the  place  appointed  to  hold  the 
talk,  they  were  met  by  a  message  that  Bowles  could  not  come  that  day, 
but  would  meet  them  next  day  at  a  creek  five  miles  from  their  general 
encampment.  "  At  the  appointed  hour  the  commissioners  proceeded  to 
the  place  appointed,  sending  James  Durst  and  Colonel  Williams  in  ad 
vance  to  notify  the  Indians  of  their  approach.  On  their  arriving  in 
sight  Bowles  and  some  of  his  men  were  discovered  on  the  bank  of  the 
creek,  and  twenty-five  warriors  painted,  armed  with  guns,  war-clubs,  etc., 
posted  behind  trees,  with  their  arms  in  readiness."  Durst  rode  back 
and  informed  the  commissioner  of  these  facts,  and  "  that  the  whole 
body  of  Indians  was  posted  back  of  a  hill  some  three  hundred  yards 
from  the  place  for  holding  the  talk."  Rusk's  regiment  was  immediately 
ordered  up,  and  posted  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  off.  "  The  commis 
sioners  invited  Bowles,  Spy  Back,  and  a  Delaware  who  represented  the 
Delawares,  to  take  seats.  General  Johnston  opened  the  talk."  The 
hostile  feelings  of  the  Indians  were  clearly  indicated  in  this  conduct. 

In  the  detailed  report  of  General  K.  H.  Douglass  it  appears  that, 
on  the  failure  of  the  negotiation,  the  whole  force  was  put  in  motion, 
under  orders  from  General  Johnston,  toward  the  encampment  of  Bowles 
on  the  Neches  ;  Landrum  moving  up  the  west  bank.  The  regiments 
of  Burleson  and  Rusk  found  the  Indians  about  six  miles  beyond  their 
abandoned  village,  occupying  a  ravine  and  thicket.  The  Texans  charged 
these,  and  after  a  sharp  skirmish  drove  the  enemy  from  the  field.  The 
Indians  left  eighteen  dead  upon  the  field,  carrying  off  their  wounded. 
They  abandoned  their  baggage  and  much  property,  ammunition,  horses, 
cattle,  and  corn. 

The  engagement,  having  taken  place  late  in  the  afternoon,  was  not 
resumed  until  the  next  day.  On  the  16th  the  troops  took  up  the  trail 
about  ten  o'clock,  and  pursued  it  some  five  miles,  when  the  Indians 
were  again  encountered.  As  soon  as  the  enemy  was  discovered,  the 
following  order  of  battle  was  adopted  :  "Burleson,  with  one  battalion 
of  his  command,  was  ordered  to  move  forward  and  sustain  the  spy  com 
pany  in  the  event  the  enemy  made  a  stand ;  and  Rusk,  with  one  bat- 


112  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

talion  of  his  regiment,  to  move  up  and  sustain  in  like  manner  Burleson 
and  the  spy  company  if  the  enemy  engaged  and  made  a  stand  against 
them  ;  one  battalion  of  each  regiment  to  be  kept  in  reserve,  to  act  as 
occasion  might  require."  This  order  was  handsomely  obeyed.  Burleson, 
leading  two  of  his  companies  against  the  Indians,  drove  them  back  upon 
the  main  body,  which  was  strongly  posted  in  a  ravine  and  thicket.  The 
rest  of  the  troops  were  brought  into  action  in  good  order,  and  were 
briskly  engaged  for  about  an  hour  and  a  half,  wThen  upon  a  concerted 
signal  a  charge  was  made  which  drove  the  enemy  from  their  stronghold. 
The  Indians  retreated  precipitately  to  a  swamp  and  thicket  in  the 
"  bottom  "  of  the  Neches,  about  half  a  mile  distant,  from  which  they 
were  again  driven  by  a  general  charge.  About  500  Texans  and  700  or 
800  Indians  were  engaged.  The  loss  of  the  former  was  two  killed  and 
thirty  wounded — three  mortally;  of  the  latter,  about  100  killed  and 
wounded,  according  to  their  own  report.  Among  those  left  dead  on 
the  field  was  the  noted  war-chief  Bowles,  the  arch-enemy  of  Texas, 
and  the  central  figure  of  the  Indian  conspiracy. 

The  army  followed  the  Indians  for  a  week,  destroying  their  villages 
and  cornfields,  capturing  cattle,  and  killing  a  few  warriors  who  were 
overtaken.  At  last  it  was  discovered  from  the  trails  that  the  organized 
Cherokees  and  their  allies  had  scattered,  and,  as  no  resisting  force  was 
left,  further  pursuit  was  unavailing.  The  troops  were  immediately 
turned  against  the  Shawnees,  who,  disheartened  by  the  defeat  of  their 
brethren,  submitted  to  the  terms  imposed  upon  them.  They  were 
promptly  returned  "from  whence  they  came" — the  United  States — 
having  been  fairly  paid  "  a  full  and  just  compensation  for  their  im 
provements,  crops,  and  all  such  property  as  they  left  through  necessity 
or  choice." 

"This  single  measure,"  says  Dr.  Starr,  "relieved  the  frontier  of  the 
entire  east,  carried  forward  the  settlements  at  least  one  hundred  miles, 
and  gave  to  our  citizens  permanent  occupancy  of  a  region  not  surpassed 
in  fertility  and  all  the  elements  for  successful  agriculture  by  any  por 
tion  of  the  State.  The  counties  of  Rusk,  Cherokee,  Anderson,  Smith, 
Henderson,  Van  Zandt,  Wood,  Upshur,  Hunt,  Kaufman,  Dallas,  and 
others,  were  subsequently  formed  from  territory  which  could  not  be 
safely  peopled  by  whites  till  these  treacherous  Indians  were  expelled." 
The  counties  named  above  contained  in  1870  a  population  of  116,370, 
with  property  assessed  at  $15,857,191.  The  faults  charged  against  the 
white  race  in  its  dealings  with  inferior  races  must,  in  this  case,  be  laid 
at  the  door  of  the  United  States,  if  anywhere,  and  not  of  Texas.  The 
savages  were  subject  to  the  United  States,  which,  contrary  to  natural 
right  and  treaty  stipulations,  permitted  them  to  invade  a  weaker  neigh 
bor,  and  did  not,  on  proper  remonstrance,  compel  them  to  return.3 
1  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  State  of  Texas,  1839,  Documents  A  and  B, 


FOUND ATIOX   OF   AUSTIX. 

Texas  communicated  to  the  United  States  her  intention  to  protect  her 
self  from  the  active  hostilities  and  dangerous  neighborhood  of  these 
savages  by  their  expulsion,1  and  drove  them  back  to  the  territory  of  the 
United  States,  without  protest  from  that  Government,  which  thus 
tacitly  admitted  the  propriety  of  these  transactions. 

General  Douglass's  report  of  the  battle  of  the  Neches  presents  the 
odd  feature  of  a  return  of  thanks  to  the  Vice-President  and  Secretary 
of  War  for  "active  exertions  on  the  field  in  both  engagements,"  and 
for  having  "behaved  in  such  manner  as  reflected  great  credit  upon 
themselves."  Honorable  mention  by  this  gallant  soldier  was  grateful 
to  both  the  gentlemen  named. 

General  Johnston  mentioned  to  the  writer  his  seeing  a  boy,  who  was 
shot  through  the  face,  riding  about  on  the  next  day  attending  to  his 
duties.  His  hardy  life,  and  the  dry,  wholesome  air,  prevented  any 
further  inconvenience  than  the  healing  of  the  wound.  General  John 
ston  also  related  the  following:  In  the  main  charge,  as  he  was  riding 
a  little  behind  the  line  of  battle,  he  encountered  a  young  man  retreat 
ing  and  evidently  panic-stricken.  He  stopped  him,  and  asked  where 
he  was  going.  The  young  man,  much  confused,  replied  that  he  was 
looking  for  his  horse.  "  My  young  friend,"  said  General  Johnston, 
calmly,  "you  are  going  the  wrong  way.  Think  a  moment.  Rejoin 
your  command  and  do  your  duty."  The  soldier  hastily  answered, 
"  You  are  right,  sir,"  and,  turning,  ran  forward  until  he  overtook  his 
comrades.  After  the  battle,  as  General  Johnston  was  retracing  his 
steps,  he  came  upon  a  squad  of  wounded,  and  among  them  this  youth. 
He  dismounted  and  said  a  few  kind  words  to  him.  The  soldier  smiled, 
and  pointed  to  his  wound.  I  asked  General  Johnston  if  he  knew  the 
man.  "  No,"  replied  he.  "  I  was  glad  not  to  know  his  name.  There 
would  have  been  a  painful  association  with  it.  I  avoided  learning  it. 
I  only  knew  him  as  a  young  man  who  had  retrieved  himself." 

The  joy  and  relief  of  the  people  of  Eastern  Texas  were  very  great, 
and  General  Johnston  was  welcomed  everywhere  as  a  public  benefactor. 
Public  dinners  were  tendered  him,  most  of  which  he  was  compelled 
to  decline  because  the  duties  of  his  office  required  his  presence  at  the 
capital. 

Congress  passed  an  act,  January  14,  1839,  appointing  five  commis 
sioners  to  select  a  site  for  the  capital  of  the  republic.  They  fixed 
upon  its  present  location — a  position  central  to  the  boundaries  of  the 
country,  secure  in  all  the  conditions  of  health  and  growth,  and  marked 
by  picturesque  beauty.  The  Government  obtained  the  title,  laid  out  a 
city,  and  named  it  Austin,  in  honor  of  the  "Father  of  the  Republic." 

To  the  situation  there  were  objections  not  to  be  disregarded,  except 
by  men  mindful  not  of  themselves  but  of  posterity  only.     It  was  an 
1  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  State  of  Texas,  letter  of  March  10,  1839. 


114  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

outpost,  within  the  range  of  the  fierce  Comanches,  35  miles  beyond 
Bastrop,  the  extreme  settlement  in  that  direction.  Houston  was  200 
miles  to  the  east ;  San  Antonio,  80  miles  southwest ;  the  Gulf,  150 
miles  distant,  with  only  two  intervening  stations ;  and  Red  River,  the 
only  inhabited  frontier,  400  miles  away.  General  Johnston  wrote,  May 
9,  1839,  to  a  friend  in  Kentucky,  "  The  agent  has  gone  forth  with  his 
workmen  armed,  under  the  protection  of  a  company  of  riflemen,  to  be 
gin  the  new  city  of  Austin."  The  commissioners,  truly  representing  the 
spirit  of  the  people,  put  aside  all  considerations  of  personal  discomfort, 
privation  and  social  isolation,  the  actual  distribution  of  population,  and 
the  danger  of  Indian  and  Mexican  enemies  upon  a  long  and  exposed 
frontier,  and  looked  only  to  what  an  accomplished  destiny  would  require 
as  the  proper  conditions  of  the  capital  of  a  great  republic.  Their  wis 
dom  has  been  justified  by  the  event;  but  what  buoyancy  of  hope,  what 
confidence  in  the  future  and  in  themselves,  must  have  inspired  these 
men  !  General  Johnston,  who  was  a  citizen  of  Austin  in  the  first  month 
of  its  existence,  said  to  the  writer  fifteen  years  afterward :  "  I  believe 
the  foundation  of  this  town  has  no  precedent  in  history.  The  Gov 
ernment  placed  itself  on  a  frontier  open  to  its  foes,  and  fixed  there  the 
centre  of  its  future  dominion.  By  doing  so  it  secured  the  desired 
result.  Where  the  American  has  planted  his  foot  he  will  not  go  back." 

In  August,  1839,  the  new  capital  was  laid  out ;  in  September  the 
government  offices  were  removed  from  Houston ;  on  the  1st  of  October 
the  officers  of  government  resumed  their  duties,  "  as  directed  by  law, 
with  very  little  inconvenience  to  themselves  and  no  derangement  of 
the  public  business  beyond  its  temporary  suspension."  ]  The  venerable 
Dr.  Starr,  then  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  writing  to  the  author, 
in  1869,  says  :  "  We  there  took  position  on  the  very  verge  of  the  terri 
tory  in  our  actual  possession,  the  Comanches  disputing  our  advance  by 
frequent  raids  into  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  capital.  There  your 
father  and  I  had  our  rooms  in  the  same  double  log-cabin  down  to  the 
time  of  his  resignation  in  the  spring  of  1840;  and,  though  the  claims 
of  the  offices  we  filled  allowed  no  relaxation,  and  our  time  and  energies 
were  taxed  to  the  utmost  extent,  my  memory  rests  upon  the  incidents 
of  that  period  as  among  the  most  interesting  reminiscences  it  is  capable 
of  recalling."  In  1840  a  stockade  was  placed  around  the  capital. 

It  has  been  seen  that  General  Johnston,  while  never  an  aggressor 
in  his  dealings  with  the  Indians,  believed  in  such  a  policy  as  would  pro 
tect  the  white  people  and  compel  the  savages  to  observe  peace  by 
severely  punishing  its  infraction.  This  decisive  treatment  led  to  a 
short  but  bloody  struggle  with  the  Comanches,  ending  in  their  severe 
chastisement  and  in  comparative  security  to  the  harassed  frontier.  In 
May,  1839,  Charles  Mason,  Assistant  Secretary  of  War,  writing  to  Gen- 
1  President  Lamar's  message,  1839. 


THE   TEXAS   INDIANS.  115 

eral  Johnston,  says:  "  Colonel  Karnes  gives  a  deplorable  account  of  the 
west ;  and  I  believe  thinks,  of  the  two,  the  marauding  parties  of  the 
Americans  are  worse  than  the  Mexicans  or  Indians.  This,  of  course, 
will  be  relieved  by  the  command  of  Captain  Ross."  While  the  brig 
ands  were  readily  put  down,  the  prairie  warriors  called  for  more  vigor 
ous  measures  of  repression. 

The  Comanches,  the  fiercest  and  most  cruel  of  the  savage  tribes, 
take  no  adult  male  prisoners,  and  subject  captive  women  to  every  hard 
ship  and  outrage.  They  are  not  excelled  in  the  world  as  horsemen, 
and  such  is  their  skill  with  the  bow  that  they  can  sho'ot  their  arrows 
unerringly  and  more  rapidly  than  a  dragoon  can  discharge  his  re 
volver.  The  Lipans  probably  belong  to  the  same  race,  but  were  finer 
men  physically,  and  were  generally  at  war  with  the  Comanches. 
Hence  they  were  often  used  by  the  Texans  as  scouts.  The  Tonka  ways, 
the  best  warriors  of  all,  and  much  feared  by  the  other  tribes,  were 
friendly  to  the  whites.  Their  chief,  Placidor,  had  a  handsome,  peace 
ful  face,  and  was  much  trusted. 

The  Comanches  had  always  been  the  scourge  of  neighboring  peoples. 
General  Houston,  who  was  extremely  solicitous  for  the  alliance  of  the 
Indian  tribes,  had  made  several  treaties  with  them.  Under  his  instruc 
tions  General  Johnston  had  in  February,  1838,  arranged  the  prelimina 
ries  of  a  treaty  with  them,  and  in  May  they  had  come  into  the  town  of 
Houston,  under  protection  of  a  white  flag,  at  the  President's  invitation, 
had  made  a  treaty  and  received  presents.  Nevertheless,  as  they 
retired,  still  under  the  white  flag,  they  killed  two  men  in  sight  of  the 
town,  and  while  passing  Gonzales  carried  off  Bird  Lockhart's  daughter, 
a  girl  fourteen  years  old.  Shortly  afterward  they  killed  a  party  of  six 
men  near  San  Antonio. 

Louis  P.  Cooke,  one  of  the  commissioners  to  select  the  site  of  the 
capital,  writing  to  General  Johnston  from  the  frontier,  March  12,  1839, 
says  :  "  The  people  of  both  the  Brazos  and  the  Colorado  sections  of 
country  are  in  a  continual  state  of  alarm;  and  I  am  convinced  that 
speedy  relief  must  be  had,  or  depopulation  will  necessarily  soon  ensue. 
The  whole  country  is  literally  swarming  with  red-skins.  I  received  an 
order  at  Bastrop,  directing  the  organization  of  the  militia,  which  I  de 
livered  to  Judge  Cunningham.  He  commenced  his  duty  immediately. 
The  people,  so  far  as  I  have  had  an  opportunity  of  observing,  appear 
quite  willing  to  comply  with  anything  that  may  be  desired  of  them  for 
the  defense  of  their  frontier,  or  the  systematizing  of  the  militia." 
Though  the  militia  organization  was  necessarily  imperfect,  yet  its 
increased  efficiency  led  to  satisfactory  results. 

In  the  autumn  of  1839  some  Comanches  came  to  San  Antonio  and 
informed  Colanel  Karnes  that  all  the  bands  had  held  a  grand  council 
and  wished  to  make  a  treaty.  Karnes  informed  them,  by  General 


116  SECRETARY  OF  WAR. 

Johnston's  orders,  that  no  further  treaty  would  be  made  with  them 
until  they  brought  in  all  their  white  prisoners,  and  that  they  must  not 
come  again  to  San  Antonio  without  them.  Colonel  Fisher,  who  suc 
ceeded  Karnes  as  commandant,  received  the  same  orders,  and  was  also 
told  not  to  give  presents  or  pay  any  ransom,  which  only  encouraged 
the  Comanches  to  renewed  depredations.  Colonel  Fisher  conveyed  his 
warning  to  them  in  February,  1840,  on  which  they  agreed  to  bring  in 
their  prisoners,  and  "  talk."  Colonel  Hugh  McLeod  and  Colonel  Wil 
liam  G.  Cooke  were  appointed  commissioners  to  assist  Fisher  at  the 
meeting  ;  and  Captain  Thomas  Howard,  with  five  companies  of  rangers, 
was  sent  to  protect  the  commissioners. 

The  narrative  herein  given  of  the  occurrences  at  San  Antonio  is 
somewhat  different  from,  and  more  detailed  than,  any  account  given 
elsewhere,  and  is  derived  from  notes  of  conversations  held  with  General 
Johnston  twenty  years  ago,  and  taken  down  at  the  time.  General 
Johnston  had  resigned  before  the  catastrophe  ;  but  there  was  no 
caution  which  could  have  effectually  prevented  the  result,  precipitated 
as  it  was  by  the  perfidy  and  ferocity  of  the  savage  character.  On 
March  19th  a  party  of  thirty-two  warriors  and  thirty-three  women  and 
children  entered  San  Antonio.  Major  Howard  arrived  at  the  same  time, 
rather  unexpectedly  to  the  Comanches.  Twelve  chiefs  met  the  commis 
sioners  in  the  stone  council-house  ;  and  the  "talk"  was  opened  by  the 
surrender  of  Lockhart's  daughter,  the  only  prisoner  they  had  brought 
in.  This  poor  child  bore  every  mark  of  brutal  treatment ;  all  her  hair 
had  been  singed  off,  and  she  had  suffered  cruelly  from  other  ill-usage. 

Colonel  Fisher  began  by  reminding  them  that  he  had  forbidden  them 
to  come  to  San  Antonio  without  their  prisoners,  thirteen  of  whom  they 
were  holding  back,  and  asked  why  they  had  disobeyed  this  positive  or 
der.  They  replied  that  they  had  brought  in  the  only  prisoner  they  had, 
and  that  the  others  were  with  other  bands  whom  they  could  not  con 
trol.  They  were  told  that  they  were  known  to  have  thirteen  other 
prisoners  ;  and  Miss  Lockhar^,  being  confronted  with  them,  stated  that 
she  had  within  the  last  few  days  seen  several  of  these  in  camp  who 
were  held  back  to  extort  a  larger  ransom  by  bringing  them  in  one  at  a 
time.  Fisher,  who  was  a  patriot  and  a  good  soldier,  and  likewise  of  a 
kind  and  generous  though  high  temper,  was  moved  with  indignation  at 
this  conduct,  and  also  at  the  treatment  Miss  Lockhart  had  endured.  He 
reproached  them  with  these  things,  and  with  their  perfidy  in  former 
treaties,  and  asked  if  they  recollected  murdering  two  men  and  stealing 
Miss  Lockhart  while  under  a  white  flag.  A  Comanche  chief  arose,  and, 
with  an  insolence  of  manner  and  tone  scarcely  conceivable  by  those  who 
have  not  witnessed  their  audacity,  replied,  "  No,  we  do  not  recollect !" 
He  then  seated  himself  after  the  Indian  fashion,  but  again  rose  up  and 
asked,  with  an  air  at  once  contemptuous  and  threatening,  "  How  do 


THE   SAX  AXTOXIO   MASSACRE.  117 

you  like  our  answer?"  Fisher  said:  "I  do  not  like  your  answer.  I 
told  you  not  to  come  here  again  without  bringing  in  the  prisoners.  You 
have  come  against  my  orders.  Your  women  and  children  may  depart 
in  peace,  and  your  braves  may  go  and  tell  your  people  to  send  in  the 
prisoners.  When  those  prisoners  are  returned,  your  chiefs  here  pres 
ent  may  likewise  go  free.  Until  then  we  will  hold  you  as  hostages." 

Besides  the  commissioners  and  the  chiefs,  there  was  present  in  the 
room  a  crowd  of  by-standers,  drawn  together  by  curiosity;  and  at  this 
moment  Captain  Howard  marched  in  a  company  of  soldiers.  But,  if 
the  commissioners  hoped  to  overawe  these  indomitable  savages  by  a 
show  of  force,  they  were  mistaken.  If  the  Comanches  do  not  spare, 
neither  do  they  ask  mercy  nor  submit  to  captivity.  When  they  had 
heard  Fisher's  speech,  they  strung  their  bows,  gave  the  war-whoop,  and 
sprang  for  the  door.  Howard  tried  to  halt  them,  motioning  them  back 
with  a  gesture  of  his  hand.  The  reply  was  a  knife-thrust,  stabbing  him 
seriously,  and  the  sentinel  was  also  cut  down.  He  then  ordered  the 
soldiers  to  fire,  and  immediately  a  desperate  conflict  ensued,  in  which 
all  the  chiefs  were  killed. 

When  the  Comanches  outside  the  building  heard  the  war-whoop 
withinj  they  at  once  attacked  the  people  ;  but  Captain  Redd's  company 
coming  up  promptly,  they  retreated,  fighting,  toward  a  stone  house, 
which  only  one  of  them  succeeded  in  reaching.  All  the  other  warriors, 
except  one  renegade  Mexican,  were  killed.  Wishing  to  spare  the  war 
rior  in  the  house,  the  commissioners  sent  in  an  Indian  woman  to  tell 
him  to  retire  peaceably.  This  he  refused  to  do  ;  and,  as  he  could  not 
be  safely  left  where  he  was,  holes  were  picked  in  the  cement  roof,  and 
burning  pitch  thrown  in  until  he  was  forced  to  leave  the  house.  He 
stepped  out  with  his  bow  strung  and  arrow  ready,  but,  before  he  could 
aim  it,  was  shot  down.  Three  women  and  two  boys,  who,  as  is  their 
custom,  took  part  in  the  fray,  were  also  slain.  One  of  the  lads  was 
amusing  some  idlers,  shooting  at  small  silver  coins  which  rewarded  his 
skill,  when  the  war-whoop  was  raised.  Quick  as  thought,  the  arrow 
upon  his  string  was  sent  through  the  heart  of  the  nearest  white  man — 
a  very  mild  and  peaceable  citizen.  Seven  Texans  were  killed  and  eight 
wounded.  Twenty-eight  Indian  women  and  children  were  detained  as 
prisoners  until  the  Comanches  brought  in  their  captives  in  exchange. 

This  sudden  affray,  ending  in  such  a  massacre,  was  a  heavy  blow  to 
the  Comanches.  They  made  extensive  preparations  to  avenge  it,  and 
in  August  400  warriors  swept  down  to  Lavaca  Bay,  butchering  and 
plundering  as  they  went.  Twenty  or  thirty  persons  were  killed,  and 
great  booty  taken.  But  the  time  was  gone  when  these  forays  could  be 
made  with  impunity.  A  militia  as  hardy,  as  daring,  and  more  intelli 
gent  than  themselves,  was  on  their  track.  It  rallied,  following  and 
attacking  whenever  it  could  overtake  them.  While  they  contended 


118  1840-1845. 

with  the  rangers  who  were  harassing  their  flanks  and  rear,  they  were 
intercepted  at  Plum  Creek  by  other  militia,  under  Felix  Huston  and 
Burleson,  and  routed  with  heavy  loss.  In  the  raid  they  lost  about 
eighty  warriors  and  most  of  their  booty. 

In  October  severe  retaliation  was  meted  out  to  the  Comanches  by 
Colonel  Moore,  with  a  force  of  ninety  Texans  and  twelve  Lipans.  He 
fell  upon  their  village  on  the  Red  Fork  of  the  Colorado,  300  miles  above 
Austin,  and  killed  130  Indians  and  captured  thirty-four,  together  with 
about  500  horses.  This  was  the  end  of  Comanche  incursions  for  a  long 
time.  Finding  war  with  the  Texans  so  unprofitable,  they  turned  their 
arms  against  their  late  allies  of  Mexico,  and  thus  became  to  all  intents 
the  unpaid  auxiliaries  of  Texas.  Judge  Love,  writing  June  4,  1840, 
says,  "  The  situation  of  the  frontier  proves  the  correctness  of  the  In 
dian  policy."  This  was  the  general  sentiment,  which  was  strengthened 
by  the  Plum  Creek  victory  and  Moore's  reprisal.  Though  all  the  com 
bats  with  the  Comanches  herein  narrated  took  place  after  General  John 
ston's  resignation,  their  success  was  the  direct  result  of  his  more  efficient 
organization  of  the  militia,  and  the  active  policy  he  had  inaugurated. 
General  Johnston  resigned  the  War  office  about  the  1st  of  March,  1840. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

1840-1845. 

THE  four  years  that  General  Johnston  had  given  to  the  public 
service  of  Texas  had  been  years  of  sacrifice,  but  of  sacrifice  that 
brought  its  own  reward.  His  activity,  which  had  chafed  against  en 
forced  idleness,  there  found  employment  as  good  as  the  times  afforded. 
He  had  gone  there  heavy-hearted;  but,  having  become  warmly  enlisted 
in  the  cause  of  Texas,  his  nature,  which  could  not  rest  satisfied  with 
merely  selfish  aims,  had  fixed  itself  upon  an  idea  that  thereafter  was  its 
pole-star — the  welfare  and  honor  of  his  adopted  State.  His  ambition, 
always  well  regulated,  had  been  gratified  by  the  general  recognition 
of  his  merits  and  services.  It  was  conceded  that  he  had  never  failed 
to  accomplish  whatever  was  possible  with  the  means  at  his  command, 
and,  if  the  results  were  not  splendid,  they  were  at  least  substantial. 
Such  was  the  public  confidence  that  all  Texas  looked  to  him  as  its  fittest 
leader  in  case  of  active  war  with  Mexico. 

On  the  other  hand,  General  Johnston's  health  had  suffered,  from  his 
wound,  from  the  privations  of  a  frontier  life  in  a  devastated  country, 
and  from  exposure  to  malaria  and  to  the  extreme  alternations  of  the 


MONEY-MATTERS.  119 

climate.  But  his  rigid  temperance  in  both  food  and  drink  preserved 
him  from  evilstthat  proved  fatal  to  so  many  of  his  contemporaries,  and, 
as  he  was  not  apt  to  complain  of  minor  ills,  he  seems  to  have  been 
rather  inclined  to  exult  in  the  blessings  he  retained  than  to  grieve  over 
what  he  had  lost  in  this  respect. 

When  he  first  went  to  Texas  he  owned  a  handsome  estate,  in  part 
devised  bv  his  wife,  and  in  part  purchased  at  St.  Louis.  But  his 
property,  though  rising  in  value,  was  unproductive  and  had  become 
embarrassed  from  neglect,  from  sales  for  reinvestments  in  Texas,  and 
from  the  drain  of  a  large  personal  expenditure.  The  neglect  was  in 
evitable;  the  reinvestments,  often  made  rather  upon  feeling  than  judg 
ment,  had  proved  unprofitable ;  and  the  expenditure  was  a  natural  con 
sequence  of  his  position.  His  fortune  at  that  time  nevertheless  prom 
ised,  if  carefully  husbanded,  to  make  him  rich  ;  and  when  he  found  it 
impaired  and  his  independence  in  danger,  he  was  forced  to  consider  the 
propriety  of  retiring  to  private  life.  Some  of  his  friends  thought  him 
heedless  about  money.  Heedless  he  was  not,  and,  no  man  was  ever 
more  sensitive  about  debt,  or  more  scrupulous  in  payment ;  among  all 
the  many  burdens  that  he  bore  during  his  life  none  was  so  hard  as  that 
of  a  debt  under  which  for  a  time  he  labored.  As  I  shall  soon  be  obliged 
to  recur  to  this  subject,  it  may  be  just  as  well  now  to  state  the  reasons 
why  he  was  not  successful  in  money-matters. 

Men  usually  succeed  best  in  the  things  that  absorb  most  completely 
their  interest  and  enlist  most  strongly  their  desires.  The  education 
and  life  of  a  United  States  officer  at  that  time,  professional  but  not 
mercenary,  while  it  taught  method,  economy,  and  other  useful  rules  of 
life,  discountenanced  commercial  transactions  of  all  kinds.  While  in 
that  army  he  had  been  accustomed  to  regular  pay,  by  which  he  had 
accurately  measured  his  expenses;  and,  with  no  taste  for  luxury  or  dis 
play,  and  no  avidity  for  fortune,  he  had  never  acquired  habits  of  either 
making  or  saving  money.  The  salary  was  meagre,  but  a  man  who  pos 
sessed  the  means  of  paying  all  his  debts  was  within  the  limits  of  safety 
and  honor.  Such  was  his  education.  When  he  was  in  Texas,  his  chil 
dren  had  already  been  provided  for,  and  he  was  not  responsible  to  a 
family  for  the  accumulation  or  even  the  preservation  of  wealth.  On 
his  own  part,  a  certain  sense  of  superiority  to  common  wants,  and  a  con 
fidence  in  his  ability  as  a  soldier  to  supply  his  simple  needs,  took  away 
the  stimulus  to  lay  up  riches.  But  it  was  not  all  education  or  habit. 
He  was  by  nature  a  cheerful  giver,  of  a  generous  spirit,  and  open- 
handed  to  the  distressed.  He  thought  every  man's  necessitj'  greater 
than  his  own,  and  was  ever  graceful  in  giving,  because  he  loved  to  give 
better  than  to  receive. 

When  it  is  stated  that  his  expenditure  in  Texas  was  large,  it  is  not 
intended  to  imply  any  prodigality.  His  salary,  paid  in  a  depreciated 


120  1840-1845. 

currency,  was  little  more  than  nominal,  so  that  he  was  compelled  to 
draw  upon  his  private  resources  for  subsistence,  and  to  maintain  the 
wide  though  primitive  hospitality  entailed  by  his  position.  Though 
not  otherwise  profuse  in  his  personal  expenses,  he  prized  and  ordinarily 
owned  handsome  horses  and  serviceable  arms  ;  but  he  valued  these  for 
use,  not  show,  and  if  a  friend  needed  them  he  bestowed  them  willingly. 
He  felt  that  what  he  had  was  not  his  exclusively,  to  hoard  against  the 
proverbial  "rainy  day,"  but  a  trust  for  those  who  lacked;  so  that  he 
was  literally  a  man  "  who  would  share  his  last  crust  with  a  friend,"  or 
even  with  a  stranger  in  want.  In  a  poor  and  struggling  country  he 
could  not  refuse  a  demand  upon  his  purse  any  more  than  upon  his  time, 
his  toil,  or  his  blood,  if  it  was  directly  or  indirectly  for  the  public  good. 
So,  too,  if  a  friend  or  a  useful  soldier  required  a  blanket,  a  pistol,  a  gun, 
or  a  horse,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  present  him  his  own,  without  anxiety 
as  to  future  necessities.  General  Johnston  was  not  a  rare  example  of 
these  traits.  There  were  many  like  him ;  so  that  in  after-days  it  came 
to  pass  that,  when  he  was  making  ready  to  go  out  to  battle,  friends  con 
tended  which  should  have  the  right  to  arm  and  equip  him.  In  view  of 
what  has  been  said,  it  is  easy  to  see  why  he  should  have  been  growing 
poorer,  and  should  desire  to  look  to  his  private  affairs. 

But,  a  stronger  motive  for  leaving  public  life  than  impaired  health 
and  wealth,  was  a  great  distaste  for  the  routine  of  civil  office.  General 
Johnston  felt  a  strong  impulse  and  entire  fitness  for  military  command. 
He  had  taken  his  place  in  the  War  Department  with  the  hope  of  organ 
izing  an  army,  at  the  head  of  which  he  knew  Lamar  would  place  him  if 
Mexico  were  invaded.  But  Texas,  which  during  the  republic  alternated 
between  the  white  heat  of  warlike  rage  and  a  frigid  apathy,  was  now 
sinking  into  the  latter  condition.  The  President's  continued  ill-health 
and  enforced  absences  from  duty  had  so  strengthened  the  opposition 
that  it  was  now  able  effectually  to  thwart  the  progressive  policy  of  the 
Administration,  and  General  Johnston  saw  no  hope  of  such  a  concen 
tration  of  resources  and  power  as  would  enable  him  to  punish  the  inso 
lence  of  Mexico.  His  motive  for  remaining  in  office  therefore  failed. 

The  details  of  party  management  and  the  ordinary  conduct  of 
American  politics  were  something  more  than  repugnant  to  him ;  they 
were  odious.  In  spite  of  much  earnest  solicitation,  he  was  never  a  can 
didate  for  election  to  a  civil  office,  and  but  once  in  his  life  for  a  military 
position.  His  correspondence  is  full  of  the  efforts  of  those  who  loved 
or  admired  him  to  draw  him  into  active  contention  for  the  highest 
places.  The  presidency  and  vice-presidency  are  constantly  mentioned 
as  the  proper  objects  of  his  ambition,  but  the  inducement  does  not  seern 
to  have  dazzled  him.  In  January,  1840,  Colonel  Love  (a  very  partial 
friend,  it  is  true)  wrote,  "  The  reason  I  have  for  saying  you  ought  not 
to  retire  just  now  is,  that  your  position  is  better  than  any  man's  in  the 


HOSTILE   CORRESPONDENCE.  121 

country,  and  not  to  be  abandoned  hastily."  And  again  in  May,  ad 
dressing  him  at  Louisville,  he  says,  "  If  you  desire  the  presidency,  your 
chance  is  good." 

But  he  felt  no  inclination  for  the  pursuit  of  politics.  He  shrank  from 
the  concessions  of  personal  independence  so  often  demanded  ;  and  the 
fence  of  words  and  dexterity  in  conduct  that  delight  the  legal  and  polit 
ical  mind  displeased  him.  He  was  not  at  all  an  advocate,  and  sought 
only  to  see  facts  in  the  cold,  clear  light  of  truth.  The  personalities  of 
controversy  were  regarded  seriously  by  him  ;  and,  although  forgiving 
of  injuries,  he  was  resentful  of  insult.  Indeed,  he  did  not  leave  office 
without  a  disagreeable  occurrence,  which,  though  adjusted  for  the  time, 
probably  rankled  in  the  breast  of  the  other  party,  as  afterward  ap 
peared.  It  was  reported  to  him  by  gentlemen  of  unimpeached  veracity 
that  General  Houston  had  spoken  of  him  in  violent  and  disrespectful 
terms.  The  following  correspondence  ensued,  upon  which  comment  is 
needless : 

CITY  OP  AUSTIN,  January  5, 1340. 

SIR  :  I  have  just  been  informed  that  on  last  evening,  and  also  on  this  morn 
ing,  you  thought  it  necessary  to  use  the  most  vituperative  language  with  regard 
to  me,  for  what  cause  I  know  not.  In  doing  so  you  bore  in  mind  the  responsi 
bility  you  incurred,  and  you  will  not  be  surprised  that  I  inform  you  that  imme 
diately  after  the  termination  of  the  present  session  of  Congress  I  will  hold  you 
accountable.  A.  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON. 

To  General  SAM  HOUSTON*. 

Memorandum  by  General  Johnston  : 

General  Houston,  on  this  note  being  presented  by  my  friend  the  Hon.  S.  M. 
Williams,  disclaimed  having  at  any  time  spoken  in  disrespectful  terms  of  me,  and 
gave  a  list  of  the  names  of  the  persons  present  at  the  time  specified  who  could 
be  referred  to.  He  said  to  Mr.  Williams  he  would  write  to  me  to  that  effect. 
On  being  told  so  by  Mr.  Williams,  I  said  he  (General  Houston)  would  not  con 
sider  my  note  before  him  in  writing  to  me,  and  it  might  be  returned  with  the 
general's  answer,  which,  if  in  accordance  with  his  verbal  statement,  I  will  con 
sider  satisfactory.  \ 

HALL  or  KEPKESENTATIVES,  January  7, 1940. 

DEAR  SIR  :  The  conversations  which  I  have  had  with  you  relative  to  expres 
sions  said  to  have  been  used  by  me,  vituperative  of  the  character  or  standing  of 
General  A.  Sidney  Johnston,  Secretary  of  War,  having  produced  a  conviction  on 
my  mind  that  there  is  no  hostile  feeling  existing  with  General  Johnston  toward 
me  which  should  cause  me  to  refrain  from  declarations  respecting  the  rumors 
which  have  been  said  to  exist,  I  take  pleasure  in  assuring  you  in  this  note,  as  I 
have  done  on  previous  occasions  verbally,  that  the  reported  expressions  said  to 
have  been  used,  evenings  since,  never  were  used  by  me,  nor  has  anything  tran 
spired  within  my  knowledge  which  could  change  the  estimation  which  I  have 
always  entertained  of  the  high  and  honorable  bearing  of  General  Johnston  and 
his  character. 


122  1840-1845. 

In  presenting  this  to  you,  I  add  my  authority  that,  if  you  deem  proper,  you 
may  show  it  to  the  gentleman  interested,  as  also  the  document  inclosed.  I  am 
as  ever  yours,  cordially  and  fraternally,  SAM  HOUSTON. 

To  Hon.  SAMUEL  M.  WILLIAMS. 

Active  men  are  apt  to  indulge  in  dreams  of  rural  peace  and  quiet  ; 
and,  in  General  Johnston's  case,  this  fancy  was  based,  as  has  been  here 
tofore  related,  upon  genuine  impulses  and  tastes.  He  had  for  some 
time  sought  to  gratify  this  wish  for  the  tranquillity  of  domestic  life  ;  but 
the  call  of  public  duty  had  still  held  him  to  his  post.  The  following 
letter,  written  under  these  emotions,  will  serve  to  explain  this  phase  of 
feeling : 

CITY  OF  AUSTIN,  TEXAN  REPUBLIC,  October  24, 1S39. 

DEAK  FRIEND:  I  am  very  sorry  to  learn  that  you  have  suffered  so  much  from 
sickness  this  summer.  "We  have,  the  most  sagacious  of  us,  but  little  ken  of  the 
future.  When  we  went  together  to  Galveston,  you  expressed  great  concern  for 
me  when  I  announced  my  determination  to  remain  in  Texas  during  the  summer. 
Yet  I  have  escaped  unscathed,  although  exposed  for  more  than  forty  days  to  the 
burning  heat  of  a  vertical  sun,  with  no  other  comfort  than  camp-fare ;  while, 
with  all  the  probabilities  in  your  favor,  you  have  suffered  much.  Such  is  des 
tiny.  You  and  your  family  are,  I  hope,  in  the  enjoyment  of  health  and  happi 
ness  now. 

I  would  be  much  pleased  to  hear  that  you  will  settle  here.  Standing  alone 
without  a  relative  in  the  country,  I  feel  like  an  exile.  What  more  should  a  man 
desire  than  the  countenance  of  kind  and  devoted  friends  to  sustain  him?  These 
are  mine,  in  the  finest  climate  and  most  beautiful  and  lovely  country  that  the 
"  blazing  eye  "  of  the  sun  looks  upon  in  his  journey  from  the  east  to  the  west. 
Yet  I  am  not  contented.  I  sometimes  fancy  myself  most  miserable.  I  stand 
alone.  But  here  I  have  cast  my  lot ;  and  here,  corne  weal  or  woe,  I  shall,  unless 
Fate  has  otherwise  decreed,  spin  out  the  thread  of  life. 

....  I  hope  you  will  make  up  your  mind  to  come  to  this  fine  country.  You 
are  now  shivering  with  cold ;  here  all  is  verdant  as  spring.  In  a  gallop  over  the 
hills  this  morning,  I  frequently  noticed  the  beauty  of  the  flowers.  Here  you  will 
live  ten  years  longer,  which  is  a  consideration  with  most  persons.  For  myself, 
I  look  to  the  end  with  more  concern  than  to  the  length  of  life.  If  that  be  deco 
rous  and  honorable,  I  feel  that  I  can  encounter  the  grim  faonster  unflinchingly 
whenever  he  may  present  himself.  .  .  . 

I  do  not  know  when  I  shall  be  able  to  go  out  of  office.  I  hope  soon ;  though 
I  cannot  calculate  on  it  with  any  certainty.  I  am  anxious  to  see  the  roof  of  my 
cedar  cabin  peering  among  the  live-oaks.  When  shall  it  be  ?  I  am  most  anxious 
to  see  Will  and  Hennie ;  but  this  cannot  be  yet.  Present  my  kind  regards  to 
your  family,  and  believe  me  to  be  very  truly  your  friend, 

A.  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON. 

To  GEOBGE  HANCOCK. 

Under  all  these  circumstances  General  Johnston  felt  that  the  time 
had  come  for  him  to  retire  from  the  cares  of  office.  The  foreign  policy 
pursued  protected  the  country  from,  immediate  invasion,  the  organiza- 


RESIGNATION  AND  POLITICS.  123 

tion  of  the  militia  made  it  a  safeguard  of  the  Indian  frontier,  and  the 
honor  and  independence  of  the  country  seemed  for  the  present  secure; 
all  this,  however,  without  any  prospect  of  active  service.  Accordingly, 
he  resigned  in  February,  1840. 

In  order  to  give  definite  shape  to  Ids  purpose  of  establishing  himself 
as  a  farmer  in  Texas,  it  was  necessary  for  General  Johnston  to  raise  the 
means  by  selling  his  real  estate  elsewhere.  After  his  resignation  he 
went  to  Louisville  for  this  purpose,  but  came  back  to  Galveston  during 
the  summer  on  business.  In  November,  1840,  he  returned  to  Kentucky, 
and  was  absent  from  Texas  a  year.  Part  of  the  summer  of  1841  he 
spent  at  Newport,  Rhode  Island,  and  other  agreeable  places  on  the  At 
lantic  coast,  in  charge  of  some  young  relations. 

During  General  Johnston's  absence  in  December,  1841,  President 
Lamar's  health  became  so  bad  that  he  vacated  his  office,  leaving  the 
Administration  in  the  hands  of  Vice-President  Burnet.  In  the  follow 
ing  spring  the  names  of  a  good  many  gentlemen  were  canvassed  in  view 
of  the  presidency,  but  finally  the  struggle  was  narrowed  down  to  a 
contest  between  Houston  and  Burnet.  Judge  Burnet,  in  spite  of  his 
exalted  character,  was  not  popular;  and  it  soon  became  evident  that  he 
would  be  signally  defeated.  General  Johnston  had  been  strongly  urged 
by  his  friends  to  remain  in  Texas  and  enter  the  canvass  for  the  presi 
dency.  He  was  now  as  strongly  solicited  to  return  and  make  the  con 
test  "as  the  only  man  around  whom  all  the  opposition  (to  Houston) 
would  be  willing  to  rally."  He  was  assured  by  his  friends  that  he  could 
beat  Houston.  General  Johnston,  however,  in  addition  to  other  objec 
tions,  would  not  permit  his  name  to  be  used  in  opposition  to  Judge 
Burnet.  He  thought  this  much  was  due  to  the  loyalty  of  friendship. 
In  May,  Love,  Mayfield,  and  other  mutual  friends  of  Burnet  and  himself, 
tried  to  induce  the  former  to  withdraw  in  favor  of  General  Johnston,  as 
his  cause  was  hopeless.  General  Johnston  was  not  apprised  of  this 
negotiation  until  it  had  failed.  He  was  not  a  party  to  it,  and  did  not 
approve  of  the  proposition ;  nor,  indeed,  did  he  return  to  Texas  until 
after  the  election.  This  resulted  in  the  success  of  General  Houston  by 
a  large  majority ;  and  the  only  consequence  of  the  connection  of  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  name  with  the  canvass  was  to  imbitter  the  animosity  of 
the  new  President  toward  him. 

On  the  5th  of  March,  1842,  General  Vasquez,  with  a  column  of  700 
men,  appeared  before  San  Antonio.  As  the  force  there  consisted  of 
only  100  men,  under  Colonel  John  C.  Hays,  it  withdrew,  and  the  town 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Mexicans.  The  enemy  only  remained  two 
days,  but  carried  off  all  the  valuables  and  a  number  of  Mexican  citizens 
who  voluntarily  accompanied  them.  Eight  days  later  3,500  Texan  vol 
unteers  had  assembled  at  San  Antonio  under  Burleson,  and  they  impa 
tiently  demanded  to  be  led  in  pursuit  of  the  retreating  foe.  Their 


1840-1845. 

commander  was  equally  ready  to  retaliate  upon  the  Mexicans,  but  they 
were  restrained  by  one  Executive  order  after  another,  until  on  April  2d 
they  were  disbanded.  On  the  6th  of  April  General  Burleson  published 
an  address,  in  which  he  says: 

I  feel  no  hesitation  in  believing  that  if  my  orders  had  permitted  me  to 
cross  the  Rio  Grande  and  retaliate  upon  our  enemy  his  oft-repeated  outrages, 
by  this  time  5,000  brave  men  would  have  been  west  of  said  river,  inflicting  a 
chastisement  upon  him  that  would  result  in  an  honorable  peace.  But  President 
Houston's  order  of  the  22d  of  March — in  which  he  says  that  '  one  hundred  and 
twenty  days  will  be  necessary  before  we  can  make  a  move  against  the  enemy  '- 
was  a  finishing  stroke  to  all  our  present  prospects  of  redress.1 

General  Johnston  was  one  of  those  who  started  for  the  rendezvous, 
and  it  was  understood  that  Burleson  concurred  in  the  intention  of  the 
volunteers  to  choose  him  as  their  commander.  It  was  probably  this 
fact  that  led  to  their  discharge  by  the  Executive. 

The  President,  in  the  first  excitement  of  the  invasion,  professed  an 
intention  to  pursue  and  punish  the  enemy,  and  hastily  dispatched 
agents  to  the  United  States  to  enlist  volunteers  and  solicit  contribu 
tions  of  money,  clothing,  and  provisions  "  for  the  munitions  of  an  invad 
ing  army"  and  "for  a  military  chest."  Some  recruits,  unarmed,  un 
equipped,  and  unprovisioned,  were  pushed  forward,  and  left  without 
care  until  they  were  starved  into  mutiny,  when  they  were  discharged. 
The  agencies  resulted  in  nothing;  and  the  whole  conduct  of  the  Govern 
ment  in  these  transactions  was  such  a  burlesque  on  administration,  and 
had  awakened  such  general  resentment  against  the  President,  that  it  was 
considered  necessary  to  mislead  the  public  mind  by  directing  its  atten 
tion  to  false  issues.  The  more  excitable  Texans  were  threatening  a  raid 
across  the  Rio  Grande,  and  would  gladly  have  availed  themselves  of 
General  Johnston's  leadership  if  he  would  have  consented ;  indeed,  all 
Texas  looked  to  him  as  its  general  in  case  of  war,  and  this  was  General 
Johnston's  real  offense  with  the  President.  While  General  Johnston 
would  gladly  have  led  an  army  properly  authorized  and  organized  by 
his  Government,  all  his  habits  of  thought  precluded  the  idea  of  his 
heading  an  expedition  not  covered  by  a  national  flag.  Without  his  de 
nial  even,  such  a  charge  would  have  been  incredible. 

Yoakum's  account  is  as  follows,  being,  in  fact,  General  Houston's 
version  of  the  matter: 

In  fact,  it  was  reported  that  an  army  would  be  raised  and  march  into 
Mexico  on  its  own  account,  and  that  for  this  purpose  agents,  other  than  those 
appointed  by  the  Government,  were  collecting  troops  and  means  in  the  United 
States.  To  counteract  these  lawless  proceedings,  President  Houston  issued  his 

1  Yoakum,  "  History  of  Texas,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  354. 


INJUSTICE   OF  PRESIDENT  HOUSTON.  125 

proclamation  on  the  25th  of  April,  declaring  such  agents  as  acting  without  the 
authority  of  the  republic;  that  the  war  with  Mexico  was  national,  and  would 
be  conducted  by  the  nation ;  and  that  such  conduct  on  the  part  of  such  pre 
tended  agents  was  calculated  to  embarrass  the  republic.1 

But  the  proclamation  went  on  to  allege  that  "said  agents  have 
offered  commissions  to  gentlemen  about  to  emigrate,  as  they  say, 
by  the  authority  of  General  A.  Sidney  Johnston,  whom  they  represent 
as  in  command  of  the  army  of  Texas,  etc."  Whether  General  Hous 
ton's  own  agents  had  transcended  their  authority  and  used  General 
Johnston's  name  where  he  was  favorably  known  in  order  to  commend 
their  cause  to  popular  confidence,  or  whether  impostors  had  availed 
themselves  of  the  looseness  with  which  the  commissions  had  been 
issued  to  pursue  a  like  course,  or  indeed  whether  the  rumor  ever  had 
existence  except  in  the  proclamation  itself,  is  matter  of  surmise  merely. 
But  this  is  certain:  General  Johnston  was  in  no  sense  a  party  to  the 
transactions,  had  given  no  such  authority,  and  had  countenanced  no 
such  course. 

General  Johnston  being  at  the  time  in  Galveston,  the  President 
could  have  ascertained  the  truth,  but  he  preferred  to  use  his  high 
official  position  to  deal  a  vindictive  blow  at  the  reputation  of  an  hon 
orable  opponent.  Though  it  was  made  clear  to  him  that  the  charge 
was  baseless  and  unjustifiable,  he  evaded  all  real  redress.  The  follow 
ing  documents  are  laid  before  the  reader  in  full,  as  the  best  explanation 
of  the  entire  affair: 

TO   THE   PEOPLE    OF   TEXAS. 

GALVESTON,  May  6, 1S42. 

My  name  having  been  used  in  a  proclamation  issued  by  the  President  on  the 
27th  ult.,  which  I  conceived  might  be  interpreted  as  a  charge  against  me  of  the 
commission  of  illegal  acts  against  the  Government,  I  addressed  a  communication 
to  the  President,  disclaiming  any  knowledge  of  the  transactions,  and  transmitted 
to  him  a  statement  from  Dr.  Turner,  upon  whose  representations  the  proclama 
tion  was  issued. 

These,  with  the  reply  of  the  President,  are  at  the  present  deemed  sufficient  to 
disabuse  the  public  mind,  if  an  opinion  has  been  produced  prejudicial  to  me,  and 
to  show,  if  any  such  opinion  existed,  there  was  no  foundation  for  it  in  fact. 

A.  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON". 

CITY  OF  GALVESTON,  May  1, 1842. 

SIR  :  Your  proclamation,  which  appeared  in  the  Civilian  of  the  27th  ult., 
alleges  that  it  has  been  represented  to  the  President  that  "  certain  individuals 
are  passing  through  various  parts  of  the  United  States,  and  claiming  to  be  agents 
of  certain  *  committees  of  vigilance  and  safety,'  and  receiving  contributions  and 

1  Yoakum,  "  History  of  Texas,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  353. 


126  1840-1845. 

aids  to  assist  in  forwarding  and  sustaining  with  suitable  implements  immigrants 
to  Texas,  and  who  represent  the  preparation  in  this  republic  of  a  warlike  char 
acter  as  the  work  of  such  committees,  and  not  originating  with  the  Executive ; 
and  whereas  said  agents  have  offered  commissions  to  gentlemen  who  were  about 
to  immigrate,  as  they  say,  by  the  authority  of  General  A.  Sidney  Johnston,  whom 
they  represent  as  in  command  of  the  army  of  Texas,  etc." 

Now,  these  representations,  if  true — and  you  must  have  thought  them  true 
when  you  deemed  it  necessary  to  counteract  them  by  a  proclamation — clearly  im 
plicate  me  before  the  world,  as  far  as  the  expression  of  your  opinion  goes,  as  in 
the  commission  of  illegal  acts  against  this  Government ;  which  being  untrue,  so 
far  as  regards  myself  (for  I  have  given  no  authority,  either  verbally  or  in  writ 
ing,  to  grant  commissions,  raise  means,  or  to  take  any  measures  to  raise  troops 
in  my  name),  your  proclamation  does  me  injustice,  which  I  request  may  be 
remedied  in  such  manner  as  may  serve  to  relieve  me  from  imputations  so  in 
jurious.  I  beg  leave  to  furnish  you,  in  addition  to  my  disavowal  of  all  knowl 
edge  of  the  transactions  alleged,  the  written  statement  of  Dr.  Turner,  upon 
whose  representations  the  proclamation  was  issued. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant,  A.  SIDNEY  JOHXSTON. 

To  his  Excellency  General  SAM  HOUSTON,  President  of  the  Republic  of  Texas. 


TEXAS,  April  27, 1S42. 

Should  any  apprehension  in  regard  to  the  statement  that  I  made  to  the  Pres 
ident  of  the  Republic  of  Texas,  concerning  the  appointing  power  as  emanating 
from  General  Johnston  as  proffered  by  the  Texas  commissioners  in  the  United 
States,  have  a  tendency  to  cast  blame  on  them,  it  was  foreign  from  my  design. 

The  only  power  that  they  seemed  to  convey  was  recommendation  for  pro 
motion,  and  my  impression  was  that  it  was  by  the  Government  authority. 

Yours,  respectfully, 

WILLIAM  C.  TUBXEB. 

To  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

GEORGE  B.  JONES,  )  Wi^^pst 
J.  S.  STDSOE,    \  *' 

EXECUTIVE  DEPARTMENT,  GALVESTON.  May  2, 1842. 

SIB:  Your  note  of  yesterday's  date,  disclaiming  any  illegal  acts  against  this 
Government,  or  any  participation  in  or  knowledge  of  the  conduct  of  certain 
persons  who,  in  the  United  States,  are  representing  themselves  as  the  agents  of 
certain  "committees  of  vigilance"  in  this  country,  acting  in  entire  indepen 
dency  of  the  constituted  authorities  of  the  country,  and  who,  it  has  been  rep 
resented  to  the  Executive,  are  offering  to  grant  commissions  in  an  army  to  be 
commanded  by  yourself,  has  just  been  handed  to  me. 

Although  my  proclamation  of  the  27th  ult.  did  not  implicate  you  as  being 
concerned  in  the  illegal  and  disorganizing  acts  of  the  agents  spoken  of,  and  was 
intended  as  a  rebuke  to  such  persons  alone  as  were  concerned  in  them,  it  gives 
me  great  pleasure  to  learn  from  yourself  that  you  had  no  participancy  in  or 
knowledge  of  such  unpatriotic  and  mischievous  acts  of  insubordination  to  the 
laws  and  constitution  of  our  country.  The  letter  of  Dr.  Turner  (a  copy  of  which 
you  inclose  me)  has  no  relevancy  to  the  facts  so  far  as  you  may  be  concerned. 


MEXICAN  INVASION.  127 

It  will  give  me  great  pleasure  in  this  trying  crisis  of  our  national  existence 
to  receive  the  cooperation  of  all  true  patriots  who  are  capable  of  rendering  effect 
ual  service  to  our  common  country.  Your  obedient  servant, 

SAM  HOUSTON. 

To  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

President  Houston  had  adopted  the  policy  of  undoing  whatever  had 
been  attempted  by  his  predecessor.  Yucatan,  which,  aided  by  the 
Texan  navy,  had  employed  so  much  of  the  energies  of  Mexico,  was 
abandoned  to  the  conquering  sword  of  Santa  Anna.  Treaties  were 
substituted  for  militia  as  a  defense  against  the  Indians,  who  had,  how 
ever,  been  too  severely  punished  to  be  troublesome  for  some  time,  and 
were  glad  of  a  breathing-spell.  The  transportation  of  the  mails  had 
entirely  ceased ;  and  the  revenue  derived  from  direct  taxation  scarcely 
paid  the  expense  of  collection.  The  volunteers,  who  were  scouting 
along  the  Rio  Grande,  were  disbanded  ;  so  that  the  frontier  was  now 
left  not  only  without  the  means  of  protection  but  of  warning. 

The  consequences  of  this  "  masterly  inactivity  "  were  soon  realized, 
and  the  dream  of  security  rudely  broken  by  another  Mexican  invasion, 
repeating  that  led  by  Vasquez  in  March.  On  September  llth  General 
Adrian  Woll  entered  San  Antonio  with  a  force  of  1,200  men.  Congress, 
warned,  by  Vasquez's  invasion,  of  the  inefficiency  of  the  President  in 
providing  for  the  public  defense,  had  passed  a  bill  for  that  purpose  just 
before  its  adjournment  in  July,  in  which  the  President  was  required  to 
hold  an  election  for  major-general  on  the  1st  of  September.  There  is 
no  doubt  that  General  Johnston  would  have  been  chosen  almost  by  ac 
clamation  ;  but  the  President,  not  signing  the  bill,  defeated  it  by  what 
is  called  "  a  pocket-veto." 

The  want  of  an  organized  force  and  a  competent  commander  was  felt 
when  Woll  burst  suddenly  upon  San  Antonio  with  his  rancheros.  He 
captured  the  judge  and  bar  of  the  district  court,  and  other  prisoners, 
fifty-three  in  all.  The  Texan  minute-men  made  a  gallant  fight  at  the 
crossing  of  the  Salado  with  part  of  Woll's  force,  but  suffered  a  heavy 
blow  in  the  loss  of  Captain  Dawson  and  fifty -three  men,  who  were  sur 
rounded  and  massacred  by  the  Mexicans.  After  a  week's  occupation  of 
San  Antonio,  Woll  retreated  with  his  prisoners  and  plunder  unmolested, 
having  attained  the  object  of  the  expedition — "  to  contradict  the  argu 
ment,  advanced  by  the  annexationists  in  the  United  States,  that  the 
war  was  in  fact  at  an  end"  (Yoakum).  On  November  18th  General 
Somerville,  under  instructions  from  the  Government,  set  out  with  750 
men  against  Mexico,  on  an  expedition  of  retaliation  which  culminated  in 
the  disaster  at  Mier. 

General  Johnston's  friends  continued  to  urge  him  to  reenter  public 
life.  During  his  absence  from  Texas,  in  1843,  he  was  continually  as 
sured  by  his  correspondents  that,  if  he  would  come  forward  for  the 
10 


128  1840-1845. 

presidency,  Rusk,  Burleson,  and  Lipscomb,  then  the  three  most  promi 
nent  candidates,  would  unite  their  influence  for  him.  Dr.  Starr,  in 
1844,  spoke  of  him  "as  the  only  man  suited  for  the  presidency."  Clay 
Davis  wrote  that  nine-tenths  of  the  voters  of  the  west  wanted  him  for 
President.  The  narrowness  of  his  private  fortune  forced  him  to  refuse 
to  enter  the  lists.  Love,  urging  him  strongly  to  return  to  Texas,  in 
1844,  he  replied  :  "  My  fortunes  are  such  that  I  am  determined  to  remain 
in  Kentucky  for  the  present,  or  until  my  affairs  wear  a  brighter  com 
plexion,  unless  the  men  of  Texas  are  needed  for  her  defense.  In  that 
event  I  will  not,  if  alive,  fail  to  be  with  you"  Seventeen  years  later 
he  crossed  the  continent  to  keep  this  promise,  and  sealed  it  with  his 
blood. 

Although  General  Johnston  took  no  further  part  in  the  public  affairs 
of  Texas,  yet  the  annexation  of  that  country  to  the  United  States  was 
so  important  an  event  to  all  its  citizens  that  a  recapitulation  of  the  chief 
facts  that  led  to  it  seems  necessary  and  proper.  Though  not  politically 
connected  with  these  events,  General  Johnston  was  a  deeply-interested 
spectator,  and  rendered  all  the  aid  he  could  in  producing  the  result. 
The  liberties  which  Texas  had  achieved  by  the  sword  had  received  the 
sanction  of  time,  and  were  now  rendered  secure  by  the  large  immigra 
tion  of  a  warlike  and  wealthy  population.  Her  increased  power  and 
productive  capacity  gave  her  importance  in  the  eyes  of  the  great 
powers  which,  having  at  first  stood  selfishly  aloof,  now  jealously  con 
tended  for  the  control  of  the  councils  of  the  rising  republic.  Finally, 
the  United  States,  actuated  less  by  sympathy  with  Texas  than  by  jeal 
ousy  of  Great  Britain,  offered  such  terms  as  Texas  could  accept ;  and 
the  free  republic  exchanged  her  independence  for  sisterhood  in  the 
family  of  States  from  which  her  people  had  sprung. 

In  the  United  States,  annexation,  which  seemed  impending  in  1836, 
was  not  accomplished  until  after  a  series  of  severe  political  struggles. 
The  President,  Mr.  Tyler,  and  the  people  of  the  South  and  West,  favored 
it  strongly ;  but  Mr.  Clay,  Mr.  Van  Buren,  and  the  more  prominent 
leaders  of  both  parties,  were  anxious  to  ignore  it,  as  a  question  fraught 
with  peril  to  its  advocates  and  opponents  alike.  Under  some  sort  of 
understanding,  they  all  declared  against  it.  In  1844  President  Tyler 
forwarded  the  plan  of  annexation  by  treaty ;  but  the  Whigs,  under  the 
discipline  of  Mr.  Clay,  voting  against  it,  it  was  defeated.  "The  ques 
tion,"  however,  was  stronger  than  the  politicians,  and  at  the  Democratic 
Convention  in  1844  a  new  man,  Mr.  Polk,  was  nominated  for  President, 
and  annexation  made  the  main  issue  in  the  canvass.  His  election  prac 
tically  settled  the  question,  and  Congress  passed  a  joint  resolution  March 
1,  1845,  admitting  Texas  into  the  Union.  Whether  justly  or  unjustly, 
it  was  feared  in  Texas  that  the  Texan  Administration  was  averse  to 
annexation,  and  would  throw  obstacles  in  its  way.  The  popular  en- 


SECOND   MARRIAGE.  129 

thusiasm,  however,  overrode  all  opposition ;  and,  on  the  23d  of  June, 
1845,  the  Texan  Congress  consented  to  the  terms  of  annexation,  and 
Texas  became  a  State  of  the  American  Union. 

It  is  now  necessary  to  recur  to  General  Johnston's  private  life.  Dur 
ing  his  visits  to  Kentucky  he  had  formed  an  attachment  for  a  young 
lady  of  great  beauty,  talents,  and  accomplishments,  Miss  Eliza  Griffin. 
Miss  Griffin  was  the  sister  of  Captain  George  H.  Griffin,  U.  S.  A.,  an 
aide  of  General  Taylor,  who  died  in  the  Florida  War;  of  Lieutenant 
William  P.  Griffin,  who  died  in  the  navy;  and  of  Dr.  John  S.  Griffin, 
long  an  army-surgeon,  but  now  for  many  years  a  resident  of  Los  Ange 
les,  California.  They  were  all  men  of  mark,  physically,  mentally,  and 
morally.  Miss  Griffin  was  cousin  to  General  Johnston's  first  wife,  and 
the  niece  and  ward  of  Mr.  George  Hancock,  in  whose  family  he  had  long 
enjoyed  entire  intimacy.  There  was  some  disparity  of  years,  but  his 
uncommon  youthfulness  of  temperament  and  appearance  diminished  the 
inequality.  After  some  delay,  principally  on  account  of  the  unsettled 
state  of  his  business,  they  were  married  October  3,  1843,  at  Lynch'a 
Station,  near  Shelbyville,  Kentucky,  the  home  of  Mr.  Hancock. 

It  may  be  remembered  that,  when  General  Johnston  retired  from  the 
War  Office,  it  was  his  intention  to  engage  in  agricultural  pursuits.  In 
partnership  with  a  friend,  he  purchased  the  China  Grove  plantation,  in 
Brazoria  County,  Texas.  General  Johnston  describes  it  thus:  "  It  con 
sists  of  1,500  acres  of  cotton-land,  between  300  and  400  acres  cleared, 
with  gin,  fences,  etc.;  and  4,428  acres  of  rich  prairie,  affording  fine  grass 
for  stock,  and  every  way  more  suitable  for  the  production  of  sugar-cane 
than  richer  bottom-lands.  The  location  is  very  convenient  to  the  mar 
ket,  being  about  thirty-five  miles  from  Galveston  by  land,  and  twelve 
miles  from  the  navigable  waters  of  the  bay."  The  estate  was  undoubt 
edly  valuable,  but  the  price,  nearly  $16,000,  was  too  great;  and  the  pur 
chase  proved  to  be  injudicious  and  disastrous.  The  purchase  was  origi 
nally  a  joint  one  with  a  personal  friend,  who  was  largely  engaged  both 
in  planting  and  in  mercantile  pursuits.  It  was  supposed  that  his  com 
mand  of  credit  would  enable  them  to  buy  the  slaves  and  supply  the 
machinery  requisite  for  a  sugar-plantation.  General  Johnston  per 
formed  his  part  of  the  contract,  realizing  the  necessary  funds  by  the 
sale  of  real  estate  at  a  considerable  sacrifice.  In  the  mean  time  his  part 
ner  had  become  so  involved  as  to  be  in  danger  of  bankruptcy,  and  ap 
pealed  to  General  Johnston  to  relieve  him  from  his  share  of  the  trans 
action,  resting  his  request  upon  the  ground  that  he  had  in  the  first  in 
stance  suggested  the  arrangement  more  with  a  view  to  General  John 
ston's  advantage  than  his  own,  which  probably  was  to  some  extent  true. 
General  Johnston,  with  a  sense  of  obligation  perhaps  too  scrupulous, 
at  once  assumed  the  whole  responsibility,  thus  incurring  a  load  of  debt 
from  which  he  was  not  freed  for  ten  years.  His  friend  was  saved,  but 


130  1340-1845. 

he  sacrificed  himself;  the  same  act  by  which  he  encumbered  himself  de 
priving  him  of  the  means  and  credit  for  stocking  the  plantation. 

The  years  between  1842  and  1846  were  spent  in  the  vain  effort  to 
pay  for  the  plantation,  either  by  its  sale  or  by  that  of  other  property. 
General  Johnston  saw  the  proceeds  of  the  sales  of  his  farm  near  St. 
Louis  and  of  his  handsome  property  in  Louisville  gradually  swallowed 
up  by  the  expenses  of  living  and  the  interest  on  his  debt,  without  dimin 
ishing  its  principal.  He  spent  a  good  deal  of  time  in  Kentucky,  occu 
pied  with  futile  attempts  to  sell  or  stock  his  place.  But  these  unavail 
ing  efforts  hastened  rather  than  retarded  his  financial  ruin  by  putting 
him  to  additional  expense.  He  preserved  throughout,  however,  his  in 
dependence,  meeting  his  obligations  at  whatever  sacrifice. 

After  the  annexation  of  Texas,  in  1845,  his  friends  sought  to  have 
him  appointed  colonel  of  one  of  the  new  regiments.  Love,  writing  in 
reference  to  the  Constitutional  Convention,  of  which  he  was  a  member, 
says:  "There  were  many  inquiries  made  for  you  in  the  most  friendly 
manner,  and  almost  every  one  expressed  for  you  sincere  friendship. 
There  is  scarcely  anything  Texas  would  not  do  for  you  if  you  would 
place  yourself  in  a  position  to  permit  it.  The  general  wish  prevails  that 
you  may  be  colonel  of  the  new  regiment  which  it  is  supposed  will  be 
raised.  All  the  prominent  men  have  told  me  if  you  wished  the  office 
they  would  urge  your  appointment.  The  aspirants  in  Texas  yield  their 
claims  to  yours."  General  Johnston  himself  took  no  part  in  this  appli 
cation;  but  his  friends  presented  his  name,  knowing  how  acceptable  the 
appointment  would  be  to  him.  When  the  selections  were  finally  made 
by  Mr.  Polk,  the  adverse  influence  of  General  Houston,  who  had  become 
Senator,  was  believed  to  have  decided  the  President  against  him. 

At  last  General  Johnston,  seeing  no  other  resource,  resolved  to  re 
treat  to  his  plantation,  and  there,  by  economy  and  industry,  to  repair 
his  broken  fortunes,  or  at  least  to  prevent  ruinous  outlay  until  oppor 
tunity  offered  to  carry  out  his  plans.  But  this  design  was  deferred  on 
the  very  eve  of  its  consummation  in  consequence  of  the  outbreak  of  the 
Mexican  War. 

Before  entering  on  this  topic  a  word  must  be  said  of  the  men 
whose  steadfast  friendship  continued  constant  and  active  through  these 
years.  Among  these  were  his  kinsmen,  Hancock  and  Preston,  and  Al 
bert  T.  Burnley,  James  S.  Mayfield,  Judge  B.  C.  Franklin,  and  others. 
General  James  Hamilton  was  his  frequent  and  confidential  correspond 
ent  and  zealous  friend.  The  following  sentence  is  selected  from  a  mass 
of  his  correspondence  as  supplying  the  key-note  to  the  whole :  "Be  as 
sured  I  cherish  your  unabated  kindness  and  friendship  to  me  with  the 
most  sincere  and  cordial  gratitude."  The  man  whom  General  Johnston 
wore  nearest  to  his  heart  was  Colonel  James  Love,  of  Galveston.  Love 
was  six  or  eight  years  his  senior,  and  had  been  a  Whig  member  of  Con- 


JAMES  LOVE.  131 

gress  from  the  mountains  of  Kentucky,  whence  he  removed  to  Galves- 
ton  soon  after  the  Revolution  of  1836.  He  was  a  man  of  quick  percep 
tions,  strong  intellect,  and  powerful  will.  Impetuous  in  temper,  free 
in  the  expression  of  his  opinions,  open,  brave,  an'd  affectionate,  he  at 
tached  himself  to  General  Johnston  with  all  the  ardor  of  his  nature. 
General  Johnston,  writing  of  him  in  1846  to  one  who  did  not  like  him, 
says,  "  I  have  experienced  at  his  hands  many  acts  of  disinterested  kind 
ness,  perhaps  more  than  from  any  living  man."  This  sense  of  obliga 
tion  was  increased  by  subsequent  events,  and  to  the  day  of  his  death 
General  Johnston  cherished  the  strongest  attachment  to  this  friend. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE    MEXICAN  WAR. 

As  soon  as  the  annexation  of  Texas  was  consummated,  the  United 
States  Government  ordered  General  Zachary  Taylor,  commanding  the 
Southwestern  Department,  to  put  troops  in  motion  to  protect  the  fron 
tier  against  the  invasion  threatened  by  Mexico.  As  Mexico  not  only 
asserted  a  general  right  to  the  sovereignty  of  Texas,  but  also  set  up  a 
special  claim  to  the  country  between  the  Rio  Grande  and  the  Nueces, 
as  belonging  to  Tamaulipas,  General  Taylor,  pending  negotiations, 
established  himself  at  Corpus  Christi,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Nueces, 
where  he  remained  until  March  8,  1846. 

Love,  writing  to  General  Johnston  in  September,  1845,  says : 

General  Taylor  has  4,000  soldiers  at  Corpus  Christi.  Six  companies  of  Texan 
Rangers,  under  Hays,  have  been  mustered  into  service.  They  are  teaching  the 
United  States  officers  and  soldiers  how  to  ride.  The  feats  of  horsemanship  of 
our  frontier-men  are  most  extraordinary.  I  saw  one  of  them  pick  up  from  the 
ground  three  dollars,  each  fifty  yards  apart,  at  full  speed,  and  pass  under  the 
horse's  neck  at  a  pace  not  much  short  of  full  speed. 

On  the  8th  of  March,  1846,  General  Taylor  made  a  forward  move 
ment  to  Point  Isabel,  which  commanded  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande. 
In  spite  of  a  protest  and  some  acts  of  hostility  committed  by  the  Mexi 
cans,  a  fortification  was  erected  opposite  Matamoras,  afterward  known 
as  Fort  Brown.  On  the  12th  of  April  General  Ampudia  addressed  a  let 
ter  to  General  Taylor,  requiring  him  to  withdraw  to  the  left  bank  of  the 
Nueces,  or  "  that  arms  alone  must  decide  the  question."  A  little  later, 
the  Mexicans  captured  Captain  Thornton  and  60  men,  and  committed 
other  overt  acts  of  war ;  and,  finally,  threatened  General  Taylor's  com- 


132  THE  MEXICAN  WAR. 

munications  with  Point  Isabel,  his  base  of  supply.  To  reestablish  his 
communications  and  secure  his  base,  General  Taylor  marched  with  his 
army  to  Point  Isabel,  leaving  a  small  but  sufficient  garrison  in  the 
fort.  The  Mexicans  opened  upon  the  fort  with  a  heavy  bombardment, 
by  which  the  commander,  Major  Brown,  was  killed  ;  but  the  garrison 
held  out  until  relieved  by  the  successes  of  the  American  troops. 

General  Taylor  started  on  his  return  from  Point  Isabel,  on  May  7th, 
with  2,300  soldiers,  and,  on  the  next  day  at  noon,  found  the  Mexican 
army,  under  General  Ampudia,  drawn  up  on  the  plain  of  Palo  Alto  to 
dispute  his  advance.  An  engagement  ensued,  in  which  the  artillery 
acted  a  conspicuous  part,  ending  in  the  retreat  of  the  Mexicans  with  a 
loss  of  600  men.  The  American  loss  was  nine  killed  and  44  wounded. 

On  the  next  day  the  American  army  again  encountered  the  Mexi 
cans,  strongly  posted  in  a  shallow  ravine  called  Resaca  de  la  Palma.  It 
was  a  hotly-contested  fight  with  6,000  Mexicans,  who  showed  a  stout 
courage  ;  but  they  were  driven  from  the  field  with  the  loss  of  1,000 
men.  The  American  loss  was  110.  The  war  had  begun. 

Volunteers  were  called  for,  and  came  pouring  in  from  all  quarters. 
The  martial  enthusiasm  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  was  only 
equaled  by  the  imbecility  of  the  Government  in  its  preparations  for  the 
conflict.  It  was  a  political  regime  merely,  and  nowise  adapted  to 
organize  or  carry  on  a  successful  war  ;  but  the  ability  of  the  command 
ers  and  the  splendid  valor  of  the  troops  supplied  all  defects,  and  made 
the  Mexican  War  an  heroic  episode  in  our  annals.  General  Taj'lor, 
having  initiated  the  struggle  by  two  brilliant  victories,  was  condemned 
to  idleness  until  September  by  the  Carthaginian  policy  of  the  Govern 
ment,  which  failed  to  supply  stores,  equipment,  and  transportation. 

General  Taylor,  early  in  1846,  sent  the  following  reply  to  a  letter 
from  Mr.  Hancock,  requesting  his  recommendation  of  General  Johnston 
as  colonel  of  one  of  the  new  regiments  : 

COKPTTS  CHBTSTI,  TEXAS,  February  8, 1846. 

DEAK  SIR  :  Your  esteemed  favor  of  the  17th  ult.,  from  Galveston,  reached 
me  on  the  2d  inst.,  and  let  me  assure  you  I  was  much  gratified  at  hearing  from 
you,  and  should  have  been  more  so  to  have  had  the  pleasure  of  taking  you  by 
the  hand  at  my  tent  at  this  place. 

The  day  after  the  receipt  of  your  letter,  I  addressed  a  communication  to  the 
Secretary  of  War,  recommending  General  Johnston  to  the  favorable  considera 
tion  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  in  the  strongest  terms  possible,  for 
the  appointment  in  question,  which  I  did  with  a  clear  conscience  and  hearty 
good-will,  as  I  know  of  but  few  as  well,  and  none  better,  qualified  for  the 
situation,  and  can  truly  say  that  no  one  desires  his  success  more  than  myself. 
At  the  same  time,  I  regret  to  learn  that  General  Houston  is  unfriendly  to  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  as  I  am  disposed  to  believe  if  he  exercises  his  influence  with  Mr. 
Polk,  he  will  prevent  his  succeeding,  as  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  appointments 
made  or  selected  from  Texas  will  be  on  the  recommendation  of  General  Houston. 


ZACHARY   TAYLOR'S  ESTIMATE.  133 

I  have,  this  moment,  received  orders  from  Washington  to  take  possession  of 
the  country  to  the  Rio  Grande,  and  establish  myself  on  the  left  bank  of  that 
river,  as  soon  as  I  could  make  the  preparations  necessary  for  doing  so  (which 
will  occupy  some  three  weeks,  principally  in  collecting  transportation,  etc.);  but 
not  to  cross  the  Rio  Grande  unless  Mexico  should  make  or  declare  war,  in  which 
case  I  would  act  on  the  offensive.  Whether  war  will  grow  out  of  this  move 
ment,  time  must  determine ;  but  I,  for  one,  hope  that  all  difficulties  between  the 
two  countries  will  be  settled  without  an  appeal  to  the  sword;  but,  if  war  must 
come,  I  trust  we  will  not  only  be  prepared  to  meet  it,  but  to  bring  it  to  a  speedy 
and  honorable  termination.  With  sincere  regards, 

I  remain,  yours  truly, 

Z.  TATLOE. 

To  Mr.  GEOBGE  HANCOCK,  Louisville,  Ky. 

When  General  Taylor  found  that  he  would  have  to  contend  with  a 
greatly  superior  force  of  Mexicans,  he  called  for  volunteers  to  sustain 
his  movement.  The  Texan  Legislature  promptly  passed  a  bill  raising 
the  quota  of  that  State.  It  was  proposed  to  confer  upon  the  Governor, 
who  was  himself  requested  to  take  chief  command,  the  appointment  of 
field  and  staff  officers  ;  and,  under  this  supposition,  Governor  Henderson 
wrote,  May  8th,  urging  General  Johnston  to  meet  him  at  Point  Isabel, 
and  again,  through  their  mutual  friend,  Thomas  F.  McKinney,  assuring 
him  that  he  should  receive  rank  next  to  himself  in  the  Texan  contin 
gent.  A  messenger  from  General  Taylor  had  arrived  in  Galveston  on 
the  28th  of  April,  with  a  request  to  General  Johnston  to  join  him  at 
once.  As,  unfortunately,  no  vessel  could  be  obtained  to  proceed  by 
sea,  he  started  on  horseback,  with  a  squad  of  gallant  young  men,  for  the 
scene  of  action.  The  time  required  for  a  land- journey  brought  him  to 
Point  Isabel  too  late  for  a  share  in  the  actions  at  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca. 
His  wife  and  infant  son  were  left  at  Galveston  under  the  care  of  Colonel 
Love  and  his  good  wife. 

Leonard  Groce,  for  many  years  General  Johnston's  friend,  knowing 
his  military  ardor,  promptly  sent  him  a  fine  war-horse,  which  bore  him 
nobly  through  the  campaign.  On  the  road  to  Point  Isabel,  General 
Johnston  saw  the  tarantula  for  the  first  time.  He  had  been  ten  years 
in  Texas,  and  much  in  the  field,  without  seeing  one;  but  after  passing 
Corpus  Christ!  they  appeared  in  great  numbers,  fiercely  rearing  them 
selves  up  and  offering  battle  to  an  approaching  horse  and  rider. 

The  Texans  were  gathering  in  hot  haste  at  Point  Isabel  to  defend  their 
border,  and  their  organization  was  rapidly  effected.  As  General  John 
ston's  extant  letters  give  a  clear  and  succinct  account  of  the  campaign 
and  his  connection  with  it,  they  may  be  allowed  to  tell  their  own  story: 

POINT  ISABEL,  July  10,  1846. 

DEAE  HAXCOCK  :  I  suppose  some  time  since  you  have  stricken  me  from  the 
roll  of  your  friends,  and,  seemingly  to  yourself,  with  great  justice;  but  things 
are  not  all  that  they  seem.  About  the  time  I  should  have  written  to  you  I  felt 


134:  THE   MEXICAN  WAR. 

myself  obliged,  by  the  request  of  the  Governor,  who  desired  to  give  me  rank 
next  himself  in  the  Texas  quota  of  four  regiments,  to  go  by  land  to  Corpus 
Christi.  Once  away  from  Galveston  there  was  no  opportunity  of  writing  until 
I  should  reach  this  point,  and  since  my  arrival  here  I  have  been  so  occupied  that 
I  have  only  taken  time  to  write  to  my  wife.  The  Governor  was  not  allowed  to 
make  the  appointments  as  he  desired.  The  Legislature  referred  the  appoint 
ments  to  the  troops ;  so  that,  on  my  arrival  here,  I  had  to  stand  a  canvass.  I 
was  elected  by  the  First  Regiment  of  Foot  Riflemen  of  Texas  colonel  of  the  regi 
ment,  which  gave  me  the  rank  I  expected  of  the  Governor.  I  have  now  en 
camped  near  this  fort  a  regiment  of  ten  companies,  numbering  650  fine  riflemen, 
ready  and  anxious  to  take  the  field. '  We  are  losing  no  time  by  waiting.  They 
are  daily  undergoing  instruction,  which  will  make  them  the  more  efficient.  Gen 
eral  Taylor  is  making  most  strenuous  efforts  to  prosecute  the  campaign  with 
vigor,  though  I  must  say  that  his  exertions  are  not  sustained  as  they  should  be 
by  the  Government.  There  has  been  great  deficiency  of  supply  in  the  quarter 
master's  department.  We  understand  that  this  will  be  speedily  remedied  both 
in  means  of  transportation  and  equipment,  and  we  have  already  seen  a  good 
many  steamboats,  adapted  to  river  navigation,  passing  up  the  Rio  Grande.  The 
advanced  guard  has  been  pushed  to  Reynosa,  about  60  miles  above  Matamoras, 
and  several  regiments  are  marching  upon  the  same  point ;  but,  on  account  of  the 
great  quantity  of  rain  which  fell  last  month,  their  progress  is  necessarily  slow. 
I  am  daily  expecting  my  regiment  to  march.  The  troops  are  occupying  Point 
Isabel,  Brazos  Santiago,  Burita  on  the  Rio  Grande,  Matamoras,  and  Reynosa,  but 
we  have  no  means  of  ascertaining  the  number — say  14,000.  I  visited  the  camp 
of  the  Louisville  Legion  on  Brazos  Island ;  they  are  a  fine  body  of  men ;  they 
are  now  at  Burita.  Rogers  *  was  quite  well. 

Very  truly,  your  friend,  A.  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON. 

POINT  ISABEL,  TEXAS,  July  80,  1846. 

DEAR  HANCOCK  :  When  I  last  wrote  to  you  we  knew  nothing  of  our  destina 
tion.  The  discharge  of  all  the  Louisiana  regiments  created  great  uneasiness 
among  the  Texas  regiments,  lest  they,  being  six  months'  men,  should  also  be 
discharged.  It  was,  however,  decided  otherwise.  I  have  received  orders  to 
march,  and  will  be  en  route  this  evening  with  my  regiment,  a  fine  body  of  rifle 
men,  capable,  from  the  instruction  received  here,  of  manoeuvring  with  great 
rapidity  and  precision;  and  I  do  not  doubt  that  they  will  acquire  distinction. 
The  commanding  general  is  concentrating  upon  Camargo  as  rapidly  as  possible 
with  the  very  limited  means  of  transportation  at  his  disposition ;  and  we  sup 
pose  we  will  march  immediately  upon  that  point.  The  war  should  be  conduct 
ed  directly  against  the  city  of  Mexico,  the  seat  of  vitality  and  strength.  Apart 
from  all  science,  a  mere  animal  instinct  would  inculcate  that. 

The  desire  of  a  speedy  termination,  as  well  as  economy,  points  out  Alvarado, 
or  some  place  south  of  Vera  Cruz  (at  the  proper  season),  as  the  initial  point  of 
operation,  retaining  an  army  corps  at  Monterey,  or  on  the  route  thence  to  Mex 
ico.  These  movements  would  compel  a  concentration  of  the  strength  of  Mexico 
at  the  capital,  where  a  decisive  engagement  would  soon  be  fought  with  adequate 
force  and  the  war  terminated.  Mexico  is  to  that  republic  what  Paris  is  to  France. 

1  Lieutenant-Colonel  Jason  Rogers,  of  the  Louisville  Legion — General  Johnston's 
brother-in-law. 


MILITARY  MOVEMENTS.  135 

If  Mexico  falls,  her  dependencies  fall  with  her.  Why,  then,  waste  a  cartridge 
on  the  castle  of  St.  Juan  d'Ulloa,  or  throw  away  the  public  treasure  in  a  war 
of  marches  against  a  country  without  population  comparatively,  as  Santa  F6, 
Chihuahua,  or  California?  These  are  portions  of  country  which  Mexico  does 
not  pretend  to  defend  against  the  Indians. 

Your  friend,  A.  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON. 

A  letter  to  Hancock,  written  August  llth,  near  Camargo,  informs 
him  of  the  movement  of  the  troops  from  Matamoras  to  that  point,  and 
describes  what  he  saw  in  his  voyage  up  the  Rio  Grande.  He  portrays 
the  six  days'  journey  up  the  tortuous  channel  of  that  river,  its  alluvial 
banks  with  their  teeming  crops,  and  the  half -barbarous  population  gath 
ered  there,  together  with  their  houses,  dress,  and  manners.  General 
Johnston  felt  gratification  that,  while  a  good  deal  of  sickness  prevailed 
among  the  volunteers,  only  three  men  of  his  regiment  had  died ;  and 
those  not  with  the  command,  but  in  a  company  of  unacclimated  Ger 
mans,  and  on  detached  service.  The  health  of  the  regiment  was  due 
to  its  discipline,  and  to  regard  for  sanitary  precautions  not  usually  ob 
served. 

The  letter  states:  " General  Taylor  is  rapidly  concentrating  his  force 
at  Camargo.  The  regular  troops  are  nearly  all  there,  and  the  volunteers 
are  all  in  motion.  My  regiment  was  the  first  ordered  to  advance.  The 
next  movement,  I  suppose  in  fifteen  or  twenty  days,  will  be  for  Mon 
terey." 

General  Johnston  had  taken  great  pride  in  his  regiment,  and  such 
were  their  drill  and  discipline  that  General  Taylor  had  given  him  the 
advance  of  the  army.  A  question  having  been  raised  whether  the  six 
months'  volunteers  were  to  be  disbanded  immediately,  unless  they  re- 
enlisted  for  an  additional  six  months,  a  deputation  of  discontented  sol 
diers  called  upon  General  Taylor  during  General  Johnston's  absence. 
The  soldiers  found  "  Old  Rough  and  Ready,"  in  his  shirt-sleeves,  shav 
ing.  They  began  to  state  their  grievance,  when  the  old  general,  divin 
ing  the  purpose  of  their  visit,  half-turned  and  bluntly  said:  "I  suppose 
you  want  to  go  home.  Well,  I  don't  want  anybody  about  me  who  don't 
want  to  stay.  I  wouldn't  give  one  willing  man  for  a  dozen  that  wanted 
to  go  home."  He  went  on  shaving,  and  the  committee  left.  The  general 
had  spoken  the  truth;  but  to  some  it  gave  offense  as  an  implied  insult, 
to  others  it  afforded  a  pretext  to  get  away  from  the  hardships  of  a 
severe  service.  The  agitators  availed  themselves  of  these  circum 
stances  ;  and  on  General  Johnston's  arrival  pleaded  General  Taylor's 
promise  that  they  might  go  home.  On  finding  the  state  of  the  case, 
General  Johnston  assembled  the  regiment  and  put  to  the  vote  the 
question  of  returning  home  or  reenlistment  :  318  voted  to  disband, 
and  224  to  reenlist.  The  majority  was  due  in  great  part  to  the  Ger 
man  company,  which  had  been  on  detached  service  and  had  suffered 


136  THE  MEXICAN  WAR. 

from  sickness,  and  which  voted  as  a  unit  77  votes  to  disband.  General 
Johnston  sometimes  told,  as  an  illustration  of  his  want  of  effectiveness 
as  an  orator,  that  after  the  adverse  vote  was  given  he  told  the  men  he 
could  not  believe  that  such  was  their  deliberate  purpose,  and  made  an 
appeal  to  them  in  terms  which  he  thought  could  not  fail  to  move  them, 
but  only  one  man  changed  his  vote.  The  regiment  was  disbanded,  but 
a  number  reenlisted  in  the  company  of  Captain  Shivers  and  won  distinc 
tion  at  Monterey. 

Thus  was  General  Johnston  again  compelled  to  see  the  labor  of 
months  undone  in  an  hour,  and  his  hopes  of  honorable  distinction  dissi 
pated,  without  fault  of  his,  by  the  instability  of  others.  He  was  deeply 
chagrined ;  but  he  determined  not  to  return  home  until  his  six  months 
of  service  had  expired,  and  he  had  shared  with  the  army  in  the  impend 
ing  battle.  General  Taylor  relieved  him  from  the  awkwardness  of  a 
subordinate  position  by  assigning  him  as  inspector-general  to  Butler's 
division,  in  which  capacity  he  served  until  after  the  battle  of  Mon 
terey. 

When  the  regiment  was  disbanded,  a  good  many  young  men,  who 
subsequently  reentered  the  service,  availed  themselves  of  the  oppor 
tunity  to  visit  their  homes,  and  thus  enjoy  a  furlough  at  least.  One  of 
them,  a  brave  but  easy  young  fellow,  the  son  of  a  noble  Texan  patriot 
and  gentleman,  useful  and  famous  in  the  history  and  career  of  the  re 
public,  came  back  with  the  rest.  As  he  joyfully  hastened  from  the 
beach  at  Galveston  to  his  father's  house,  he  saw  his  father  sternly  re 
garding  him  from  his  front  porch.  When  he  came  within  speaking 
distance  the  old  gentleman  halted  him  by  inquiring,  in  no  tender  tones, 
"  What  are  you  doing  here,  sir  ?  Your  six  months  are  not  up  !  "  "  The 
regiment  is  disbanded,  father,  and  the  men  have  gone  home;  and  I 
thought  I  would  come  to  see  you,  and  then  go  back."  "  Has  General 
Johnston  come  home?"  "No,  sir."  "Then  go  back;  you  cannot 
come  in  here ! "  The  son  hurried  back  to  the  beach,  got  aboard  a 
schooner,  and  was  with  the  army  in  time  to  share  with  his'  comrades 
under  Shivers  in  the  attack  on  Monterey. 

The  following  letter,  written  soon  after  the  battle  of  Monterey, 
gives  a  sufficient  view  of  the  campaign,  terminating  in  that  fine  feat  of 
arms  : 

MONTEREY,  MEXICO,  September  28, 1846. 

MY  DEAE  Sox :  My  regiment  was  disbanded  at  Camargo  on  the  24th  of  Au 
gust,  under  the  construction  of  the  law  given  by  the  "War  Department  in  reference 
to  six  months'  volunteers.  Soon  after,  General  Taylor  offered  me  the  appoint 
ment  of  inspector-general  of  the  field  division  of  volunteers  under  Major-General 
Butler,  which  I  accepted,  as  I  was  desirous  of  participating  in  the  campaign 
which  was  about  to  commence.  The  army  moved  from  Camargo,  and  was  con 
centrated  at  Ceralvo  on  the  12th ;  and  marched  thence  to  Monterey,  successively 


STORMING   OF  MONTEREY.  137 

in  divisions,  on  the  13th,  14th,  and  15th,  as  follows:  Twiggs's  division  on  the 
13th,  Worth's  on  the  14th,  and  Butler's  on  the  15th.  They  were  again  united  at 
Marin  on  the  17th,  and  arrived  together  at  the  forest  of  St.  Domingo,  three  miles 
from  Monterey,  on  the  19th.  The  19th  and  20th  were  passed  in  reconnoitring 
the  position  of  the  enemy's  defenses  and  making  the  necessary  disposition  for 
the  attack.  These  arrangements  having  been  made,  and  Gen.eral  Worth's  divis 
ion  having  occupied  the  gorge  of  the  mountain  above  the  city  on  the  Saltillo 
road,  the  attack  was  commenced  by  General  Worth,  who  had  by  his  position 
taken  all  their  defenses  in  reverse,  and  pressed  by  him  on  the  21st  until  he  had 
captured  two  of  their  batteries.  At  daylight,  on  the  22d,  he  took  the  height 
which  commanded  a  strong  work  on  the  slope  of  the  hill  in  the  direction  of  the 
city,  at  the  bishop's  palace,  and  on  Wednesday  entered  the  city,  fighting  from 
house  to  house  with  his  infantry  (regulars  and  dismounted  Texans),  and  along 
the  streets  with  his  light  artillery.  In  cooperation  with  the  attack  of  General 
Worth,  General  Taylor  ordered  Twiggs's  division  to  attack  their  admirably  ar 
ranged  and  powerful  system  of  defense  at  the  lower  end  of  the  city;  here  was 
the  means  of  greatest  resistance.  This  attack  was  supported  by  Butler's  divis 
ion,  with  the  exception  of  the  Louisville  Legion,  which  was  ordered  to  take  a 
position  near  the  mortar  which  was  throwing  shells  into  the  main  fort  near  the 
upper  end  of  the  city.  These  divisions  approached  the  city  under  a  tremendous 
shower  of  artillery  and  musketry  from  the  fort  and  numerous  batteries,  suffering 
great  loss.  Twiggs's  division  attacked  the  batteries,  and  afterward  filed  off  by 
the  right  flank  toward  a  tete-de-pont  (a  species  of  fort),  across  a  branch  of  the 
St.  Juan,  which  runs  through  the  city.  The  Tennesseans  and  Mississippians  of 
Butler's  division  and  a  few  regulars  under  Captain  Backus,  moving  rapidly  in 
support,  attacked  the  first  battery  or  redoubt,  a  strong  work  armed  with  artil 
lery  and  escopetas  or  muskets,  and  bravely  carried  the  work  (Alexander  McClung, 
at  the  head  of  the  Mississippians  of  his  wing  of  the  regiment,  being  the  first  to 
enter),  driving  the  enemy  from  it  with  considerable  loss.  The  Ohio  regiment, 
under  Colonel  Mitchell,  entered  the  town  more  to  the  right,  and  attacked  the 
works  with  great  courage  and  spirit;  but  here  was  concentrated  the  fire  of  all 
their  works.  From  this  point,  or  a  little  in  the  rear,  the  regulars  had  been 
forced  back  with  great  loss  of  officers  and  men,  after  keeping  up  the  attack  for 
more  than  an  hour,  and  after  having  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  a  great  number. 
Having  been  ordered  to  retire,  the  Ohio  regiment  did  so  in  tolerably  good  order. 
As  it  debouched  from  the  streets  of  the  city,  believing  that  it  was  routed,  the 
lancers  of  the  enemy  charged  the  Ohio  regiment ;  but  it  had  none  of  the  xim  of 
an  American  charge,  and  was  easily  repulsed  with  some  loss  to  them.  On  the 
night  of  the  22d  the  enemy  abandoned  their  strong  line  of  defense  at  the  lower 
end  of  the  city,  and  retired  to  the  plazas  and  barricades. 

Daring  these  operations  the  light  artillery  and  howitzers  kept  up  a  terrible  fire 
of  shot  and  shells  against  the  enemy.  On  Wednesday,  the  23d,  the  Texans  and 
Mississippians  were  ordered  to  attack  in  the  streets,  and  fight  and  work  their  way 
through  the  houses  to  the  plaza.  These  orders  were  faithfully  executed,  so  that 
at  night  they  had  arrived  as  near  the  public  square  (plaza)  at  the  lower  part  as 
Worth  had  at  the  upper  part  of  the  city.1  On  Thursday  the  Mexicans  sent  in, 

1  It  is  probable,  as  was  subsequently  ascertained,  that  at  the  time  mentioned  Worth's 
command  had  not  got  beyond  the  Plazuela  del  Came.  The  Mississippians  and  Tennes 
seans  on  the  east  had  forced  their  way  to  within  100  yards  of  the  Grand  Plaza. 


138  THE  MEXICAN  WAR. 

early  in  the  morning,  a  white  flag ;  and  during  the  day  articles  of  capitulation 
were  agreed  to,  by  which  the  city,  its  defenses,  public  property,  munitions  of 
war,  etc.,  were  surrendered  to  the  United  States  army,  except  their  army, 
which  is  allowed  to  march  beyond  designated  limits,  viz. :  Rinconada  (the  main 
pass  of  the  mountains),  Linares,  and  St.  Fernando — a  line  passing  through  these 
points  being  the  boundary.  Within  these  limits  the  armies  will  remain  for  eight 
weeks,  or  until  their  respective  governments  can  be  heard  from.  Thus,  after  a 
series  of  brilliant  and  sanguinary  actions,  we  have  possession  of  this  beautiful 
and  strongly-fortified  place.  Butler's  division  sustained  about  half  the  loss  of 
the  army,  say  250  killed  and  wounded,  not  less  and  perhaps  many  more.  Gen 
eral  Butler  was  wounded  in  the  leg,  while  I,  finely  mounted  throughout,  escaped 
with  my  huge  frame  without  a  scratch.  I  endeavored  to  do  my  duty  well,  and 
I  presume  my  conduct  will  be  spoken  of  approvingly.  Send  a  copy  of  this  to 
Henny,  and  my  love  to  your  uncles  George  and  Will,  and  to  Aunt  Mary  and 
Margaret.  Your  affectionate  father, 

A.  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON. 

To  WILLIAM  PBESTON  JOHNSTON. 

To  this  clear  and  succinct  account  of  the  storming  of  Monterey  I 
add  the  following  interesting  description  of  the  desperate  assault  of  the 
Mississippians,  given  me  in  a  letter  from  the  Hon.  Jefferson  Davis,  who 
commanded  them,  with  other  incidents  of  the  battle  : 

The  first  attack  was  made  on  Fort  Taneria,  a  stone  building  covered  by  a 
low  and  hastily-constructed  redoubt.  Twiggs's  brigade,  led  by  Colonel  Garland, 
was  in  advance,  and  after  a  brief  attempt  was  moved  off  to  the  right  into  a 
cornfield.  Then  the  Tennesseans  and  Mississippians  moved  up;  the  former 
were  brought  into  line  to  the  left  of  the  redoubt,  the  Mississippians  on  their 
right  and  in  front  of  the  work.  The  firing  commenced  on  our  side,  and  was 
continued  on  that  of  the  enemy.  In  the  redoubt,  musketeers  lined  the  breast 
work  between  the  pieces  of  artillery,  and  on  the  flat  roof  of  the  Taneria 
musketeers  in  large  numbers  fired  over  the  heads  of  the  men  in  the  redoubt. 
After  firing  a  few  minutes,  it  was  perceptibly  our  best  policy  to  storm  the  cover 
ing  work,  and  I  ordered  my  men  to  advance.  Lieutenant-Colonel  McClung  had 
been  the  captain  of  the  company  raised  in  the  Tombigbee  Valley,  and  which 
was  on  the  left  of  the  centre.  He  sprang  before  it,  and  called  out,  "  Tombigbee 
boys,  follow  me !  "  The  whole  regiment  moved  forward— that  company  most 
rapidly— and  Lieutenant- Colonel  McClung  and  Lieutenant  Patterson  first  sprang 
upon  the  breastwork.  The  Mexicans  ran  hastily  out  of  the  redoubt  to  the  stone 
building  in  the  rear,  and  we  pursued  them  so  closely  that  I  reached  the  gate  as 
they  were  closing  it,  and,  jumping  against  it,  forced  it  open.  The  cry  im 
mediately  went  up  of  surrender,  and  the  officer  supposed  to  be  in  command 
advanced  and  delivered  his  sword. 

After  the  capture  of  the  redoubt  and  the  Fort  Taneria,  I  followed  the  flying 
Mexicans  with  a  large  part  of  my  regiment  to  attack  the  Fort  el  Diablo,  and 
when  near  to  it  was  ordered  back  by  General  Quitman,  the  brigade  com 
mander,  and  directed  to  join  our  division.  It  was  behind  a  long  wall,  and 
under  cross-fire  of  the  artillery  of  the  enemy's  salients  on  our  left.  I  ap 
proached  General  Johnston,  and  told  him  I  had  been  recalled  when  about  to 
take  the  salient  on  our  left,  that  we  were  uselessly  exposed  where  we  were,  and 


DAVIS  AND  JOHNSTON  AT  MONTEREY.  139 

said,  "  If  not  the  left,  then  let  the  right  salient  be  attacked."  He  answered,  with 
his  usual  cairn  manner  and  quick  perception,  "  We  cannot  get  any  orders,  but  if 
you  will  move  your  .regiment  to  the  right  place  the  rest  may  follow  you." 

I  moved  off  across  a  small  stream,  and  through  a  field  to  the  front  of  the 
tete-de-pont,  which  covered  the  front  of  the  Purissima  Bridge,  where  I  met 
Captain  Field,  of  the  United  States  Infantry,  with  his  company,  and  Colonel 
Mansfield,  of  the  United  States  Engineers.  Under  their  advice,  a  plan  was 
formed  for  immediate  attack;  and,  while  we  were  making  the  needful  dispo 
sitions,  General  Hamer,  who  had  in  the  mean  time  succeeded  to  the  command 
of  the  division,  General  Butler  having  been  wounded,  came  up  with  his  com 
mand  and  ordered  me  to  retire.  Both  Colonel  Mansfield  and  I  remonstrated 
with  him,  and  endeavored  to  show  him  the  importance  of  our  position.  He  was 
not  convinced,  but  persisted  in  his  own  view.  My  men  were  withdrawn  from 
the  several  posts  assigned  to  them ;  but  before  this  could  be  done  the  division 
had  gone  a  considerable  distance.  Captain  Field  withdrew  with  me,  and  was 
killed  while  crossing  the  open  field,  by  fire  from  the  main  fort.  This  field  was 
inclosed  by  a  high  fence  made  of  chaparral-bushes  beaten  down  between  up 
right  posts. 

My  regiment  (the  First  Mississippi)  was  following  the  movement  of  the 
division,  and  some  distance  in  the  rear,  when  the  Mexican  Lancers,  seeing  the 
movement  from  off  the  field  of  battle,  came  from  the  direction  of  the  Black 
Fort,  and,  passing  behind  the  column  to  a  place  where  the  fence  was  old  and 
low,  leaped  into  the  cornfield  and  commenced  slaughtering  stragglers  and 
wounded  men.  I  halted  my  regiment,  formed  line  to  the  rear,  and  advanced  on 
the  enemy,  firing.  The  effect  of  this  attack  was  the  sudden  flight  of  the 
lancers,  leaving  a  number  of  killed  and  wounded,  their  leader  being  of  the 
former.  General  Johnston  afterward  spoke  of  it  as  a  remarkable  event  in  war. 

During  the  passage  through  the  cornfield,  General  Hamer  moved  on  until  he 
reached  a  point  where  the  fence  was  too  high  to  be  crossed  by  horsemen ;  a 
deep  irrigating  ditch  was  before  them,  and  the  lancers  in  their  rear.  Your 
father  told  me  that  the  signs  were  such  as  precede  a  rout,  and  he  felt  that  his 
hour  was  near.  His  only  weapon  was  a  sword  I  had  received  from  the  com 
manding  officer  when  we  burst  open  the  gate  of  Fort  Taneria,  and  received  the 
surrender  of  the  garrison,  and  which  subsequently  I  had  handed  to  him.  Other 
reliance  he  had  none.  Just  then,  he  said  he  heard  some  one  giving  orders  in 
tones  welcome  and  familiar  to  his  ear,  and  saw  the  Mississippi  Riflemen  formed 
and  advancing  on  the  enemy.  He  told  me  he  called  General  JIamer's  attention 
to  it. 

During  the  assault  upon  the  city,  General  Johnston  accompanied 
Hamer's  brigade  of  Butler's  division,  remaining  for  the  most  part  with 
Colonel  Mitchell's  First  Ohio  Regiment.  He  was  near  that  officer 
when  he  fell  wounded  in  the  streets  of  Monterey,  at  the  point  mentioned 
by  Mr.  Davis  as  the  place  where  he  met  General  Johnston,  under  the 
converging  fires  of  the  salients.  General  Butler  was  wounded  at  the 
same  point.  General  Johnston's  horse  was  thrice  wounded ;  but, 
though  he  offered  a  conspicuous  mark,  he  would  not  dismount  when 
all  the  officers  around  him  were  dismounted  or  disabled.  He  told  me 
that  his  reason  for  incurring  this  extraordinary  hazard  was,  "  that  he 


140  THE  MEXICAN  WAR. 

was  unwilling  to  risk  separation  from  his  horse,  as  his  efficiency  would 
be  greatly  impaired  if  left  on  foot."  "  There  is  a  friend  that  sticketh 
closer  than  a  brother." 

In  following  the  Ohio  Regiment  from  the  city,  when  he  came  to  the 
irrigating  ditch  mentioned  by  Mr.  Davis,  he  found  it  too  wide  for  his 
horse  to  clear  at  a  leap.  He  dismounted,  and,  forcing  his  horse  into 
the  canal,  crossed  on  a  narrow  plank,  which  he  fortunately  found.  He 
then  discovered  that  his  horse  was  swimming  about,  unable  to  clamber 
up  the  perpendicular  walls  of  the  canal.  He  called  to  his  horse,  who, 
obeying  his  master's  voice,  immediately  swam  to  him.  Leading  the 
good  steed  to  the  lowest  point  in  the  wall,  be  braced  himself,  and,  lift 
ing  him  with  both  hands  by  the  bit,  encouraged  him  to  come  out.  The 
spirited  animal  made  a  desperate  effort,  planted  his  forefeet  on  the 
bank,  and,  with  his  master's  aid,  struggled  out.  The  docility  and  in 
telligence  of  his  gallant  charger  probably  saved  General  Johnston's 
life  on  this  occasion,  as  he  was  left  alone  not  far  from  the  enemy. 

General  Joseph  Hooker,  who  has  subsequently  attained  eminence  in 
the  United  States  Army,  has,  in  a  letter  dated  June  3,  1875,  furnished 
the  following  description  and  generous  estimate  of  General  Johnston's 
conduct  at  Monterey : 

In  approaching  the  subject  of  your  letter,  I  may  premise  with  stating  that 
the  episode  in  the  battle  of  Monterey  to  which  you  allude  was  the  only  real 
service  in  which  I  had  an  opportunity  to  participate  with  your  father.  A  few 
days  before  the  battle  of  Monterey,  his  regiment  returned  to  Texas,  and  your 
father  accepted  the  appointment  of  inspector-general  on  the  staff  of  Major-Gen 
eral  Butler.  At  that  time,  General  Taylor's  army  was  encamped  at  Walnut 
Spring,  four  or  five  miles  in  advance  of  Monterey. 

On  Sunday  morning,  September  21,  1846,  Major-General  Worth  was  dis 
patched  with  his  division  to  take  possession  of  some  high  ground  a  few  miles  to 
the  north  of  Monterey,  and  to  threaten  the  city  via  the  Bishop's  Palace ;  and 
the  following  morning  Garland's  brigade  was  advanced  to  cover  a  reconnaissance 
in  front  of  the  city,  and  at  the  same  time  to  create  a  diversion  in  favor  of  the 
column.  Soon  after  they  left  camp,  we  learned  that  Garland's  troops  were 
engaged  with  the*  enemy,  and  General  Butler's  division  was  at  once  marched 
out  in  support.  As  the  firing  became  brisk,  our  step  was  quickened,  and  by  the 
most  direct  route.  This  took  us  within  point-blank  range  of  a  formidable  bat 
tery  in  the  Black  Fort,  standing  about  a  mile  in  front  of  the  city  in  an  open  and 
level  country.  By  a  short  detour  this  work  might  have  been  avoided,  but,  in 
our  haste  to  join  our  comrades,  we  took  the  shortest  route,  and  did  not  discover 
our  mistake  until  after  we  had  lost  a  number  of  men  from  the  enemy's  batteries. 
Our  men  became  confused,  and,  just  at  that  moment,  the  enemy's  lancers  were 
seen  to  sally  out  from  behind  the  fort,  and  to  make  toward  us. 

From  causes,  which  I  do  not  now  remember,  our  troops,  from  the  moment 
•we  left  the  Kio  Gr'ande,  had  invested  the  enemy's  lancers  with  a  good  deal  of 
prowess ;  and,  as  soon  as  it  was  announced,  all  organization  was  lost,  and  our 
men  were  flying  to  the  left  in  the  direction  of  a  cornfield  a  few  hundred  yards 


GENERAL  JOSEPH  HOOKER'S  NARRATIVE. 

off.  This  was  inclosed  by  a  strong  chaparral-fence,  formed  by  piling  in  cha 
parral-branches  between  posts  driven  six  or  eight  inches  apart,  and  the  fence 
itself  was  so  substantial  that  it  was  as  good  as  a  stone-wall  of  corresponding 
height  for  defensive  purposes  against  cavalry.  It  was  no  discredit  to  new  troops, 
in  my  opinion,  to  break  under  the  circumstances,  as  it  was  the  first  time  they 
had  been  exposed  to  fire  from  artillery,  where  they  had  no  opportunity  to  return 
it  with  their  own  weapons. 

It  was  thought  by  myself  that,  when  they  had  gotten  over  the  fence,  they 
would  stop  and  receive  the  enemy,  it  being  a  perfectly  safe  place ;  but,  when  I 
rode  up  to  the  fence,  I  found  that  the  men  had  not  stopped,  but  were  continuing 
to  run  to  the  rear  through  the  corn.  As  they  had  nowhere  thrown  down  the 
fence  in  climbing  over  it,  and  as  it  was  too  high  to  leap,  I  dismounted,  and  made 
into  the  corn  on  foot,  when  I  first  met  your  father  in  trying  to  bring  and  keep 
the  men  up  to  their  work.  The  artillery  of  the  enemy  was  playing  on  us  all 
the  time,  and  appeared  to  be  much  more  severe,  I  suppose,  than  it  really  was. 
The  shots  made  more  fuss  in  the  corn-leaves  in  their  flight  than  if  uninterrupted 
in  the  open  air.  We  succeeded  in  keeping  about  150  or  200  men  up  to  the 
fence ;  and,  after  a  discharge  or  two  of  our  pieces,  emptying  many  saddles,  the 
lancers  retired  and  gave  us  no  further  annoyance. 

It  was  all  the  work  of  a  few  moments,  but  was  long  enough  to  satisfy  me  of 
the  character  of  your  father.  It  was  through  his  agency,  mainly,  that  our 
division  was  saved  from  a  cruel  slaughter ;  and  the  effect  on  the  part  of  the 
army,  serving  on  that  side  of  the  town,  would  have  been  almost,  if  not  quite, 
irreparable.  The  coolness  and  magnificent  presence  your  father  displayed  on 
this  field,  brief  as  it  was,  left  an  impression  on  my  mind  that  I  have  never  for 
gotten.  They  prepared  me  for  the  stirring  accounts  related  to  me  by  his 
companions  on  the  Utah  campaign,  and  for  his  almost  godlike  deeds  on  the 
field  on  which  he  fell,  at  Shiloh. 

General  Johnston  probably  entered  the  cornfield  a  few  minutes 
later  than  General  Hooker,  or  at  a  different  point,  as  he  told  the 
writer  that  the  rush  of  the  men  in  retreat  broke  down  a  space  in 
the  fence,  through  which  he  easily  rode.  He  alluded  in  complimentary 
terms  to  General  (then  Captain)  Hooker's  bearing  and  efforts.  He 
cited  the  quickness  of  the  Ohioans  to  avail  themselves  of  the  chapar 
ral-fence  as  a  barrier  against  cavalry  so  soon  as  it  was  pointed  out  to 
them,  as  a  proof  of  the  intelligence  of  the  American  soldier,  even  when 
a  recruit. 

Some  days  before  the  battle,  there  had  been  an  unpleasant  official 
difference,  reaching  high  words,  between  General  Johnston  and  Brig 
adier-General  Hamer.  This  officer  had  been  a  member  of  Congress, 
and  was  appointed  by  President  Polk,  because  of  his  political  impor 
tance.  He  was  not  a  soldier,  but  he  was  a  very  gallant  and  estimable 
gentleman.  On  the  field  he  found  the  counsel  and  assistance  of  General 
Johnston  of  the  utmost  value  to  him.  He  was  a  man  of  quick  and 
generous  emotions ;  and,  that  night,  after  the  fight  was  done,  he  came 
to  General  Johnston,  and,  with  tears  standing  in  his  eyes,  took  him  by 


142  THE  MEXICAN  WAR. 

both  hands,  and  told  him  he  wished  henceforth  to  be  accounted  his 
friend.  General  Johnston  felt  a  deep  regret  when  Harner,  shortly 
after,  fell  a  victim  to  the  climate.  It  was  believed  that,  had  he  survived, 
he  would  have  been  the  next  Governor  of  Ohio. 

General  Butler  and  General  Taylor  certified  on  General  Johnston's 
pay-account  that,  as  inspector-general,  "  he  performed  the  duties  of  the 
office  on  the  march  from  Camargo,  and  during  the  operations  before 
Monterey,  resulting  in  its  capture,  with  zeal,  efficiency,  and  courage  ; 
and  that  his  services  were  eminently  important  to  the  public  interest." 
General  Butler  also  complimented  him  in  his  report ;  and  both  he  and 
General  Taylor  recommended  him  for  the  position  of  brigadier-general. 
But  military  recommendations  counted  for  little  at  that  time,  when  gen 
erals  were  neither  born  nor  made,  but  manufactured  to  order.  He  was 
even  refused  pay  by  the  Government  for  this  month  in  which  he  had 
done  such  good  service,  on  the  ground  that  his  assignment  by  the  com 
manding  general  gave  him  no  legal  status.  He  was  thus  thrust,  as  it 
were,  from  the  United  States  service.  Happy  and  fortunate  the  people 
who  can  afford  to  cast  aside  as  superfluous  a  soldier  so  willing  and 
capable ! 

It  was  a  great  pleasure  to  General  Johnston  to  meet  again  in  this 
campaign  his  early  comrade-in-arms,  Jefferson  Davis.  Mr.  Davis  had 
resigned  from  the  army  in  1835,  and  retired  to  his  plantation  near 
Vicksburg,  Mississippi,  where  he  lived  in  seclusion  until  1844.  He 
then  appeared  in  political  life  as  presidential  elector,  and  the  next 
year  was  elected  to  Congress.  At  the  breaking  out  of  the  Mexican 
War  he  was  elected  colonel  of  the  First  Mississippi  Rifles,  which  under 
his  command  won  great  distinction  at  Monterey,  and  subsequently  at 
Buena  Vista  performed  exploits  which  made  the  Union  ring  with  applause. 

Colonel  Davis  was  selected  by  General  Taylor  as  one  of  the  com 
missioners  to  negotiate  for  the  capitulation  of  Monterey.  In  speaking 
of  these  events,  Mr.  Davis  has  frequently  related  a  circumstance 
illustrative  of  General  Johnston's  character.  He  said  that  General 
Johnston  excelled  all  the  men  he  had  ever  known,  in  consistency  of 
conduct  and  in  equanimity  and  decisiveness.  Every  action  seemed 
weighed  beforehand.  The  smaller  as  well  as  the  greater  acts  of  his 
life  showed  these  traits.  If  he  met  a  man  in  the  street,  whose  un 
certainty  of  movement  indicated  that  he  would  blunder  against  him, 
he  would  calmly  stop  and  allow  the  man  to  take  his  choice  on  the  path, 
thus  avoiding  the  unseemly  jostling  that  sometimes  occurs.  No  apol 
ogy  is  necessary  for  offering  the  following  incident  of  the  capitulation, 
which  I  have  heard  from  the  lips  of  both  Mr.  Davis  and  General  John 
ston,  in  the  language  of  the  former.  He  writes  as  follows : 

"When  the  commissioners  had  completed  their  labors,  and  written  out  the 
terms  of  capitulation  in  English  and  Spanish,  each  to  be  signed  by  both  of  the 


PERILOUS  ADVENTURE.  143 

commanding  generals,  there  was  a  manifest  purpose  on  the  part  of  General 
Ampudia  to  delay  and  to  chaffer.  I  left  him,  after  an  unpleasant  interview,  with 
a  promise  on  his  part  to  give  me  General  Taylor's  draft  with  his  (Ampudia's)  sig 
nature,  as  early  in  the  morning  as  I  would  call  for  it.  At  dawn  of  day,  I  mounted 
my  horse  and  started  for  the  town,  about  three  miles  distant.  General  Taylor, 
always  an  early  riser,  heard  the  horse's  feet  as  I  passed  by  his  tent,  and  called  to 
me,  asking  where  I  was  going,  then  inviting  me  to  take  a  cup  of  coffee  with 
him.  The  question  was  answered,  and  the  invitation  declined,  having  already 
had  coffee.  Your  father,  seeing  me  on  horseback,  came  from  his  tent  to  learn 
the  cause  of  it,  and  proposed  to  go  with  me.  General  Taylor  promptly  said  he 
wished  he  would  do  so;  and,  as  soon  as  his  horse  could  be  saddled,  he  joined 
me,  and  we  rode  on  for  General  Ampudia's  headquarters,  at  the  Grand  Plaza  of 
Monterey. 

As  we  approached  the  entrance  to  the  plaza,  the  flat  roofs  of  the  houses  were 
seen  to  be  occupied  by  infantry  in  line  and  under  arms.  The  barricade  across 
the  street,  behind  which  was  artillery,  showed  the  gunners  in  place,  and  the 
port-fires  blazing.  It  may  well  be  asked,  Why  should  they  fire  on  us?  The  only 
answer  is,  the  indications  were  strong  that  they  intended  to  do  so.  We  were  rid 
ing  at  a  walk,  and  continued  to  advance  at  the  same  gait.  Your  father  suggested 
we  should  raise  our  white  handkerchiefs;  and  thus  we  rode  up  to  the  battery. 
Addressing  the  captain,  I  told  him  that  I  was  there  by  appointment  to  meet 
General  Ampudia,  and  wished  to  pass.  He  sent  a  soldier  to  the  rear,  with 
orders  which  we  could  not  hear.  After  waiting  a  due  time,  the  wish  to  pass 
was  stated  as  before.  Again  the  captain  sent  off  a  soldier ;  and  a  third  time 
was  this  repeated,  none  of  the  soldiers  returning.  In  this  state  of  affairs  we 
saw  the  adjutant-general  of  Ampudia  coming  on  horseback.  We  knew  that 
ho  spoke  English,  and  that,  as  the  chief  of  the  commander's  staff,  he  was 
aware  of  my  appointment  and  could  relieve  us  of  our  detention.  There  was  a 
narrow  space  between  the  end  of  the  breastwork  and  the  wall  of  the  house, 
barely  sufficient  for  one  horse  to  pass  at  a  time.  We  were  quite  near  to  this 
passage,  and  as  the  adjutant-general  advanced,  evidently  with  the  intention  to 
ride  through,  I  addressed  him,  stating  my  case,  and  remonstrated  on  the  dis 
courtesy  with  which  we  had  been  treated.  He  turned  to  the  captain,  and, 
speaking  in  Spanish,  and  with  such  rapid  utterance  that  we  could  not  compre 
hend  the  meaning,  he  put  his  horse  in  motion  to  go  through.  Quick  and  daring 
in  action,  as  slow  and  mild  in  speech,  your  father  said,  "  Had  we  not  better  keep 
him  with  us? "  We  squared  our  horses  so  as  to  prevent  his  passing,  and  told 
him  it  would  much  oblige  us  if  he  would  accompany  us  to  the  quarters  of 
General  Ampudia.  He  appreciated  both  his  necessity  and  our  own ;  and,  feign 
ing  great  pleasure  in  attending -us,  he  turned  back  and  conducted  us  to  his 
chief. 

Whether  the  danger  of  being  fired  on  was  as  great  as  it  seemed,  cannot  be 
determined ;  but  the  advantage  of  having  the  well-known  chief  of  staff  ex 
posed  to  any  fire  which  should  be  aimed  at  us  will  be  readily  perceived.  On 
this,  as  on  many  other  occasions,  during  our  long  acquaintance,  your  father 
exhibited  that  quick  perception  and  decision  which  characterize  the  military 
genius.  The  occasion  may  seem  small  to  others ;  it  was  great  to  us.  Together 
we  had  seen  the  sun  rise ;  and  the  chances  seemed  to  both,  many  to  one,  that 
neither  of  us  would  ever  see  it  set.  Ampudia  received  us  with  the  extravagant 


144:  THE  MEXICAN  WAR, 

demonstrations  of  his  nation,  ordered  our  horses  to  be  taken  care  of,  and  invited 
us  to  breakfast  with  him.  Declining  the  invitation,  he  was  reminded  of  the  ob 
ject  of  our  visit,  and  of  the  desire  to  avoid  further  delay  in  the  exchange  of  the 
articles  of  capitulation.  He  promptly  delivered  the  duplicate  left  with  him, 
which  he  had  signed ;  and  we  took  formal  leave  of  him. 

A  little  incident  occurred  during  our  brief  visit,  which  illustrates  one  aspect 
of  the  Mexican  character.  In  the  "  Black-Hawk  "  campaign,  your  father  had 
given  me  one  of  a  pair  of  pistols,  and  it  was  in  my  holster  when  our  horses 
were  in  charge  of  Ampudia's  orderly.  After  we  had  ridden,  perhaps  a  mile, 
out  of  Monterey,  on  our  way  to  General  Taylor's  headquarters,  in  leaping  a 
ditch  the  flap  of  my  holster  flew  up,  and  I  discovered  that  the  pistol  had  been 
stolen  while  we  were  holding  an  official  interview  with  the  general-in-chief, 
It  was  the  loss  of  a  weapon  valued  more  for  its  associations  than  its  intrinsic 
worth,  though  it  was  the  best  one  I  ever  owned ;  and  the  petty  pillage  was  in 
bold  contrast  with  the  grandiloquent  professions  with  which  we  had  been  enter 
tained,  and  the  rich  appointments  of  the  headquarters  where  we  were  received. 

Great  in  small  things  as  in  large  ones,  measuring  matters  with  the  exact 
ness  of  cold  calculation,  yet  keenly  alive  to  every  demand  of  honor  or  of 
courtesy,  or  of  personal  or  official  obligation,  General  Johnston  was  a  friend 
to  whom  one  could  go  for  counsel  in  the  most  delicate  affair  of  life,  and  equally 
rely  on  where  personal  hazards  were  to  be  taken,  or  values  in  business  trans 
actions  to  be  balanced.  Viewing  him,  as  I  did,  through  the  medium  of  ardent 
affection,  my  estimate  might  seem  the  result  of  bias  were  it  not  sustained  by 
all  who  knew  him  intimately.  General  Z.  Taylor,  whose  judgment  of  soldiers 
was  wellnigh  unerring,  gave  full  evidence  of  his  high  appreciation  of  your 
father,  both  as  an  officer  and  as  a  man.  But  this  is  a  theme  on  which  I  feel 
so  warmly  and  know  s6  much,  that  even  to  his  son  there  is  danger  of  my  be 
coming  prolix  in  speaking  of  your  father ;  therefore  I  desist. 

General  Johnston  told  the  author  that  his  only  embarrassment  in 
accompanying  Colonel  Davis  was  his  dress.  By  an  accident  at  Point 
Isabel,  his  uniform  had  been  soaked  with  sea-water,  and  shrunken  out 
of  shape  ;  and  hence  his  garb  v? as,  per  force,  a  red-flannel  shirt,  blue- 
jean  pants,  a  torn  check  coat,  and  a  wide-awake  hat ;  a  costume 
picturesque,  but  undiplomatic.  Colonel  Davis  made  light  of  the  diffi 
culty,  and  so  he  waived  it.  This  trifling  circumstance  led,  however, 
to  a  little  incident  which,  though  in  itself  grotesque,  increased  the 
danger  of  the  situation  already  described  in  Mr.  Davis's  letter.  While 
they  were  waiting  at  the  barricade,  with  the  dark  faces  of  the  Mexican 
soldiers  glowering  at  them  over  the  parapet,  a  rabble  gathered  around 
them  with  menacing  gestures.  One  old  hag,  darting  from  the  mob, 
thrust  out  her  skinny  finger  toward  General  Johnston  and  hissed  out, 
"  Tejano  !  "  Her  divination  of  his  nationality  was  probably  due  to  his 
uncouth  attire.  But  such  was  the  hatred  of  the  lower  Mexicans  to  the 
Texans,  that  immediately  the  aspect  of  the  mob  became  more  threaten 
ing  ;  and  they  were  probably  saved  from  violence  only  by  the  oppor 
tune  arrival  of  Ampudia's  adjutant-general. 

As  it  was  evident  that  the  capitulation  and  armistice  closed  active 


UNCOMPLIMENTARY  RECOGNITION.  145 

operations  for  some  time,  General  Johnston,  having  no  fixed  rank  or 
employment  recognized  by  the  Government,  thought  it  right  to  retire 
until  there  should  be  some  call  for  his  services. 


CHAPTER  X. 

PLANTATION-LIFE. 

GENERAL  JOHNSTON  returned  to  Galveston  in  October,  and  was  re 
ceived  with  enthusiasm  by  its  citizens,  with  whom  he  was  always  a 
favorite.  A  public  dinner  was  tendered  him,  which  his  business,  how 
ever,  compelled  him  to  decline.  A  question  of  the  utmost  importance 
to  himself  now  came  before  General  Johnston  for  decision.  When  he 
had  gone  to  General  Taylor's  assistance  in  May,  he  had  promised  his 
wife,  who  strongly  opposed  his  volunteering,  that  he  would  not  reenlist 
at  the  expiration  of  his  term  of  service  without  her  consent.  He  knew 
that  she  was  too  high-spirited  to  insist  on  his  retirement  while  in  the 
line  of  either  duty  or  distinction.  But  he  had  come  back  from  the  army 
with  a  heavy  heart.  When  the  war  broke  out,  rank  and  celebrity  seemed 
to  await  him,  and  the  opportunity  had  apparently  arrived  when  his  abil 
ities  would  find  a  fair  field  for  their  display;  but  liis  brief  career  had 
ended  in  disappointment.  He  had  seen  the  regiment,  which  he  had  con 
verted  into  a  powerful  engine  of  war,  dissolved  before  his  eyes  by  a 
stroke  of  the  pen.  Though  he  had  done  all  that  a  man  could  do  under 
the  circumstances,  and  had  won  the  approbation  and  esteem  of  his  com 
manders  and  fellow-soldiers,  his  services  were  not  such  as  his  Govern 
ment  chose  to  acknowledge.  It  was  almost  an  avowed  policy  to  confer 
military  command  as  the  reward  of  political  activity;  and  party  notables, 
transformed  into  generals  and  accompanied  by  special  correspondents 
for  the  manufacture  of  glory,  became  the  centres  of  faction  and  the 
ephemeral  heroes  of  the  press.  Such  methods  and  appliances  were  not 
only  discouraging  to  merit  and  distasteful  to  real  soldiers,  but,  detected 
at  last  by  the  newspapers  and  people,  recoiled  on  the  pretenders.  Still, 
for  the  time,  confounding  spurious  and  genuine  reputation,  they  repelled 
many  good  soldiers  from  the  service. 

General  Johnston  was  not  without  sufficient  influence  to  have  ar 
rested  the  attention  of  the  Administration  and  enforced  some  sort  of 
recognition  of  his  claims;  but  such  a  course  of  procedure  was  alto 
gether  foreign  to  his  nature  and  principles,  and  rank  or  power  thus 
attained  would  have  afforded  him  no  gratification.  He  valued  these  as 
the  symbols  of  accorded  merit  and  the  opportunity  of  more  useful  ser- 


146  PLANTATION-LIFE. 

vices.  His  inclination  was  to  return  to  the  army  as  a  volunteer,  and  do 
whatever  work  came  to  his  hand.  It  was  the  natural  desire  of  a  profes 
sional  soldier,  unwilling  to  rust  while  others  mingled  in  the  fray.  On 
the  other  hand,  he  was  no  mere  military  adventurer,  and  there  was  no 
call  of  patriotic  duty  upon  him  when  there  was  an  excess  of  soldiers 
impatient  for  the  same  service,  and  a  Government  that  did  not  want  his 
sword.  His  wife,  moreover,  insisted  upon  a  fulfillment  of  his  promise 
not  to  rejoin  the  army  against  her  consent.  Untrammeled,  he  would 
probably  have  followed  professional  instincts  and  returned  to  the  field ; 
but  the  claims  of  his  family  upon  him  were  very  strong,  and  he  finally 
determined  to  yield  to  the  wishes  of  his  wife,  abandon  the  military  pro 
fession  forever,  and  enter  upon  the  peaceful  pursuits  of  agriculture. 
This  step  was  not  taken  without  a  severe  mental  struggle ;  but,  when 
once  taken,  all  the  force  of  a  resolute  will  was  exerted  to  banish  vain 
regrets,  and  conform  his  mental  habits  to  the  mode  of  life  adopted. 

The  author  takes  pleasure,  as  an  act  of  gratitude  and  of  filial  duty, 
in  recording  an  instance  of  General  Johnston's  self-abnegation  and  gen 
erosity.  As  tenant  by  the  courtesy,  he  possessed  a  life-estate  in  the 
property  inherited  from  his  first  wife  by  her  children.  Considering  the 
avails  not  more  than  sufficient  for  their  education,  maintenance,  and 
start  in  life,  he  divested  himself  of  his  life-estate,  and  surrendered  it  for 
the  benefit  of  these  children. 

With  the  small  means  now  at  his  command  he  bought  the  simple 
furniture,  utensils,  and  supplies,  required  in  the  humble  home  to  which 
he  was  retiring,  and  such  stock,  farm-implements,  and  seed,  as  were 
absolutely  necessary.  His  housekeeping  was  in  a  style  as  primitive  as 
any  of  the  pioneers.  A  double  log-cabin,  covered  with  clapboards,  and 
fronted  with  a  wide  porch,  gave  a  rude  shelter;  and  the  pine  tables, 
hickory  chairs,  and  other  household  effects,  might  have  suited  a  camp 
better  than  a  permanent  establishment.  Such  as  they  were,  they  suf 
ficed  for  his  wants. 

The  China  Grove  plantation,  to  which  he  removed,  was  situated 
partly  in  the  alluvial  bottom-lands  of  Oyster  Creek,  a  stream  nearly 
parallel  with  the  Brazos  River,  and  partly  in  the  flat  and  rather  sandy 
prairie  that  stretched  away  toward  Galveston  Bay.  Three  or  four  hun 
dred  acres,  constituting  "  the  plantation  "  proper,  had  been  cleared  of 
the  dense  timber  and  undergrowth  of  the  primeval  forest,  which  still 
shaded  nearly  a  thousand  acres  more;  while  toward  the  south  and  east 
a  square  league  of  prairie,  waving  with  the  luxuriant  grasses  of  the  coast- 
lands,  afforded  ample  pasture  for  herds  of  cattle  which  ranged  at  will.  A 
belt  of  thick  woods,  eight  or  ten  miles  wide,  almost  pathless,  filled  with 
all  manner  of  wild  beasts  and  game,  thick  set  with  jungle,  and  conceal 
ing  miasmatic  swamps  caused  by  the  annual  overflow  of  the  river, 
reached  almost  to  the  doors.  A  fever-breeding  malaria  exhaled  from 


TEXAN   SCENERY. 

these  marshes  and  crept  toward  the  prairie,  where  it  was  met  by  the 
salt  sea-breeze,  which,  sweeping  steadily  across  the  broad  savanna, 
mastered  it  with  a  doubtful  victory.  The  open  friend  was  always  glad 
ly  welcomed;  the  secret  foe  sometimes  laid  its  poisonous  finger  on  an 
unsuspecting  household. 

From  the  front  porch  the  view  extended  as  far  as  the  eye  could 
reach  over  a  grassy  plain,  unbroken  except  by  an  occasional  fringe  or 
mot  of  distant  timber.  To  a  lover  of  Nature  in  all  her  moods,  like  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  this  vast  amphitheatre  was  a  source  of  continual  pleas 
ure.  Everywhere  were  the  evidences  of  fertility;  and  Nature  offered 
to  the  observant  eye  all  the  beauty  that  a  level  surface,  unaided  by  art, 
could  afford. 

In  early  spring  an  emerald  sward,  embroidered  with  the  blue  lupin, 
the  crimson  phlox,  the  fragrant  and  flossy  mimosa,  and  a  thousand  flow 
ers  of  varied  perfume  and  hue,  invited  great  herds  of  deer  to  browse 
upon  the  tender  grass,  while  the  long-horned  cattle,  scarcely  less  wild, 
watched  with  startled  eyes  the  unfrequent  traveler.  Innumerable  flights 
of  wild-fowl  circled  and  settled  in  the  shallow  pools  left  by  the  winter 
rains.  Cranes,  herons,  wild-geese,  brants,  ducks,  and  sea-birds,  gulls, 
curlews,  and  others,  made  this  their  feeding-ground.  Summer  saw  the 
tall,  yellow  grass  waving  like  a  sea  of  gold,  and  the  transforming  power 
of  a  Southern  sun  and  moist  atmosphere  working  the  marvels  of  the 
mirage.  In  winter  came  the  long  rains  driving  slant,  or  the  air  cleared 
by  the  bracing  norther,  or  the  midnight  sky  lit  by  a  distant  or  nearer 
circle  of  flame  that  marked  the  movement  of  the  prairie-fire.  Over  all 
was  solitude  with  its  narrowing,  strengthening  influences,  its  lessons  of 
self-reliance  and  self-denial,  and  its  invitations  to  self-communion  and 
the  study  of  Nature. 

General  Johnston's  family,  when  he  settled  on  the  China  Grove 
plantation,  consisted  of  his  wife  and  infant  son,  a  negro  man  and  his 
wife,  two  negro  boys  and  a  girl.  Of  course,  he  did  not  expect  to  be 
able  to  work  the  place  with  this  force,  but  merely  to  find  shelter  and 
food  until  he  could  either  sell  the  land  and  obtain  a  less  costly  home,  or 
secure  labor  sufficient  to  work  it.  He  preferred  this  latter  course,  by 
means  of  which  he  could  easily  have  extricated  himself  from  debt  and 
derived  a  handsome  revenue.  But,  although,  in  view  of  the  large  immi 
gration  of  planters  to  Texas,  he  had  just  grounds  for  believing  this  plan 
feasible,  he  was,  from  causes  not  necessary  to  enter  into  here,  continu 
ally  disappointed  in  his  hopes.  By  the  application  of  the  rent  to  re 
pairs  he  had  managed  to  keep  the  plantation  in  tolerable  order  and 
cultivation  from  its  purchase  until  his  own  arrival  there ;  and  now,  by 
his  personal  supervision  and  labor,  he  made  it  a  desirable  home. 

In  this  secluded  spot  he  was  buried  for  three  years.  His  chief  busi 
ness  was  to  make  a  crop  of  Indian-corn,  for  bread  for  his  family  and 


148  PLANTATION-LIFE. 

forage  for  his  work-animals ;  a  crop  of  cotton,  for  the  purchase  of  sup 
plies  ;  a  small  crop  of  sugar-cane  ;  and  an  ample  supply  of  all  sorts  of 
vegetables.  To  these  ends  he  gave  a  good  deal  of  hard  labor  in  the 
field  and  garden,  but  he  did  not  neglect  the  simple  but  delightful  recre 
ation  of  the  flower-garden.  His  house  was  shaded  by  a  grove  of  the 
fragrant  pride  of  China,  and  the  spacious  yard  contained  towering  live- 
oaks,  pecans,  and  other  beautiful  native  forest-trees.  A  hedge  of  Cher 
okee  rose  with  its  snowy  bloom  protected  the  inclosure ;  and  an  ample 
orchard  of  figs  and  peaches  furnished  its  fruits  for  the  table.  When 
General  Johnston  went  there,  he  was  told  leeks  were  the  only  vegetable 
that  would  thrive,  but  he  soon  proved  that  hardly  any  vegetable  known 
to  American  gardens  would  fail  under  ordinary  care.  It  is  true  that  he 
was  careful,  patient,  industrious,  and  skillful  in  plant-nurture ;  but  all 
this  is  necessary  to  the  best  success  anywhere. 

The  frequent  allusions  in  his  correspondence  to  his  own  share  in  the 
labor  of  the  plantation  sprang  from  an  honest  pride  in  doing  well  in 
every  part  of  the  work  he  had  undertaken.  I  remember  that  some  years 
after,  when  he  had  changed  his  occupation,  a  wealthy  and  cultivated 
friend  with  whom  we  were  dining  very  ingeniously  maintained  the 
theory  that  manual  labor  .unfitted  a  man  for  the  higher  reaches  of 
thought  and  spheres  of  action.  "  What  you  say,"  replied  Genera] 
Johnston,  "  seems  very  plausible,  but  self-love  forbids  me  to  agree  with 
you.  I  have  ploughed,  and  planted,  and  gathered  the  harvest.  The 
spade,  the  hoe,  the  plough,  and  the  axe,  are  familiar  to  my  hands,  and 
that  not  for  recreation,  but  for  bread." 

He  had  but  one  near  neighbor,  Colonel  Warren  D.  C.  Hall,  who, 
with  his  wife,  rendered  General  Johnston's  family  every  friendly  office 
that  kind  hearts  could  suggest.  Colonel  Hall  was  one  of  Austin's  colo 
nists,  and  prominent  in  the  earlier  conflicts  of  the  revolutionary  strug 
gle.  He  was  elderly,  and  had  not  been  fortunate ;  so  that  his  large 
estate  was  laboring  under  embarrassments,  from  which  I  believe  it  was 
subsequently  relieved.  He  was  a  bold,  warm-hearted,  hospitable  planter. 
He  and  his  wife  were  childless,  but  their  affections  went  out  to  cheer 
all  about  them.  As  almost  the  only  family  that  General  and  Mrs. 
Johnston  saw  in  their  years  of  plantation-life,  this  notice  seems  to  me 
brief ;  but  the  record  of  the  amenities  that  sweeten  life  are  written 
elsewhere  than  in  printed  books. 

I  trust  that  some  recollections  of  the  earlier  part  of  my  father's  stay 
at  China  Grove  will  not  be  considered  an  obtrusive  introduction  of  my 
own  personality  into  this  memoir.  But  as  his  treatment  of  me  illus 
trates  not  only  many  of  his  views  but  some  of  his  characteristics,  what 
might  otherwise  seem  an  unnecessary  self-display  will,  I  hope,  be  par 
doned.  Soon  after  establishing  himself  on  the  plantation,  my  father 
sent  for  me  to  visit  him,  and  I  spent  about  three  months  from  New-Year's 


PERSONAL   REMINISCENCES.  149 

(1847)  there.  It  is  proper  to  say  that  he  had  always  treated  me  with  a 
confidence  and  consideration  proportioned  not  at  all  to  my  merits,  nor 
probably  even  to  his  conception  of  them,  but  to  the  ideal  which  he  set 
before  me  as  worthy  of  imitation.  His  rule  with  children  was  to  give 
them  a  character,  that  they  would  try  to  live  up  to  it.  He  was  an  indul 
gent  husband,  father,  and  master.  He  viewed  the  conduct  of  others 
with  charitable  eye,  and  made  their  opportunities  the  measure  of  their 
responsibilities.  While  he  did  not  expect  in  slaves  the  virtues  of  free 
men,  he  incited  them  to  well-doing  by  kindness,  and  tried  hard  to  raise 
their  moral  tone  by  a  ready  recognition  of  their  good  traits.  Few 
people  wished  or  attempted  to  resist  his  authority.  He  had  the  gift  of 
command.  Though  his  sway  was  gentle,  I,  at  least,  felt  that  its  con 
straint  was  absolute.  He  was  no  believer  in  the  rod,  or  in  any  form  of 
terror,  which  he  said  made  cowards  and  liars.  His  appeal  was  always 
to  the  reason  and  moral  nature,  and  was  made  with  irresistible  force 
and  persuasiveness.  His  children  were  his  companions  and  friends,  and 
this  without  sacrifice  of  his  dignity  or  of  their  filial  relation.  The  sym 
pathy  was  very  deep  and  tender  ;  but  it  was  accompanied  by  a  sense  of 
grateful  obligation  and  the  perception  that  they  had  been  lifted  to  his 
moral  plane,  from  which  an  unworthy  act  would  hopelessly  banish  them. 

When  I  went  to  Brazoria  County  I  was  a  lad  of  sixteen,  with  health 
and  strength  somewhat  impaired  by  too  rapid  growth,  and,  as  my  father 
imagined,  by  too  much  study.  To  remedy  my  defect  of  vigor,  he  set 
me  to  hunting,  riding,  digging,  planting,  and  other  kinds  of  exercise, 
on  which  I  entered  with  the  same  enthusiasm  I  had  given  to  books,  and 
from  which  I  derived  great  benefit  in  many  ways. 

For  some  months  I  was  his  companion  in  the  labors  of  the  farm  and 
garden.  I  was  allowed  to  rive  out,  sharpen,  and  nail  on  the  pickets  of 
a  long  line  of  fence,  and  to  dig  a  trench  a  quarter  of  a  mile  long  and 
two  feet  or  more  in  width  and  depth,  on  the  embankment  of  which  I 
planted  a  hedge  of  the  Cherokee  rose.  In  this  last  venture  my  instruct 
or  was  our  Irish  ditcher,  named  John.  John,  in  personal  appearance, 
might  have  passed  for  a  doctor  of  divinity,  and,  barring  an  occasional 
spree,  was  an  honest  fellow,  with  a  rich  vein  of  Irish  humor.  Once 
having  returned  from  a  fortnight's  frolic,  sick,  sober,  and  penitent,  he 
was  groaning  rheurnatically  over  his  spade,  when,  desiring  "  to  improve 
the  occasion  "  for  his  benefit,  I  opened  up  a  lecture  on  temperance  and 
thrift.  Probably  not  wishing  to  discuss  delicate  questions,  John  silenced 
me  by  this  assurance :  "  You  misconsthrue  the  whole  matter  intirely, 
Misther  William.  It  is  gout  I  have.  I  am  sufferin'  for  another  man's 
sins,  you  see.  It  all  comes  of  me  father  drinking  claret  at  a  guinea  a 
bottle  ! " 

After  I  left  Texas  my  father  wrote  me :  "  Old  John  has  greatly  la 
mented  your  absence.  Mr.  Will  is  still  the  subject  of  the  greatest 


150  PLANTATION-LIFE. 

laudation  with  him.  He  has  finished  his  ditch,  greatly  to  his  own  de 
light  and  to  my  praise  as  a  judicious  farmer,  and  to  the  disgrace  of 
other  farmers  who  have  neglected  such  means  of  improvement,  '  though 
so  long  stopping  in  the  counthry."1 " 

My  father  encouraged  me  to  hunt,  and  sometimes  accompanied  me. 
His  deliberation  and  steadiness  of  hand  made  him  a  very  successful 
shot;  though  at  other  times  he  limited  his  destructiveness  by  the  needs 
of  the  larder,  and  said  that  he  was  "  not  a  true  sportsman,  but  a  mere 
butcher,  who  hunted  for  meat." 

There  was  a  great  variety  of  game  in  the  neighborhood.  Besides  the 
water-fowl  which  have  been  mentioned,  wild-turkeys,  grouse,  and  quail, 
were  plentiful ;  a  single  shot  supplied  a  dinner  of  robins  or  rice-birds  ; 
hares  and  squirrels  were  a  nuisance  to  the  crops,  and  there  was  no  lack 
of  the  larger  game.  On  the  prairie  grazed  long  lines  of  deer,  marshaled 
like  the  open  files  of  a  cavalry  brigade ;  and  in  the  woods  a  fat  bear  was 
a  frequent  victim.  Panthers  and  wild-cats  were  often  met  with.  I  re 
member  my  father's  shooting  a  wild-goose  feeding  on  the  prairie  at  the 
measured  distance  of  140  yards.  Though  shot  through  the  liver  with  a 
half-ounce  ball,  it  rose  and  flew  several  hundred  yards.  In  a  healed 
wound  were  found  several  long  slugs,  which  he  recognized  as  Canadian 
in  manufacture.  On  another  occasion,  seeing  three  wild-turkeys  ap 
proaching  him  en  echelon,  he  waited  till  he  had  them  all  in  range,  when 
he  fired.  A  twenty-pound  gabbler  dropped,  one  flew  off,  and  the  third 
escaped,  evidently  wounded.  An  hour  later  Colonel  Hall  came  over, 
and  mentioned  that  a  wounded  wild-turkey  had  run  into  his  blacksmith- 
shop  at  full  speed  and  dropped  dead.  It  ran  half  a  mile  after  being  shot 
entirely  through. 

General  Johnston  took  pleasure  in  observing  the  habits  of  animals. 
He  once  called  my  attention  to  a  woodcock,  which  was  imitating  the 
actions  of  a  wounded  bird,  as  the  lapwing  does ;  and,  on  going  to  the 
spot  from  which  it  rose,  we  found  its  nest  with  the  unfledged  young. 
We  took  the  nest  of  a  beautiful  crested  wood-duck  from  a  hollow  tree, 
and  hatched  the  eggs,  seventeen  in  number,  under  a  hen.  The  young 
ducks  could  not  be  kept  in  confinement,  but  would  even  climb  up  the 
perpendicular  sides  of  a  barrel.  Nevertheless,  with  a  good  deal  of 
pains,  we  managed  to  rear  four  or  five  ;  but  they  did  not  lose  their 
wild  nature,  and  eventually  escaped  to  the  woods. 

General  Johnston  brought  down,  at  long  range,  an  eagle,  which  was 
threatening  the  poultry-yard.  His  wing  was  broken,  and  he  was  chained 
to  a  log.  Some  large  turkey-gobblers  became  very  indignant  at  his 
presence,  and  gave  expression  to  their  feelings  by  strutting  around  him 
with  uncouth  antics  of  rage.  The  captive  sat  in  silent  majesty,  seem 
ingly  unconscious  of  their  existence.  At  last,  one  of  these  dons  of  the 
poultry-yard,  a  foolhardy  blusterer,  went  too  near  ;  when,  quick  as  a 


RULES  OF  CONDUCT. 

flash,  the  eagle's  talons  tore  his  head  off.  My  father  pointed  to  the 
human  analogies  and  obvious  moral  in  this  scene. 

His  clearness  of  mental  vision  and  steadiness  of  purpose  enabled 
General  Johnston  to  govern  his  life  by  a  few  simple,  general  prin 
ciples.  With  these  his  own  life  was  consistent,  and  he  wished  for  those 
he  loved  that  their  lives  also  should  accord  with  the  fixed  standards  of 
right.  He  felt  the  duty  and  necessity  of  walking  by  such  lights  as  he 
had  and  the  strength  to  do  so;  but,  conscious  of  his  fallibility,  he 
viewed  his  own  conduct  and  opinions  severely,  and  those  of  others  with 
the  utmost  toleration,  not  enforcing  his  views  or  opinions  even  upon 
his  children.  In  dealing  with  the  writer,  he  was  solicitous  to  impress 
the  idea  that  life  should  be  conformed  to  the  principles  of  virtue  and 
right — that  truth,  justice,  mercy,  honor,  the  decorous  and  the  beauti 
ful,  should,  in  harmony,  control  our  thoughts  and  actions ;  but  he  was 
likewise  careful  that  moral  and  intellectual  growth  should  be,  by 
processes  of  self-development,  under  the  concurrent  operation  of  these 
quickening  powers,  uninfluenced  by  his  own  individuality.  The  writer 
has  often  regretted  that  such  was  the  case,  as  there  never  was  a  man  he 
would  rather  have  chosen  to  resemble.  But  General  Johnston,  per 
ceiving  that,  though  principles  are  eternal,  opinions  are  modified  by  our 
surroundings,  was  unwilling  to  transmit  his  prejudices,  and  imposed 
upon  himself  great  reserve  of  censure,  especially  in  personal  matters. 
In  relating  the  variances  between  General  Sam  Houston  and  himself,  in 
reply  to  my  questions,  he  stated  the  facts  clearly,  but  with  a  total 
absence  of  coloring.  He  used  no  resentful  or  derogatory  epithets,  and 
was  always  willing  to  cover  his  injuries  with  silence.  It  was  the  same 
in  other  cases.  Petty  wrongs  he  considered  as  beneath  a  wise  man's 
concern,  and  greater  ones  as  demanding  either  prompt  punishment  or 
magnanimous  oblivion. 

General  Johnston  was  little  disposed  to  take  narrow  or  provincial 
views.  In  reply  to  boasts  of  the  superiority  of  Southern  hospitality,  he 
was  wont  to  resolve  it  into  a  habit,  resulting  from  ample  means  and  the 
easy  gratification  of  a  selfish  want — the  lack  of  society.  He  said  : 

The  solitary  planter,  who  gives  a  traveler  supper  and  lodging,  receives  in 
return  human  intercourse,  news  from  the  outer  world,  and,  perhaps,  intelligent 
discourse.  He  is  very  well  repaid.  But  in  a  dense  population,  crowded  into  a 
city,  or  on  a  poor  soil,  entertainment  implies  personal  inconvenience  and  out 
lay  of  money,  not  compensated  by  companionship,  the  need  of  which  is  amply 
supplied.  In  the  first  case,  provisions  and  house-room  are  cheap,  and  society 
scarce ;  in  the  second,  provisions  and  house-room  are  dear,  and  society  a  drug  in 
the  market. 

The  intellectual  pastime  of  chess  was  General  Johnston's  chief  recre 
ation.  His  correspondence  contains  many  problems  submitted  to  him 


152  PLANTATION-LIFE. 

by  letter,  with  his  solutions.  He  was  as  a  chess-player  admirable,  not 
only  for  skill,  but  for  the  equanimity  with  which  he  met  both  victory 
and  defeat.  Although  throughout  life  he  was  more  of  a  thinker  than  a 
reader,  yet  he  always  had  some  book  undergoing  the  processes  of  diges 
tion  and  assimilation.  His  habit  was  to  read  slowly,  weighing  the  mat 
ter  of  the  book  as  he  went  along,  and  reflecting  on  it  afterward.  But, 
during  this  period,  I  recollect  that  he  was  accustomed  to  run  rapidly 
over  Euclid  and  other  mathematical  works  with  which  he  was  familiar, 
^reviving  at  a  glance  their  trains  of  reasoning. 

General  Johnston  read  slowly,  and  not  many  books ;  but  he  thought 
much  on  what  he  read.  His  habit  was  to  revolve  what  he  read  in  every 
possible  relation  to  practical  life.  He  was  familiar  with  Shakespeare  ; 
he  enjoyed  Dickens,  and  drew  largely  upon  Gil  Bias  for  illustration. 
He  was  fond  of  physical  science,  and  Mrs.  Somerville  and  Sir  Charles 
Lyell  were  favorites  with  him.  But,  at  the  time  of  which  I  speak,  his 
chief  literary  delight  was  a  translation  of  Herodotus.  He  was  the  first 
to  impress  upon  me  the  veracity  of  the  Old  Historian,  and  to  point  out 
the  care  with  which  he  discriminated  between  what  he  saw,  what  he 
heard,  and  what  he  surmised  or  inferred. 

While  I  was  with  him,  a  report  came  that  his  friend,  Colonel  Jason 
Kogers,  commanding  at  Monterey,  was  cooped  up  in  the  Black  Fort, 
with  a  small  garrison — the  Louisville  Legion — by  an  overwhelming 
force  of  Mexicans,  to  whom  he  must  surrender.  He  said  to  me:  "They 
don't  know  Rogers,  if  they  think  he  will  surrender.  He  will  hold  the 
citadel  to  the  last  man,  and  then  blow  it  up,  before  he  will  surrender. 
But  I  am  glad  he  is  there.  He  will  beat  the  Mexicans,  and  has  now 
a  chance  to  win  renown."  Unfortunately,  the  Mexicans  did  not  make 
the  attempt. 

When  the  battle  of  Buena  Vista  was  impending,  it  was  said  that 
"Old  Zach"  had  made  a  mistake  in  his  movements,  and  would  be 
destroyed  by  Santa  Anna.  General  Johnston  reviewed  the  campaign, 
explaining  the  reasons  that  made  General  Taylor's  strategy  the  best 
under  the  circumstances,  and  confidently  predicted  his  success.  He  had 
faith  in  Taylor's  military  capacity  and  soldierly  qualities. 

Though  cut  off  from  a  participation  in  the  exciting  events  of  the 
Mexican  War,  General  Johnston  took  a  lively  interest  in  the  operations 
of  the  American  army.  His  correspondence  shows  a  full  appreciation 
of  the  valor  and  skill  of  our  officers  and  soldiers,  but  no  very  high  esti 
mate  of  the  superintending  wisdom  of  the  Government.  There  is  no 
real  discrepancy  between  his  opinion  of  the  propriety  of  employing  a 
larger  attacking  army  against  Mexico,  and  his  own  willingness  at  an 
earlier  period  to  invade  that  country  with  a  force  so  much  inferior.  The 
circumstances  had  changed.  In  the  present  case,  the  Mexicans  were 
united  against  what  they  fancied  was  an  army  of  subjugation ;  in  the 


HIS  OPINIONS  OF  THE  WAR  AND   OF   TAYLOR.  153 

former  instance,  the  Texans  were  to  act  as  auxiliaries  of  one  of  the  two 
parties  into  which  Mexico  was  almost  equally  divided.  General  John 
ston  so  rarely  indulged  in  personal  criticism  that  his  judgment  as  to 
General  Taylor  will  not  be  found  the  least  interesting  part  of  his 
letters.  His  reflections  on  the  waste  of  war  are  commended  to  those 
who  are  used  to  look  only  at  its  scenic  and  splendid  side. 

General  Johnston,  writing  in  regard  to  a  kinsman,  who  had  volun 
teered  to  go  to  Mexico,  says : 

It  is  a  game  upon  which  there  is,  in  his  case,  too  much  staked.  The  die, 
however,  is  cast ;  and,  I  have  no  doubt,  he  will  play  it  out  nobly.  Few  compre 
hend  the  ravages  and  perils  of  war.  They  are  not  to  be  found  in  the  reports  of 
the  battle-field,  which  account  for  but  a  small  portion  of  the  waste  of  life  or  the 
dangers  encountered.  The  unaccustomed  life  of  a  soldier,  privations  without 
number,  and  hard  marches  under  a  vertical  sun,  or  in  the  chilly  hours  of  the 
night,  make  up  a  bill  of  mortality  treble  that  of  the  fiercest  warfare.  This  was 
the  case  with  the  British  army  in  the  Peninsular  War.  It  has  been  peculiarly 
so  with  ours  in  this  war ;  and,  I  have  no  doubt,  if  any  one  would  take  the 
trouble  to  examine,  it  would  be  found  the  history  of  all  warfare.  .  .  . 

War,  like  any  other  business,  cannot  progress  prosperously  unless  with 
means  adequate  to  the  end.  Our  Government  had  them,  but,  instead  of  con 
centrating  its  power  with  tbe  paralyzing  shock  of  the  thunderbolt  on  some  vital 
point,  it  has  wasted  its  momentum  by  breaking  up  the  force  into  army  corps, 
which,  from  the  vast  extent  of  the  country  they  operate  in,  have  in  every  in 
stance  been  isolated  and  placed  en  prise,  from  which  positions  the  indomitable 
courage  of  our  gallant  soldiers  has  alone  extricated  them.  This  is  peculiarly  tbe 
case  with  that  noble  column  in  possession  of  the  Mexican  capital.  A  foreign 
army  so  placed  in  our  midst  could  never  extricate  itself.  Our  armies,  whenever 
employed,  have  acquitted  themselves  admirably ;  but,  being  separated,  their 
efforts  have  produced  no  results.  The  simplest  knowledge  of  mechanical  power 
would  indicate  tbe  folly  of  dividing  our  forces.  But  enough  of  this ;  our  offi 
cers  and  soldiers,  notwithstanding  everything  opposing,  have  added  the  greatest 
lustre  to  our  arms. 

The  following  testimonial  to  the  great  abilities  and  solid  character 
of  the  hero  of  Monterey  and  Buena  Vista  is  inserted  as  one  soldier's 
estimate  of  another,  whom  he  had  known  under  trying  and  widely- 
varying  circumstances  : 

August  3, 184T. 

DEAR  PEESTON  :  .  .  .  I  will  effect  all  or  more  than  I  expected  in  coming 
here,  without  encountering  the  dangers  from  the  climate,  with  which  the  appre 
hensions  of  our  friends  threatened  us.  If  by  any  good  fortune  I  can  obtain  tbe 
capital  to  cultivate  my  plantation  in  sugar-cane,  I  feel  sure  that  I  will  accumulate 
wealth.  Like  the  poor,  imprisoned  abbe  of  the  Castle  d'lf,  I  am  sure  that,  in 
the  ownership  of  this  beautiful  estate,  I  possess  a  great  treasure ;  but  I  fear  I 
shall  not  be  able  to  make  it  manifest  to  any  capitalist. 

Fifteen  years  ago  yesterday  we  fought  the  Sacs  and  Foxes,  and  defeated 


154:  PLANTATION-LIFE. 

them  at  Bad  Axe  on  the  Upper  Mississippi.  Old  Zach,  as  lieutenant-colonel, 
commanded  the  First  Regiment  there.  His  conduct  on  that  occasion  estab 
lished  in  my  mind  an  unshaken  confidence  in  his  great  courage  and  loyal  devo 
tion  to  his  country,  as  well  as  a  high  opinion  of  his  good  sense  and  excellent 
judgment ;  but  no  one  imagined  that  in  that  honest  and  faithful  brain  there 
were,  even  latent,  those  great  principles  of  strategy  which  the  events  of  last 
year  have  so  splendidly  illustrated.  My  memory  now  recalls  the  expression  of 
the  most  vigorous  thoughts  connected  with  military  operations,  and  I  am  con 
vinced  that  he  then  possessed  all  the  high  powers  of  mind  which  he  has  lately 
displayed ;  that  his  capacity  is  no  sudden  endowment ;  that  the  great  strate- 
getic  problems  solved  by  him  have  often  undergone  the  severest  scrutiny  of  close 
investigation. 

These  things  are  true  of  all  minds  which  are  accounted  great  on  any  subject. 
The  vast  conceptions  of  Hannibal,  Cassar,  Napoleon,  Newton,  Cicero,  Homer, 
Angelo,  Wren,  Davy,  etc.,  following  the  analogies  of  Nature,  were  embodi 
ments  which  were  developed  by  the  active  and  toilsome  labors  of  the  mind. 
Hence  the  confidence,  energy,  and  readiness,  when  the  emergency  arises.  They 
are  no  sudden  inspirations.  We  tread  with  rapidity  and  confidence  the  path 
we  have  often  traveled  over,  all  others  with  tardy  doubtfulness. 

We  hear  nothing  of  the  progress  of  the  war.  There  is  too  much  to  be  done 
with  too  little  means.  An  acknowledged  principle  of  war  is  that,  when  the 
line  of  operations  is  pierced  or  even  interrupted,  the  army  is  in  danger.  How 
far  this  applies  to  the  condition  of  things  in  Mexico  I  do  not  know,  or  from 
what  jeopardy  the  heroism  of  our  troops  can  extricate  themselves — we  believe 
a  very  great  one,  but  who  can  calculate  it  ?  The  glory  of  the  American  arms 
ought  not  to  depend  upon  the  hazard  of  the  die.  The  United  States  can  play  a 
sure  game.  It  is  therefore  foolishness  to  run  the  risks  they  have  done  from  the 
beginning  of  the  war.  The  magnitude  of  the  object  is  now  apparent,  though  it 
was  not  in  the  beginning.  Let  the  means  be  adequate  to  the  object,  a  propo 
sition  perfectly  simple,  and  comprehended  and  acted  upon  by  all  who  can.  Let 
the  Government  in  this  matter  imitate  the  conduct  of  men  in  private  life.  No 
sensible  citizen  believes  that  less  than  50,000  men  ought  to  invade  by  way  of 
Vera  Cruz.  With  a  less  number  the  operations  will  be  tardy  and  expensive. 

Your  friend, 

A.  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON'. 

While  the  writer  is  aware  that  on  some  accounts  a  summary  of  inci 
dents  and  opinions  is  preferable  to  the  method  by  which  a  man's  life 
is  exhibited  in  his  letters,  yet  there  are  also  cogent  reasons  why  in  this 
case  as  much  as  possible  of  the  record  should  be  presented  in  General 
Johnston's  own  language.  Drusus  wished  so  to  live  that  all  his  actions 
might  be  open  to  the  eyes  of  all  men.  The  subject  of  this  memoir  did 
so  live  that  all  the  world  might  share  his  thoughts  with  his  bosom 
friends.  He  was  eminently  sincere,  so  that  the  unconscious  autobiog 
raphy  set  down  in  his  correspondence  has  a  value  above  "  confessions  " 
written  for  the  public  eye.  Though  frank  where  frankness  was  proper, 
he  had  a  certain  delicacy  of  feeling  and  a  proud  reserve  that  prevented 
him  from  laying  bare  his  private  griefs.  His  religion  was  one  of  thank- 


SOLITUDE.  155 

fulness,  endurance,  and  self-restraint  ;  and  it  was  alike  his  instinct 
and  his  philosophy  to  offer  a  cheerful  front  to  whatever  ills  befell  him. 
Hence,  as  the  blasts  of  penury  and  disappointment  blew  more  chill,  he 
drew  his  mantle  closer  around  a  wounded  breast  and  lifted  his  brow  a 
little  higher  toward  the  sunlight  ;  and  it  may  be  pardoned  him  if  he 
pictured  to  infrequent  friends  the  bright  side  only  of  his  Arcadia. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind,  in  reading  the  letters  that  follow,  that 
they  were  written  under  great  mental  strain.  Those  were  years  of  a 
new  and  severe  discipline  of  spirit.  A  heavy,  increasing,  and  seeming 
ly  hopeless  burden  of  debt  taxed  his  energies,  his  pride,  and  his  pa 
tience.  He  heard  the  sound  of  arms  afar  off,  and  the  echoes  of  fame 
pronouncing  the  names  of  companions  and  rivals  in  arms  ;  but  he  had 
turned  his  back  upon  glory,  and  the  arena  where  he  had  felt  sure  of 
success  was  for  others — to  him  it  was  closed.  Rare  greetings  came 
from  old  friends,  and  in  the  mighty  sweep  of  events  he  was  passing 
out  of  memory.  His  life  was,  in  a  manner,  condemned  to  prison-bounds, 
and  Poverty  and  Oblivion  were  the  jailers.  There  was  no  escape  ex 
cept  through  solicitation,  from  which  his  soul  recoiled  as  from  the  worst 
of  humiliations.  Yet  he  never  dreamed  of  succumbing  to  poverty,  pri 
vation,  debt,  and  solitude.  It  was  a  campaign  in  which  he  might  die 
struggling,  but  in  which  he  did  not  intend  to  surrender  manhood,  cheer 
fulness,  or  hope. 

General  Johnston's  strongly  domestic  nature  found  a  stay  in  his 
family.  His  two  infant  boys,  one  born  on  the  plantation,  were  a  great 
comfort  to  him,  delighting  as  he  did  in  the  company  of  little  children  ; 
and  his  wife  not  only  bore  privations,  and  managed  her  household  with 
contentment  and  good-humor,  but  whiled  away  the  weary  hours  by  her 
resources  in  music  and  painting.  If  friends  were  few  they  were  stead 
fast.  Colonel  Love  came  to  see  him  whenever  he  could,  and  wrote 
often ;  and  General  Hamilton  occasionally.  Colonel  Samuel  M.  Williams 
wrote  him,  when  his  fortunes  were  lowest,  to  draw  on  his  bank  at  Gal- 
veston  according  to  his  necessities.  Hancock,  Preston,  Burnley,  and 
some  others,  retained  their  interest,  and  manifested  it  as  occasion 
offered.  The  letters  appended  present  a  fair  record  of  his  plantation- 
life  and  current  of  thought,  and  illustrate  the  facts  and  characteristics 
already  mentioned.  The  first  extract  is  from  a  letter  written  by  Gen 
eral  Johnston  in  the  spring  of  1847  to  the  author,  who  had  recently 
left  him  : 

Sid  is  a  fine  boy,  grows  well,  and  talks  a  great  deal  about  brother  Willie. 
Like  all  healthy  children,  he  is  considered  a  prodigy,  physically  and  mentally. 
His  mother  will  give  you  the  facts  sustaining  this  opinion,  and  can  do  it  better 
than  I  can.  "With  the  exception  of  the  loss  of  Newman  Noggs,1  whom  no  skill 
could  save,  everything  continues  to  thrive  with  us  ;  the  dairy,  the  piggery,  the 

1  A  horse,  whose  name  was  considered  characteristic. 


156  PLANTATION-LIFE. 

poultry-yard — and  a  well-filled  poultry-yard,  with  no  market  at  hand  to  tempt 
the  cupidity  of  owners,  is  no  contemptible  thing  in  the  opinion  of  a  person  in 
robust  health.  We  have  bushels  of  figs,  and  wish  you  were  here  to  enjoy  them. 
We  have  also  a  fine  patch  of  sweet-potatoes. 

A  few  letters  are  given  from  a  large  correspondence  with  Mr.  Han 
cock  and  the  writer  : 

CHINA  GROVE,  February  28,  1847. 

DEAR  HANCOCK  :  You  have  long  since,  I  fear,  condemned  me  for  neglect, 
and  appearances  are  so  much  against  me  that  I  would  not  blame  you ;  but  I 
had  a  reasonable  excuse  in  the  unremitted  labor  I  had  to  encounter  in  repairing 
my  farm  and  preparing  for  a  crop.  I  may  say  with  truth  that  I  have  scarcely 
taken  time  to  rest  since  we  came  here.  The  plantation  has  quite  a  renovated 
appearance,  and  I  hope  by  next  winter  to  have  it  in  complete  reparation,  with  a 
comfortable  house  to  live  in,  and  everything  farmer-like  about  it.  I  hoped  to 
be  able  to  return  in  the  autumn  in  time  to  make  you  a  visit,  but  I  was  detained 
so  much  later  than  I  expected  that  I  was  compelled  to  come  here  at  once  and  go 
to  work.  This  I  believed  to  be  the  best  course  to  pursue,  whether  I  sold  the 
place  or  kept  it;  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  what  I  have  already  done  would 
make  the  place  sell  for  two  thousand  dollars  more.  You  would  be  surprised,  I 
think,  at  what  I  have  achieved  in  three  months  with  my  limited  means.  If  a 
good  opportunity  to  sell  occurs,  I  will  not  let  it  pass.  .  .  . 

The  successful  cultivation  of  the  cane  here  is  no  longer  a  problem.  Every 
where  it  has  been  tried  in  this  neighborhood  it  has  succeeded  excellently  well. 
The  yield  has  been  great ;  and  the  quality  Mr.  Kenner,  I  understand,  says  equal, 
if  not  superior,  to  Louisiana  sugar  made  by  the  most  improved  means.  Mr. 
Caldwell,  fifteen  miles  from  here,  on  the  same  kind  of  soil  as  mine  (peach-land1), 
made  104  hogsheads  (or  thousands  of  pounds)  of  sugar,  besides  molasses,  with 
sixteen  hands,  which  is  selling  from  eight  to  ten  cents  per  pound.  Sweeney  has 
been  quite  as  successful,  and  others  that  I  have  heard  from. 

Your  kind  invitation  and  offers  to  us  will  be  long  gratefully  remembered. 
It  is  at  the  dead  point  that  aid  is  most  valued  and  most  seldom  offered;  and, 
therefore,  when  it  is,  it  ought  never  to  be  forgotten. 

Writing  to  Mr.  Hancock,  October  21,  1847,  General  Johnston  says : 

We  have  been  blessed  with  excellent  health  since  we  came  here,  and  every 
thing  has  prospered  with  us  better  than  we  had  any  right  to  anticipate.  I  have 
cribbed  900  bushels  of  corn,  and  will  send  enough  cotton  to  market  to  pay  all 
of  our  expenses  of  every  kind,  besides  considerable  repairs  and  improvements. 
This,  I  think,  is  as  much  as  could  have  been  expected  from  so  small  a  force.  I 
esteem  it  also  of  great  importance  to  me  to  have  acquired  some  practical  knowl 
edge  as  a  farmer ;  and  mine  has  been  truly  so,  for  I  have  often  lent  a  hand  in 
the  work. 

My  object  in  coming  here  with  a  force  so  inadequate  was  to  repair  the  dilapi 
dations  which  rented  property  always  suffers,  and  to  keep  the  place  until  I 
could  sell  it,  or  make  such  an  arrangement  for  the  cultivation  of  the  whole  of 

1  The  wild-peach,  a  kind  of  laurel,  grows  on  the  low  ridges  and  drier  spots  of  the 
alluvion. 


LETTERS.  157 

the  cleared  land  as  to  enable  me  to  pay  the  remainder  of  my  debt.  The  latter 
arrangement  I  would  prefer,  as  I  still  regard  this  as  a  splendid  estate,  which,  if 
possible,  I  would  like  to  hold.  If  I  had  it  paid  for,  I  would  be  satisfied  to  live 
here  with  the  little  force  I  have,  with  the  confidence  of  supporting  myself;  but 
it  would  be  a  pity  to  let  so  large  a  place  lie  idle,  when  its  cultivation  in  sugar 
cane  would,  without  doubt,  produce  abundant  wealth  in  a  few  years.  .  .  . 

I  promised  my  wife  last  year  that,  if  she  would  patiently  submit  to  my  vol 
unteering  for  six  months1  service,  I  would  then,  if  she  desired,  abandon  military 
life  forever.  I  found  her,  upon  my  return,  more  obstinately  bent  upon  my 
withdrawal  than  ever ;  so  much  so  that,  although  I  told  her  it  might  result  in 
daily  labor  for  support,  she  said  she  would  cheerfully  encounter  every  trial 
rather  than  I  should  return.  I  therefore  yielded  up  all  the  hopes  and  aspira 
tions  of  a  soldier,  and  with  them  has  vanished  all  regret.  I  made  no  effort  to 
obtain  a  post  in  the  army,  nor  did  I  request  any  friend  to  do  it ;  nor  would  I, 
after  that,  have  accepted  any  offer.  I  have  had  the  firmness  to  resist  the  most 
powerful  impulse  of  Nature  and  education ;  and,  no  doubt,  for  the  best,  at  least 
so  far  as  my  family  is  concerned. 

You  will  oblige  me  by  presenting  my  most  friendly  regards  to  General  But 
ler.  His  soldierly  and  gallant  bearing  commanded  the  admiration  of  every 
one,  and  I  would  be  glad  to  know  that  he  will  lead  an  effective  force  to  the  aid 
of  Scott ;  for,  truly,  the  situation  of  our  army  is  precarious.  The  force  to 
have  accomplished  the  work  given  to  him,  promptly  and  economically  both 
with  regard  to  blood  and  treasure,  should  not  have  been  less  than  50,000  men. 
With  that  amount  of  force  he  could  have  controlled  the  resources  of  the  coun 
try  for  the  support  of  his  army,  and  saved  all  further  expense  to  his  own  Gov 
ernment  after  his  outfit.  A  force  so  small  as  his  present  one,  and  so  isolated 
in  the  midst  of  any  other  people  than  Mexicans,  would  never  receive  from 
home  another  biscuit,  nor  the  succor  of  another  detachment.  It  would  be  inex 
tricably  compromised.  But  we  cannot  reason  with  regard  to  Mexicans  as  with 
regard  to  any  other  people. 

General  Johnston  wrote  as  follows  on  the  22d  of  March,  1848,  to 
Mr.  Hancock: 

We  like  our  residence  here,  although  entirely  secluded  from  the  world  and 
from  all  society  whatever.  If  we  lose  the  pleasures  and  sweets  of  society,  we 
are  free  from  all  the  drawbacks,  which  themselves  form  a  numerous  catalogue. 
Happy  contentment  reigns  under  our  humble  roof.  "We  both  industriously  en 
deavor  to  do  our  part  in  our  own  sphere,  and  the  result  of  our  efforts  is  never 
the  subject  of  complaint.  We  have  been  married  nearly  five  years  and  the  first 
unkind  word  or  look  has  never  passed  between  us.  If  this  is  true — and  it  is  so, 
for  I  have  said  it — have  we  not  sufficient  indemnity  for  the  loss  of  society  and 
the  absence  of  wealth  ?  There  are  those  who,  not  comprehending  the  object  of 
life,  would  sneer  at  our  humble  and  satisfied  views  of  it,  but  experience  will  in 
the  end  convince.  .  .  . 

After  apologizing  for  not  accepting  a  kind  invitation  to  visit  his 
friend  in  Kentucky,  he  continues : 


158  PLANTATION-LIFE. 

Our  little  crop  will  need  my  constant  supervision,  and  the  expense  of  the 
journey  would  go  far  toward  building  a  comfortable  residence  for  us.  Our  ex 
pense  is  very  little,  for  we  manage  to  raise  almost  everything  we  want. 

"We  are  now  in  the  midst  of  spring.  Everything  is  very  beautiful  around  us. 
The  grounds  around  our  cabin  are  filled  with  China-trees  in  full  bloom ;  large 
monthly  roses,  also  blooming;  the  Cherokee-rose  hedge,  its  dark  green  spangled 
with  large  white  roses;  the  Ouasatchee,  a  species  of  acacia,  "waving  its  yellow 
hair;  "  and  the  air  redolent  of  sweets.  Tell  Aunt  Mary  I  am  reaping  the  fruits 
of  my  apprenticeship  under  her  as  a  gardener ;  my  horticultural  knowledge  is 
very  respectable.  We  have  fine  strawberries  and  Irish  potatoes,  tomatoes  in 
bloom,  and  many  other  vegetables.  My  corn  all  came  up  in  February,  and  the 
stand  is  excellent  and  growing  finely.  I  had  a  time  of  it  to  save  it  from  the 
birds.  "  The  price  of  corn  is  eternal  vigilance  "  here. 

In  a  letter  of  May  16,  1849,  to  the  writer,  General  Johnston  says : 

My  crops  are  small,  but  since  I  have  become  a  farmer  I  have  the  gratification 
of  success  in  everything  I  have  attempted ;  and  in  gardening  I  have  succeeded 
as  well.  We  have  had  a  great  abundance  of  strawberries ;  and  at  this  time  we 
have  a  good  variety  of  excellent  vegetables — artichokes,  pie-plant,  fine  heads  of 
early  York  cabbage,  squash,  tomatoes,  Irish  potatoes,  and  your  favorite  yams  of 
last  year's  crop,  which  we  have  never  been  without  since  we  came  here.  Our 
cantelupes  will  soon  be  ripe,  and  in  a  short  time  we  will  have  plenty  of  figs  and 
watermelons. 

The  statistics  of  the  poultry-yard  and  dairy  are  still  more  creditable  to  the 
industry  and  attention  of  your  mother.  She  boasts  of  her  flock  of  100  turkeys, 
with  prospects  of  as  many  more,  besides  swarms  of  chickens  and  ducks,  and  as 
many  eggs  as  we  want ;  this  latter  remark  applies  to  Sid  and  Hancock,  too.  All 
these  things,  with  butter  and  milk,  and  a  good  appetite  gained  by  some  toil,  en 
able  us  to  live,  so  far  as  these  matters  are  concerned,  as  well  as  rich  folk ;  and 
these  are  the  things  within  the  reach  of  the  industrious  poor  from  the  St.  Law 
rence  to  San  Francisco.  This  is  the  mystery  which  foreigners  cannot  unveil. 
They  -do  not  perceive  that  the  well-being  of  our  population  flows  from  a  foster 
ing  government,  which  does  not  meddle  much  with  private  pursuits,  and  taxes 
with  great  moderation — always  excepting  the  municipal  tyrannies  of  our  land. 
The  patriotism  of  our  people  is  founded  in  the  advantages  derived  from  their 
institutions;  hence  its  ardor  ;  hence  it  is  "  a  constant  quantity,"  never  short  of 
the  exigency. 

General  Johnston  regretted  deeply  that  distance,  poverty,  and  the 
requirements  of  their  education,  separated  his  elder  children  from  him. 
In  expressing  this  feeling  to  his  daughter,  in  1848,  lie  says: 

It  is  a  great  disappointment  to  me  ;  but  we  have  learned  to  repine  at  noth 
ing,  believing  that  there  is  a  Power  that  orders  all  things  for  the  best — that 
even  those  things  that  are  seemingly  to  our  finite  mental  vision  a  chastisement 
are  ultimately  for  some  good  beyond  our  ken. 

In  a  letter  dated  June  10,  1849,  replying  to  some  good-humored 
reproaches  from  Mr.  Edward  Hobbs  for  not  writing  to  him,  General 
Johnston  says: 


VIEWS   OX   EDUCATION.  159 

The  life  of  seclusion  and  obscurity  in  which  I  have  lived  accounts  for  your 
not  having  heard  from  me.  On  my  return  from  Mexico  after  the  campaign  of 
Monterey,  I  found  that  all  the  proceeds  of  the  Louisville  property  would  scarce 
ly  suffice  for  the  education  of  Will  and  his  sister,  and  that  it  was  necessary  to  go 
to  work  at  once  with  small  means  for  the  support  of  my  family.  It  was  a  ques 
tion  of  bread.  I  immediately  carried  my  resolution  into  effect.  My  own  per 
sonal  labor  (this  is  no  figure  of  speech — I  don't  mean  head-work)  was  necessary 
in  conducting  my  small  farming  operations;  and  I  have  yielded  it  with  cheerful 
ness,  and  have  thus,  after  three  years'  toil,  become  a  rugged  farmer,  with  good 
habits. 

We  have  been  away  from  home  but  about  three  or  four  times  to  visit  a 
neighbor  since  we  came  here.  So  you  see  our  habits  conform  to  the  humbleness 
of  our  position ;  and,  as  for  correspondence,  a  man  in  my  situation  is  not  likely 
to  be  overburdened  by  his  friends.  In  this  "  battle  of  life  "  such  ammunition  so 
aimed  would  be  uselessly  expended.  A  series  of  adverse  circumstances  have, 
with  me,  disappointed  expectations  most  justly  founded ;  and,  although  I  am 
still  confident  of  a  final  extrication,  the  effect  has  been  to  throw  me  beyond  the 
sphere  of  motion  of  friends  and  acquaintances  to  a  distance,  I  fear,  at  which 
sympathy  languishes.  But,  as  this  is  the  result  of  a  natural  law  of  our  organi 
zation,  I  do  not  complain.  I  feel  satisfied  that  I  have  not  deserved  to  forfeit 
their  esteem.  It  ought  to  be  held  as  honorable  to  battle  with  adversity  with  un- 
quailing  front  as  to  lead  the  way  to  the  deadly  breach  amid  the  roar  of  cannon 
and  the  din  of  mortal  combat.  Thus  much  I  have  said  in  vindication.  Do  not 
believe  that  silence  is  forgetfulness ;  nor  that  the  scenes  with  which  I  am  sur 
rounded  engender  any  but  cheerful  feelings,  and  kindly  thoughts  and  charitable. 
Even  the  bitterness  of  ancient  enmity  is  softened  down  or  forgotten. 

The  writer  ventures  to  introduce  at  some  length  a  number  of  ex 
tracts  from  General  Johnston's  letters,  touching  topics  connected 
with  the  education  of  his  son.  Writing  with  the  freedom  of  private 
correspondence,  it  is  not  to  be  expected  that  the  subjects  discussed 
should  be  elaborately  treated,  and  his  opinions  are  marked  rather  by 
wisdom  than  novelty.  Still,  as  the  result  of  wide  experience  and  de 
liberate,  independent  thought  and  not  of  borrowed  lore,  they  are  emi 
nently  characteristic,  and  may  deserve  the  attention  even  of  educators. 
Doubtless  the  same  subjects  may  be  found  handled  in  a  more  skillful 
and  striking  manner  in  the  systematic  essays  of  professed  teachers; 
but,  nevertheless,  the  absolute  sincerity  and  practical  nature  of  his 
conclusions  will  probably  give  them  a  certain  value  to  a  large  class  of 
readers. 

In  a  letter  to  Colonel  William  Preston,  who  had  kindly  interested 
himself  in  the  education  of  General  Johnston's  children,  he  says : 

Your  letter  in  reference  to  the  education  of  my  children  has  received  my 
most  grateful  attention.  It  has  long  been  with  me  an  object  of  deep  solicitude. 
They  both  have  superior  mental  endowments,  which  will  bear  all  the  culture 
that  the  most  liberal  education  can  bestow.  .  .  . 

With  regard  to  a  foreign  education  my  judgment  is  opposed  to  yours.  I 
12 


160  PLANTATION-LIFE. 

would  greatly  prefer  that  my  son  should  be  educated  in  one  of  our  own  schools, 
and  that  my  daughter  should  be  educated  as  near  her  grandmother  as  possible. 
I  do  not  wish  her  to  cross  the  mountains.  Your  mind  will  at  once  cite  our  ex 
cellent  wives  as  examples  of  the  superiority  of  Eastern  schools.  They  are  only 
exceptions.  Thousands  are  made  worthless  by  them. 

As  I  place  the  American  people  above  all  others,  so  I  place  their  institutions. 
In  their  schools  only  will  our  children  learn  to  comprehend  the  essence  and  spirit 
of  those  institutions  in  a  liberal  and  enlightened  manner,  and  to  love  and  admire 
them.  You  are  aware  of  the  value,  to  one  who  looks  forward  to  political  prefer 
ment,  of  the  great  advantages  to  be  derived  from  the  friendships  and  general  ac 
quaintance  formed  in  our  public  schools.  Their  influence  is  incalculable  ;  and, 
if  it  is  granted  that  a  superior  education  can  be  had  abroad,  we  must  still  claim 
for  our  own  a  better  adaptation  for  this  particular  arena.  To  seek  an  education 
abroad  seems  to  me  like  groping  in  the  dark  in  search  of  those  things  which  are 
here  everywhere  exposed  to  view.  Acknowledged  truths  with  us  are  yet  sub 
jects  of  doubt  and  investigation  with  them.  They  are  ages  behind  us  in  the  sci 
ence  of  government — the  well-being  of  the  many.  I  know  of  no  great  man  of 
any  country  who  was  educated  away  from  his  people.  An  important  part  of 
education  is  the  study  of  the  temper  and  tendencies  of  our  own  race — of  the 
people,  in  units  and  in  mass,  among  whom  we  are  to  act — without  a  knowledge  of 
which  no  one  need  ever  hope  to  wield  power  in  a  free  country.  One  educated 
at  home  is  recognized  and  received  as  a  man  of  the  people ;  he  is  of  them  ;  there 
is  no  disruption  of  those  strong  bonds  of  sympathy,  without  the  power  to  arouse 
which  the  greatest  mind  would  be  impotent.  Besides  all  this  and  many  more 
reasons  I  could  give,  did  I  not  fear  to  fatigue  and  annoy  you,  I  oppose  an  in 
stinctive  dread  of  a  foreign  influence.  European  opinions,  manners,  notions, 
and  habits  differ,  in  toto  ccelo,  from  ours;  I  fear  he  would  unconsciously  imbibe 
them.  If  my  son  could  stand  in  the  midst  of  any  assembly  in  Europe  and  think 
or  believe  that  there  was  present  any  nobler  or  bolder  spirit  than  his  own,  I 
would  scorn  him  ;  yet,  did  he  not,  they  would  deem  him  a  fool.  This  illustrates 
the  difference  between  them  and  us.  Let  us  rear  our  children  among  equals, 
and  let  them  take  such  eminence  as  genius  and  merit  may  command.  We  will 
not  bow  down  their  honest  pride  of  manhood  by  placing  them  among  acknowl 
edged  classes,  where  they  are  never  esteemed  first,  whatever  may  be  said  to  the 
contrary.  I  have  perfect  confidence  in  your  judgment  with  regard  to  our  own 
institutions,  and  have  already  referred  William  to  you  for  your  advice. 

Truly,  your  friend,  A.  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON. 

It  may  not  be  amiss  to  state  here  that,  when  General  Johnston  was 
Secretary  of  War  of  Texas  in  1839,  Admiral  Baudin,  of  the  French 
Navy,  then  visiting  Texas  on  diplomatic  business,  was  pleased  to  express 
great  esteem  for  General  Johnston,  and  tendered  him  an  appointment 
for  his  son  in  the  Polytechnic  School.  General  Johnston,  though  much 
gratified  at  this  mark  of  respect,  felt  constrained  to  decline  it.  He  also 
dissuaded  his  son  at  a  later  date  from  taking  an  appointment  at  West 
Point,  his  own  experience  pointing  to  so  many  evils  and  discourage 
ments  in  the  career  of  a  professional  soldier  in  America  as  to  render  it 
most  undesirable.  He  sent  his  son  to  Yale  College,  and  wished  him  to 


THE   DIGNITY   OF   LABOR. 

travel  and  study  in  Europe,  after  his  principles  and  habits  were  estab 
lished;  but  circumstances  prevented  this.  The  following  brief  extract 
in  regard  to  parental  duty  in  the  matter  of  education,  and  the  dignity 
of  labor,  is  from  a  letter  to  the  writer  : 

Education  in  the  present  age  is  a  positive  right.  It  would  be  criminal  iu  a 
parent  to  withhold  it,  if  any  sacrifice  or  privation  on  his  part  could  procure  it. 
In  my  opinion,  there  is  no  excuse  in  this  country  for  neglect  in  this  matter.  If 
there  be  not  ready  and  available  means,  then  the  parent  is  bound  to  labor  for 
them.  With  a  resolute  heart  and  a  right  way  of  thinking  about  it,  this  is  neither 
a  humiliation  nor  a  hardship;  it  is  a  labor  of  love.  Labor  does  not  degrade  the 
mind  of  an  educated  man ;  if  he  has  talents,  they  are  invigorated ;  if  he  has 
honor,  it  becomes  more  steadfast.  He  regards  his  brawny  hands  as  the  guaran 
tee  of  his  independence;  a  view  of  them  brings  no  shame  to  his  proud  heart; 
he  sees  in  them  nothing  more  than  the  evidence  of  honorable  exertion.  The 
opinions  of  those  whose  opinions  are  worth  anything  sustain  him.  They  would 
intrust  him  with  the  transaction  of  important  business,  or  with  power,  if  there 
was  need.  They  who  affect  to  despise  those  of  whom  circumstances  demand 
personal  exertion,  and  exult  in  their  own  exemption  as  an  evidence  of  their 
superiority,  are  the  moths  of  society,  who,  after  a  few  giddy  gyrations,  usually 
have  their  wings  clipped  and  fall,  to  struggle  in  irapotency.  Their  foolishness 
has  prevented  many  a  thoughtless,  but  noble,  spirit  from  pursuing  the  course 
pointed  out  by  duty,  while  their  miserable  fate  seems  to  have  taught  but  few 
that  they  ought  to  have  despised  rather  than  feared  them. 

The  writer,  having  been  selected  by  his  comrades  as  the  orator  in  a 
college  celebration  of  the  birthday  of  Washington,  received  the  follow 
ing  letter  of  encouragement  from  his  father.  There  are  in  it  some 
old-fashioned  lessons  of  patriotism  that  will  bear  revival : 

BRAZORIA  COUNTY,  January  4,  1848. 

I  have  the  opportunity,  my  dear  "Will,  of  writing  a  few  lines  to  you,  and  I 
seize  it  with  great  pleasure,  as  it  affords  me  the  gratification  of  acknowledging 
the  receipt  of  your  letter  since  you  were  installed  as  a  member  of  the  Military 
Institute,  by  which  we  learn  that  you  are  agreeably  situated,  and  have  been 
greatly  honored  by  the  good  opinion  of  your  comrades  in  their  selection  of  you 
as  their  speaker  for  the  22d  of  February.  It  is  said  to  be  a  difficult  theme,  on 
account  of  the  immense  number  of  speeches  that  have  been  made  in  commemo 
ration  of  the  birth  of  Washington  ;  that  all  has  been  said  that  can  be  ;  that  the 
subject  is  trite.  The  same  might  be  said  of  all  the  most  sublime  virtues ;  of 
whatever  is  great,  good,  or  beautiful ;  of  fortitude,  courage,  patriotism ;  but  it 
would  be  no  more  true  than  the  remark  with  regard  to  the  birthday  of  Wash 
ington.  Do  we  not  see  that  everything  in  Nature,  in  every  new  light  in  which 
it  is  viewed,  presents  new  beauties  ?  Every  position  gives  a  different  light,  and,  as 
these  positions  are  infinite,  there  cannot  be  any  limit  to  the  beauties  of  whatever 
is  beautiful.  It  is  the  same  in  the  moral  world  as  in  the  physical.  Does  a  man 
possess  great  goodness,  great  courage,  great  patriotism,  the  coloring  of  language 
may  be  so  skillfully  applied  as  to  make  their  representation  charming  to  the 
mind,  although  the  thoughts  in  reference  to  them  might  be  familiar  to  all.  We 


162  PLANTATION-LIFE. 

all  have  some  conception 'of  the  infinite  attributes  of  Deity,  and  we  are  awed  and 
delighted  in  the  ratio  of  its  strength ;  yet  there  are  those  who  can  so  finely  de 
scribe  these  subjects  of  familiar  contemplation  as  greatly  to  enhance  our  awe, 
admiration,  and  pleasure. 

The  Father  of  his  Country  imbued  the  minds  of  the  people  with  his  own  great 
qualities,  and  great  occasions  invariably  draw  them  forth.  Let  the  noble  enthu 
siasm  and  devotion  of  the  soldiery  to  the  cause  of  the  country  serve  for  an 
illustration.  Remember  the  last  22d  and  23d;  the  day  had  its  inspiration.1 
There  is  a  holy  inspiration  in  the  memory  of  Washington's  great  services  that 
would  make  any  American  willingly  risk  the  sacrifice  of  his  life  in  emulation  of 
them.  You  ought  not,  therefore,  to  be  discouraged.  Your  subject  will  find 
sympathy  in  the  minds  and  hearts  of  your  audience  if  they  be  American.  .  .  . 

Your  affectionate  father, 

A.  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON". 

The  following  letters  and  extracts  are  offered  without  further  apol 
ogy  : 

Nay  9,  1849. 

Neglect  none  of  the  subordinate  means  for  the  attainment  of  a  superior 
knowledge  of  law.  A  limited  acquaintance  with  mathematical  science  is  one  of 
those  means.  The  course  you  mentioned  will  be  sufficient;  proficiency  in  al 
gebra,  the  elements  of  geometry,  trigonometry,  and  surveying,  will  give  you  the 
art  of  developing  truth  by  the  skillful  use  of  the  reasoning  powers,  and,  besides, 
store  your  mind  with  a  species  of  knowledge  of  daily  practical  utility  to  a  law 
yer.  The  art  of  reasoning  employed  by  the  mathematician  is  beautifully  syn 
thetic  and  analytic;  and  this  method,  not  limited  by  the  restrictions  exacted  by 
rigid  science,  but  aided  by  the  conceptions  of  a  mind  fertile  in  its  ingenuity,  must 
give  him  who  employs  it  a  decided  advantage  over  one  not  so  guided.  It  is  the 
helm  of  the  mind,  steering  it  over  the  shortest  route  from  the  point  of  depart 
ure  to  the  destination — from  cause  to  effect. 

But  inasmuch  as  in  mathematical  reasoning  the  arguments  (or  proof)  are 
furnished,  the  facility  with  which  a  correct  conclusion  is  reached  is  determined 
by  the  skillful  use  of  axioms  and  truths  founded  upon  them.  The  mind,  there 
fore,  long  employed  in  the  investigation  of  mathematical  propositions  becomes 
impoverished  in  ingenuity  and  worldly  comprehensiveness.  Many  moral  truths, 
illustrations,  etc.,  which  convince  the  minds  of  men  are  not  admitted  by  the 
mathematician,  and  therefore  not  employed.  His  language  takes  the  form  of  his 
reasoning;  it  is  stiff,  rigid,  exact,  without  ornament.  His  argument  is  sound 
and  incontrovertible  ;  it  is  a  solid,  granite  structure,  without  a  bunch  of  ivy  or 
straggling  flower  to  please  the  eye,  and  with  its  fragrance  charm  the  senses. 
But  the  skillful  speaker  conjures  up  every  fascination  to  hold  his  audience,  while 
they  listen  to  his  reasoning  and  concur  in  its  truth. 

The  science  of  law,  as  I  understand  it,  consists  in  the  reasons  of  the  law  and 
their  applications.  These  reasons  are  not  always  founded  in  abstract  justice, 
but  are  derived  from  the  wants  of  society,  dependent  upon  a  multitude  of 
causes  ;  and  the  acquirement  of  a  knowledge  of  the  science  calls  into  requisition 
the  whole  circle  of  human  knowledge.  The  knowledge  you  have  and  what 

1  The  battle  of  Buena  Vista  was  fought  February  22  and  23,  1847. 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  MODERATION.  163 

you  will  acquire  are  so  many  degrees  in  the  noble  profession  you  are  about 
to  adopt. 

In  your  commencement,  do  not  plunge  in  medias  res.  Begin  at  the  begin 
ning.  Learn  well  the  axioms  and  principles  of  the  law  as  a  first  step ;  your 
progress  afterward  will  be  easy  and  pleasing.  In  your  debating  society,  venture 
on  no  subject  that  has  not  been  well  considered  beforehand,  and  do  not  be  much 
upon  your  legs.  Be  courteous  and  calm,  and  endeavor  to  convince  by  the  earnest 
exhibition  of  your  argument,  and  do  not  employ  personalities.  Above  all,  do 
not  try  to  show  your  superiority :  if  you  have  it,  it  will  be  felt  and  silently  ac 
knowledged  ;  if  exacted  by  words  or  bearing,  it  will  be  withheld.  With  the 
consciousness  of  having  deserved  well  be  content.  If  you  deserve  well,  the 
merit  of  it  will  usually  be  accorded  to  you.  But  no  one  must  try  to  find  out 
what  people  think  of  actions  he  himself  may  approve.  At  the  same  time  that 
the  good  opinion  of  those  by  whom  we  are  surrounded  is  to  be  highly  valued, 
those  who  fish  for  it  usually  catch  minnows.  Avoid  in  your  speaking  what 
Macaulay  calls  "carmagnoles"  (puns,  jests,  rant,  interjections);  but  few  condi 
tions  of  society  admit  their  use. 

Your  own  good  sense,  my  dear  son,  has  already  suggested  to  you  better 
counsel  than  I  can  give  you;  but  it  is  the  privilege  of  age  to  make  youth  suffer 
in  that  way,  and  you  perceive  I  use  my  privilege. 

Your  affectionate  father, 

A.  SIDNEY  JOHXSTON". 

BRAZOKIA  COUNTY,  TEXAS,  December  11,  1848. 

MY  DEAR  WILL:  Your  last  letter,  giving  renewed  assurance  of  fhe  satisfac 
tory  progress  and  improvement  in  your  studies,  was  received  with  all  the  gratifi 
cation  the  most  solicitous  parent  must  naturally  experience  for  a  son  whose 
conduct  has  always  commanded  his  highest  respect  as  well  as  unbounded 
affection. 

You  express  the  determination  to  make  great  efforts,  and  if  necessary  great 
sacrifices,  for  the  attainment  of  the  first  honor.  While  I  would  inculcate  all 
the  diligence  compatible  with  good  health  and  a  full  development  of  physical 
power,  I  would  most  assuredly  deprecate  and  regret  any  exertion  beyond  that, 
if  it  endangered  the  loss  of  the  one  or  checked  the  other. 

You  are,  I  hope,  preparing  for  a  long  career.  In  that  case,  our  experience 
teaches  us  that  the  powers,  physical  and  mental,  should  be  husbanded,  or  used 
moderately  and  economically ;  otherwise  the  goal  can  never  be  reached  with 
distinction.  If  our  experience  is  correct,  it  would  be  unwise  to  waste  our 
strength  in  a  first  effort.  The  untaught  pedestrian  who  is  trained  for  a  ten-mile 
race  knows  this;  he  wins  his  race  by  at  no  time  in  the  course  attaining  the 
highest  speed  of  which  he  is  capable.  What  would  you  think  of  the  judgment 
of  a  race-rider  who  would  give  his  horse  the  highest  speed  at  the  start,  or  who, 
all  other  things  being  equal,  would  agree  to  carry  ten  pounds  more  than  his 
opponent?  Now,  this  latter  view  embraces  your  case;  you  have  one  more 
study  than  your  rival.  You  may  possibly  beat  him ;  so  may  the  horse  that  car 
ries  undue  weight  win,  but  in  most  cases  he  never  wins  again — all  his  powers 
have  been  sacrificed  for  a  single  object. 

Would  it  not  be  thought  insane  if  a  man  should  agree  to  give  his  left  arm 
for  a  full  knowledge  of  integral  and  differential  calculus?  If  so,  to  use  the  Ian- 


PLANTATION-LIFE. 

guage  of  mathematics,  how  much  more  insane  would  he  be  who  would  risk  the 
loss  of  all  his  physical  powers  for  a  less  object,  or  for  any  object!  Mind  and 
matter  are  dependent  upon  each  other  for  effective  action;  if  one  is  sick  or  de 
bilitated,  the  other  will  sympathize.  Cassar  with  the  ague  whines  like  a  sick 
girl.  An  effective  mind  can  spare  nothing  from  the  physical  organization — not 
even  its  shadow.  Cultivate  the  mind ;  but  with  the  same  sedulous  care  culti 
vate  the  body.  Learn  if  you  can ;  but  learn  nothing  at  the  risk — I  do  not  say 
loss — at  the  risk  of  health.  Neither  wealth,  nor  power,  nor  human  admiration, 
if  gained  in  exchange,  could  compensate  for  its  loss. 

Higher  honors  await  moderation  than  any  qualities  you  may  possess.  "  Bide 
your  time."  Study  moderately ;  exercise  moderately ;  eat  moderately;  in  fine, 
let  this  be  your  rule.  I  say  these  things  for  your  sister  as  well  as  yourself,  for  I 
know  no  difference  in  my  feelings  toward  you.  You  are  both  my  pride  and 
hope.  I  believe  I  am  very  honest,  and  I  would  maintain  my  honor  at  the  risk 
of  my  life ;  but  I  do  not  think  there  is  anything  else  in  my  character  worthy  of 
imitation:  your  own  good  sense  will  inform  you  of  whatever  is  defective;  that, 
of  course,  you  will  avoid.  So,  if  I  give  you  advice  not  in  harmony  with  my 
own  course,  it  is  to  warn  you  off  the  shoals  upon  which  my  own  little  bark  has 
been  stranded. 

My  judgment  is  that,  after  you  have  taken  your  degree  at  Georgetown,  you 
will  be  qualified  to  begin  the  study  of  the  law.  Those  who  do  not  begin  early 
rarely  succeed  in  law.  If  you  like  mathematics,  you  will  like  law  more.  What 
ever  of  ingenuity  your  mind  may  possess  will  be  brought  into  play  in  the  solu 
tion  of  its  entangled  and  difficult  problems.  It  is  often  said  that  descriptive 
geometry  is  the  poetry  of  mathematics ;  if  so,  its  imaginings  are  stereotyped. 
The  science  furnishes  the  arguments  and  the  imagination.  Not  so  the  law; 
here  more  is  required  of  mind.  Give  my  love  to  Henrietta. 

Your  affectionate  father, 

A.    SlDXEY   JOIIXSTOX. 

Again,  in  the  same  strain,  he  says  : 

Take  exercise  regularly  and  moderately,  and  rest,  and  so  of  study ;  and  you 
will  be  able  to  continue  your  exertions  in  the  acquirement  of  knowledge  even 
to  old  age.  Infinite  magnitudes  may  be  the  accretion  of  infinitely  small  incre 
ments.  Great  learning  may  be  the  result  of  the  daily  acquirement  of  small 
items  of  knowledge.  Be  patient,  therefore,  and  be  satisfied  with  moderate  prog 
ress.  Go  to  bed  early ;  rise  early ;  read  three  or  four  hours  a  day.  Turn  your 
reading  over  in  your  mind  well  and  frequently,  and  be  sure  to  talk  about  it  with 
some  one  able  to  illustrate  and  explain  it. 

I  have  occasionally  offered  you  a  little  of  my  experience,  of  which  I  have  a 
large  stock,  purchased  at  high  prices  (which  men  of  strong  will  have  always  to 
pay),  to  save  you  expense ;  but  I  doubt  if  it  is  a  transferable  article.  It  does  not 
do  to  deal  too  much  in  such  expenditures ;  the  means  will  not  hold  out.  Caution 
and  reflection  are  a  cheap  and  safe  substitute.  It  is  better  to  make  a  survey, 
and  sound  where  you  intend  to  dive,  than  buy  the  same  information  by  heed 
lessly  plunging  in  and  breaking  your  head. 

Every  step  taken  by  the  man  who  would  acquire  fame  or  fortune  must  receive 
the  sanction  of  his  own  judgment,  unwarped  by  passion  and  unbiased  by  preju 
dice.  Facts  and  information  from  friends  you  will  find  valuable;  but  their  ad- 


ISOLATION  AXD   DEJECTION.  1G5 

vice  as  to  the  use  to  be  made  of  them,  or  as  to  the  course  you  ought  to  pursue 
in  any  matter,  is  not  so  much  to  be  depended  upon  as  the  result  of  your  own 
reasoning.  The  one  is  often  an  off-hand  shot ;  while  the  latter  is  usually  a  long, 
labored,  and  patient  investigation.  Upon  this  we  ought  early  in  life  to  learn  to 
rely,  rather  than  to  catch  up  the  hasty  opinions  of  friends,  which,  however 
well  meant,  are  not  sufficiently  elaborated.  If,  then,  acting  from  a  judgment  so 
well  guarded  against  extraneous  influences,  we  should  fail,  there  is  left  behind 
no  mortification  or  stings  of  conscience,  and  we  have  only  to  deplore  that  our 
mental  endowments  have  not  sufficient  scope.  The  love  of  approbation  or  the 
urgency  of  friends,  generally  well  intended,  sometimes  precipitates  us  on  a 
course  which  we  have  greatly  to  regret.  Be  careful,  therefore,  not  to  mistake 
these  influences  for  a  decision  of  your  own  judgment.  I  have  now  nearly  torn 
this  subject  to  tatters,  and  turn  over  the  letter  to  your  mother. 

From  what  has  been  said,  and  from  General  Johnston's  own  utter 
ances,  it  is  manifest  that  under  the  humble  roof  of  his  frontier  cabin  a 
lofty  philosophy  made  its  home.  Though  luxuriant  Nature  had  poured 
out  so  much  of  beauty  upon  this  teeming  spot,  it  was,  nevertheless,  a 
monotonous  plain  ;  and  ever  lurking  near  was  the  insidious,  fever- 
breeding  malaria,  which  saps  the  health  and  strength  and  energies  of 
its  victims.  Although  General  Johnston  and  his  family  did  not  suffer 
the  worst  consequences  of  a  residence  so  near  the  swamp,  yet  when 
they  left  the  plantation  they  were  sallow,  gaunt,  and  ague-stricken  in 
appearance.  But  the  causes  that  wore  down  the  edge  of  his  spirit 
were  moral  rather  than  physical.  This  was  not  the  country-home  that 
bis  fancy  had  portrayed  when  Fortune  seemed  ready  to  provide  him  a 
field  and  ample  returns  for  all  his  energies,  together  with  such  delights 
and  recreations  as  taste  and  culture  might  suggest.  Gradually,  too, 
the  conviction  must  have  forced  itself  upon  him  that  he  had  mistaken 
his  vocation ;  and  that,  though  his  occupation  was  endurable,  and  had 
its  own  stock  of  simple,  rational  pleasures,  yet  it  was  in  arms  alone 
that  he  found  full  play  for  all  his  faculties  and  for  the  exercise  of  his 
special  talents.  Then,  too,  he  saw  the  interest  on  his  debt  steadily 
swelling  the  burden  that  galled  his  neck  like  an  iron  yoke. 

Mrs.  Johnston  says,  in  one  letter  :  "  He  is  almost  in  despair,  and 
often  says  he  feels  like  a  drowning  man  with  his  hands  tied;  but  he 
tries  to  keep  up  his  spirits."  And  again,  writing  in  October,  1849, 
she  says  :  "  Our  home  is  now  a  beautiful  place,  and  I  have  become  so 
attached  to  it  that  I  shall  grieve  a  great  deal  when  we  must  leave  it. 
Your  father  looks  care-worn  and  sad.  You  would  be  astonished  at  the 
great  change  in  him  since  you  last  saw  him  (April,  1847).  From  a  fleshy, 
stout  man  he  has  grown  quite  thin,  and,  considering  his  frame,  slender." 

It  would  not  have  been  strange  if  disappointment  had  tinged  with 
bitterness  a  nature  so  aspiring  ;  but,  if  it  was  so,  it  took  the  form  of  an 
almost  silent  self-reproach,  which  accepted  with  stoical  firmness  both  the 
consequences  of  his  own  mistakes  and  the  hard  decrees  of  a  seemingly 


166  PLANTATION-LIFE. 

inexorable  destiny.  It  is  proof  of  the  strength  of  his  principles  and  the 
sweetness  of  his  temper,  as  well  as  of  the  practical  soundness  of  his 
philosophy,  that  he  came  out  of  this  trial  with  a  nature  enlarged  and  en 
nobled.  He  had  a  great  share  of  magnanimity ;  and  his  soul,  exalted 
above  the  jealousies  and  littlenesses  of  small  minds,  learned  in  solitude 
to  correct,  in  many  important  points,  its  standard  of  the  world. 

While  General  Johnston  was  planting  in  Brazoria  Countv,  a  polit 
ical  revolution  occurred  which  again  changed  the  current  of  his  fate. 
The  Whig  party,  thoroughly  vanquished  by  its  opposition  to  the  an 
nexation  of  Texas  and  its  adhesion  to  a  narrow  commercial  policy,  was 
seeking  to  rally  its  forces  on  a  broader  platform,  under  the  leadership 
of  a  candidate  available  and  unencumbered  with  the  weight  of  political 
disaster.  Though  Clay,  Webster,  and  other  political  chiefs,  had  each  a 
following  of  devoted  adherents,  the  most  obtuse  felt  that  without  some 
new  and  more  popular  name  the  fate  of  the  Whig  party  was  sealed  ; 
and  presently  attention  was  turned  to  the  victor  of  Resaca  and  Mon 
terey.  General  Taylor  promptly  and  bluntly  put  aside  the  glittering 
temptation;  but  the  over-astute  policy  of  the  Government  in  its  further 
employment  of  him  gave  color  to  the  popular  notion  that  his  services 
were  to  be  depreciated,  and  perhaps,  even,  that  himself  and  his  army 
were  to  be  sacrificed  for  political  considerations.  The  prevalence  of 
such  an  opinion,  whether  just  or  unjust,  was  at  once  fatal  to  the  organ 
ization  charged  with  such  conduct,  and  an  augury  of  triumph  to  the 
supposed  victim.  Already  a  popular  favorite,  General  Taylor  became 
a  popular  idol ;  and  the  evident  sincerity  with  which  he  at  first  resisted 
all  manifestations  on  his  behalf  swelled  the  tide  of  enthusiasm,  which 
finally  bore  him  into  the  White  House  over  all  opposition,  and  almost 
against  his  own  protest.  There  is  no  doubt  that  General  Taylor  felt  a 
real  disquietude  on  account  of  his  inexperience  in  political  affairs,  and 
committed  himself  too  entirely  to  a  clique  unequal  to  the  greatness  of 
the  situation.  Had  he  lived,  it  is  not  improbable  that  his  strong  sense 
and  courage  would  have  asserted  themselves  by  casting  off  the  trammels 
of  party  management,  and  that  he  would  have  vindicated  his  ability  in 
civil  as  in  military  affairs ;  but  his  presidential  career  was  so  brief  as  to 
furnish  no  sufficient  criterion  of  what  he  might  have  been. 

General  Johnston  shared  in  the  popular  sentiment  that  raised  Gen 
eral  Taylor  to  the  chief  magistracy,  and  entertained  the  liveliest  hopes 
of  reform  as  a  consequence  of  the  defeat  of  the  old  organized  parties ; 
but  he  contributed  to  it  no  more  than  his  vote.  It  is  somewhat  remark 
able  that  this  was  the  first  vote  he  ever  cast,  and  I  believe  the  only  one. 
Officers  of  the  United  States  Army  formerly  regarded  partisanship  in 
political  struggles  as  indecorous;  and,  after  his  removal  to  Texas,  his 
position  had  either  been  similar,  or  circumstances  prevented  the  exer 
cise  of  this  right. 


OFFICE-SEEKING.  1(57 

When  General  Taylor  was  elected,  General  Johnston's  friends  con 
fidently  expected  his  appointment  to  some  position  of  trust  or  honor 
which  would  relieve  him  from  his  unsuitable  situation.  Though  the  le 
gitimate  use  of  influence  would  seem  quite  natural  under  the  circum 
stances,  his  friends,  knowing  his  proud  sensibility,  did  not  propose  that 
he  should  employ  it,  but  only  that  he  would  indicate  for  their  guidance 
in  what  direction  his  wishes  inclined.  Hancock  and  Burnley,  who  were 
intimate  personal  friends  of  the  President,  were  especially  zealous. 
General  Johnston,  however,  looked  at  the  matter  in  an  unexpected 
light,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  correspondence  presented  herewith  ;  so 
that,  but  for  the  voluntary  efforts  of  these  and  other  friends,  and  still 
more  the  personal  interest  of  the  President  and  his  brother,  Colonel 
Joseph  P.  Taylor,  it  is  likely  he  would  have  been  forgotten  in  the  eager 
press  of  aspirants.  As  it  was,  his  appointment  was  delayed  until  De 
cember,  1849.  General  Taylor  then  conferred  upon  him  the  place  of 
paymaster  in  the  army,  a  <?w<m'-military  office,  which  was  permanent, 
with  a  living  salary,  and  gave  him  a  footing  in  the  regular  army  estab 
lishment,  from  which  he  might  hope,  by  possible  promotion  or  transfer, 
to  reenter  the  line.  If  General  Taylor's  death  had  not  occurred  so  soon 
after,  it  was  thought  that  at  the  first  opportunity  he  would  have  effected 
this  transfer  to  a  position  strictly  military  and  entirely  congenial.  Re 
garding  it  as  a  probation,  but  as  the  only  door  to  the  regular  army  open 
to  him,  General  Johnston  accepted  the  post.  For  the  fuller  explanation 
of  the  foregoing  statements,  the  following  letters  are  now  introduced : 

BEAZOBIA  COUNTY,  TEXAS,  December  2, 1848. 

DEAR  HANCOCK  :  Your  letter  of  the  10th  November  has  been  received,  but 
not  in  time  to  answer  you  at  Carrollton.  In  my  reply,  I  hope  you  will  not 
misunderstand  me;  but,  on  the  contrary,  always  believe  that  I  appreciate  your 
kindness  toward  me. 

With  regard  to  appointments  to  office,  I  have  notions  of  my  own,  which,  if 
peculiar,  should  not  be  so.  I  think  the  President  should  be  left  free  to  select 
for  himself.  Heretofore,  General  Taylor's  judgment  has  proved  unerring  in 
selections  for  services  to  be  performed  under  his  orders.  It  has  been  remarked 
that  he  has  always  found  the  right  man  when  anything  was  to  be  done.  Let 
the  reform  in  this  commence  now.  The  scramble  for  office  after  a  presidential 
election  is  well  calculated  to  make  the  world  doubt  whether  it  is  a  mere  contest 
for  principle.  It  is  time  that  this  disgraceful  feature  of  a  great  public  event 
was  done  away  with.  It  was  not,  I  understand,  the  custom  in  the  early  history 
of  the  Government.  No  one  presumed  then  to  consume  the  valuable  time  of 
the  President  in  setting  forth  the  respective  merits  and  claims  of  applicants  for 
office.  In  truth,  for  some  years  past  the  President's  audience-room  has  been 
but  little  better  than  an  "  intelligence  office,"  where  employment  was  sought  for 
and  could  be  found.  Every  one  says  it  is  a  shameful  evil.  If  it  is,  let  it  be 
changed.  The  announcement  that  the  employment  of  congressional  influence 
to  obtain  office  would  be  considered  a  species  of  bribery  fatal  to  the  hopes  of 
the  applicant  would  do  much  to  relieve  the  President  from  this  clamor.  It  is 


168  PLANTATION-LIFE. 

said  that  this  is  the  best  method  to  obtain  information.  It  is  the  worst.  It  is 
the  way  in  which  mere  partisans  and  demagogues  receive  their  reward.  I  do 
not,  therefore,  wish  my  friends  to  ask  General  Taylor  for  any  office  for  me.  lie 
knows  me  well ;  and  if  it  should  not  occur  to  him  to  offer  me  a  place,  1  shall 
only  think  that  he  has  selected  others  whom  he  believed  better  capable  of  pro 
moting  the  public  interest.  This  consideration,  I  believe,  will  alone  guide  him ; 
and  God  grant  that  it  may  be  always  the  only  rule  of  action  ! 

We  now  have  a  man  for  President  who  will  administer  the  Government 
according  to  the  Constitution  construed  in  a  liberal  and  enlightened  spirit, 
whether  the  principles  educed  by  him  have  been  approved  or  condemned  by 
one  party  or  the  other.  The  extremes  of  neither  party  will  find  any  footing 
with  his  Administration.  He  will  be  as  averse  from  the  fanaticism  that  imposes 
high  and  oppressive  tariffs  as  from  that  which,  standing  upon  "  54°  40',''  bullies 
our  rivals  in  trade  and  threatens  the  peace  of  the  world  ;  or  from  that  which,  as 
a  rabid  propagandist,  preaches  "  the  extension  of  the  area  of  freedom."  Attempt 
to  conceal  it  as  they  may,  a  new  and  great  party  has  arisen,  which,  like  "  the 
rod  of  Aaron,  has  swallowed  up  all  the  others."  A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 


DEAR  GENERAL:  Burnley  informed  me  he  had  seen  you  ;  and  showed  me  a 
letter  the  day  he  started  for  Washington,  that  he  had  just  received  from  you, 
giving  him  the  reasons  why  yon  could  receive  no  office  from  General  Taylor.  I 
had  some  time  before  received  one  of  a  similar  kind,  and  had  followed  your  in 
junction  "  that  no  application  should  be  made  to  General  Taylor  in  your  behalf." 
I  was  one  of  a  committee  sent  by  the  city  and  county  to  escort  the  general  to 
Louisville,  and,  being  several  days  with  him,  had  frequent  and  confidential  talks 
with  him.  He  asked  kindly  after  you.  I  told  him  you  were  struggling  along 
in  Texas.  He  remarked  that  it  was  no  place  for  you,  and  observed,  "I  had 
not  been  informed  of  my  election  long  before  I  determined  to  do  something  for 
Johnston."  I  am  convinced  that  it  is  not  only  his  wish,  but  that  it  would  give 
him  great  pleasure,  to  put  you  in  a  position  that  would  be  lucrative  and  honor 
able  ;  and  the  only  thing  is  to  know  what  place  would  l)e  most  agreeable  to  you — 
Governor  of  Oregon,  commissioner  to  run  the  Mexican  boundary,  Treasurer  of 
the  United  States,  charge  to  Sardinia  or  Naples,  Superintendent  of  the  Mint  in 
California,  Surveyor-General  of  California  or  Missouri,  or  paymaster  in  the 
army.  I  will  guarantee  you  will  have  the  offer  from  General  Tavlor  of  what 
ever  he  may  know  it  would  be  agreeable  to  you  to  accept.  .  .  . 

G.  HANCOCK. 

To  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

Mr.  Hancock  further  says,  in  a  letter  of  April  22,  1849  : 

You  seem  to  have  misapprehended  me  in  relation  to  your  applying  for  office. 
I  agree  with  you  fully  that  a  gentleman  ought  not  to  ask  for  one,  but  in  your 
case  this  never  was  asked  of  you.  The  President  of  his  own  accord  expressed 
the  determination  to  give  you  one,  if  you  would  take  it,  and  your  friends  only 
wanted  to  learn  from  you  what  you  preferred.  However,  the  thing  is  now  set 
tled.  Joe  Taylor  is  now  here,  and  tells  me  you  will  shortly  be  offered  the 
place  of  paymaster  in  the  army.  ...  G.  HANCOCK. 


REEXTERS  THE  ARMY.  109 

Mr.  A.  T.  Burnley  was  in  General  Taylor's  confidence,  and  had 
been  selected  by  him  as  one  of  the  proprietors  of  the  Administration 
"  organ."  He  wrote  to  General  Johnston,  on  the  21st  of  May : 

General  Taylor  intended  to  offer  you  the  marshalship  of  Texas.  I  told  him 
you  would  not  have  it.  He  said  then,  if  Reynolds  resigned,  he  intended  to  offer 
you  the  collectorship  of  Galveston.  I  told  him  you  would  not  have  it. 
u  Then,"  said  he,  "  I  shall  offer  him  a  paymaster's  place  in  the  army."  Not 
knowing  your  views  as  to  that  place,  I  replied,  I  expected  you  would  take  it ; 
because  I  thought  it  was  a  good  office,  and  wanted  it  offered  to  you.  I  have 
since  ascertained  that  it  is  worth  about  $3,000  per  annum,  and  impermanent. 

In  thus  exchanging  the  life  of  the  plantation  for  military  service 
again,  General  Johnston  had  the  encouragement  of  his  wife,  who  now 
clearly  perceived  that,  however  faithfully  he  might  perform  the  duties 
that  fell  to  the  lot  of  a  farmer,  his  heart,  his  thoughts,  and  his  aspira 
tions,  were  in  the  profession  to  which  he  had  been  educated.  But 
though  he  deliberately  reentered  a  military  life,  which  he  had  thought 
closed  upon  him  forever,  it  was  through  no  arch  of  triumph,  but  by  an 
obscure  postern  and  along  the  hard  and  narrow  path  of  petty  and  cler 
ical  routine.  He  saw  in  it  the  path  of  duty,  and  trod  it  manfully. 

General  Johnston,  in  conversation  with  the  writer,  said,  in  allusion 
to  this  appointment  : 

A  good  character  has  a  solid  value.  I  had  tried  to  live  blameless  and  to 
deserve  well ;  and  yet,  at  last,  I  found  myself  where  I  thought  I  was  entirely 
forgotten.  Now,  do  you  think  that  if  I  had  been  a  sharp  fellow,  General  Tay 
lor  would  have  taken  the  trouble  to  hunt  me  up  in  the  mud  of  the  Brazos  bot 
tom  to  make  a  paymaster  of  me  ? 


CHAPTER  XI. 

PAYMASTER    IN   UNITED   STATES   ARMY. 

GENERAL  JOHNSTON  was  appointed  paymaster,  October  31,  1849. 
On  the  3d  of  December,  1849,  he  wrote  to  the  adjutant-general,  ac 
cepting  the  appointment.1  This  office  gave  him  the  emoluments  and 
the  nominal  rank  of  major  in  the  United  States  Army  ;  but,  in  fact,  the 
paymaster  was  a  mere  disbursing  officer  and  nothing  more,  without  au 
thority  or  command.  On  the  frontier  of  Texas,  to  which  he  was  as- 

1  It  is  proper  to  state  that  General  Johnston's  legal  rank  while  paymaster  was  major  ; 
but  it  has  not  been  thought  necessary  in  this  or  subsequent  chapters  to  change  the  title 
by  which  he  was  generally  known. 


170  PAYMASTER  IN  UNITED   STATES  ARMY. 

signed,  his  duties  were  arduous  and  dangerous  ;  and,  as  has  been  sug 
gested,  General  Johnston  accepted  the  office  because  he  regarded  it  "  as 
a  stepping-stone  to  service  in  the  line."  More  than  once  he  seemed  on 
the  point  of  attaining  this  end  by  exchange  with  a  major  of  the  line, 
but  each  time  he  was  disappointed. 

So  much  had  his  health  been  impaired  by  the  malaria  of  the  Brazos 
bottom,  that,  on  the  8th  of  April,  1850,  while  waiting  orders  at  Galves- 
ton,  he  was  obliged,  at  the  suggestion  of  his  superior  officers,  to  ask  a 
little  indulgence  before  reporting  for  duty.  He  availed  himself  of  this 
to  take  his  family  to  Kentucky.  The  pay  district  assigned  to  him  in 
cluded  the  military  posts  from  the  river  Trinity  to  the  Colorado.  He 
selected  Austin  as  his  home  on  account  of  its  healthfulness,  natural 
beauty,  pleasant  society,  and  proximity  to  his  district.  Some  of  his  old 
friends  had  settled  there,  which  was  another  attraction.  General  John 
ston,  having  placed  his  family  in  Kentucky  for  the  summer,  returned  to 
Texas,  and  entered  upon  his  duties.  In  September  he  proceeded  to 
New  Orleans  for  funds  to  pay  the  troops,  when,  notwithstanding  his 
long  experience  in  a  Southern  climate,  he  took  the  yellow  fever  on  ship 
board  while  returning.  The  fever,  though  sharp,  was  short,  and  yield 
ed  to  his  own  treatment  and  simple  remedies,  detaining  him,  however, 
several  weeks  in  Galveston.  On  November  13th  he  reported  to  the 
paymaster-general  that  he  had  completed  the  first  payment  of  troops  in 
his  district. 

At  first  his  duty  was  to  pay  every  four  months  the  troops  at  Forts 
Croghan,  Gates,  Graham,  and  Belknap,  and  at  Austin.  This  required 
a  journey  of  about  500  miles  each  time,  besides  a  visit  to  New  Orleans 
for  the  funds  requisite  for  each  payment — between  $40,000  and  $50,000. 
He  was  usually  assisted  in  the  transportation  of  these  funds  by  a  clerk  ; 
but  these  journeys  were,  nevertheless,  periods  of  great  solicitude  to  him. 
The  route  was  by  steamer  to  Galveston,  thence  by  steamboat  to  Hous 
ton,  and  thence  by  stage,  a  distance  of  185  miles,  to  Austin  ;  and  the 
journey  was  continued  day  and  night  for  about  a  week.  In  addition  to 
perils  of  the  sea  and  yellow  fever,  the  stage-road  had  its  dangers.  Pass 
ing  through  the  boggy  Brazos  bottom,  through  wide  post-oak  woods, 
and  across  broad  tracts  of  sparsely-settled  prairie,  there  was  considera 
ble  danger  of  robbery,  and  greater  still  from  upsets  which  several  times 
happened.  The  money  was  in  gold  and  silver  coin  packed  in  a  small 
iron  chest,  and  always  placed  between  the  feet  of  its  guardians,  who 
watched  in  turn  from  New  Orleans  to  Austin.  This  exhausting  vigi 
lance  was  happily  rewarded  by  exemption  from  loss  or  serious  accident, 
In  1851  General  Johnston  was  obliged  to  visit  New  Orleans  in  May,  in 
June,  and  in  August,  to  obtain  extra  funds  to  pay  off  the  Texas  volun 
teers  of  1848-'49.  This  work,  which  required  great  care  and  circum 
spection  to  protect  both  the  Government  and  the  soldier,  was  completed 


PERIL  AND   CARE. 

that  fall.  In  the  autumn'  of  1852  he  was  enabled  to  discontinue  his 
harassing  visits  to  New  Orleans  by  arranging  for  the  sale  of  drafts  in 
Austin,  which  he  had  been  unable  to  do  before. 

General  Johnston's  pay  district  was  gradually  altered  and  enlarged 
in  consequence  of  the  movements  of  troops,  until  finally  it  embraced 
Forts  Belknap,  Chadbourne,  and  McKavitt,  and  required  a  journey  of 
695  miles  for  each  payment.  In  1854  payments  were  ordered  to  be 
made  every  two  months,  thus  compelling  the  paymaster  to  travel  an 
nually  nearly  4,200  miles.  Each  journey  took  more  than  a  month,  of 
which  only  four  or  five  days  were  spent  at  the  posts,  which  were  occu 
pied  in  paying  the  soldiers.  General  Johnston,  with  his  clerk,  negro 
driver  John,  and  negro  cook"  Randolph,  rode  in  a  covered  ambulance 
drawn  by  four  mules,  and  carried  His  money-chest  and  baggage  in  the 
same  conveyance.  He  was  accompanied  by  a  forage-wagon  and  an  es 
cort  of  dragoons,  varying  from  four  to  twelve  in  number,  under  charge 
of  a  non-commssioned  officer.  The  escort  was  usually  too  small  to 
guard  against  outlaws  or  Indians  who  constantly  menaced  that  region  ; 
and  his  escape  from  attack  was  due  in  great  measure  to  his  extreme 
wariness,  and  to  the  observance  of  every  possible  precaution  against 
surprise. 

General  Johnston  says,  in  a  letter  written  in  1850 : 

Scarcely  a  day  has  passed  since  my  arrival  that  a  depredation  has  not  been 
committed.  They  (the  Indians)  have  driven  off  nearly  all  the  horses  and  mules 
from  the  Cibolo,  Salado,  and  other  portions  of  of  the  frontier.  Parties  are  sent 
in  pursuit,  but  without  success.  To  give  peace  to  the  frontier,  and  that  perfect 
security  so  necessary  to  the  happiness  and  prosperity  of  communities,  the  troops 
ought  to  act  offensively  and  carry  the  war  to  the  homes  of  the  enemy. 

The  continued  movement  of  these  marauding  parties  on  the  border 
for  the  next  five  years  made  each  of  General  Johnston's  pay-tours  a 
perilous  expedition. 

General  Johnston  suffered  great  annoyance  because  the  transporta 
tion  furnished  him  was  never  suitable  to  the  work  to  be  done.  He  had 
to  remonstrate  often,  but  in  vain,  against  the  tired  mules  and  worn-out 
wagons  supplied  to  him.  As  his  circuit  was  made  through  a  wilder 
ness,  he  prevented  detention  and  its  ill  results  only  by  the  most  heedful 
preparation  of  his  outfit  and  the  utmost  attention  to  details,  so  that  no 
bolt,  buckle,  or  horseshoe-nail,  was  overlooked. 

The  following  extracts  will  suggest  some  of  his  difficulties.  In  a 
letter  dated  October  18, 1853,  to  Colonel  A.  J.  Coffee,  deputy  paymaster- 
general,  he  writes  that  if  his  tour  were  increased,  as  was  proposed,  to 
925  miles,  a  payment,  would  occupy  forty-five  days;  and  adds  : 

If,  after  the  information  I  have  given  you  as  to  the  distances  to  be  traveled, 
etc.,  you  think  the  public  interest  would  be  properly  subserved  by  my  includ- 


172  PAYMASTER  IN  UNITED   STATES  ARMY. 

ing  Paymaster  Butter's  district  with  my  own,  I  will,  as  soon  as  notified,  take 
upon  myself  the  duties  of  the  district,  thus  arranged,  with  pleasure.  I  think  it 
my  duty  to  say  that  the  quartermaster  at  this  place  has  not  had  the  means  to 
give  a  good  team  for  the  ambulance  for  a  long  time,  and  I  would  do  no  injustice 
to  say  that  I  have  at  no  time  had  a  sufficiently  good  team.  .  .  .  The  team  fur 
nished  at  this  point  now  has  to  work  in  the  trains  when  not  in  the  service  of  the 
pay  department,  a  practice  which  makes  a  team  totally  unfit  for  ambulance 
service. 

He  adds : 

There  is  no  ambulance  here ;  the  one  mentioned  in  my  requisition  became  a 
wreck  on  a  late  trip  of  Major  Woods  from  Phantom  Hill.  This  is  a  small  mat 
ter  to  trouble  you  with,  and  I  hate  grumblers  so  much  that  I  dislike  to  make  any 
complaint;  but,  if  service  is  to  be  promptly  and  efficiently  performed,  the  means 
should  not  be  withheld. 

In  a  letter  addressed  to  Colonel  B.  F.  Earned,  paymaster-general, 
April  8,  1852,  General  Johnston  says  : 

I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  the  district  to  which  I  have  been  assigned 
has  been  paid  to  the  29th  February  last.  It  is  constituted  as  follows  :  Fort  Gra 
ham,  Brazos  River  ;  Fort  Worth,  Clear  Fork  of  the  Trinity ;  Belknap,  Salt  Fork 
of  the  Brazos ;  and  the  post  on  the  Clear  Fork  of  the  Brazos.  The  distance 
traveled  in  making  the  payment  was  V30  miles;  time — from  29th  February  to 
3d  April — thirty-five  days,  under  favorable  circumstances.  The  country  is  ele 
vated,  the  greater  portion  being  a  succession  of  ranges  of  high  hills,  intersected 
with  numerous  streams,  the  crossing  of  which  is  always  troublesome,  and  often 
produces  delay  in  the  journey.  The  march  is  commenced  at  daylight,  and  con 
tinued  industriously  during  the  day,  except  two  hours  in  mid-day ;  and  thus  the 
journey  is  prosecuted  without  any  loss  of  time,  either  on  the  route  or  at  the 
posts.  You  may,  therefore,  fix  the  average  time  at  thirty-five  or  forty  days. 
This  six  times  repeated  during  the  year  makes  up  an  amount  of  travel,  sleeping 
on  the  ground,  privation,  and  exposure  to  heat  and  cold,  not  imagined  by  the 
framers  of  the  law,  nor  encountered  by  a  private  soldier  in  time  of  war  or 
peace,  for  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  country  traversed  is  uninhabited. 

The  commanding  general  of  this  department  issued  an  order  last  summer  fix 
ing  the  period  of  the  payments  at  four  months,  which  I  thought  the  circum 
stances  of  the  case  called  for,  and  which  has  been  productive  of  no  detriment 
whatever  to  the  public  service ;  since  then  the  interior  line  has  been  established, 
making  the  travel  much  greater.  In  conclusion,  I  beg  leave  to  refer  you  to 
Colonel  Cooper  for  the  best  information  with  regard  to  this  district,  and  to  say 
that  I  will  endeavor  to  execute  faithfully  whatever  order  you  may  deem  it  proper 
to  give  with  regard  to  the  period  of  the  payment. 

General  Johnston,  in  a  letter  of  August  10,  1854,  to  his  daughter, 
gives  this  account  of  his  tours  of  duty  : 

MY  DEAR  DAUGHTER  :  I  received  your  beautiful  letter  on  my  return  from  my 
last  tour  to  the  military  posts,  and  have  had  necessarily  to  defer  my  answer 
until  I  could  get  off  to  Washington  a  statement  of  my  accounts,  which  is 


A  PAYMASTER'S  TOUR.  173 

the  first  thing  to  be  done  after  each  payment,  and  cannot  be  dispensed  with. 
The  payments  have  to  be  made  every  two  months;  the  distance  to  be  traveled 
is  near  700  miles ;  so  you  see,  with  traveling  and  making  up  accounts,  I  have 
but  little  leisure.  Traveling  in  an  uninhabited  country,  making  from  twenty- 
five  to  thirty  miles  a  day,  is  no  longer  by  me  classed  with  trips  of  pleasure. 
With  your  modern  improvements  you  accomplish  as  much  in  t\vo  days  as  we 
can  in  a  month. 

Although  we  do  not  travel  far  in  a  day,  it  is  sufficiently  fatiguing.  We  are, 
every  morning,  on  our  feet  at  the  first  peep  of  dawn ;  and,  as  the  glorious  orb 
of  day  discloses  his  radiant  face,  which  in  this  sunny  climate  is  almost  every 
day,  we  begin  our  march.  We  continue  tiD  11  A.  M.,  and  start  again  about  2 
p.  M.,  and  stop  for  the  night,  about  five  o'clock,  in  some  romantic  spot  made 
hospitable  to  us  by  Dame  Nature ;  and  so,  on  and  on,  as  one  day,  so  all.  A  first 
trip  is  delightful ;  all  that  is  beautiful  and  charming,  and  much  that  is  magnifi 
cent  or  sublime,  in  scenery,  daily  feasts  the  eye.  But  even  this  becomes  tire 
some  and  uninteresting  when  seen  too  often.  I  took  Sid 1  with  me  on  my  last 
trip.  It  was  a  rich  treat  to  him.  He  swam  and  fished  in  almost  every  stream 
on  the  route.  lie  is  a  bold,  intelligent  boy,  with  a  splendid  physique. 

In  March,  1854,  the  writer  made  one  of  these  rounds  of  duty  with 
General  Johnston,  taking  the  place  of  his  clerk.  The  journey  was  one 
of  lively  enjoyment,  and  afforded  a  good  opportunity  for  noting  some 
of  General  Johnston's  traits.  The  average  rate  of  travel  was  about 
thirty  miles  a  day.  The  trail  over  dry  and  treeless  plains,  though 
hardly  to  be  called  a  road,  offered  little  interruption  or  detention,  ex 
cept  at  the  crossings  of  streams,  where  sometimes  a  large  part  of  a  day 
was  spent.  General  Johnston's  equipage  has  already  been  described  ; 
a  buffalo-robe  and  some  blankets  furnished  the  bed  ;  and  two  daily 
meals  of  cold  bread,  cold  ham,  and  black  coffee,  with  an  occasional  bird 
or  wild-duck,  shot  by  the  road-side,  made  our  simple  fare.  It  may  be 
remarked  that  he  did  not  use  spirits  on  the  road,  though,  of  course,  he 
had  them  in  case  of  need. 

General  Johnston  pointed  out  with  interest  both  the  geological  and 
topographical  features  of  the  country.  Our  route,  for  the  most  part, 
lay  across  high,  wide,  rolling  prairies,  the  rich  soil  of  which  was  clothed 
with  its  earliest  verdure,  and  spangled  with  hyacinth,  coryopsis,  ver 
bena,  pink  phlox,  yellow  primrose,  and  other  flowers  just  beginning  to 
bloom.  Of  course,  in  a  circuit  of  700  miles,  the  aspect  of  the  country 
varied  greatly.  From  Austin  to  Fort  Belknap,  after  passing  for  miles 
over  swelling  prairies  capable  of  the  utmost  productiveness  under 
the  hand  of  man,  but  then  uninhabited,  we  would  sometimes  skirt  a 
range  of  low  hills,  covered  with  cedar-brake,  or  plunge  into  a  belt  of 
live-oak  or  post-oak  forest.  Emerging,  we  would  again  strike  across  a 
plain  overgrown  with  scrubby  mesquite,  or  wind  around  the  base  of  a 
conical  hill,  the  frequent  landmark  of  the  region.  The  soil  was  gener- 

1  His  son,  thirteen  years  old. 


174  PAYMASTER  IN  UNITED   STATES  ARMY. 

ally  calcareous  ;  and  at  the  hill-tops  a  bald  crown  of  white  marl  rose 
above  the  encircling  sod.  Though  marks  of  volcanic  action  were  not 
wanting,  the  strata,  where  visible,  were  commonly  horizontal.  In 
Hamilton's  Valley,  marble  was  found,  pure  white,  pink,  or  drab,  of  fine 
grain  and  good  polish.  At  Belknap,  and  along  the  Brazos,  there  was 
plenty  of  coal. 

From  Fort  Belknap  to  Phantom  Hill,  Fort  Chadbourne,  Fort 
McKavitt,  and  thence  to  Austin,  the  country  was  bolder,  wilder,  more 
rugged  and  sterile.  The  breaks  in  these  elevated  table-lands  often 
present  the  appearance  of  successive  mountain-ranges,  and  -the  eye  is 
often  delighted  with  a  landscape  forty  miles  in  extent,  under  a  cloudless 
sky.  A  conical  peak,  sometimes  called  "  Abercrombie's  Peak,"  where 
General  Johnston  often  camped,  he  named  "  Bleak  House,"  after  Dick- 
ens's  fictitious  mansion.  There  were  manifold  and  unmistakable  signs  that 
the  whole  land  had  once  been  submerged,  and  had  risen  from  the  deep, 
by  numerous  successive  elevations  of  the  most  gradual  character.  On  the 
hill-sides  the  well-defined  water-levels,  beaches  of  a  vanished  ocean,  re 
sembled  walled  terraces,  and  were  surmounted  by  summits  which  looked 
like  the  remains  of  embrasured  strongholds  ;  so  that  everywhere  was 
presented  the  illusion  of  ancient  fortifications  on  the  most  gigantic  scale. 

These  high  plains  are  the  border-land  of  the  desert.  At  Fort  Chad- 
bourne,  we  were  told,  by  Captain  Calliouii  and  Dr.  Swift,  that  on  the 
9th  of  June,  1854,  a  terrible  hailstorm  had  swept  over  them,  which  had 
drifted  six  or  eight  feet  deep  in  the  bed  of  the  creek ;  twenty  wagon-loads 
of  hailstones  were  gathered,  and  a  hundred  more  might  have  been,  had 
it  pleased  them.  Hailstorms  followed  for  twro  weeks.  In  October,  a 
flight  of  grasshoppers  from  the  northeast  was  three  days  in  passing  over 
the  place  ;  and  such  was  the  multitude,  and  so  constant  the  flitting  of 
wings,  that  it  resembled  a  snow-storm. 

On  this  journey  we  were  assailed  by  several  "northers,"  the  pecul 
iar  wind  of  a  Texan  winter,  and  the  dread  of  the  pioneer.  The  prevail 
ing  wind  is  a  strong  sea-breeze  that  blows  with  the  regularity  of  a  trade- 
wind,  except  when  interrupted  by  the  norther.  On  a  day  as  balmy  as 
spring,  the  thermometer  perhaps  at  80°  in  the  shade,  the  weathercock 
suddenly  veers,  and  without  warning  a  fierce,  dry,  searching  blast 
comes  howling  down  from  the  northwest,  accompanied  by  a  change  of 
temperature  of  as  much,  often,  as  60°  or  70°  in  two  or  three  hours. 
The  cattle  flee  to  thickets  ;  indeed,  every  living  thing  seeks  shelter, 
and  people  exposed  to  it  are  often  chilled  to  death.  By  General  John 
ston's  direction  I  recorded  observations  and  collected  data  as  to  the  di 
rection,  progress,  and  phenomena,  of  the  norther.  From  these,  combined 
with  his  long  experience  of  the  characteristics  of  this  wind,  he  arrived 
at  the  conclusion  that  it  was  a  wind  of  propulsion  ;  that  is  to  say,  that 
it  began  to  blow  at  the  more  northerly  points  first,  and  was  not  a  "  cav- 


STUDY  OF  NATURE.  175 

ing-in  "  wind,  commencing  to  blow  at  the  Gulf,  as  some  imagined  ;  that 
its  rate  of  progress  was  from  thirty  to  forty-five  miles  per  hour  ;  and 
that  it  had  its  origin  in  the  Rocky  Mountains  or  on  the  Plains.  He 
surmised  that  a  great  snow-fall,  evolving  an  enormous  amount  of  heat, 
produced  a  rising,  moving  column  of  air,  with  a  southward  tendency, 
which  drew  after  it  the  arctic  blasts  that  made  the  norther. 

General  Johnston's  interest  in  animals — what  might  be  called  his 
friendliness  to  them — has  been  mentioned.  There  was  along  our  road 
a  tract  many  square  miles  in  extent,  reaching  from  Bluff  Creek  to  Fort 
McKavitt,  which  was  called  the  Prairie  Dog  City.  Here  dwelt  in  large 
communities  these  lively  little  marmots.  Most  of  them  occupied  plain 
holes  in  the  ground  ;  these,  General  Johnston  called  the  plebs.  Others, 
who  seemed  to  enjoy  consideration  on  account  of  the  broad,  elevated 
terraces  around  their  dwellings,  from  which  they  harangued  the  multi 
tude  with  great  chatter,  he  said  were  the  magistrates  and  orators.  He 
speculated  amusingly  on  the  analogies  here  to  human  government,  and 
called  attention  to  the  common  lot  by  which  they  fell  victims  to  the 
rattlesnakes,  which  in  turn  became  the  prey  of  the  owls  that  infested 
the  city. 

General  Johnston  noted  closely  the  habits  of  birds.  I  remember 
well  the  infinite  patience  with  which  he  reared  a  nest  of  red-birds  for  me 
near  Shelbyville,  Kentucky,  when  I  was  a  boy.  They  had  an  incessant, 
metallic  clack,  and  were  always  hungry.  The  same  year  he  brought  up  by 
hand,  in  like  manner,  two  orioles  which  became  great  pets.  On  our  fron 
tier  journey,  he  continually  called  attention  to  the  ways  of  the  animals 
that  we  saw.  A  blue,  swallow-tailed  hawk  kept  near  us  all  one  day, 
allowing  us  to  flush  the  small  birds  for  him.  General  Johnston  knew 
not  which  most  to  admire,  the  poise  and  swoop  of  the  aerial  hunter,  or 
the  intelligence  that  made  him  avail  himself  of  our  aid  in  getting  his 
dinner.  "  That  hawk,"  he  said,  "  doubtless  considers  himself  the  centre 
of  creation,  and  that  our  place  in  it  is  to  play  jackal  to  him." 

In  his  study  of  Nature,  General  Johnston  combined  scientific  exact 
ness  with  aesthetic  gratification.  A  flower  was  viewed  by  him  in  more 
than  one  aspect.  Grouped  with  others  it  was  a  piece  of  color,  or  a  feat 
ure  in  the  landscape ;  and  again,  as  a  single  study,  it  became  in  turn 
an  index  of  the  soil,  a  sign  of  the  season,  or,  with  its  wonderful  arrange 
ment  of  stamen  and  petal,  an  evidence  of  design  and  a  symbol  of  order 
in  the  universe.  He  showed  me  the  distinctive  features  and  the  rela 
tive  practical  values  of  the  white  mesquite,  the  curly  mesquite,  and 
half  a  dozen  other  nutritious  native  grasses.  His  acquaintance  with 
plants  was  very  intimate.  In  the  cultivation  of  this  taste,  he  had  the 
aid  and  encouragement  of  his  wife,  who  possessed  remarkable  talent 
and  skill  in  painting  flowers.  In  his  various  tours  he  collected  for  her 

a  large  number  of  varieties  of  cactus — as  many  as  sixty,  I  believe. 
13 


176  PAYMASTER  IN  UNITED   STATES  ARMY. 

General  Johnston  showed  me  a  tract  on  the  dividing  ridge  between 
the  San  Gabriel  and  its  South  Fork,  where,  fifteen  years  before,  with 
Burleson,  Tom  Howard,  William  S.  Fisher,  and  half  a  dozen  others,  he 
had  hunted  buffalo.  Out  of  six  that  they  saw  they  killed  five.  The 
Indians  had  attacked  every  other  party  that  had  attempted  to  cross  the 
country ;  they,  however,  took  the  risk  of  meeting  them,  as  they  were 
all  old  frontiersmen ;  but  they  were  not  molested. 

I  had  occasion  to  remark,  on  this  visit,  the  great  patience  and  unself 
ishness  of  General  Johnston  in  attending  to  the  wants  and  business  of 
others.  As  he  made  his  round  from  post  to  post,  he  was  intrusted  with 
a  budget  of  commissions  that  might  well  have  taxed  his  equanimity. 
To  buy  a  horse,  a  gun,  a  pair  of  boots,  a  ribbon  ;  to  have  a  watch 
mended  ;  to  pay  taxes ;  to  adjust  some  entangled  business — any  and 
every  sort  of  affair  that  these  isolated  people  could  not  attend  to  in 
person  was  committed  to  his  care  and  looked  after  with  solicitude.  No 
right  or  claim  of  a  soldier  was  neglected ;  and  these  poor  fellows  little 
knew  the  amount  of  thought  and  correspondence  frequently  involved 
in  enforcing  their  demand  for  some  inconsiderable  sum.  Friends  in 
other  States  availed  themselves  of  his  extended  and  minute  topograph 
ical  knowledge  to  obtain  information  in  locating  lands ;  and,  ignorant 
that  this  knowledge  had  a  fixed  commercial  value,  accepted  his  services 
without  compensation.  In  one  instance  he  located  for  a  friend  40,000 
acres  of  land  without  remuneration,  the  fee  for  which  would  have  been, 
according  to  custom,  one  fourth  of  the  land.  But  he  imparted  what  he 
knew  freely  and  cheerfully ;  not  seeking  to  engross  for  himself  what  he 
was  aware  would  become  a  great  fortune.  He  seemed  to  feel  that,  as 
a  public  servant,  all  his  faculties  were  to  be  used  for  the  benefit  of 
others. 

It  has  been  stated  that,  on  his  tours,  General  Johnston's  only  com 
panions  were  a  clerk  (not  always  congenial),  negro  servants,  and  a  dra 
goon  escort,  with  whom  the  custom  of  the  service  permitted  only  formal 
communication.  Hence  he  was  thrown  much  upon  his  own  resources, 
and  passed  many  days  without  conversation  ;  but  this  was  less  weari 
some  to  him  than  to  most  men,  owing  to  a  large  capacity  for  enjoy 
ment,  to  his  habits  of  observation,  and  to  a  way  he  had  of  thinking  over 
contingencies  likely  to  happen.  Without  doubt,  on  these  long  and 
wellnigh  solitary  journeys,  his  meditation  was  fruitful.  It  was  a  study 
of  probable,  practical  events,  as  close  and  compact  as  the  solution  of 
the  difficult  chess-problems  for  which  he  had  so  great  a  relish,  and  not 
at  all  resembling  reverie,  for  which  he  felt  a  marked  dislike.  If  he  saw 
a  child  listlessly  musing  over  a  book,  he  would  say  :  "  Do  not  nurse 
your  book ;  study  it,  or  put  it  by."  It  was  often  remarked  that  he 
was  never  taken  by  surprise,  or  unable  to  come  to  a  prompt  decision  as 
to  his  course  of  action.  Though  this  was  undoubtedly  due  in  part  to  the 


OPINIONS.  177 

even  balance  of  his  mind  and  moral  nature,  General  Johnston  explained 
it  by  saying  that  "  what  was  called  his  presence  of  mind  was  often 
merely  putting  into  action  a  course  of  conduct  long  determined  on." 
His  forethought  surely  saved  him  many  times  from  surprise  and  unex 
pected  situations. 

Long  service  on  the  frontier,  individual  aptitudes,  and  continued 
exercise  of  the  faculty,  had  given  General  Johnston  that  sort  of  topo 
graphical  knowledge  and  insight  which,  when  put  in  practice,  seems 
almost  like  an  instinct.  He  had  ample  woodcraft,  but  the  habit  of 
prairie-travel  unquestionably  helped  to  train  his  eye  and  imagination  to 
take  in  at  a  glance  the  salient  features  of  a  country.  An  instance  illus 
trating  this  occurred  during  his  service  as  paymaster.  The  road  from 
Austin  to  Belknap  followed  the  old  Indian  trail,  as  is  usual  on  the  fron 
tier.  As  this  route  diverged  much  from'  a  direct  line,  and  crossed  the 
breaks  of  the  table-lands  instead  of  following  the  water-sheds  to  advan 
tage,  it  was  thought  best  to  establish  a  new  wagon-road.  General 
Johnston  was  consulted,  and  gave  such  accurate  instructions  that  the 
road  was  shortened  twenty  or  thirty  miles,  and  avoided  the  chief  diffi 
culties  of  frontier  travel ;  yet  in  many  parts  he  had  never  been  over  the 
ground,  and  in  some  not  within  ten  or  fifteen  miles  of  it.  He  knew, 
however,  what  its  profile  and  characteristics  must  be. 

Whatever  concerned  the  honor  or  happiness  of  Texas  interested 
General  Johnston  deeply.  The  rights  of  her  old  settlers  and  revolu 
tionary  patriots  enlisted  his  warmest  sympathies,  and  he  lent  his  voice 
in  behalf  of  those  claimants  for  reimbursement  who  had  suffered  spolia 
tion  at  the  hands  of  their  own  Government  and  army.  The  productive 
capacity  and  material  development  of  the  State  were  constant  themes 
in  his  letters.  He  had  high  hopes  that  the  manifest  superiority  of  the 
Southern  route  to  the  Pacific  would  secure  the  completion  of  a  railroad 
along  that  line  which  would  be  the  beginning  of  an  era  of  wonderful 
progress  and  prosperity  for  the  State.  He  predicted  that  its  cotton, 
its  wheat,  and  its  beef,  would  then  successfully  compete,  in  New  York 
and  the  markets  of  Europe,  with  the  most  favored  rivals. 

General  Johnston  was  drawn  into  warmer  sympathy  with  the  Demo 
cratic  party  by  his  attitude  of  resistance  to  Know-Nothingism  and  to 
the  antislavery  crusade  that  was  now  beginning  to  become  formidable. 
The  allusions  in  his  correspondence  to  these  questions  are  few  and  brief, 
but  explicit :  "  I  am  glad  Kentucky  came  so  near  giving  a  good  Demo 
cratic  vote.  She  will  yet  be  saved."  In  another  letter  he  alludes  point 
edly  and  with  reprobation  to  the  abolition  movement. 

In  a  letter  to  the  author,  dated  October  19,  1854,  General  Johnston 
says : 

Know-Xothingism  will  have  its  day,  perhaps  a  brief  triumph,  and  then  will 
be  denounced  as  an  anti-republican  heresy.  The  restriction  of  the  right  of  suf- 


178  PAYMASTER  IN  UNITED  STATES  ARMY. 

frage  to  the  present  population  and  their  descendants,  and  to  the  descendants  of 
future  immigrants,  can  now  be  effected  without  the  intervention  of  a  secret  po 
litical  organization  of  unknown  principles — perhaps  menacing  religious  tolera 
tion,  and  opposed  by  the  seorecy  of  its  proceedings  to  the  genius  of  our  institu 
tions.  If  our  leading  men  would  have  the  boldness  to  meet  the  question  openly 
and  on  the  grounds  of  its  utility  alone,  I  do  not  doubt  that  the  aid  of  most  of 
our  naturalized  citizens  could  be  obtained  for  the  enactment  of  a  law  that  would 
give  every  security. 

In  1853  General  Johnston  was  relieved  from  the  burden  of  indebted 
ness  he  had  so  long  borne,  by  the  sale  of  his  plantation  on  terms  that 
paid  off  all  incumbrances  and  left  him  a  free  man.  But,  by  a  cruel 
stroke  of  fortune,  he  had  hardly  got  rid  of  the  heavy  load  that  had  so 
long  weighed  down  his  spirits  and  wounded  his  sensibilities,  when  a 
new  and  more  severe  trial  befell  him  from  an  unexpected  source.  He 
found,  on  counting  the  Government  funds  in  his  possession,  a  deficit  of 
several  hundred  dollars;  and  on  several  other  occasions  in  1853  he  dis 
covered  similar  losses,  amounting  to  $1,700.  Such  was  the  accuracy  of 
his  accounts  and  payments  that  robbery  was  the  only  solution.  The 
money  was  kept  in  an  iron  strong-box,  rarely  from  under  the  eye  of 
himself  or  his  clerk  ;  and,  as  no  violence  was  used,  access  must  have 
been  had  by  false  keys.  Owing  to  various  causes  several  persons  suc 
ceeded  each  other  in  his  office  as  clerk,  all  reputable  men,  who  united 
with  General  Johnston  in  trying  to  detect  the  thief,  but  in  vain.  In 
1854  about  the  same  amount  was  abstracted  by  the  same  methods,  but 
the  utmost  vigilance  failed  to  furnish  any  sufficient  clew.  These  mys 
terious  robberies,  and  his  inability  to  frustrate  them,  were  not  only  im 
poverishing  him,  but  so  seriously  threatened  him  with  loss  of  property 
and  reputation  that  he  almost  sunk  under  it,  and  determined  to  resign 
a  position  so  perilous.  In  the  mean  time,  being  aware  that  to  report 
these  circumstances  would  be  merely  to  undermine  the  confidence  of 
his  superiors  and  to  draw  unmerited  suspicion  upon  himself,  he  made 
good  the  losses  from  his  private  means  by  appropriating  in  that  way 
some  old  debts  that  came  in  providentially  just  then,  and  by  a  frugality 
in  his  expenditure  amounting  to  privation. 

When  I  accompanied  him  in  March,  1855,  he  stated  all  the  facts  to 
me,  and  we  counted  the  money  just  before  starting.  I  asked  him  if  he 
suspected  no  one,  and  he  replied  that  he  had  "  no  right  to  suspect  any 
particular  person,  though  he  did;  but  he  wished  me  to  watch  with  him, 
and  to  consider  the  case  unbiased  by  his  prejudice,  and  therefore  he 
preferred  not  to  state  his  suspicions."  During  the  journey  the  strong 
box  was  out  of  our  sight  for  only  a  few  hours  at  Fort  McKavitt,  when 
it  was  under  guard.  The  most  scrupulous  exactness  in  payment  had 
been  observed,  and  yet,  on  the  second  day  after  our  return,  on  counting 
the  money,  $700  was  missing.  The  cash  had  been  taken  as  usual  from 


A  ROBBER  DETECTED.  179 

different  bags,  and  this  time  in  half-eagles  with  some  marked  coins  in 
cluded.  My  own  mind  had  been  made  up  before,  but  now  I  was  certain 
of  the  thief.  I  pointed  out  to  General  Johnston  that  by  the  principle 
of  exclusion  the  guilt  had  been  narrowed  down  to  his  negro  servants, 
and  that  his  driver  John  was  the  man.  John  was  a  family  slave,  an 
ugly,  black  fellow,  but  handy,  who  had  been  greatly  indulged.  About 
two  years  before  he  had  married  a  quadroon  woman,  whom  he  had  sup 
ported  in  considerable  luxury.  He  explained  his  means  of  extrava 
gance  by  the  profits  of  barter  with  the  soldiers.  There  were  certain 
other  subtile  signs  of  guilt  that  convinced  my  mind. 

I  proposed  a  prompt  and  thorough  search  of  John's  luggage,  which 
was  stowed  at  the  house  of  his  wife's  master.  General  Johnston  admit 
ted  that  he  had  long  suspected  John,  but  had  no  proof;  and  he  now 
hesitated  to  make  the  search,  because,  if  the  man  was  innocent,  it 
would  be  a  hard  case  indeed  for  such  a  blow  to  be  dealt  by  the  hand  of 
his  master,  who  was  the  one  person  in  the  world  to  whom  he  could  look 
for  protection.  I  insisted  that  where  so  much  was  at  stake  such  extreme 
conscientiousness  and  tenderness  were  morbid.  General  Johnston  yield 
ed,  and  stated  all  the  circumstances  to  three  neighbors  who  made  the 
search,  the  owner  of  the  premises  being  one.  Impunity  had  made  the 
negro  careless ;  and  six  hundred  of  the  seven  hundred  dollars,  includ 
ing  some  of  the  marked  coin,  were  found  in  his  trunk.  He  afterward 
told  me  that  a  white  gambler  had  furnished  him  the  false  keys. 

Persons  to  whom  the  facts  became  known  were  eager  to  punish  the 
crime  by  severely  whipping  the  culprit,  hoping  thus  to  ascertain  his  ac 
complices,  if  he  had  any;  but  General  Johnston  would  not  permit  it. 
"Such  evidence  is  worthless,"  said  he.  "Besides,  the  whipping  will 
not  restore  what  is  lost ;  and  it  will  not  benefit  the  negro,  whom  a  life 
time  of  kind  treatment  has  failed  to  make  honest.  It  would  be  a  mere 
act  of  revenge,  to  which  I  cannot  consent."  He  agreed  with  the  views 
of  his  friends,  who  urged  that  the  negro  should  be  sold  out  of  the  com 
munity,  where,  indeed,  he  was  not  safe.  He  was  taken  to  Galveston, 
and  allowed  to  select  his  own  master.  He  was  sold  for  $1,000,  which 
went  to  make  up  in  part  what  he  had  stolen  from  the  United  States 
Government. 

Soon  after,  General  Johnston  was  appointed  colonel  of  the  Second 
Cavalry.  The  report  of  the  Second  Auditor  in  the  settlement  of  his 
accounts  to  the  9th  of  April,  when  he  resigned,  stated : 

Balance  due  him  per  official  statement        .        .        .        .        $4  22 
"         "        "        his  own      "  ....          0  00 

Difference  in  his  favor        .        *        .        .         .         .        $4  22 

It  is  due  to  General  Johnston  to  say  that  not  only  were  his  trusts  as 
paymaster  executed  with  scrupulous  fidelity,  but  his  accounts  were  kept 


180  PAYMASTER  IN    UNITED   STATES  ARMY. 

with  rare  accuracy  and  beauty.  The  Second  Auditor,  construing  stat 
utes  under  a  different  light,  of  course  often  disallowed  small  sums  paid 
by  General  Johnston;  but  he  had  in  him  a  strenuous  and  punctilious 
correspondent,  who  hardly  ever  failed  to  present  an  argument  setting 
forth  the  grounds  on  which  the  payment  had  been  made.  When  I 
asked  him  why  he  took  so  much  trouble  for  so  little,  he  said  it  was  due 
to  himself  to  justify  himself  from  even  the  appearance  of  carelessness. 
The  following  was  a  playful  reply  to  a  letter  of  the  author,  written 
when  he  came  of  age,  in  1852 : 

You  have  formally  announced  your  majority,  and  your  right  to  independent 
action.  It  only  remains  to  me,  as  an  act  of  comity,  being  convinced  of  your 
ability  to  maintain  the  attitude  you  have  assumed,  to  recognize  you  as  a  man,  de 
facto  et  dejwe,  and  to  invest  you  in  good  faith  and  with  all  solemnity  with  the 
toga  mrilis.  You  have,  therefore,  the  right  in  your  sovereign  capacity  to  make 
treaties  of  alliance,  coin  money,  regulate  and  control  your  own  trade,  and  do 
whatever  else  it  may  seem  best  to  you  in  the  pursuit  of  happiness,  always  keep 
ing  in  view  the  prohibitions  of  the  law  as  to  other  sovereigns  so  situated. 

You  are  still  willing  to  acknowledge  an  allegiance  to  me.  I  have  no  right  to 
demand  it ;  and,  for  your  own  good,  would  not  accept  it.  Now  that  you  are 
about  to  pass  from  the  sham  fights  of  life  to  its  real  battles,  your  security  and 
success  will  depend  upon  a  high  degree  of  self-reliance.  It  is  the  momentum  of 
great  confidence,  regulated  by  sound  judgment,  that  crushes  every  obstacle. 

The  following  letter  also  was  written  during  the  period  of  his  service 
as  paymaster,  and  while  he  was  under  the  shadow  of  doubt,  loss,  and 
privation,  already  mentioned.  It  is  another  illustration  of  his  resolute 
trust  and  cheerfulness  in  trouble  : 

ATTSTIN,  TEXAS,  December  23, 1854. 

MY  DEAR  SON  :  I  send  you  and  Rosa  and  Hennie  the  best  wishes  of  my  heart 
for  your  health  and  happiness  always;  but  especially  do  I  offer  my  wishes  for  a 
"  happy  Christmas  "  and  a  "  happy  New  Year,"  which  I  am  reminded  to  do  by 
the  happy  little  faces  around  me,  impatient  for  the  arrival  of  those  days  so 
delightful  to  the  beneficiaries  of  that  merry  little  friend  of  good  children,  St. 
Nicholas.  Maggie  implicitly  believes  in  his  advent  and  good  works ;  but  Sid  and 
Hancock  are  disenchanted,  though  the  little  hypocrites,  like  taller  ones,  wisely 
affect  a  belief  they  do  not  entertain,  for  the  accruing  benefits.  The  children  are 
in  fine  health,  and  improving  in  their  studies;  each  has  earned  a  reward  for 
extra  work.  These  little  cheerful  faces,  happy  in  the  hopes  of  the  future,  reflect 
their  sunshine  on  us ;  and  if  Brother  Willie,  Sister  Hennie,  and  Sister  Eosa,  as 
these  prattlers  call  you,  were  here  to  throw  their  sunlight  on  us,  the  evening  of 
our  days  would  be  as  beautiful  and  as  full  of  exquisite  repose  as  the  close  of  day 
in  this  delicious  climate. 

You  mentioned  tbat  you  had  not  yet  had  any  business  to  do  in  your  profes 
sion.  I  was  glad  to  see  that  you  feel  no  discouragement.  You  should  feel 
none.  You  knew  well  beforehand  the  long  probation  of  those  who  are  now 
successful,  and  could  not  reasonably  expect  to  be  an  exception.  Wait  patiently, 
and  prepare;  your  time  will  come.  Live  with  economy,  spend  nothing  for 


MR.  FONTAINE'S  REMINISCENCES. 

appearance'  sake,  and  you  will  be  able  to  hold  out  till  the  harvest-time.  The 
history  of  almost  every  successful  lawyer  of  your  State  is  one  of  hope  deferred. 

J ,  one  of  your  very  best  lawyers,  sat,  I  am  told,  seven  long  years  without  a 

case,  like  a  huge  spider  spread  out  on  his  web,  and  like  that  courageous  insect, 
in  expectant  attitude,  waited  to  throw  the  meshes  of  the  law  around  some  oppo 
nent.  His  patience  was  crowned  with  success.  Wait,  but  work.  Do  not  reject 
business  because  it  is  not  important.  Be  faithful  over  a  few  things,  and  you 
shall  soon  be  steward  over  many.  .  .  . 

Sebastopol  may  possibly  fall,  though  the  science  of  war  has  had  little  to  do, 
thus  far,  in  the  work.  The  great  master  of  the  art  of  war  would  have  made 
preparation  commensurate  with  the  object  to  be  accomplished.  He  would  have 
seized  the  neck  of  the  Crimea  with  a  good  army,  and  carried  on  the  siege  of 
the  place,  according  to  well-approved  principles,  undisturbed  by  a  relieving  army, 
to  a  certain  success,  with  due  regard  to  economy  of  life. 

Affectionately  your  father,  A.  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON. 

The  following  reminiscence  is  from  the  pen  of  the  Rev.  Edward 
Fontaine,  the  Episcopal  minister  at  Austin,  a  gentleman  of  eloquence 
and  earnestness  : 

I  have  said  that  he  had  at  all  times  perfect  self-control.  I  will  mention  some 
instances  in  which  I  saw  his  power  of  self-government  severely  tried ;  but  his 
temper  stood  the  various  tests  admirably. 

I  was  once  fishing  with  him  in  the  Colorado  River.  A  large  bass  seized  his 
hook,  and  it  required  all  his  skill  to  reel  him  to  the  surface  of  the  water  with  a 
small  silk  line.  After  a  contest  of  several  minutes  with  the  powerful  fish,  he 
succeeded  in  bringing  his  fine  proportions  in  full  view ;  but  just  as  he  was  about 
landing  him,  with  a  sharp  strain  upon  his  rod,  he  gave  an  "indignant  flounce," 
and  disappeared  in  the  clear  depths  of  the  stream,  leaving  the  snapped  line  tan 
gled  fast  to  a  willow-limb,  high  above  the  head  of  the  disappointed  general. 
He  gave  it  a  gentle  pull ;  but  finding  it  hung  fast,  he  walked  up  the  bank  and 
cut  a  pole  with  a  hook  to  it,  and  pulled  down  the  limb  very  cautiously ;  and 
then  set  to  work  very  deliberately  to  untangle  the  Gordian  knot  into  which  he, 
the  bass,  and  the  limb  together  had  tied  the  line. 

After  the  patient  labor  of  at  least  half  an  hour,  he  succeeded  in  righting  his 
tackle,  put  on  another  hook  and  minnow,  and  "  threw  out "  to  tempt  another 
bite.  In  the  mean  time,  I  watched  his  motions,  very  much  amused  at  the  mis 
hap,  but  said  nothing.  He  made  no  exclamation  of  impatience,  and  exhibited 
no  emotion.  I  then  remarked:  "General,  although  you  are  not  a  member  of 
the  Church,  I  believe  you  are  a  better  Christian  than  myself  in  one  respect — 
you  are  more  patient.  If  old  Izaak  Walton  himself  had  lost  that  fish  after 
such  a  tussle,  and  lost  his  hook  with  him,  and  tied  up  his  tackle  in  that  way, 
he  might  not  have  cursed  the  fish  or  his  luck,  but  I  think  he  would  have  said 
something  spiteful,  and  have  felt  a  little  blasphemous."  He  replied  :  "  I  have 
long  since  learned,  sir,  by  experience,  that  it  is  best  never  to  get  excited 
about  anything;  for  in  a  fit  of  excitement  very  sensible  men  are  apt  to  do  or 
say  something  rash  or  foolish,  for  which  they  may  have  to  repent  in  a  cooler 
moment. 

He  had  a  valuable  Newfoundland  dog,  which  was  a  very  great  favorite  with 


182  PAYMASTER  IN  UNITED   STATES  ARMY. 

the  family.  It  guarded  little  Sidney,  Hancock,  and  Maggie,  his  three  youngest 
children,  in  their  rambles  about  his  premises,  and  I  think  it  sometimes  pulled 
the  little  girl  in  a  toy  carriage.  But  the  dog  one  day  went  into  the  lot  of  a  near 
neighbor  to  play  with  a  "  cur  of  low  degree  "  —  a  proper  dog  for  a  master  as 
mean  and  worthless  as  himself.  This  man,  who  had  been  kindly  treated  by  the 
general  and  his  family,  but  who  envied  and  hated  him  with  that  sort  of  malice 
which  the  base  and  vulgar  generally'  cherish  toward  the  noble  and  refined,  to 
distress  the  children,  or  show  his  spite  against  his  distinguished  neighbors,  or 
from  the  promptings  of  some  dirty  motive  which  is  only  understood  by  the 
devils  that  got  into  the  swine  of  Gennesaret,  or  by  those  who  are  instigated  by 
them,  threw  a  piece  of  meat  poisoned  with  strychnine  to  the  dog,  which  came 
home,  and  in  a  few  minutes  died  with  convulsions,  in  the  presence  of  the  chil 
dren  and  their  parents.  The  little  children  wept  bitterly  the  loss  of  their  favor 
ite,  and  Mrs.  Johnston  shed  tears.  The  general  was  deeply  distressed,  but  said 
nothing  in  anger.  Some  one  present  declared  that  the  villain  who  committed 
the  deed  ought  to  be  prosecuted  or  shot.  He  replied  that  if  he  sued  or  killed 
him,  it  would  make  the  man  no  better,  and  it  would  do  himself  and  family  no 
good  ;  that  he  would  be  compelled  to  endure  the  outrage,  as  there  was  no  re 
dress  for  it.  The  dog  was  dead,  and  nothing  could  restore  him  to  life,  and  he 
hoped  that  his  family  would  bear  their  loss  with  fortitude. 

It  has  been  mentioned  that,  when  General  Johnston  was  appointed 
paymaster,  his  family  spent  the  summer  in  Kentucky.  On  their 
return  he  met  them  in  New  Orleans,  only  to  learn  that  his  infant 
daughter  had  recently  died.  The  following  touching  letter  expresses 
exactly  the  spirit  in  which  he  habitually  accepted  afflictions,  as  well  as 
other  dispensations  of  Providence  : 


ORLEANS,  Saturday,  December  14,  1850. 

DEAE  HANCOCK  :  My  family  arrived  here  yesterday,  and  I  only  then  learned 
from  my  wife  the  loss  of  our  dear  little  Mary.  Great  as  our  distress  is,  I  can 
still  thank  God  that  my  wife  and  my  other  children  are  left  to  me.  It  is  not 
right  to  judge  of  his  dispensations,  nor  do  I,  but  bow  with  humble  submission 
to  decrees  the  wisdom  of  which  I  cannot  comprehend  and  the  justice  of  which 
I  must  not  question. 

I  received  Aunt  Mary's  letter.  I  cannot  write  to  her  now.  I  hope  she  will 
write  to  my  poor  wife  as  often  as  she  can,  for  she  needs  her  sympathy. 

Your  friend,  A.  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON. 

To  Mr.  GEORGE  HANCOCK,  Louisville,  Ky. 

He  spoke  little  of  his  inner  life  ;  but  once  in  Austin  he  said  to  the 
writer  that  a  minister  had  been  urging  upon  him  the  benefits  of  prayer, 
and  added  :  "  I  did  not  think  it  necessary  to  tell  him,  but  it  is  many 
years  since  I  have  closed  my  eyes  in  sleep  without  prayer.  Indeed,  I 
feel  that  I  cannot  thank  God  enough  for  his  goodness  to  me.  Beyond 
that  thanksgiving  I  almost  dread  to  go  ;  his  care  is  so  great,  and  my 
views  so  narrow,  that  I  do  not  know  how  to  ask  God  for  anything  bet 
ter  for  me  and  mine  than  that  his  will  be  done."  On  many  other  occa- 


THANKFULNESS  AND  FAITH.  183 

sions  he  said  to  me  substantially  the  same  thing.  He  delighted  in  the 
glories  of  the  starry  heavens,  which  led  him,  as  they  have  so  many 
other  watchers  in  the  desert,  to  contemplate  the  splendors  and  unfath 
omable  mysteries  of  the  universe  and  its  Creafor. 


CHAPTER   XII. 

THE     SECOND     CAVALRY.1 

WHEN  General  Franklin  Pierce  was  elected  President,  he  appointed 
General  Jefferson  Davis  Secretary  of  War.  Pierce's  gallantry,  amia 
bility,  and  address,  had  enabled  him  to  avoid  the  blunders  of  the  other 
"  political  generals  "  in  the  Mexican  War ;  while  his  actual  service  made 
him  perceive  clearly  the  necessity  of  positive  qualifications  at  the  head 
of  the  War  Department.  He  had  the  good  fortune  to  secure  as  secre 
tary  a  man  who  combined  political  knowledge  and  administrative 
ability  with  a  perfect  experience  in  the  details  and  requirements  of 
the  service.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  department  was 
never  conducted  with  more  intelligence  and  skill,  or  with  more  satis 
faction  to  the  army  and  the  country.  The  secretary  attempted  and 
secured  great  improvements  in  the  organization  and  efficiency  of  all 
branches  of  the  service.  In  carrying  out  these  plans  he  had  to  ask 
for  an  increase  in  the  force,  which  resulted  in  a  bill,  passed  March  3, 
1855,  providing  for  four  new  regiments — two  of  cavalry  and  two  of 
infantry. 

The  necessity  for  this  increase  in  the  strength  of  the  army  will  be 
at  once  apparent  by  reference  to  the  President's  message,  and  to  the 
secretary's  report  of  December  4,  1854.  The  secretary  says  : 

We  have  a  seaboard  and  foreign  frontier  of  more  than  10,000  miles ;  an 
Indian  frontier  and  routes  through  the  Indian  country  requiring  constant  pro 
tection  of  more  than  8,000  miles;  and  an  Indian  population  of  more  than 
400,000,  of  whom  probably  one-half,  or  40,000  warriors,  are  inimical,  and  only 
wait  the  opportunity  to  become  active  enemies.  If  our  army  should  be  expanded 
to  its  greatest  limits  it  would  have  a  force  of  14,731  officers  and  men;  but  as 
a  large  allowance  must  always  be  made  for  absentees,  invalids,  etc.,  the  effective 
force  would  probably  never  exceed  11,000. 

The  secretary  also  estimated  the  Indian  frontier  of  Texas  at  nearly 
2,000  miles,  the  lines  of  communication  through  the  Indian  country 

1  The  Second  Cavalry  is  now  styled  the  Fifth  Cavalry. 


184:  THE  SECOND   CAVALRY. 

at  more  than  1,200  miles,  and  the  nomadic  and  predatory  Indians 
at  30,000;  while  the  army  in  that  department  was  only  2,886  offi 
cers  and  men,  a  force  entirely  inadequate  for  its  protection  and  de 
fense. 

While  the  policy  of  the  Administration  was  taking  shape,  the  friends 
of  different  aspirants  for  appointment  or  promotion  naturally  urged  their 
claims  in  the  usual  manner.  General  Johnston  followed  the  same  line 
of  conduct  which  he  had  prescribed  for  himself  during  General  Taylor's 
Administration,  and  abstained  from  presenting  his  claims.  His  patient 
performance  of  the  duties  of  paymaster,  however,  incited  the  friends 
who  witnessed  it  to  move  on  his  behalf.  The  Texas  Legislature  con 
tained  a  number  of  those  brave  spirits  who  had  formerly  looked  to  him 
in  the  days  of  the  republic  as  their  leader  in  every  martial  enterprise ; 
and,  under  this  guidance,  the  whole  Legislature  united  in  a  recom 
mendation  for  General  Johnston's  appointment  to  the  command  of 
one  of  the  proposed  regiments.  This  memorial,  dated  January  8, 
1854,  in  which  the  Governor,  Lieutenant-Governor,  and  Speaker  of 
the  House  united,  was  addressed  to  Senator  Rusk,  and  urged  the 
cooperation  of  himself  and  his  colleagues  in  securing  the  object  of  the 
petition. 

When  the  bill  was  passed,  in  1855,  General  Rusk,  who  needed  no 
other  prompting  than  his  own  feelings  in  the  matter,  used  active  efforts 
to  secure  the  appointment  for  General  Johnston.  His  position  was 
somewhat  embarrassing,  as  that  gallant  and  popular  partisan  leader, 
Major  Ben  McCulloch,  was  vehemently  pressed  by  influential  friends 
for  the  same  appointment.  Hon.  P.  H.  Bell,  although  an  advocate  of 
the  claims  of  McCulloch,  kindly  offered  a  testimonial  to  the  capacity 
and  character  of  General  Johnston.  Hon.  William  Preston,  member 
of  Congress  from  Kentucky,  was  in  the  opposition,  but  was  able, 
perhaps  partly  on  that  account,  to  smooth  the  way  for  General  John 
ston's  promotion.  But  as  it  had  been  General  Johnston's  good,  fortune 
previously  to  be  personally  known  and  appreciated  by  President  Tay 
lor,  so  he  chanced  again  to  have  in  the  Secretary  of  War  a  friend 
who  had  known  him  from  boyhood  and  who  esteemed  him  as  highly 
as  any  man  living.  Mr.  Preston  wrote  :  "  Johnston's  merits  should 
have  given  him  a  regiment  years  ago,  but  his  pride  and  delicacy  have 
always  prevented  him  from  pressing  his  claims.  Davis  was  truly  his 
friend." 

It  had  been  a  custom,  almost  passing  into  precedent,  on  the  forma 
tion  of  new  regiments,  for  the  existing  Administration  to  reward  its 
supporters  with  important  commands,  so  that  the  army  was  in  danger 
of  degenerating  into  a  retired  list  for  decayed  politicians.  Nothing 
could  be  more  fatal  to  honorable  ambition.  But  now  the  Secretary  of 
War,  himself  a  soldier  of  distinguished  merit,  was  able  to  present  the 


APPOINTED   COLONEL.  185 

subject  so  strongly  to  the  President,  that  he  was  allowed  to  make  his 
selections,  for  the  most  part,  from  the  army.  The  political  pressure 
brought  to  bear  upon  Mr.  Davis  was  very  great,  but  no  man  was  ever 
less  amenable  to  such  considerations  ;  and  that  his  appointments  were 
made  with  sole  reference  to  efficiency  is  best  evinced  by  the  subsequent 
careers  of  the  men  selected. 

To  the  Second  Regiment  of  cavalry,  which  was  intended  for  imme 
diate  service  in  Texas,  General  Johnston  was  appointed  as  colonel, 
with  rank  from  March  3,  1855.  Brevet  Colonel  Robert  E.  Lee  was 
made  lieutenant-colonel  ;  and  Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel  William  J. 
Hardee  and  Major  George  H.  Thomas,  majors.  Hardee  was  afterward 
a  lieutenant-general  in  the  Confederate  army,  and  was  always  found 
equal  to  the  occasion.  Thomas  is  equally  well  known  as  a  distinguished 
general  on  the  Northern  side.  Among  the  captains  were  Earl  Van 
Dorn,  E.  Kirby  Smith,  and  N.  G.  Evans,  who  were  generals  in  the  Con 
federate  army ;  and  I.  N.  Palmer,  George  Stoneman,  and  R.  W.  John 
son,  who  held  the  same  rank  in  the  Union  army.  Among  the  subal 
terns,  John  B.  Hood,  Charles  W.  Field,  Chambliss,  and  Phifer,  became 
Southern  generals  ;  and  K.  Garrard  and  others  attained  the  same  place 
in  the  Northern  army.  It  is  doubtful  whether  any  other  one  regiment 
furnished  an  equal  number  of  distinguished  officers  to  the  two  contend 
ing  armies  during  the  great  civil  war. 

McCulloch,  in  his  disappointment  at  not  receiving  a  colonel's  com 
mission,  refused  the  position  of  major  tendered  him.  He  had  been  a 
gallant  and  enterprising  leader  of  partisan  troops,  and  deserved  well  of 
his  country.  His  nomination  was  a  high  compliment,  as  he  was  the 
only  field-officer  selected  from  civil  life.  Long  before  his  untimely 
death  in  battle,  he  had  the  generosity  to  say  that  Mr.  Davis  had  acted 
wisely  in  preferring  General  Johnston  above  him. 

General  Scott  said  to  Mr.  Preston,  who  was  on  intimate  terms  with 
him,  that  the  appointments  were  very  good,  but  that  the  positions  of 
Johnston  and  Lee  should  have  been  transposed.  The  acquaintance  that 
had  existed  between  these  two  officers  ripened  into  mutual  regard  and 
esteem,  of  which  some  slight  but  decided  evidences  will  appear  in  the 
course  of  this  memoir.  Indeed,  the  writer's  admiration  of  General  Lee, 
which  has  been  expressed  elsewhere  under  so  many  forms,  had  its  ori 
gin  in  General  Johnston's  commendations  of  that  soldier  subsequently 
so  illustrious.  From  each  he  has  heard  in  regard  to  the  other  senti 
ments  of  respect  and  appreciation,  delivered  in  terms  of  noble  sin 
cerity — an  estimate  that  grew  and  strengthened  to  the  close.  Some 
years  after,  General  Scott,  in  another  conversation,  with  Mr.  Pres 
ton,  referring  to  his  former  conversation  took  occasion  to  say  that 
no  better  appointment  than  General  Johnston  could  have  been  made  ; 
that  he  was  equal  to  any  position,  and  he  would  not  have  it  other- 


186  THE  SECOND   CAVALRY. 

wise.  Captain  Eaton  informs  the  writer  that  General  Scott  told  him 
in  the  winter  of  1858  that  he  regarded  General  Johnston's  appoint 
ment  as  "  a  Godsend  to  the  army  and  to  the  country."  His  opinion 
of  General  Johnston's  qualities  had  greatly  improved  on  a  better  ac 
quaintance. 

Thus  while  General  Johnston  was  undergoing  the  combined  hard 
ships,  drudgery,  and  mental  torture,  arising  out  of  his  duties  and  losses 
as  paymaster,  a  kind  Providence  and  zealous  friends  advanced  him  to 
the  very  position  which  he  preferred  to  all  others.  It  is  true  that  he 
had  never  held  a  regular  cavalry  command,  though  he  had  served  with 
the  rangers  in  Texas ;  but  his  professional  knowledge  was  wide,  and 
his  special  tastes  inclined  him  to  that  arm  of  the  service,  so  that  he  felt 
no  difficulty  in  accepting  the  promotion.  The  writer  was  with  him 
when  he  received,  at  Fort  McKavitt,  the  notification  of  this  fact ;  and, 
though  his  heart's  desire  was  gratified  by  it,  he  learned  it  with  perfect 
composure,  and  delayed  his  acceptance  until  he  had  surveyed  the  case 
in  every  possible  bearing. 

The  citizens  of  Austin  tendered  him  a  public  supper  and  ball,  "  as 
an  unostentatious  display  of  genuine  feeling  and  respect  for  a  distin 
guished  public  servant."  But  a  still  more  gratifying  evidence  Of  the 
public  estimation  w*as  the  confidence  inspired  on  that  whole  frontier, 
that  his  presence  in  command  there  was  a  sufficient  guarantee  of  its 
safety.  On  May  19th  he  was  ordered  to  Louisville,  Kentucky ;  and,  by 
telegram,  on  June  29th,  to  report  at  Washington  City. 

When  General  Johnston  was  ordered  on,  it  was  not  expected  that 
his  regiment  would  be  filled  for  some  time ;  and  both  he  and  Colonel 
Lee  were  directed  to  proceed  to  Fort  Leavenworth,  to  sit  on  a  general 
court-martial,  to  be  held  September  24th.  Recruiting  for  the  army  had 
been  slow,  and  often  from  an  undesirable  class  of  persons.  But  now, 
owing  to  the  increase  of  pay,  the  prospect  of  a  life  of  active  adventure 
on  the  Plains,  and  other  motives,  the  cavalry  regiments  were  rapidly 
recruited*  with  farmers'  sons  and  other  daring  young  men,  making  its 
complement  of  men  (850)  about  the  middle  of  August.  The  recruits 
were  rendezvoused  at  Jefferson  Barracks,  Missouri,  under  the  command 
of  Major  Hardee,  with  orders  to  march  to  the  frontier  of  Texas  in  Oc 
tober.  General  Johnston  was  troubled  at  being  absent  from  his  regi 
ment  at  this  critical  period,  and  in  a  letter  to  the  writer,  dated  Septem 
ber  29th,  says :  "  I  am  much  annoyed  at  being  absent  from  my  regi 
ment  at  a  time  when  the  presence  of  every  officer  is  peculiarly  needed. 
It  is  really  bringing  form  out  of  chaos  to  organize  a  regiment  of  raw 
recruits  and  prepare  them  for  a  long  march.  They  have  suffered 
some  from  cholera  and  other  diseases,  which  has  caused  a  consid 
erable  number  to  desert.  I  do  not  expect  desertion  to  cease  while 
the  regiment  remains  at  Jefferson  Barracks."  He  was  relieved,  how- 


A  HARD  MARCH.  187 

ever,  early  in  October,  and  proceeded  to  assume  the  command  of  his 
regiment. 

Major  Hardee,  an  officer  of  tact,  intelligence,  and  professional  knowl 
edge,  had  been  in  charge  of  the  regiment,  and  had  accomplished  all  that 
could  be  expected  under  the  circumstances  ;  but  ague,  cholera,  deser 
tion,  and  the  other  discouragements  incident  to  novitiates  in  garrison, 
kept  the  regiment  in  an  unhappy  and  restless  condition  until  it  moved. 
General  Johnston  began  by  the  application  of  a  rigid  discipline,  and 
the  letter  of  a  witness  mentions  that  six  men  were  on  the  same  day 
drummed  out  of  the  regiment  with  shaven  heads  and  other  marks  of 
degradation.  The  preparations  were  urged  with  all  possible  dispatch ; 
and,  on  the  27th  of  October,  the  column  was  put  in  motion  for  the  fron 
tier  of  Texas. 

It  was  a  happy  day  for  General  Johnston  when,  mounting  his  splen 
did  gray  charger,  he  led  a  regiment  of  United  States  regular  cavalry, 
nearly  800  strong,  on  the  road  toward  Texas.  As  Texas  was  to  be  their 
home  for  some  years,  the  families  of  the  married  officers  accompanied 
them.  General  Johnston's  wife  and  family  were  packed  into  an  ambu 
lance-wagon,  and  occupied  a  tent  ten  feet  square  during  the  halts. 
They,  with  the  other  families  accompanying  the  regiment,  bore  the 
hardships  of  a  winter's  march  and  a  gypsy-life  with  uncomplaining 
fortitude. 

The  march  was  not  eventful.  Though  in  the  earlier  part  of  the 
journey  the  progress  was  slow,  on  account  of  rain,  high  water,  and  bad 
roads,  yet  the  change  from  garrison-life  to  the  march  and  active  work 
put  new  life  into  the  men.  Discontent  vanished,  and  only  one  deser 
tion,  I  believe,  occurred.  Some  casualties  happened,  of  course.  A 
drunken  soldier  was  killed  by  a  fall  from  his  horse.  Another  soldier 
was  killed  by  a  kick  of  his  horse ;  and  a  few  men  died  in  consequence 
of  the  extreme  cold  weather.  The  strictest  discipline  was  enforced ; 
and  though  offenses  were  few,  they  were  promptly  and  severely  pun 
ished.  The  rights  of  citizens  were  respected  without  qualification; 
and  of  this  regard  for  law  the  colonel  himself  set  a  good  example.  In 
Mrs.  Johnston's  journal  occurs  the  following  entry:  "Marched  to-day 
eighteen  miles  through  a  well-cultivated  country,  but  inhabited  by  a 
mean  set  of  people.  A  man  refused  to  sell  me  fresh  milk  for  my  sick 
baby  at  any  price  ;  '  for,'  said  he,  <  that  milk  has  butter  in  it.  After  it 
is  churned,  if  you  will  send  for  it,  I  will  sell  it  to  you.' "  No  further 
effort  was  made  with  him,  not  even  a  remonstrance.  The  supremacy  of 
law  over  force  was  fully  recognized.  The  incident  is  trifling  in  itself, 
but  it  has  its  value. 

The  route  from  Jefferson  Barracks  lay  through  the  Ozark  Moun 
tains,  in  Southwestern  Missouri,  and  passed  by  the  way  of  Springfield 
and  Neosho  into  the  Indian  Territory.  Reaching  Talequah,  November 


188  THE  SECOND  CAVALRY. 

28th,  and  traveling  by  Fort  Gibson  and  Fort  Washita,  they  entered 
Texas  at  Preston  on  the  15th  of  December.  From  Preston  the  column 
moved  to  Belknap,  and  thence  to  Fort  Mason,  its  destination,  where  it 
arrived  January  14,  1856.  Four  companies  were  left  on  the  Clear  Fork 
of  the  Brazos,  under  Major  Hardee.  In  this  march  they  forded  many 
rivers,  and  suffered  three  weeks  of  the  coldest  weather  ever  felt  in 
Texas. 

While  still  on  the  elevated  table-lands,  some  sixty  miles  northeast  of 
Fort  Belknap,  the  regiment  was  caught  by  a  terrible  norther.  General 
Johnston  says  in  a  letter  to  the  writer,  of  January  17th : 

Norther!  It  makes  me  cold  to  write  the  word.  I  do  not  believe  that  any  of 
the  hyperborean  explorers  felt  the  cold  more  intensely  than  did  my  regiment. 
Noble  fellows!  Officers  and  men,  they  will  always  be  found  at  their  post,  wher 
ever  duty  calls  them.  Think  of  a  northern  blast,  sixty  miles  an  hour,  unceasing, 
unrelenting  (the  mercury  below  zero,  ice  six  inches  thick),  coming  suddenly 
down  on  the  highest  table-lands  of  Texas,  2,000  feet  above  the  sea,  upon  a  regi 
ment  only  a  few  moments  before  luxuriously  enjoying  the  balmy,  bland  south 
breeze,  and  dissipating  in  a  moment  the  sweet,  illusive  hope  that,  having  trav 
eled  far  into  the  sunny  South,  we  had  escaped  the  horrors  of  a  Northern  win 
ter! 

This  wonderful  change  of  temperature  occurred  on  the  niglit  of  December 
22d.  I  had  just  received  and  finished  reading  your  letter,  in  which  you  men 
tioned  the  delightful  weather  with  which  you  were  blessed  in  New  York.  I  re 
joiced  that  the  rude  blasts  had  not  visited  you  all  too  roughly,  but  pitied  you  in 
the  future.  Blind  mortals  that  we  are!  I  could  not  know  that  what  I  so 
dreaded  for  you  would  in  a  moment  be  inflicted  upon  myself.  From  the  22d  to 
this  time  it  has  been  severely  cold,  but  it  is  moderate  now.  On  the  23d  I  did 
not  march,  as  we  had  a  ration  of  corn  on  hand  for  our  poor,  benumbed  horses. 
On  the  24th  we  were  compelled  to  give  up  the  little  shelter  afforded  by  a  skirt 
of  timber,  and  take  our  route  over  the  prairie.  This  was  a  hard  day  for  all.  I 
do  not  go  much  into  detail,  because  you  have  with  me  faced  a  Texas  norther, 
and  you  will  comprehend  that  it  was  fortunate  that  our  course  was  southwest. 
I  think  we  could  not  have  marched  northward.  On  the  25th,  having  overtaken 
our  supply -train  the  evening  before,  and  having  a  ration  of  corn  for  our  horses, 
we  remained  in  camp,  the  best  sheltered  by  timber  that  we  could  find  for  so 
large  a  body  of  troops,  but  not  good.  This  bright,  clear,  beautiful  day  was  the 
coldest  of  all ;  the  ground  was  covered  with  snow,  and  the  small  quantity  of 
water  to  be  found  was  nearly  all  congealed,  so  that  with  great  difficulty  an  in 
sufficient  supply  was  obtained  for  our  horses.  On  the  26th  we  were  compelled 
to  take  the  route  again  and  go  on  to  our  depot  of  corn,  and  there  encamped 
without  water  for  our  horses  and  with  very  little  for  our  men.  On  the  27th  we 
reached  Belknap,  and  encamped  near  the  post  until  the  2d  of  January,  when  we 
marched  for  this  place.  We  are  now  comfortable,  and  begin  to  forget  the  past. 

During  their  march  from  Belknap  they  encountered  hail,  snow,  and 
sleet ;  and  both  men  and  animals  suffered  severely.  A  train  on  its  way 
from  the  coast  to  meet  them  lost  113  oxen.  At  Fort  Mason,  as  the  ac- 


ABOLITIONISM.  189 

commodations  were  insufficient  for  the  comfort  of  the  officers'  families, 
General  Johnston  reserved  only  one  small  room  for  his  own  family. 
Soon  after  his  arrival  there  he  was  attacked  by  a  violent  remittent 
bilious  fever,  brought  on  by  the  exposure  of  the  march.  The  disease 
nearly  proved  fatal,  but  he  finally  rallied  and  seemed  to  recover. 

Having  been  ordered,  on  the  3d  of  April,  to  proceed  to  San  Antonio 
to  take  command  of  the  department,  he  made  the  journey  on  horse 
back  while  still  convalescent.  He  had  hardly  secured  comfortable 
quarters  before  he  suffered  a  relapse,  which  brought  him  to  the  verge 
of  the  grave.  His  strong  constitution  at  last  brought  him  safely 
through.  Writing  about  the  middle  of  May,  he  says :  "  I  try  my 
physical  powers  a  little  every  day.  I  have  been  so  little  accustomed 
to  sickness  that  I  can  hardly  realize  it,  and  find  myself  inclined  con 
stantly  to  jump  up  and  go  right  off  to  work."  He  was  gradually  re 
stored  to  strength  and  health,  but  did  not  recover  his  robust  appear 
ance  until  braced  by  a  winter  in  Utah. 

During  the  summer  and  fall  of  1856  all  other  interests  were  subordi 
nate  to  the  political  struggle  which  resulted  in  the  election  of  Mr.  Bu 
chanan,  the  Democratic  candidate,  over  Fremont,  the  nominee  of  the 
Antislavery  party.  The  following  letters  are  inserted,  because  they 
clearly  define  General  Johnston's  views  on  the  subject  of  abolitionism 
and  his  apprehensions  at  that  time. 

On  the  21st  of  August,  writing  from  San  Antonio  to  the  author,  he 
says: 

The  best  friends  of  the  Union  begin  to  feel  apprehensions  for  its  permanency. 
A  disruption  ia  too  horrid  for  contemplation.  War  and  its  accompaniments 
would  be  a  necessary  consequence ;  a  peaceful  separation  is  impossible.  Let  us 
make  war  against  the  world  rather  than  against  each  other.  Our  compact  of 
union  seems  to  be  drifting  toward  a  lee-shore;  already  expectant,  we  stand  to 
listen  for  the  insolent  shouts  of  the  greedy  wreckers.  May  Divine  interposition 
prevent  the  shock ! 

SAN  ANTONIO,  TEXAS,  September  12, 1856. 

MY  DEA.E  SON:  We  are  all  well,  but  good  health  is  no  novelty  here;  the 
beneficence  of  Providence  has  accorded  this  blessing  to  all  the  inhabitants  of  this 
beautiful  region.  The  simplicity  of  our  habits,  from  the  necessity  of  practising 
a  rigid  economy,  imposes  upon  us  the  fulfillment  of  the  conditions  which  insure 
that  blessing  to  us.  After  providing  for  our  wants,  though  not  many,  there  is 
nothing  left  for  hospitality.  This  gives  me  no  uneasiness.  I  prefer  rather  that 
my  creditors  (now  very  few)  should  regard  me  as  an  honest  man  than  that  the 
world  should  esteem  me  a  generous  fellow.  My  outfit  and  necessary  expenses 
in  bringing  my  family  to  this  country  on  a  long  overland  route  will  keep  me 
under  half-pay  until  March. 

I  notice  with  sorrow  the  progress  of  fanaticism  in  the  North.  What  do  they 
want  ?  We  want  the  Union  with  the  Constitution.  We  want  to  share  in  its 
glorious,  benevolent,  civilizing  mission,  and  its- high  and  magnificent  destiny. 


190  THE  SECOND   CAVALRY. 

Our  whole  hearts  are  devoted  to  its  support  and  perpetuity.  "We  want  the 
rights  and  independence  of  the  States  and  the  security  to  individuals  guaran 
teed  by  its  Constitution;  we  claim  immunity  from  intervention  and  interfer 
ence.  Do  they  want  these  things?  Let  them  then  cease  to  agitate  a  question 
which  reaches  our  hearths  and  should  be  sacred,  which  disturbs  our  peace  and 
produces  a  feeling  of  insecurity  which  is  intolerable.  "With  whatever  sorrow, 
however  heart-felt  and  agonizing,  we  will  not  hesitate  to  encounter  separation 
with  all  its  attendant  horrors  rather  than  bear  the  evils  and  degradation  relent 
lessly  heaped  upon  us  by  the  heartless  folly  of  fanaticism. 

Hypochondriac  persons,  without  a  single  cause  of  unhappiness,  by  cherishing 
insane  ideas,  contrive  to  make  themselves  truly  miserable.  So  with  our  people 
of  the  North.  A  merciful  and  beneficent  God  has  placed  within  our  grasp  every 
source  of  human  happiness.  He  has  given  us  the  finest  country  on  earth,  em 
bracing  every  variety  of  climate,  soil,  and  production,  affording  the  means  of  a 
perfect  independence  of  the  rest  of  the  world ;  a  government  more  free  than 
any  other,  and  laws  whose  extreme  benevolence  hardly  restrains  individual  ac 
tion  sufficiently  for  public  safety ;  and  the  right  to  worship  even  according  to 
our  fancy.  Yet  with  all  these  gifts — surely  divine — they  cannot  be  happy  un 
less  their  Southern  brothers  will  consent  to  lie  upon  the  Procrustean  bed  they 
have  constructed  for  them.  They  must  adopt  some  other  basis  for  the  settle 
ment  of  the  question  in  agitation  than  passion.  "Why  not  let  reason  again  re 
sume  its  sway  ? 

Yours,  affectionately,  A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

Writing  on  the  23d  of  November,  he  says,  in  allusion  to  the  same 
topic,  and  the  election  of  Mr.  Buchanan  as  President : 

MY  DEAE  "WILL:  We  are  all  well,  and  contented  with  the  result  of  the  elec 
tion.  If  our  Northern  brethren  will  give  up  their  fanatical,  idolatrous  negro- 
worship,  we  can  go  on  harmoniously,  happily,  and  prosperously,  and  also 
gloriously,  as  a  nation.  "We  hope  this,  although  we  fear  it  is  asking  too  much  of 
poor  human  nature.  It  is  more  in  accordance  with  human  experience  to  believe 
that  they  will  cherish  their  unhappy  delusion.  "What  a  people !  what  a  destiny ! 
Great,  almost  without  limit  we  would  be,  if  they  would  employ  all  the  energy, 
all  the  talents,  all  the  genius,  and  all  the  resolution,  to  build  up,  beautify,  adorn, 
and  strengthen  our  Government,  which  they  have  used  from  the  beginning  to 
cripple  and  destroy  it. 

General  Johnston's  administration  of  the  Department  of  Texas  was 
eminently  satisfactory,  not  only  to  the  Government,  but  to  the  people  of 
the  frontier — a  state  of  affairs  very  rare  indeed.  He  was  keenly  alive 
to  the  duty  intrusted  to  him— the  defense  of  the  frontier.  It  was  a 
subject  that  had  engaged  his  interest  and  sympathy  for  twenty  years, 
and  the  field  of  operations  was  perfectly  familiar  to  him.  His  command 
was  a  force  more  suitable  for  service  than  had  formerly  been  employed, 
and  his  orders  were  carried  out  by  as  able  and  enterprising  a  body  of 
officers  and  men  as  has  ever  been  collected  into  one  regiment  in  Amer 
ica.  Enjoying,  too,  very  fully,  the  confidence  of  the  people,  he  received 


GUARDING  THE   FRONTIER.  191 

that  justice  at  their  hands  which  is  not  always  accorded  to  commanders, 
even  when  deserving. 

When  General  Johnston  reached  Fort  Mason,  the  border  was  full  of 
terror.  The  year  1855  had  been  one  of  unusual  disaster  and  suffering. 
The  Indians  had  murdered  and  pillaged  as  far  down  as  the  Blanco, 
within  twenty  miles  of  Austin,  and  even  below  San  Antonio,  in  Sep 
tember.  The  arrival  of  the  Second  Cavalry  changed  the  aspect  of  affairs  ; 
and  a  vigorous  warfare  upon  the  Comanches,  illustrated  by  many  suc 
cessful  combats,  gave  an  unwonted  security  to  the  settlers. 

General  Johnston,  in  allusion  to  this  improvement  in  the  condition 
of  the  department,  says  in  a  letter  to  the  writer,  dated  August  21st  : 

So  far,  since  my  administration  of  the  affairs  of  this  department,  our  fron 
tiers  have  been  free  from  Indian  incursions.  Our  troops  have  driven  them  far 
into  the  interior,  and  I  hope  they  will  not  soon  venture  in  again.  This  is,  of 
course,  only  a  hope ;  for  there  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of  the  country  offering 
any  obstacle  to  their  movements.  The  country,  as  you  know,  is  as  open  as  the 
ocean.  They  can  come  when  they  like,  taking  the  chance  of  chastisement.  If 
they  choose,  therefore,  it  need  only  be  a  question  of  legs. 

In  General  Orders  No.  14,  dated  November  13, 1857,  the  commander- 
in-chief  compliments  no  less  than  eleven  exploits  of  the  Second  Cavalry. 
Although  these  exhibit  the  actual  conflicts  of  the  regiment,  they  afford 
no  measure  of  the  activity,  the  toil,  the  suffering,  and  the  useful  results 
of  its  employment.  In  their  rapid  pursuit  of  the  flying  marauders,  the 
troops  were  exposed  to  severe  cold  and  rains  in  winter,  and  to  the  still 
more  trying  heat  of  a  semi-tropical  sun  in  summer ;  they  endured  the 
extremities  of  thirst,  were  often  compelled  to  subsist  on  the  flesh  of 
broken-down  horses,  or  even,  in  some  cases,  to  go  without  food  for 
several  days  ;  and  yet  the  marches  performed  under  these  circumstances 
were  sometimes  surprising  ;  in  one  case,  as  much  as  160  miles  in  two 
days  and  a  half.  These  expeditions,  conducted  with  energy,  judgment, 
and  courage,  inflicted  serious  loss  on  the  enemy,  and  made  the  frontier 
of  Texas  a  safe  residence  in  comparison  to  what  it  is  now. 

One  of  their  newspapers,  in  speaking  of  General  Johnston,  said : 

We  believe  we  express  the  common  sentiment  of  our  frontier  people,  that 
no  predecessor  has  given  more  satisfaction  to  them,  or  inspired  them  with  more 
confidence  in  the  United  States  Army,  than  this  gallant  officer  and  well-known 
citizen. 

And  another  says  : 

Colonel  Johnston's  regiment  has  been  quite  successful  in  operating  against 
the  Indians.  They  have  acquired  considerable  character  as  Indian  fighters.  The 
colonel  has  for  many  years  enjoyed  the  confidence  of  the  Texans.  They  ex 
pected  much  from  him,  and  he  has  not  disappointed  them.  His  conduct,  since 


192  THE  SECOND   CAVALRY. 

he  has  been  in  command  of  the  Texas  frontier,  challenges  the  admiration  and 
esteem  of  his  fellow-citizens.  He  has  shown  himself  an  able  and  energetic  com 
mander." 

These  notices  might  be  multiplied,  but  it  is  unnecessary.  A  vacancy 
occurring  in  the  rank  of  brigadier-general,  a  great  many  of  the  Texas 
journals  testified  their  good-will  by  expressing  the  hope  that  General 
Johnston  would  be  appointed  to  it ;  a  fact  which  is  now  mentioned 
merely  to  show  their  satisfaction  with  his  administration  on  their 
frontier. 

The  following  instance  is  given  as  an  illustration  of  General  John 
ston's  mode  of  dealing  with  the  people  of  the  frontier.  The  citizens 
of  Hays  and  Comal  Counties  joined  in  a  petition  to  General  Johnston, 
requesting  him  to  station  a  force  to  protect  their  settlements.  To  their 
spokesman,  Judge  William  E.  Jones,  General  Johnston  sent  the  follow-- 
ing  reply: 

SAN  ANTONIO,  TEXAS,  December  1,  1856. 

DEAR  SIE:  Your  letter  in  relation  to  the  exposed  condition  of  the  settle 
ments  between  the  Guadalupe  and  Pedernalis  Rivers,  embracing  those  of  the 
Blanco,  has  been  received. 

Captain  Bradfute,  Second  Cavalry,  with  the  effective  strength  of  his  company, 
has  been  ordered  to  encamp  at  some  suitable  position  between  five  and  ten 
miles  to  the  northward  of  Sisterdale,  to  keep  the  country  up  the  Guadalupe,  on 
the  Pedernalis,  and  intermediate,  constantly  under  observation  by  means  of 
scouting  parties,  and  also  to  examine  the  country  in  the  direction  of  the  Blanco. 

While  all  that  activity  and  zeal  can  accomplish  may  be  expected  from  the 
officers  and  men  of  this  company,  a  hearty  cooperation  of  the  people  of  the 
settlements,  in  the  way  of  communicating  prompt  intelligence  of  the  presence  of 
Indians  to  the  troops,  and  furnishing  the  latter  with  reliable  guides,  will  greatly 
contribute  to  their  security. 

The  frontier  has  been  unremittingly  watched  over  by  the  small  force  sta 
tioned  on  it ;  but  on  a  frontier  of  such  extent,  presenting  so  many  facilities  of 
approach  and  concealment,  small  parties  can  elude  the  vigilance  of  their  scouts, 
and  penetrate  into  the  settlements. 

With  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

Hon.  "W.  E.  JONES. 

Commenting  upon  this  in  grateful  terms,  a  local  journal  says : 

This  is  one  of  the  few  efforts  made  by  regular  officers  to  conciliate  the  people 
and  secure  their  services.  It  is  the  first  step  toward  producing  the  harmony  and 
good  feeling  which  ought  to  exist  between  the  Texans  and  the  United  States 
Army.  Colonel  Johnston,  notwithstanding  he  is  an  officer  of  the  army,  does 
not  forget  he  is  at  the  same  time  a  citizen  of  the  United  States.  This  is  a  senti 
ment,  it  is  to  be  feared,  some  officers  do  not  entertain,  or  cannot  sufficiently  ap 
preciate. 

The  people  of  this  State  were  much  gratified  when  they  learned  Colonel 
Johnston  had  charge  of  this  department.  His  course,  and  the  successes  of  his 


THE  FRIEND   OF  YOUTH.  193 

officers,  have  fully  met  their  expectations,  and,  should  he  be  continued,  there  is 
an  abiding  trust  reposed  in  his  ability  to  give  protection  to  the  frontier. 

In  a  letter  to  the  author,  dated  December  24,  1856,  inclosing  the 
foregoing,  General  Johnston  remarks  : 

They  praise  or  condemn  on  grounds  equally  untenable.  In  this  case  they 
totally  misapprehend  me.  They  believe  I  have  a  desire  to  conciliate,  and  con 
sider  it  the  motive  of  my  action.  The  truth  is,  they  felt  unsafe.  A  feeling  of 
security  was  due  to  them.  According  it  to  them  was  a  simple  act  of  duty,  noth 
ing  more. 

General  Johnston's  influence  with  young  and  ardent  men  was  very 
great.  Two  illustrations  of  this  are  given  by  a  devoted  friend  and 
admirer,  whose  terms  of  laudation  I  have  sometimes  omitted,  though  I 
have  naturally  accepted  them  as  genuine  and  just.  He  was  the  son  of 
a  friend  of  General  Johnston,  and,  having  settled  at  San  Antonio  as  a 
lawyer  while  the  latter  had  his  headquarters  there,  was  at  once  put  upon 
familiar  terms  with  him  and  his  family.  He  says : 

I  regard  the  hours  spent  with  them  as  among  the  happiest  and  best  improved 
of  my  life.  I  have  long  since  recognized  that  his  interest  was  purely  the  result 
of  a  desire  to  guard  the  son  of  an  old  friend  against  the  temptations  of  youth 
incident  to  a  frontier  town.  During  the  two  years  that  I  was  a  constant  visitor 
under  his  roof,  he  could  not  have  been  kinder  or  more  considerate  if  I  had  been 
his  own  son,  as  the  incidents  alluded  to  will  go  to  show. 

The  writer  goes  on  to  narrate  how,  a  personal  altercation  having 
arisen  between  an  officer  of  the  Second  Cavalry  and  another  person,  he 
was  engaged  to  act  as  the  friend  of  the  former.  Unfortunately,  the 
correspondence  passed  to  such  a  point  that  he  felt  constrained  to  advise 
his  principal  that,  in  the  event  of  an  anticipated  contingency,  he  must 
kill  his  antagonist  on  sight,  pledging  himself  to  do  the  same  to  any 
other  man  who  should  interfere. 

That  night  between  ten  and  twelve  o'clock,  General  Johnston  entered 
his  room,  and  inquired  whether  he  had  given  such  advice.  Before  an 
swering,  my  informant  asked  General  Johnston  whether  he  proposed 
to  take  official  action  in  the  premises.  On  his  replying  that  he  did  not 
propose  to  avail  himself  of  his  position  to  interfere  officiously  in  the 
affair,  he  was  told  that  such  had  been  the  advice  given.  General  John 
ston  then  asked  whether  he  had  counted  the  cost  and  weighed  the  pos 
sible  consequences  ;  and  was  told  that  he  had,  and  that  he  had  advised 
the  course  that  he  himself  would  have  adopted  if  principal,  though  he 
knew  it  must  lead  to  a  bloody  street-brawl.  To  General  Johnston's 
expressed  hope  that  he  might  convince  him  that  his  action  was,  to  say 
the  least,  precipitate,  he  replied  that  he  feared  the  task  was  hopeless. 
"But,"  to  use  the  language  of  my  informant,  "he  did,  at  length,  sue- 


194:  THE  SECOND   CAVALRY. 

ceed,  by  the  mathematical  argument  of  honor  and  the  inexorable  logic 
of  *  the  code,'  in  inducing  me  to  withdraw  my  counsel  and  leave  my 
friend  free  to  act  after  a  plan  which  he  (General  Johnston)  suggested. 
I  now  know  that  it  was  the  wisest  and  best  that  could  have  been 
adopted,  and  that  by  its  substitution  for  mine  I  have  been  saved  a  life 
long  term  of  remorse  and  self-reproach.  .  .  .  Not  for  worlds,  now,  would 
I  have  had  my  advice  followed.  General  Johnston  was  probably  the  one 
man  in  the  world  who  could  have  prevented  it,  and  his  arguments  were 
the  only  ones  that  could  have  proved  effectual."  Both  of  these  young 
men  attained  high  rank  and  distinction  in  the  civil  war;  the  writer  of 
the  above  in  the  Confederate  Army,  and  his  principal  in  the  Federal 
Army. 

The  other  incident  occurred  at  the  crisis  of  the  Nicaragua  filibuster 
ing  fever,  and  is  narrated  as  follows  by  my  informant : 

A  battalion  was  raised  in  and  around  San  Antonio  to  go  to  General  Walker's 
assistance,  and  I  was  waited  upon  by  a  committee  to  know  whether  I  would  ac 
cept  a  command.  Nothing  could  have  been  more  consonant  to  my  feelings  at 
the  time;  but,  for  some  reason,  I  demanded  until  the  next  day  before  returning 
an  answer,  suggesting,  in  the  mean  time,  to  swell  the  numbers  by  additional  re 
cruits.  While  that  was  going  on  that  night  quite  briskly  in  the  plaza,  G  eneral 
Johnston  came  along,  and,  taking  me  by  the  arm,  asked  me  to  accompany  him 
out  of  the  crowd.  Then,  turning  to  me,  he  desired  to  know  whether  it  was  true 
that  I  purposed  going  on  such  a  wild-goose  chase.  On  being  told  that  such  was 
my  intention,  he  replied:  "My  young  friend,  think  twice,  and  think  seriously, 
before  taking  this  step;  because,  in  all  likelihood,  it  is  the  turning-point  in  your 
life." 

Admitting  that  in  youth  the  impulse  was  natural,  and  referring  to  analogous 
cases  in  his  own  career,  lie  continued:  "The  days  of  Quixotism  are  past,  and 
with  them  the  chance  for  name  and  fame  in  all  such  enterprises  as  this.  The 
age  is  materialistic,  and  he  who  goes  about  in  search  of  windmills  and  giants  is 
apt  to  be  considered  a  fit  candidate  for  Bedlam.  The  question,  however,  wears 
a  moral  aspect,  which  should  be  duly  weighed  and  considered.  Is  there  any 
material  difference  between  the  filibuster  and  the  buccaneer?  Tell  me  not  of 
philanthropy  as  a  plea.  I  say  of  it  as  Roland's  wife  said  of  liberty :  '  Alas !  how 
many  crimes  are  committed  in  thy  name ! '  Besides,  if  you  are  pining  for  advent 
ure,  you  will  not  have  long  to  wait.  Liberty  and  philanthropy  are  at  work, 
and  on  a  broader  field  than  yours.  Fanaticism  will  soon  bring  on  a  sectional 
collision  between  the  States  of  the  Union,  in  which  every  man  will  have  to 
choose  his  side.  When  it  comes  there  will  be  no  lack  of  blows,  and  may  God 
help  the  right !  Then  give  up  your  present  project,  and  wait.  Go  to  Austin  and 
enter  on  your  profession  there.  I  will  give  you  letters  which  will  insure  you  an 
advantageous  business  connection  there."  By  these  arguments,  here  given  al 
most  in  his  very  words,  and  similar  ones,  he  again  induced  me  to  defer  my  wishes 
to  his  judgment,  and  I  have  never  regretted  the  decision.  The  letters  I  have 
now. 

Permit  me  to  say,  in  conclusion,  that  I  have  never  known  the  man  who  held 
in  such  nice  equipoise  qualities  akin  and  yet  in  a  measure  antagonistic — the 


A  FRIEXDLY  PORTRAITURE.  195 

genial  and  reserved,  the  gentle  and  the  grand,  the  humane  and  the  heroic.  He 
would  have  gone  a  day's  journey  to  reclaim  an  erring  brother,  and  would  have 
turned  out  of  his  path  to  avoid  crushing  a  worm ;  and  yet  he  would  have  sacri 
ficed  his  life  and  all  he  held  dear  in  it  rather  than  deviate  one  hair's  breadth 
from  the  strictest  line  of  right  and  duty. 

There  was  no  cant  in  his  composition,  for  he  was  a  cavalier  of  the  straitest 
sect;  but  I  have  never  met  the  man  who  combined  in  himself  more  of  the  ele 
ments  of  a  follower  of  the  Unerring  Teacher.  In  his  company  the  humblest  felt 
at  ease,  and  yet  a  crowned  head  would  not  have  ventured  upon  a  freedom  with 
him.  In  the  course  of  an  eventful  life  and  extensive  travel,  I  have  come  in  con 
tact  with  many  of  the  historic  personages  of  the  day;  and  yet  I  scruple  not  to 
say  that  of  them  all,  but  three,  to  my  thinking,  would  stand  the  test  of  the  most 
rigid  scrutiny.  Of  these,  by  a  singular  coincidence,  the  colonel  and  lieutenant- 
colonel  of  a  cavalry  regiment  in  the  United  States  Army,  afterward  respectively 
the  ranking  officers  of  a  hostile  army,  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  and  Robert  E. 
Lee,  were  two;  the  third  was  Mr.  Calhoun.  No  time-serving  or  self-seeking 
entered  into  their  calculations.  Self-abnegation  at  the  bidding  of  duty  was  the 
rule  of  their  lives.  Could  our  much-maligned  section  lay  no  further  claim  to 
the  consideration  of  mankind,  the  fact  that  it  produced,  almost  in  the  same  gen 
eration,  such  a  triumvirate,  typical  of  their  people,  is  enough  to  place  it  among 
the  foremost  nations  of  the  earth  in  the  realms  of  thought,  honor,  patriotism, 
and  knightly  grace. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE   MORMON   REBELLION. 

GENERAL  JOHNSTON,  as  commander  of  the  United  States  troops 
employed  to  enforce  the  Federal  authority  in  Utah,  was  for  more  than 
two  years  placed  in  relations  of  either  direct  or  indirect  antagonism 
with  the  Mormon  chiefs  ;  and,  as  his  position  was  peculiarly  dangerous 
and  difficult,  it  is  impossible  clearly  to  understand  it  without  some 
knowledge  of  the  situation  of  this  people  and  of  the  abnormal  develop 
ment  of  religious  ideas  which  led  to  their  separation  into  a  distinct  com 
munity. 

The  rise  and  spread  of  the  Mormons,  or  Latter-Day  Saints,  is  one  of 
the  most  remarkable  facts  of  this  century.  Observers  recognize  the 
existence  in  civilized  society  of  a  barbarous  element,  sometimes  charac 
terized  as  "  the  dangerous  classes."  Its  manifestation  is  usually  political 
and  communistic,  or  predatory.  Under  the  influence  of  religious  fanati 
cism,  it  gave  birth  to  Mormonism.  Joseph  Smith,  an  ignorant  and  cun 
ning  charlatan,  with  the  aid  of  certain  confederates  animated  by  similar 
sordid  motives,  deliberately  framed  and  preached  and  organized  a  system 
of  religious  imposture,  which  was  to  establish  him  as  the  prophet  and 


196  THE  MORMON  REBELLION. 

vicegerent  of  the  Most  High.  He  pretended  to  announce  his  mission 
by  divine  revelation,  and  to  attest  it  by  miracles.  Secretly  he  made  it 
the  instrument  of  unbounded  license,  and  of  a  perfect  despotism,  spir 
itual  and  temporal,  over  his  deluded  followers. 

Joseph  Smith  was  a  native  of  Vermont,  where  he  was  born  in  1805. 
His  father  removed  during  his  boyhood  to  near  Palmyra,  New  York. 
His  family  was  of  the  vagabond  class,  thriftless  and  superstitious. 
They  were  people  of  the  lowest  social  grade,  subsisting  on  the  proceeds 
of  irregular  labor — hunting,  trapping,  well-digging,  and  peddling  beer 
and  cakes,  together  with  some  shiftless  and  ill-directed  work  on  the 
farm  on  which  they  had  "  squatted."  Their  neighbors  testified  that 
they  were  idle,  thriftless,  and  suspected  of  pilfering.  The  family  were 
very  ignorant  and  superstitious,  dreaming  dreams,  seeing  visions,  and 
catching  eagerly  at  all  the  marvels  current  in  their  circle.  In  the 
camp-meetings  and  revivals  that  formed  the  chief  recreation  of  their 
community,  they  picked  up  an  extensive  Scriptural  vocabulary  and 
some  ill-defined  views  of  theology,  but  no  impulse,  apparently,  to  carry 
the  word  of  God  into  the  practical  conduct  of  life.  Their  spiritual 
life  was  passed  in  that  sediment  of  fanaticism  which  consists  chiefly  of 
credulity,  self-deception,  and  imposture.  Such  was  the  school  of  morals 
in  which  Joseph  Smith  was  educated  in  all  the  points  of  charlatanism. 

Joseph  Smith  was  himself  accounted  in  youth  a  worthless,  idle, 
lying,  immoral  vagabond  ;  though  both  he  and  his  mother  testified  that 
it  was  religious  meditation  which  occupied  his  thoughts.  "  He  was," 
according  to  his  father,  "  the  genus  of  the  family."  His  neighbors 
assert  that  he  professed  to  discover  hidden  treasures  by  the  use  of 
"  a  peep-stone  " — a  large  crystal  through  which  he  looked — and  that 
he  was  also  "a  water-witch,"  who  found  wells  with  the  hazel-rod. 
According  to  his  own  account,  at  the  age  of  fifteen,  he  had  a  vision  in 
which  Christ  appeared  to  him  and  warned  him  against  all  existing  creeds 
and  sects.  He  received  his  call  as  a  prophet  on  the  23d  of  September, 
1823,  when  "  Nephi,  a  messenger  of  God,"  appeared  to  him  in  a  vision, 
.and  told  him  that  "  God  had  a  work  for  him  to  do,"  etc. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  recapitulate  here  the  steps  by  which  a  bold 
imposture  rose  to  a  formidable  fanaticism.  Smith  began  his  practices 
in  1823,  at  the  age  of  eighteen,  but  it  was  seven  years  later  before  Mor- 
monism  began  to  take  shape  as  a  sect.  His  shallow  pretenses  of  the 
discovery  of  "  the  book  of  Mormon,"  and  of  miraculous  spectacles  to 
read  it  with,  and  his  other  tricks,  have  all  been  laid  bare.  Nevertheless, 
he  drew  around  him  a  band  in  which  craftiness,  audacity,  and  supersti 
tion,  accompanied  by  an  American  aptitude  for  organization,  were  the 
marked  characteristics.  A  sect  was  founded. 

Converts  were  made  rapidly,  and  colonies  were  established  at  Kirt- 
land,  Ohio,  and  Independence,  Missouri.  Great  missionary  enterprises 


A  PAIR  OF  PROPHETS.  197 

were  undertaken,  and  the  sect  was  separated  into  a  distinct  body, 
organized  for  political  and  ecclesiastical  ends,  and  literally,  not  figura 
tively,  "  at  war  with  the  world."  Horse-stealing  and  counterfeiting 
were  charged  as  effective  means  by  which  they  "  spoiled  the  Egyp 
tians  ; "  and  so  deep-seated  was  this  belief  that  they  were  expelled 
from  Ohio  and  Missouri  by  popular  uprisings.  In  1839  the  exiles  took 
refuge  in  Illinois,  and  built  a  handsome  city  on  the  banks  of  the  Missis 
sippi,  named  Nauvoo,  which  in  two  years  contained  two  thousand 
houses.  Though  warmly  welcomed  at  first,  their  ill  name  followed 
them,  and  a  war  seemed  imminent  between  them  and  the  people  of  the 
country.  In  the  half-hostile,  half-legal  phases  of  the  contest,  Smith  fell 
into  the  hands  of  his  enemies,  and,  while  in  the  custody  of  the  law,  was 
murdered  in  jail  by  a  mob  in  June,  1844.  The  martyrdom  of  its  founder 
gave  a  seal  to  the  church.  His  place  as  "  seer "  and  "  revelator  of 
God,"  after  a  brief  contest,  was  usurped  by  a  man  of  real  ability,  grasp, 
and  steady  purpose.  Brigham  Young,  one  of  his  earliest  converts  and 
chief  counselors,  a  man  of  rude,  native  strength  and  cunning  and  excel 
lent  administrative  power,  came  to  the  front  as  successor.  Holding 
with  firm  hand  the  reins  of  power,  he  guided  the  destiny  of  the  Latter- 
Day  Saints  until  his  death  in  1877. 

Brigham  Young  was  born  in  Vermont,  June  1,  1801,  whence  he  was 
removed  while  an  infant  to  New  York  by  his  father,  who  was  a  small 
farmer.  Though  brought  up  to  farm-labor,  he  became  a  painter  and 
glazier.  He  was  an  early  proselyte  in  1832,  and  joined  Smith  at  Kirt- 
land.  He  soon  attained  a  high  place  in  Smith's  confidence,  and  in  rank 
in  the  church.  In  1835  he  was  made  an  apostle,  and  in  1836,  president 
of  the  twelve  apostles.  He  was  absent  in  England  two  years  on  a 
successful  mission ;  but,  except  during  this  absence,  followed  Smith's 
fortunes  closely,  and  was  his  most  trusted  counselor.  He  owed  his  po 
sition  to  qualities  of  which  his  chief  felt  the  need — business  sense,  per 
sistence,  and  self-control.  He  had  shrewdness  and  insight,  and  cloaked 
an  imperious  will  under  a  profession  of  blind  obedience.  He  is  said 
to  have  managed  Smith,  and  to  have  ruled  as  vizier  before  he  became 
sultan.  At  first  he  was  a  poor  preacher,  only  affecting  "  the  gift  of 
tongues,"  or  talking  gibberish  to  be  translated  by  another.  The  habit 
of  command  and  long  practice  at  length  made  him  a  strong  though 
rude  speaker.  Such  was  the  successor  of  Joseph. 

Prophecy  required  the  completion  of  the  temple  at  Nauvoo ;  and 
Brigham  finished  it  after  a  fashion.  In  the  mean  time,  foreseeing  the 
conflict  impending  with  the  Gentiles,  he  cautiously  paved  the  way  to  a 
removal  of  his  people  to  the  Rocky  Mountains,  and  at  last  declared  a 
revelation  to  that  effect.  In  February,  1846,  the  advance-guard  crossed 
the  Mississippi,  Nauvoo  was  abandoned,  and  that  toilsome  pilgrimage 
began,  which  ended  in  the  valley  of  Salt  Lake.  Nauvoo  was  said  to 


198  THE  MORMON  REBELLION. 

contain  15,000  inhabitants,  and  it  was  entirely  deserted.  The  sudden 
exodus  of  such  a  population  from  the  midst  of  enraged  neighbors  was 
marked  by  every  form  of  hardship,  privation,  and  affliction,  and  their 
migration  across  the  Plains  was  at  a  heavy  cost  in  human  life.  The 
United  States  Government,  in  order  to  relieve  the  distress  of  the  Mor 
mons,  authorized  the  enlistment  of  a  battalion  of  volunteers,  who  re 
ceived  $20,000  pay  in  advance,  were  marched  to  their  destination,  and 
dismissed  with  their  arms.  This  act  of  sympathy,  gratefully  acknowl 
edged  at  the  time,  was  afterward  basely  misrepresented  as  a  cruel  and 
malignant  persecution. 

Brigham  Young  arrived  at  the  site  of  Salt  Lake  City  with  a  small 
detachment,  July  24,  1847 ;  and,  leaving  a  colony,  returned  to  lead  for 
ward  the  main  body  from  their  winter-quarters  near  Council  Bluffs,  Iowa. 

On  the  24th  of  December,  1847,  by  a  second  coup  cVetat,  he  had  him 
self  chosen  first  president  of  the  church,  and  thus  succeeded  to  the 
place  arid  power  of  Joseph  Smith.  Henceforth,  as  prophet,  priest, 
and  king,  he  ruled  as  absolute  monarch  of  the  Mormons — a  Grand 
Lama,  or  incarnate  deity.  In  1848  he  led  his  people  to  the  valley  of 
Salt  Lake.  The  city  he  built  there  he  proclaimed  the  Zion  of  the 
Mountains.  In  his  explorations,  and  as  the  pioneer  leader  of  a  mixed 
multitude  in  their  passage  over  the  desert,  Brigham  Young  appears  at 
his  best.  He  showed  great  energy,  skill,  and  decision,  and,  when  he  had 
fairly  crossed  the  boundary  into  Mexican  territory,  he  set  up  his  standard. 

The  Mormons  from  the  origin  of  their  sect  have  tried  to  preserve 
every  possible  analogy  to  the  Hebrews;  and  this  memorable  migration 
out  of  Egypt  to  the  promised  land  has  enabled  them  to  indulge  it. 
Utah  reproduced  to  their  imaginations  a  new  and  enlarged  type  of 
Canaan.  As  they  emerged  from  the  denies  of  the  Rocky  Mountains 
they  beheld  a  vast  basin,  in  which  lay  a  Dead  Sea,  with  a  shore-line  of 
290  miles,  in  a  frame  of  treeless  mountains,  its  sullen  waves  lapping  a 
snow-white  beach.  From  a  second  sea  of  Galilee — the  beautiful  Utah 
Lake — another  Jordan  poured  down,  along  whose  green  banks  the  Mor 
mon,  in  his  mind's  eye,  saw  set  the  cities  of  the  Lord. 

Brigham  Young  looked  beyond  these  types,  and  perceived  himself 
posted  in  a  stronghold  where  he  thought  he  could  bid  defiance  to  the 
armies  of  the  world.  Lofty  and  inaccessible  mountains  girdled  it,  to 
whose  few  and  narrow  gateways  he  would  hold  the  key.  His  new  city 
would  be  a  Tadmor  of  the  desert,  a  city  of  refuge,  a  holy  place,  and  a 
prison  whose  door  he  would  keep — a  city  of  which  the  world  had  not 
seen  the  like,  at  once  a  new  Rome  and  a  new  Jerusalem. 

At  first  the  Mormon  colony  suffered  for  food  ;  but  judicious  manage 
ment  and  fortitude  tided  them  over  the  danger  of  starvation  ;  and  in 
1849  an  abundant  harvest  relieved  them.  In  1850  and  thereafter  a 
great  emigration  passed  over  the  continent  to  California  ;  and,  as  the 


QUARRELS  WITH  FEDERAL  OFFICIALS.  199 

owners  of  the  half-way  station,  the  Mormons  were  enriched  by  legiti 
mate  commerce.  Brigham  showed  administrative  talent;  and,  with  full 
command  of  the  resources  of  his  people,  he  was  able  to  combine  co 
operative  effectiveness  with  the  individual  energy  and  spontaneous 
industry  of  the  population  in  such  a  way  as  to  work  marvels  of  achieve 
ment. 

Utah  was  transferred,  by  the  treaty  of  1848,  from  Mexico  to  the 
United  States.  The  question  was  thus  revived,  whether  it  were  better 
to  pursue  their  pilgrimage  still  farther,  encountering  Apache  cruelty 
and  Mexican  bigotry,  or  to  trust  to  their  isolation,  and  "  build  up  the 
kingdom  "  on  United  States  territory.  The  Mormons  chose  the  latter 
course.  Early  in  1849  they  organized  the  State  of  "  Deseret ; "  but  Con 
gress  ignored  it,  and,  in  September,  1850,  created  instead  the  Territory 
of  Utah.  President  Fillmore  appointed  Brigham  Young  Governor  ;  and 
he  took  the  oath  of  office  Februarys,  1851.  Stenhouse  says,1  "Presi 
dent  Fillmore  appointed  Brigham  on  the  recommendation  of  Colo 
nel  Thomas  L.  Kane,  and  upon  the  assurance  of  that  gentleman  that 
the  charges  against  Brigham  Young's  Christian  morality  were  unfound 
ed."  A  judge,  the  attorney,  and  the  marshal  of  the  district  court, 
were  also  Mormons.  Two  of  the  judges  were  "  Gentiles."  Thus  was 
impressed  a  Mormon  policy  upon  the  Federal  relations  of  the  Territory. 

The  Federal  officers  arrived  in  July,  and  were  soon  involved  in 
trouble.  Judge  Brocchus  reprobated  polygamy  in  a  public  assembly, 
and  was  told  by  the  Governor,  "  I  will  kick  you  or  any  other  Gentile 
judge  from  this  stand,  if  you  or  they  again  attempt  to  interfere  with 
the  affairs  of  our  Zion  !  "  He  afterward  said,  "  If  I  had  crooked  my 
finger,  the  women  would  have  torn  him  to  pieces."  Disliking  such 
tenure  of  office  and  life,  the  Gentile  Federal  officers  retreated  from  the 
Territory,  and  left  affairs  in  the  hands  of  their  Mormon  colleagues. 
Judge  Shaver,  who  succeeded  Brocchus,  died,  with  some  suspicion  of 
foul  play  ;  and  Judge  Reed,  his  associate,  returned  to  New  York.  A 
third  set  of  officials  was  sent  out  in  1854,  whose  relations  with  the 
Mormon  chiefs  became  still  more  unpleasant.  A  bitter  controversy 
sprang  up  between  Judge  Drummond  and  the  Saints,  with  mutual  accu 
sations  of  crime.  The  former  charged  the  massacre  of  Lieutenant  Gun- 
nison's  party  on  the  Mormons,  together  with  many  other  outrages ; 
while  the  latter  retorted  with  allegations  of  gross  immorality.  Judge 
Drummond,  having  got  to  Carson's  Valley,  took  care  not  to  return. 

The  Secretary  of  State,  Almon  W.  Babbitt,  having  offended  Brigham 
Young,  started  across  the  Plains,  but  was  murdered  on  the  road  by  In 
dians  "  who  spoke  good  English  ; "  or,  in  other  words,  by  Mormons. 
Brigham's  comment  was  :  "  There  was  Almon  W.  Babbitt.  He  under 
took  to  quarrel  with  me,  and  soon  after  was  killed  by  the  Indians.  He 
1  "  Rocky  Mountain  Saints,"  p.  275. 


200  THE  MORMON  REBELLION". 

lived  like  a  fool,  and  died  like  a  fool."  This  unrelenting  vindictiveness 
of  Brigham  seems  the  worst  feature  of  his  character. 

Judge  Styles  was  a  Mormon  who  had  outgrown  his  faith  ;  and,  hav 
ing  offended  the  Saints  by  his  decision  of  a  question  of  jurisdiction  ad 
versely  to  their  wishes,  he  was  set  upon,  insulted,  and  threatened  by 
the  Mormon  bar.  His  records  and  books  were  stolen,  and,  as  he  sup 
posed,  burned  ;  though,  in  fact,  they  were  hidden  for  subsequent  use  by 
Clawson,  Brigham's  son-in-law  and  confidential  clerk.  Styles  escaped 
to  complain  at  Washington  City ;  but  his  intimate  friend,  a  lawyer 
named  Williams,  was  murdered. 

Whether  the  immoralities  charged  against  the  Federal  officials  were 
true  or  not,  their  chief  sin  was  the  effort  to  punish  the  crimes  of  certain 
violent  men,  who  in  the  name  of  religion  had  instituted  a  reign  of  ter 
ror  over  the  Mormons  themselves.  The  Danites,  or  Destroying  Angels, 
were  a  secret  organization,  said  to  have  originated  with  one  Dr.  Avard, 
in  the  Missouri  troubles  of  1838.  They  had  their  grips  and  passwords; 
and  blind  obedience  to  the  Prophet  was  the  sole  article  of  their  creed. 
They  have  had  their  prototypes  under  every  aspect  of  despotism,  such 
as  the  Kruptoi  of  Sparta,  the  stabbers  of  Dr.  Francia,  and  the  assassins 
of  the  Old  Man  of  the  Mountain.  This  secret  police  executed  the 
bloody  decrees  of  the  church  and  the  will  of  its  president  with  merciless 
rigor,  and  hunted  down  Gentiles  and  apostate  Saints  under  the  com 
bined  influence  of  fanaticism,  greed,  and  private  vengeance. 

Elder  Stenhouse,  in  the  thirty-sixth  chapter  of  his  "  Rocky  Mountain 
Saints,"  gives  a  terrible  picture  of  the  outburst  of  fanaticism  in  the 
"Reformation"  of  1856.  This  was  "a  revival"  begun  by  Jedediah 
M.  Grant,  in  which  the  most  dangerous  dogmas  of  their  church  were 
pressed  to  their  extremest  consequences,  and  the  whole  population  was 
in  a  ferment  of  religious  frenzy.  It  has  already  been  stated  that  what 
ever  was  plausible  in  doctrine  or  popular  in  ritual  had  been  adopted 
into  the  Mormon  Church,  so  that  its  creed  was  a  seething  mass  of  in 
congruous  heresies  and  monstrous  errors.  Humanity  recoiled  4,000 
years  with  the  growth  of  this  bastard  dispensation,  which  seemed  to 
have  exuded  from  the  slime  of  the  Nile,  instead  of  drawing  living 
waters  from  "  Siloa's  brook,  that  flowed  fast  by  the  oracle  of  God." 
The  Godhead  was  dragged  down  to  the  likeness  of  the  created,  and 
pictured  with  all  the  appetites  of  humanity,  while  a  brutal  peasantry 
were  taught  that  each  one  should  become  "  a  god  "  to  create,  populate, 
and  reign  over  a  new  earth  as  his  peculiar  domain.  This  procreation, 
transmigration,  and  exaltation  of  souls,  was  to  be  secured  by  obedience 
and  the  practice  of  polygamy.  All  the  worst  possible  phases  of  polyg 
amy  were  practised,  including  incest.  Heber  C.  Kimball,  Young's 
associate  in  the  first  presidency,  "  declared  to  the  people  that  Young 
was  his  God  and  their  God."  Grant  said,  "If  President  Young  wants 


A  HIDEOUS  FANATICISM.  201 

my  wives,  I  will  give  them  to  him  without  a  grumble,  and  he  can  take 
them  whenever  he  likes."  Confession  was  insisted  on  ;  those  who 
hesitated  were  excommunicated,  and  those  who  confessed  were  pub 
lished  and  punished.  Rebaptism  for  the  remission  of  sins  was  en 
joined.  The  wavering,  the  doubtful,  the  suspected,  were  seized  by 
night,  whipped,  ducked,  or  even  worse  maltreated.  Brigham  Young 
taught  that  "  to  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself  "  meant  to  prevent  his 
apostasy  by  shedding  his  blood.  Many  murders  and  other  outrages 
were  the  consequence  ;  and  the  hatred  and  fury  against  the  Gentiles, 
engendered  in  these  heated  imaginations,  had  much  to  do  with  the  re 
sistance  to  the  United  States  Government,  and  the  acts  of  open  hostility 
in  1857. 

After  the  inauguration  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  he  determined  to  put  an 
end  to  the  conflict  of  authority  in  Utah  by  the  removal  from  office  of 
Brigham  Young,  and  the  appointment  of  an  entire  body  of  Federal 
officers  in  no  wise  affiliated  with  Mormonism.  Alfred  Cummins:,  of 

&  * 

Georgia,  was  made  Governor ;  D.  R.  Eckles,  Chief-Justice  ;  John 
Cradlebaugh  and  Charles  E.  Sinclair,  Associate  Justices;  John  Hart- 
nett,  Secretary  ;  and  Peter  K.  Dotson,  Marshal.  A  detachment  of  the 
army,  under  Brigadier-General  Harney,  was  ordered  to  accompany  the 
Federal  appointees,  to  protect  them  from  the  violence  shown  their  pre 
decessors,  and  to  act  as  a,  posse  comitatus  in  the  execution  of  the  laws. 

Brigham  is  said  to  have  received  this  news  on  the  24th  of  July, 
1857,  when  celebrating  the  tenth  anniversary  of  his  arrival  in  Salt  Lake 
City.  Two  thousand  persons  were  present  in  a  camp-meeting  at  Big 
Cottonwood  Lake,  and  their  leader  fired  all  hearts  by  his  denunciation 
of  the  Gentiles,  and  his  resolve  to  resist  the  authority  of  the  United 
States.  "  God  was  with  them,  and  the  devil  had  taken  him  at  his 
word.  He  had  said  ten  years  before,  and  he  could  but  repeat  it,  he 
would  ask  no  odds  of  Uncle  Sam  or  the  devil."  He  had  said  in  1853, 
"  I  am  and  will  be  Governor,  and  no  power  can  hinder  it,  until  the 
Lord  Almighty  says,  '  Brigham,  you  need  not  be  Governor  any  longer.' " 

When  the  Mormons  had  found  that  the  Treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidal 
go,  in  1848,  made  them  American  instead  of  Mexican  citizens,  they  had 
submitted  patiently  in  the  belief  that  they  would  be  able  to  build  up  a 
sovereign  state  on  the  basis  of  their  peculiar  ideas.  They  were  satisfied 
with  their  allegiance  when  they  only  felt  it  in  the  payment  of  salaries 
by  the  Federal  Government  to  officials  of  their  own  faith.  The  Cali 
fornia  immigration  proved  so  lucrative  to  the  Saints  that,  at  first,  it 
gave  little  discontent;  but  when  it  left  a  residuum  of  Gentiles  in 
Utah,  whose  criticism  or  obduracy  provoked  the  enmity  of  the  Mormon 
leaders,  the  old  rancor  was  quickly  revived,  and  the  Destroying  Angels 
were  summoned  to  their  bloody  work.  Assassination  was  very  common, 
and  other  outrages  frequent,  traceable  to  this  cause.  But  to  place 


202  THE  MORMON  KEBELLION. 

the  civil  government  in  Gentile  hands  would,  it  was  feared,  prove  the 
downfall  of  the  "kingdom;"  Gentiles  would  be  protected,  Danites 
punished,  and  the  machinery  of  the  church  dislocated.  Resistance  was 
resolved  upon. 

Stenhouse  says  (page  353) : 

The  Saints  had  no  time  now  to  lose ;  the  enemy  was  approaching  their  homes. 
The  leaders  preached  war,  prayed  war,  taught  war ;  while  saintly  poets  scribbled 
war,  and  the  people  sang  their  ditties.  The  *  God  of  battles '  was  the  deity  of 
the  hour,  and  his  influence  was  everywhere  seen  and  felt.  Public  works  and 
private  enterprise  were  alike  suspended,  while  every  artist  who  had  sufficient 
genius  for  the  manufacture  of  revolvers,  repairing  old  guns,  or  burnishing  and 
sharpening  rusty  sabres  and  bayonets,  was  pressed  into  the  service  of  Zion. 
The  sisters,  too,  were  seized  with  the  war-fever,  and  their  weaving  and  knitting 
talents  were  fully  exercised  in  preparation  for  the  coming  campaign.  It  was  a 
great  time  for  rejoicing  in  the  Lord,  cursing  Uncle  Sam,  and  keeping  powder 
dry. 

The  Mormon  outlying  colonies,  at  San  Bernardino,  Carson's,  Wa- 
shoe,  and  Jack's  Valleys,  and  elsewhere,  were  called  in ;  and  these  Saints 
sold  for  a  song  property  soon  after  worth  millions.  Missionaries  re 
turned  in  disguise.  Preparations  for  desperate  revolt  were  made;  and 
the  people  were  taught  that  war  to  the  knife,  even  to  the  desolation  of 
the  land,  was  to  be  the  measure  of  their  resistance.  Major  Van  Vliet, 
the  quartermaster,  sent  to  purchase  lumber  for  quarters,  forage,  and 
subsistence,  arrived  on  September  3d,  and  found  to  his  surprise  that  he 
could  buy  nothing  for  the  Government,  and  that  the  troops  were  to  be 
treated  as  enemies.  He  was  told  by  Brigham  Young  that  "  the  troops 
now  on  the  march  for  Utah  should  not  enter  Salt  Lake  Valley." 

Major  Van  Vliet  explained  that  the  action  in  regard  to  Utah  was 
exactly  that  taken  in  regard  to  all  the  other  Territories,  and  that  no  hos 
tile  demonstration  against  the  inhabitants  was  contemplated.  But  he 
found  the  president,  leaders,  and  people,  unanimous  in  their  determina 
tion  to  prevent  United  States  troops  from  entering  the  valley. 

Major  Van  Vliet  left  on  the  14th  of  September  ;  and,  on  the  next 
day,  Brigham  Young  issued  a  proclamation  of  the  most  inflammatory 
character,  beginning — 

CITIZENS  OF  UTAH  :  We  are  invaded  by  a  hostile  force  who  are  evidently  assail 
ing  us  to  accomplish  our  overthrow  and  destruction. 

After  reciting  the  various  supposed  grounds  of  grievance  against 
the  United  States,  and  declaring,  "  Our  duty  to  ourselves,  to  our  fami 
lies,  requires  us  not  tamely  to  be  driven  and  slain  without  an  attempt  to 
preserve  ourselves,"  he  concludes : 

Therefore,  I,  Brigham  Young,  Governor,  etc. — 1.  Forbid  all  forces  of  every/ 
description  from  coming  into  this  Territory,  under  any  pretense  whatever. 


MORMOX   ORATORY.  203 

2.  That  all  the  forces  in  said  Territory  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  march 
at  a  moment's  notice  to  repel  any  and  all  such  invasion. 

3.  Martial  law  is  hereby  declared  to  exist  in  this  Territory  from  and  after 
the  publication  of  this  proclamation,  and  no  person  shall  be  allowed  to  pass  or 
repass  into  or  through  or  from  the  Territory  without  a  permit  from  the  proper 
officers. 

On  the  next  day,  at  the  Tabernacle,  the  spirit  of  enthusiasm  was  in 
creased  by  war  speeches  from  the  leaders.  Brigham  broke  into  the 
following  strain  of  denunciation  and  vigorous  metaphor : 

We  have  borne  enough  of  their  oppression  and  hellish  abuse,  and  we  will  not 
bear  any  more  of  it,  for  there  is  no  just  law  requiring  further  forbearance  on 
our  part.  And  I  am  not  going  to  have  troops  here  to  protect  the  priests  and 
hellish  rabble  in  efforts  to  drive  us  from  the  land  we  possess;  for  the  Lord  does 
not  want  us  to  be  driven,  and  has  said,  "  If  you  will  assert  your  rights,  and  keep 
my  commandments,  you  shall  never  again  be  brought  into  bondage  by  your 
enemies."  .  .  .  They  say  that  their  army  is  legal;  and  I  say  that  such  a  state 
ment  is  as  false  as  hell,  and  that  they  are  as  rotten  as  an  old  pumpkin  that  has 
been  frozen  seven  times  and  melted  in  a  harvest  sun.  Come  on  with  your 
thousands  of  illegally-ordered  troops,  and  I  will  promise  you,  in  the  name  of 
Israel's  God,  that  you  shall  melt  away  as  the  snow  before  a  July  sun.  .  .  .  You 
might  as  well  tell  me  you  can  make  hell  into  a  powder-house  as  to  tell  me  you 
could  let  an  army  in  here  and  have  peace ;  and  I  intend  to  tell  them  and  show 
them  this  if  they  do  not  stay  away.  .  .  .  And  I  say  our  enemies  shall  not  slip 
the  bow  on  old  Bright' s  neck  again.  God  bless  you !  Amen. 

This  declaration  of  independence  by  the  Mormon  Prophet  was  reit 
erated  from  every  pulpit.  It  is  a  curious  illustration  of  the  power  of 
fanaticism  that  the  refutation  of  his  fallacious  revelations  and  the 
speedy  failure  of  his  prophecies  did  not  shake  the  faith  of  his  disciples. 

At  the  same  meeting  of  September  16th,  Heber  Kimball,  Brig- 
ham's  first  councilor,  abject  sycophant,  and  a  blasphemous  old  buffoon, 
preached  thus : 

Is  there  a  collision  between  us  and  the  United  States?  No;  we  have  not 
collashed  ;  that  is  the  word  that  sounds  nearest  to  what  I  mean.  But  now  the 
thread  is  cut  between  them  and  us,  and  we  will  never  gybe  again — no,  never, 
worlds  without  end  (voices,  "  Amen!  ").  ...  Do  as  you  are  told,  and  Brigham 
Young  will  never  leave  the  governorship  of  this  Territory,  from  this  time  hence 
forth  and  forever.  ISTo,  never.  ...  The  spirit  that  is  upon  me  this  morning  is 
the  Spirit  of  the  Lord,  that  is,  the  Holy  Ghost— though  some  of  you  may  think 
the  Holy  Ghost  is  never  cheerful.  Well,  let  me  tell  you,  the  Holy  Ghost  is  a 
man  ;  he  is  one  of  the  sons  of  our  Father  and  our  God,  and  he  is  that  man  that 
stood  next  to  Jesus  Christ— just  as  I  stand  by  Brother  Brigham.  .  .  .  You  think 
our  Father  and  our  God  is  not  a  lively,  sociable,  and  cheerful  man ;  he  is  one  of 
the  most  lively  men  that  ever  lived.  .  .  .  Brother  Brigham  is  my  leader,  he  is 
my  prophet  and  my  seer,  my  revelator:  and  whatever  he  says,  that  is  for  me  to 
do,  and  it  is  not  for  me  to  question  him  one  word,  nor  to  question  God  a  minute. 

Such  were  the  teachings  of  the  heads  of  the  church, 


204:  THE   MORMON  REBELLION. 

In  the  mean  time  the  Saints  were  organized  and  drilled ;  and  rough 
defenses  were  built  in  Echo  Canon,  and  other  approaches  to  the  valley. 

The  Territory  of  Utah,  as  at  present  constituted,  extends  from  109° 
to  114°  west  longitude,  and  from  37°  to  42°  north  latitude,  with  an  area 
of  84,476  square  miles.  But  the  kingdom  which  Brigham  tried  to  set 
up  claimed  wider  and  undefined  limits.  The  Wahsatch  Range  bisects 
the  Territory  for  400  miles  in  a  southwesterly  direction,  including  in  its 
eastern  section  table-lands  5,000  feet  above  the  sea-level,  and  on  its 
western  slopes  a  series  of  valleys  of  half  that  altitude.  The  air  has  the 
dryness  of  the  desert,  and  the  sandy,  porous  soil  drinks  up  the  mountain- 
torrents.  Wherever  irrigation  is  possible,  the  earth  yields  abundantly ; 
and  coal,  iron,  gold,  silver,  and  lead,  are  found  in  the  mountains ;  but 
the  largest  part  of  the  country  must  always  be  devoted  to  pastoral  pur 
poses.  Its  cloudless  skies,  lofty  mountains,  and  green  intervales,  offer 
grand  and  varied  scenery  to  the  eye  and  imagination.  The  population  has 
generally  been  over-estimated.  In  1870  the  census  reported  it  at  88,374; 
and  in  1857  it  may  be  safely  computed  at  about  35,000  or  40,000. 

When  Brigham  looked  up  at  his  Alpine  walls  and  their  warders,  he 
believed  his  stronghold  impregnable.  Its  denies  were  guarded  by  hardy 
mountaineers,  trained  to  blind  obedience  and  pitiless  zeal  by  ten  years 
in  the  wilderness  ;  and  the  Indian  tribes,  the  intervening  desert,  and 
an  almost  arctic  winter,  were  counted  on  as  sure  and  cruel  allies.  He 
had  seen  the  unopposed  emigrant  fall  their  victim  ;  and  the  prophecy 
seemed  safe  that,  great  as  were  the  odds,  he  could  foil  an  invading 
army.  In  spite  of  his  undoubted  ability,  and  well-organized  people,  he 
was  without  intelligent  military  advice,  and  but  repeating  the  policy  of 
Schamyl  and  other  barbarian  chiefs,  to  whom  he  was  little  superior  in 
information.  He  therefore  indulged  himself  in  the  dream  of  successful 
revolt  and  complete  independence. 

The  following  are  his  orders,  issued  through  Daniel  H.  Wells,  his 
commander-in-chief,  on  the  4th  of  October,  1856  : 

On  ascertaining  the  locality  or  route  of  the  troops,  proceed  at  once  to  annoy 
them  in  every  possible  way.  Use  every  exertion  to  stampede  their  animals  and 
set  fire  to  their  trains.  Burn  the  whole  country  before  them  and  on  their  flanks. 
Keep  them  from  sleeping  by  night-surprises.  Blockade  the  road  by  felling  trees, 
or  destroying  the  fords  when  you  can.  Watch  for  opportunities  to  set  fire  to 
the  grass  on  their  windward,  so  as,  if  possible,  to  envelop  tbeir  trains.  Leave 
no  grass  before  them  that  can  be  burned.  Keep  your  men  concealed  as  much  as 
possible,  and  guard  against  surprise.  Keep  scouts  out  at  all  times,  and  com 
munication  open  with  Colonel  Burton,  Major  McAllister,  and  O.  P.  Rockwell, 
wbo  are  operating  in  the  same  way.  Keep  me  advised  daily  of  your  move 
ments,  and  every  step  the  troops  take,  and  in  which  direction. 

God  bless  you,  and  give  you  success. 

Your  brother  in  Christ, 
(Signed)  DANIEL  H.  WELLS. 


MOUNTAIN  MEADOWS  MASSACRE.  205 

These  judicious  instructions  for  partisan  warfare,  though  not  exe 
cuted  with  much  vigor,  met  some  success,  as  will  appear  hereafter.  It 
were  well  for  humanity  and  the  Mormon  name  had  their  hostility  been 
restricted  to  legitimate  war  ;  but  who  shall  set  bounds  to  religious 
hate?  The  chronic  rancor  against  the  Gentiles  had  been  envenomed 
by  the  delirious  "  reformation  "  of  the  year  before,  and  by  the  killing  of 
the  apostle  Perley  Pratt,  in  Arkansas.  Pratt  had  seduced  the  wife 
and  abducted  the  children  of  a  man  named  McLean,  who  followed  him 
from  San  Francisco  to  Arkansas,  where  he  overtook  and  slew  him  in 
combat.  Though  Mormon  "common  law"  justifies  homicide  as  the 
penalty  of  adultery,  the  Gentile  has  not  the  benefit  of  the  rule,  and  ven 
geance  was  denounced  against  the  people  of  Arkansas.  The  new  access 
of  fury,  stimulated  by  the  approach  of  the  troops,  culminated  in  Sep 
tember,  1857,  in  an  unparalleled  atrocity.  Robbery,  outrage,  and  mur 
der,  had  been  the  ordinary  fate  of  the  alien  and  the  waverer,  but  the 
climax  of  religious  rage  was  reached  in  the  massacre  at  Mountain 
Meadows. 

A  band  of  emigrants,  about  135  in  number,  quietly  traveling  from 
Arkansas  to  Southern  California,  arrived  in  Utah.  This  company  was 
made  up  of  farmers'  families,  allied  by  blood  or  friendship,  and  far  above 
the  average  in  wealth,  intelligence,  and  orderly  conduct.  They  were 
Methodists,  and  had  religious  service  regularly  morning  and  evening. 
They  expected,  according  to  custom,  to  refit  their  teams  in  Utah,  and 
buy  food  and  forage  sufficient  to  pass  the  California  Desert ;  but,  to 
their  horror,  this  reasonable  traffic  was  everywhere  refused.  When  they 
stopped  at  the  Jordan  to  rest,  they  were  ordered  to  move  on  ;  and 
Brigham  sent  a  courier  ahead  to  forbid  all  intercourse  with  the  weary 
and  terror-stricken  band.  Pity  orcovetousness  evaded  the  decree  so  far 
as  to  permit  the  purchase  of  thirty  bushels  of  corn  at  Fillmore,  and 
fifty  bushels  of  flour  at  Cedar  City.  But  so  exhausted  did  the  emi 
grants  become,  that  they  made  but  thirty-five  miles  in  their  last  four 
daj^s  of  travel. 

As  they  were  thus  crawling  along,  "  the  decree  was  passed,  devot 
ing  said  company  to  destruction  ; "  and  the  militia  was  regularly  called 
out  under  orders  from  a  military  council  at  Parowan.  The  authorities 
were  Colonel  W.  H.  Dame,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Isaac  C.  Haight,  Presi 
dent  and  High-Priest  of  Southern  Utah,  and  Major  John  D.  Lee,  a 
bishop  of  the  church.  Their  orders  were  to  "  kill  the  entire  company, 
except  the  little  children."  The  Mormon  regiment,  with  some  Indian 
auxiliaries,  attacked  the  emigrants  soon  after  they  broke  up  camp  on 
September  12th.  The  travelers  quickly  rallied,  corraled  their  wagons, 
and  kept  up  such  a  fire  that  the  assailants  were  afraid  to  come  to  close 
quarters.  Reinforcements  were  sent  for,  and  arrived;  but  still  the 
Mormons  did  not  venture  to  assault  the  desperate  men,  who  were  fight- 


206  THE   MORMON  REBELLION. 

ing  for  their  wives  and  little  ones.  At  last,  on  the  15th,  the  fourth  day 
of  the  siege,  Lee  sent  in  a  flag  of  truce,  offering,  "  if  the  emigrants 
would  lay  down  their  arms,  to  protect  them."  They  complied,  laid 
down  their  arms,  and  half  an  hour  afterward  the  massacre  began.  All 
were  killed  except  seventeen  little  children.  Every  atrocity  accom 
panied  the  slaughter,  and  the  corpses  were  mutilated  and  left  naked  on 
the  ground.  "  Three  men  got  out  of  the  valley,  two  of  whom  were 
soon  overtaken  and  killed  ;  the  other  reached  Muddy  Creek,  fifty  miles 
off,  and  was  overtaken  and  killed  by  several  white  men  and  one  In 
dian."  Eighteen  months  afterward  the  surviving  children  were  rescued 
and  restored  to  their  friends  in  Arkansas,  by  Jacob  Forney,  Superin 
tendent  of  Indian  Affairs.  Thirty  thousand  dollars'  worth  of  plunder 
was  distributed  ;  and  Beadle,  in  his  "  Life  in  Utah,"  says :  "  Much  of  it 
was  sold  in  Cedar  City  at  public  auction  ;  it  was  there  facetiously  styled 
*  property  taken  at  the  siege  of  Sebastopol.' ':  But  it  is  needless  to 
dwell  upon  the  details  of  this  foul  crime ;  though  at  first  denied  by  the 
Mormons,  proofs  of  their  guilt  accumulated  as  the  years  rolled  on,  and 
the  evidence  that  it  was  a  cold-blooded  affair  of  state  is  now  complete. 
It  was  asserted,  at  the  time,  that  the  order  of  extermination  came  from 
headquarters  ;  Lee  was  a  son  by  adoption  of  Brigham  Young,  and  was 
always  protected  by  him.  Brigham's  word  was  law  in  church  and 
state,  and  such  a  deed  would  not  have  been  done  without  his  appro 
bation,  and  scarcely  except  by  his  orders.  It  was  in  accordance  with 
the  letter  and  spirit  of  his  teaching  at  the  time  ;  and  his  subsequent 
conduct  proving  him  an  accessory  after  the  fact  also  implicates  him 
with  the  perpetration  of  the  crime.  He  availed  himself  of  his  official 
position,  as  Governor  and  Superintendent  of  Indian  Affairs,  to  bury  in 
oblivion  this  dreadful  crime,  and  throw  the  mantle  of  the  Prophet 
around  the  shedders  of  innocent  blood.  According  to  his  works  let  him 
be  judged. 

John  D.  Lee  enjoyed  twenty  years  of  impunity,  but  he  was  at 
last  brought  to  justice,  convicted  of  and  executed  for  this  crime  in  1877. 
Soon  afterward  the  hand  which  had  shielded  him  so  long  yielded  the 
reins  of  power  to  the  conqueror  Death. 

The  words  and  deeds  of  the  Mormons,  which  have  been  given,  are 
illustrations  of  the  temper  of  that  people  and  their  chief  toward  the 
United  States,  in  1857.  A  violent  revolt  was  in  motion,  and  we  shall 
now  see  how  this  hostile  population  was  brought  back  to  its  allegiance. 


FEDERAL  POLICY  TOWARD  -UTAH.  207 


CHAPTER   XIV. 

UTAH    CAMPAIGN. 

THOUGH  the  troubles  in  Utah  had  been  so  long  brewing,  their  nature 
seems  to  have  been  imperfectly  understood  by  the  people  and  Govern 
ment  of  the  United  States.  The  Mormons  made  occasional  public  and 
formal  professions  of  loyalty  to  the  Government  and  of  adhesion  to  the 
principles  of  American  liberty;  and  their  complaints  were  nominally 
against  particular  acts  and  persons.  Hence  it  was  not  unreasonable  to 
suppose  that  the  remedy  of  particular  grievances  and  the  punishment 
of  particular  offenders  would  insure  the  peace  of  the  Territory.  This 
inference,  though  natural,  was  a  mistake;  because  the  grounds  of  vari 
ance  were  general  and  radical,  and  not  special,  as  pretended. 

The  Mormons  alleged  national  persecution,  when,  in  fact,  the  reli 
gious  freedom  of  the  country  had  allowed  them  to  preach  a  pagan  doc 
trine  and  a  barbarous  code  of  ethics,  to  proselytize,  and  to  develop 
their  heresy  into  a  system.  Where  the  strong  hand  of  an  arbitrary  gov 
ernment  would  have  repressed  their  extravagances,  American  faith  in 
the  power  of  truth  to  triumph  over  error  by  moral  forces  permitted 
them  to  occupy  an  almost  impregnable  stronghold  on  the  established 
road  across  the  continent  for  commerce  and  immigration,  where  they 
were  encouraged  to  levy  a  peaceful  tribute  as  farmers  and  traders.  But 
the  Government  went  even  beyond  this;  and,  in  the  spirit  of  concilia 
tion,  aided  the  union  of  church  and  state  in  the  hands  of  the  Prophet 
by  making  him  Governor  and  Superintendent  of  Indian  Affairs,  and  by 
giving  him  the  virtual  control  of  the  Territory.  This  policy  had  worked 
badly ;  Brigham  Young  and  his  coadjutors  had  abused  the  trust  reposed 
in  them  ;  life,  liberty,  and  property,  were  all  made  unsafe  by  his  machi 
nations.  It  was,  therefore,  found  necessary  to  supersede  him ;  but  this 
was  done  in  no  hostile  spirit. 

The  general  conduct  of  our  Government  toward  all  dependencies 
had  been  fostering;  and  this  could  not  be  otherwise  with  the  Adminis 
tration  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  which,  moulded  by  the  character  of  its  chief, 
was  essentially  bureaucratic,  conservative,  and  pacific.  The  Secretary 
of  War,  Mr.  Floyd,  expresses  this  sentiment  in  his  report  for  1857-'o8: 
"  It  has  always  been  the  policy  and  desire  of  the  Federal  Government 
to  avoid  collision  with  the  Mormon  community.  It  has  borne  with  the 
insubordination  they  have  exhibited  under  circumstances  where  respect 
for  its  own  authority  has  frequently  counseled  harsh  measures  of  dis 
cipline."  The  Secretary  adds  that  this  forbearance  might  have  been 
15 


208  UTAH  CAMPAIGN. 

prolonged  but  for  their  attitude — "  a  lion  in  the  path  " — across  the  line 
of  commerce  and  emigration,  defying  the  Federal  authority,  and  ex 
citing  the  Indians  to  pillage  and  massacre. 

To  sustain  the  newly-appointed  civil  functionaries,  and  protect  the 
line  of  travel,  it  was  determined  to  send  a  small  force  of  troops  to  Utah 
and  establish  a  military  department  there  similar  to  others  on  the  fron 
tier;  but  every  measure  was  taken  to  avoid  offense  to  the  self-love  and 
prejudices  of  the  people.  The  force  sent  was  small,  and  the  orders  given 
were  strict.  Though  the  intended  commander,  General  Harney,  was  in 
formed  that  he  must  not  be  unprepared  for  general,  organized,  and 
formidable  obstruction,  still  it  was  not  really  expected  that  the  local 
authorities,  or  Mormon  Church  as  such,  would  array  themselves  in  open 
opposition  to  the  United  States;  but  that  embarrassments  from  popular 
disorder,  mob  violence,  and  secret  combinations,  fomented  by  priest 
craft,  would  require  management  and  a  show  of  force.  Indeed,  the 
state  of  affairs  in  Utah  was  entirely  unforeseen  at  Washington,  The 
Government  expected  turbulence — it  found  armed  and  open  hostility ; 
it  provided  against  sedition,  and  had  to  meet  a  rebellion ;  it  sent  a 
fiosse  comitatus  where  it  needed  an  army  of  occupation. 

When  the  expedition  to  Utah  was  determined  on  General  Harney 
was  selected  to  command  it.  In  his  orders  of  May  28th  the  Fifth  and 
Tenth  Regiments  of  Infantry,  the  Second  Regiment  of  Dragoons,  and 
Phelps's  light  artillery,  were  designated  as  the  force  to  be  sent  forward, 
with  supplies  for  2,500  men.  Reno's  battery  was  afterward  added,  As 
no  active  opposition  was  expected,  and  the  season  was  already  advanced, 
the  troops  and  supply-trains  marched  as  soon  as  they  could  be  put  in 
motion,  in  July,  in  a  somewhat  irregular  manner.  General  Scott  sug 
gested  to  General  Harney,  on  the  26th  of  June,  to  send  part  of  his 
horse  in  advance  to  Fort  Laramie  to  recruit  in  strength  before  the  main 
body  came  up  ;  but,  unfortunately,  this  was  not  done.  The  Second 
Dragoons  were  detained  in  Kansas  in  consequence  of  the  political  trou 
bles  there  ;  and,  finally,  at  the  request  of  Governor  Walker,  and  proba 
bly  in  accordance  with  his  own  wishes,  General  Harney  was  himself  re 
tained  in  command  of  that  department. 

From  information  received,  it  began  to  be  feared  that  the  dissension 
might  end  in  a  rupture  with  the  Mormons,  and  apprehensions  were 
awakened  that,  owing  to  the  lateness  of  the  season  and  the  desultory 
character  of  the  movement,  some  disaster  might  ensue.  As  cold  weather 
approached  these  fears  increased,  and  the  public  shared  with  the  Gov 
ernment  in  the  most  painful  surmises  as  to  the  result.  Finally,  General 
Johnston  was  selected  to  succeed  General  Harney,  and,  on  the  28th  of 
August,  received  orders  to  repair  to  Fort  Leavenworth  and  assume  com 
mand,  governing  himself  by  the  orders  and  instructions  already  issued 
to  General  Harney.  The  following  extract  contains  the  most  important 


ARMY  ORDERS.  209 

points  in  these,  and  is  inserted  to  show  the  scope  of  the  intended  move 
ment,  and  also  the  nature  of  General  Johnston's  duties,  which  subse 
quently  became  matter  of  controversy  between'Governor  Gumming  and 
himself: 

HEADQTTAETEES  OF  THE  ARMY,  June  29,  1857. 

....  The  community  and,  in  part,  the  civil  government  of  Utah  Territory 
are  in  a  state  of  substantial  rebellion  against  the  laws  and  authority  of  the  United 
States.  A  new  civil  Governor  is  about  to  be  designated,  and  to  be  charged  with 
the  establishment  and  maintenance  of  law  and  order.  Your  able  and  energetic 
aid,  with  that  of  the  troops  to  be  placed  under  your  command,  is  relied  upon  to 
insure  the  success  of  his  mission.  The  principles  by  which  you  should  be  guided 
have  been  already  indicated  in  a  somewhat  similar  case,  and  are  here  substan 
tially  repeated. 

If  the  Governor  of  the  Territory,  finding  the  ordinary  course  of  judicial  pro 
ceedings,  and  the  power  vested  in  the  United  States  marshals  and  other  proper 
officers,  inadequate  for  the  preservation  of  the  public  peace  and  the  due  execu 
tion  of  the  laws,  should  make  requisition  upon  you  for  a  military  force  to  aid 
him  as  a  posse  comitatus  in  the  performance  of  that  official  duty,  you  are  hereby 
directed  to  employ  for  that  purpose  the  whole  or  such  part  of  your  command  as 
may  be  required;  or  should  the  Governor,  the  judges,  or  marshals  of  the  Terri 
tory  find  it  necessary  directly  to  summon  a  part  of  your  troops  to  aid  either  in 
the  performance  of  his  duties,  you  will  take  care  that  the  summons  be  prompt 
ly  obeyed ;  and  in  no  case  will  you,  your  officers,  or  men,  attack  any  body  of 
citizens  whatever  except  on  such  requisition  or  summons,  or  in  sheer  self-de 
fense.  In  executing  this  delicate  function  of  the  military  power  of  the  United 
States  the  civil  responsibility  will  be  upon  the  Governor,  the  judges,  and  mar 
shals  of  the  Territory.  While  you  are  not  to  be,  and  cannot  be,  subjected  to  the 
orders,  strictly  speaking,  of  the  Governor,  you  will  be  responsible  for  a  zealous, 
harmonious,  and  thorough  cooperation  with  him,  on  frequent  and  full  consulta 
tion,  and  will  conform  your  action  to  his  request  and  views  in  all  cases  where 
your  military  judgment  and  prudence  do  not  forbid,  nor  compel  you  to  modify 
in  execution  the  movements  he  may  suggest.  No  doubt  is  entertained  that  your 
conduct  will  fully  meet  the  moral  and  professional  responsibilities  of  your  trust, 
and  justify  the  high  confidence  already  reposed  in  you  by  the  Government. 

The  lateness  of  the  season,  the  dispersed  condition  of  the  troops,  and  the 
smallness  of  the  numbers  available,  have  seemed  to  present  elements  of  difficul 
ty,  if  not  hazard,  in  this  expedition.  But  it  is  believed  that  these  may  be  com 
pensated  by  unusual  care  in  its  outfit  and  great  prudence  in  its  conduct.  .  .  . 

GEORGE  "W.  LAY, 
Lieutenant- Colonel,  Aide-de-Camp  to  General  Scott. 

General  Johnston  arrived  at  Fort  Leavenworth,  September  llth, 
and  remained  one  week  to  complete  arrangements  for  the  expedition. 
The  Second  Dragoons  were  called  in,  and,  such  was  the  diligence  of 
preparation,  were  on  the  road  to  Salt  Lake  on  the  17th.  Six  companies 
of  this  cavalry  were  assigned  as  an  escort  to  Governor  Gumming  and 
the  civil  officers  of  Utah  ;  but  General  Johnston  in  person  waited  on 


210  UTAH  CAMPAIGN. 

the  Governor,  and  offered  him  his  choice  between  the  escort  and  accom 
panying  himself  to  Utah.  The  Governor  chose  the  former.  General 
Johnston  allowed  great  discretion  in  the  movements  of  the  escort  to 
the  commander,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Philip  St.  George  Cooke,  whom  he 
mentions  as  "  a  cavalry-officer  of  great  experience,  and  well  acquainted 
with  frontier  service." 

So  much  was  General  Johnston  impressed  with  the  necessity  of  ce 
lerity  that,  leaving  Fort  Leavenworth  on  the  18th  of  September,  with 
an  escort  of  forty  dragoons,  he  made  the  journey  to  camp,  near  South 
Pass,  920  miles,  over  bad  and  muddy  roads  in  twenty-seven  days,  arriv 
ing  there  October  loth.  But  this  speed  was  not  at  the  expense  of  any 
important  interest,  as  he  availed  himself  of  every  opportunity  on  the 
route  to  further  the  ends  of  the  expedition,  by  providing  for  the  safe 
and  rapid  movement  of  mails,  trains,  and  troops.  Learning  that  the 
grass  ahead  was  bad,  he  arranged  to  have  thirty-one  extra  wagons  of 
corn  with  strong  teams  waiting  for  Colonel  Cooke  at  Fort  Kearny,  and 
attended  to  many  details  not  necessary  to  specify  here.  The  journey 
across  the  Plains  has  been  so  often  and  so  well  described  that  its  inci 
dents  are  familiar  to  all  who  take  an  interest  in  the  subject.  There  was 
nothing  unusual  in  General  Johnston's  progress,  except  its  speed,  which 
was  great,  considering  the  absence  of  relays,  and  the  condition  of  the 
roads,  softened  by  the  fall  rains. 

General  Fitz-John  Porter,  then  major  and  assistant-adjutant-general, 
who  accompanied  General  Johnston  on  this  expedition,  rendering  him 
valuable  aid,  has  placed  the  writer  under  great  obligations  by  memo 
randa,  of  which  he  has  freely  availed  himself.  General  Porter  says  : 

Colonel  Johnston  entered  upon  no  ordinary  task.  His  command  and  their 
subsistence,  clothing,  and  means  of  erecting  shelter,  were  stretched  over  nearly 
1,000  miles  of  almost  desert  road  between  Fort  Kearny  and  Salt  Lake.  So  late 
in  the  season  had  the  troops  started  on  their  march  that  fears  were  entertained 
that,  if  they  succeeded  in  reaching  their  destination,  it  would  be  only  by  aban 
doning  the  greater  part  of  their  supplies  and  endangering  the  lives  of  many  men 
amid  the  snows  of  the  Rocky  Mountains.  Colonel  Johnston  felt  and  accepted 
the  responsibility,  determined,  if  possible,  to  reach  his  destination  and  to  secure 
the  expedition  against  disaster  and  perhaps  destruction,  which  the  rapidly-ap 
proaching  winter  threatened.  So  much  was  a  terrible  disaster  feared  by  those 
well  acquainted  with  the  rigors  of  a  winter  life  in  the  Rocky  Mountains,  that  Gen 
eral  Harney  was  said  to  have  predicted  it,  and  to  have  inducfed  Governor  Walker 
(of  Kansas)  to  ask  for  his  retention.  The  route  was  not  then,  as  now,  lined  with 
settlements  and  ranches,  which  would  afford  some  comfort  to  man  and  beast. 

The  narrow  valleys,  already  grazed  over  by  thousands  of  animals,  yielded  a 
scanty  subsistence  for  his  horses ;  yet  he  pushed  on  at  the  rate  of  from  thirty 
to  sixty  miles  a  day,  stopping  at  Forts  Kearny  and  Laramie  only  time  enough 
to  rest  his  teams — a  day  at  each. 


MORMON   HOSTILITIES.  211 

On  the  29th  of  September,  on  the  South  Fork  of  the  Platte,  General 
Johnston  received  Captain  Van  Vliet's  report  of  his  journey  to  Salt 
Lake  City,  which  was  his  first  authentic  information  that  actual  organ 
ized  resistance  by  the  Mormons  might  be  expected.  General  Johnston 
gathered  some  200  mounted  men  on  the  route,  with  whom  he  reenforced 
Lieutenant-Colonel  C.  F.  Smith,  and  gave  support  to  the  supply-trains. 
General  Porter  says : 

Beyond  Fort  Laramie,  rumors  of  trains  destroyed  and  troops  attacked  reached 
Colonel  Johnston.  Van  Vliet's  return  with  ill  reports  only  tended  to  increase 
the  alarm  along  the  route.  Conductors  of  trains  hesitated,  and  teamsters  shirked 
duty  and  delayed  progress.  Colonel  Johnston's  anxiety  increased,  yet  his  speed 
could  be  no  greater ;  but,  experienced  on  the  Plains  and  of  established  reputa 
tion  for  energy,  courage,  and  resources,  his  presence  restored  confidence  at  all 
points,  and  encouraged  the  weak-hearted  and  panic-stricken  multitude.  The 
long  chain  of  wagons,  kinked,  tangled,  and  hard  to  move,  uncoiled  and  went 
forward  smoothly.  Near  the  Rocky  Mountains  snow-storms  began  to  overtake  us, 
but  Bridger,  the  faitbful  and  experienced  guide,  ever  on  the  alert,  would  point 
in  time  to  the  "snow-boats,"  which,  like  balloons,  sailing  from  the  snow 
capped  mountains,  warned  us  of  storms,  and  would  hasten  to  a  good  and  early 
camp  in  time  for  shelter  before  the  tempest  broke  upon  us.  At  the  South  Pass 
a  cold  and  driving  snow-storm  barred  progress  for  a  few  days,  but  permitted  the 
gathering  of  trains,  which,  assured  of  protection  and  of  intelligent  control,  and 
encouraged  by  the  cheerful  words  and  bearing  of  our  commander,  moved  on 
with  renewed  life. 

When  General  Johnston  arrived  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  South 
Pass,  October  15th,  his  first  endeavor  was  to  concentrate  his  trains  at  Pa 
cific  Springs,  five  miles  beyond,  and  to  assemble  and  organize  a  sufficient 
force  for  their  protection.  To  this  end  he  hastened  the  march  of  Lieu 
tenant  Smith  and  Colonel  Cooke  by  all  means  possible,  and  enrolled  in 
military  companies  all  unemployed  teamsters  and  camp-followers.  He 
also  interdicted  all  communication  with  the  Mormons,  and  took  meas 
ures  for  the  arrest  of  spies  and  unknown  persons  approaching  the  camps. 
On  the  2d  of  October  the  Mormons  had  moved  to  the  rear  of  Colonel 
Alexander's  command  and  burned  three  trains,  including  seventy-five 
wagons  loaded  with  provisions  and  quartermaster's  stores,  and  driven 
off  the  draught-animals  to  Salt  Lake  Valley.  This  occurred  on  Green 
River,  near  the  Sandy,  before  General  Johnston  arrived  at  Laramie. 
They  were  greatly  elated  with  this  successful  stroke;  but  it  is  evidence 
of  great  want  of  enterprise,  or  of  intelligence,  that  they  did  not  pursue 
their  advantage  and  burn  all  the  trains,  which  they  might  easily  have 
done  without  risk,  as  they  were  well  mounted,  and  the  infantry  too  far 
off  to  interfere,  while  the  cavalry  was  700  miles  in  the  rear. 

The  infantry  and  artillery  of  the  expedition,  about  1,100  men,  were 
assembled  on  October  4th,  on  Ham's  Fork,  at  a  camp  some  thirty  miles 


212  UTAH   CAMPAIGN. 

from  Fort  Bridger  and  130  miles  from  South  Pass.  Next  day  Colonel 
Alexander,  having  assumed  command,  determined,  after  counsel  with 
his  senior  officers,  that  the  Fort  Bridger  route  to  Salt  Lake  Valley  was 
impracticable  on  account  of  the  defenses  in  Echo  Canon,  and  that  the 
more  circuitous  route  by  the  most  northern  bend  of  Bear  River  Valley 
offered  the  best  chance  of  safely  wintering  the  troops.  This  movement 
wTas  begun  without  knowledge  of  the  mishap  to  the  supply-trains  in 
his  rear. 

General  Johnston,  having  satisfied  himself  by  those  mental  processes 
so  much  like  intuition  to  the  observer  that  Bear  River  Valley  was  im 
practicable,  and  Fort  Bridger  the  only  point  of  concentration  where  the 
army  could  be  wintered,  acted  with  his  usual  decision.  He  took  every 
means  to  this  end,  and  ordered  Colonel  Alexander  to  withdraw  his 
command,  so  as  to  effect  a  junction,  and  "  to  treat  as  enemies  all  who 
might  appear  in  arms  or  in  anyway  annoy  him."  In  the  mean  time  he 
advanced  the  trains  as  fast  as  he  could  under  escort. 

But  General  Johnston  found  his  efforts  to  concentrate  opposed  by  a 
foe  more  potent  than  the  Mormons.  Winter  fell  suddenly  upon  his  un 
prepared  men  and  animals.  On  the  night  of  the  17th  there  was  a  snow 
storm,  and  the  thermometer  fell  to  16°.  Colonel  Smith  lost  eleven 
mules  by  cold,  and  as  many  more  in  the  next  few  days,  and  the  trains 
suffered  severely.  General  Johnston  had  passed  about  200  wagons, 
belonging  to  contractors  and  merchant-trains,  near  the  Three  Crossings 
of  the  Sweetwater,  on  the  13th.  It  was  nine  days  before  the  rear  of 
these  trains  came  up  with  Lieutenant  Smith's  command,  so  much  were 
the  draught-animals  reduced  by  want  of  grass.  These  trains  were  neces 
sary  to  the  march  of  the  troops,  as  they  contained  the  winter  clothing 
and  Sibley  tents,  besides  subsistence,  ordnance,  and  medical  stores,  to 
a  large  amount,  indispensable  to  the  comfort  and  efficiency  of  the  men. 
Without  them  no  advance  could  be  made,  except  with  great  suffering, 
and  perhaps  loss  of  life.  Still,  go  forward  they  must,  in  order  to  effect 
the  junction  with  Colonel  Alexander  on  Ham's  Fork,  ninety  miles  dis 
tant.  Colonel  Alexander  in  the  mean  time,  on  account  of  the  heavy 
snows  and  to  secure  supplies,  had  fortunately  begun  to  retrace  his  steps 
before  receiving  General  Johnston's  orders.  A  few  days  of  delay  would 
have  rendered  a  junction  impossible.  General  Johnston,  convinced  by 
the  destruction  of  the  arm}T-trains,  and  by  their  hostile  language  and 
attitude,  of  the  warlike  purpose  of  the  Mormon  leaders  and  people, 
wrote  to  the  adjutant-general  on  November  5th,  reciting  the  facts.  He 
adds  : 

The  state  of  things  now  existing  has  not  been  brought  about  by  the  move 
ment  of  troops  in  this  direction,  for  these  people  understand  the  relation  of  the 
military  to  the  civil  power  of  the  Government  as  well  as  any  other  portion  of 
the  inhabitants  of  the  Union,  and  that  the  arms  of  our  soldiers  are  designed  for 


IX  THE  SNOW-DRIFTS.  213 

the  preservation  of  the  peaceful  condition  of  society,  and  not  for  its  disturbance. 
Their  conduct,  as  I  have  before  stated  as  ray  opinion,  results  from  a  settled  de 
termination  on  their  part  not  to  submit  to  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  or 
any  other  outside  of  their  church. 

These  views  of  General  Johnston,  though  sustained  theoretically 
by  the  Administration,  Congress,  and  the  country,  were  the  subject  of 
severe  animadversion  by  some  members  of  Congress,  who  perhaps  mis 
understood  and  certainly  misapplied  his  language,  representing  him  as 
breathing  slaughter  and  vengeance  against  the  Saints.  The  following 
is  from  a  reply  made  to  these  strictures,  in  the  Senate,  by  the  Hon. 
Jefferson  Davis : 

Moreover,  I  would  say,  as  the  question  -of  the  expedition  to  Utah  has  been 
touched,  that  I  hold  that  the  country  is  indebted  to  the  Administration  for  hav 
ing  selected  the  man  who  is  at  the  head  of  the  expedition ;  who,  as  a  soldier, 
has  not  his  superior  in  the  army  nor  out  of  it,  and  whose  judgment,  whose  art, 
whose  knowledge  are  equal  to  this  or  any  other  emergency ;  a  man  of  such  de 
cision,  such  resolution,  that  his  country's  honor  can  never  be  tarnished  in  his 
hands ;  a  man  of  such  calmness,  such  kindness,  that  a  deluded  people  can  never 
suffer  by  harshness  from  him. 

General  Johnston,  writing  February  5,  1858,  from  Fort  Bridger,  to 
Captain  N.  J.  Eaton,  of  St.  Louis,  gives  an  account  of  the  progress  and 
extrication  of  the  army,  as  follows  : 

The  country  over  the  distance  to  be  traversed,  and,  in  fact,  to  this  place — 125 
miles — presents  the  appearance  of  a  great  desert,  including  the  whole  space  be 
tween  the  Rocky  Mountains  and  the  range  in  front  of  us.  There  is  neither  tree 
nor  bush  anywhere,  except  in  the  water-courses.  They  are  sparsely  fringed 
with  stunted  willows,  cottonwood,  and  aspen.  The  upland  is  everywhere  cov 
ered  with  wild-sage  and  its  varieties  and  with  grass  in  bunches  in  season.  Grass 
is  found  on  all  the  water-courses  in  abundance  in  summer.  The  bad  condition 
of  our  animals,  and  the  country  before  us  almost  destitute  of  subsistence,  offered 
but  little  encouragement  to  the  hope  of  reaching  our  destination  this  winter, 
and  I  had  already  had  under  consideration  the  most  suitable  position  to  pass  the 
winter.  On  our  march  from  the  South  Pass  we  had  fine  roads  and  fine  weather, 
and  effected  the  march  in  eight  days,  uniting  the  troops  and  supplies  on  the  3d 
of  November,  with  the  exception  of  Cooke's  command.  Two  days  were  occupied 
in  distributing  clothing  and  making  arrangements  to  resume  our  march. 

On  the  6th  of  November  it  was  resumed,  and  then  commenced  the  storm  and 
wintry  cold,  racking  the  bones  of  our.  men  and  starving  our  oxen,  and  mules, 
and  horses,  already  half  starved.  They  died  on  the  road  and  at  our  camps  by 
hundreds,  and  so  diminished  were  their  numbers  that  from  camp  to  camp,  only 
four  or  five  miles,  as  many  days  were  required  to  bring  them  all  up,  as  it  was 
necessary  to  give  time  to  rest  the  animals,  now  incapable  of  protracted  efforts, 
and  to  hunt  for  food.  In  this  way  fifteen  days  were  consumed  in  making  thirty- 
five  miles  to  this  place,  the  nearest  and  best  place  for  shelter  and  fuel  for  the 
troops,  and  for  shelter  and  grass  for  the  animals.  The  struggle  then  amid  snow 


CAMPAIGN. 

and  arctic  cold  (the  thermometer  16°  below  zero)  was  for  a  place  of  safety. 
If  any  douht  existed  before  this  storm  of  the  propriety  of  risking  the  troops  on 
the  mountains  before  us  before  spring,  or  of  the  ability  to  accomplish  the  march, 
the  destruction  among  our  draught-animals,  the  necessity  of  saving  all  the  oxen 
left  for  food,  even  if  capable  of  further  exertion,  now  dispelled  that  doubt  and 
solved  the  question. 

Colonel  Cooke's  command  arrived  here  with  the  rear  of  the  main  body  on 
the  19th  of  November.  The  storm  which  he  encountered  on  the  Sweetwater, 
and  on  through  the  South  Pass,  destroyed  more  than  half  of  his  horses  and  a 
large  number  of  his  mules,  although  he  had  corn  for  them.  In  that  high  region, 
much  higher  than  where  we  were,  the  cold  must  have  been  much  more  intense 
than  experienced  by  us,  and  his  animals,  I  presume,  perished  mainly  from  cold. 
I  have  the  satisfaction  to  say  that  the  privations  of  the  march  were  endured  by 
officers  and  men  without  complaint,  or,  perhaps,  I  might  more  justly  say,  with 
cheerfulness.  The  troops  are  in  fine  health  and  condition.  The  winter,  thus 
far,  has  not  been  so  rigorous  as  to  prevent  often  the  daily  instruction  of  the 
troops.  They  have  proved  themselves  to  be  hardy  enough  for  any  service ;  a 
few  only — as  many  as  thirty  or  less — have  been  frost-bitten,  but  now  our  scouts 
bivouac,  when  necessary,  in  the  passes  without  suffering. 

The  horses  and  mules,  and  the  cattle  left,  after  slaughtering  as  many  as  would 
serve  until  April,  have  been  distributed  on  Smith's  and  Henry's  Forks,  and  most 
of  them  will  get  through  the  winter.  TVe  have,  of  course,  a  large  number  yet, 
and  hope  many  of  them  will  be  fit  for  service  after  they  have  the  spring  grass  a 
while.  I  have  not,  however,  trusted  to  that,  but,  soon  after  I  established  my 
camp  here,  I  dispatched  Captain  Marcy  to  New  Mexico  for  draught-mules,  and 
a  remount  for  dragoons  and  batteries,  and  expect  him  to  return  before  the  1st 
of  May.  If  I  get  the  spring  supplies  from  Laramie  in  time  I  will  be  able  to  ad 
vance  as  soon  as  the  route  is  practicable,  in  May,  with  an  effective  force,  much 
improved  by  drilling  the  recruits. 

The  Mormons  have  declared,  as  fully  as  words  and  actions  can  manifest  in 
tentions,  that  they  will  no  longer  submit  to  the  Government,  or  to  any  govern 
ment  but  their  own.  The  people  of  the  Union  must  now  submit  to  a  usurpation 
of  their  territory — to  have  a  government  erected  in  their  midst,  not  loyal  to,  or 
rather  not  acknowledging  any  dependence  upon,  or  allegiance  to  the  Federal 
Government— and  what  is  not  less  impolitic  and  entirely  incompatible  with  our 
institutions,  must  allow  them  to  ingraft  their  social  organization  upon  ours  and 
make  it.  a  part  of  our  system,  or  they  must  act  with  the  vigor  and  force  to  com 
pel  them  to  submit.  This  is  due  to  the  dignity  and  honor  of  the  Government.  • 

In  a  subsequent  explanatory  letter,  he  says  : 

The  march  was  resumed  on  the  6th  of  November,  amid  snow,  intense  cold, 
and  every  circumstance  of  privation  to  men  and  animals,  and  with  enormous 
mortality  to  the  latter,  as  long  as  it  was  possible  to  take  another  step,  and  long 
after  any  one  believed  a  passage  of  the  mountains  at  all  possible  for  an  army, 
encumbered  with  a  train.  This  continued  effort  to  advance  was  a  struggle  for 
fuel,  and  grass,  and  shelter,  which  we  knew  were  near  Fort  Bridger.  The  army 
under  my  command  took  the  last  possible  step  forward  at  Bridger,  in  the  condi 
tion  of  the  animals  then  alive.  These  dying  and  half-dead  animals  were  my 


RESCUE  OF  THE  ARMY.  215 

only  dependence  for  meat  six  days  out  of  seven ;  and  every  day's  work  reduced 
fearfully  the  probability  of  my  being  able  to  feed  the  troops — a  terrible  risk 
with  a  six  months'  winter  before  us.  The  country  being  covered  with  snow, 
there  was  no  subsistence  for  animals  to  be  found  in  the  mountains.  I  do  not, 
of  course,  speak  of  small  parties ;  a  few  men  can  go  anywhere  generally. 

Describing  this  march,  General  Porter  says : 

That  night  (November  5th)  a  great  storm  covered  the  ground  with  six  inches 
of  snow,  and  the  next  day  the  march  was  for  thirteen  miles  against  a  driving 
snow,  threatening  every  hour  to  arrest  the  march.  Many  trains  did  not  break 
camp  for  several  days,  and  some,  whose  animals  had  been  killed  by  intense  cold 
and  starvation,  were  not  moved  for  weeks.  Maintaining  a  cheerful  and  confi 
dent  bearing,  Colonel  Johnston  footed  along  at  the  head  of  the  command,  setting 
an  example  of  endurance  that  checked  complaint,  and  turned  these  trials  into 
matter  for  jest  and  good-humor.  The  following  day  (November  7th)  was  one 
of  a  series  of  stormy  days  for  nearly  a  month,  and  few  can  appreciate  it  who 
have  not  experienced  a  Rocky  Mountain  winter.  All  remained  in  the  tem 
porary  shelter  obtained  the  previous  night.  A  driving  snow-storm  and  intense 
cold  prevailed  all  day.  Sage-brush  and  u  grease-wood  "  wore  the  only  fuel,  and 
that  very  scarce.  The  burden  was  to  be  borne;  the  question  was  one  of  self- 
preservation;  there  must  be  no  confusion,  no  grumbling,  no  demoralization. 
Officers  and  men  were  accommodated  alike,  and  the  former,  taking  their  cue 
from  the  bearing  of  their  commander,  maintained  a  cheerful  tone  and  assured 
their  men.  The  snow  covered  the  ground  to  about  a  foot  in  depth ;  there  was 
no  food  for  animals,  and  the  streams  were  frozen  by  cold  16°  below  zero.  Un 
shod,  the  oxen  slipped  to  rise  no  more ;  hundreds  died,  and  the  mules  would 
cluster  around  the  abandoned  night-fires  to  waste  away  with  hunger  and  cold. 
Whenever  the  weather  would  permit,  the  troops  would  march,  going  three  to 
five  miles  a  day,  till  they  reached  Fort  Bridger,  near  which  camp  was  pitched 
for  the  winter.  The  trains  were  about  twenty  days  making  the  last  fifteen 
miles.  The  great  loss  and  weakened  condition  of  the  animals  required  many 
trips  to  bring  up  each  train. 

Colonel  Cooke,  in  his  report,  says  : 

The  assurances  you  gave  me  of  confidence  in  my  commander  have  been  more 
than  realized,  and  he  now  has,  I  believe,  the  unbounded  confidence  of  the  army. 
You  will  see  from  his  letters  and  orders  how  he  grappled  with  the  difficulties  in 
his  path,  and  I  hope  the  spring  will  see  him  the  conqueror.  This  little  army  is 
in  fine  health  and  cheerful  spirits.  The  men  have  borne  their  trials  without  a 
murmur.  Duty  is  severe  upon  the  men,  but  not  a  word  of  complaint  have  I 
heard.  We  have  all  endured  alike,  and  the  fact  that  Colonel  Johnston  has  on  the 
march  "footed  it,"  as  did  the  men,  suffers  the  same  exposure,  and  will  not  per 
mit  the  officer  to  receive  more  than  the  soldier,  has  endeared  him  to  all. 

The  arrival  at  Fort  Bridger  marked  one  distinct  phase  of  the  ex 
pedition.  It  was  rescue  from  sudden  and  impending  death  under  the 
pitiless  pelting  of  the  winter  storms.  It  was  present  safety. 


216  UTAH  CAMPAIGN". 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out  the  severe  tests  of  soldiership  to 
which  GeneralJohnston  was  subjected  in  this  extraordinary  march.  He 
had,  in  the  face  of  an  unexpected  enemy  and  of  an  unprecedented  sea 
son,  gathered  the  disjointed  fragments  of  his  army  into  a  compact  body, 
and,  in  the  midst  of  the  snow-clad  and  mountain-girdled  desert,  had  se 
cured  it  in  a  place  of  shelter  and  safety.  In  a  Moscow  campaign  he 
had  won  a  victory  over  the  elements  ;  and  his  little  command  rose  from 
its  frozen  couch  in  the  desert,  not  only  without  demoralization,  but  fully 
inspired  with  confidence  in  themselves  and  their  commander.  A  great 
result  had  been  achieved  ;  but  the  arrival  at  Fort  Bridger  was  but  the 
beginning  of  new  cares  and  responsibilities.  If,  in  carrying  out  his 
plans,  he  was  untrammeled  by  Government,  he  was  likewise  unassisted. 
He  did  not  receive  one  word  of  orders  or  advice  from  headquarters  from 
the  middle  of  September  to  the  middle  of  March.  The  problem  was  so  to 
apply  existing  resources  as  to  maintain  the  army  without  suffering  until 
the  next  May,  when  belated  trains  at  Fort  Laramie  could  bring  up  sup 
plies,  and  then  have  it  in  condition  to  force  the  passes  to  Salt  Lake 
City.  This  hope  and  intention  he  expressed  in  decided  terms  to  the 
Government  ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  he  pointed  out  that,  in  case  of 
vigorous  resistance  by  the  Mormons,  a  cooperating  force  sent  from  the 
side  of  California  would  prove  the  most  effective  means  of  crushing  re 
sistance  with  the  least  delay,  expense,  and  loss  of  life.  Arrangements 
were  made  to  carry  this  plan  into  effect,  but  were  subsequently  aban 
doned. 

General  Johnston  mustered  into  service  for  nine  months,  at  Fort 
Bridger,  a  battalion  of  four  full  companies  of  volunteers,  325  men,  the 
discharged  employes  of  army  contractors  and  others,  of  whom  he  says : 
"  They  are  young,  active,  and  hardy  men,  generally  good  shots ;  and, 
with  such  instruction  as  they  will  receive,  will  make  most  excellent 
light  troops."  These  auxiliaries,  with  the  cavalry,  raised  the  force  to 
about  2,000  men. 

The  Mormons,  before  retiring,  had  burned  the  buildings  at  Fort 
Bridger  and  Fort  Supply,  twelve  miles  distant,  and  had  destroyed  the 
grain  and  crops  round  about.  Fort  Bridger  was  situated  on  Black's 
Fork  of  Green  River,  near  the  foot  of  the  Uintah  Mountains,  in  lati 
tude  41°  20',  and  longitude  110°  30',  at  an  altitude  said  to  be  7,254  feet 
above  the  sea.  The  "basin,  in  the  southwest  corner  of  which  it  is  placed, 
is  bounded  fnr  away  to  the  east  by  the  Black  Hills  and  other  flanking 
ranges  of  the  Rocky  Mountains,  on  the  northeast  by  the  Wind  River 
Mountains,  on  the  south  by  the  Uintah  Mountains,  and  on  the  west  by 
the  mighty  Wahsatch  range.  These  mountain-ranges  tower  with  a 
crest-line  of  from  10,000  to  12,000  feet  in  height,  broken  by  peaks  that 
are  often  over  13,000  feet  high,  sometimes  snow-clad  in  August.  In 
the  valleys  and  canons,  whose  narrow  bottoms  are  threaded  by  Alpine 


THE   CITY  OF  REFUGE.  217 

torrents,  the  precipitous  walls  rise  from  800  to  1,000  feet  perpendicular; 
and  here  gather  the  winter  snows  to  the  depth,  sometimes,  of  fifty  feet, 
forming,  too,  in  favorable  sites,  avalanches  and  land-slides  of  great  ex 
tent.  The  Uintah  Mountains  break  down  in  terraces  to  the  foot-hills  ; 
and  they,  to  the  wide,  arid,  sterile  plateau,  over  which  the  troops  had 
toiled  from  the  South  Pass.  The  soil  of  this  table-laud,  like  that  of  many 
other  deserts,  contains  the  elements  of  fertility,  but  is  unproductive 
from  want  of  water. 

From  the  ravines  of  the  mountains  pour  down  the  streams  that  form 
Henry's,  Black's,  Smith's,  Muddy,  and  Sandy  Fork,  and  other  tributaries 
of  Green  River.  These  small  rivers,  bordered  by  sunken  valleys,  rich, 
alluvial,  and  teeming,  traverse  the  Desert  Basin.  The  valley  of  Henry's 
Fork  is  from  one  to  five  miles  wide,  and  thirty  miles  long,  abounding  in 
luxuriant  grass ;  that  of  Black's  Fork  is  nearly  a  mile  wide,  and  com 
posed  of  rich,  black  mould  ;  and  others  have  similar  characteristics. 
These  valleys  were,  in  the  summer-time,  oases,  where  wood,  water,  and 
fine  pasturage,  invited  and  rejoiced  the  first  pioneers.  But  it  was  only 
by  comparison  with  the  surrounding  region  that  such  a  nook  as  Fort 
Bridger  could  be  considered  a  favored  spot.  In  their  dire  need,  how 
ever,  the  storm-pressed  wayfarers  looked  toward  it  as  a  city  of  refuge 
in  a  solitude  of  snow. 

Fort  Bridger  itself  was  only  the  ruins  of  a  trading-post,  belonging 
to  the  adventurous  and  large-hearted  James  Bridger.  "  Major  "  Bridger, 
as  he  was  called,  was  a  fine  specimen  of  his  class,  the  early  pioneer, 
who  was  at  once  hunter,  trapper,  herdsman,  and  trader.  It  was  located 
in  the  comparatively  warm,  wooded,  and  well-watered  valley  of  Black's 
Fork,  and  consisted  of  a  high,  well-built,  strong  stone-wall,  inclosing 
a  square  of  100  feet.  General  Johnston  fortified  it  by  the  addition  of 
two  lunettes,  which  made  it  defensible  by  a  small  force,  and  a  safe  place 
for  the  storage  of  supplies  and  for  a  guarded  depot  when  the  army 
should  advance.  The  army  was  put  into  winter  quarters  close  by,  at 
Camp  Scott. 

The  diary  of  Major  Porter,  assistant  adjutant-general,  kindly  put  at 
the  disposal  of  the  writer,  has  this  entry : 

November  llth. — Marched  and  camped  on  Black's  Fork,  about  one  mile  and 
three-quarters  above  Fort  Bridger,  and  established  winter-quarters.  The  arrange 
ments  for  a  permanent  camp  were  entered  upon  immediately.  Nothing  seems 
to  have  been  neglected  by  our  chief  for  the  health  and  comfort  of  our  men,  the 
security  of  the  camp,  provisions,  animals  for  the  winter,  and  to  insure  move 
ment  as  early  as  spring  will  permit. 

General  Porter,  in  a  letter  to  the  writer,  says : 

Horses  and  mules,  followed  by  such  oxen  as  would  survive  the  trip,  were 
sent  to  the  neighboring  valleys  where  the  grazing  was  ample.  The  starving 


218  UTAH  CAMPAIGN. 

oxen,  now  almost  skeletons,  were  butchered  to  prevent  dying,  and  their  meat 
smoked,  or  dried,  or  packed  in  ice.  The  provision  was  carefully  estimated,  and 
the  ration  so  proportioned  that  there  should  be  no  suffering.  Officers  and  men 
fared  alike,  and  there  was  no  deviation  from  the  rule  for  any  one's  benefit.  The 
bulk  of  the  ration  was  poor  beef  six  days  in  the  week,  and  bacon  one  day,  and 
thirteen  ounces  of  flour  daily,  made  into  bread ;  but  the  other  component  parts 
of  the  ration  were  served  out  in  quantity  sufficient  for  health. 

General  Porter  continues : 

No  idleness  was  permitted  in  camp.  There  was  no  time  or  mercy  for  gam 
blers.  The  hundreds  of  citizen  teamsters  were  not  permitted  to  become  an  ele 
ment  of  trouble.  They  had  either  to  enroll  as  volunteers  in  the  United  States 
service,  or  return  to  the  States.  No  permission  to  remain  would  be  given  them 
otherwise.  Every  one  had  an  occupation ;  and  an  effective  police,  under  a  pro 
vost-marshal,  responsible  to  the  colonel,  was  established. 

Captain  Randolph  B.  Marcy,  an  accomplished,  energetic  officer  and  experienced 
explorer,  was  selected,  with  a  small  body  of  volunteering  soldiers,  to  make  their 
way  across  the  Uintah  Mountains  into  New  Mexico,  make  known  to  General  Gar 
land  our  dangers  and  wants,  and  bring  relief  by  way  of  Bridger's  Pass  early  in  the 
spring.  Dispatches  via  Fort  Laramie  went  to  the  Government,  and  an.  expedi 
tion  through  Bridger's  Pass  and  along  Lodge-Pole  Creek  was  also  sent  with 
letters,  with  the  view  of  testing  the  practicability  and  utility  of  this  route,  which 
was  some  seventy  miles  shorter.  An  expedition  was  also  sent  into  the  Snake 
Indian  country  to  quiet  the  Indians,  and  prevent  their  employment  by  the  Mor 
mons,  and  to  induce  traders  to  bring  cattle  and  horses  to  camp.  These  expedi 
tions  were  all  fruitful  in  good  results.  Captain  Marcy's  command,  deemed  a 
forlorn  hope  when  it  started,  after  many  struggles  against  storms  and  starvation 
in  the  mountains,  finally  reached  Fort  Union,  New  Mexico,  safe,  but  greatly 
weakened.  Early  in  the  spring  Captain  Marcy  returned  with  numerous  head  of 
sheep  and  horses,  escorted  by  cavalry  under  Colonel  Loring,  to  guard  against  a 
threatened  movement  of  the  Mormons.  The  success  of  these  expeditions  through 
Bridger's  Pass  led  in  the  spring  to  the  opening  by  the  Sixth  Infantry  of  the 
route  up  Lodge-Pole  Creek,  through  Bridger's  Pass  and  down  Bitter  Creek ;  and 
that  summer,  as  the  road  was  shorter,  easier,  and  better  for  grass,  the  Overland 
Stage  Line  and  Pony  Express  were  transferred  to  it  from  the  Laramie  route. 
Thus  was  opened  the  route  afterward  adopted  by  the  Union  Pacific  Railroad. 
General  Johnston  made  constant  representations  and  strenuous  efforts  to  have 
this  route  opened,  feeling  sure  that  it  must  be  the  route  for  a  railroad,  if  one  was 
ever  made  through  the  Salt  Lake  region. 

As  the  army  was  bound  to  Salt  Lake  Valley,  the  Government  regarded  send 
ing  salt  for  rations  as  unnecessary — "  coals  to  Newcastle."  General  Johnston 
took  prompt  steps  to  get  a  supply  from  Laramie;  but,  when  none  was  to  be  had 
at  Fort  Bridger,  grumbling  began  at  the  insipid  food,  and  maledictions  were 
hurled  on  the  Subsistence  Department  at  "Washington.  In  the  midst  of  one  of 
the  heaviest  snow-storms  of  the  season  the  picket-guard  brought  in  three  men 
bearing  letters  from  Mormon  officials  to  General  Johnston.  When  admitted  to 
his  presence  they  stated  that  they  bore  letters  from  Adjutant-General  Wells  and 
were  messengers  from  Governor  Young,  bringing  several  mule-loads  of  salt, 
which  "he  understood  the  army  had  none  of,  and  that  there  was  enough  to  last 


REPLY  TO  BRIGHAM  YOUNG.  219 

until  spring,  when  the  army  should  retrace  its  steps  to  the  United  States,  as  enter 
the  Mormon  settlement  it  should  not." 

After  carefully  reading  the  letter,  and  reexarnining  parts  of  it,  General  John 
ston,  in  an  impressive  manner,  said : 

"I  will  not  accept  of  this  salt  sent  by  Brigham  Young,  not  for  the  reason 
hinted  in  his  letter,  but  I  can  accept  of  nothing  from  him  so  long  as  he  and  his 
people  maintain  a  hostile  position  to  my  Government.  I  regret  he  has  insinuated 
the  probability  of  its  refusal  on  account  of  its  deleterious  property.  There 
is  no  portion  of  the  American  people  who  would  be  guilty  of  so  base  an  act, 
and  none  to  suspect  it.  So  far  as  poison  is  concerned,  I  would  freely  partake  of 
Brigham  Young's  hospitality,  but  I  can  accept  of  no  present,  nor  interchange 
courtesies  so  long  as  he  continues  his  present  course.  I  have  no  answer  to  send. 
I  can  hold  no  intercourse  with  Brigham  Young  and  his  people.  I  have  nothing 
to  do  with  him  or  them.  The  Governor  of  the  Territory  is  here,  and  his  procla 
mation  you  have  seen.  To  him  Brigham  Young  must  send  his  communications. 
When  he  returns  to  his  allegiance  I  will  be  happy  to  interchange  courtesies  with 
him.  I  have  been  sent  here  by  my  Government,  and  I  shall  advance.  His  in 
sinuation  of  this  army  returning  in  the  spring,  I  assure  you,  is  not  to  be  relied 
upon;  an  American  army  never  retrogrades,  and  I  intend  to  advance  in  the 
spring.  If  he  and  his  people  oppose  me  with  an  army,  I  shall  meet  it  and  offer 
the  same  resistance.  Peace  or  war  is  in  their  hands,  and  if  they  have  war  it 
will  be  of  their  own  making. 

Your  people  must  know  that  an  army  entering  this  Territory  comes  to  it  in 
the  same  manner  as  to  any  other,  and  I  tell  you  I  have  no  more  to  do  with  your 
people  than  I  would  with  the  inhabitants  of  New  York  if  going  there.  All  per 
sons  who  stay  at  home,  when  I  advance,  and  mind  their  own  business,  will  be 
undisturbed ;  but  all  who  oppose  my  march  I  shall  treat  as  enemies.  Those  who 
have  been  molesting  my  trains  and  cattle  I  shall  regard  and  treat  as  robbers; 
and  I  wish  Brigham  Young,  if  he  has  anything  to  send  to  me  (but  I  cannot 
imagine  the  occasion),  I  wish  him  to  send  it  by  a  flag,  that  I  may  know  who  to 
treat  as  messengers  as  distinct  from  robbers.  I  wish  to  hold  no  intercourse  with 
him  now,  but  when  he  and  his  people  express  their  willingness  to  return  to  their 
allegiance — and  that  must  be  done  through  the  proper  channel — I  will  be  pleased 
to  acknowledge  his  courtesies.  Till  then  I  must  treat  them  as  enemies  if  they 
offer  resistance  to  my  advance.  I  hope  you  will  remember  what  I  have  said.  I 
have  no  written  answer  to  this  letter.  It  requires  none  from  my  hands,  as  I  tell 
you  I  cannot  recognize  him  in  any  manner.  Your  salt  you  will  take  back  with 
you ;  not,  as  I  tell  you,  because  I  suspect  its  purity,  but  I  will  not  accept  a  pres 
ent  from  an  enemy  of  my  Government." 

The  mission  of  these  men  was  soon  known  in  camp,  and  much  rejoicing  was 
expressed  at  the  prospect  of  a  little  salt ;  so  that  the  disappointment  was  griev 
ous  when  it  became  known  that  they  were  to  return  with  their  burden.  When 
the  stand  the  general  had  taken  and  his  reply  were  also  learned,  they  were  not 
merely  approved,  but  applauded.  The  course  he  had  taken  gave  the  army  an 
insight  into  the  character  of  the  man,  whose  every  step  increased  their  confi 
dence  and  respect.  The  salt  soon  arrived  from  Fort  Laramie. 

General  Johnston  found  in  the  rigors  and  necessities  of  the  situa 
tion  the  means  to  enforce  a  more  exact  instead  of  laxer  discipline.  The 


220  UTAH   CAMPAIGN. 

volunteers,  instead  of  constituting  a  disorderly  element,  when  organized 
vied  with  the  regulars  in  all  the  duties  of  the  soldier.  Drill  and  instruc 
tion  brought  the  troops  to  a  high  state  of  military  efficiency,  and  the 
monotony  of  camp-life  was  relieved  and  the  health  of  the  men  improved 
by  the  character  of  the  tasks  imposed.  The  vigilance  requisite  for  an 
active  campaign  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy  was  observed  by  pickets 
and  outposts ;  and,  owing  to  the  weakness  of  the  draught-animals,  the 
men  had  to  haul  by  hand  from  the  mountains  all  the  fire-wood  used. 
These  toilsome  tasks  were  cheerfully  performed,  because  the  men  knew 
that  tfyey  were  necessary  to  safety  and  comfort,  and  not  imposed  simply 
to  occupy  time.  Very  few  and  slight  punishments  were  inflicted,  and 
there  has  rarely  been  a  military  force  where  less  harshness  was  exer 
cised  toward  the  soldier. 

Nor  did  the  pressure  of  large  cares  and  heavy  responsibilities  pre 
vent  him  from  forwarding  those  scientific  researches  to  which  he  at 
tached  so  much  importance.  Mr.  C.  Drexler,  the  ornithologist,  who 
started  in  1857  with  Magraw's  wagon-train,  but  did  not  reach  Fort 
Bridger  before  March,  was  enabled,  through  the  assistance  afforded 
him  by  General  Johnston,  to  catalogue  106  species  of  birds  near  Fort 
Bridger  in  the  next  three  months,  as  is  mentioned  in  his  report  pub 
lished  in  the  Pacific  Railroad  explorations.  If  space  allowed,  it  could 
be  shown  from,  the  order-books  that  in  the  minutest  details  the  safety 
and  comfort  of  the  soldier  were  provided  for  by  the  same  mind  which, 
grasping  the  important  features  of  the  campaign  in  its  large  strategic 
generalizations,  waited  calmly  and  sternly  the  proper  moment  to  close 
with  the  enemy.1  General  Johnston's  view  of  the  policy  to  be  pursued 
toward  the  Mormons,  as  already  shown,  was  to  hold  no  terms  with  armed 
resistance,  and  to  do  all  for  law  and  obedience  to  the  Federal  authority, 
nothing  for  vengeance. 

In  a  letter  to  army  headquarters,  January  20, 1858,  General  Johnston 
says: 

MA  JOE:  I  have  nothing  material  to  report  since  my  last  communication.  Ac 
companying  that  I  sent  a  file  of  the  Deseret  News,  containing  the  message  of  Brig- 
ham  Young  to  the  Legislature  of  Utah.  You  have  in  that  message  and  the  res 
olutions  of  the  Legislature  a  full  confirmation  of  the  charge  of  their  disloyalty 
to  the  Union  heretofore  made  against  this  people.  My  information  respecting 
their  conduct  since  is  that  their  troops  are  organized  to  resist  the  establishment 
of  a  Territorial  government  by  the  United  States,  and,  in  furtherance  of  that  ob 
ject,  they  have  erected  works  of  defense  in  the  mountain-passes  and  near  Salt 
Lake  City. 

• 

1  The 'reader  who  desires  to  know  in  fuller  and  more  detailed  form  the  interesting  par 
ticulars  of  this  winter's  work  will  find  the  most  of  them  in  "  Executive  Documents,"  first 
session,  Thirty-fifth  Congress,  vol.  ii.,  part  ii.,  and  in  second  session,  Thirty-fifth  Congress, 
vol.  ii.,  part  ii. 


CONFLICTING  POLICIES.  221 

Knowing  how  repugnant  it  would  be  to  the  policy  and  interest  of  the  Gov 
ernment  to  do  any  act  that  would  force  these  people  into  unpleasant  relations 
with  the  Federal  Government,  I  would,  in  conformity  with  the  views  also  of 
the  commanding  general,  on  all  proper  occasions  have  manifested  in  my  inter 
course  with  them  a  spirit  of  conciliation  ;  hut  I  do  not  believe  that  such  consid 
eration  for  them  would  be  properly  appreciated  now,  or  rather  it  would  be 
wrongly  interpreted :  and,  in  view  of  the  treasonable  temper  and  feeling  now 
pervading  the  leaders  and  a  great  portion  of  the  Mormons,  I  think  that  neither 
the  honor  nor  the  dignity  of  the  Government  will  allow  of  the  slightest  conces 
sion  being  made  to  them.  They  should  be  made  to  submit  to  the  constitutional 
and  legal  demands  of  the  Government  unconditionally.  An  adjustment  of  ex 
isting  differences  on  any  other  basis  would  be  nugatory. 

Their  threat  to  oppose  the  march  of  the  troops  in  the  spring  will  not  have 
the  slightest  influence  in  delaying  it;  and,  if  they  desire  to  join  issue,  I  believe 
that  it  is  for  the  interest  of  the  Government  that  they  should  have  the  oppor 
tunity. 

President  Buchanan,  by  temperament  and  education,  and  from  all 
his  habits  of  life  and  thought,  a  diplomatist,  naturally  took  a  different 
view  of  the  situation.  The  prospect  of  civil  strife  and  a  large  budget 
for  war  expenditure  during  his  chief  magistracy  was  utterly  repugnant 
to  his  notions  of  a  successful  Administration,  and  he  cast  about  to  post 
pone  the  present  trouble.  There  is  a  wisdom  in  avoiding  dangers,  and 
a  wisdom  in  meeting  them;  no  general  rule  can  be  established  to  fit 
every  case,  and  the  result  alone  can  decide  where  lay  the  true  line  of 
action.  The  decided  policy  proposed  by  General  Johnston  would  have 
definitively  settled  the  Mormon  question,  which  remains  unsettled  to  the 
present  day.  Brigham  Young  must  have  submitted  unconditionally, 
with  a  loss  of  prestige  and  power  among  his  people  ;  or  he  must  have 
fought  and  been  subdued,  with  the  disorganization  and  new  arrange 
ments  consequent  upon  reconstruction;  or  he  must  have  fled  the  coun 
try  with  his  followers,  and  thus  relieved  the  United  States  from  further 
consideration  of  the  embarrassing  question.  Mr.  Buchanan,  on  the  con 
trary,  finding  that  the  mere  show  of  force  had  irritated  instead  of  sub 
duing  the  Mormons,  was  quite  willing  to  return  to  the  statu  quo,  nomi 
nal  submission  and  real  independence,  in  which  the  Federal  Govern 
ment  should  be  represented  by  an  array  of  civil  and  military  functiona 
ries  with  hands  tied — a  pageant  not  unlike  that  Byzantine  supremacv 
which  commanded  and  trembled  before  its  Gothic  vassals. 

Most  opportunely  for  the  inauguration  of  this  policy,  an  agent  pre 
sented  himself  in  every  way  fitted  for  the  office  of  such  negotiation. 
Colonel  Thomas  L.  Kane  was  a  son  of  Judge  Kane,  of  Philadelphia,  and 
a  brother  of  the  arctic  explorer — of  a  family  connected  with  the.  Presi 
dent  by  ties  of  friendship.  He  was  a  man  of  talents  and  restless  en 
ergy,  but  of  an  intriguing  and  erratic  temper.  He  was  supposed  to 
have  been  baptized  into  the  Mormon  Church ;  but,  however  that  may 


222  UTAH  CAMPAIGN. 

be,  he  always  manifested  the  deepest  interest  in  carrying  out  their 
policy.  When  they  were  expelled  from  Nauvoo  he  had  delivered  lect 
ures  to  excite  popular  sympathy  on  their  behalf;  he  is  said  to  have 
procured  Brigham  Young's  first  appointment  as  Governor  from  Mr.  Fill- 
more  on  the  representation  that  he  was  not  a  polygamist,  and  he  now 
offered  himself  as  a  volunteer  agent  to  secure  the  submission  of  the 
Mormons.  The  President  gave  him  a  guarded  letter  of  recommenda 
tion,  sufficient,  however,  to  accredit  him  unofficially  to  both  Brigham 
Young  and  the  United  States  officers.  Armed  with  this  he  started 
about  New  Year,  and  made  his  way  through  California  to  Salt  Lake 
City,  where  he  arrived  early  in  March. 

When  Colonel  Kane  arrived,  Brigham  Young  was  already  virtually 
conquered.  The  army,  which  his  prophecies  had  doomed  to  certain  de 
struction,  had  neither  been  overwhelmed  by  avalanches,  nor  starved  with 
hunger  and  cold,  nor  entrapped  in  the  canons  and  scattered  by  the  sword 
of  Gideon.  On  the  contrary,  it  lay  in  its  mountain-lair  silent,  stern,  and 
collected.  The  enthusiasm  of  the  saints  had  cooled,  and  their  courage 
had  waned  in  the  long  season  of  inaction,  and  in  the  presence  of  a  power 
that  made  no  mistakes.  Brigham  Young,  for  the  first  time,  felt  himself 
opposed  by  moral  forces  with  which  he  could  not  cope.  He  was  already 
suggesting  flight  as  a  possible  contingency.  Colonel  Kane's  arrival, 
therefore,  was  a  godsend  to  him  as  a  means  to  abate  his  high  preten 
sions,  and  to  avail  himself  of  some  decent  pretext  for  submission.  So 
far  it  may  have  been  fortunate  for  both  the  Government  and  the  Mor 
mons;  but  it  was  not  a  happy  conception  in  Mr.  Buchanan  to  intrust, 
in  any  manner,  the  interests  or  honor  of  the  United  States  to  the  hands 
of  a  person  so  closely  identified  with  the  enemy. 

Colonel  Kane,  after  receiving  the  inspiration  for  his  mission  in  a 
full  consultation  with  the  Prophet,  appeared  suddenly  in  camp.  He 
affected  a  certain  mystery  in  his  movements,  and  left  his  escort  of  Mor 
mons  in  such  an  equivocal  position  that  he  was  under  apprehensions, 
unfounded  but  not  unreasonable,  that  they  had  been  fired  on  by  the 
picket. 

Brigham  Young,  whether  as  a  measure  of  diplomacy  and  concil 
iation  or  as  an  act  of  insolence,  having  "just  learned,"  as  he  said, 
"through  the  southern  Indians  that  the  troops  are  very  destitute  of 
provisions,"  offered  through  Colonel  Kane  to  send  in  200  head  of  cat 
tle  and  15,000  or  20,000  pounds  of  flour,  "  to  which  they  will  be  made 
perfectly  welcome,  or  pay  for,  just  as  they  choose."  General  Johnston 
replied  to  Colonel  Kane,  March  15th : 

SIR  :  President  Young  is  not  correctly  informed  with  regard  to  the  state  of 
the  supply  of  provisions  of  this  army.  There  has  been  no  deficiency,  nor  is 
there  any  now.  "We  have  abundance  to  last  until  the  Government  can  renew 


MORMON  DIPLOMACY.  223 

the  supply.  "Whatever  might  be  the  need  of  the  army  under  my  command  for 
food,  we  would  neither  ask  nor  receive  from  President  Young  and  his  confeder 
ates  any  supplies  while  they  continue  to  he  the  enemies  .of  the  Government.  .  . 
However  unfortunate  the  position  now  occupied  by  that  portion  of  the  citi 
zens  of  Utah  belonging  to  the  sect  of  Mormons,  it  is  of  their  own  seeking,  and 
it  is  one  from  which  they  can  be  relieved  by  the  mere  act  of  obedience  to  the 
proclamation  of  Governor  Gumming.  Having  the  question  of  peace  or  war 
under  his  own  control,  President  Young  would,  should  he  choose  the  latter,  be 
responsible  for  all  the  consequences. 

Colonel  Kane  tried  to  induce  General  Johnston  to  change  this  ac 
tion.  He  wrote : 

Sra :  At  the  request  of  his  Excellency  Governor  Gumming,  I  consent  to  bear 
the  reply  which  you  request  me  to  communicate  to  President  Brigham  Young. 
I  fear  it  must  greatly  prejudice  the  public  interest  to  refuse  Mr.  Young's  propo 
sal  in  such  a  manner  at  the  present  time.  Permit  me,  therefore,  to  entreat  you, 
most  respectfully,  to  reconsider  it. 

This  diplomatic  trick  failed.  Had  any  part  of  the  provisions  been 
received,  it  would  have  been  claimed  by  the  Mormons  that  the  army  was 
rescued  by  them  from  starvation,  and  yet  was  ready  to  smite  the  hand 
that  fed  it. 

Colonel  Kane,  having  asked  an  interview,  had  a  conference  with 
General  Johnston,  in  which  he  urged  a  modification  of  General  John 
ston's  reply  to  him.  He  said  his  object  was  peace;  that  in  Utah  there 
was  a  war  party  and  a  peace  party,  and  that  Brigham  Young  belonged 
to  the  latter.  General  Johnston  then  said  to  him : 

I  have  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  political  question  between  the  Gov 
ernment  and  the  Mormons.  I  am  here  in  the  fulfillment  of  special  instructions 
from  the  Government,  and  I  have  on  another  occasion  informed  Brigham  Young 
of  that  fact,  and  that  peace  or  war  is  in  his  hands.  I  told  Mr.  Earle  (the  man 
who  brought  the  salt)  to  inform  him  that  I  had  nothing  to  do  with  him  or  his 
people,  and  that  when  I  advance,  if  the  people  stay  at  home  and  behave  them 
selves,  and  do  not  molest  me,  they  will  not  be  troubled.  The  army  is  to  pro 
tect,  not  oppress;  but  if  my  advance  is  opposed  with  force  I  shall  meet  it  with 
force.  It  becomes  Brigham  Young  to  consider  before  he  so  acts  as  to  bring  on 
the  horrors  of  war.  The  officers  under  me  do  not  want  war,  but  fear  not  its 
results  if  forced  upon  them.  Brigham  Young  should  consider  the  calamities  he 
is  bringing  upon  his  people  in  pursuing  a  course  of  open  opposition. 

No  new  result  was  arrived  at,  nor  was  Brigham  Young  without 

friends  and  allies  at  Washington.    While  General  Johnston  lay  hemmed 

in  by  the  avalanches  of  the  Rocky  Mountains,  and  nearly  all  Americans 

were  anxious  as  to  his  fate,  the  ancient  animosity  of  General  Houston 

16 


224  UTAH  CAMPAIGN. 

still  pursued  him.  That  veteran  politician,  from  his  place  in  the  Unit 
ed  States  Senate,  on  the  25th  of  February,1  made  the  following  remarks 
in  allusion  to  the  "  salt "  embassy,  declaring  at  the  same  time  that  the 
Mormons  expected  extermination  at  the  hands  of  the  army. 

An  act  of  eivility  was  tendered  by  Brigham  Young,  and  you  might,  if  you 
please,  construe  it  under  the  circumstances  rather  as  an  act  of  submission.  He 
sent  salt  to  the  troops,  understanding  it  was  scarce  there,  and  was  selling  at 
seven  dollars  a  pint.  As  an  act  of  humanity,  thinking  at  least  that  it  could  not 
be  regarded  as  discourteous,  he  sent  a  supply  of  salt  for  the  relief  of  the  en 
campment,  intimating  to  the  commander  that  he  could  pay  for  it,  if  he  would 
not  accept  it  as  a  present.  What  was  the  message  the  military  officer  sent  him 
back  ?  I  believe  that  the  substance  of  it  was,  that  he  would  have  no  intercourse 
with  a  rebel,  and  that  when  they  met  they  would  fight.  They  will  fight ;  and, 
if  they  fight,  he  will  get  miserably  whipped. 

That  was  a  time  to  make  peace  with  Brigham  Young;  because  there  is  some 
thing  potent  in  salt.  With  the  Turk,  who  has  similar  habits  and  religion  with 
the  Mormons,  it  is  the  sacrament  of  perpetual  friendship.  Why  may  not  the 
Mormons  have  incorporated  that  into  their  creed  ?  But,  instead  of  that,  he  sent 
him  a  taunt  and  a  defiance. 

But  this  fine  spurt  of  senatorial  rhetoric,  for  a  wonder,  culminated 
in  cabals  that  merely  hampered  without  overthrowing  the  officer  as 
sailed. 

Brigham  Young  renewed  his  effort  to  patronize  the  army  by  making 
his  offer  anew  through  Governor  Gumming,  after  a  month's  interval,  but 
without  effect.  Though  unsuccessful  in  his  diplomacy  with  General 
Johnston,  the  Prophet  accomplished  more  through  his  friend  Colonel 
Kane  with  Governor  Gumming  than  he  had  a  right  to  hope. 

But  let  General  Porter  tell  the  story,  of  which  he  had  personal 
knowledge  in  all  its  details  : 

The  presence  of  Governor  Gumming  and  some  of  the  judiciary  in  camp  re 
lieved  Colonel  Johnston  of  all  concern  in  regard  to  civil  affairs.  His  command 
was,  of  course,  independent  of  the  civil  authorities,  except  to  fill  a  requisition  to 
suppress  insurrection,  and  to  support  the  United  States  marshal  in  executing  the 
decrees  of  the  court. 

Governor  Gumming  was  a  guest  in  his  camp,  and  dependent  for  everything 
upon  the  courtesy  of  Colonel  Johnston,  who  made  him  as  independent  and  com 
fortable  as  was  possible  under  the  forlorn  circumstances,  without  the  slightest 
indication  of  obligation.  His  dependence,  however,  seemed  to  annoy  him  ;  and 
being  a  Governor  without  anything  to  govern,  he  showed  a  continual  irritation 
and  petulance,  which  Colonel  Johnston  forbore  to  notice. 

The  arrival  of  Colonel  Kane,  a  self-imposed  embassador,  caused  a  slight 
breach  in  the  intercourse  between  the  Governor  and  the  colonel.  Kane's  ante- 

1  Congressional  Globe,  vol.  xxxvi.,  part  i.,  p.  8*74. 


COLONEL  KANE  AND   GOVERNOR  GUMMING.  225 

cedents,  Ms  mode  of  proceeding,  and  his  uncivil  behavior  on  entering  camp,  con 
firmed  the  belief  that  he  was  connected  with  the  Mormons.  Yet  he  was  at  once 
taken  to  his  heart  by  Governor  Gumming,  and  no  emissary  to  foment  trouble 
and  stir  up  Governor  Gumming  against  Colonel  Johnston  could  have  been  better 
chosen.  Fortunately,  Colonel  Johnston  was  above  petty  quarrels;  and  such  were 
his  dignity  and  bearing  in  all  matters  as  to  force  Governor  Gumming  and  every 
one  else  to  respect  him  and  his  position.  His  staff  entered  into  his  feelings,  and 
bore  themselves  so  as  not  to  compromise  him  by  act  or  word. 

Colonel  Johnston's  orderly,  happening  to  be  in  personal  attendance  upon 
Colonel  Kane  for  a  short  time,  said,  of  his  own  motion,  to  another  sent  to  re 
lieve  him,  to  ':keep  an  eye  on  the  d d  Mormon."  Colonel  Kane,  though 

in-doors,  and  the  orderly  outside,  overheard  the  remark,  and  fired  Governor  Cum- 
ining's  heart.  The  Governor  chose  to  construe  it  as  an  intentional  insult  by 
Colonel  Johnston  to  his  guest,  and  hence  to  himself,  and  proposed  to  resort  to  a 
challenge.  As  Colonel  Johnston  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  instructions  given 
the  orderly,  his  adjutant-general  assumed  whatever  responsibility  existed,  and 
the  absurdity  of  the  Governor's  position  was  finally  made  plain  to  him,  and  the 
matter  ended. 

Conduct  so  captious,  however,  put  Colonel  Johnston  on  his  guard,  and  de 
stroyed  all  possibility  of  any  cordial  or  confidential  relations  between  himself 
and  the  Governor.  While  it  did  not  diminish  the  courtesy  that  he  practised  as 
due  the  Executive  of  the  Territory,  yet  the  Governor,  on  his  part,  retained 
and  exhibited  a  rankling  irritation  and  jealousy  that  proved  injurious  to  the 
public  interests. 

The  army  was  well  drilled  and  thoroughly  disciplined  during  the  winter,  at 
Fort  Bridger,  and  was  prepared  in  every  respect  to  carry  out  whatever  might  be 
required  to  secure  an  entrance  into  Salt  Lake  Valley.  The  idea  of  open  resist 
ance  by  the  Mormons  now  became  absurd.  The  chief  anxiety  was  so  to  maintain 
discipline  that  it  should  not  be  broken  by  the  insults  of  an  ignorant  community, 
excited  by  its  leaders  to  acts  and  expressions  of  hostility. 

The  advance  of  spring  in  this  ice-bound  desert  was  very  slow.  Major 
Porter's  diary  says,  on  March  19th  : 

Stormed  all  day  severely.  This  is  the  worst  storm  we  have  had  since  we  have 
been  here;  snowing  and  blowing  hard;  no  wood,  no  fire,  except  for  the  cooks, 
and  very  cold. 

April  1st.— Clear  and  warm.     Thermometer  64°  at  12  M. 

2(7. — About  3  A.  M.  a  violent  storm  of  wind  arose,  threatening  to  carry  away 
tents  and  all  habitations.  So  violent  a  storm  I  never  felt.  At  reveille,  snow 
mixed  with  hail  in  large  quantities  fell,  covering  the  ground  till  noon.  Squalls 
of  snow  were  passing  over  all  day.  The  storm  is  severe  upon  the  animals; 
but  the  moisture  is  good  for  the  grass.  If  our  animals  do  not  improve  shortly, 
I  fear  we  will  have  to  resort  to  mule-meat,  though  the  ration  of  beef  is  dimin 
ished  to  avoid  such  a  contingency. 

Bd.— Still  blowing,  and  very  cold.  Streams  were  frozen  last  night.  Ther 
mometer,  at  sunrise,  20°. 

*lih  and  8th. — Snow  and  hail,  and  very  cold. 

Qth. — Snow  about  two  inches  deep  fell  last  night. 


226  UTAH  CAMPAIGN. 

18^. — Stormed  again  last  night,  covering  the  mountains  with  as  white  a  man 
tle  as  as  they  have  had  the  past  winter. 
292A. — Commenced  snowing  after  dark. 
30th. — Cold  and  severe  storm  of  snow  from  the  east. 
May  1st. — Cold  and  storming. 

These  extracts  are  sufficient  to  show  why  no  earlier  advance  could 
be  made  in  these  mountains,  as  well  as  to  illustrate  the  hardships  of 
the  command.  It  is  difficult  for  the  resident  of  a  city  or  favored  rural 
community  to  appreciate  the  intense  interest  of  the  frontiersman  in  the 
phases  of  the  weather.  General  Johnston  used  to  praise  his  rather  frail 
cabin  in  Brazoria  to  the  writer.  "  Civilization,"  he  would  say,  "  de 
stroys  our  habits  of  observation.  What  does  a  man  care  for  the 
weather  who  has  brick  walls  and  a  tight  shelter  overhead  ?  Your  true 
meteorologist  is  the  man  with  a  leaky  roof." 

The  arrival  of  Governor  Powell  and  Colonel  McCulloch,  as  embas- 
sadors  of  peace  from  Mr.  Buchanan,  with  power  to  declare  a  general 
amnesty  for  all  offenses,  etc.,  soon  led  to  a  semblance  of  peace.  In  all 
their  deliberations  for  the  settlement  of  troubles  with  Brigham,  General 
Johnston  was  fully  consulted,  and  the  decisions  were  generally  founded 
on  his  counsel.  General  Johnston,  feeling  that  any  check  or  delay  to 
the  army  after  it  was  ready  to  move  would  diminish  its  future  utility, 
insisted  that  no  promise  or  agreement  should  be  made  that  would  in 
the  slightest  trammel  his  movements.  It  is  true  that  Governor  Cum- 
ming  tried  in  his  correspondence  to  produce  an  opposite  impression  ; 
but  the  commissioners  sustained  General  Johnston  in  his  view  that  he 
was  left  free  to  move  when  and  where  he  chose.  General  Porter  says  : 

Governor  dimming  was  placed  in  his  chair,  and  became  Governor  without 
power  and  without  the  respect  or  obedience  of  the  community  he  presided 
over.  The  semblance  of  peace  thus  restored  was  really  due  not  to  negotiation, 
hut  to  the  moral  effect  of  the  presence  of  the  army,  commanded  by  an  honest, 
brave,  and  accomplished  soldier  and  statesman. 

Colonel  Kane  had  in  some  manner  satisfied  Governor  Gumming  that 
not  only  would  he  be  personally  welcomed,  as  the  Executive  of  the  Ter 
ritory,  at  Salt  Lake,  but  that  such  submission  would  satisfy  every  re 
quirement  of  the  situation,  without  the  advance  of  the  army  into  Salt 
Lake  Valley.  Governor  Gumming  left  camp  on  the  5th  of  April,  and 
arrived  at  Salt  Lake  City  on  the  12th,  after  having  been  fully  impressed 
with  the  formidable  nature  of  the  warlike  preparations  on  the  route,  and 
also  of  the  respect  felt  for  himself.  He  seemed  to  fall  at  once  into  the 
views  of  the  Mormon  leaders;  and,  although  the  populace  were  danger 
ously  excited,  and  could  scarcely  be  restrained  by  the  leaders  who  had 
aroused  them,  he  regarded  his  reception  as  the  "  auspicious  issue  of  our 


SUBMISSION  AND  PROCLAMATION.  227 

difficulties."  The  Mormon  troops,  in  the  mean  time,  continued  to  occupy 
the  approaches  to  the  valley,  and  it  was  not  until  the  21st  of  May  that 
General  Johnston  was  notified  that  they  were  disbanded.  In  accord 
ance  with  the  command  of  Brigham  Young,  the  people  of  Utah,  most 
of  them  reluctantly,  abandoned  their  homes,  and  began  another  exodus, 
destined,  it  was  said,  to  Sonora.  After  the  people  had  been  congre 
gated  at  Prove,  .they  were  allowed  to  return  to  their  homes.  Neither 
the  motives  for  the  removal,  nor  for  the  return,  have  been  satisfactorily 
explained. 

The  commissioners  from  the  President  arrived  in  camp  June  2d,  and 
in  Salt  Lake  City  on  the  7th.  They  accepted  the  submission  of  Brig- 
ham  and  the  Mormons,  and  issued  the  President's  proclamation  of  par 
don.  The  army,  having  received  its  reinforcements  and  supplies,  ad 
vanced  June  13th,  and  arrived  without  opposition,  June  26th,  near  Salt 
Lake  City.  The  commissioners  suggested  that  a  proclamation  would 
relieve  the  inhabitants  from  fear  of  injury  by  the  army.  General  John 
ston's  reply  and  proclamation  were  as  follows  : 

GENERAL   JOHNSTON'S   REPLY    TO    THE   PEACE    COMMISSIONERS. 

HEADQTTAKTEKS  DEPARTMENT  OF  UTAH,         i 
CAMP  ON  BEAK  KIVEE,  June  14, 1858.  \ 

GENTLEMEN  :  Your  communication  from  Salt  Lake  City  was  received  to-day. 
The  accomplishment  of  the  object  of  your  mission  entirely  in  accordance  with 
the  instructions  of  the  President,  and  the  wisdom  and  forbearance  which  you 
have  so  ably  displayed  to  the  people  of  the  Territory,  will,  I  hope,  lead  to  a  more 
just  appreciation  of  their  relations  to  the  General  Government  and  the  establish 
ment  of  the  supremacy  of  the  laws.  I  learn  with  surprise  that  uneasiness  is 
felt  by  the  people  as  to  the  treatment  that  they  may  receive  from  the  army. 
Acting  under  the  twofold  obligations  of  citizens  and  soldiers,  we  may  be  sup 
posed  to  comprehend  the  rights  of  the  people  and  to  be  sufficiently  mindful  of 
the  obligations  of  our  oaths  not  to  disregard  the  laws  which  govern  us  as  a  mili 
tary  body.  A  reference  to  them  will  show  with  what  jealous  care  the  General 
Government  has  guarded  the  rights  of  citizens  against  any  encroachment.  The 
army  has  duties  to  perform  here  in  execution  of  orders  of  the  Department  of 
War,  which,  from  the  nature  of  them,  cannot  lead  to  interference  with  the  peo 
ple  in  their  various  pursuits ;  and,  if  no  obstruction  is  presented  to  the  discharge 
of  those  duties,  there  need  not  be  the  slightest  apprehension  that  any  person 
whatever  will  have  cause  of  complaint  against  it. 

The  army  will  continue  its  march  from  this  position  on  Thursday,  17th  inst., 
and  reach  the  valley  in  five.  days.  I  desire  to  encamp  beyond  the  Jordan  on  the 
day  of  arrival  in  the  valley. 

With  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  S.  JOHNSTON, 

Colonel  Second  Cavalry  and  Brevet  Brigadier- General  United  States  Army,  com 
manding. 

To  the  Hon.  L.  W.  POWELL  and  Major  BEN  McCrtLOCH,  United  States  Commissioners  to  Utah. 


228  UTAH  CAMPAIGN. 

GENERAL  JOHNSTON^  PKOCLAMATION  TO  THE  PEOPLE  OF  UTAH. 

The  commissioners  of  the  United  States,  deputed  by  the  President  to  urge 
upon  the  people  of  this  Territory  the  necessity  of  obedience  to  the  Constitution 
and  laws,  as  enjoined  by  his  proclamation,  have  this  day  informed  me  that  there 
will  be  no  obstruction  to  the  administration  and  execution  of  the  laws  of  the 
Federal  Government,  nor  any  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  people  of  this  Terri 
tory  to  the  military  force  of  the  Government  in  the  execution  of  their  orders. 
I  therefore  feel  it  incumbent  on  me,  and  have  great  satisfaction  in  doing  so,  to 
assure  those  citizens  of  the  Territory  who,  I  learn,  apprehend  from  the  army  ill- 
treatment,  that  no  person  whatever  will  be  in  anywise  interfered  with  or  mo 
lested  in  his  person  or  rights,  or  in  the  peaceful  pursuit  of  his  avocation ;  and, 
should  protection  be  needed,  that  they  will  find  the  army  (always  faithful  to  the 
obligations  of  duty)  as  ready  now  to  assist  and  protect  them  as  it  was  to  oppose 
them  while  it  was  believed  they  were  resisting  the  laws  of  their  Government. 

A.  S.  JOHNSTON, 
Colonel  Second  Cavalry  and  Brevet  Brigadier-  General,  commanding. 

Such  utterances  from  a  calm,  intelligent,  and  patriotic  soldier  would, 
in  these  days  of  loose  construction,  form  a  better  guide  to  the  young 
officer  than  more  recent  precedents  drawn  from  Cossack  rule  in  Poland 
and  the  dragonnades  of  Louis  XIV.  Nor  were  they  mere  words ;  such 
was  the  rule  of  conduct  for  officers  and  men,  and  no  people  ever  had 
less  right  to  complain  of  injuries  to  person  and  property. 

The  commissioners  in  all  their  reports  to  the  Secretary  of  War  men 
tion  General  Johnston's  hearty  aid  in  furtherance  of  their  mission,  and 
in  their  letter  of  July  3d  say:  "Brevet  Brigadier-General  Johnston  has 
continued  cordially  to  cob'perate  with  us  in  carrying  out  the  wishes  of 
the  President.  He  has  discharged  the  important  and  delicate  duties  in 
trusted  to  him  with  eminent  prudence  and  distinguished  ability." 

It  may  be  remembered  that  Ben  McCulloch,  one  of  the  commission 
ers,  had  been  disappointed  in  not  receiving  the  colonelcy  of  the  Second 
Cavalry  when  General  Johnston  was  appointed  to  it.  His  magnanimi 
ty  was  evinced  not  only  in  his  correspondence  with  General  Johnston, 
but  in  his  conversation  with  others.  Colonel  Love,  writing  to  General 
Johnston  from  Washington  City,  June  11,  1860,  says: 

Ben  McCulloch  told  me  yesterday  that  he  was  rejoiced  that  you  had  been  ap 
pointed,  instead  of  himself,  colonel  of  the  regiment,  as,  from  close  observation 
in  Utah,  he  believed  you  were  the  best  man  that  could  have  been  sent  there, 
and  that  he  yielded  to  you  in  everything  in  the  line  of  your  duty,  as  you  had 
nobly  performed  it. 

As  the  army  approached  Salt  Lake  City,  Governor  Cumming  wrote 
to  General  Johnston,  June  17th: 

The  present  excited  condition  of  the  public  mind  demands  the  utmost  cau 
tion  on  your  part.  ...  It  is  my  duty  to  protest  against  your  occupancy  of  posi- 


., 


ARMY  ORDERS.  229 

tions  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  this  city  or  other  dense  settlements  of  the 
population.  Should  you  resolve  to  act  in  opposition  to  my  solemn  protest,  you 
may  rest  assured  that  it  will  result  in  disastrous  consequences,  such  as  cannot  be 
approved  by  our  Government. 

General  Johnston  had  no  intention  of  fixing  his  headquarters  in  any 
such  location;  and,  for  the  obvious  advantages  of  commanding  situation, 
isolation,  grass,  water,  wood,  and  shelter,  had  selected  the  north  end  of 
Cedar  Valley  as  a  proper  site.  Nevertheless,  it  was  evident  that  the 
Mormons  ought  to  feel  that  the  Federal  authority  extended  everywhere; 
and,  therefore,  General  Johnston  marched  his  command  in  perfect  order 
through  the  chief  streets  of  the  sacred  city.  After  thus  formally  assert 
ing  the  Federal  authority,  he  moved  his  troops  to  Cedar  Valley,  and 
made  his  headquarters  at  Camp  Floyd. 

Early  in  January,  while  the  Government  and  the  country  alike  were 
in  suspense  and  anxiety  as  to  the  fate  of  the  expedition,  it  was  deter 
mined  that  reinforcements  to  the  number  of  4,000  soldiers  should  be 
sent  to  the  aid  of  the  little  command  of  1,700  regulars,  buried  in  the 
snows  of  the  Wahsatch  range.  General  Scott  at  first  intended  to  pro 
ceed  to  the  Pacific  coast  to  direct  the  movements  of  the  cooperating 
force,  but  gave  up  that  part  of  the  movement  in  February.  When  the 
public  mind  had  been  relieved  in  regard  to  the  safety  of  the  army,  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  conduct  was  the  subject  of  general  commendation,  and 
the  military  authorities  gave  him  every  assurance  of  approval.  General 
Scott  wrote,  on  the  23d  of  January : 

Your  conduct  in  command,  as  set  forth  in  the  reports,  meets  with  full  and 
hearty  approval,  united  with  sympathy  for  those  difficulties  you  have  so  manfully 
conquered,  and  which  it  is  clearly  perceived  no  act  or  omission  of  yours  had  any 
part  in  creating. 

Early  in  April  General  Scott  sent  renewed  assurances  of  his  confi 
dence,  and  on  the  10th  of  April  General  Johnston  was  notified  by  the 
adjutant-general  of  his  appointment  as  brevet  brigadier-general.  A 
few  days  later,  April  15th,  it  was  announced,  in  General  Orders  No.  8, 
that  Brevet  Major-General  Persifer  F.  Smith  and  Brevet  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  William  S.  Harney  were  assigned  to  the  Department  of  Utah,  thus 
superseding  General  Johnston  and  placing  him  third  in  command.  Not 
withstanding  the  compliments  paid  him,  this  was  a  practical  way  of  say 
ing  that,  though  he  was  good  enough  for  a  winter  campaign,  the  Gov 
ernment  preferred  some  one  else  to  do  its  summer  fighting. 

General  Johnston,  on  the  8th  of  July,  having  placed  the  army  in  a 
commanding  position  at  Camp  Floyd,  addressed  a  communication  to 
headquarters,  which  closes  thus,  without  any  allusion  to  what  he  might 
naturally  have  considered  a  grievance  : 


230  UTAH  CAMPAIGN. 

On  the  arrival  of  General  Harney  or  Colonel  Suraner  I  desire  to  be  ordered 
to  join  my  regiment.  If  that  cannot  be  granted,  I  request  that  the  general  will 
grant  me  a  furlough  for  four  months,  with  leave  to  apply  for  an  extension.  I 
have  had  no  relaxation  from  duty — not  for  a  day — for  more  than  nine  years. 

His  request  was  refused;  but,  as  there  was  no  longer  danger  of  war 
in  Utah,  and  a  general  was  not  needed  there,  he  was  retained  to  ad 
minister  the  duties  of  the  department  nearly  two  years  longer. 

The  adjutant-general,  however,  after  declining  his  request,  and  in 
forming  him  that  he  was  not  to  be  superseded,  writes,  August  28, 1858: 

I  am  further  instructed  to  add  that  General  Johnston's  measures  in  the  man 
agement  of  affairs  in  Utah,  from  time  to  time  reported  by  him,  are  fully  ap 
proved  by  the  War  Department. 

The  commanding  general  was  kind  enough  to  issue  the  following 
order,  summing  up  the  conduct  and  character  of  the  expedition : 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,         j 
(General  Orders  No.  19.)  WEST  POINT,  NEW  YORK,  August  10, 1858.  \ 

The  general-in- chief,  learning  of  the  arrival  of  the  troops  under  Brevet  Brig 
adier-General  Johnston  at  their  destination  in  the  Salt  Lake  country,  after  their 
detention  in  the  valley  of  Green  Kiver  during  the  last  winter,  takes  occasion  to 
commend  them  in  general  orders — as  he  has  already  done  through  their  com 
mander — for  their  exemplary  conduct  under  the  trying  circumstances  in  which 
they  have  been  placed. 

Detained,  after  a  long  and  wearisome  march  of  over  a  thousand  miles,  by 
causes  over  which  their  commander  had  no  control,  in  a  most  barren  and  inhos 
pitable  region ;  subjected — by  the  rigors  of  the  season,  which  destroyed  or  par 
alyzed  their  draught-animals — to  toils  of  no  ordinary  nature ;  and,  on  account 
of  the  destruction  of  part  of  their  supplies,  obliged  to  labor  with  insufficient 
clothing ;  indifferent,  and  often  restricted,  rations  of  food — this  fine  body  of 
men,  instead  of  giving  way  to  insubordination,  irregularities,  or  murmurs  even, 
went  on  improving  in  discipline  and  instruction,  and  discharging  their  accumu 
lating  duties  with  the  utmost  alacrity  and  cheerfulness;  and,  at  the  order  of 
their  commander,  not  showing  the  inhabitants  of  Salt  Lake  Valley,  as  they 
passed  through  their  settlements,  either  by  act,  word,  or  gesture,  that  they  had 
recently  stood  toward  them  in  a  hostile  attitude. 

The  march — in  the  depths  of  winter — of  Lieutenant-Colonel  (now  Colonel) 
P.  St.  George  Cooke,  commanding  the  Second  Dragoons,  from  Fort  Laramie 
through  the  South  Pass  to  Green  Kiver ;  and  that  of  Captain  E.  B.  Marcy,  Fifth 
Infantry,  from  Camp  Scott  over  the  mountains  to  New  Mexico,  deserve,  as  they 
have  already  received,  special  commendation. 

Brevet  Brigadier-General  Johnston  has  had  the  honor  to  be  supported  by 
officers  of  great  intelligence,  zeal,  and  experience.  Yet  it  is  not  to  be  doubted 
that  to  his  own  high  soldierly  qualities,  untiring  exertions,  tact,  and  sound  judg 
ment,  the  credit  for  the  condition  and  high  tone  of  his  army  is  preeminently  due. 

By  command  of  Brevet  Lieutenant-General  SCOTT  : 

IEVIN  MCDOWELL, 
Assistant  Adjutant- General. 


COMMENDATION  AND   CRITICISM.  231 

The  Secretary  of  War  in  his  report,  December  6,  1858,  made  the 
following  mention  of  the  conduct  of  General  Johnston,  after  discussing 
the  causes  that  led  to  the  expedition : 

The  conduct  of  both  officers  and  men  has  been  worthy  of  all  praise.  The 
commander,  Brevet  Brigadier-General  A.  S.  Johnston,  who  joined  his  command 
at  a  time  of  great  trial  and  embarrassment,  with  a  calm  and  lofty  bearing,  with 
a  true  and  manly  sympathy  for  all  around  him,  infused  into  his  command  a  spirit 
of  serenity  and  contentment  which  amounted  to  cheerfulness,  amid  uncommon 
hardships  and  privations  which  were  unabated  throughout  the  tedious  and  in 
clement  season  of  the  winter. 

The  correspondent  of  the  New  York  Times,  Mr.  Simonton,  I  be 
lieve,  writing  from  Camp  Scott,  under  date  of  May  28th,  says : 

I  called  on  General  Johnston  to-day.  He  is,  apparently,  something  over  fifty 
years  of  age,  and  a  plain,  frank,  whole-hearted  soldier,  equal  to  any  emergency, 
and  always  prepared  for  it.  In  simple,  honest  directness  of  manner,  coolness  of 
purpose,  readiness  of  action,  and  practical  common-sense,  he  reminds  me  much 
of  the  lamented  General  Taylor.  During  the  time  I  spent  in  his  tent  I  had  no 
difficulty  in  understanding  the  magnetism  which  attracts  to  him  the  respect  and 
love  of  his  command.  I  am  told  that  amid  all  the  privations  of  winter  the  men 
never  thought  of  complaining,  even  among  themselves,  of  their  commander, 
whom  they  saw  sharing  equally  with  themselves  in  the  inconvenience  of  short 
rations,  and  struggling,  with  the  aid  of  an  excellent  commissary  department,  to 
defeat  the  Mormon  design  of  starving  the  army — a  design  which  the  destruction 
of  the  supply-trains  in  October  last  would  have  rendered  easy  of  accomplish 
ment  except  for  General  Johnston's  efforts. 

It  is  not  to  be  supposed,  however,  that  in  the  general  applause  which 
greeted  General  Johnston's  conduct  of  the  Utah  campaign  he  altogether 
escaped  criticism.  By  whatever  motive  actuated,  a  writer  in  the  St. 
Louis  Democrat,  in  August,  1858,  made  a  violent  assault  upon  him, 
which  elicited  a  full  and  conclusive  answer  from  the  friendly  pen  of 
Captain  N.  J.  Eaton.  These  articles  are  not  here  inserted,  because  it  is 
believed  that  the  events  of  the  campaign  as  narrated  are  a  sufficient  re 
ply  to  cavil.  It  is,  indeed,  alluded  to  only  because  it  drew  from  Gen 
eral  Johnston  a  letter  to  Captain  Eaton,  already  quoted,  of  October  11, 
1858,  from  which  it  is  thought  proper  to  make  further  extracts  in  re 
sponse  to  the  following  charge  by  his  critic : 

We  propose  directing  attention  to  the  claims  of  an  individual  who  has  won 
rank  and,  perhaps,  reputation  by  the  exhibition  of  unparalleled  inactivity.  Gen 
eral  Johnston  has  gained  his  brevet  by  no  deed  of  heroism  or  display  of  general 
ship,  but  by  obstinate  immobility  for  eight  or  nine  months. 

General  Johnston  contented  himself  with  a  simple  statement  of  the 
circumstances  as  the  best  refutation  of  the  strictures  of  the  letter- 
writer.  The  rest  of  his  letter  is  as  follows : 


232  UTAH  CAMPAIGN. 

MY  DEAK  EATON"  :  I  received  your  letter  of  the  3d  inst.,  and  have  now  the 
pleasure  to  acknowledge  the  great  obligations  under  which  you  have  placed  me, 
and  to  express  my  grateful  sense  of  your  generous  conduct  in  defending  an  absent 
friend  from  an  unjust  and  unfair  attack  by  a  person  wholly  unknown  to  him, 
but  I  hope  not  so  prejudiced  as  to  condemn  upon  an  exparte  hearing. 

Connecting  as  he  does  a  criticism  of  my  course  as  a  commander  with  an  as 
sault  upon  the  Administration,  he  evidently  imagines  that  I  am  the  recipient  of 
political  favor,  and  that  the  patronage  of  the  Government  placed  me  in  com 
mand  of  the  Utah  army.  On  this  point  it  is  easy  to  disabuse  the  minds  of  any 
who  entertain  such  a  notion. 

If  I  were  much  of  a  favorite  it  would  very  naturally  be  supposed  that  I  was 
personally  known  to  the  party  whose  patronage  I  am  supposed  to  enjoy.  It  so 
happens  that  I  have  never  had  the  opportunity  to  be  introduced  to  the  Presi 
dent,  and  of  course  have  never  spoken  to  him,  and  am  personally  unknown  to 
him.  I  was  called  to  the  command  of  this  department,  I  understand,  at  the  re 
quest  of  the  commander-in-chief.  The  command  was  unsolicited  by  me,  and  not 
desirable  on  account  of  the  inconvenience  to  my  family  and  the  unprotected  sit 
uation  in  which  I  was  obliged  to  leave  them.  The  notice  was  sudden  and  unex 
pected  ;  and,  moreover,  I  was  sick  and  in  need  of  surgical  aid :  the  notice,  how 
ever,  was  promptly  responded  to.  I  am  sure  the  service  was  repugnant  to  the 
wishes  of  every  one,  as  it  must  always  be  where  it  involves  the  enforcement  of 
the  laws  upon  any  portion  of  our  citizens,  be  they  good  or  bad.  No  one  so  em 
ployed  can  escape  censure ;  though  to  the  honor  of  the  army  be  it  said  that, 
with  this  foreknowledge,  there  has  never  been  a  want  of  zeal  in  the  execution  of 
such,  or  any,  orders.  .  .  . 

The  brevet  rank  conferred  upon  me  was  not  at  my  solicitation ;  it  was  volun 
tarily  offered,  and  of  course  accepted.  I  did  not  consider  whether  I  deserved 
it  or  not ;  and  I  know  I  would  be  unable  to  determine  that  question.  "With  re 
gard  to  the  service  performed  by  me,  I  felt  that  it  was  done  with  a  loyal,  hearty 
good-will,  and  regretted  that  more  could  not  be  done. 

It  is,  of  course,  painful  to  any  gentleman  to  speak  of  himself;  but  I  think  I 
can  say  without  vanity  that  the  brevet  rank  conferred  upon  me  was  the  dis 
charge  of  a  debt  of  twelve  years'  standing,  during  nearly  ten  of  which,  as  a  pub 
lic  servant,  I  have  not  had  one  day's  relaxation  from  duty,  and  more  than  half  of 
which  time,  from  the  nature  of  my  duties,  I  have  not  slept  in  a  house.  I  say  it 
was  an  old  debt  in  this  wise.  At  the  storming  of  Monterey  I  was  a  volunteer, 
acting  as  inspector-general  with  the  rank  of  colonel.  By  reference  to  official 
reports  you  will  see  that  favorable  mention  was  made  of  my  name  with  others. 
Those  belonging  to  the  regular  army  were  brevetted  for  this  notice.  I  could 
not  be,  but  received  in  lieu,  what  was  very  precious  to  me,  the  thanks  of  Gen 
eral  Taylor  in  special  orders.  This  being  so,  is  it  too  much  to  say  that  the  brevet 
was  won  twelve  years  since,  and  for  the  same  grade  as  that  now  given? 

It  is  quite  ridiculous,  especially  as  connected  with  a  person  so  obscure,  with 
out  political  influence,  and  unsustained  by  the  patronage  of  any  party,  to  attrib 
ute  a  motive  of  interest  to  our  venerated  Chief  Magistrate  or  commander-in- 
chief,  standing,  as  they  do,  each  in  his  own  sphere  the  first  man  of  his  day. 

I  am  by  some  pointed  out  as  a  novm  homo — a  person  but  a  short  time  in  the 
service.  My  experience  in  the  service  runs  back  more  than  thirty  years.  I 
claim  that  my  life  and  my  means  (not  small)  have  been  devoted  to  the  service  of 


DUTIES  AT  CAMP  FLOYD.  233 

my  country.  It  is  true  that  I  was  out  of  the  army  for  some  years,  but  I  was 
not  idle.  I  was  laboring  on  another  field ;  the  benefits,  not  less  than  an  empire 
in  extent,  enured  to  the  Government.  To  this  result  I  contributed  my  humble 
aid.  It  was  not  my  good  fortune  to  be  present  at  the  battle  at  which  was  won 
the  independence  of  Texas  by  a  band  of  heroic  men ;  but  I  served  long  and 
faithfully,  assisting  to  maintain  that  independence,  and,  in  so  doing,  I  think,  the 
interest  of  the  United  States  was  well  subserved.  .  .  . 

Your  friend  and  obedient  servant, 

A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

CAMP   FLOYD. 

CAMP  FLOYD,  the  headquarters  of  the  Army  of  Utah,  was  situated  at 
the  north  end  of  Cedar  Valley,  midway  between  Salt  Lake  City  and 
Provo,  about  thirty-six  miles  distant  from  each.  The  valley  was  about 
eight  miles  wide  and  twenty -five  miles  long,  and  situated  three  miles 
west  of  Utah  Lake,  with  a  low  range  of  mountains  intervening.  The 
population  of  the  Territory  was  located  chiefly  at  the  western  base  of 
the  Wahsatch  range,  and  along  the  eastern  rim  of  the  Great  Salt  Lake 
Basin.  The  position  selected  for  the  camp  was  a  commanding  one,  as 
the  valley  debouched  in  the  direction  of  Salt  Lake  City  by  two  routes, 
toward  Provo  by  two,  and  also  into  Tintic  Valley  in  the  direction  of 
Fillmore  City.  The  grass  of  Cedar  Valley,  and  of  Tintic  and  Rush 
Valleys,  which  communicated  with  it,  was  the  main  reliance  for  the  sub 
sistence  of  the  horses,  mules,  and  beef-cattle.  The  grass,  though  nu 
tritious,  was  bunchy  and  sparse,  so  that  a  large  space  of  country  was 
required  to  support  the  animals,  about  8,000  head  in  number.  To  guard 
this  stock  from  both  Indians  and  white  robbers  was  an  important  and 
troublesome  duty,  but  successfully  performed. 

When  the  army  had  been  established  at  Camp  Floyd,  three  duties 
devolved  upon  General  Johnston  :  first,  to  secure  the  troops  under  his 
command  against  the  hardships  and  privations  of  the  preceding  winter; 
second,  to  control  the  Indians,  at  least  so  far  as  to  prevent  or  punish 
depredations  upon  the  inhabitants  ;  and  third,  to  aid  the  civil  authori 
ties  in  executing  the  laws,  by  furnishing  troops  to  act  as  a  posse,  on 
the  requisition  of  the  Executive  or  judicial  officers  of  the  Territory.  To 
these  might  be  added  the  auxiliary  work  of  exploration  and  road-mak 
ing. 

His  first  care  was  so  to  disband  the  volunteers  as  to  avoid  turning 
loose  a  large  body  of  strangers  "  who  might,"  as  he  remarks,  "  produce 


234  CAMP  FLOYD. 

disturbance  in  the  communities,  although  it  may  be  truly  said  of  them 
that  the  Government  never  had  a  better  regiment  of  volunteers."  The 
battalion  was  ordered  to  Leavenworth  to  be  disbanded,  so  as  to  afford 
them  transportation  and  subsistence  home,  except  where  they  preferred 
to  take  employment  in  Utah  or  go  to  California.  Similar  precautions 
were  taken  with  the  employe's  discharged  by  the  quartermaster's  de 
partment  and  contractors,  some  500  in  number.  Those  who  would  emi 
grate  to  California  or  return  home  were  allowed  to  purchase  arms  and 
outfits  from  the  Government,  and  those  who  wished  employment  in 
Utah  were  hired  as  wood-choppers  and  herdsmen.  No  confusion  or 
trouble  ensued. 

General  Porter  says : 

General  Johnston's  attention  was  now  successfully  turned  to  establishing  his 
command  in  comfort  for  the  coming  winter,  to  securing  the  necessary  supplies 
for  the  support  of  men  and  animals,  and' to  protecting  provisions  from  the  effects 
of  the  climate.  Before  winter  set  in,  the  men  were  all  comfortably  housed,  the 
provisions  under  shelter,  and  the  mules  and  cattle  distributed  to  proper  grazing- 
grounds. 

Quarters  were  built  of  adobe,  and  covered  with  plank  and  earth ; 
and,  with  such  comforts  as  could  be  added,  the  troops  were  wintered 
in  health  and  contentment. 

In  a  letter  to  the  writer,  September  23, 1858,  General  Johnston  says : 

Although  nothing  has  been  changed  in  the  Mormon  polity,  quiet  prevails. 
The  people  take  employment  at  our  camp,  when  they  are  needed.  Large  num 
bers  are  employed  making  adobes  and  in  the  various  mechanical  pursuits.  They 
bring  in  freely  their  surplus  grain  and  vegetables.  Our  winter-quarters  will  be 
comfortable;  we  are  building  a  great  many  houses  to  shelter  the  men,  and  large 
storehouses  for  our  supplies.  The  walls  of  our  houses  are  eight  feet  high  ;  the 
roofs  are  covered  with  plank,  which  is  again  covered  with  three  or  four  inches 
of  clay.  Small  windows,  rough  doors,  and  well-pounded  clay  floors  complete 
the  building.  To  put  up  buildings,  even  of  rude  structure,  for  3,000  or  4,000 
men,  is  a  work  of  immense  labor,  where  the  materials  are  to  be  brought  from  a 
distance. 

Congress  has  made  no  appropriations  for  sheltering  the  troops  here,  and  all 
this  considerable  outlay  of  money  is  on  my  own  responsibility.  Congress,  I  do 
not  doubt,  will  make  the  appropriation ;  yet  it  is  not  pleasant  to  have  to  incur 
weighty  responsibilities.  At  this  distance  from  the  seat  of  government  much 
responsibility  has  at  all  times  to  be  assumed,  and  I  shall  not  shrink  from  it.  As 
I  will  do  no  one  thing  which  my  conscience  does  not  approve  as  beneficial  to  my 
country,  I  shall  always  be  without  fear,  and,  I  hope,  without  reproach. 

The  arrival,  in  October,  of  Colonel  Crosman,  who  had  been  assigned 
as  his  chief  quartermaster,  was  a  source  of  great  relief  to  General 
Johnston.  His  predecessor  had  done  his  part  well,  but  Crosman  was 


INDIAN  AFFAIRS.  235 

an  old  and  tried  friend,  in  whose  experience,  good  sense,  and  loyalty  of 
heart,  he  placed  an  unbounded  trust,  which  was  never  impaired. 

It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  this  well-administered  army  passed  the 
winter  not  only  contentedly  but  cheerfully,  bringing  to  their  aid  the 
recreations  and  amusements  of  civilized  life  without  relaxation  of  dis 
cipline,  or  of  the  vigilance  necessary  to  a  strict  performance  of  their 
duties.  General  Johnston  applied  again  for  a  leave  of  absence,  to  take 
effect  in  the  spring,  but  without  success. 

In  regard  to  the  relations  established  by  General  Johnston  with  the 
Indians,  General  Porter  makes  these  remarks : 

While  journeying  to  Utah,  and  while  at  Fort  Bridger,  Colonel  Johnston  took 
every  occasion  to  bring  the  Indians  within  knowledge  and  influence  of  the  army, 
and  induced  numerous  chiefs  to  come  to  his  camp.  There  is  nothing  so  civilizing 
to  an  Indian  as  the  display  of  power,  and  the  appearance  of  the  troops  insured 
respect  and  quietude.  Colonel  Johnston  was  ever  kind,  but  firm  and  dignified, 
to  them;  and  he  was  respected  and  feared  as  the  "Great  Chief." 

Washki,  the  chief  of  the  Snakes,  the  white  man's  friend,  was  invited  by  the 
colonel,  when  near  South  Pass,  into  camp,  and  feasted  and  smoked  for  a  talk. 
This  resulted  in  the  disclosure  that  Brigham  Young  had  sent  to  him  and  his 
young  men,  to  induce  them  to  make  war  on  the  United  States  army ;  and  that 
he  (Washki)  had  turned  the  Mormons  from  his  country,  telling  them  that  his 
tribe  did  not  meddle  in  white  men's  quarrels,  and  never  against  the  United 
States ;  that  they  knew  no  difference  between  white  men,  and  were  as  apt  in 
war  to  slay  Mormons  as  Americans.  How  much  Colonel  Johnston's  impressive 
presence  and  the  manifestations  of  power  had  to  do  with  Washki's  attitude  can 
not  be  known ;  but  it  is  to  his  credit  that  he  maintained  it,  holding  his  men 
under  control  on  trying  occasions,  when  unworthy  white  men  had  deservedly 
earned  the  enmity  of  the  Snake  tribe. 

The  Utes,  Pi-Utes,  Bannocks,  and  other  tribes,  visited  Colonel  Johnston, 
and  all  went  away  expressing  themselves  pleased,  assuring  him  that  so  long  as 
he  remained  they  would  prove  his  friends,  which  the  colonel  told  them  would 
be  best  for  them.  Thus  he  effectually  destroyed  all  influence  of  the  Mormons 
over  them,  and  insured  friendly  treatment  to  travelers  to  and  from  California 
and  Oregon. 

General  Johnston,  while  using  every  means  to  secure  the  friendship 
of  the  Indians,  was  most  careful  to  warn  them  to  keep  clear  of  the  im 
pending  conflict.  This  did  not,  however,  prevent  malicious  attacks  by 
those  who  had  often  found  unscrupulous  detraction  a  powerful  engine 
against  opponents.  Governor  Cumming's  first  communication  from  Salt 
Lake  City  to  General  Johnston,  written  within  three  days  after  his  ar 
rival,  while  the  Mormons  were  yet  confronting  the  troops  in  arms,  was 
to  apprise  him  of  charges  made  by  William  H.  Hooper,  the  Mormon 
Secretary  of  State,  against  United  States  officers,  as  advising  the  Indi 
ans  to  murder  and  pillage,  and  of  insinuations  against  General  John 
ston  himself.  The  Deseret  N~ews  also  made  similar  statements.  These 


236  CAMP  FLOYD. 

were  fit  fabrications  to  emanate  from  the  conclave  which  had  instigated 
the  Mountain  Meadows  massacre.  As  General  Johnston's  "  talks  "  with 
the  Indians  had  been  in  the  presence  of  others,  he  had  no  difficulty  in 
placing  on  record  the  false  and  slanderous  character  of  these  state 
ments  ;  and  those  who  are  curious  in  such  matters  will  find  them  set 
forth  in  "  Executive  Documents,"  second  session,  Thirty-fifth  Congress, 
vol.  ii.,  part  ii.,  1858-'59,  pp.  71-87. 

During  General  Johnston's  administration  of  that  military  depart 
ment,  the  Indians  behaved  very  well.  A  few  outrages  only  were  per 
petrated  by  bands  of  "  vagabond "  Indians,  who  were  promptly  pun 
ished  ;  and  California  and  Oregon  emigrants  will  remember  that  their 
wagon-trains  received  escorts  of  dragoons  over  the  dangerous  parts  of 
the  route. 

In  the  spring  of  1859  an  issue  arose  between  General  Johnston  and 
Governor  Gumming,  in  which  the  latter  was  evidently  misled  by  his 
feelings.  The  documents  and  correspondence  will  be  found  in  the  ex 
ecutive  document  just  quoted  above,  and  may  be  summarized  as  fol 
lows  :  Governor  Cumrning,  from  the  time  of  his  association  with  Colonel 
Kane,  imagined  that  his  civil  functions  were  to  protect  the  Mormons 
from  the  military,  who  were  seeking  their  destruction ;  a  very  praise 
worthy  and  magnanimous  state  of  mind,  if  it  had  been  founded  upon 
facts.  His  error  was,  I  presume,  of  the  head  rather  than  of  the  heart ; 
and  it  is  not  probable  that  he  could  have  so  misconceived  General  John 
ston,  if  he  had  allowed  himself  to  become  better  acquainted  with  him. 
He  indulged  another  fancy,  that  his  office,  somehow,  clothed  him  with 
militarv  authority  ;  while,  in  fact,  his  sole  function  in  this  direction  was 
to  obtain,  by  requisition  upon  the  commander,  troops  who  should  act  as 
a  posse  to  enforce  the  laws  or  protect  citizens  in  their  rights  of  person  or 
property.  It  will  be  remembered  that  General  Johnston's  orders  (page 
209)  directed  him  to  obey  the  requisition  of  the  judges,  as  well  as  of  the 
Governor  ;  but  this  fact  the  Governor  did  not  choose  to  recognize. 

Judge  Cradlebaugh,  who  had  charge  of  the  southern  district  of 
Utah,  determined,  if  possible,  to  bring  to  justice  the  leaders  in  the 
Mountain  Meadows  massacre,  and,  on  proper  information,  had  John  D. 
Lee,  Isaac  Haight,  and  six  others,  committed  for  trial  at  a  term  of  the 
district  court,  held  on  the  8th  of  March  at  Provo.  In  accordance  with 
his  authority,  he  made  a  requisition  for  troops  to  protect  the  court  and 
witnesses,  and  hold  the  prisoners  securely,  there  being  no  jail.  A  com 
pany  was  sent  to  Provo,  and  later  a  regiment  put  within  supporting 
distance ;  and  an  examination  of  all  the  facts  will  show  that  the  in 
structions  from  the  commanding  general,  and  their  execution  by  his 
subordinate,  were  clearly  within  the  letter  and  the  spirit  of  the  law, 
and  scrupulous  in  their  conformity  to  technical  observances  as  well  as 
to  the  necessities  of  the  case.  Not  only  were  the  officers  firm  and  dis- 


CONFLICTS  OF  AUTHORITY.  237 

creet,  but  the  soldiers  avoided  even  the  appearance  of  incivility.  Nev 
ertheless,  the  major  and  council  protested  against  "  the  military  occu 
pation  "  of  their  town,  to  "  the  annoyance  and  intimidation  "  of  citizens. 
Judge  Cradlebaugh  replied  politely,  pointing  out  the  necessity  of  his 
action ;  and  a  controversy  ensued  in  which  the  Mormons  dwelt  upon 
the  dangers  of  military  despotism,  and  offered  to  provide  for  the  se 
curity  of  the  prisoners.  This,  of  course,  would  have  been  a  mere  mock 
ery  of  justice. 

At  this  juncture,  March  20th,  Governor  Gumming  appeared  upon 
the  scene,  and  requested  General  Johnston  promptly  to  withdraw  the 
guard  from  Provo,  adding,  "I  am  satisfied  that  the  presence  of  the 
military  force  in  this  vicinity  is  unnecessary,  and  for  this  and  other 
reasons  I  desire  to  impress  upon  you  the  propriety  of  the  immediate 
disposition  of  the  troops  as  above  indicated."  He  also  complained  that 
the  detachment  commander,  Captain  Heth,  had  not  reported  to  him. 

General  Johnston  returned  a  courteous  reply  to  this  letter,  declining 
to  obey  the  Governor's  commands,  and  reciting  his  own  orders,  Judge 
Cradlebaugh's  requisition,  the  want  of  a  jail  or  any  other  means  of 
detaining  the  prisoners,  except  by  the  guard,  and  his  care  to  avoid  giv 
ing  just  offense  to  well-disposed  persons.  He  says,  also  : 

I  beg  most  respectfully  to  suggest  that,  under  the  circumstances,  there  would 
have  been  a  manifest  impropriety  in  Captain  Heth's  reporting  to  you;  such  an 
act  would  be  an  acknowledgment  of  military  supremacy  on  your  part,  which 
does  not  exist.  To  prevent  any  misunderstanding  hereafter,  I  desire  to  say  to 
your  excellency  that  I  am  under  no  obligations  whatever  to  conform  to  your 
suggestions  with  regard  to  the  military  disposition  of  the  troops  of  this  depart 
ment,  except  only  when  it  may  be  expedient  to  employ  them  in  their  civil  ca 
pacity  as  a  posse ;  in  which  case,  should  the  emergency  arise,  your  requisition 
for  any  portion  of  the  troops  under  my  command  will  be  complied  with,  and 
they  will  be  instructed  to  discharge  the  duty  pointed  out. 

In  transmitting  the  correspondence  to  the  general-in-chief,  March 
24,  1859,  General  Johnston  writes  : 

I  regret  that  his  instructions  should  have  impressed  upon  him  (Governor 
Gumming)  a  view  of  his  powers  so  inconsistent  with  the  well-understood  the 
ory  of  military  organization ;  and  so  much  the  more  do  I  regret  it,  because  this 
discrepancy  of  view  between  the  Executive  of  the  Territory  and  the  commander 
of  the  department  cannot  fail  to  entail  all  the  evil  consequences  of  want  of  har 
mony  and  of  unity  of  purpose.  .  .  . 

By  my  instructions  I  am  equally  bound  to  respond  to  the  call  of  the  judiciary 
as  of  the  Executive ;  and,  if  I  had  complied  with  his  command,  to  make  any 
other  disposition  of  the  force  acting  in  aid  of  tbe  administration  of  justice  than 
as  requested  by  the  judge,  without  his  consent,  I  should  have  been  accessory  to 
an  executive  interference  with  a  coordinate  branch  of  the  Territorial  govern 
ment. 


238  CAMP  FLOYD. 

Governor  Gumming  issued  the  following  proclamation,  denouncing 
the  action  of  General  Johnston,  and  placing  him  before  the  people  of 
the  Territory  in  an  entirely  false  light : 

By  Alfred  dimming^  Governor  of  Utah  Territory. 

A   PROCLAMATION. 

Whereas,  One  company  of  the  United  States  Infantry,  under  the  command 
of  Captain  Heth,  is  now  stationed  around  the  court-house  at  Provo,  where  the 
Hon.  Judge  Cradlebaugh  is  now  holding  court,  and  eight  additional  companies 
of  infantry,  one  of  artillery,  and  one  of  cavalry,  under  the  command  of  Major 
Paul,  are  stationed  within  sight  of  the  court-house;  and — 

Whereas,  The  presence  of  soldiers  has  a  tendency  not  only  to  terrify  the  in 
habitants  and  disturb  the  peace  of  the  Territory,  but  also  to  subvert  the  ends  of 
justice,  by  causing  the  intimidation  of  witnesses  and  jurors ;  and — 

Whereas,  This  movement  of  troops  has  been  made  without  consultation  with 
me,  and,  as  I  believe,  is  in  opposition  to  both  the  letter  and  spirit  of  my  instruc 
tions;  and — 

Whereas,  General  Johnston,  commander  of  the  military  department  of  Utah, 
has  refused  my  request,  that  he  would  issue  the  necessary  orders  for  the  removal 
of  the  above-mentioned  troops : 

Now,  therefore,  I,  Alfred  Gumming,  Governor  of  the  Territory  of  Utah,  do 
hereby  publish  this  my  solemn  protest  against  this  present  military  movement, 
and  also  against  all  movements  of  troops,  incompatible  with  the  letter  and  spirit 
of  the  annexed  extract  from  the  instruction  received  by  me  from  Government, 
for  my  guidance  while  Governor  of  the  Territory  of  Utah. 

In  testimony  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand,  and  caused 

the  seal  of  the  Territory  to  be  affixed.     Done  at  Great  Salt  Lake  City, 

!  L.  s. :  this  twenty-seventh  day  of  March,  A.  D.  eighteen  hundred  and  fifty- 
nine,  and  of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  the  eighty-third. 

ALFEED  GUMMING. 

By  the  Governor :  (Signed)  JOHN  HAETNETT, 

Secretary  of  State. 

With  whatever  accuracy  Governor  Gumming  may  have  interpreted 
his  instructions  from  the  State  Department,  it  was  manifestly  unrea 
sonable  in  him  to  expect  General  Johnston  to  conform  to  them  in  dis 
obedience  of  his  own  orders.  But,  however  that  might  be,  the  issue 
having  been  made  and  referred  to  competent  authority  for  decision, 
should  have  rested  there.  His  proclamation  was  erroneous  in  law  and 
in  fact,  and  calculated  to  exasperate  an  already  excited  people,  unless 
they  had  been  restrained  by  leaders  who  now  felt  the  folly  of  open  war. 

In  the  mean  time  the  Mormon  county  court  impaneled  a  grand- 
jury,. in  which  sat  some  of  the  men  implicated  in  the  massacre  and  in 
other  murders  which  were  to  be  investigated.  Nevertheless,  a  consid 
erable  number  of  witnesses  appeared  before  them,  testified  to  the  most 


AMBIGUOUS  POLICY  OF  THE   GOVERNMENT.  239 

conclusive  facts,  and  then  sought  the  protection  of  the  military  from  an 
"  intimidated  "  people.  The  grand-jury  having  sat  two  weeks,  and  failed 
to  make  a  presentment,  was  finally  discharged  by  the  judge.  It  was 
evident  that  the  local  authorities  and  the  people,  with  the  countenance 
of  the  Territorial  Executive,  were  able  to  arrest  the  course  of  justice,  so 
that  the  functions  of  the  judiciary  were  virtually  at  an  end,  unless  other 
modes  of  trial  were  adopted  by  Congress.  Judge  Cradlebaugh  was  able, 
however,  as  a  committing  magistrate,  to  place  on  record  a  mass  of  testi 
mony  that  fixes  on  the  Mormon  leaders  the  indelible  stigma  of  atrocious 
deeds,  which  will  cling  to  the  church  until  it  perishes. 

Closer  contact  with  the  Mormons,  and  continued  observation  of  their 
system,  gave  General  Johnston  no  better  opinion  of  them  than  he  had 
held  at  Fort  Bridger.  In  commenting  upon  his  own  official  reports,  he 
wrote  to  General  Scott,  March  31,  1859: 

I  have  refrained  from  speaking  of  the  horrible  crimes  that  have  been  perpe 
trated  in  this  Territory — crimes  of  a  magnitude  and  of  an  apparently  studied  re 
finement  in  atrocity  hardly  to  be  conceived  of,  and  which  have  gone  unwhipped 
of  justice.  These,  if  the  judges  are  sustained,  they  will  endeavor  to  bring  to 
light. 

General  Johnston  was  not  at  all  satisfied  with  the  measure  of  sup 
port  he  received  from  the  Administration,  which,  for  many  obvious  rea 
sons,  was  anxious  simply  to  tide  over  the  troubles  in  Utah.  He  had 
obeyed  his  orders  scrupulously  in  letter  and  in  spirit,  and  yet  he  found 
himself  left  in  a  somewhat  ambiguous  attitude  before  the  country. 
Moreover,  he  had  become  convinced  that  proper  laws  should  regulate 
the  Territorial  relations  to  the  General  Government ;  yet  he  found  that 
these  were  drifting  at  the  mercy  of  events. 

The  Government  could  not  disapprove  of  General  Johnston's  course, 
but  tried  to  obviate  the  difficulty  by  modifying  his  orders,  as  will  be 
seen  by  the  following  letter  from  the  Secretary  of  War.  The  letter  is 
the  key  to  the  subsequent  policy  at  Washington.  It  ties  the  hands  of 
the  judiciary,  and  leaves  Utah  to  ferment  into  whatever  it  may — living 
waters  or  a  hell-broth,  as  the  case  may  be: 

WAS  DEPARTMENT,  WASHINGTON,  May  6, 1859. 

SIR  :  The  change  which  seems  to  have  taken  place  in  the  condition  of  things 
in  Utah  Territory  since  the  date  of  your  former  instructions  renders  some  modi 
fication  of  these  instructions  necessary. 

Peace  being  now  restored  to  the  Territory,  the  judicial  administration  of  tht 
laws  will  require  no  help  from  the  army  under  your  command.  If  the  services 
of  the  United  States  troops  should  be  needed  under  any  circumstances  it  could 
only  be  to  assist  the  executive  authority  in  executing  the  sentence  of  law  or  the 
judicial  decrees  of  the  court ;  and  that  necessity  could  only  arise  when  the  ser 
vices  of  a  civil  posse  were  found  to  be  insufficient.  You  will  therefore  only 
17 


240  CAMP  FLOYD. 

order  the  troops  under  your  command  to  assist  as  a  posse  comitatus  in  the  exe 
cution  of  the  laws,  upon  the  written  application  of  the  Governor  of  the  Territory, 
and  not  otherwise. 

The  fidelity  with  which  you  have  obeyed  the  instructions  of  this  department 
heretofore  given  you  is  the  fullest  guarantee  that  you  will  with  the  same  zeal 
and  efficiency  conform  to  these. 

I  am,  general,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

(Signed)  Jonx  B.  FLOYD, 

Secretary  of  War. 

Brevet  Brigadier-General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  commanding  Department  of  Utah,  Camp  Floyd,  U.  T. 

General  Johnston,  in  a  letter  to  the  author,  June  10th,  comments 
upon  the  modification  of  his  orders  thus : 

This,  in  view  of  the  premises  assumed  by  the  Secretary,  is  rightly  done ;  but 
these  are  not  the  law-abiding  people  the  Administration  believes  them  to  be, 
and  he  will  find  that  henceforward  the  law  here  is  a  nullity. 

I  suppose  the  Secretary  found  it  difficult  to  sustain  me  at  all,  so  I  ought  to  be 
satisfied  with  him,  for  I  do  not  doubt  that  he  had  to  combat  the  foregone  con 
clusion  of  the  President  and  most  of  the  cabinet  that  this  question  is  finally  set 
tled,  or  their  predetermination  so  to  view  it.  I  have  conscientiously  discharged 
my  duty  in  sustaining  the  judiciary,  and  the  people  will  applaud  me  for  it ;  for 
the  time  is  not  far  distant  when  they  will  know  the  utter  incompatibility  of 
Mormon  institutions  and  those  that  our  own  people  are  pledged  by  every  obli 
gation  of  duty  and  honor  to  establish  and  cherish  in  every  part  of  our  broad 
territory. 

During  the  remainder  of  my  sojourn  here  I  shall  not  be  called  upon  in  the 
discharge  of  my  duty  to  make  any  comment  upon  events  transpiring  here  not 
purely  of  a  military  character.  I  now  hope  I  may  be  granted  a  leave  of  absence, 

It  would  seem  proper,  in  view  of  the  want  of  harmony  in  sentiment 
and  personal  relations  between  the  Governor  and  the  military  command 
er,  that  the  Government  should  have  removed  one  of  them.  The  Admin 
istration  thought  otherwise  ;  and,  although  General  Johnston  requested 
to  be  relieved,  he  was  obliged  to  retain  bis  unpleasant  post  another 
year.  The  motive  for  adopting  this  sort  of  middle  ground,  so  charac 
teristic  of  Mr.  Buchanan,  was  not  an  unkind  one.  To  relieve  General 
Johnston,  under  the  circumstances,  might  have  the  semblance  of  con 
demning  him  for  obedience  to  orders ;  to  appoint  another  Governor 
would  look  like  an  intent  to  pursue  a  decisive  policy  instead  of  the 
laissez-faire  course  represented  by  Governor  Gumming.  So  he  let 
things  drift. 

Though  the  transaction  of  business  with  a  population  trained  to  an 
noy  and  pillage  the  Government  was  always  disagreeable  to  its  repre 
sentatives,  yet  such  were  General  Johnston's  exact  justice  and  circum 
spection  of  conduct  that  no  commander  has  held  this  department  with 
less  detraction. 


ADMINISTRATION  OF  UTAH. 
General  Porter  says  in  his  letter  to  the  writer : 

The  army  had  now  nothing  to  do  hut  to  maintain  discipline  and  efficiency, 
and  be  ready  for  any  emergency.  Yet  General  Johnston  availed  himself  of 
every  occasion  to  display  force  where  its  presence  would  have  a  good  in 
fluence. 

He  sent  Colonel  Loring  to  New  Mexico  hy  a  new  route  directly  across  the 
mountains,  through  the  Ute  tribes.  He  dispatched  a  force  to  the  southern  part 
of  the  Territory  to  the  scene  of  the  Mountain  Meadows  massacre,  that  the  guilty 
might  feel  that  a  power  was  close  at  hand  to  prevent  or  punish  such  crimes  in 
future.  He  sent  a  large  and  well-provided  force  to  Oregon,  and  another  to  Cali 
fornia,  taking  care  they  should  pass  through  the  regions  least  frequented  by 
troops.  He  had  the  country  south  of  Salt  Lake  explored  to  Carson's  Valley,  and 
opened  a  mail  route  and  emigrant  trail  to  California,  300  miles  shorter  than  the 
old  road.  He  opened  the  route  up  Provo  Kiver  to  Fort  Bridger,  which,  with 
the  route  through  Bridger's  Pass  to  the  east,  and  to  California  west,  established 
the  easiest,  best,  and  shortest  route  across  the  continent. 

These  explorations  had  in  view  not  only  the  display  of  force  and  the  opening 
of  as  many  avenues  as  possible  into  the  country  so  as  to  counteract  as  far  as  pos 
sible  the  policy  of  isolation  on  which  the  priesthood  relied  for  its  absolute  con 
trol,  but  information  which  would  render  easier  the  location  of  a  railroad  route 
to  the  Pacific. 

The  Union  Pacific  Railroad  now  runs  some  distance  east  and  west  of  Fort 
Bridger  over  the  route  laid  down,  and  much  of  it  opened,  by  Colonel  Johnston; 
and,  had  not  the  local  interests  of  Brigham  Young  prevailed  over  the  interests  of 
the  road  and  of  the  Government,  its  better  location  would  have  carried  it  down 
the  Provo  Eiver  to  the  bench-lands  of  the  valley,  and  thence  with  the  main 
trunk  south  of  the  lake,  and  with  a  branch  to  Salt  Lake  City. 

General  Johnston  bore  with  some  impatience  the  political  arrange 
ments  that  kept  him  in  Utah.  He  found  the  climate  healthful  but  dis 
agreeable,  and  the  separation  from  his  family  and  social  isolation  very 
irksome.  Though  he  could  not  express  these  feelings  to  his  superiors, 
he  did  to  the  writer  occasionally.  Writing  August  5, 1858,  he  says :  "  I 
shall  be  obliged  to  remain  here  another  winter,  at  least.  We  cannot 
avoid  our  destiny;  so  I  will  try  to  be  contented,  and  hope  always.  This 
is  the  most  sterile  country  I  have  ever  seen  or  imagined."  Again,  Sep 
tember  15th,  he  says:  "I  bear  my  exile  here  badly.  My  philosophy 
sometimes  gives  way.  I  try  to  be  content,  and  hope  for  better  times." 
Finally  his  request  to  be  relieved  was  granted,  and  on  February  29, 
1860,  he  turned  over  his  command  to  Colonel  Smith.  Gladly  obeying 
bis  orders,  he  proceeded  to  San  Francisco,  and  thence  by  sea  to  New 
York. 

The  army  of  Utah  was,  for  the  most  part,  withdrawn  from  the 
Territory,  and  the  Saints  were  left  to  their  own  devices.  As  soon  as  the 
pressure  of  the  troops  was  removed,  the  voice  of  the  Prophet  resumed 
its  earlier  tone  of  truculent  defiance,  blackguardism,  and  blasphemy. 


242  CAMP  FLOYD. 

The  following  from  an  officer  at  Camp  Floyd,  August  11,  1860,  gives 
the  changed  aspect  of  affairs  : 

The  same  game  has  commenced  on  the  part  of  the  Mormons  that  was  played 
before  the  army  came  here  as  regards  the  Gentiles.  Brigham  preached  a  very 
inflammatory  sermon  last  Sunday.  He  cursed  the  Government,  the  President, 
and  the  Gentiles.  He  said  u  he  would  wipe  them  all — every  one — out,  d — n  them ! 
that  he  would  let  the  Government  know  that  he  was  still  here;  that  he  would 
send  every  Gentile  to  hell  with  wooden  legs,  and  that  they  had  better  be  supply 
ing  themselves  now  while  lumber  was  cheap." 

With  the  further  history  of  events  in  Utah  this  memoir  has  no  con 
cern,  and  hence  it  may  be  dismissed  with  the  remark  that  the  vexed 
question  is  still  an  open  one,  under  the  changed  conditions,  however, 
that  eighteen  years  make  in  all  human  affairs. 

The  following  letter  will  not  be  without  interest  to  those  who  feel  a 
concern  about  the  United  States  army : 

CAMP  FLOYD,  UTAH,  June  22, 1859. 
MY  DEAR  SON:  .Your  letter  of  May  14th,  ult.,  concerning  the  nephew  of  Dr. 

L B ,  has  been  received.     I  have  made  inquiry  respecting  him,  and  am 

glad  to  learn  that  he  is  regarded  as  a  worthy  soldier.  I  have  the  power  by  the 
articles  of  war  to  discharge  soldiers  from  the  service,  but  it  is  an  authority  never 
exercised  for  private  reasons.  Great  length  of  service,  disability  from  physical 
or  mental  causes,  etc.,  are  some  of  the  motives  which  would  justify  a  depart 
ment  commander  in  exercising  this  power.  It  B is  ambitious  he  can  be  grati 
fied  ;  the  door  is  open  to  all  in  the  ranks.  Having  the  prerequisite  of  a  good 
moral  character,  the  other  qualifications  can  be  obtained  by  proper  industry.  If 
he  prepares  himself  for  the  examinations  which  must  be  gone  through,  I  feel 
sure  he  will  find  no  difficulty  in  procuring  the  recommendations  of  his  company 
and  regimental  commanders  to  be  allowed  to  be  examined.  The  quality  of  the 
enlisted  men  of  the  army,  morally  and  physically,  is  not  well  understood  by  the 
citizens.  There  exists  so  deep-rooted  a  prejudice  against  the  soldiery  that  I 
must  believe  that,  some  time  or  other  in  our  history  as  a  nation  or  as  provin 
cials,  they  must  have  been  intolerably  bad.  I  think  this  is  likely.  Within  my 
own  knowledge  of  the  reputation  of  this  class  of  men,  which  runs  back  more 
than  thirty  years,  they  were  very  objectionable.  I  am  glad  to  say  that  since  my 
first  acquaintance  with  them  there  has  been  a  vast  improvement,  morally  and 
physically.  They  were  then  said  to  be  broken-down  drunkards;  now,  physical 
ly,  they  are  literally  without  blemish.  After  several  minute  inspections  of  the 
naked  corpus  by  surgeons,  they,  if  found  perfect  in  their  physique,  are  accepted ; 
and,  all  being  very  young  men,  very  few,  if  any,  of  them  can  have  been  injured 
by  previous  habits.  A  large  majority  of  them  write  their  names ;  so  that  there 
can  be  claimed  for  them,  for  their  class,  a  high  degree  of  intelligence.  It  is  said 
many  of  them  are  foreigners ;  this  is  true,  and  in  that  they  represent  very  per 
fectly  the  population  of  the  country.  Their  pay,  though  nominally  less  than 
laborers',  with  all  the  advantages  of  clothing  and  food  and  physicians'  bills  free, 
with  good  care  in  the  hospitals  when  they  are  sick,  makes  it  appreciated  by 
many  as  more  desirable  than  the  precarious  wages  of  the  laborer  who  may  lose 


FAMILY  AFFECTIONS.  243 

all  his  earnings  through  the  grasping  cupidity  of  the  doctors.  Soldiers  cannot 
be  associates  for  refined  persons ;  but  they  ought  now  to  be  as  much  respected 
as  it  is  the  custom  to  despise  them.  When  called  upon  for  duty  they  do  not 
count  the  cost. 

Numerous  illustrations  might  be  given  of  General  Johnston's  deep 
and  tender  feeling  for  his  family — an  affection  that  never  failed  in  any 
act  of  self-sacrifice,  and  was  manifested  rather  by  a  constant  course  of 
gracious  and  forbearing  conduct  than  by  extravagant  demonstration. 
These  are  for  the  most  part  omitted,  as  no  public  end  would  be  served 
by  their  introduction  ;  but  the  following  extract  from  one  of  his  letters 
to  his  daughters,  with  its  personal  allusions,  is  given  because  it  truly 
represents  his  relations  to  his  children  : 

The  thermometer  has  fallen  once  to  22°  below  zero,  and  often  to  10°  below. 
I  do  not  mind  the  cold  now.  I  ride  on  horseback  or  walk  every  day  without 
an  overcoat.  My  mustache  soon  becomes  an  icicle;  yet  I  do  not  suffer  from 
cold,  or  have  the  dread  of  it  that  every  one  feels  for  a  Texas  norther.  I  am  in 
robust  health.  Every  symptom  of  liver-complaint  has  vanished,  and  I  am  now 
as  active  and  strong  as  I  have  ever  been.  You  may  know  that  my  fare  is  not 
meagre  when  I  tell  you  I  weigh  194  pounds. 

Will  lias  a  charming  family,  and  I  am  delighted  with  your  account  of  my 
dear  little  granddaughters.  I  am  sure  he  deserves  all  the  blessings  with  which 
he  is  surrounded,  and  that  your  presence  gives  additional  sunlight  to  the  happy 
scene.  I  wish  I  could  be  with  you.more,  that  I  might  manifest  the  love  I  bear 
for  you  and  him  and  all  my  children,  and  the  pride  I  feel  in  the  high  tone  and 
honorable  principles  of  each.  Destiny  has  otherwise  decreed.  I  do  not  repine, 
for  in  a  great  measure  we  make  our  own  destiny,  and  ought  to  submit  without 
murmuring ;  but  I  hope  the  future  has  many  good  gifts  in  store  for  us.  /  trust 
in  God;  in  that  consists  the  sum  of  my  religion.  No  hour  passes  without  my 
thoughts  reverting  to  you  and  each  one  of  my  family. 

When  General  Johnston  relinquished  his  command  in  Utah,  it  was 
with  that  mingled  feeling  of  regret  and  relief  that  accompanies  the 
severance  of  ties  binding  us  to  comrades  with  whom  we  have  shared 
arduous  duties,  to  enter  on  a  more  attractive  field.  Mutual  confidence, 
affection,  and  esteem,  bound  together  the  army  and  its  commander. 
General  Henry  Heth  told  the  writer  that  the  most  touching  scene  he 
ever  witnessed,  except  the  surrender  at  Appomattox  Court-House,  was 
General  Johnston's  departure  from  the  army  of  Utah.  As  he  rode  along 
the  line  of  soldiers,  drawn  up  to  bid  him  farewell,  there  was  not  a  dry 
eye. 

During  General  Johnston's  official  career  in  Utah,  as  elsewhere,  it 
was  his  wish  so  to  conduct  the  affairs  of  his  command  that  every  citizen 
might  feel  that  the  Government  he  represented  was  ready  to  accord  him 
the  most  generous  treatment.  When  the  snow-storms  broke  upon  him 
in  the  valleys  of  the  Wahsatch,  he  made  common  cause  with  the  army 


244  CAMP  FLOYD. 

contractors  against  the  elements,  and,  in  serving  the  Government  and 
providing  for  his  army,  he  was  able  to  place  the  army  contractors  and 
merchants  with  trains  for  Utah  under  heavy  obligations.  One  of  the 
wealthiest  and  most  powerful  of  these  merchant  princes  of  the  desert 
sent  General  Johnston  a  New-Year's  gift  that  gave  rise  to  the  following 
correspondence : 

CAMP  SCOTT,  January  1,  1958. 

DEAR  SIR:  Accept  the  articles  sent  you  on  the  inclosed  memorandum  as  a 
New-Year's  gift  from  your  humble  servant, 

General  Johnston  sent  a  polite  note  of  thanks,  but  on  opening  the 
package  next  day  discovered  the  character  of  the  present,  and  at  once 
returned  it  with  the  following  note : 

CAMP  SCOTT,  January  2,  1853. 

To ,  Esq. 

DEAR  SIR:  In  my  note  to  you  yesterday  evening,  accepting  your  New-Year's 
gift,  I  thought  it  was  some  trifle  in  value,  offered  in  a  spirit  of  kindness,  which 
I  might  properly  receive ;  hut,  on  examination  of  the  packages,  finding  that  it 
is  a  splendid  and  costly  service  of  plate,  I  feel  constrained  by  our  official  rela 
tions  to  decline  the  acceptance  of  it,  which  I  do  with  the  utmost  respect  for 
you,  and  with  grateful  acknowledgment  of  the  friendly  sentiment  which  dic 
tated  the  offer. 

I  beg  that  you  will  believe  that,  in  declining  to  receive  this  token  of  your 
regard  (but  which  will  also  be  considered  as  an  evidence  of  your  approbation  of 
my  conduct  as  commander),  I  am  actuated  by  no  other  feeling  than  a  sense  of 
military  propriety. 

In  the  turmoil  of  parties  preceding  a  presidential  election,  promi 
nent  citizens  not  unfrequently  endeavor  to  find  some  new  man,  with 
such  elements  of  popularity  and  usefulness  as  will  render  his  name  ac 
ceptable  to  the  people.  Polk  and  Taylor,  Pierce  and  Lincoln,  have  all 
been  selections  of  this  sort.  While  General  Johnston  was  in  Utah, 
some  leading  gentlemen  in  the  West,  of  conservative  views,  and  doubt 
less  moved  by  a  friendship  that  overlooked  all  obstacles,  fixed  on  his 
name  in  conference  as  a  proper  one  to  be  introduced  into  the  canvass 
for  the  presidency.  They  believed  that  he  combined  certain  popular 
features  that  would  make  him  strong  before  the  people  in  an  uprising 
against  faction  and  fanaticism,  and  with  this  view  they  communicated 
with  him  to  learn  his  feelings  on  the  subject. 

General  Johnston  made  the  following  reply  to  one  of  them,  who 
united  in  himself  a  warm  and  loyal  friendship  with  an  ardent  patriotism  : 

"I  have  no  ambition  for  the  high  place  you  mention  in  your  letter;  or,  I 
might  better  say,  I  have  no  taste  for  political  life.  You  describe  a  state  of  things 
for  which  there  is  no  cure,  and  which  it  would  be  wholly  beyond  the  power  of 
any  man,  no  matter  how  honest  or  how  able,  to  remedy.  It  must  run  its  course. 
When  the  moral  basis  of  political  action  has  become  corrupt,  it  is  a  disease 


KNOW  THYSELF.  245 

which  cannot  be  arrested.  It  is  like  some  diseases  of  the  human  body,  which 
men  wise  and  learned  in  medicine  abstain  from  treating.  We  must  imitate 
them.  We  must  watch  and  sustain  the  patient  when  he  sinks,  and  trust  to  the 
medicinal  power  of  Nature.  Time  will,  I  trust,  restore  to  us  a  sound  and  healthy 
basis  of  moral  action,  such  as  we  set  out  with  as  a  people  in  the  days  of  Wash 
ington  and  the  elder  Adams. 

In  another  letter,  to  the  same  friend,  he  says : 

I  have  known  you  long,  more  than  the  lifetime  of  a  generation.  ...  It  must 
be  believed  from  our  personal  antecedents  that,  with  you  (if  such  a  course  on 
my  part  were  possible  with  any  one)  I  would  not  feign  a  reluctance  to  take  that 
which  I  ardently  desired.  You  will  know  that  my  opinions,  expressed  in  refer 
ence  to  so  important  a  matter,  are  candid  and  sincere,  and  that  my  decision  as 
to  my  own  course  is  final. 

I  have  given  the  subject  full  consideration,  for  it  has  been  before  me  for 
some  time,  and  I  have  been  ruled  by  a  sense  of  duty  in  the  conclusion  I  have 
arrived  at,  and  not  by  desire.  I  well  comprehend  that,  to  be  thought  worthy  of 
so  high  a  trust  is  an  honor,  and  at  the  same  time' a  testimonial,  than  which  there 
is  none  higher ;  but,  while  entertaining  toward  my  friends,  should  they  proffer  a 
nomination,  a  grateful  sense  of  their  kindness  and  good  opinion,  in  order  to 
prove  myself  worthy  of  such  regard,  I  should  feel  it  my  patriotic  duty  to  com 
mend  to  their  choice  some  other  citizen  more  competent  for  the  discharge  of  the 
duties  appertaining  to  that  eminent  station. 

Your  partiality,  my  friend,  would  draw  me  from  a  vocation  and  duties  for 
which,  from  my  education  and  taste,  I  have  I  believe  some  qualification,  to  place 
me  upon  an  arena  which,  with  my  views  of  it,  would  seem  to  demand  a  life-long 
familiarity  with  the  objects  and  operations  of  our  institutions  to  do  justice  to 
the  requirements  of  so  responsible  a  position.  I  will  not  consent,  but  will  rather 
imitate  your  own  example  when  civic  honors  were  offered  to  you. 

In  a  letter  to  the  present  writer,  adverting  to  the  foregoing,  Gen 
eral  Johnston  says : 

My  friends,  some  of  them,  in  the  States,  say  that  a  glittering  prize  is  within 
my  grasp,  in  their  opinion.  If  I  had  you  to  write  my  answer,  declining  the 
proffered  honor,  if  by  any  chance  it  should  be  offered,  I  could,  by  displaying  the 
folly  of  our  people  in  selecting  men  for  public  office  without  any  regard  to  their 
fitness  by  education  and  training  for  the  particular  duties  they  are  called  upon 
to  perform,  more  entitle  myself  to  their  good  opinion  than  by  accepting.  My 
education,  my  taste,  and  my  ambition,  if  I  have  any,  would  find  nothing  con 
genial  in  the  performance  of  the  duties  of  a  civil  office.  If  success  were  certain. 
I  still  have  honor  and  patriotism  enough  to  say  that  there  are  others  much  more 
capable  and  more  fit  for  the  station  who  ought  to  have  precedence.  A  friend  of 
mine  used  to  say  that  there  is  nothing  in  which  we  so  well  display  our  judgment 
as  to  stop  speaking  when  we  have  said  enough.  I  suppose  it  must  be  the  same 
in  writing.  I  therefore  dismiss  the  subject. 

When  General  Johnston  first  went  to  Texas,  he  bought  a  league  of 
land,  which  was  afterward  "  squatted  "  upon,  and  thus  became  the  sub- 


246  CAMP  FLOYD. 

ject  of  litigation.  This  suit  wore  on  for  many  years,  the  local  claimants 
obtaining  all  those  advantages  which  the  elective  system  gives  the  voter 
over  the  non-resident.  The  precedents  in  the  State  courts  pointed  to 
a  final  decision  adverse  to  General  Johnston,  while  in  the  Federal  courts 
the  adjudications  were  in  his  favor.  For  this  reason,  and  to  remove 
the  cases  from  the  sphere  of  local  influence,  the  attorneys  for  General 
Johnston  wished  to  bring  them  before  the  United  States  tribunals.  It 
was  therefore  proposed  to  him,  through  the  present  writer,  that,  as  he 
had  been  so  long  an  officer  of  the  army,  and  for  some  years  absent  from 
the  State,  he  should  renounce  his  citizenship  for  this  purpose.  The 
following  was  his  reply,  from  Camp  Floyd,  August  27,  1859  : 

My  citizenship  in  Texas  was  obtained  at  the  cost  of  the  bloom  of  health  and 
the  prime  of  life  spent  in  the  service  of  the  State,  and  of  property,  which,  if  I 
had  it  now,  would  constitute  a  princely  estate.  I  will  not  give  it  up  now, 
though  I  should  lose  in  consequence  every  foot  of  land  I  have  in  the  State. 
This  I  would  regard  as  a  mere  mess  of  pottage  in  comparison  with  my  citizen 
ship. 

General  Johnston  returned  to  the  Atlantic  coast  by  way  of  Cali 
fornia  and  the  Isthmus,  as  it  was  too  cold  to  cross  the  Plains.  In 
Southern  Utah,  an  Indian  chief,  to  prove  his  friendship  and  warn  off 
prowling  clansmen,  ran  on  foot  for  several  days  beside  his  wagon,  keep 
ing  pace  with  the  trot  of  the  mules.  General  Johnston  on  parting 
gave  him  among  other  presents,  to  his  extravagant  delight,  "  a  coat  of 
many  colors  " — a  gay  patchwork  quilt  that  had  served  through  the  cam 
paign.  He  said  it  was  a  prudent  gift,  as  its  bizarre  brightness  was 
fascinating  enough  to  an  Indian  to  stir  up  a  border  war,  or,  at  least, 
induce  a  massacre. 

At  San  Francisco  he  saw  the  first  Japanese  embassy  to  this  country. 
He  was  much  interested  in  the  Japs,  and  observed  them,  both  then  and 
afterward  at  Washington,  with  friendly  curiosity.  He  remarked  to  the 
writer  in  regard  to  them  : 

How  apt  we  are  to  undervalue  what  is  unfamiliar!  We  call  the  Japanese 
barbarians.  Yet  compare  their  skill  and  perfectness  in  all  handicraft  with  our 
own.  Look  at  their  cutlery  and  lacquer-ware,  their  fabrics  of  paper  and  silk, 
and  the  cunning  joinery  of  one  of  their  little  cabinets;  and  then  consider  how 
few  men  in  America  can  make  a  bureau-drawer  that  will  open  without  a  jerk. 
Then,  too,  they  are  brave,  aspiring,  and  sensitively  honorable.  We  call  them 
barbarians ;  but  such  a  people  ought  to  have  a  great  future. 

No  important  incidents  occurred  on  his  voyage  or  after  his  arrival 
in  the  East.  General  Scott  received  him  with  the  utmost  kindness, 
approved  heartily  of  all  his  acts,  and  spoke  of  him  publicly  in  the  most 
unqualified  terms  of  commendation.  The  office  of  quartermaster-gen 
eral,  with  the  assimilated  rank  of  brigadier-general,  became  vacant  in 


HOME  AGAIN. 

the  summer  of  1860,  and  was  conferred  by  Secretary  Floyd  on  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  Joseph  E.  Johnston.  It  was  said  at  the  time  that  General 
Scott  urged  the  name  of  General  A.  S.  Johnston  for  the  appointment ; 
and  a  rumor  was  prevalent  that  he  had  also  filed  a  paper  in  the  War 
Department,  recommending  him  as  commander-in-chief  in  case  of  his 
own  decease.  Without  means  of  verifying  the  correctness  of  these 
reports,  they  evince,  nevertheless,  the  estimate  that  General  Scott  was 
commonly  supposed  to  place  upon  him. 

General  Johnston  was  greatly  rejoiced  to  be  reunited  to  his  family 
after  two  years  and  a  half  of  separation.  His  wife  and  children  had 
resided  in  Louisville  under  the  protection  of  kind  friends  during  his 
absence  ;  and,  now  that  he  was  again  in  a  home  of  his  own  for  a  brief 
season,  its  happiness  was  the  brighter  by  the  contrast  with  the  clouds 
that  lowered  over  the  world  without.  His  health  had  been  completely 
restored  by  three  winters  in  Utah  ;  and,  such  was  his  vigor  that,  at 
fifty-eight  years  of  age,  he  might  have  been  mistaken  for  forty-five. 
He  spent  most  of  the  summer  and  fall  in  Louisville,  except  when  called 
to  Washington  on  army  business.  In  Kentucky  and  wherever  he  went 
the  greatest  respect  and  consideration  were  shown  him. 

The  year  1860  was  the  crisis  of  American  destiny.  The  presidential 
election  that  resulted  in  the  triumph  of  the  antislavery  Republican 
party  was  a  season  of  tremendous  political  excitement,  and  every  pas 
sion  that  sways  a  popular  government  was  aroused  to  the  utmost. 
General  Johnston  beheld  the  scene  with  gloomy  forebodings,  and  yet 
with  a  calmness  which  did  not  condescend  to  discussion  even.  His 
opinion,  his  voice,  his  utmost  energies,  would  have  no  effect  in  stilling 
the  storm  which  he  had  done  nothing  to  stir.  The  angry  passions  of 
men  seemed  to  be  moved  by  an  unseen  power,  as  the  waves  of  the  sea 
are  lifted  by  the  breath  of  the  tempest.  Though  far  from  feeling  in 
difference,  yet,  as  he  had  no  power  for  active  good,  he  maintained  that 
attitude  which  he  thought  most  becoming  in  an  army-officer  of  his  rank 
— the  utmost  reticence.  He  saw  the  wisdom,  the  eloquence,  the  polit 
ical  skill,  of  powerful  and  patriotic  statesmen  set  at  naught  in  the 
elemental  strife ;  and  to  him — a  man  of  action,  not  of  words — silence 
seemed  the  only  proper  course. 

During  the  summer,  prominent  Texans  at  Washington  had  been 
soliciting  the  secretary  to  assign  General  Johnston  to  command  the 
Southwestern  Department.  Finally,  on  the  1st  of  November,  the  ad 
jutant-general  informed  General  Johnston  that  the  secretary  had  given 
orders  to  that  effect,  and  wished  to  see  him  as  soon  as  convenient.  He 
was  at  the  same  time  apprised,  by  telegram  and  letter,  of  October  30th, 
that  General  Scott  desired  to  send  him  to  California  to  take  command 
of  the  Pacific  coast.  On  November  2d  General  Scott  addressed  an 
official  communication  to  the  adjutant-general  to  that  effect. 


248  CAMP  FLOYD. 

When  General  Johnston  reported  to  the  Secretary  of  "War,  he  had 
made  up  his  mind,  as  he  subsequently  informed  the  writer,  not  to  go  to 
Texas.  If  the  State  seceded,  and  the  Federal  Government  did  not 
promptly  accommodate  the  questions  thus  started,  a  collision  would 
probably  occur.  In  this  event,  General  Johnston  took  the  view  that 
he  could  only  surrender  the  charge  committed  to  him  to  the  authority 
from  which  he  had  received  it.  He  would  thus  be  forced  either  to  fail 
in  his  duty  to  the  power  which  had  confided  in  him  and  to  which  he 
owed  service,  or  in  his  duty  to  the  Commonwealth  to  which  he  owed 
allegiance ;  to  violate  the  trust  reposed  in  him,  or  resist  the  State  which 
had  a  paramount  claim  upon  him.  He  said  that  it  was  impossible  for 
him  to  do  the  former ;  and  he  would  not  be  so  placed  as  to  be  com 
pelled  to  encounter  his  State.  With  this  dilemma  before  him,  he  pre 
ferred  to  resign  rather  than  accept  the  command  of  the  Department  of 
Texas.  The  alternative  was  not  forced  upon  him.  He  placed  his  pref 
erences  for  California  before  Mr.  Floyd  in  so  strong  a  light,  though 
without  touching  the  above-named  difficulty,  that,  with  General  Scott's 
backing  in  the  matter,  he  was  assigned  to  the  Department  of  the  Pa 
cific. 

General  Johnston,  before  leaving  for  California,  manumitted  his 
body-servant,  Randolph,  a  slave  born  in  his  family  in  1832.  Randolph 
had  served  him  .faithfully  in  Texas  and  Utah,  and  wished  to  go  with 
him  to  California.  He  was  employed  on  wages,  and  followed  his  mas 
ter's  fortunes  to  California,  and  afterward  to  the  Confederacy.  He 
was  with  him  at  Shiloh,  remained  in  the  Southern  army  till  the  close  of 
the  war,  and  yet  lives  a  humble  but  honorable  remembrancer  of  the 
loyal  attachment  which  could  subsist  between  master  and  slave. 

General  Johnston  sailed  from  New  York  on  the  21st  of  December, 
with  his  family,  by  way  of  the  Panama  route,  reaching  San  Francisco 
about  the  middle  of  January.  During  the  three  months  that  he  admin 
istered  the  department  no  military  events  occurred,  except  some  move 
ments  of  troops  against  the  Indians,  for  the  management  of  which  he 
received  the  approbation  of  the  press  and  people  at  the  time.  It  may 
be  here  mentioned,  in  advance,  that  he  resigned  his  commission  April 
10th,  and  was  relieved  by  General  Sumner  April  25,  1861. 


ORIGIN  OF  THE  TROUBLES.  249 

CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE    SOUTHERN    CONFEDERACY. 

As  the  purpose  of  this  biography  is  to  set  forth,  not  to  justify,  the 
acts  and  opinions  of  its  subject,  a  discussion  of  the  causes  of  the  civil 
war  would  here  be  out  of  place.  Success  gives  strong  ground  for 
self-complacency,  and  so  does  martyrdom.  Hence  the  very  conclusive- 
ness  of  such  an  argument,  while  not  needed  to  confirm  the  faith  of  its 
believers,  would  only  serve  to  arouse  anew  the  prejudices  of  adversa 
ries.  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  the  truth  of  history  ;  since  all  the  phases 
of  that  famous  controversy,  though  settled  at  last  by  the  arbitrament 
of  the  sword,  had  been  thoroughly  sifted  and  debated,  before  this  final 
appeal,  by  orators,  statesmen,  and  jurists — and  by  an  innumerable 
throng  of  politicians,  preachers,  philanthropists,  editors,  writers,  and 
talkers. 

Nevertheless,  it  seems  necessary  here  to  state  briefly  the  standpoint 
of  the  Southern  people,  as  an  historical  fact.  In  a  struggle  so  momen 
tous  and  so  unequal,  it  is  impossible  to  understand  the  motives  that 
influenced  the  best  men  of  the  South  to  maintain  her  cause  with  such 
unexampled  unanimity  and  devotion,  without  knowing  the  beliefs  and 
opinions  upon  which  their  action  was  based. 

In  1861  long-pending  disputes  between  the  slaveholding  and  non- 
slaveholding  States  came  to  an  issue.  Springing  primarily,  doubtless, 
from  the  difference  in  social  organization,  the  more  immediate  causes  of 
strife  were  certain  real  or  imaginary  collisions  of  material  interests,  a 
different  mode  of  interpreting  the  Constitution,  and  the  agitation  for 
the  abolition  of  negro-slavery.  Of  the  first,  there  were  none  so  vital 
as  to  be  incapable  of  adjustment,  as  had  been  shown  in  the  tariff  com 
promise  with  South  Carolina  in  1832-'33.  Nor  would  theoretical  dif 
ferences  about  the  Constitution  have  assumed  so  dangerous  a  form,  un 
less  they  had  been  embodied  in  a  sectional  or  revolutionary  movement. 
But,  at  the  South,  it  was  the  Northern  method  of  dealing  with  the  sla 
very  question  which  was  considered  not  only  sectional  and  revolution 
ary,  but  unjust  and  dangerous  to  its  property  and  liberties. 

The  material  interests  and  social  and  political  difficulties  involved  in 
the  slavery  question  rendered  it  impossible  for  the  South  to  consider  it 
dispassionately.  On  the  other  hand,  the  sentimental  and  philanthropic 
origin  of  the  slavery  agitation  in  the  North  made  it  impossible  to  fix 
any  legal  or  constitutional  limits  to  the  abolition  crusade.  At  the  South 
the  Constitution  was  regarded  as  an  historical  document.  It  was  a  char- 


250  THE  SOUTHERN  CONFEDERACY. 

ter  conveying  to  the  Federal  Government,  as  the  agent  of  the  States, 
certain  well-defined  powers  for  certain  specific  purposes  ;  all  powers 
not  thus  explicitly  granted  being  reserved  to  the  several  States.  The 
instrument  was  to  be  strictly  construed  ;  and  a  breach  of  the  covenant 
entitled  the  aggrieved  party  to  redress,  the  measure  of  which  the  State 
must  fix,  as  no  common  tribunal  had  been  established  for  that  purpose. 
This  involved  the  right  of  withdrawal  from  the  Union,  either  by  peace 
able  secession  or  by  revolution.  In  the  extreme  South  the  former  was 
regarded  as  the  legitimate  method.  When  the  emergency  arose,  those 
States  attempted  thus  to  exercise  their  right. 

In  the  North  these  primitive  views  of  the  Constitution  were  changed 
by  an  immense  influx  of  European  immigrants,  who,  controlled  by  spec 
ulative  republicans,  regarded  the  Constitution  as  a  mere  Bill  of  Rights, 
and  the  mission  of  the  republic  to  be  the  emancipation  and  illumina 
tion  of  the  world.  A  modern  national,  or  rather  an  imperial,  theory  of 
the  nature  of  our  Government  prevailed  there.  Legalists  gave  form 
and  color  of  authority  to  attacks  on  slavery,  which  were  regarded  in 
the  South  as  willful,  dangerous,  and  manifest  infractions  of  the  Consti 
tution. 

The  irritations  of  the  controversy  were  great  and  growing.  The 
loss  of  $1,000,000  worth  of  slaves  annually  ;  aids  to  their  escape  and 
incitements  to  their  insurrection  ;  resistance  to  their  rendition  when 
fugitives  by  mobs  or  by  nullifying  State  laws  ;  appeals  to  the  "  higher- 
law  "  of  conscience  as  overruling  the  Constitution  ;  and  the  intemperate 
invectives  of  the  abolitionists,  engendered  a  bitter  and  unmeasured  re 
sentment  in  the  South.  This  was  evinced  in  words  and  acts. 

It  is  true  that,  when  Mr.  Lincoln  was  elected  President  in  1860,  the 
Republican  party  made  the  basis  of  its  creed  the  exclusion  of  slavery 
from  the  Territories  of  the  Union  by  act  of  Congress.  But  this  will 
hardly  be  regarded  now  as  more  than  a  mere  phase  of  the  antislavery 
agitation.  It  was  so  considered  in  the  South  then.  It  was  there  held 
to  be  a  gross  violation  of  the  Constitution.  The  success  of  this  party 
opened  to  the  South  a  vista  of  unnumbered  ills.  The  Gulf  States 
resolved  on  immediate  separation :  South  Carolina  began  by  seceding 
December  20, 1860 ;  the  others  quickly  followed  ;  and  the  government  of 
the  Confederate  States  was  formed. 

The  Confederate  Government  was  organized  February  8,  1861,  by 
South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Florida,  Alabama,  Mississippi,  and  Louisiana, 
which  adopted  a  Constitution  not  differing  materially  from  the  old  one. 
It  was  not  of  the  provisions  of  the  Constitution  that  they  complained, 
but  of  their  infraction.  The  Convention  of  Texas  passed  an  ordinance 
of  secession  February  1st,  which  was  ratified  by  a  vote  of  the  people 
February  23d,  and  went  into  effect  March  2d.  Thus,  the  seven  most 
southern  States  presented  a  compact  front  to  the  Union,  from  the  Rio 


OPINION  IN  THE  SOUTH.  251 

Grande  to  the  Atlantic.  The  party  in  those  States  which  had  preferred 
cooperation  to  separate  State  action  found  in  the  prompt  organization 
of  the  new  Confederacy  a  more  practical  solution  of  their  policy  than 
in  prolonged  and  indecisive  deliberation,  and  at  once  coalesced  with 
their  opponents. 

The  Provisional  Congress,  which  met  at  Montgomery,  Alabama, 
elected  Jefferson  Davis,  of  Mississippi,  President,  and  Alexander  H.  Ste 
phens,  of  Georgia,  Vice-President  ;  and  the  new  government  fell  into 
shape,  and  went  into  operation,  with  as  little  friction  as  if  it  had  stood 
the  tests  of  a  decade.  All  of  its  utterances  were  pacific  ;  and,  though 
the  President  did  not  share  the  expectation,  many  of  the  leaders  and  a 
large  part  of  the  people  confidently  believed  that  they  would  be  per 
mitted  to  separate  without  war.  This  delusion,  and  a  kindred  one 
indulged  in  by  certain  dreamy  statisticians  and  turgid  orators,  and  for 
mulated  in  the  phrase  "  Cotton  is  king,"  encouraged  a  vainglorious 
apathy  in  the  masses,  and  enabled  their  representatives  to  paralyze  in 
many  essential  points  the  policy  of  preparation  which  the  President 
undoubtedly  desired  to  inaugurate.  Still,  the  fervid  condition  of  the 
public  mind  enabled  him  to  secure  appropriate  legislation  on  most  mat 
ters  of  the  first  importance.  An  instance  of  the  inadequacy  of  the 
provision  for  war  is  to  be  found  in  the  appropriation  by  the  Mississippi 
Legislature,  after  the  act  of  secession,  of  $150,000  for  armament, 
when  Mr.  Davis  recommended  $3,000,000.  The  language  and  acts  of 
the  "  cotton  "  fanatics  lent  plausibility  to  the  idea  that  union  with  the 
border  States  was  scarcely  desired  by  the  extreme  South. 

The  establishment  of  the  Confederate  Government  had  the  effect, 
in  the  other  Southern  States,  of  drawing  more  sharply  the  lines  which 
divided  opinion.  Scarcely  anybody  in  them  had  wished  for  disunion, 
though  many  believed  it  inevitable;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  there  were 
few  willing  to  avow  themselves  unconditional  submissionists  to  Federal 
decrees.  Those  hopeless  of  compromise  and  peace  now  began  to  urge 
measures  that  would  place  their  States  in  a  position  for  defense,  and 
thus  give  weight  to  their  voice  in  the  final  settlement.  They  advo 
cated  either  an  alliance  with  the  Confederacy,  or  such  prompt  and  simul 
taneous  action  as  would  secure  sufficient  constitutional  guarantees,  or 
at  least  convince  the  North  that  war  was  not  expedient.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  unconditional  Union  men  were  able  to  point  out  to  the  rich, 
the  timid,  and  the  indifferent,  that  a  disruption  along  the  line  between 
the  free  and  slave  States  exposed  the  border  States  to  great  peril  and 
damage  ;  and  that  the  precipitate  action  of  the  cotton  States,  without 
proper  delay  for  conference  or  cooperation,  was  derogatory  to  their  dig 
nity,  and  with  the  selfish  view  of  interposing  them  as  a  barrier  to 
Northern  aggression,  or  of  coercing  them  "  to  follow  South  Carolina." 
The  reply  to  this  was,  that  the  Unionists  had  prevented  that  coQpera- 


252  THE  SOUTHERN  CONFEDERACY. 

tion  whose  failure  they  now  resented  ;  that  the  danger  was  to  all,  and 
resistance  to  be  effectual  must  be  united,  and  hence  that  punctilio  as  to 
forms  was  absurd;  and  that  complete  armament  and  a  solid  front  would 
be  the  strongest  arguments  for  peace,  and  the  only  way  to  restore  the 
Union  as  it  was. 

Between  these  extremes  halted  the  body  of  the  people.  They  were 
indignant  at  the  conduct  of  the  Republican  party,  but  unconvinced  that 
secession  would  afford  a  safe  remedy  for  their  grievances.  If  they 
should  abide  in  the  Union,  their  liberties  and  property  were  at  the 
mercy  of  hostile  legislation ;  if  they  went  with  the  South,  they  were  in 
danger  of  subjugation  by  the  sword.  Hence  the  final  decisions  and 
actions  of  persons  were  governed  more  by  their  circumstances  and  char 
acters  than  by  their  abstract  opinions.  While  the  Unionists  condemned 
all  preparation  for  war,  as  leading  to  that  result,  the  State-rights  men 
denounced  vacillation  and  apathy  as  the  prelude  to  submission  to  tyr 
anny  and  political  death.  To  a  community  in  doubt,  inaction  is  the 
natural  policy;  and  it  only  needed  moderation  and  a  pacific  purpose  on 
the  part  of  the  Administration  to  have  preserved  the  Union  intact  in 
seven  Southern  States,  and  to  have  inaugurated  measures  of  peaceful 
reconstruction  with  the  others.  But  this  would  not  have  accorded  with 
the  designs  of  its  leaders  ;  and,  though  President  Buchanan  is  reviled 
for  permitting  the  peaceful  withdrawal  of  half  the  Southern  States, 
President  Lincoln  is  applauded  for  driving  the  other  half  into  armed 
resistance.  A  survey  of  the  whole  field  evinces  the  fact  that  the  border 
States,  though  averse  to  disunion,  and  not  satisfied  with  the  prospect 
of  the  Confederacy,  were  resolved  to  maintain  their  own  rights,  as  they 
understood  them,  and  to  resist  the  coercion  of  the  seceding  States. 

The  voice  of  Virginia  had  all  along  been  for  conciliation,  but  with 
out  sacrifice  of  principle.  Her  traditions,  her  moderation,  and  her  un 
wavering  courage,  gave  her  the  right  to  be  heard,  but  her  counsels 
were  drowned  in  the  tumult  of  passion. 

The  Virginia  Convention,  in  spite  of  the  failure  of  many  well-meant 
efforts  to  save  the  Union  by  compromise,  as  late  as  the  4th  of  April, 
rejected,  by  a  vote  of  eighty-nine  to  forty-five,  a  motion  to  submit  an 
ordinance  of  secession  to  the  popular  vote.  Fort  Sumter  surrendered 
on  April  13th,  after  thirty-four  hours'  resistance  ;  and  on  the  15th  of 
April  President  Lincoln  issued  a  proclamation,  under  the  pretended 
authority  of  an  act  of  Congress  of  1.795,  calling  on  the  Governors  of 
the  several  States  for  militia — 75,000  in  the  aggregate — to  suppress 
certain  "combinations"  in  the  seceding  States.  Governor  Letcher,  a 
sturdy  patriot,  replied  on  the  17th  : 

I  have  only  to  say  that  the  militia  of  Virginia  will  not  be  furnished  to  the 
powers  at  Washington  for  any  such  use  or  purpose  as  they  have  in  view.  Your 
object  is  to  subjugate  the  Southern  States,  and  a  requisition  made  upon  me  for 


THE   REVOLUTION.  253 

such  an  object — an  object,  in  my  judgment,  not  within  the  province  of  the  Con 
stitution  or  the  act  of  1795 — will  not  be  complied  with.  You  have  chosen  to  in 
augurate  civil  war,  and,  having  done  so,  we  will  meet  it  in  a  spirit  as  determined 
as  the  Administration  has  exhibited  toward  the  South. 

On  the  same  day  Virginia  passed  an  ordinance  of  secession,  subject 
to  a  ratification  by  the  vote  of  the  people  on  the  fourth  Thursday  of 
May  following. 

The  decisive  step  taken  by  Virginia,  in  placing  herself  in  the  breach, 
is  among  tbe  most  heroic  acts  in  history.  The  issue  was  not  of  her 
choosing,  but  was  forced  upon  her ;  she  did  not  seek  it,  neither  did  she 
shrink  from  or  evade  it.  Detached  from  the  Confederacy  by  States 
still  passive,  she  was,  even  with  their  support,  a  salient,  inviting  attack; 
an  advanced  post  with  no  natural  barriers,  no  other  defenses  than  her 
indomitable  sons.  But  she  counted  upon  the  derided  chivalric  instinct 
of  the  South  to  come  to  her  rescue,  and  she  was  not  disappointed.  The 
responses  of  the  Southern  Governors  were  in  a  like  spirit  with  Letcher's. 
Jackson,  of  Missouri,  replied,  "  Your  requisition  is  illegal,  unconstitu 
tional,  diabolical,  and  cannot  be  complied  with."  Harris,  of  Tennessee, 
said,  "  Tennessee  will  not  furnish  a  single  man  for  coercion,  but  50,000, 
if  necessary,  for  the  defense  of  our  rights  or  those  of  our  Southern 
brethren."  All  acted  with  vigor,  except  in  Kentucky  and  Maryland. 
Arkansas  and  Tennessee  seceded  May  6th,  and  North  Carolina  May 
20th.  The  popular  vote,  to  which  the  several  ordinances  were  sub 
mitted,  ratified  them  by  overwhelming  majorities.  In  Tennessee,  which 
had  a  little  before  refused  by  a  large  popular  majority  even  to  call  a 
convention,  the  ordinance  of  secession  was  now  passed  by  a  vote  of 
104,913  for,  to  47,238  against  it.  In  Virginia,  the  vote  was  125,950 
for,  and  20,273  against  secession.  There  was  a  similar  'revulsion  of 
feeling  in  the  other  States  ;  and  the  change  was  due,  not  as  Greeley 
and  other  Northern  writers  allege,  to  fraud  and  intimidation,  but  to 
despair  of  justice  and  peace,  and  a  resolution  to  resist  coercion. 

Most  of  the  Union  leaders  gave  in  their  adhesion  to  the  new  gov 
ernment  with  more  or  less  frankness  and  zeal,  and  notably  the  Hon. 
John  Bell,  of  Tennessee,  the  late  Union  candidate  for  the  presidency;  and 
party  distinctions  were  lost  in  patriotic  emulation.  The  only  marked 
exception  was  in  the  mountain-region  of  Western  Virginia  and  East 
Tennessee,  in  which  prevailed  the  spirit  of  unconditional  submission. 
This  sentiment,  and  its  vulnerability,  enabled  Mr.  Lincoln,  with  the  aid 
of  ambitious  local  leaders,  to  effect  the  schism  of  West  Virginia,  and, 
by  a  proceeding  totally  unconstitutional  and  revolutionary,  to  establish 
it  as  a  State.  In  East  Tennessee,  a  sedition  was  organized  by  Andrew 
Johnson,  T.  A.  R.  Nelson,  and  William  G.  Brownlow,  which  proved  a 
constant  source  of  weakness  and  danger  to  the  Confederacy. 

Passing  by,  for  the  present,  transactions  in  Maryland,  Kentucky, 


254:  THE   SOUTHERN   CONFEDERACY. 

and  Missouri,  brief  mention  will  suffice,  in  this  connection,  of  the  mili 
tary  events  which  happened  before  General  Johnston's  arrival  at  Rich 
mond.  The  reduction  of  Fort  Sumter  and  President  Lincoln's  call  for 
75,000  men  for  "  the  irrepressible  conflict "  were  met  with  tumultuous 
fervor  at  the  North  as  the  signal  for  war.  The  North  gave  its  men 
and  money  without  stint  to  the  work  of  "  putting  down  the  rebellion." 
Three  months  time  was  set  apart  for  the  work,  and  troops  were  hur 
ried  to  Washington,  ostensibly  to  protect  the  capital,  but,  in  fact,  as 
the  advance-guard  of  the  army  of  invasion. 

As  "the  defense  of  the  capital"  made  Washington  the  first  and 
most  important  base  of  the  Federal  army,  so  the  adoption  of  Richmond 
as  the  Confederate  seat  of  government  made  that  city  the  objective 
point  of  attack.  As  Virginia  had  placed  herself  in  the  fore-front  of 
battle,  and  must  bear  its  brunt,  a  magnanimous  wisdom  led  the  Con 
federates  to  plant  their  standard  on  her  border,  "  point  to  point  op 
posing."  The  Confederate  Government  was  established  at  Richmond, 
June  1st. 

When  the  Southern  States  seceded,  they  seized  the  Federal  fortifi 
cations  within  their  limits,  as  a  precautionary  measure,  offering,  how 
ever,  at  the  same  time,  to  adjust  their  claims  thereto  by  negotiation. 
Of  all  the  Federal  fortresses  in  those  States,  Fort  Pickens,  near  Pensa- 
cola,  Florida,  and  Fortress  Monroe,  near  Norfolk,  Virginia,  alone  re 
mained  in  the  hands  of  the  United  States.  In  retiring  from  the  navy- 
yards  at  Pensacola  and  Norfolk,  and  the  arsenal  at  Harper's  Ferry,  the 
United  States  troops  had  wrought  all  the  damage  and  destruction  they 
could ;  but,  still,  enough  arms  and  material  of  war  fell  into  Confederate 
hands  to  perform  an  important  part  in  the  resistance  of  the  South,  un 
prepared  as  it  was  for  the  struggle. 

The  war  opened  with  a  slight  skirmish  at  Bethel,  near  Fortress  Mon 
roe,  June  10th,  in  which  the  Federals  were  repulsed  with  loss  by  a  small 
er  force  of  Confederates.  The  effect  of  Bethel  and  some  other  skirmishes 
was  to  exalt,  perhaps  unduly,  the  confidence  of  the  Southern  troops ; 
but  this  was  chastened  by  reverses  in  West  Virginia,  which  seemed 
about  to  admit  the  enemy  by  a  postern  to  the  citadel.  The  Federal 
plan  of  campaign,  apparently,  was  to  envelop  the  shores  and  frontiers 
with  its  armies  and  navies,  and  test  every  joint  in  the  armor  of  defense; 
but  its  main  attack  was  directed  from  Washington — "on  to  Rich 
mond." 

It  is  not  necessary  to  narrate  here  the  campaign  in  Virginia.  The 
battle  of  Manassas,  or  Bull  Run,  fought  July  21, 1862,  began  and  ended 
it.  Its  story  is  well  known. 

The  immediate  advantages  of  the  victory  were  very  great.  The 
effect  abroad  was  enormous.  Time  had  been  gained,  so  valuable  an 
element  of  success  in  revolutions,  and  prestige,  so  valuable  in  every 


COMPARATIVE  STRENGTH.  255 

contest.  There  was  a  reverse  to  the  picture,  however.  The  North, 
suddenly  checked  in  its  vainglorious  boast  of  subjugating  the  South  in 
ninety  days,  sobered  itself  down  to  a  steadier  prosecution  of  its  deadly 
purpose.  Scott  and  McDowell  went  into  eclipse,  and  McClellan  was 
called  to  the  work  of  organization  and  command.  Nevertheless,  oper 
ations  were  closed  on  that  line  for  nearly  a  year,  and  the  activity  of 
preparation  was  transferred  to  the  West.  In  the  South  an  undue  and 
ignorant  exultation  blinded  the  masses  of  the  people  to  the  dangers 
ahead.  They  could  not  be  made  to  believe  that  preparation  was  neces 
sary  to  meet  the  formidable  armaments  gathering  for  their  destruction. 
The  effects  of  this  fatuous  apathy  at  such  a  season  extended  themselves 
to  the  close  of  the  war  ;  but  the  first  stunning  result  was  felt  by  the 
subject  of  this  memoir,  in  his  efforts  to  create  an  army  for  the  defense 
of  the  West.  This  will  be  seen  more  fully  hereafter. 

The  map  of  the  Southern  States  and  the  distribution  of  population 
there  evince  the  odds  encountered  in  the  vain  struggle  for  indepen 
dence.  The  eleven  seceding  States,  including  the  present  State  of  Vir 
ginia,  contained  a  little  more  than  5,000,000  whites,  and  about  3,700,000 
negroes,  of  whom  130,000  were  free.  The  aggregate  population  of 
Maryland,  West  Virginia,  Kentucky,  and  Missouri,  was  about  3,400,000; 
of  whom  2,850,000  were  white,  446,000  slaves,  and  100,000  free  negroes. 
Nearly  one-sixth  of  their  population  was  black  ;  a  fourth  belonged  to 
families  from  Europe  or  the  North ;  and  a  twelfth  is  not  a  large  esti 
mate  for  persons  influenced  by  party  or  other  considerations  to  side 
with  the  North.  Thus,  a  half  of  the  aggregate  population  may  be 
counted  as  in  sympathy  with  the  North  ;  but,  of  the  voters  and  of  the 
rich  and  intelligent,  a  great  majority  were  in. favor  of  the  South,  and 
the  existing  local  State  governments  were  all  in  the  hands  of  the  State- 
rights  party.  But  it  is  one  thing  to  believe  in  ideas,  and  another  to 
fight  for  them ;  and  the  troops  furnished  by  these  States  to  the  Con 
federate  army — say  40,000  men — were  not  more  than  an  offset  in  num 
bers  to  the  counter-current  of  Union  refugees  from  East  Tennessee  and 
other  disaffected  localities.  Deducting,  then,  5,000,000  for  the  popula 
tion  that  supplied  the  Confederate  army  with  troops,  and  4,000,000  for 
negroes,  etc.,  from  the  31,500,000  total  population,  22,500,000  represent 
the  available  force  for  men  and  tribute  on  which  the  United  States 
drew,  without  counting  foreign  enlistments  and  negro  recruits.  But,  if 
Kentucky,  Missouri,  Maryland,  and  West  Virginia,  are  excluded  from 
the  calculation  altogether,  the  result  still  leaves  in  the  South  only 
5,100,000  whites  and  3,700,000  blacks,  representing  the  resisting  force, 
against  19,000,000  of  the  North. 

A  brief  explanation  is  necessary  to  show  how  these  border  Common 
wealths  were  so  easily  transferred  from  their  natural  alliance  with  the 
South   to  the  side  of  her  adversary.     The  situation  was  different  in 
18 


256  CALIFORNIA. 

each  ;  yet  all  were  alike  in  being  exposed  to  direct  and  flank  attacks, 
in  suffering  from  a  divided  sentiment,  and  in  earnestly  desiring  peace. 
Geographically,  Maryland  was  a  mere  fringe  to  the  Southern  border. 
The  ocean,  Chesapeake  Bay,  and  the  Potomac,  laid  open  all  her  homes 
to  attacks  by  water;  while  the  Baltimore  &  Ohio  Railroad  and  the 
railroads  from  Philadelphia  and  Harrisburg  were  channels  along  which 
poured  the  living  tide  to  Washington.  In  a  word,  the  State  was  de 
fenseless  ;  and,  unless  her  people  could  have  been  brought  to  act  with 
unanimity  and  promptness  in  some  early  cooperative  movement,  her 
resources  would  necessarily  be  counted  in  the  scale  of  the  North.  Her 
voice  was  raised  in  indignant  protest  and  her  hand  in  unavailing  defi 
ance  against  the  Northern  host  that  overran  her  and  trampled  out  her 
liberties  ;  but  the  voice  was  soon  silenced  in  the  dungeon,  and  the  hand 
manacled  by  martial  law.  Henceforth,  Maryland's  quota  to  the  South 
was  paid  in  suffering,  exile,  and  martyrdom.  When  the  Federal  troops 
occupied  Alexandria,  Virginia  (May  24,  1861),  the  Potomac  became  the 
boundary. 

In  West  Virginia,  though  the  State  was  occupied  by  large  Federal 
armies,  and  its  severance  accomplished  as  a  political  fact,  the  State- 
rights  men  maintained  their  allegiance  to  the  "  Old  Dominion "  by 
stubborn  warfare  until  the  close  of  the  contest ;  and  its  eastern  border 
was  at  all  times  a  "  debatable  ground."  On  this  field  General  McClel- 
lan  gained  his  first  distinction,  which  raised  him,  as  the  successor  of 
Scott,  for  a  time  to  the  chief  command  of  the  United  States  Army. 
The  movements  in  this  quarter  from  the  Ohio  River  Valley  as  a  base, 
though  well  contested  in  many  a  bloody  combat,  resulted  on  the  whole 
advantageously  to  the  North. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

CALIFORNIA. 

GENERAL  JOHNSTON  had  never  been  a  politician  or  party-man.  He 
had  cast  but  one  vote  in  his  life,  and  that  had  been  for  General  Taylor, 
who,  he  thought,  would  rise  above  party.  He  never  forgot,  however, 
that  he  was  the  citizen  of  a  republic.  Deeply  interested  in  its  welfare, 
conversant  with  its  history,  well  acquainted  with  its  practical  working, 
long  associated  with  its  leading  men,  and  himself  a  thinker  and  a  leader 
in  his  own  particular  sphere,  he  could  not  fail  to  have  decided  opinions 
on  the  greater  questions  that  divided  the  country.  Though  little  bound 
by  prejudice,  his  opinions  were,  of  course,  much  influenced  by  his  asso- 


GENERAL  JOHNSTON'S  IDEAS  OF  THE   GOVERNMENT.  257 

ciations  and  circumstances.  A  recapitulation  of  these  will  exhibit  the 
conditions  under  which  his  ideas  took  form. 

His  family  affiliations,  his  early  associations,  and  some  of  his  warmest 
friendships,  inclined  him,  while  young,  to  the  principles  of  the  Whig 
party,  then  in  its  best  days.  The  constitutional  text-book  at  West  Point 
in  his  cadetship  was,  I  believe,  Rawle's  "  Commentaries,"  a  book  of 
wholesome  doctrine.  The  military  education  there  had  a  natural  and 
necessary  tendency  to  inspire  affection  for  the  union  of  the  States,  and 
exalt  the  Federal  authority  in  the  youthful  mind ;  and  continued  ser 
vice  in  the  army  increased  the  feeling.  On  the  other  hand,  the  tempo 
rary  severance  of  his  allegiance,  and  his  service  under  the  independent 
government  of  Texas,  and  its  formal  voluntary  annexation  to  the  United 
States,  must  have  compelled  him  to  define  the  nature  of  Federal  rela 
tions  in  a  clearer  way  than  did  most  army-officers.  In  the  latter  half 
of  his  life  he  saw  the  Democratic  party  as  the  champion,  interpreter, 
and  representative  of  conservative  ideas,  especially  in  the  South.  This, 
with  other  causes,  contributed  to  draw  him  nearer  to  it.  At  once 
strongly  Southern  and  strongly  Unionist,  he  regarded  with  aversion  the 
Republican  party,  which  was  anti-Southern,  and,  in  its  inception  and 
tendency,  disunionist. 

To  a  soldier,  that  government  commonly  seems  the  best  which  is 
best  administered  ;  and  the  nurture  and  protection  of  liberty  are  less 
apt  to  engage  his  admiration  than  the  display  of  certain  other  virtues. 
Order,  justice,  and  vigor,  are  more  apparent  agencies  than  the  spirit  of 
freedom  which  gives  them  the  breath  of  life.  Power,  exercised  with 
decision,  and  restrained  only  by  a  sense  of  responsibility,  appears  as  the 
model  of  government ;  and  fetters  upon  the  hands  of  authority  seem  the 
evidence  of  blind  jealousy  and  unreasoning  suspicion.  Though  General 
Johnston  was  something  more  than  a  mere  soldier,  this  military  ideal 
was  not  without  its  influence  on  his  conception  of  government.  A 
powerful,  stable,  energetic  government,  careful  of  the  interests  of  the 
people,  presents  so  many  excellences  that  it  is  hard  not  to  wish  to  see 
it  realized.  Such  a  vision  influenced  to  some  extent  his  imagination, 
the  more  so,  as  he  deemed  the  spirit  of  personal  independence  the  only 
effectual  check  upon  the  tendency  to  despotism  present  in  all  govern 
ment.  Devotion  to  the  Union,  fostered  by  the  conviction  of  its  un 
numbered  blessings,  and  by  his  military  service,  made  him  unwilling  to 
consider  it  otherwise  than  as  "  perpetual."  In  Utah,  as  the  exponent 
of  the  military  power  of  the  Government,  he  was  intrusted  with  the 
execution  of  its  orders  ;  its  honor  and  dignity  were  in  his  custody ;  its 
welfare  was  the  constant  motive  of  his  acts ;  and  in  his  hands  the  mere 
symbols  of  its  power  had  triumphed  over  the  causeless  rebellion  of  that 
disaffected  yet  dependent  population. 

But  his  life  had  not  been  passed  altogether  in  the  service  of  the 


258  CALIFORNIA. 

United  States.  He  had  been  the  soldier  of  Anglo-Saxon  freedom,  the 
cabinet  officer  of  a  constitutional  and  independent  republic,  and  a 
planter  who  had  earned  his  bread  in  the  sweat  of  his  brow.  He  under 
stood  the  delicate  and  complicated  mechanism  of  our  Government ;  and, 
much  as  he  desired  to  see  its  hands  strengthened  within  its  legitimate 
sphere,  he  knew  that  the  sovereignty  of  the  States  was  the  palladium  of 
our  liberties,  and  was  to  be  respected  and  defended  with  jealous  care. 
It  is  true  that  he  thought  that  the  rights  of  the  States  could  be  better 
secured  by  many  concessions  even  than  by  arms  ;  but  he  had  no  doubts 
as  to  which  party  was  the  aggressor,  and  his  convictions,  as  well  as  his 
sympathies,  were  with  his  own  State  and  section.  Moreover,  he  had 
learned  from  the  patriots  of  1776  the  inherent  right  of  every  people  to 
select  their  own  form  of  government,  and  to  maintain  their  independence 
by  revolution. 

General  Johnston's  views  in  regard  to  slavery  were  those  generally 
held  in  the  South,  where  he  was  born  and  brought  up,  and  with 
whose  social  structure  he  had  been  identified.  Right  or  wrong,  they 
were  the  beliefs  of  eight  millions  of  people,  who  have  shown  as  high 
traits,  as  pure  a  morality,  as  lofty  a  courage,  and  as  intelligent  a  states 
manship,  as  any  who  ever  lived.  With  no  great  respect  for  political 
abstractions,  and  perceiving  clearly  the  differences  that  mark  race  and 
condition,  he  rejected  with  intellectual  scorn  the  generalizations  which 
overlook  all  existing  facts,  and  confound  all  the  relations  of  life.  He 
recognized  our  common  humanity,  no  man  more  distinctly;  and  acted 
upon  it,  no  man  no  more  fully.  But  he  could  not  ignore  that  the  mani 
fest  inferiority  of  the  negro  fitted  him  for  the  place  he  held,  and  that 
time  alone  could  fit  him  for  any  other.  The  slaves  had  been  bought 
with  a  price,  under  the  strongest  legal  sanctions,  and  all  arguments  for 
their  forcible  emancipation  applied  equally  well  to  the  confiscation  of 
every  other  species  of  wealth  or  property.  The  destructive  consequences 
of  the  abolition  of  slavery  had  been  proved  in  the  West  Indies,  and 
were  as  certain  as  any  future  event  could  be.  Hence  he  shared  the  re 
sentment,  though  not  the  expression  of  it,  universal  in  the  South, 
against  the  domineering  philanthropy  that  assailed  its  institutions.  His 
views  in  regard  to  the  nature  and  polity  of  the  United  States  Govern 
ment,  on  the  whole,  fairly  represented  the  ideas  of  the  army-officers  as 
a  class,  but  enlarged  and  modified  by  a  wider  experience.  If  they 
could  be  summed  up  in  a  single  word,  it  would  be — conservative. 

General  Johnston  had  been  so  long  the  stanch  soldier  of  the  United 
States  that  he  was  unwilling  to  contemplate  the  picture  of  its  majestic 
fabric  shattered  and  in  ruins.  If  the  States  were  to  be  severed,  it 
mattered  little  to  him  under  what  class  of  rights  the  act  was  to  be  con 
summated.  Whether  called  secession,  or  revolution,  or  rebellion,  it 
was  the  prostration  of  that  governmental  ideal  for  whose  exaltation 


RIGHT   OF  RESISTANCE.  259 

his  life  had  been  spent.  Like  Mr.  Madison,  he  had  "veiled"  the  pos 
sibility,  but  the  rude  hand  of  fanaticism  had  rent  the  veil  asunder. 
Ah  !  was  it  wise  for  the  mighty  North  to  force  such  faithful  servants, 
such  loyal  hearts  as  this,  as  Jackson,  as  Lee,  into  resistance  and  the 
final  argument  of  the  battle-field.  Lip-service  and  the  hireling  sword 
are  everywhere  at  the  command  of  power  ;  but  men  like  these,  at  their 
need,  the  generations  must  wait  for.  They  are  the  product  of  wisdom, 
and  justice,  and  beneficence,  in  the  country  which  possesses  them.  Be 
sotted  is  the  people  who  believe  that  their  place  can  be  supplied  by  able 
adventurers.  The  splendid  military  genius  of  Hannibal  could  not  sus- 
tain  itself  with  mercenary  spears  against  the  moderate  talents  of  Fabius 
and  the  unequal  inspiration  of  Scipio,  animated  by  patriotic  fervor. 

But,  devoted  as  General  Johnston  was  to  the  Union,  he  could  not 
forget  that  he  was  also  the  citizen  of  a  State.  To  Texas  he  had  sworn 
allegiance ;  his  estate  and  his  best  years  had  been  spent  in  shielding  her; 
he  had  aided  to  merge  her  autonomy  and  to  limit  her  independent  sove 
reignty  by  annexation,  and  he  knew  that  when  she  entered  the  Union  it 
was  by  treaty,  as  an  equal,  and  that  the  Constitution  was  the  bond  to 
which  she  had  consented.  She  had  performed  her  covenant  faithfully ; 
it  was  the  North  by  which  it  had  been  trampled  into  the  dust.  She  had, 
therefore,  the  right  to  renounce  the  broken  contract,  or  to  try  to  enforce 
it,  as  she  deemed  most  expedient.  If  she  elected  to  secure  her  liberties 
by  withdrawing  from  a  Union  in  which  they  were  assailed,  her  action 
would  be  justified  by  either  the  letter  of  the  bond,  or  by  the  "  inaliena 
ble  right,"  as  the  Declaration  of  Independence  has  it,  of  a  people  to 
choose  their  own  form  of  government.  It  was  an  act  of  sovereignty, 
for  which  the  State  was  responsible  to  whatever  other  community  should 
choose  to  dispute  it,;  but  not  to  its  own  citizens,  who  were  bound  to 
adhere  to  it  the  more  closely  the  more  it  was  endangered. 

Now,  though  General  Johnston  was  satisfied  that  Texas  and  the 
other  Southern  States  had  ample  grounds  for  resistance  or  withdrawal, 
and  the  right  to  take  the  extremest  measures  to  secure  themselves,  he 
did  not  believe  the  means  adopted  were  wise  or  expedient.  His  mind 
was  too  sternly  practical  to  allow  him  to  suppose,  when  the  clearest 
guarantees  of  the  Constitution  had  failed  to  restrain  partisan  zeal  and 
the  lust  of  dominion,  that  these  passions  would  be  arrested  now  by  the 
assertion  of  a  disputed  right.  He  was  sure  that  peaceable  secession 
was  impossible,  and  therefore  thought  that  it  was  a  remedy  to  be  tried 
only  when  all  others  had  been  exhausted,  and  not  until  every  effort  at 
conciliation  had  failed,  and  every  sacrifice  had  been  made  to  preserve 
the  Union.  Nor  was  he  without  hopes  that,  if  an  interval  were  left  for 
returning  reason  to  resume  its  sway,  fanaticism  might  be  dethroned, 
and  the  people  would  demand  equity  and  peace.  But,  if  resistance  was 
to  be  made,  he  thought  it  should  be  attempted  on  no  doubtful  issue, 


260  CALIFORNIA. 

but  only  after  radical  tactics  had  fully  laid  bare  the  purposes  of  that 
party.  Such  delay  would  unite  the  South,  justify  its  action,  and  give 
the  opportunity  for  cooperation,  organization,  and  the  accumulation 
of  adequate  means  of  defense.  Delusive  as  were  these  hopes,  they 
were  those  of  a  patriot,  and  had  much  to  do  in  shaping  General  John 
ston's  conduct  in  the  opening  of  the  war. 

He  knew  that  no  man's  voice  or  influence  could  control  the  tempest 
of  human  passions  which  was  driving  the  republic  on  the  breakers  ;  yet 
such  was  his  faith  in  its  destiny  that  he  could  still  trust  that  a  good 
Providence  would  rescue  it,  even  if  by  a  miracle.  In  such  a  state  of 
affairs,  there  was  nothing  left  for  a  man  in  his  position  but  to  drift, 
standing  at  his  post.  His  temper  was  of  a  cast  so  cheerful,  his  philos 
ophy  so  bracing,  and  his  code  of  duty  so  exacting,  that  he  felt  able  to 
perform  the  minutest  detail  of  service  required  of  him  with  perfect 
fidelity  of  spirit  and  unshaken  by  the  tumult,  until  a  conflict  of  duties 
should  arise.  He  would  not  anticipate  the  painful  hour,  for  "  sufficient 
unto  the  day  is  the  evil  thereof ;  "  but,  when  the  moment  for  decision 
came,  he  would  obey  that  conscience  which  had  been  his  constant 
monitor. 

When  Texas  seceded,  the  alternative  was  presented  him.  On  one 
side  'was  the  grand  nationality,  whose  flag  he  had  borne,  whose  author 
ity  he  had  upheld,  to  whose  glory  he  had  consecrated  his  career,  and 
in  whose  service  were  embarked  all  his  plans  for  power,  prosperity,  and 
worldly  advancement.  On  the  other  was  his  feeble  State  and  her  con 
curring  sisters,  as  yet  not  united  even  in  a  defensive  league,  rent  by 
faction,  unprepared  for  war,  and  making  no  definite  call  upon  his  ser 
vices.  Had  he  listened  to  the  voice  of  ambition,  the  tempter  would 
have  told  him  that,  in  the  United  States  Army,  he  stood  at  the  head  of 
the  list  of  active  officers,  and  that  above  him  were  none  except  those 
whom  age  or  meagre  ability  excluded  from  rivalry,  and  that  the  large 
resources  and  commanding  position  of  the  established  Government 
offered  every  advantage  a  soldier  could  wish,  while  its  rewards  would 
accord  with  its  imperial  designs.  Whatever  others  may  have  thought, 
he  was  not  deceived  as  to  the  comparative  strength  of  the  opponents. 
He  knew  the  facts  only  too  well.  When,  therefore,  he  made  his  choice, 
it  was  the  easy  triumph  of  duty  over  interest,  and  of  affection  for  his 
own  people  over  all  the  allurements  that  ambition  can  hold  out. 

Until  Texas  seceded  he  went  forward  unswervingly  in  the  service 
of  his  employer  the  General  Government ;  but,  when  that  event  pre 
sented  a  definite  issue,  he  promptly  took  his  choice  of  evils.  The 
United  States  Army  was  no  longer  the  place  for  him,  when,  at  any 
moment,  he  might  be  called  upon  to  aid  in  the  work  of  subjugation. 
He  had  resolved  never  to  lift  his  hand  against  "  his  people  ; "  and,  since 
Texas  had  left  the  Union,  in  the  army  he  could  not  remain.  He  there- 


RESIGNATION  FROM  THE  ARMY.  261 

fore  resigned.  Still,  as  secession  was  not  war,  and  Texas  ardently  de 
sired  peace,  he  indulged  the  hope  that  the  mercy  which  had  so  often 
saved  the  country  from  the  consequences  of  its  own  sins  and  follies 
might  even  yet  avert  impending  disasters.  In  this  event  he  would  re 
tire  to  some  small  farm,  near  Los  Angeles,  California,  and,  among  con 
genial  friends,  far  from  the  strife  of  faction,  would  pass  the  evening  of 
his  days  in  tranquillity.  His  age  and  services  might  claim  exemption 
from  contests  for  which  he  had  no  heart ;  and,  in  the  balmy  air  of  that 
garden  of  the  West,  he  would  nurture  his  children  in  scenes  unvisited 
by  civil  discord. 

He  tendered  his  resignation,  and  asked  that  a  successor  might  be 
sent  to  relieve  him.  He  was  very  anxious  to  fulfill  strictly  and  satis 
factorily  the  trust  committed  to  him,  and  to  be  relieved  from  it  before 
the  jar  of  civil  war  should  complicate  his  position.  Lest  the  knowledge 
of  his  resignation  might  weaken  the  moral  hold  he  had  over  the  soldiers, 
or  promote  disaffection  and  a  revolutionary  spirit  among  the  numerous 
Southerners  resident  in  California,  he  kept  the  fact  concealed.  His 
adjutant-general  (Major  Mackall)  and  Mrs.  Johnston  were  aware  of  the 
fact,  which  he  also  communicated  to  Dr.  Griffin,  and  Mr.  and  Mrs.  H. 
P.  Hepburn,  his  kinsfolk,  under  the  seal  of  secrecy.  This  was  so  well 
observed  that  San  Francisco  was  taken  by  surprise  when  his  resigna 
tion  was  announced  a  fortnight  later. 

About  this  time,  General  Johnston  was  told,  by  some  Republicans  of 
San  Francisco,  that  a  plot  existed  to  seize  Alcatraz,  the  fortress  which 
commands  the  entrance  to  the  bay  and  harbor  of  that  key  of  California, 
in  order  to  set  up  a  Pacific  republic.  General  Johnston  replied  that  he 
hoped  they  were  mistaken,  but  that  precautions  would  be  taken  to  pre 
vent  the  success  of  such  an  enterprise.  He  proceeded  quietly  to  re 
move  several  thousand  stand  of  arms  from  the  arsenal  at  Benicia,  where 
they  were  exposed,  to  Alcatraz,  which  was  virtually  impregnable,  and 
informed  the  Governor  that,  in  case  of  any  outbreak  or  insurrection, 
they  could  be  employed  by  the  militia  to  repress  it.  He  also  took 
other  measures  to  insure  peace.  The  writer  does  not  believe  that  any 
plot  or  design  was  made  by  the  Southerners,  or  others  in  California,  to 
take  the  State  out  of  the  Union ;  but  there  is  no  doubt  that,  if  the  large 
element  of  restless  and  revolutionary  men  on  that  coast  had  imagined 
they  would  receive  the  aid  or  countenance  of  the  military  commander 
in  such  an  undertaking,  they  had  the  hardihood  to  make  the  attempt. 
A  friend,  long  domiciled  there,  who  would  have  known  if  anybody  in 
that  country  knew,  told  the  writer  that  there  were  prominent  men  in 
California  who  wished  such  a  result,  and,  knowing  his  long  intimacy, 
asked  him  to  sound  General  Johnston  as  to  the  feasibility  of  a  Pacific 
republic,  and  as  to  his  wishes  and  intentions.  "  But,"  said  he,  "  I  did 
not  dare  to  approach  him  on  the  subject.  He  told  me,  however,  of  his 


262  CALIFORNIA. 

own  accord,  that  as  long  as  he  held  his  commission  he  would  maintain 
the  authority  of  the  United  States  to  the  last  extremity ;  and  we  knew 
he  would  do  it." 

While  he  was  waiting,  in  suspense  and  much  inward  sorrow,  the 
action  of  the  authorities  at  Washington,  General  E.  V.  Sumner  sud 
denly  arrived  unannounced  at  San  Francisco,  with  orders  to  supersede 
him  in  the  command  of  the  department.  As  the  circumstances  of  Gen 
eral  Sumner's  arrival  have  been  greatly  falsified  by  some  of  the  baser 
sort  of  party  journals,  and  the  more  careless  sort  of  partisan  histories, 
it  is  necessary  to  mention  them  here  with  more  detail  than  would  other 
wise  be  called  for.  General  Sumner  sailed  from  New  York  about  the 
1st  of  April,  secretly,  and  perhaps,  as  was  stated  at  the  time,  under  an 
assumed  name.  His  name  was  not  in  the  list  of  passengers  forwarded 
by  th«  Pony  Express,  which  reached  San  Francisco  a  week  in  advance 
of  the  steamer.  He  had  hardly  taken  command,  before  the  Administra 
tion  organs  from  ocean  to  ocean  began  to  hint  darkly  of  a  deep-laid 
conspiracy  nipped  in  the  bud  by  this  wonderful  coup-cPvtat.  With  that 
fertility  of  fancy  which  characterizes  a  certain  class  of  journalists,  the 
story  grew  by  embellishment.  This  was  the  manner,  as  published  by 
one  of  them : 

There  came  one  day  to  our  good  President  a  message  that  caused  his  cheek 
to  pale,  and  his  great  heart  to  beat  quick  with  apprehension.  This  was  the 
message — short,  as  it  was  ominous — "  There  is  treason  on  Alcatraz !  "  Alcatraz 
is  the  name  of  the  island  and  fort,  etc. 

Then  follows  a  long  description  of  the  situation,  with  full  details 
of  an  imaginary  plot,  evidently  evolved  from  the  inner  consciousness  of 
this  political  romancer  : 

To  insure  the  success  of  the  scheme,  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  was  placed  in 
command  at  Fort  Alcatraz.  It  was  arranged  that  the  leaders  in  San  Francisco, 
with  a  force  of  picked  men  sufficient  for  the  purpose,  should  surprise  and  capt 
ure  the  fort.  The  details  were  all  arranged.  They  were  waiting  only  for  or 
ders  from  the  rebel  government  to  strike  the  fatal  blow.  The  birds  of  the  air 
carried  whisperings  of  this  treason  to  loyal  ears,  etc. 

General  Sumner's  secret  appointment  and  transit  are  then  given, 
with  this  denotiment : 

The  eager  thousands  who  thronged  the  streets  hardly  noticed  the  momen 
tary  pause  of  the  steamer  when  passing  Fort  Alcatraz,  nor  did  they  note  the 
little  boat  that  shot  out  from  her  side  toward  the  island ;  yet  that  tiny  boat 
bore  more  to  them  "  than  Caesar  and  his  fortunes."  It  bore  General  Sumner, 
who,  in  a  few  minutes,  stood  before -the  commander,  and,  as  his  superior  in 
rank,  and  under  special  orders  from  the  President,  assumed  command  of  Fort 
Alcatraz.  California  was  saved  to  the  Union. 


A  SLANDER  REFUTED.  263 

This  is  a  pretty  fair  sample  of  a  story  that  has  since  been  frequent 
ly  reproduced  with  variations  in  Northern  prints.  On  its  face  it  bears 
the  marks  of  a  mythical  origin — signs  of  improbability — circumstantial 
details,  resting  on  the  evidence  of  "  the  birds  of  the  air  " — a  meta 
phor,  probably,  for  that  vile  brood  of  troubled  times,  the  paid  informers. 
It  would  not  be  worth  while  to  notice  such  a  rumor,  had  it  not  been 
suggested  by  the  conduct  of  the  Administration,  and,  most  probably, 
from  its  source  and  prevalence,  by  official  inspiration.  The  truth  was, 
that  General  Sumner  landed  at  the  wharf  with  the  other  passengers, 
and  did  not  see  General  Johnston  till  the  next  day  at  noon.  When 
the  command  was  turned  over  to  him,  he  expressed  an  approval  of  all 
his  predecessor's  acts,  and  much  gratification  at  the  condition  of  the 
department,  also  asking  his  advice  as  to  future  arrangements,  the  dis 
position  of  troops,  etc.  He  stated  that  he  would  make  a  favorable  re 
port  to  the  War  Department. 

The  following  extract  from  his  report  of  April  28,  1861,  to  the  ad 
jutant-general,  gives  all  that  he  says  in  regard  to  General  Johnston ; 
but,  in  so  far  as  it  goes,  it  confirms  what  has  been  said  : 

I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  I  arrived  here  on  the  24th  hist.,  and  on  the 
25th  relieved  General  Johnston  in  command  of  this  department.  My  departure 
from  Xew  York  was  not  known  here  till  the  night  before  my  arrival.  It  gives 
me  pleasure  to  state  that  the  command  was  turned  over  to  me  in  good  order. 
General  Johnston  had  forwarded  his  resignation  before  I  arrived,  but  he  con 
tinued  to  hold  tlie  command,  and  was  carrying  out  the  orders  of  the  Govern 
ment. 

Having  applied  for  information  on  this  topic  to  General  Buell,  who 
was  Sumner's  chief  of  staff,  in  California,  he  replied,  in  a  letter  of  April 
2,  1873  : 

I  did  not  accompany  General  Sumner  to  California  in  the  spring  of  1861," 
and  was  not  there  when  your  father  turned  over  the  command  to  him.  I  ar 
rived,  however,  very  soon  after.  I  do  remember  that  a  report  had  some  cur 
rency  about  that  time  to  the  effect  that  your  father  desired,  or  had  it  in  con 
templation,  to  surrender  California  to  the  cause  of  the  Southern  Confederacy. 
Those  were  days  of  a  good  deal  of  distrust  and  bitterness ;  but  I  do  not  believe 
that  any  well-informed  person  ever  gave  credence  to  the  report.  For,  besides 
the  intrinsic  absurdity  of  such  a  proposition,  and  its  utter  inconsistency  with 
your  father's  character,  there  was  no  foundation  whatever  for  such  a  report. 
Xo  man  who  knew  your  father  well  could  ever  believe  him  capable  of  a  base 
action. 

This  slander  having  been  lately  revived  in  California,  possibly  for 
some  political  motive,  has  called  forth  a  letter  from  Governor  Downey. 
The  article  from  the  Los  Angeles  Express  and  the  reply  of  Governor 
Downey  are  here  given. 


264:  CALIFORNIA. 

All  old  residents  of  the  Pacific  coast  know  that  at  the  time  of  the  break 
ing  out  of  the  rebellion  a  plot  was  formed  by  A.  S.  Johnston,  then  the  military 
commander  of  this  department,  in  connection  with  a  number  of  prominent 
leaders  (some  of  whom  are  still  prominent  in  that  party),  to  seize  the  United 
States  Arsenal,  distribute  the  arms  to  their  partisans,  and  hand  the  State  of 
California  over  to  the  Southern  Confederacy.  Unfortunately  for  the  success  of 
this  precious  scheme,  it  by  some  means  leaked  out,  and  the  Government  at 
"Washington,  comprehending  the  danger,  lost  no  time  in  dispatching  General 
Sumner  to  supersede  Johnston,  and  save  the  State  to  the  Union.  General  Smn- 
ner  arrived  here  incognito,  and  immediately  proceeded  to  Benicia,  where  he 
presented  the  order  assigning  him  to  the  command,  and  demanded  possession 
of  the  department.  Sumner's  appearance  was  like  a  thunder-clap  to  the  con 
spirators,  who  had  not  anticipated  such  prompt  action,  and  were  not  prepared 
to  resist,  so  there  was  nothing  for  Johnston  to  do  but  submit,  and  turn  over 
the  command  to  Sumner,  which  he  did,  and  himself  left  a  few  days  after  for  the 
South,  where  he  fell  on  the  field  of  Shiloh. 

To  the  Editor  of  the  Express  : 

The  above  is  taken  from  an  article  in  the  Los  Angeles  Daily  Republican,  and 
is  written  to  subserve  the  local  campaign  ;  but  it  is  at  great  sacrifice  of  the  truths 
of  history.  During  the  term  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  I  had  constant 
intercourse  with  him  on  official  business.  Up  to  my  term  of  office  we  had  year 
ly  wars  with  the  Indians,  in  which  the  State  annually  incurred  great  expense. 
I  took  the  ground  that  this  was  all  wrong,  that  it  was  a  Federal  matter  purely, 
and  that  the  Federal  troops  on  this  coast  were  ample,  at  all  times,  for  every 
Indian  emergency.  The  executive  office  was  flooded  with  petitions  to  call  out 
troops.  I  applied  to  General  Johnston  for  relief,  which  he  immediately  grant 
ed,  and  assured  me  that  he  had  all  the  force  and  material  required  to  quell  the 
Indian  disturbances,  and  that  this  service  was  about  all  that  himself,  officers, 
and  men,  had  to  perform  on  this  coast.  It  was  suggested  by  several  citizens  to 
me  that  there  were  75,000  stand  of  arms  at  Benicia  that  might,  in  those  dis 
turbed  times,  fall  into  hands  that  would  use  them  against  the  Government.  I 
Called  on  General  Johnston  in  relation  to  these  arms.  He  said,  in  the  most  im 
pressive  manner :  "  Governor,  I  have  spent  the  greater  part  of  my  life  in  the 
service  of  my  country,  and  while  I  hold  her  commission  I  shall  serve  her  hon 
orably  and  faithfully.  I  shall  protect  her  public  property,  and  not  a  cartridge 
or  a  percussion-cap  shall  pass  to  any  enemy  while  I  am  here  as  her  representa 
tive.  There  is,"  he  said,  "  no  man  in  the  Union  more  sorely  afflicted  than  I  am 
at  the  occurrences  now  taking  place.  I  do  not  know  yet  what  position  Texas 
may  take.  I  have  been  long  identified  with  Texas,  her  interests  and  public  men, 
and  her  action  may  control  my  future  destiny,  but  in  any  event  I  shall  give  due 
notice,  and  turn  over  intact  my  department  to  my  successor."  Now,  I  say  it  is 
not  true  that  there  was  any  plot  to  carry  this  State  out  of  the  Union.  I  was 
in  constant  communication  with  Mr.  Seward  and  the  Secretary  of  War.  I 
raised  all  the  troops  that  were  required,  without  an  expense  of  twenty -five  cents 
to  the  State.  The  railroad  was  no  factor  in  this  question.  No  troops  came 
here  from  the  East.  I  raised  them  and  sent  them  forward  East,  all  under  Demo 
cratic  officers — the  Arizona  column,  under  Generals  Carleton  and  West,  and  the 
Utah  column,  under  Generals  Conner,  Evans,  O'Neal,  and  others.  General 


THE  TRUTH  PROVED.  265 

Johnston  did  not  leave  the  State  in  a  few  days  after  the  arrival  of  Snraner. 
He  remained  in  San  Francisco  a  long  time,  and  his  house  was  the  centre  to 
which  the  army-officers  tended  in  a  social  way.  Long  after  his  replacement  by 
General  Simmer  I  met  the  most  of  the  Federal  officers  at  his  house,  many  of 
them  men  who  distinguished  themselves  afterward  during  the  war.  It  was  long 
after  this  occurrence  that  General  Johnston  was  in  Los  Angeles,  and  I  believe 
still  undetermined  what  course  to  pursue.  So  it  is  plain  that  the  Republican  is 
badly  informed.  I  have  the  kindest  letters  from  General  Sumner  and  General 
Wright,  his  successors,  thanking  me  for  my  aid  in  helping  them  to  discharge 
their  duties  at  this  very  critical  period.  Neither  of  these  gentlemen  believed 
that  General  Johnston  had  any  knowledge  of  any  plot  on  this  coast ;  nor  that 
there  was  any  necessity  for  the  unusual  and  precipitous  manner  which  the  War 
Department  pursued.  It  is  plain  that,  if  the  Department  of  War  thought  there 
was  any  danger,  they  would  not  have  shipped  the  arms  at  Benicia  East  by  way 
of  Panama.  They  would  have  kept  them  here  for  us  to  put  down  rebellion. 

JOHN  G.  DOWNEY. 

This  chapter  having  been  submitted  by  letter  to  General  W.  W. 
Mackall,  Assistant  Adjutant-General  of  the  Department  of  California 
in  1861,  he  replied  January  7,  1876.  The  following  is  an  extract  from 
the  letter  of  General  Mackall : 

That  your  father  exercised  his  command  honestly  for  the  Government  he 
served  in  California  is  thoroughly  known  to  me  ;  but,  as  a  matter  of  course,  my 
evidence  can  have  no  weight  with  those  inclined  to  doubt  it.  When  Texas 
seceded,  he  told  me  that  he  had  sent  in  his  resignation.  I  was  surprised,  and 
said,  "  I  always  thought  you  were  a  Kentuckian."  He  replied,  "  I  adopted 
Texas,  and  its  people  have  been  my  fast  friends  and  are  entitled  to  my  best  ser 
vices."  In  reply,  some  days  after,  to  a  remark  of  mine  (not,  however,  in  refer 
ence  to  himself),  that  I  thought  an  officer  inexcusable  in  negotiating  with  an 
other  government  for  position,  while  holding  a  United  States  commission,  he 
said,  "  Major,  I  assure  you  that  I  have  never  written  one  word  to  any  one  on 
such  a  subject."  9 

The  morning  General  Sumner  arrived,  General  Johnston  and  I  were  in  the 
office  with  some  other  officers,  when  my  clerk  announced  Sumner's  arrival. 
General  Johnston  turned  to  me  and,  smiling,  said,  "  Major,  you  and  I  know 
how  welcome  he  is."  Neither  of  us  suspected  that  it  had  any  other  significance 
than  the  natural  answer  to  his  resignation,  or  a  command  given  to  Sumner  on 
his  promotion.  I  am  satisfied  that  no  officer,  Northern  or  Southern,  had  up  to 
this  time  thought  that  General  Johnston  would  act  otherwise  than  as  a  gentle 
man  true  to  his  trust.  Nor  do  I  believe  that  he,  much  as  his  character  com 
manded  the  respect  of  all,  had  he  attempted  to  make  use  of  his  position  to  in 
jure  the  Government  he  then  served,  could  have  called  to  his  side  a  single 
Southern  officer.  Sure  am  I  that  none  of  those  who  afterward,  with  great  sor 
row,  felt  themselves  obliged  to  leave  the  service  and  go  to  the  defense  of  their 
own  people,  for  whom  many  of  them  gave  up  their  lives,  would  have  been  found 
among  the  number.  The  only  complaint  I  ever  heard  from  General  Sumner  as 
to  the  condition  of  the  command  as  he  received  it  was,  that  he  was  not  assured 
of  the  loyalty  of  the  commander  of  Alcatraz  Island.  I  do  not  remember 


266  CALIFORNIA. 

•whether  or  no  he  superseded  him.  This,  however,  is  known,  that  the  officer 
continued  to  serve  the  United  States  during  the  war ;  and  so  Sumner  must 
have  learned  that,  even  in  this  instance,  General  Johnston  had  heen  true.  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  however,  had  acted  from  no  special  knowledge  of  the  officer's 
politics,  hut  from  his  own  honest  instincts,  which  brought  the  conviction  that 
a  gentleman  would  not  accept  a  trust  which  he  might  be  induced  to  betray. 

The  meeting  was  cordial  on  both  sides.  Whomsoever  else  that  bluff 
soldier  might  suspect,  he  knew  that  the  man  before  him  was  the  model 
of  spotless  integrity.  General  Johnston  mentioned  the  facts  of  his 
resignation  to  General  Sumner,  who  then  said:  "General,  I  wish  you 
would  reconsider  and  recall  your  resignation.  General  Scott  bade  me 
say  to  you  that  he  wished  you  for  active  service,  and  that  you  should  be 
only  second  to  himself."  General  Johnston  replied,  "  I  thank  General 
Scott  for  his  opinion  of  me,  but  nothing  can  change  my  determination." 

When  General  Johnston  learned  how  his  successor  had  been  sent 
forward,  and  the  inference  thus  suggested  to  the  public  mind,  together 
with  the  version  of  his  conduct  which  had  been  put  forth  by  the  Ad 
ministration  press  for  some  weeks  previous,  he  felt  the  deepest  indigna 
tion.  To  the  officers  who  informed  him  of  General  Sumner's  arrival,  he 
had  said  with  emotion  at  the  weight  of  care  which  had  been  lifted  from 
his  shoulders,  "  Then  am  I  doubly  relieved."  But,  after  he  had  so 
guarded  his  action  as  to  keep  his  fair  fame  spotless,  at  the  expense  of 
feeling  and  interest,  the  iniquity  of  this  insidious  blow  rankled  in  his 
bosom.  Whether  it  was  the  fabrication  of  some  malignant  slanderer,  or 
a  nightmare  conjured  up  from  the  tangled  designs  of  the  cabinet,  he 
scorned  the  imputation  upon  him  of  conspiracy  or  infidelity  to  his  duty 
as  a  United  States  officer.  He  said  once  and  again  to  friends,  "  If  I 
had  proved  faithless  here,  how  could  my  own  people  ever  trust  me  ?  " 

Colonel  Munford,  on  his  staff  during  the  civil  war,  made  the  fol 
lowing  statement  in  his  public  address  at  Memphis,  on  General  John 
ston  : 

When  his  resignation  of  command  in  the  army  of  the  United  States  was  sent 
from  California,  he  kept  his  purpose  and  action  a  profound  secret.  I  heard  him 
say  that  he  believed  if  he  had  tried  he  could  have  brought  nearly  or  quite  his 
entire  command  with  him,  and,  remarking  that  we  needed  them  very  much,  I 
asked  him  if  he  did  not  regret  not  having  done  so.  "  No  sir,"  he  replied. 
"  That  army  was  not  mine ;  it  belonged,  with  all  its  appointments,  to  the  Gov 
ernment  of  the  United  States.  My  position  was  a  trust  which  for  myself  I 
could  relinquish,  but  only  on  condition  of  handing  over,  to  those  for  whom  I  held, 
whatever  was  in  my  hands.  I  waited  till  I  had  cause  to  know  my  resignation 
had  been  received  in  Washington,  turned  over  the  entire  command  to  the  next 
ranking  officer,  mounted  my  horse  and  started  across  the  Plains." 

Colonel  Thomas  F.  McKinney,  his  old  friend,  wrote  in  1872,  in  re* 
gard  to  General  Johnston  : 


ATTEMPTED  REPARATION.  267 

One  thing  is  very  clear  from  what  he  said  as  he  passed  through  Texas,  that 
the  war  between  the  North  and  South  distressed  him  exceedingly. 

The  whole  proceeding  was  at  once  imbecile  and  insulting.  Had  the 
suspicion  been  correct,  and  General  Johnston  the  arch-conspirator  he 
was  represented  to  be,  no  man  who  knows  the  boldness  and  decision  of 
his  character  can  doubt  that  he  would  have  solved  the  problem  of  a 
Pacific  republic  promptly  enough,  by  clapping  his  successor  in  irons, 
and  turning  the  guns  of  Alcatraz  upon  San  Francisco.  As  his  corre 
spondence  will  show,  however,  he  was  still  hoping  for  a  peaceable  solu 
tion  of  the  question,  and  was  alternately  swayed  with  grief  at  the  con 
dition  of  affairs  and  satisfaction  at  the  Union  feeling  in  San  Francisco. 
The  only  effect  upon  him  was  to  revolt  his  whole  soul  against  those 
who  had  assailed  his  honor.  His  friends  on  the  Atlantic  coast,  without 
fully  comprehending  the  force  of  the  thrust  made  at  him,  tried  to  wipe 
out  or  repair  the  injury  as  far  as  possible.  General  Scott,  as  soon  as 
he  heard  what  had  been  done,  sent  him  the  strongest  assurances  of 
friendship.  A  cadetship  at  the  Military  Academy  for  his  son  was  for 
warded  on  the  19th  of  April,  probably  through  General  Scott's  instru 
mentality  ;  and  other  evidences  were  offered  of  a  desire  to  employ  him 
in  high  position,  which  were  communicated  to  him  through  various 
channels  more  or  less  direct. 

The  Hon.  Montgomery  Blair,  Mr.  Lincoln's  Postmaster-General,  in  a 
letter  to  the  writer,  shows  that,  at  a  later  date,  when  opportunity  for 
investigation  and  a  correct  knowledge  of  the  facts  had  been  afforded, 
the  Administration  entertained  no  such  view  of  conspiracy  as  the  loyal 
press  had  disseminated.  Mr.  Blair  says  : 

There  is  a  fact  in  regard  to  your  father  that  I  ought  to  mention.  When 
General  Ord  came  here  from  San  Francisco,  he  called  on  me,  and  stated  that 
great  injury  had  been  done  your  father  by  the  manner  in  which  he  had  been 
superseded,  that  he  was  opposed  to  the  secession  movement  altogether,  and 
that  he  had  often  heard  him  check  persons  using  secession  talk  in  his  presence, 
telling  them  that  it  was  not  respectful  to  him,  as  a  United  States  officer.  This 
statement  was  substantiated  by  a  letter  of  yours  which  had  been  intercepted  and 
given  to  me.  I  immediately  told  Mr.  Lincoln  the  facts,  and  recommended  him 
to  send  your  father  a  major-general's  commission,  and  he  at  once  executed  the 
commission.  I  had  it  forwarded  to  your  father  at  San  Francisco.  But  a  few 
days  afterward  I  learned  that  he  had  started  for  Texas,  and  I  directed  the  post 
master  to  retain  the  package  for  cancellation. 

This  must  have  been  early  in  July. 

So  far  as  his  merely  personal  attitude  was  concerned,  the  assurances 
he  received  of  the  disposition  of  the  President  and  cabinet  toward  him 
might  have  been  accepted  as  satisfactory,  though  it  is  not  probable 
that  he  ever  would  have  resumed  his  sword,  under  any  circumstances, 


268  CALIFORNIA. 

under  the  orders  of  an  Administration  that  had  touched  his  honor  so 
nearly.  But  the  allurements  held  out  to  him  had  no  weight  in  altering 
a  resolution  formed  on  entirely  different  grounds.  From  the  moment 
Texas  seceded,  his  purpose  was  fixed,  no  longer  to  bear  arms  for  a  Gov 
ernment  of  wrhich  she  was  not  a  member. 

General  Johnston  was  now  again  a  private  citizen.  He  left  San 
Francisco  on  the  28th  of  April,  and  proceeded  to  Los  Angeles,  where 
he  became  the  guest  of  his  brother-in-law,  Dr.  John  S.  Griffin.  He  had 
made  comparatively  few  acquaintances  in  California  ;  but,  as  soon  as 
he  ceased  to  wear  the  uniform  of  the  United  States,  numbers  flocked  to 
him  for  advice  as  to  what  should  be  done  in  such  a  crisis.  His  habitual 
reply  was : 

If  you  sympathize  with  either  side,  and  feel  the  call  of  duty  to  take  part  in  a 
sectional  war,  go  home,  and  fight  there  if  necessary.  But  here  there  should  be 
peace.  Strife  here  would  be  civil  war — not  North  against  South — but  neighbor 
against  neighbor ;  and  no  one  can  imagine  the  horrors  that  would  ensue. 

The  writer  does  not  think  he  is  claiming  too  much  when  he  says 
that  the  exemption  of  the  Pacific  coast  from  the  calamities  of  civil  war, 
and,  in  great  measure,  subsequently,  from  the  bitterness  engendered 
elsewhere  thereby,  was  due  to  General  Johnston,  perhaps,  more  than 
to  any  other  man,  by  reason  of  his  firm  and  unshaken  attitude  as  a 
commander  until  relieved,  arid  afterward  by  his  counsels  as  a  private 
citizen. 

About  the  first  of  May,  the  writer,  hearing  that  it  was  probable  that 
General  Johnston  would  be  arrested  if  he  returned  to  the  United  States 
by  the  way  of  New  York,  determined  to  apprise  him  of  his  danger. 
Knowing  that  all  letters  were  liable  to  official  scrutiny,  he  engaged 
a  midshipman,  who  had  lately  resigned  and  was  highly  recommended, 
to  bear  advices  to  General  Johnston.  The  messenger,  with  excellent 
intentions,  was  so  indiscreet  as  to  confide  his  letters  to  a  United  States 
consul  in  the  West  Indies,  and  to  land  in  New  York,  where  he  was 
arrested.  This  is  the  intercepted  letter  alluded  to  by  Mr.  Blair.  As 
General  Johnston  knew  nothing  of  this  attempt  to  warn  him,  it  did  not 
influence  his  movements.  It  is  mentioned  now  only  because  it  was  pro 
claimed  at  the  time  as  another  link  in  the  grand  chain  of  conspiracy 
which  was  erroneously  assumed  by  the  excited  imagination  of  the  North 
to  encircle  the  Confederate  States. 

With  fair  opportunities  of  knowing  the  details  of  the  secession 
movement,  the  writer  does  not  hesitate  to  say  that  its  most  salient 
characteristics  were  spontaneous  enthusiasm  and  reckless  confidence. 
The  revolution  was  essentially  popular ;  and  a  martial  democracy,  in 
which  public  measures  had  always  been  settled  by  oral  discussion,  was 
not  apt  to  practise  any  concealment  of  conduct  or  opinion.  In  fact,  as 


LETTERS.  269 

the  entire  State  action  claimed  to  be  based  on  legal  right,  all  mystery 
was  repudiated  as  savoring  of  intrigue,  and  much  force  was  spent  in 
vehement  assertion  that  might  better  have  been  put  into  preparation 
for  the  conflict.  Conspiracy  is  alien  to  the  genius  of  a  free  people.  It 
requires  generations  of  despotism  to  train  men  to  the  secrecy,  perfect 
organization,  and  implicit  obedience,  necessary  to  success  in  it.  There 
were  no  materials  for  this  sort  of  work  in  the  South  ;  and,  indeed,  the 
education  that  supplies  them  unfits  a  people  for  the  liberty  it  seeks 
through  them.  It  would,  nevertheless,  be  well  for  Americans  of  all 
sections  if  the  spirit  of  self-restraint  were  cultivated  more,  and  if  a 
greater  reserve  were  studied  to  replace  the  unbridled  expression  of 
thought  and  feeling  that  is  becoming  so  marked  a  national  trait. 

In  a  letter  written  January  17,  1861,  from  San  Francisco  to  the 
writer,  General  Johnston,  after  describing  the  rough  voyage  by  which 
he  and  his  family  reached  their  destination  on  the  14th  of  January, 
says : 

When  we  get  to  our  new  home  and  look  around  a  little,  I  shall  be  able  to 
give  you  some  account  of  California  affairs.  I  think  the  public  sentiment  here 
is  decidedly  in  favor  of  the  maintenance  of  the  Union. 

Again : 

SAN  FRANCISCO,  CALIFORNIA,  February  25, 1861. 

MY  DEAE  Sox :  "We  are  all  well,  and  almost  as  comfortable  as  we  could  de 
sire,  were  it  not  for  the  unhappy  condition  of  our  country.  I  confess  I  can  only 
expect  a  general  disruption,  for  passion  seems  to  rule.  Yet,  though  hope  has 
been  so  often  disappointed,  a  gleam  breaks  upon  us  from  the  efforts  of  the  4th 
of  February  convention  at  Washington,  leading  us  on  to  indulge  in  its  illusions 
a  little  longer. 

A  huge  Union  meeting  was  held  here  on  the  22d.  The  day  was  a  perfect 
holiday  for  the  whole  population,  who  filled  the  streets,  and  in  their  best  dresses 
seemed  to  enjoy  the  beautiful  weather.  The  resolutions  adopted  testified  to  a 
devoted  loyalty  to  the  Union,  declared  against  secession  as  a  right,  and  repudi 
ated  the  idea  of  a  Pacific  republic  as  impossible.  They  express  fraternal  feel 
ings  for  all  the  States,  and  declare  that  their  interest  and  honor  demand  every 
exertion  on  their  part  to  bring  about  harmony  again.  I  presume  that  the  senti 
ments  of  these  resolutions,  which  are  those  of  the  people  of  this  city,  may  be  set 
down  as  those  of  the  State,  with  the  exception  of  a  small  minority. 

I  send  Hennie,  Rosa,  Mrs.  Duncan,  and  grandpa's  little  pets,  best  love.  Your 
affectionate  father,  A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

The  following  letter  to  Major  Fitz-John  Porter,  though  in  parts 
nearly  identical  with  that  just  given,  is  inserted  as  corroborative  of 
General  Johnston's  perfect  frankness  of  dealing.  While  his  son  was 
acting  with  those  in  the  South  who  were  readiest  to  meet  the  issue  of 
war,  his  late  adjutant-general  and  trusted  friend,  looking  at  affairs  from 
a  Northern  point  of  view,  was  gradually  yielding  his  conservative  views 
and  entering  with  zeal  into  the  idea  of  coercing  the  South.  General 


270  CALIFORNIA. 

Johnston,  agreeing  with  neither,  did  not  resent  in  those  he  loved  that 
liberty  of  thought  and  action  which  he  claimed  for  himself  as  his  dear 
est  right  : 

SAN  FRANCISCO,  CALIFORNIA,  February  25,  1661. 

MY  DEAE  MAJOE  :  I  have  received  your  letter  of  22d  of  January.  I  found 
my -trunk  at  Wells,  Fargo  &  Co.'s  office.  I  have  no  news  to  give  you  from  this 
far-off  region.  Everything  is  quiet,  and  the  affairs  of  the  department  are  being 
conducted  quietly  and  without  difficulty  from  any  source;  though,  without  any 
excuse  for  it,  the  Government  has  allowed  every  department  of  the  staff  here  to 
fall  into  a  state  of  pauperism,  making  the  military  arm  as  impotent  for  action 
here  as  the  greatest  enemy  of  the  republic  could  desire  to  have  it.  The  district 
of  Oregon  owes  not  less  than  $200,000,  and  no  money  on  hand  except  a  few 
thousands  in  the  Subsistence  Department;  this  department  owes  probably 
$100,000,  and  not  a  cent  to  pay  with.  Is  our  Government  absolutely  stupefied? 
or  why  overlook  the  fact  that  they  can  protect  the  public  interest  here  at  least? 
There  is  abundance  of  money  in  the  Mint  to  pay  all  the  indebtedness  of  the 
Government  here,  and  meet  any  emergency,  if  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
would  only  recognize  the  fact,  and  transfer  the  funds  in  the  Sub-Treasury  to  the 
credit  of  the  disbursing  officers.  Volumes  have  been  written  against  the  credit 
system  and  the  losses  to  the  General  Government  in  consequence  of  it,  when  it 
had  credit ;  how  much  more  strongly  may  all  the  arguments  be  urged  now, 
when  men  begin  to  doubt  its  longer  continuance !  The  loss  to  the  Government 
must  be  so  much  the  greater  in  consequence. 

There  was  a  huge  Union  meeting  here  on  the  22d.  The  weather  was  beau 
tiful,  and  the  day  was  made  a  perfect  holiday  by  the  whole  population,  who, 
well  dressed  and  entirely  respectable  in  appearance  and  deportment,  seemed  to 
enjoy  the  fine  weather.  The  streets  were  filled  all  day,  the  people  going  to  and 
fro  in  pursuit  of  pleasure.  The  resolutions  adopted  by  the  meeting  were  declar 
atory  of  the  devoted  attachment  of  the  people  to  the  Union,  of  their  opposition 
to  secession  as  a  right,  of  their  repudiation  of  the  idea  of  a  Pacific  republic  as 
impossible,  and  expressive  of  their  fraternal  feelings  toward  all  the  States,  and 
their  duty  and  interest  to  bring  about  harmony.  I  would  that  there  were  no 
other  sentiments  within  the  broad  expanse  of  our  country. 

Please  present  my  kind  regards  to  Mrs.  Porter  and  Mrs.  Holbrook,  and  be 
lieve  me,  very  truly  your  friend, 

A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

To  Major  F.  J.  PORTER,  No.  66  Union  Place,  New  York  City. 

SAN  FRANCISCO,  CALIFORNIA,  Apivl  9,  1S61. 

MY  DEAE  SON  :  Yesterday  the  newspapers  of  this  city  announced  that  Texas 
had  completed  all  arrangements  contemplated  as  necessary  to  separate  her  des 
tiny  from  the  General  Government,  the  final  act  being  the  taking  the  oath  of 
allegiance  to  the  new  Confederacy  by  the  Legislature  and  other  State  offi 
cers.  I  have  hoped  to  the  last  that  a  reconciliation  would  be,  by  some  great 
statesmanlike  move  in  the  right  direction,  effected,  with  such  guarantees  as 
would  be  satisfactory  and  reestablish  the  tranquillity  of  the  Southern  mind  and 
those  fraternal  relations  which  alone  make  our  confederate  system  possible. 
"Whether  these  acts  could  or  could  not  be  rightfully  done  under  the  Constitution 
need  no  longer  be  discussed.  The  people  have  resolved,  and  so  declared  to  the 


REASONS  FOR  RESIGNATION.  271 

world,  to  establish  a  government  for  themselves.  A  great  fact  thus  presents 
itself,  which  must  be  dealt  with  not  with  technicalities,  but  in  view  of  all  the 
considerations  and  interests  which  affect  the  future  of  two  great  sections  of  our 
country.  To  continue  to  hold  my  commission  after  being  apprised  of  the  final 
action  of  my  State,  to  whose  partiality  in  a  great  measure  I  owe  my  position, 
could  find  no  justification  in  my  own  conscience;  and  I  have*  therefore,  this  day 
forwarded  the  resignation  of  my  commission  for  the  acceptance  of  the  President, 
which  I  hope  may  be  promptly  accepted.  I  have  asked  that  my  successor  be 
appointed  and  ordered  to  relieve  me  as  soon  as  practicable. 

You  probably  have  seen  a  paragraph  in  the  papers  to  the  effect  that  evi 
dence  is  in  possession  of  the  War  Department  that  General  Johnston  and  other 
officers  are  conspiring  to  establish  a  Pacific  republic.  I  say  the  whole  charge  is 
false  in  every  particular,  and  that  there  is  not  the  slightest  ground  for  it.  I  am 
a  stranger  here,  and  have  had  no  conversation  even  with  any  one  who  desires 
such  a  result  or  entertains  such  views.  If  the  War  Department  has  such  infor 
mation,  why  don't  they  order  an  investigation,  and  not  give  it  to  the  letter- 
writers  to  damage  the  reputation  of  officers  ?  My  escutcheon  is  without  a  blur 
upon  it,  and  never  will  be  tarnished.  I  shall  do  my  duty  to  the  last,  and  when 
absolved  take  my  course.  I  must  now  look  out  for  a  livelihood  for  my  poor 
family ;  how  or  where  to  find  it  is  not  apparent,  but  with  my  courage  all  will 
not  be  lost.  Give  my  love  to  Hennie,  Rosa.  Mrs.  Duncan,  and  the  children. 
Your  affectionate  father,  A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

You  had,  perhaps,  better  let  the  announcement  of  my  resignation  come  from 
the  department. 

[CONFIDENTIAL.]  SAN  FRANCISCO,  CALIFORNIA,  April  14,  1861. 

MY  DEAR  DOCTOR:  The  news  reached  this  place  on  the  9th  inst.  that  Texas 
had,  in  the  most  solemn  and  conclusive  manner,  taken  the  final  step  to  separate 
her  destiny  from  that  of  the  Northern  States,  and  had  joined  the  Southern  Con 
federacy.  This  extreme  action  is  entirely  consistent  with  the  belief  on  their 
part  that  the  unfriendly  sentiment  of  the  North,  which  so  injuriously  affected 
the  tranquillity  and  security  of  the  Southern  communities,  would  undergo  no 
change,  and  that  the  future,  in  consequence  of  it,  would  be  worse  than  the  past. 
For  my  own  part,  I  thought  differently.  I  believed  that  the  joint  action  of  the 
slaveholding  States  (if  it  could  be  brought  about)  would  obtain  from  the  North 
all  the  guarantees  necessary  for  the  preservation  of  the  equality  of  the  States, 
and  prevent  for  the  future  the  system  of  molestation  kept  up  by  fanaticism,  and 
that  the  unfriendly  sentiment  (sufficiently  prevalent  at  the  North  for  mischief), 
no  longer  sustained  by  political  sanctions,  would  die  out.  I  thought  this  course 
would  preserve  the  integrity  of  the  Union,  and  make  it  compatible  with  the 
honor  and  interests  of  the  whole  to  maintain  it.  But  the  persistent  obstinacy 
of  the  Republican  party,  in  refusing  to  concede  anything  whatever  for  the  sake 
of  the  Union  up  to  the  hour  of  the  adjournment  of  the  Senate,  seems  to  indicate 
that  the  action  of  the  South  was  based  upon  a  correct  understanding  of  the  true 
sentiments  of  the  North  and  their  unbending  character.  It  seems  instinctively 
to  have  seized  the  right  conclusion.  The  Government  has  now  to  deal  with  a 
great  fact — a  portion  of  the  Confederacy  in  the  attitude  and  progress  of  revolu 
tion.  It  is  now  immaterial  whether  the  steps  by  which  they  have  reached  this 
point  are  legal  or  not ;  the  question  now  rests  upon  principles  which  constitute 
19 


272  CALIFORNIA. 

the  essence  of  our  organic  law,  i.  e.,  the  right  of  revolution.  A  wise,  straight 
forward,  manly  statesmanship  may  lead  to  a  peaceful  solution ;  but  there  is 
nothing  so  far  to  found  the  hasis  of  such  a  hope  upon.  The  quibbling  about 
technicalities,  which  can  no  longer  enter  into  the  question,  has  only  produced 
embarrassment  so  far.  I  felt,  as  soon  as  I  learned  the  course  adopted  by  my 
State  (Texas),  that  it  was  my  duty  to  conform  to  her  will,  and  that  I  ought  to 
forward  my  resignation  to  the  President ;  and  I  have  accordingly  done  so.  I 
have  served  faithfully  to  the  present  moment,  and  will  continue  to  until  I  am 
properly  relieved.  Until  then,  rest  assured  that  •!  will  do  nothing  inconsistent 
with  my  obligations  to  the  Government  as  an  officer.  The  pressure  of  Northern 
views  had  begun  to  manifest  itself  in  the  army,  and  therefore  I  felt  less  repug 
nance  in  severing  my  connection  with  it.  You  will  allow  that  a  man's  convic 
tions  of  the  necessity  must  be  strong  to  lead  him  to  take  the  step  I  have  done. 
I  have  counseled  only  with  my  wife.  It  brings  us  face  to  face  with  poverty. 
There  is  no  dishonor  in  this;  but,  to  serve  without  the  proper  animus,  there 
would  be.  In  the  contingencies  of  life,  we  have  taught  ourselves  to  believe 
that  all  conditions  of  life  are  tolerable,  without  dishonor.  I  am  willing  to 
undertake  any  employment  that  will  yield  a  support  for  my  family.  Your 
advice  would  assist  me.  I  will  have  in  cash  about  $1,500  to  begin  with. 

Your  friend  and  brother,  A.  S.  Jonxsxox. 

Any  publicity  given  to  the  fact  of  my  having  resigned  would  embarrass  me 
in  the  proper  discharge  of  my  duty.  It  would  be  better  for  the  notice  to  come 
from  the  East. 

To  Dr.  JOHN  S.  GRIFFIN. 

WASHINGTON  CITY,  April  18, 1861. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL:  I  take  the  greatest  pleasure  in  assuring  you,  for  the 
Secretary  of  War,  that  he  has  the  utmost  confidence  in  you,  and  will  give  you 
the  most  important  command  and  trust,  on  your  arrival  here.  Sidney  is  ap 
pointed  to  the  Military  Academy. 

I  hope  soon  to  see  you ;  and,  with  a  heart  glowing  with  pride  and  pleasure 
for  my  commander  and  friend,  I  remain,  ever  yours, 

F.  J.  PORTER, 

Assis  tan  t  A  dju  tant-  Genera  I. 

To  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  San  Francisco,  California. 

The  following  letter,  addressed  to  Major  Porter  by  an  officer,  then 
and  since  very  prominent  in  the  United  States  Army,  needs  no  com 
ment  : 

"WASHINGTON,  May  10, 1861. 

DEAR  PORTER:  General  Johnston  has  resigned.  He  did  so,  April  9,  1861! 
Suraner's  orders  were  not  known  here  till  near  that  time.  He  left  "Washington 
April  1st.  Johnston  asked  that  a  successor  might  be  sent  to  relieve  him !  His 
letter  did  not  show  that  he  had  any  idea  that  he  was  suspected,  or  that  any  one 
was  sent  to  relieve  him — says  that  he  has  heard  that  Johnston  has  been  talking, 
very  openly,  secession  doctrines  in  San  Francisco.  The  thing  is  all  up.  His 
resignation  is  accepted,  and  the  feeling  is  so  strong  against  those  who  have 
abandoned  the  country,  that  it  would  be  utterly  useless  to  say  a  word. 


A  RIGHTEOUS  INDIGNATION.  273 

General  Johnston's  resignation  was  accepted  on  the  6th  of  May,  to 
take  effect  on  the  3d  instant. 

From  his  sister-in-law,  Mrs.  Eliza  Gilpin,  already  mentioned  as  the 
widow  of  his  brother,  Josiah  Stoddard  Johnston,  he  received  a  letter, 
dated  at  Philadelphia,  April  15th,  breathing  the  excited  feeling  of 
devotion  to  the  Union  just  then  newly  aroused  by  the  fall  of  Fort 
Sumter.  The  following  extract,  however,  contains  all  that  is  essential 
to  this  memoir  :  • 

MY  VERY  DEAR  BROTHER:  The  newspaper  account  of  your  having  been  su 
perseded  in  your  command,  and  without  any  reasons  having  been  assigned  for 
it,  has  given  nae  much  anxiety  on  your  account,  and  excited  much  indignation, 
as  no  one  alive  has  a  right  to  feel  for  you  a  more  natural  and  affectionate  in 
terest.  Your  elder  brother,  my  beloved  husband,  having  felt  for  you  as  a  father, 
gives  me  a  right  to  speak  as  a  mother ;  and  I  do  affectionately  request  you  not  to 
act  hastily  and  resign  your  commission.  I  have  a  letter,  this  moment  received 
from  Washington,  from  the  most  reliable  source— an  officer  of  rank,  and  a  great 
personal  friend  of  yours.  From  him  I  asked  what  it  meant.  His  reply  is: 
"  Great  astonishment  prevails  at  the  course  taken  with  regard  to  your  brother, 
General  Johnston,  and  General  Scott  expresses  great  mortification  at  the  course, 
which  we  all  believe  to  be  purely  political.  The  general  designs,  when  General 
Johnston  arrives  here,  to  place  him  in  a  position  at  once  which  will  relieve  him 
from  the  slightest  imputation."  Therefore,  my  dear  Albert,  do  not  think  of 
resigning.  Remember  your  dear  brother's  love  for  the  Union,  his  exalted  pa 
triotism,  and  his  many  virtues.  You  are  his  representative  now,  and  will  remain 
by  our  beloved  flag.  .  .  . 

God  bless  you,  my  dear  brother,  and  direct  you  in  the  right  way ! 

YOUR  SISTER. 

The  following  was  General  Johnston's  reply: 

Los  ANGELES,  CALIFORNIA,  June  1, 1S61. 

MY  DEAR  SISTER  :  I  received  your  kind  and  affectionate  letter  of  April  15th, 
last  evening.  The  resignation  of  my  commission  in  the  army  was  forwarded 
from  San  Francisco,  for  the  acceptance  of  the  President,  on  the  10th  of  April, 
by  the  Pony  Express.  It  should  have  reached  Washington  on  the  25th  of 
April,  the  day  on  which  General  Sumner,  under  the  orders  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  relieved  me  from  the  command  of  the  Pacific  Department.  I  was  directed 
in  that  order  to  repair  to  Washington  to  receive  orders.  Presuming  that  my 
resignation  had  been  accepted  by  the  President,  to  take  effect  on  the  arrival  of 
my  successor,  as  had  been  requested  by  me,  I  have  awaited  here  the  announce 
ment  of  its  acceptance.  It  may  be  that,  having,  under  the  influence  of  an  unac 
countable  and  unjustifiable  distrust,  ordered  me  to  be  relieved,  the  authorities 
deferred  the  acceptance  till  they  received  General  Sumner's  report,  in  which 
case  I  cannot  receive  an  answer  before  the  23d  inst. 

Having  faithfully  administered  the  affairs  of  the  department  until  I  was  re 
lieved,  there  can  be  no  reason  to  refuse  the  acceptance.  As  I  am  neither  in 
debted  to  the  Government,  nor  have  done  any  exceptionable  act,  a  refusal  to 
accept  would  be  without  precedent ;  and,  inasmuch  as  themselves  made  it  im- 


274:  CALIFORNIA. 

possible  for  any  man  with  a  spark  of  honor,  in  my  position,  to  serve  longer,  it 
would  also  be  most  unjust.  I  do  not  say  I  would  have  served  much  longer  under 
any  circumstances ;  but  I  do  say  that  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  me  to 
have  done  any  act  inconsistent  with  the  trust  reposed  in  me ;  and  that  trust 
would,  under  all  circumstances,  have  been  restored,  as  it  was,  to  the  Govern 
ment,  intact. 

After  General  Sumner's  promotion,  I  expected,  as  a  matter  of  course,  to  be 
relieved  by  him,  and  was  not  aware  when  I  was  relieved  that  his  being  sent  out 
was  accompanied  by  circumstances  manifesting  distrust.  This  I  learned  after 
ward.  I  was  astonished  to  see  in  the  San  Francisco  Bulletin  of  the  Vth  of 
April,  and  I  must  say  also  disgusted,  that  the  War  Department,  which  should 
guard  and  protect  the  fame  of  the  officer  of  the  army,  allowed  itself  to  be  the 
vehicle  of  foully  slanderous  imputations  against  me,  derived  no  doubt  from 
anonymous  sources.  If  not,  justice  required  an  investigation,  which  would  have 
fixed  the  guilt,  or  have  acquitted.  Instead  of  this,  letter-writers  were  suffered 
to  spread  the  charge  of  disloyalty  against  me  through  the  wide  extent  of  the 
States,  though  there  was  not  a  single  fact  to  sustain  it. 

I  have  since  received  the  assurances  of  the  Secretary,  dated  April  18th, 
through  an  excellent  friend,  of  full  confidence  in  me,  and  that  my  son  was  ap 
pointed  a  cadet.  This  is  better  than  nothing,  but  is  a  small  compensation  for 
the  damage  done.  I  have  at  no  time  thought  that  General  Scott  had  anything 
to  do  with  this.  I  still  feel  for  him  all  the  gratitude  and  kindness  I  have  always 
felt. 

I  do  not  desire  ever  again  to  hold  an  office.  No  one  could  feel  more  sensibly 
the  calamitous  condition  of  our  country  than  myself;  and,  whatever  part  I  may 
take  hereafter,  it  will  always  be  a  subject  of  gratulation  with  me  that  no  act  of 
mine  ever  contributed  to  bring  it  about.  I  suppose  the  difficulties  will  now  only 
be  adjusted  by  the  sword.  In  my  humble  judgment  that  was  not  the  remedy. 

I  hope,  my  dear  sister,  you  are  in  good  health,  and  that  you  may  long  live  to 
enjoy  the  good  things  Providence  has  placed  in  your  hands.  Such  is  the  prayer 
of  your  affectionate  brother,  A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

It  is  a  pleasant  thought,  now  that  death  has  reunited  these  kindred 
and  exalted  spirits,  to  remember  that,  though  differing  so  widely,  the 
affection  of  a  lifetime  was  not  imbittered  even  by  the  events  of  the 
civil  war.  This  venerable  lady  cherished  a  tender,  sisterly  recollection 
for  the  memory  of  the  soldier  to  whose  martial  virtues  her  benign  influ 
ence  had  early  imparted  some  of  the  grace  of  her  own  refined  and  ele 
gant  character.  In  a  letter  to  the  writer,  dated  July  12,  1861,  she 
says: 

I  truly  grieve  for  the  necessity  of  your  father's  resignation.  Still,  I  cannot 
blame  him.  He  has  always  been  the  soul  of  honor ;  and  so  he  will  be,  in  my 
estimation,  while  I  live. 

Years  afterward  these  sentiments  were  reiterated  by  the  trembling 
hand  of  age. 


A  DREAD   ALTERNATIVE.  275 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

THE     DESERT     JOURNEY. 

GENERAL  JOHNSTON  remained  at  Los  Angeles  from  May  2d  to  June 
16th.  His  letter  to  Mrs.  Gilpin,  already  given  (page  273),  reveals  in 
some  measure  his  feelings  at  this  time.  The  Administration,  which 
thought  the  personal  indignity  put  upon  him  atoned  for  by  an  offer  of 
promotion,  and  the  crooked  policy  of  discrediting  an  upright  soldier  an 
act  merely  "  political,"  left  his  reputation  to  this  late  vindication.  The 
arbitrary  delay,  without  cause  or  explanation,  in  accepting  his  resigna 
tion,  as  if  to  embarrass  his  action,  evidently  aroused  General  John 
ston's  indignation.  The  acceptance  was  received  at  last,  however,  be 
fore  he  left  Los  Angeles,  thus  completely  severing  the  tie  that  bound 
him  to  military  service.  As  has  been  said,  the  grievances  that  wounded 
his  proud  spirit,  though  sufficient  to  drive  him  from  the  army,  were  not 
the  considerations  that  impelled  him  to  his  final  course  of  action.  These 
were  totally  different. 

When  General  Johnston  resigned,  the  elements  were  astir  with  the 
strife  and  evils  brewing,  but  hostilities  had  not  begun  ;  and  he  still 
flattered  himself  with  a  hope  of  peace.  But  he  had  not  been  long  at 
Los  Angeles  before  there  came  the  news  of  actual  conflict.  The  tremen 
dous  outburst  of  resentment  in  the  North  at  the  fall  of  Sumter  made  it 
evident  that  the  contest  would  be  waged  within  no  ordinary  bounds  ; 
and  the  soberest  minds  felt  the  most  concern.  A  martial  people,  whose 
wars  for  nearly  a  century  had  been  but  the  pricking  of  a  spur  to  their 
enthusiasm,  finding  themselves  of  a  sudden  arrayed  in  two  hostile 
camps,  would  not  sheathe  their  swords  without  a  fierce  and  protracted 
struggle.  To  a  man  used  to  study  the  passions  as  evinced  in  warfare, 
this  was  plain. 

The  question  was  now  forced  upon  General  Johnston  whether  he 
was  to  remain  neutral  in  this  contest,  submissive  to  the  authority  he 
could  no  longer  serve,  and  alien  to  the  land  and  people  to  which  his 
heart  called  him,  or  resist  the  Government  he  had  served  so  long  and 
so  devotedly.  To  those  who  have  read  this  biography,  it  is  needless  to 
say  that,  in  this  supreme  action  of  his  life,  General  Johnston  was  guid 
ed  by  the  same  severe  convictions  of  duty  that  had  always  animated 
him.  The  powerful  passions  of  his  energetic  nature,  by  long  subjec 
tion,  had  become  the  ministers,  instead  of  the  counselors,  of  his  reason. 
Their  dictates  entered  but  as  a  slight  element  into  his  motives.  Hence 
his  course  was  consistent.  If  he  would  not,  in  his  action,  anticipate  a 
painful  duty,  yet,  when  it  was  fully  and  fairly  presented,  there  was 


276  THE  DESERT  JOURNEY. 

neither  hesitation  in  entering  upon  it  nor  vacillation  in  following  it  to 
its  remotest  consequences. 

He  soon  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  same  reasons  that  had 
compelled  him  to  resign  for  the  sake  of  his  State  must,  at  its  need, 
also  constrain  him  to  return  to  its  soil  and  adhere  to  its  fortunes.  But, 
unaware  in  that  isolated  community  of  the  martial  tread  of  events  or 
of  the  fury  of  the  public  mind,  he  had  made  his  arrangements  to  return 
by  sea  to  New  York,  and  was  about  to  put  his  family  on  the  steamer, 
when  he  was  warned  by  friends  that  he  would  be  arrested  if  he  tried 
to  leave ;  and  it  soon  became  clear  that,  even  if  he  escaped  this  fate 
in  California,  he  must  submit  to  it  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  As  events 
thickened  and  the  news  kept  pouring  in,  his  ardent  nature  took  fire. 
If  he  had  been  accustomed  to  ordinary  self-appreciation,  he  might  have 
known  all  along  that  a  soldier  of  his  temper,  reputation,  and  position, 
would  not  be  allowed  to  stand  aloof  with  such  interests  at  stake  to  be 
decided  by  wager  of  battle.  He  was  a  man  who,  in  the  piping  times 
of  peace,  might  be  left  to  rust  in  obscurity ;  but,  when  the  fate  of  an 
empire  was  at  poise,  no  one  on  either  side  believed  that  the  sword  of 
Albert  Sidney  Johnston  would  weigh  lightly  in  the  scale.  There  were 
mighty  demands  upon  him  now.  In  California  there  were  many  South 
erners,  Texans  especially  ;  and  the  low  murmur  of  appeal,  even  of 
remonstrance,  made  itself  heard  in  behalf  of  the  beloved  land.  "  It 
looks  like  fate,"  he  said  to  his  wife  ;  "twice  Texas  makes  me  a  rebel." 

While  General  Johnston  was  at  Los  Angeles  a  beautiful  set  of  sil 
ver  was  sent  to  him,  on  the  salver  of  which  was  this  inscription,  "  To 
General  A.  Sidney  Johnston,  from  friends  in  San  Francisco."  Coming 
at  such  a  time,  this  mark  of  approbation  from  valued  friends  was  doubly 
prized.  While  in  service,  he  had  scrupulously  regarded  the  obligation 
laid  upon  public  officers  alike  by  a  jealous  self-respect  and  by  the  Mo 
saic  injunction  :  "  Thou  shalt  take  no  gift ;  for  the  gift  blindeth  the  wise 
and  perverteth  the  words  of  the  righteous."  But  as  a  private  citizen, 
insulted  and  proscribed,  this  proof  of  esteem  was  very  grateful  to  him. 

There  were  considerations  to  hold  him  back  from  the  fray  that  might 
well  have  weakened  the  stoutest  resolution.  A  wife  and  helpless  fam 
ily  of  little  children  looked  to  him  for  protection  and  support.  He  had 
saved  no  fortune  :  fifteen  hundred  dollars  made  up  his  available  means. 
And  now,  when  a  great  public  duty  demanded  his  talents  and  experi 
ence,  it  seemed  that  it  must  yield  to  the  more  immediate  call  of  domes 
tic  obligations.  But  the  very  spot  and  people  to  which  Providence  had 
led  him  afforded  to  his  family  a  retreat  unequaled  for  security,  while  a 
generous,  affectionate,  and  vigorous  protector  was  raised  up  for  their 
care  and  succor.  Dr.  John  S.  Griffin,  Mrs.  Johnston's  brother,  had  the 
will  and  power  to  relieve  General  Johnston's  embarrassment,  by  taking 
charge  of  his  family.  To  him  they  were  committed,  and  nobly  was  the 


THE  START.  277 

trust  redeemed.  Freed  from  this  imperious  demand,  General  Johnston 
made  up  his  mind  to  sacrifice  all  private  interests  for  the  sake  of  his 
State  and  of  the  South.  Once  resolved,  he  entered  upon  his  line  of 
action  without  reserve,  and  took  the  steps  for  its  successful  accomplish 
ment  with  his  accustomed  sagacity. 

General  Johnston's  position  had  now  become  one  of  anxiety,  diffi 
culty,  and  danger.  The  sea,  thoroughly  in  the  interest  of  the  North, 
was  closed  to  him.  Soldiers  had  been  sent  to  Los  Angeles  to  watch 
his  movements,  and  he  was  subjected  to  a  most  unpleasant  surveillance. 
Note  was  taken  of  all  his  acts,  and  the  eager  hand  of  military  power 
threatened  each  moment  to  seize  him.  He  was  virtually  a  prisoner  in 
the  department  he  had  lately  commanded.  The  only  way  of  escape,  by 
which  he  could  reach  Texas,  was  across  an  inhospitable  desert,  beset 
with  hardships  and  perils  that  might  well  appall  even  a  veteran  cam 
paigner.  While  considering  the  proper  means  for  such  an  enterprise, 
he  learned,  to  his  great  satisfaction,  of  the  formation  of  a  band  of  bold 
and  enthusiastic  Southerners  pledged  to  the  attempt,  and  he  gladly 
joined  them.  The  writer  is  largely  indebted  to  Captain  Gift,  Colonel 
Ridley,  and  Colonel  Hardcastle,  for  important  details  in  regard  to  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  journey  through  Arizona  ;  and,  assured  that  the  spirited 
narratives  of  these  faithful  companions  will  be  cheerfully  accepted  in 
lieu  of  his  own,  he  has  preferred  to  use  their  own  words,  except  where, 
for  the  sake  of  conciseness,  the  account  is  abridged. 

Captain  Gift  was  a  Tennesseean,  and  had  resigned  a  midshipman's 
warrant  in  the  United  States  Navy  in  1849,  to  settle  in  California.  He 
served  faithfully  through  the  war,  and  now  resides  at  Napa,  California. 
Alonso  Ridley,  though  of  Northern  birth,  was  deeply  impressed  with 
the  righteousness  of  the  Southern  cause.  He  will  often  appear  in  this 
narrative.  He  was  captain  to  General  Johnston's  body-guard,  and  after 
ward  major  of  the  Third  Arizona  Regiment. 

The  following  is  Captain  Gift's  account  of  the  organization  and 
start  of  the  expedition : 

Prior  to  the  arrival  of  General  Johnston  in  Los  Angeles,  Captain  Alonso 
Ridley 1  and  the  writer  had  determined  to  go  South,  and  waited  a  favorable 
opportunity.  Ridley  favored  the  journey  across  the  Plains,  and  I  favored  the 
route  by  sea,  being  a  seaman. 

On  the  arrival  of  the  general  from  San  Francisco,  we  had  an  interview,  and 
it  was  determined  to  try  to  raise  a  party  sufficiently  strong  to  cross  the  Plains 
without  fear  of  molestation  from  the  Indians,  then  very  hostile  and  enterprising. 
It  was  concluded  that  the  party  should  consist  of  at  least  thirty  men.  Ridley 
undertook  to  collect  the  party,  and  to  his  tact  and  indomitable  energy  is  due 
the  success  of  the  enterprise.  He  rode  several  hundred  miles  to  consult  with 
friends,  and  spent  all  the  money  needed  in  the  outfit  of  nearly  half  the  party. 

1  Captain  Ridley  is  now  known  as  Colonel  Ridley. 


278  THE  DESERT  JOURNEY. 

The  Federal  military  authorities  deemed  it  necessary  to  order  a  force  of 
horse  and  foot  to  Los  Angeles  to  observe  our  movements ;  and,  as  the  time  of 
departure  drew  near,  we  began  to  suspect  that  arrests  would  be  made,  or 
attempted.  The  time  of  departure  was  fixed  for  the  20th  of  June ;  but,  upon 
consultation,  we  determined  to  give  it  out  that  we  would  not  leave  until  the 
25th,  and  then  leave  on  the  17th  or  18th.  The  general  left  on  the  16th.  His 
outfit  consisted  of  a  strong,  light,  covered  ambulance,  drawn  by  two  good  Amer 
ican  mules  (American  as  distinguished  from  Mexican),  a  saddle-horse  of  Califor 
nia  breed,  and  a  small,  black,  Mexican  pack-mule,  a  hardy,  untamable  beast. 
The  general  carried  all  his  provisions,  camp-equipage,  etc.,  in  the  ambulance, 
and,  in  crossing  the  desert,  a  good  quantity  of  barley  for  forage.  The  mule  was 
also  packed  with  barley. 

As  previously  mentioned,  it  was  given  out  that  our  starting-day  had  been 
postponed  to  the  25th.  The  general  being  all  ready  on  the  16th,  he  started  to 
the  place  of  rendezvous,  Warner's  Ranch,  or  Agua  Caliente,  in  San  Diego 
County,  which  was  more  than  a  hundred  miles  on  the  road.  He  left  Los  Angeles 
at  daybreak  with  Captain  Kidley  and  his  servant  Kan,  and  went  to  the  Chino 
Kanch,  thirty  miles  from  Los  Angeles,  whence  he  was  accompanied  by  Dr.  Car 
man  Frazee.  Dr.  Frazee  knew  the  country  well,  and  acted  as  guide.1  They  rested 
at  Chino  during  part  of  the  day,  and  then  moved  forward,  Mr.  Carlisle,  the 
proprietor  of  the  Chino,  having  first  picketed  the  road  with  some  of  his  va- 
queros,  with  orders  to  ride  forward  and  warn  the  general  should  soldiers  appear 
in  his  rear.  In  this  event,  he  and  Frazee  would  have  made  their  way  to  Mexi 
can  territory  on  horseback.  The  Federals,  however,  had  no  knowledge  of  the 
general's  departure,  and  did  not  follow  him.  About  the  25th  of  June  nearly 
the  whole  party  had  arrived  at  the  rendezvous,  where  we  found  the  general 
enjoying  himself,  though  the  weather  was  excessively  hot.  The  ranch  was 
owned  by  John  Eains,  Esq.,  whose  major-domo  had  orders  to  kill  several  bul 
locks,  and  jerk  the  meat  for  our  use.  This  necessitated  several  additional  days 
of  delay,  and  I  think  it  was  the  29th  of  June,  or  about  that  time,  when  we 
finally  moved  away,  organized  under  command  of  Alonso  Ridley,  to  whom  we 
intrusted  the  order  of  marching,  etc.,  etc. 

The  following  additional  particulars  are  from  a  letter  of  Colonel 
Ridley.  They  vary  in  some  unimportant  respects  from  Captain  Gift's 
account  : 

It  gives  me  great  pleasure  to  learn  that  you  are  engaged  in  so  laudable  a 
labor  as  a  memoir  of  that  great  and  good  man,  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston. 
The  simple  story  of  his  life  is  sufficient.  It  is  the  proudest  memory  of  my  own 
life  to  have  been  associated  with  him. 

I  first  made  the  general's  acquaintance  on  his  arrival  at  Los  Angeles,  after 
his  resignation.  I  was  quietly  engaged  at  the  time  in  raising  a  party  to  proceed  to 
Texas.  In  conversation  one  day  with  Dr.  Griffin,  who  knew  of  my  movements, 
I  remarked  that  if  the  general  desired  to  go  South  it  would  be  a  good  oppor 
tunity  for  him.  Griffin  thought  it  would  not  do  ;  the  Indians  were  bad  all  along 

1  Frazee  served  as  private  in  Colonel  Jefferson  Davis's  First  Mississippi  Regiment  in 
the  Mexican  War. 


OX   THE   ROAD.  279 

the  route,  and  the  general  had  so  many  friends  that  he  could  easily  reach  the 
South  by  way  of  New  York.  A  few  days  after  I  met  the  general  in  the  street, 
and  he  asked  if  he  could  see  me  a  few  minutes  privately.  We  walked  to  the 
office  of  Dr.  Griffin,  and,  being  alone,  he  told  me  that  he  had  been  informed  of 
my  proposed  expedition,  and  he  thought  he  should  like  to  go  along.  I  told  him 
at  once  that  the  party  would  be  glad  to  escort  him.  He  said,  "No;"  that  he 
was  no  longer  an  officer  of  the  army,  and  that  if  he  went  it  would  be  simply  as 
one  of  the  party.  After  some  further  conversation  relative  to  my  movements 
and  the  proposed  time  of  departure,  he  decided  then  and  there  to  accompany  us. 
We  hurried  our  departure,  leaving  some  days  before  we  intended,  having 
learned  that  movements  were  on  foot  for  the  arrest  of  the  general  and  myself, 
on  the  charge  of  treason.  Owing  to  this  quite  a  number  who  had  proposed  to 
accompany  us  were  left  behind.  The  general  and  I  left  Los  Angeles  at  a  very 
early  hour,  accompanied  only  by  his  servant  Randolph.  I  left  him  at  Ranch 
Chino,  some  thirty-five  miles  distant,  where  we  arrived  the  same  day,  in  order 
to  collect  our  company,  and  sent  Dr.  Frazee  to  guide  him  to  Agua  Caliente,  our 
place  of  rendezvous.  There  I  joined  him  after  a  few  days. 

The  following  letter,  written  by  General  Johnston  to  his  wife  from 
near  Warner's  Ranch,  June  26th,  will  conclude  the  account  of  the 
preparations  : 

MY  DEAR  WIFE  :  We  arrived  this  far  on  our  journey  on  Friday,  22d.  I  rode 
on  my  horse  from  Chino  to  this  place,  except  a  few  miles  which  I  got  Ban  to 
do  for  me.  I  am  now  pretty  well  seasoned,  and  have  no  apprehension  of  fever. 
I  thank  you  for  the  veils.  I  am  now  well  supplied  with  means  of  defense 
against  the  mosquitoes.  How  will  Ran  look  with  a  blue  veil  on?  He  is  as 
good  a  hand  with  mules  as  need  be ;  with  my  backing,  Ran  is  sans  peur.  .  .  . 
We  should  not  borrow  trouble  by  apprehension  of  dangers  in  the  future,  but 
nerve  ourselves  to  meet  them  bravely  should  they  come.  I  am  happy  that  my 
family  is  away  from  the  turmoil  and  conflicts  of  civil  dissension,  and  I  can,  on 
account  of  their  security  under  the  protecting  arm  of  a  brave,  kind  brother,  dis 
charge  my  duty  in  whatever  position  Fortune  may  assign  me,  with  equanimity 
and  cheerfulness,  and  with  the  hope  that  there  is  much  good  in  store  for  us. 
Can  I  better  testify  my  love  for  you  and  my  children  than  by  this  journey  ? 
Love  and  hope  cheer  me  on  to  discharge  a  great  duty.  Kiss  our  dear  children. 
My  most  ardent  hope  is  that  they  may  love  you  and  each  other. 

The  march  was  begun  from  Warner's,  June  27th,  and  a  halt  made 
June  30th,  at  Vallecito.  The  itinerary  at  the  end  of  this  chapter  may 
be  found  useful  in  elucidating  the  incidents  of  the  journey. 

General  Johnston  wrote  as  follows  to  his  wife,  from  Vallecito : 

VALLECITO,  130  MILES  TO  YUMA,  ) 
Sunday,  June  30, 1861.     ) 

....  I  received  your  letter  of  June  25th  by  Major  Armistead,  who  arrived 
here  this  morning.  Our  party  is  now  as  large  as  need  be  desired  for  safety  or 
convenience  in  traveling.1  They  are  good  men  and  well  armed.  Late  of  the 

1  Eight  resigned  army-officers  and  twenty-five  citizens. 


280  TnE   DESERT  JOURNEY. 

army  we  have  Major  Armistead,  Lieutenants  Hardcastle,  Brewer,  Riley,  Shaaf, 
Mallory,  and  Wickliffe.1  These  young  gentlemen,  though  accustomed  to  a  life 
of  comparative  ease,  rough  it  as  well  as  the  best  of  them ;  wash,  cook,  pack, 
and  harness  animals,  etc.  The  party  is  well  armed,  and,  "by  observing  a  good 
compact  order  of  march  and  vigilance  in  camp,  we  will  be  free  from  any  dan 
ger  of  attack  from  Indians.  I  think  there  is  no  need  of  apprehension  of  moles 
tation  on  the  part  of  the  authorities,  civil  or  military,  unless  orders  come  from 
Washington.  Should  there  be  such,  I  will  have  notice  in  time. 

We  find  it  very  hot  in  some  parts  of  the  day ;  in  others,  not  unpleasant. 
We  have,  tell  your  brother,  in  our  mess,  Captain  Dillard,  Mr.  Jordan,  and  Mr. 
Frazee  ;  and,  with  Ran  as  our  cook  and  driver  of  my  carriage,  I  could  have  no 
better  arrangement  for  the  most  comfortable  traveling  the  season  and  route  will 
admit  of.  I  have  ridden  but  a  few  miles  in  the  carriage  since  we  started.  .  .  . 
I  have  nothing  to  say  to  my  boys  that  has  not  already  been  said.  I  have  per 
fect  confidence  that  they  will  be  all  that  ought  to  be  desired  or  expected.  They 
must  learn  that  one  man  by  an  exhibition  of  physical  power  can  control  but 
few.  'It  is  by  moral  power  alone  that  numbers  of  minds  are  controlled  and 
directed  by  one  mind.  By  not  preserving  his  equanimity  a  man  throws  away 
his  moral  power.  He  who  cannot  control  himself  cannot  control  others.  He 
should  know  when  to  feel  and  to  show  resentment ;  and  it  is  only  on  grave 
occasions  that  this  is  necessary.  Napoleon  knew  the  value  of  a  scene ;  but 
his  judgment,  rather  than  his  passion,  dictated  it.  Be  patient ;  be  hope 
ful.  .  .  . 

I  am  writing  on  a  barley-sack.  We  leave  here  this  evening  and  go  to  Car- 
rizo,  eighteen  miles ;  to-morrow  to  Indian  Wells,  thirty-two  miles,  and  so  on, 
traveling  from  four  o'clock  till  late  at  night,  till  we  get  to  a  better  climate.  .  .  . 

From  Yuma  General  Johnston  addressed  a  third  letter  on  July  5th 
to  Mrs.  Johnston,  as  follows  : 

We  arrived  at  this  place  last  evening.  They  were  firing  the  Federal  salute 
of  the  evening  in  honor  of  the  day,  thirteen  guns.  We  were  near  enough  at  12 
o'clock  to  hear  the  national  salute.  We  passed  the  desert  without  much  suffer 
ing,  either  among  the  men  or  animals.  The  heat  from  the  sand,  as  well  as  from 
the  direct  rays  of  the  sun,  was  intense,  but  tempered  for  us  by  gentle  breezes. 
We  started  from  Carrizo  at  3  P.  M.,  and  arrived  at  Indian  Wells,  thirty-seven 
miles,  at  sunrise.  Here  the  water,  if  clear,  is  good ;  but  the  well  had  to  be 
cleaned  out,  and  it  was,  for  us,  muddy  and  unpalatable.  At  this  place  the  flies 
— house-flies — swarm  in  myriads.  It  was  not  possible  to  throw  a  veil  over 
your  face  quick  enough  to  "exclude  them.  The  scrubby  mesquite  afforded  but 
little  shelter  from  the  burning  heat,  and  on  these  accounts  we  concluded  to 
take  the  route  again  at  12  M.,  and  go  to  Alamo  Well,  twenty-eight  miles,  where 
we  arrived  at  9  p.  M.,  worn  out  for  want  of  sleep  and  the  long  time  we  had 
been  in  the  saddle.  In  going  from  Carrizo  to  Indian  Wells  I  rode  by  the  car 
riage  all  night.  Though  Ran  is  very  trustworthy,  I  found  he  would  go  to  sleep. 
He  kept  wide  awake  and  bright,  whistling  at  times,  till  about  3  A.  M.,  when 
nature,  not  faithful  Ran,  gave  way.  Falling  fast  asleep,  he  drove  square  off 

1  Of  the  eight,  four  fell  in  battle — Johnston,  Armistead,  Mallory,  and  Brewer. 


THE   DESERT.  281 

into  the  desert.  Of  course  I  immediately  roused  him,  and  put  him  on  the  road 
again.  Our  march,  Sunday,  30th,  was  far  in  the  night.  When  night  came  on 
we  were  astonished  to  see  a  huge  comet,  as  large  as  Venus,  with  a  tail  100° 
long,  stretching  far  into  the  milky-way.  Its  brightness  contributed  to  make 
our  route  quite  apparent  during  the  march,  and  also  favored  us  with  great  ad 
ditional  light  during  the  whole  of  the  following  night.  In  marching  through 
this  great  desert,  although  we  have  only  had  a  cloud  of  dust  by  day,  we  had  a 
pillar  of  naming  light  by  night.  We  regard  this  comet  as  a  good  omen ;  its 
tail  stood  to  the  southeast,  which  was  our  course.  It  seems  to  move  with  in 
conceivable  velocity,  and  is  already  fast  disappearing.  I  have  been  compelled 
to  wait  here  to-day  to  have  our  carriage-tires  cut. 

General  Johnston's  letters,  written  to  his  wife  on  the  road,  do  not 
convey  a  full  conception  of  the  sufferings  of  this  midsummer  march. 
His  stoicism  and  the  wish  to  relieve  his  wife's  solicitude  caused  him  to 
treat  lightly  annoyances  that  in  the  aggregate  amounted  to  torture ; 
torrid  heat,  swarms  of  flies  and  mosquitoes,  clouds  of  stifling  dust, 
brackish  drinking-water,  wearing  vigils,  prolonged  night-marches,  and 
exhausting  fatigue,  are  but  a  part  of  the  ills  undergone.  The  route  lay 
through  one  of  the  hottest  regions  in  the  world,  where  the  thermometer 
often  marked  over  120°  in  the  shade,  when  shade  could  be  found.  The 
Colorado  Desert,  through  which  their  route  lay,  is  a  depressed  basin, 
treeless,  arid,  and  cut  off  from  moisture  and  the  cooling  breath  of  the 
sea-breeze.  One  hundred  and  thirty  miles  across,  sixty  miles  of  waste 
stretch  away  without  a  drop  of  water,  or  a  sign  of  animal  or  vegetable 
life.  The  struggling  mules  sometimes  sank  to  the  knee  in  its  dry  sands; 
and  the  hot  blast  of  the  sirocco  lifted  the  loose,  moving  soil,  in  clouds 
and  pillars  of  dust,  that  fell  like  the  showers  of  ashes  that  buried  Pom 
peii.  Captain  Gift  gives  the  following  vivid  description  of  their  passage 
of  the  desert  : 

On  the  afternoon  of  July  1st,  after  the  sun  had  sunk  low  enough  to  permit 
the  waters  of  the  spring  to  cool  so  that  our  animals  would  drink,  we  commenced 
our  first  real  desert  march  of  forty-two  miles  or  thereabouts,  to  Indian  Wells. 
The  memory  of  that  weary  night-march  remains  with  me  like  a  horrible  night 
mare.  The  first  few  miles  was  through  sand,  but  the  remainder  over  a  beautiful 
hard  road,  as  level  as  a  floor  and  as  firm  as  a  turnpike.  But  it  was  horribly  mo 
notonous — sage-brush  and  barren  plains.  A  companion  with  whom  I  rode  pro 
posed  during  the  latter  part  of  the  night  that  we  fall  out  and  leave  the  road  a 
hundred  yards,  and  lie  down  to  sleep  until  daylight,  and  then  mount  and  gallop 
on  to  camp;  urging  that  we  would  be  greatly  refreshed,  and  our  horses  would 
also  be  improved  by  the  opportunity  of  sleeping.  Each  of  us  had  begun  the 
march  with  a  lota  (leather  bottle)  of  water  holding  a  gallon  and  a  half.  We  had 
at  no  time  during  the  night  permitted  ourselves  to  more  than  moisten  our  lips, 
and  yet  such  was  the  evaporation  that,  when  we  lay  down,  we  had  scarcely  a 
drink  of  water  left.  The  solitude  of  the  desert  came  upon  me  in  all  its  force,  as 
the  rattle  of  the  ambulances  (we  had  four  in  the  whole  party)  was  lost.  But 


282  THE  DESERT  JOURNEY. 

the  solitude  was  not  so  overpowering  as  the  heat  or  rather  the  drying,  wither 
ing  breeze  that  blew  from  toward  the  Gulf  of  California.  I  had  never  met  the 
sirocco  before,  and  as  I  breathed  it  I  felt  as  one  confined  in  a  burning  apart 
ment.  Weariness  brought  sleep,  and  daylight  found  us  resting.  The  coming 
sun  cast  his  heat  ahead  of  him,  and  we  saddled  and  galloped  away. 

Five  or  six  miles  from  the  "  Wells,"  we  overtook  one  of  our  party,  whose 
weak  and  jaded  horses  (he  had  a  pack-horse  and  a  saddle  animal)  were  almost 
ready  to  fall  by  the  way-side ;  and  our  companion  had  dismounted  and  was 
trudging  along  on  foot,  driving  his  beasts  before  him.  He  begged  us  to  go  ahead 
and  send  him  some  water,  as  he  was  almost  famished.  Within  an  hour  we  rode 
into  camp  and  reported  the  matter  to  our  captain,  who  detailed  one  of  the  mess 
mates  of  the  straggler  to  return  and  carry  water,  and  otherwise  assist  him.  The 
young  man,  who  was  also  weary  and  his  horse  exhausted,  was  loath  to  go.  Some 
words  ensued  in  regard  to  it,  which  attracted  the  attention  of  the  general,  who 
approached,  and  desired  to  know  what  the  difficulty  was.  Ridley  stated  the 
case,  when  the  general  begged  him  not  to  insist  on  the  return  of  the  young  fel 
low,  but  permit  him  (the  general)  to  go  in  his  place  and  carry  succor.  This 
aroused  the  pride  of  a  dozen,  and  a  messenger  was  soon  galloping  away  with 
water.  This  was  our  severest  trial.  Men  and  animals  fairly  wilted.  The  gen 
eral,  Ridley,  and  myself,  stood  at  the  well  and  drew  water  from  it  until  it  was 
dry,  and  still  we  did  not  appease  the  thirst  of  our  famishing  cattle.  We  would 
permit  our  animals  to  drink  ten  gallons  of  water,  and  then  have  to  drag  them 
from  the  spot.  They  were  so  thirsty  they  would  eat  but  little.  At  noon  we 
left  this  place,  and  at  ten  o'clock  reached  the  Alamo  Mocha  Well,  thirty  miles 
farther,  where  the  water  was  better.  W  e  got  a  little  rest  here,  and  rolled  out 
at  eight  o'clock  next  morning,  reaching  our  next  station,  Cook's  Wells,  in  the 
afternoon. 

We  had  now  crossed  100  miles  of  desert,  and  were  near  the  Colorado  and 
Fort  Yuma.  It  was  necessary  to  approach  this  place  with  caution,  as  a  trap 
might  be  set  for  us.  A  scout  was  sent  forward,  and  at  noon,  it  being  July  4th, 
we  heard  the  national  salute.  The  scout  returned,  and  reported  all  the  officers 
of  the  garrison  sick,  and  that  we  could  cross  the  river  without  fear.  In  the 
afternoon  we  camped  in  sight  of  the  post,  at  the  village  on  the  west  bank  of  the 
river.  We  stationed  sentinels,  and  preserved  our  military  appearance.  Major 
Armistead  was  the  first  sentinel  on  post,  and  was  approached  by  a  soldier  from 
the  garrison,  who  was  one  of  the  majors  old  regiment,  and  who  desired  a  par 
ley.  He  had  come  with  a  proposition  from  some  of  the  soldiers  to  desert  over 
to  us,  and  then  to  seize  the  place  and  plunder  it.  But  for  the  general's  coolness 
on  that  occasion,  we  would  in  all  likelihood  have  left  Fort  Yuma  behind  us  a 
heap  of  smoking  ruins.  He  objected  to  the  procedure,  on  the  ground  that  we 
were  not  in  commission,  and  that  an  attack  would  be  equivalent  to  piracy  at  sea. 
I  think  we  remained  here  three  days,  having  tires  cut,  horses  shod,  and  prepar 
ing  for  the  next  stage  of  the  journey.  No  effort  was  made  to  molest  us. 

Ridley  sa}Ts: 

Traveling  from  Yallecito  to  Carrizo  Creek,  we  observed  a  luminous  appear 
ance  in  the  heavens  resembling  a  comet,  extending  two-thirds  across  the  heavens, 
its  nucleus  near  the  horizon  toward  the  northwest.  The  general  and  I  were 
riding  together  when  we  first  observed  it.  He  remarked  that  it  was  not  strange 


THE   COMET.  283 

that  we  should  see  sights  and  portents  in  the  heavens,  making  playful  allusion 
to  events  in  old  Rome.1  Its  appearance  was  so  sudden  that  I  am  sure  that 
there  was  not  a  man  in  the  party  upon  whom  it  did  not  make  an  impression. 

Captain  Gift  says  : 

At  Blue  Water  we  were  met  by  two  citizens  of  Tucson,  who  came  to  ap 
prise  us  of  the  fact  that  the  Federal  forces  were  evacuating  the  Territory,  and 
had  already  burned  Fort  Breckinridge,  and,  in  passing  through  Tucson  toward 
Fort  Buchanan,  had  burned  the  town  grist-mill,  the  only  one  upon  which  the 
people  had  to  depend  for  their  flour.  Therefore,  much  indignation  existed,  and 
there  was  a  general  wish  to  join  forces  with  us  and  punish  the  vandals.  The 
Federal  troops  amounted  to  four  companies — two  infantry  and  two  dragoon — 
and  with  our  force  of  thirty  men,  the  people  could  combine  an  equal  number, 
and,  by  pouncing  suddenly  on  the  enemy,  it  was  thought  an  easy  victory  could 
be  obtained.  Many  of  our  party  were  eager  to  burn  powder,  and  try  their 
mettle ;  but  the  general  restrained  them  with  the  same  argument  he  had  used 
at  Yuma — we  must  commit  no  illegal  act.  We  rested  by  the  pure  waters,  and 
grazed  our  animals  on  the  pastures  near  Tucson,  for  two  days. 

The  country  through  which  they  passed  was  uninhabited,  except  at 
rare  intervals.  There  were  a  few  villages  of  Pimos  Indians,  a  peace 
able  agricultural  tribe ;  but  the  country  was  infested  by  roving  bands 
of  Apache  and  Navajo  Indians,  tribes  very  similar  to  the  Comanches, 
heretofore  described  in  this  volume.  Timber  was  scarce  ;  and,  on  every 
hand,  the  distant  landscape  was  broken  by  rugged  ranges,  or  bald,  iso 
lated  mountains.  Sometimes  the  road  passed  through  a  region  of 
thorns  and  cacti,  of  all  forms  and  sizes,  prickly  and  threatening,  that 
pressed  their  spines  against  the  unwary  traveler.  Then  the  road  would 
ascend  from  these  depressed  valleys  to  high,  rocky  table-lands,  thread 
ing  the  most  accessible  paths  around  the  foot  of  detached  ridges  and 
"  lost  mountains,"  on  which  grew  a  scanty  herbage  of  agave,  salt  grass, 
and  wild-sage. 

Captain  Gift  tells  the  following  anecdote  of  their  stay  at  Tucson : 

Encamped  near  us  was  a  party  of  Texas  Unionists,  bound  to  California. 
During  the  afternoon  one  of  the  elders  of  the  party  came  over  to  enjoy  a  little 

1  "  A  mote  it  is  to  trouble  the  mind's  eye. 
In  the  most  high  and  palmy  state  of  Rome, 
A  little  ere  the  mightiest  Julius  fell,  .  .  . 
(Were)  stars  with  trains  of  fire  and  dews  of  blood.  .  .  . 
And  even  the  like  precurse  of  fierce  events, 
As  harbingers  preceding  still  the  fates, 
And  prologue  to  the  omen  coming  on, 
Have  heaven  and  earth  together  demonstrated, 
Unto  our  climatures  and  countrymen." 

Hamlet,  Ad  /,  Scene  1. 


284  THE  DESERT  JOURNEY. 

conversation  with  us.  He  sat  down  in  the  general's  carnp,  and  I  happened  to 
be  present.  The  general  and  his  visitor  soon  discovered  a  mutual  acquaintance 
ship  as  to  various  localities,  roads,  and  towns,  in  Texas.  The  emigrant  described 
a  route  between  two  certain  towns  ;  the  general  disagreed  with  him  as  to  some 
minor  detail.  The  old  fellow  insisted  on  his  point,  the  general  as  stoutly  re 
sisted,  remarking  that  he  had  passed  over  that  road  daily  for  several  years. 
"  Indeed !  "  said  his  visitor ;  "  stage- driving,  I  presume  ? "  "  No,"  said  the  gen 
eral,  "  just  traveling  from  home  to  town."  And  so  he  went  on  talking  for  an 
hour  or  more,  and  his  guest  went  away,  little  thinking  that  he  had  mistaken  the 
greatest  general  of  his  time  for  a  stage-driver.  When  I  told  the  joke  the  general 
begged  that  I  should  be  sure  and  have  it  appear  that  he  had  not  undeceived  the 
Texan. 

Colonel  Hardcastle  also  mentions  this  incident  as  happening  in  his 
hearing. 

The  troops  then  in  that  part  of  the  Territory  were  collected  at 
Fort  Buchanan,  south  of  Tucson,  but  were  preparing  to  evacuate  the 
country  and  join  the  forces  on  the  Rio  Grande.  Hardcastle  says : 

Lieutenant  Lord  said  to  one  of  the  citizens  that  he  would  take  General  John 
ston's  scalp,  if  he  could  catch  him.  The  general  told  the  citizen  that  we  might 
be  called  foreigners  passing  through  the  country  to  our  homes,  and,  if  molested 
or  hindered,  we  would  cut  our  way  through  to  the  last  man. 

As  General  Johnston  did  not  wish  to  encounter  the  United  States 
troops,  he  took  the  road  on  the  morning  of  the  22d,  at  8  A.  M.,  with  the 
intention  of  reaching  Dragoon  Springs,  where  the  Fort  Buchanan  road 
came  into  the  trail  from  Tucson  to  the  Rio  Grande,  before  the  United 
States  troops  should  arrive  there.  His  party  marched  thirty  miles  that 
day,  and  forty  miles  the  next,  camping  without  water.  On  the  next 
morning  they  pushed  forward  fifteen  miles  to  Dragoon  Springs,  before 
breakfast.  A  vast  column  of  smoke  from  Fort  Buchanan  had  pre 
viously  warned  them  that  the  enemy  had  burned  his  depot,  and  was  on 
the  road.  The  report  of  the  scouts  that  the  Federal  troops  were  near 
at  hand  compelled  them,  tired  as  they  were,  to  go  on.  It  was  between 
forty  and  fifty  miles  to  the  next  water,  at  Apache  Pass,  and  it  was  now 
nine  o'clock  in  the  forenoon.  But  it  would  not  do  to  await  the  advan 
cing  column,  nine  or  ten  times  stronger  than  their  little  party,  so  they 
pushed  on.  That  their  precautions  were  well-judged  is  manifest  from 
the  following  letter,  written  from  El  Paso  some  weeks  later : 

HY  DEAR  GENERAL  :  Colonel  Canby  sent  an  order  to  Fort  Buchanan  to  have 
you  intercepted  and  made  prisoner.  An  officer  and  twenty-five  dragoons  were 
sent  from  Buchanan  to  Dragoon  Springs  to  execute  the  order ;  but  they  reached 
the  Springs,  it  is  said,  some  thirty-six  hours  after  you  passed  that  point.  All 

this  I  get  from  ,  who  came  in  behind  Moore's  command.      Of  its  truth 

there  is  not  a  question.     I  am  sorry  the  dragoons  did  not  intercept  you ;  as, 
had  they  done  so,  they  would  have  been  made  prisoners  by  your  party. 


AN  INDIAN   MASSACRE.  285 

It  is  probable  that  the  delay  occasioned  by  a  collision  with  this 
scout  would  have  brought  the  main  body  on  them.  Captain  Gift  says  : 

We  saddled  and  harnessed,  and  took  the  road  again.  It  was  a  long,  weary 
journey.  The  road  to  the  entrance  of  the  pass  lay  before  us  all  day,  like  a  line 
ruled  through  the  immense  green  meadow  (this  part  of  Arizona  is  very  fertile). 
It  was  eleven  o'clock  at  night  before  we  reached  the  spring,  and  then  we  found 
more  Texas  Unionists  to  dispute  our  right  to  the  use  of  the  water.  We  were  too 
thirsty,  tired,  and  bad-tempered,  to  argue  long.  We  had  the  force,  and  our 
necessities  were  great.  We  took  the  water.  There  was  more  ill-nature  ex 
pressed  here  than  at  any  other  encampment  on  the  journey.  We  were  very 
sore,  tired,  and  irritable.  A  proposition  to  await  the  approach  of  the  enemy, 
surprise  him  in  the  pass,  cut  him  off  from  the  water,  and  force  his  surrender, 
was  overruled  by  the  general.  The  plan  was  very  captivating  to  the  younger 
members  of  the  party ;  but  we  moved  away  during  the  forenoon,  and  gave  it 
up.  I  have  neglected  to  mention  that  after  leaving  Fort  Yuma  we  were  con 
stantly  in  the  country  of  hostile  Apaches,  who  no  doubt  watched  our  every 
movement,  and  would  have  made  an  effort  to  cut  us  off  had  our  watchful  com 
mander  neglected  any  precaution  in  the  way  of  guards  or  the  order  of  marching. 
We  moved  always  in  compact  order,  and  no  one  was  permitted  to  leave  the  col 
umn  or  camp  under  any  pretext.  Between  Tucson  and  Mesilla  we  saw  the 
wrecks  of  two  stages  which  had  been  robbed,  and  the  guards,  drivers,  and  pas 
sengers,  some  fourteen  persons,  murdered. 

Colonel  Ridley  adds : 

Some  buzzards,  wheeling  about  a  neighboring  cliff,  gave  evidence  that  one 
of  those  sickening  tragedies,  so  common  in  Arizona  before  and  since,  had  been 
enacted  here.  I  was  afterward  told  that  the  party  was  attacked  by  a  large 
band  of  Indians ;  but,  having  succeeded  in  reaching  a  hill  near  by,  they  main 
tained  themselves  for  several  days,  killing  many  Indians  and  striking  terror  to 
the  others.  But  their  gallant  defense  did  not  save  them.  The  lost  men  could 
not  reach  the  water,  and  at  last  succumbed  to  thirst  and  many  wounds.  My 
informant  had  this  story  from  Cochise,  the  chief  who  said  he  led  the  Indians. 

This  massacre  was  between  Apache  Pass  and  Cook's  Spring. 

The  journey  from  Cook's  Spring  to  the  Rio  Grande,  some  sixty 
miles,  was  made  without  camping.  The  road  led  to  the  river  at  a  point 
several  miles  above  Mesilla,  where  was  situated  the  little  Mexican  vil 
lage  of  Picacho,  inhabited  by  poor  farmers,  whose  cornfields  lay  about 
the  town.  Eight  miles  below  Mesilla  was  Fort  Fillmore,  with  a  strong 
Federal  garrison,  and  it  was  probable  that  they  would  find  the  road 
picketed,  and  troops  in  the  village.  There  was  good  ground  for  appre 
hension,  as  a  cavalry  scout  had  gone  ahead  of  them  one  day,  and,  not 
withstanding  their  celerity,  had  gained  on  them.  They  therefore  halt 
ed  about  two  miles  from  Picacho,  to  make  such  dispositions  as  pru 
dence  dictated.  It  was  determined  that,  in  case  they  were  assailed  by 
an  overpowering  force,  their  little  column  should  amuse  the  enemy, 


286  THE  DESERT  JOURNEY. 

while  General  Johnston,  accompanied  by  two  picked  men,  should  ride 
for  the  Mexican  frontier,  forty  miles  distant,  and  to  Chihuahua,  if  neces 
sary.  For  this  purpose,  his  riding  horse  and  two  of  Ridley's  had  been 
kept  in  good  condition  and  unsaddled.  He  now  mounted  afresh,  and 
took  his  place,  with  Mackenzie  and  Ryerson,  who  had  been  selected  to 
accompany  him  ;  Ryerson  for  his  familiarity  with  the  country,  Macken 
zie  for  his  personal  devotion  to  General  Johnston,  and  for  the  posses 
sion  of  every  quality  to  fit  him  for  such  an  enterprise.  Gift  says  : 

Dave  Mackenzie  was  one  of  the  best  scouts  in  America,  and  one  of  the  cool 
est  and  bravest  men  in  the  world.  As  a  shot  he  had  few  equals,  if  we  except 
Kidley  himself,  between  whom  and  Dave  existed  a  friendship  only  found  among 
men  of  the  frontier. 

After  these  arrangements  had  been  made,  Ridley  and  Bowers  rode 
to  the  village.  They  could  get  no  answer  to  repeated  calls  from  any  of 
the  mud-huts,  and  not  a  soul  was  visible  anywhere.  Finally,  they  capt 
ured  a  Mexican  creeping  behind  a  hedge.  Ridley  says  : 

He  was  evidently  dodging  us,  and  watching  our  motions.  We  could  get 
nothing  out  of  him  at  first,  but,  when  I  told  him  we  were  scouts  from  Lord's 
command,  he  replied  in  Spanish,  "  The  brush  is  full  of  Texans,  creeping  about 
like  cats  in  every  direction."  He  also  told  us  that  the  Texans  had  captured  all 
the  soldiers,  and  that  they  would  get  us  also,  unless  we  were  careful.  We  told 
him  we  were  not  afraid,  as  our  whole  command  would  be  up  shortly.  We 
learned  afterward  that  the  rascal  went  immediately  and  told  the  Texans  of  the 
good  opportunity  they  had  to  catch  Lord.  But  I  forgive  him.  The  news  was 
good,  though  vague,  and  hardly  to  be  believed.  We  returned  and  reported,  and 
the  general  decided  to  go  to  the  village. 

Captain  Gift  gives  this  description  of  their  entrance  into  the  vil 
lage  : 

Ridley  took  the  head  of  the  column,  with  Stonehouse,  Bower,  and  myself 
riding  abreast  with  him.  It  was  11  o'clock  at  night  when  we  entered  the  vil 
lage,  yet  the  people  were  out  of  bed,  and,  what  was  most  singular,  on  the  roofs 
of  their  flat-topped  houses,  and  peeped  down  at  us  furtively  and  in  doubt. 
Ridley,  who  spoke  Spanish  like  a  native,  hailed  and  inquired  the  news.  The 
man  before  answering  demanded  to  know  whether  we  were  troops  of  the  line 
or  Texans.  Ridley  said,  troops  of  the  line.  Then  said  the  Mexican,  "  By  all 
means  go  north  at  once,  for  the  Texans  only  yesterday  captured  all  the  troops, 
and  have  all  the  guns,  horses,  and  stores !  "  While  this  colloquy  was  going  on 
the  general  rode  up,  and  Ridley  interpreted  the  sense  of  what  he  had  learned. 
The  general  doubted  the  information,  as  Lynde's  regiment  was  one  of  the  best 
in  the  service,  and  did  not  believe  the  story.  It  proved  to  be  the  truth,  however. 

Ridley  continues : 

I  had  just  laid  down  when  I  heard  Hardcastle,  who  was  posted  with  Poer, 
cry  out,  "  Captain,  I  have  got  a  prisoner."  It  proved  to  be  a  fellow  called  the 


THE   RIO   GRANDE.  287 

"  Skinned  Pant'er."  He  had  crawled  into  camp  to  take  observations,  but 
could  not  resist  his  admiration  for  horse-flesh,  and  was  getting  away  with  Hard- 
castle's  own  charger,  when  Poer  stopped  him  with  his  shot-gun.  He  told  us 
he  belonged  to  Captain  0 's  spy  company,  and  that  they  had  all  the  Feder 
als  prisoners.  I  told  Hardcastle  to  turn  him  loose,  which  he  did  reluctantly.  I 
ordered  him  to  tell  his  captain,  whom  I  had  known  in  California,  that  Macken 
zie  and  Ridley,  with  a  party  of  Californians,  had  just  arrived,  and  wished  to 
see  him.  The  captain  soon  came,  and  we  learned  that  Baylor  had,  indeed,  capt 
ured  all  of  Ly ride's  command. 

Some  days  after,  Captain  C was  expatiating  on  the  astuteness  of  his 

company,  and  making  rather  vainglorious  allusions  to  the  "  Skinned  Pant'er  " 
having  got  into  our  camp.  The  general  was  present,  and  said  in  his  quiet  way, 
"  Yes,  captain,  he  got  in,  and  we  took  very  good  care  of  him,  thanks  to  Hard- 
castle,  until  we  found  it  convenient  to  let  him  go  out  again." 

General  Johnston  could  hardly  believe  the  good  fortune  that  re 
lieved  him  from  all  danger  of  the  United  States  troops  on  the  Rio 
Grande.  Gift  says  : 

The  next  morning  Colonel  Baylor  called,  and  begged  to  turn  over  the  com 
mand  of  his  troops  to  the  general,  to  give  him  an  opportunity  to  catch  and  pun 
ish  the  fellows  who  had  chased  us  in.  This  command  he  accepted  for  a  few 
days ;  but  a  Mexican  scout  having  gone  out,  notified  the  advancing  enemy  of 
the  trap  set  for  him,  when  he  changed  his  course  for  Santa  Fe. 

Ridley  says  : 

The  general  was  anxious  to  get  on,  but  the  Texans  desired  him  to  take  com 
mand  of  them  and  capture  Lord.  Baylor  asked  him  to  do  so  ;  he  complied  very 
reluctantly,  and  told  me  privately  he  did  not  like  the  delay ;  "but  that  it  was 
like  being  asked  to  dance  by  a  lady— he  could  not  refuse." 

Ridley  attributes  the  escape  of  Moore  and  Lord,  when  they  burned 
their  camp  at  Cook's  Spring,  and  turned  off  to  Fort  Craig,  to  the  neg 
ligence  of  the  scouts,  who  did  not  report  the  movement  for  some  twen 
ty-four  hours. 

General  Johnston's  letter,  written  immediately  after  these  events, 
gives  the  dispositions  made  by  him  for  the  capture  of  Lieutenants 
Moore  and  Lord,  with  their  commands.  It  also  contains  what  may  be 
accepted  as  a  well-weighed  report  of  the  capture  of  Lynde's  command 
by  the  Texans  under  Colonel  Baylor : 

MESILLA,  ARIZONA,  August. 7, 1861. 

MY  DEAR  WIFE  :  We  arrived  at  this  place  on  July  28th,  three  days  after  the 
capture  of  eleven  companies  of  United  States  troops  by  the  Texan  Confederate 
troops  under  the  command  of  Colonel  John  R.  Baylor.  These  troops,  consist 
ing  of  eight  companies  of  the  Seventh  Infantry  and  three  companies  of  the 
Rifle  regiment,  had  been  concentrated  at  Fort  Fillmore,  eight  miles  below  this 
place,  with  the  view  of  transferring  them  to  the  States  after  the  arrival  of  four 
companies  from  Fort  Buchanan,  viz.,  two  of  the  Seventh  Infantry  and  two  of 
20 


288  T1IE   DESERT  JOURNEY. 

the  First  Dragoons,  which  we  preceded  on  the  road.  The  audacity  of  the 
Mesilla  people  in  keeping  up  a  secession  flag  had  excited  the  ire  of  the  com 
mander  of  the  United  States  forces  at  Fort  Fillmore,  Major  Lynde,  and,  after 
frequent  threats,  he  resolved  to  chastise  them.  The  Texan  commander,  hearing 
of  the  condition  of  affairs  at  Mesilla,  came  up,  and  occupied  the  place  with 
about  280  Texans.  Major  Lynde  crossed  the  river,  marched  to  this  place,  and 
demanded  the  surrender  of  the  Texans,  who  received  his  proposition  .with 
bitter  taunts.  He  then  made  a  feeble  attack — perpetrating,  however,  a  great 
outrage  against  humanity,  in  firing  into  the  town  filled  with  women  and  chil 
dren,  without  any  notice  to  have  them  removed. 

In  the  attack  the  Mounted  Eifles  charged  on  the  Texans,  who  with  their 
rifles  knocked  a  few  of  them  from  their  saddles,  when  they  turned,  running 
over  the  infantry  and  producing  great  confusion  in  their  flight.  The  major 
then  withdrew.  They  were  thus,  I  think,  wholly  demoralized,  and  that  night 
commenced  a  disorderly  retreat  toward  New  Mexico.  Next  day  they  were 
overtaken  by  the  Texans,  and,  without  the  loss  of  a  man,  surrendered  them 
selves  prisoners  of  war ;  that  is,  the  major  surrendered  them.  They  certainly 
were  in  no  condition  to  resist,  though  Captain  Potter  and  one  or  two  others 
protested,  Captain among  them.  He  commanded  the  rear-guard.  Cap 
tain  Hardiman,  a  Texan  and  a  good  soldier,  says,  " fled  from  his  company 

with  his  squadron  before  he  was  within  600  yards  of  him."  Six  hundred  United 
States  troops,  arms,  transportation,  etc.,  surrendered  to  280  Texans,  and  are 
now  paroled,  officers  and  men,  on  their  way  to  the  States. 

At  the  request  of  Colonel  Baylor  and  the  Texans  I  remained  here  with  my 
party,  and  took  command  of  the  troops,  to  capture  the  United  States  troops 
from  Fort  Buchanan,  who  were  coming  on.  I  took  every  precaution  to  prevent 
their  obtaining  any  information  of  the  condition  of  affairs  here,  by  the  employ 
ment  of  experienced  scouts,  who  gave  us  daily  information  of  their  movements. 
On  the  night  of  the  5th  these  assured  us  that  the  troops  were  coming  on, 
though  they  much  doubted  it  before.  They  judged  from  the  disorderly  charac 
ter  of  their  march,  and  their  apparent  unconsciousness  of  danger.  The  troops 
were  then  at  Cook's  Spring,  fifty  miles  from  our  camp  at  the  forks  of  the  road 
to  Fort  Thorn,  fifty  miles  above  here  on  the  river.  Our  scouts  took  their  posi 
tion  to  watch  them  during  the  night,  and  to  ascertain  in  the  morning  which 
route  they  would  take.  On  either  there  could  have  been  no  chance  of  escape, 
as,  being  advised  of  their  taking  the  route  to  Thorn,  our  troops  could  have 
reached  there  first. 

During  the  early  part  of  the  night  Captain  Moore  received  a  dispatch  from 
Fort  Craig,  notifying  him  of  his  danger.  They  immediately  destroyed  their 
cannon,  burned  their  train,  all  but  eight  wagons,  mounted  their  infantry  upon 
the  mules,  and  marched  or  rather  took  to  flight  on  the  route  to  Fort  Craig,  120 
miles  above  this,  I  judge,  a  forlorn-looking  band.  Thus  250  infantry  and  dra 
goons — United  States  soldiers — saved  themselves  from  the  terrible  Texans  by  an 
ignominious  flight. 

It  is  due  to  the  Texans  to  say  that  they  accorded  to  the  prisoners  taken  in 
their  recent  engagement  the  most  honorable  terms,  and  treated  them  with  the 
greatest  consideration,  which  was  acknowledged  by  their  officers  in  a  handsome 
letter  to  the  commander. 

Our  party  arrived  all  well  and  animals  in  good  condition,  and  the  best  of 


THROUGH  TEXAS.  289 

feeling  prevailing.  To-morrow  we  will  resume  our  journey.  Great  events  are 
transpiring,  and  we  feel  called  on  to  hurry  on.  I  may  take  the  stage  at  El 
Paso,  though  I  dread  stages  overland,  especially  as  they  are  always  crowded. 
Tell  Dr.  John  that  his  friend  Captain  Potter  was  among  the  prisoners,  and,  it 
is  said,  would  have  managed  better  if  he  had  been  in  command. 

I  have  stood  the  journey  well  so  far,  and  expect  to  get  to  Richmond  in  good 
health.  May  God  preserve  you,  dear  wife,  and  sustain  you  in  your  trials ! 
Give  my  love  to  our  dear  children. 

At  Mesilla,  the  party  disbanded,  most  of  them  taking  the  stage  for 
San  Antonio,  and,  on  by  land,  to  New  Orleans.  Ridley  says  : 

There  was  a  stage  from  Mesilla  to  San  Antonio,  and  some  of  our  party  availed 
themselves  of  it  at  once.  The  general,  after  nearly  two  weeks'  unavoidable  de 
lay,  proceeded  by  the  same  conveyance,  from  El  Paso.  He  did  this  very  reluc 
tantly,  and  would  have  remained  with  us,  until  the  last  of  the  party  could  start 
for  San  Antonio,  but  for  our  urging  upon  him  the  necessity  of  getting  to  Rich 
mond  as  fast  as  possible.  In  his  entire  forgetfulness  of  self,  he  was  ever  ready 
to  sacrifice  himself  and  his  own  interests  and  desires  for  others. 

Among  the  little  incidents  retained  in  the  memory  of  his  companions 
on  this  joumej7,  Ridley  relates  this : 

At  El  Paso,  a  small  party  were  collected,  among  whom  were  the  general  and 
Major  Armistead.  The  usual  topic  was  being  discussed — the  Yankees  and  the 
war.  Some  one  made  the  remark,  "  But  they  won't  stand  steel."  The  general, 
who  had  been  a  quiet  listener,  said :  "  Gentlemen,  I  think  you  are  mistaken. 
We  are  a  proud  people.  Manners  and  customs  in  the  different  sections  make 
about  the  only  difference  that  really  exists.  If  we  are  to  be  successful,  what  we 
have  to  do  must  be  done  quickly.  The  longer  we  have  them  to  fight,  the  more 
difficult  they  will  be  to  defeat."  His  words  were  prophetic.  They  made  a  great 
impression  on  me  at  the  time,  as  much,  perhaps,  from  his  manner  of  saying  them 
as  from  the  words  themselves. 

Colonel  Hardcastle  writes  : 

During  our  trip,  subjected  as  we  were  to  the  oppressive  tropical  heat,  scanty 
rations  for  man  and  beast,  and  scarcity  of  water — at  one  time  going  seventy 
miles  without  any  for  our  stock,  and  supplying  ourselves  from  canteens  and  kegs 
— I  could  not  but  remark  the  patience  and  endurance  of  our  general,  who  at  all 
times  bore  himself  with  cheerfulness  and  dignity,  and  set  us  an  example  of  for 
titude  and  self-denial.  After  our  seventy  miles'  ride  without  water,  when  we 
reached  the  wells  entirely  spent  and  dry,  we  found  them  foul  and  noxious  with 
dead  rats.  We  set  to  work  to  draw  out  and  clean  them ;  and,  after  we  had 
finished,  the  first  cup  was  handed  to  the  general.  He  drank,  and  remarked, 
"  This  water  tastes  like  the  White  Sulphur  Springs  in  Virginia."  After  that,  no 
man  could  decline  to  taste  of  the  waters,  and  we  gladly  cooled  our  parched 
throats. 

On  a  certain  night,  wet  and  stormy,  as  I  sat  by  the  camp-fire  of  the  general, 
I  expressed  my  dread  of  water,  having  nothing  but  blankets  to  sleep  upon. 


290  THE  DESERT  JOURNEY. 

Whereupon  a  most  cordial  invitation  was  given  me  to  share  his  water-proof 
rubbers,  which  afforded  us  a  most  comfortable  night's  lodging. 

The  journey  from  Los  Angeles  to  Mesilla  was  800  miles,  and  thence 
to  San  Antonio,  the  frontier  city  of  Texas,  700  more.  It  was  made 
under  the  burning  glare  of  a  July  sun,  through  wastes  of  shifting  sand 
or  treeless  gravel,  often  with  no  fuel,  grass,  shade,  or  water.  It  is 
strange  how  well  General  Johnston,  at  his  age,  fifty-nine,  bore  the  toils 
and  hardships  of  this  journey.  After  the  wearisome  march,  he  would 
lie  down  to  sleep  upon  the  ground,  with  his  saddle  for  a  pillow,  and  the 
sky  as  his  only  canopy.  His  abstemious  habits  made  the  poor  fare  a 
small  privation,  and  his  chief  concern  was  a  veteran's  anxiety  for  the 
endurance  of  his  younger  or  less  hardy  comrades.  It  needed  bold 
hearts  to  seek  out,  at  the  summer  solstice,  the  secrets  of  the  desert.  It 
would  not  be  hard  to  weave,  from  such  a  pilgrimage  of  patriotism,  a 
page  of  romance ;  but  the  plain  truth  is  far  better.  The  heroic  spirit, 
that  "  scorned  delights  and  lived  laborious  days,"  took  but  passing  note 
of  the  dangers  and  distress  that  beset  him.  In  the  simple  but  sublime 
confidence  of  his  creed — "  in  the  great  hand  of  God  I  stand  " — he 
moved  on  to  his  fate. 

When  General  Johnston  plunged  into  the  desert  and  was  lost  to  the 
sight  of  men,  the  relays  of  the  overland  express  swiftly  bore  the  tidings 
East.  The  Washington  Government  sent  its  orders  to  intercept  him  ; 
and,  even  in  that  crisis  of  a  nation's  destiny,  both  sides  watched  the 
issue  with  intense  interest.  Weeks  of  suspense  passed  ;  and  his  reap- 
pearancs  on  the  frontier,  at  the  place  and  almost  at  the  moment  of 
Baylor's  brilliant  victory  and  of  the  fall  of  the  Federal  power  in  Ari 
zona,  linked  his  coming  with  auguries  of  victory.  He  had  safely  run 
the  gantlet,  in  spite  of  the  snares  in  his  path. 

A  general  burst  of  relief  and  joy  throughout  the  South  greeted 
General  Johnston's  safe  arrival,  and  evinced  the  importance  attached  to 
his  services.  An  auxiliary  army  could  not  have  been  welcomed  with  a 
more  certain  assurance  of  its  value,  or  with  more  genuine  rejoicing.  It 
is  in  such  times  that  the  people  are  forced  to  count  how  priceless  may 
be  the  services  of  one  man  who  is  equal  to  the  highest  command.  In 
his  rapid  progress  to  Richmond,  General  Johnston  could  not  escape  a 
continued  ovation.  Popular  recognition  of  him  as  a  great  leader  was 
suddenly  and  spontaneously  accorded  by  acclamation.  This  was  due  in 
part  to  the  well-settled  opinion  of  the  officers  and  men  of  the  old  army, 
and  to  President  Davis's  frank  declaration  to  that  effect,  but  still  more 
to  the  strong  belief  of  the  Southwest  in  his  ability  as  a  soldier.  He 
had  been  marked  for  vengeance,  and  hunted  as  an  outlaw  for  months ; 
but  he  was  once  again  among  his  own  people.  He  had  come  to  them 
without  communication  or  understanding  with  the  Confederate  Govern 
ment  or  any  of  its  leaders,  ready  to  take  whatever  post  of  duty  might 


AT  RICHMOND.  291 

be  assigned  him,  and  he  found  a  nation  waiting  for  him  and  calling  him 
to  the  front. 

The  telegraph,  of  course,  had  announced  him  ;  but  President  Davis 
was  not  aware  that  he  had  reached  Richmond,  when  he  called  at  the 
Executive  mansion.  The  President  was  sick  in  bed;  but,  when  he 
heard  the  bell  and  General  Johnston's  step  below,  he  started  up,  and 
exclaimed :  "  That  is  Sidney  Johnston's  step.  Bring  him  up."  He  said 
many  times  afterward,  "  I  hoped  and  expected  that  I  had  others  who 
would  prove  generals,  but  I  knew  I  had  one,  and  that  was  Sidney  John 
ston." 

ITINERARY. 
1861. 

June  16. — Left  Los  Angeles — to  Rancho  Chino,  thirty-five  miles. 

"     22. — Arrived  at  Warner's  Ranch.     One  hundred  miles  from  Los  Angeles. 

"     27.— Left  Warner's.     To  Vallecito. 

"     30. —   "    Vallecito.     Sunday  night.     Eighteen  miles  to  Carrizo  Wells.    Comet  seen. 
July     1. —   "    Carrizo,  3  P.  M.     Thirty-seven  miles  to  Indian  Wells. 

"       2. —    "    Indian  Wells  at  noon.     Twenty-eight  miles  to  Alamo  Springs. 

"       3.—    "    Alamo  Springs  at  8  A.  M.     Thirty  miles  to  Cook's  Wells. 

"       4. —   "    Cook's  to  Yeager's  Ferry.     (Fort  Yuma.) 

7. —  "    Yuma,  up  the  Gila,  and  thence  two  hundred  and  seventy  miles  to  Tucson. 

"     18.— Arrived  at  Tucson. 

"     22. — Left  Tucson,  8  A.  M.     Thirty  miles. 

"     23. — Forty  miles  to  a  dry  camp. 

"     24. — Fifteen  miles  to  Dragoon  Springs,  thence  fifty  miles  to  Apache  Pass. 

"     25   ) 

"     26*     — From  Apache  Pass.     One  hundred  and  sixty-five  miles  to  the  Rio  Grande 

u        '  \          at  Picacho,  near  Mesilla. 

"    2S.— To  Mesilla. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

SITUATION   IX   THE    WEST. 

BEFORE  General  Johnston's  arrival  at  Richmond,  deputations  from 
the  West  had  reached  there,  asking  that  he  might  be  assigned  to  com 
mand  on  that  line.  General  Polk  had  visited  Richmond  partly  for  that 
purpose,  and  had  also  written  urgently ;  a  committee  from  Memphis, 
and  other  delegations,  had  made  the  same  request,  and  the  public  ex 
pectation  hopefully  awaited  the  announcement  of  his  appointment. 
But  the  President  needed  no  urging.  It  was  evident  that  the  general 
direction  of  affairs  in  the  West  should  be  intrusted  to  one  chief,  and 
that  he  must  be  a  man  to  whom  both  President  and  people  should 
give  their  entire  confidence.  Men  of  ability  commanded  the  small 


292  SITUATION  IN  THE  WEST. 

armies  of  observation  stationed  at  intervals  along  the  extended  fron 
tiers,  from  Virginia  to  Kansas  ;  but  no  general  plan  of  defense  had 
been  adopted,  and  each  emergency  was  met  as  best  it  might  be.  Want 
of  coherence  and  cooperation,  not  lack  of  vigor  or  valor,  prevented  effi 
cient  action,  and  combined  movement  seemed  impossible. 

Accordingly,  on  the  10th  of  September,  General  Johnston  was  as 
signed  to  command,  under  the  following  orders : 

[EXTBACT.] 

ADJUTANT  AND  INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S  OFFICE,  > 
RICHMOND,  September  10.  1361.        \ 
SPECIAL  OBDEES  No.  149. 

14.  ...  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  Confederate  States  Army,  is  as 
signed  to  the  command  of  Department  No.  2,  which  will  hereafter  embrace  the 
States  of  Tennessee  and  Arkansas,  and  that  part  of  the  State  of  Mississippi 
west  of  the  New  Orleans,  Jackson  &  Great  Northern  and  Central  Railroad ;  also, 
the  military  operations  in  Kentucky,  Missouri,  Kansas,  and  the  Indian  country 
immediately  west  of  Missouri  and  Arkansas.  He  will  repair  to  Memphis,  Ten 
nessee,  and  assume  command,  fixing  his  headquarters  at  such  point  as,  in  his 
judgment,  will  best  secure  the  purposes  of  the  command. 
By  command  of  the  Secretary  of  War : 

JOHN  WITHERS, 

Assistant  Adjutant- General. 

He  was  further  directed  to  go  by  Nashville,  confer  with  Governor 
Harris,  and  then  decide  upon  the  steps  to  be  taken. 

The  rank  of  "  general,"  the  highest  in  the  Confederate  army,  had 
been  created  by  law,  and  five  officers  had  been  appointed  by  the  Presi 
dent  and  assigned  to  duty  with  the  following  relative  rank :  1.  S. 
Cooper  (the  adjutant-general)  ;  2.  A.  S.  Johnston ;  3.  R.  E.  Lee ;  4. 
J.  E.  Johnston  ;  5.  G.  T.  Beauregard.  General  J.  E.  Johnston  regard 
ed  himself  as  entitled  by  law  to  the  first  place,  and  engaged  in  a  con 
troversy  with  the  President  relative  thereto,  the  points  of  which  he 
has  perpetuated  in  his  "  Narrative  "  (pages  70-72).  It  is  needless  here 
to  enter  on  a  discussion  of  the  merits  of  this  question  ;  but  it  is 
proper  to  say  that  it  was  one  of  no  concern  to  General  A.  S.  Johnston. 
President  Davis  has  frequently  told  the  writer  that  the  question  of 
rank  was  never  mentioned  in  his  conversations  with  General  A.  S. 
Johnston.  It  is  not  probable  that  he  ever  heard  of  this  discussion : 
he  certainly  had  no  share  in  it.  His  relative  rank  was  a  matter  to 
which  he  ascribed  no  importance,  and  his  great  responsibilities  occu 
pied  his  full  attention.  The  subject  is  alluded  to  only  to  disclaim  for 
him  all  connection  with  it. 

The  command  to  which  General  Johnston  was  called  thus  embraced 
all  the  northern  frontier  west  of  the  Alleghanies,  and  a  portion  of  that 
mountain-barrier.  The  interests  confided  to  him  were  not  only  vast. 


MISSOURI.  293 

but  often  conflicting.  The  great  Mississippi  divided  his  department 
into  two  theatres  of  war  with  widely-separated  bases,  and  it  was  pene 
trated  by  the  solid  wedge  of  the  Northwest.  A  brief  view  of  the  situa 
tion  of  affairs  in  Kentucky  and  Missouri  is  necessary,  in  order  to  com 
prehend  the  campaign  which  General  Johnston  conducted  against  the 
powerful  armies  collected  by  the  United  States  Government  in  the 
West. 

The  war  in  the  West  first  fairly  took  shape  in  the  State  of  Missouri. 
Here,  a  great  debatable  ground  was  occupied  by  able  and  well-matched 
antagonists,  who  executed  a  series  of  bold  and  striking  enterprises,  which 
were  ended  at  last  by  the  mere  weight  of  the  heaviest  battalions.  The 
lessons  of  this  struggle  would  be  entertaining  and  instructive  to  the 
student  of  American  history,  and  its  results  were  very  important  in 
determining  the  exact  character  of  General  Johnston's  military  opera 
tions  ;  but  the  limits  of  this  biography  do  not  permit  its  narration  here. 

It  may  be  briefly  stated  that  Missouri  was  in  political  sentiment 
strongly  Southern  and  Democratic,  and,  at  the  same  time,  equally  op 
posed  to  a  dissolution  of  the  Union.  Probably  three-fourths  of  its 
citizens  held  these  views.  Though  a  very  warlike  people,  the}7  con 
templated  with  horror  the  idea  of  civil  or  sectional  war,  and,  according 
to  preconceived  opinions,  looked  on  this  or  that  party  with  aversion  as 
the  promoters  of  strife.  When  once  engaged  in  it,  however,  they  be 
came  relentless. 

The  two  men  who  were  most  prominent  in  Missouri  affairs,  on  the 
Federal  side,  were  General  Frank  P.  Blair  and  General  Nathaniel  Lyon. 
They  were  both  Republicans,  with  fixed  views  and  purposes  to  maintain 
an  unconditional  union  of  the  States  at  all  hazards,  and  to  inaugurate 
a  policy  looking  to  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves.  Their  following  was 
small  and  odious  to  the  native  white  population  of  the  State ;  but  they 
were  supported  by  the  unlimited  means  of  the  Government  at  Wash 
ington,  and,  under  its  secret  authority,  Blair  wielded  the  prerogatives 
of  a  dictator. 

To  this  powerful  and  compact  organization  was  opposed  a  vast 
majority  of  the  people,  under  leaders  of  every  shade  of  opinion  and 
every  degree  of  daring.  There  was  no  concert  of  views,  organization, 
or  action.  The  Governor,  Claiborne  F.  Jackson,  was  a  man  of  courage 
and  capacity ;  but  he  deplored,  while  he  recognized,  the  approach  of 
war,  and  procrastinated  when  he  should  have  struck  a  blow.  But  he 
was  embarrassed  by  dissensions  in  the  counsels  of  his  own  party.  His 
policy  might,  nevertheless,  have  prevailed,  had  he  been  confronted  by 
less  able  antagonists.  General  Sterling  Price,  subsequently  so  eminent 
as  a  Confederate  leader,  was  at  first  a  Unionist. 

The  Governor  contemplated  the  capture  of  the  St.  Louis  Arsenal ; 
and  the  assemblage  of  the  militia  at  Camp  Jackson,  in  the  suburbs  of 


294  SITUATION  IN  THE  WEST. 

St.  Louis,  was  with  some  ulterior  purpose  of  that  sort.  General  D. 
M.  Frost  had  established  a  militia  camp  there,  some  1,200  strong,  on 
the  3d  of  May.  The  radical  secret  clubs,  on  the  other  hand,  had  been 
for  several  months  organized  by  Blair,  into  regiments,  and  armed  with 
muskets  from  the  United  States  Arsenal,  so  that  Lyon  was  able  sud 
denly,  on  the  10th  of  May,  with  these  and  his  regulars  from  the  arsenal, 
to  surround  Camp  Jackson,  which  surrendered  to  him. 

In  the  course  of  the  turmoil  the  German  volunteers  fired  on  the 
people  in  the  streets,  and  killed  thirty-one,  including  women  and  chil 
dren.  This  was  the  signal  for  war.  The  Southern  party  took  up  arms 
and  began  to  organize,  and  Price  was  appointed  their  commander-in- 
chief  by  the  State  authorities.  Lyon  ended  some  fruitless  negotiations, 
by  declaring  his  unalterable  purpose  to  make  no  terms  with  rebels;  and, 
being  now  ready,  by  a  rapid  and  aggressive  movement,  he  took  posses 
sion  of  the  whole  of  Central  Missouri,  the  heart  of  the  Southern  cause. 
On  the  15th  of  June  Lyon  began  operations  by  occupying  Jefferson 
City,  the  seat  of  government.  Two  days  later  an  insignificant  skirmish 
at  Boonville  won  him  great  reputation.  Moving  about  with  a  few 
thousand  men,  he  overawed  the  timid,  secured  the  lukewarm  and  time 
serving,  and  forced  the  unorganized  Southern  volunteers  to  seek  refuge 
in  the  southwestern  corner  of  the  State. 

The  war  had  finally  begun.  Troops  were  poured  in  from  other 
States  by  the  United  States  Government,  and  recruits  were  enlisted  in 
large  numbers  by  both  parties  ;  the  Federals  acting  under  the  authority 
of  the  United  States  Government  and  of  a  State  Convention,  the  South 
erners  under  that  of  the  Governor  and  Legislature.  There  were 
many  skirmishes,  and  in  the  swamps  of  the  southeast  a  guerrilla  war 
was  maintained  by  the  Missourians.  At  Carthage  there  was  an  engage 
ment,  almost  reaching  the  dignity  of  a  battle  in  the  numbers  present, 
but  in  no  other  respect.  The  first  occasion  on  which  the  opposing 
forces  measured  arms,  under  their  leaders  and  with  real  purpose,  was 
on  the  10th  of  August,  1862,  at  the  battle  of  Wilson's  Creek  or  Oak 
Hills,  near  Springfield,  Missouri. 

Lyon  had  followed  the  Missourians  to  this  remote  quarter  with  a 
small,  though  well  organized,  drilled,  and  disciplined,  army.  According 
to  the  official  report,  he  had  5,868  men,  including  1,200  regulars, 
inured  to  war  and  strong  in  the  mutual  dependence  of  an  exact  disci 
pline.  He  had  sixteen  guns,  manned  by  experienced  gunners.  His 
officers  were  trained  soldiers,  and  his  army  a  compact  machine. 

The  army  confronting  him  was  made  up  of  3,200  Confederate  troops 
from  Texas,  Louisiana,  and  Arkansas,  under  General  Ben  McCulloch, 
1,800  Arkansas  State  troops  under  General  N.  B.  Pearce,  and  5,000  or 
6,000  Missourians  under  General  Price.  McCulloch  had  command. 
McCulloch  puts  his  force  at  "  5,300  infantry,  fifteen  pieces  of  artillery, 


WILSON'S  CREEK  AND  LEXINGTON.  295 

and  6,000  horsemen,"  poorly  armed.  The  personnel  of  this  army  was 
excellent,  and  it  was  animated  by  a  splendid  martial  enthusiasm  ;  but 
it  was  little  more  than  an  aggregation  of  bands  of  raw  recruits. 

After  some  days  of  fruitless  skirmishing  and  vacillation,  Lyon's 
haughty  and  impatient  spirit  cast  off  the  counsels  that  impeded  it,  and 
he  resolved  on  the  aggressive.  Moving  from  Springfield  in  two  col 
umns  by  a  night-march,  he  attacked  the  Confederate  army  at  daylight 
on  the  10th  of  August.  An  attack  on  the  rear  was  led  by  General 
Sigel,  with  1,500  men.  He  was  at  first  successful,  but  was  soon  re 
pulsed,  routed,  and  pursued  from  the  field,  with  the  loss  of  his  artillery. 
Lyon,  who  commanded  in  the  front  attack,  had  for  a  long  time  better 
fortune.  The  Confederate  vanguard  was  surprised  and  routed.  But 
now  ensued  a  desperate  conflict  between  Lyoii's  front  line  and  the 
Missouri  troops.  It  was  a  death-grapple  of  the  fiercest  and  most  relent 
less  character.  Pearce  led  his  Arkansas  troops  to  Price's  aid,  and 
McCulloch  returned  from  the  defeat  of  Sigel  to  join  in  the  struggle. 
All  of  Lyon's  troops  were  now  engaged  in  the  doubtful  contest.  In 
the  crisis  of  the  fight,  Lyon,  while  leading  a  charge,  was  shot  through 
the  heart.  The  tide  of  battle  rolled  back,  and  after  a  little  while  the 
Federals  sullenly  left  the  field.  The  Confederates  were  unable  to  pur 
sue.  They  slowly  followed  the  Federals,  who  fell  back  to  Springfield, 
and  thence  to  Rolla.  Major  Sturgess  reported  the  Federal  loss  at 
1,235  men.  The  Southerners  lost  265  killed,  800  wounded,  and  thirty 
missing  ;  but  it  was  a  dear-bought  victory,  especially  in  officers. 

Fremont  had  70,000  men  in  Missouri,  with  only  some  20,000  opposed 
to  him.  But,  by  his  harsh  and  arbitrary  orders  and  conduct,  he 
aroused  such  a  feeling  in  the  Southern  party  that  it  required  all  of  his 
force  to  keep  it  down.  Price,  after  a  short  delay,  moved,  with  5,000 
men  and  seven  pieces  of  artillery,  upon  Lexington,  his  old  home,  a 
town  of  about  8,000  inhabitants,  on  the  Missouri  River.  General 
McCulloch  did  not  accompany  him,  for  reasons  not  necessary  to  discuss 
here.  Price's  expedition  was  short  and  brilliant.  On  the  4th  of  Sep 
tember  he  routed  Lane  and  Montgomery's  "  Jayhawkers,"  near  Fort 
Scott.  His  force  swelled  as  he  advanced,  until  it  reached  some  12,000 
men,  before  he  arrived  at  Lexington.  The  garrison  of  3,500  men,  under 
Colonel  Mulligan,  had  made  good  preparations  for  defense.  But  Price 
attacked  his  fortifications  on  the  12th  of  September,  and  so  sharp  and 
continuous  were  his  assaults  that,  on  the  20th  of  September,  the  garri 
son,  after  a  very  gallant  defense,  were  worn  out,  and  compelled  to  sur 
render.  They  were  paroled.  Price  captured  five  cannon,  3,000  muskets, 
and  $100,000  worth  of  commissary  stores. 

In  the  mean  time  Fremont  had  been  concentrating  his  large  army, 
and,  to  evade  him,  Price  moved  southward  on  the  27th  of  September. 
He  skillfully  eluded  the  enemy,  and  made  good  his  retreat  to  Neosho, 


296  SITUATION  IN  THE  WEST. 

where  McCulloch  held  himself  in  reserve.  Most  of  his  new  recruits  re 
turned  to  their  homes,  leaving  him  little  stronger  than  when  he  set 
forward.  But  he  had  gained  prestige  and  some  material  advantages, 
and  had  employed  a  large  force  of  the  enemy.  Fremont  then  advanced 
slowly,  with  a  numerous  army,  as  far  as  Springfield,  where  he  was 
relieved  November  2d. 

During  General  Price's  operations,  General  Hardee  had  assembled 
six  or  seven  thousand  men,  at  Pocahontas,  in  Northeastern  Arkansas. 
Some  ineffectual  attempts  were  made  toward  combined  movements  by 
this  force  with  Price  and  with  Pillow,  who  became  otherwise  em 
ployed.  But  virulent  types  of  camp  epidemics  disabled  his  command, 
and  nothing  of  importance  was  accomplished. 

Thus,  General  Johnston  had  hardly  assumed  command  when  he 
found  the  Federal  armies  in  possession  of  nearly  the  whole  of  Missouri, 
and  continually  menacing  Columbus,  the  left  flank  of  his  line  in  Ken 
tucky,  with  heavy  forces  massed  at  Cairo. 

The  war  in  Kentucky  had  been  fought  with  different  weapons. 
Here,  diplomacy  instead  of  arms  had  transferred  a  Commonwealth  of 
strongly  Southern  feelings  from  its  natural  alliance  with  the  other 
slaveholding  States  to  the  ranks  of  their  invaders.  Kentucky  was  the 
first  State  admitted  to  the  Union  by  the  original  thirteen.  Settled 
from  Virginia,  her  people  brought  with  them  from  that  ancient 
Commonwealth  its  characteristics  and  traditions,  with  a  greater  vehe 
mence  and  keener  enterprise.  The  spirit  of  combat  was  fostered  in 
the  early  Indian  contests  ;  and,  in  the  wars  with  Great  Britain  and 
Mexico,  no  troops  won  a  more  enviable  distinction  for  steadiness  and 
valor. 

Kentucky,  along  with  Virginia,  had,  in  179S-'99,  taken  the  most 
advanced  position  in  regard  to  the  reserved  rights  of  the  States  ;  nor 
did  she  recede  from  it  for  more  than  a  generation.  For  nearly  forty 
years  previous  to  1850  her  destinies  were  guided  by  the  commanding 
talents  of  one  man.  Henry  Clay,  by  his  oratory,  his  imperious  will, 
and  his  skill  in  leadership,  became  not  only  the  political  chief  of  Ken 
tucky,  but  the  favorite  of  a  national  party,  which  blindly  followed  his 
personal  fortunes.  In  the  mutations  of  politics,  it  became  the  policy 
of  this  party  to  exalt  and  intensify  the  idea  of  the  Union. 

Much  of  Mr.  Clay's  great  fame  had  been  won  as  a  leader  in  com 
promising  sectional  quarrels  ;  and  it  was  natural  that  the  party  which 
followed  him  should  exalt  the  idea  of  the  Union,  even  at  the  expense 
of  the  vital  principle  which  gave  to  it  its  sanctity.  Mr.  Clay  was  a 
conservative,  and  it  is  not  possible  that  he  would  have  consented  to  the 
terms  imposed  upon  their  Southern  adherents  by  the  Lincoln  Adminis 
tration.  He  lived  to  witness  the  decay  of  his  power,  and  the  transfer 
of  Kentucky  to  the  Democratic  party.  When  he  died,  his  sceptre  fell 


JOHN  C.    BRECKINRIDGE.  297 

to  an  unlineal  hand.  A  youth,  who  had  gathered  his  honors  in  oppo 
sition  to  Mr.  Clay,  succeeded  to  his  unbounded  influence. 

John  C.  Breckinridge,  who  drew  to  himself  much  of  the  enthusiasm 
that  had  attached  to  Mr.  Clay,  was  a  man  of  widely  different  type. 
Though  born  to  narrow  means,  he  was  the  son  of  a  public  man  whose 
early  death  alone  cut  him  off  from  high  distinction.  His  grandfather 
had  been  President  Jefferson's  attorney-general  ;  his  great-grandfather, 
a  signer  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence;  and  his  lineage  was 
traced  to  John  Knox,  the  Reformer.  Among  his  immediate  and  re 
moter  kindred  were  many  distinguished  for  oratory,  in  the  pulpit,  at 
the  bar,  and  in  legislative  halls.  Breckinridge,  though  never  a  severe 
student,  had  natural  gifts  that  made  him  a  vigorous  writer,  an  agree 
able  talker,  and  a  ready  and  impressive  speaker.  His  person  was 
commanding,  his  countenance  striking,  his  address  frank  and  gracious, 
his  personal  influence  irresistible.  His  judgment  and  temper  were 
calm  and  sober,  and  he  had  the  poise  of  perfect  moral  and  physical 
courage.  Though  somewhat  indolent  and  fond  of  pleasure,  he  had  the 
capacity  for  heroic  deeds  and  under  the  pressure  of  great  occasions  was 
always  found  equal  to  them — at  the  bar,  in  the  Senate,  and  on  the  bat 
tle-field.  Though  his  genial  manner  awakened  a  contagious  enthusiasm, 
he  was  singularly  reticent  and  cautious  in  matters  of  import.  He  made 
few  promises  and  broke  none,  and  was  truthful  and  magnanimous.  It 
was  difficult  to  move  him  to  anger,  impossible  to  provoke  him  to  re 
venge.  He  did  not  strive  for  wealth  or  place,  and,  as  a  citizen  and 
statesman,  was  stainless  and  incorrupt.  He  seemed  born  under  a  star, 
and  greatness  sought  him  out. 

After  a  short  military  experience  in  Mexico,  he  was  adopted  by  a 
State-rights  coterie  in  Kentucky,  by  whom  his  fortunes  were  eagerly 
pushed.  In  1851,  and  again  in  1853,  he  was  sent  to  Congress  ;  and 
in  1856  was  elected  Vice-President,  when  only  thirty-five  years  of  age. 
He  presided  over  the  Senate  with  fairness  and  dignity  in  very  troubled 
times.  When  the  rupture  took  place  in  the  Democratic  party,  he  was 
selected  at  Baltimore  as  the  nominee  of  the  State-rights  party  for  Presi 
dent.  He  continued  until  Lincoln's  inauguration  to  preside  over  the 
Senate,  when  he  took  his  seat  in  that  body  as  Senator  from  Kentucky. 

With  Breckinridge's  powerful  hold  on  all  classes  in  Kentucky, 
it  was  in  his  power,  at  any  time  before  June  1st,  by  putting  himself 
at  the  head  of  a  party  of  movement,  to  have  dictated  the  policy  of 
the  State.  Events  drifted  so  rapidly  that,  after  that  time,  it  was  too 
late.  He  knew  the  tendency  of  public  feeling,  and  thought  it  would 
carry  the  State  with  him,  counting  at  too  little  the  hundred-handed 
grasp  that  was  throttling  public  opinion  and  binding  the  State  hand 
and  foot.  Though  he  afterward  proved  a  brave  and  able  soldier,  wise 
in  counsel,  able  in  administration,  vigorous  in  action,  it  is  no  discredit 


298  SITUATION  IN  THE   WEST. 

to  him  to  say  that  his  talents  were  not  revolutionary.  While  his  intel 
lectual  convictions  carried  him  with  the  secessionists,  his  heart  inclined 
him  to  peace  and  the  hope  of  compromise.  Thus  the  State-rights 
men  of  Kentucky  lost  the  leadership  of  the  only  man  then  able  to 
rally  them  into  a  compact  organization.  Though  numerous,  and  ready 
for  any  enterprise,  no  name  of  acknowledged  authority  appeared  at 
their  head.  Mr.  Guthrie  had  renounced  his  place  with  them,  and  was 
openly  acting  with  the  unconditional  submissionists.  The  Governor, 
Magoffin,  was  unequal  to  the  difficulties  by  which  he  was  surrounded. 
William  Preston  was  absent,  as  minister  to  Spain.  Humphrey  Mar 
shall,  and  some  other  men  of  ability,  were  hampered  by  their  positions 
in  Congress. 

Under  the  circumstances,  the  situation  seemed  more  in  the  hands  of 
General  Simon  B.  Buckner  than  of  any  other  one  man.  Buckner  was  a 
native  of  Kentucky,  and  thirty-eight  years  of  age.  He  was  graduated 
at  West  Point,  where  he  was  subsequently  an  instructor  in  ethics  and 
in  tactics.  In  the  Mexican  War  he  was  wounded  at  Churubusco,  and 
brevetted  for  gallantry.  After  a  varied  service,  he  resigned  in  1855, 
and  in  1858  settled  in  Louisville.  Though  the  care  of  a  large  estate 
occupied  much  of  his  time  and  attention,  yet,  being  an  enthusiast  in  his 
profession,  he  undertook,  as  a  congenial  pursuit,  the  organization  of  the 
militia  of  Kentucky.  Of  this,  with  the  title  of  inspector-general  and 
the  rank  of  major-general,  he  became  the  virtual  chief.  Under  his 
management,  the  old  "  cornstalk "  militia  was  transformed  into  the 
State  Guard ;  and  the  absurd  levy  en  masse,  whose  reviews  were  a  bur 
lesque  on  military  training,  was  replaced  by  a  compact  corps  of  10,000 
or  12,000  men,  organized,  uniformed,  armed,  drilled,  and,  to  some  ex 
tent,  disciplined.  It  was  not  equaled  in  effectiveness  by  any  military 
body  in  the  United  States,  except  the  regular  army.  Composed  of  the 
flower  of  the  people,  it  was  a  unit  in  its  sympathy  for  the  South,  and 
was  animated  by  a  powerful  esprit  'de  corps. 

Buckner  obtained  unbounded  influence  with  this  command  by  his 
attractive  manners  and  by  a  genuine  enthusiasm  in  military  matters, 
shared  by  the  young  volunteers  under  his  command.  In  personal  ap 
pearance  he  was  thought  to  bear  a  marked  likeness  to  General  A.  S. 
Johnston.  His  decided  though  moderate  views  gave  weight  to  his 
counsel  ;  he  was  committed  to  resistance  against  coercion  ;  and  his 
course,  from  first  to  last,  was  open,  manly,  and  consistent.  His  in 
terests  were  in  the  North ;  but  his  heart  and  his  sword  were  with  the 
cause  of  constitutional  liberty.  With  the  great  influence  Buckner  had 
acquired  over  the  State  Guard,  he  might,  if  he  could  have  been  in 
duced  to  employ  constraint,  have  compelled,  under  all  the  forms  of  law, 
the  State  government  to  act  according  to  his  own  view^s.  But  he  re 
garded  himself  as  the  servant  of  the  Commonwealth ;  and,  scrupulous 


KENTUCKY.  299 

by  nature  and  education,  construed  his  rights  and  duties  with  legal 
strictness. 

Everything  tended  to  fasten  the  Federal  authority  on  the  people 
of  Kentucky.  The  established  government,  even  when  regarded  as  a 
tyranny,  has  mighty  advantages.  In  Kentucky  the  Union  seemed  pan 
oplied  ;  and,  as  lingering  superstition  paralyzes  the  arm  of  the  recent 
convert  who  would  cast  down  the  idols  of  ancient  gods,  conviction  of 
duty  could  not  rouse  the  people  to  action  till  the  time  for  action  had 
passed,  and  chains  were  on  every  limb. 

The  State  government  had  been  elected  by  the  State-rights  party ; 
but  the  Legislature  suffered  from  all  the  dissensions  which  had  produced 
the  schisms  in  that  opposition  which  had  lately  been  vanquished  by  the 
solid  minority  that  elected  Lincoln.  Under  the  urgent  advice  of  vet 
eran  leaders,  like  Guthrie  and  Crittenden,  entreating  time  for  compro 
mise,  the  trimmers  and  waverers  got  possession  of  the  government  and 
of  the  public  confidence.  It  seemed  so  much  better  to  trust  those  who 
promised  peace  than  men  who  called  for  armament,  expenditure,  and 
action  !  One  of  the  most  potent  agencies  in  lulling  the  spirit  of  resist 
ance,  until  Kentucky  found  itself  bound  hand  and  foot,  was  the  Louis 
ville  Journal,  which  for  thirty  years  had  struck  the  key-note  of  the 
Whig  party.  Its  editor,  George  D.  Prentice,  a  New-Englander  by  birth, 
was  a  pungent  wit,  a  poet,  a  man  of  careless  and  convivial  habits,  an 
effective  editor,  and  a  politician  who  had  grown  gray  in  the  service  of 
his  party.  He  displayed  great  tact  in  marshaling  the  ranks  of  the 
Unionists,  and  contributed  more  to  their  success  than  any  other  man  in 
Kentucky.  The  Louisville  Courier  was  the  advocate  of  the  State- 
rights  party.  Its  publisher,  Walter  N.  Haldeman,  was  proscribed, 
plundered,  and  exiled.  By  a  curious  turn  of  fortune,  he  is  now  the 
proprietor  of  an  establishment  which  unites  in  one  concern — the 
Courier- Journal — all  the  interests  of  these  two  former  rivals  of  the 
press ;  while  above  the  main  entrance,  as  the  presiding  genius  of  the 
place,  sits  the  marble  effigy  of  the  gifted  Prentice. 

In  the  winter  of  1860-'61  the  feeling  in  Kentucky  against  coercion 
was  so  general  and  decided  that  there  were  few  men  bold  enough  to 
approve  it  openly.  The  writer  recollects  only  one  of  any  consequence, 
Lovell  H.  Rousseau,  who  was  fearless  and  sincere  in  his  unconditional 
Unionism.  Even  those  who  secretly  favored  it  pretended  to  reprobate 
and  to  be  willing  to  resist  it.  It  is  not  necessary,  in  this  connection,  to 
trace  the  modes  by  which  they  arrived  at  conclusions  exactly  opposite 
to  their  original  professions,  and  perhaps  to  their  convictions.  We 
have  here  to  deal  with  events  rather  than  motives. 

On  the  8th  of  January  a  convention  was  held  at  Louisville  by  rep 
resentative  Unionists,  which  recommended  certain  amendments  to  the 
Constitution,  and  that  the  States  agreeing  to  them  "  shall  form  a  sepa- 


300  SITUATION  IN  THE  WEST. 

rate  Confederacy ;  "  and  resolved  that  "  we  deplore  the  existence  of  a 
Union  to  be  held  together  by  the  sword."  This  was  a  strange  prelude  to 
the  stringent  tests  of  later  loyalty  ;  but  opinions,  about  that  time,  were 
very  unfixed  and  drifting. 

The  Legislature  met  in  extra  session  in  February,  1861.  The  Gov 
ernor  recommended  the  call  of  a  State  Convention ;  and  there  is  little 
doubt  that,  if  such  an  authoritative  body  had  convened,  it  would  have 
occupied  a  position  similar  to  that  of  Virginia,  adhesion  to  the  Union, 
except  in  the  event  of  an  attempt  at  coercion  and  subjugation,  and  then 
resistance.  The  Legislature  refused  to  call  a  convention,  and  recom 
mended  the  abortive  "  Peace  Conference  "  held  at  Washington,  and  also 
a  National  Convention.  But  it  directed  the  Governor  to  reply  to  certain 
resolutions  from  Northern  Legislatures : 

That  when  those  States  should  send  armed  forces  to  the  South  for  the  pur 
pose  indicated  in  said  resolutions,  the  people  of  Kentucky,  uniting  with  their 
brethren  of  the  South,  will,  as  one  man,  resist  such  invasion  of  the  soil  of  the 
South,  at  all  hazards,  and  to  the  last  extremity. 

It  also  resolved  : 

That  we  protest  against  the  use  of  force  or  coercion  by  the  General  Govern 
ment  against  the  seceded  States,  as  unwise  and  inexpedient,  and  tending  to  the 
destruction  of  our  common  country. 

The  Union  leaders  and  journals  denounced  secession  and  coercion 
with  the  same  breath.  On  the  18th  of  April  they  first  shadowed  forth, 
in  a  meeting  at  Louisville,  that  sham  "  neutrality  "  policy  in  whose 
tangled  web  the  State  was  ensnared.  It  declared : 

That,  as  we  oppose  the  call  of  the  President  for  volunteers  for  the  purpose 
of  coercing  the  seceded  States,  so  we  oppose  the  raising  of  troops  in  this  State 
to  cooperate  with  the  Southern  Confederacy;  that  the  present  duty  of  Ken 
tucky  is  to  maintain  her  present  independent  position,  taking  sides  not  with  the 
Administration,  nor  with  the  seceding  States,  but  with  the  Union  against  them 
both,  declaring  her  soil  to  be  sacred  from  the  hostile  tread  of  either,  and,  if 
necessary,  to  make  the  declaration  good  with  her  strong  right  arm. 

It  is  true  that  no  one  ought  to  have  been  deceived  by  such  fraud 
ulent  pretenses,  but  they  answered  for  the  moment ;  and  thousands 
willingly  lent  themselves  to  the  delusion,  who  were  unable  to  face  the 
consequences  of  decided  action  in  either  direction.  The  unconditional 
Unionists,  comparatively  few,  but  compact,  thoroughly  organized,  and 
backed  by  the  Federal  Government,  wanted  time  to  rally  a  following  ; 
the  Southern  party,  numerous,  but  without  leaders  or  definite  purpose, 
were  content  that  time  should  develop  a  course  of  action  for  them ; 
the  uncertain  multitude  hailed  it  as  a  verbal  breakwater  for  the  tides 
and  storms  of  an  ocean.  After  all,  this  "  neutrality  "  was  a  sad  thing — 


A  SHAM  NEUTRALITY.  301 

a  false  pretense  that  served  for  some  months  as  the  cloak  of  irresolution 
and  all  its  consequent  ills.  Horace  Greeley,  in  his  "American  Con 
flict,"  says  that  this  "astounding  drivel"  "insulted  the  common-sense 
and  nauseated  the  loyal  stomach  of  the  nation  ;  "  but  it  was  the  opiate 
that  stupefied  both  the  common-sense  and  the  moral  sense,  and  un 
nerved  the  arm  of  the  people  of  Kentucky. 

When  Mr.  Lincoln  made  his  first  call  for  troops,  Governor  Magoffin 
replied  in  the  same  spirit  with  the  other  Southern  Executives  : 

Your  dispatch  is  received.  In  answer,  I  say  emphatically,  Kentucky  will 
furnish  no  troops  for  the  wicked  purpose  of  subduing  her  sister  Southern  States. 

And  on  the  24th  of  April,  in  a  proclamation  convening  the  General 
Assembly,  the  Governor  said  : 

The  tread  of  armies  is  the  response  which  is  being  made  to  the  measures  of 
pacification  which  are  being  discussed  before  our  people;  while  up  to  this 
moment  we  are  comparatively  in  a  defenseless  attitude.  Whatever  else  should 
be  done,  it  is,  in  my  judgment,  the  duty  of  Kentucky,  without  delay,  to  place 
herself  in  a  complete  position  for  defense. 

On  May  16th  the  General  Assembly,  which  had  convened  May  6th, 

Resolved,  That  this  State  and  the  citizens  thereof  should  take  no  part  in  the 
civil  war  now  waged,  except  as  mediators  and  friends  to  the  belligerent  parties, 
and  that  Kentucky  should,  during  the  contest,  occupy  the  position  of  strict 
neutrality. 

Resolved,  further,  That  the  act  of  the  Governor  in  refusing  to  furnish  troops 
or  military  force,  upon  the  call  of  the  Executive  authority  of  the  United  States, 
under  existing  circumstances,  is  approved. 

The  Unionists,  however,  secured  the  passage  of  an  act  compelling 
the  State  Guard  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States,  as 
well  as  to  the  State  of  Kentucky.  The  Governor  issued  a  proclamation 
of  neutrality  on  the  20th  of  May ;  and  on  the  24th  of  May,  just  before 
its  adjournment,  the  Senate 

Resolved,  Kentucky  will  not  sever  her  connection  with  the  national  Govern 
ment,  nor  take  up  arms  for  either  belligerent  party;  but  arm  herself  for  the 
preservation  of  peace  within  her  borders. 

It  also  passed  laws  for  arming. 

Garrett  Davis  visited  Washington,  and  engaged  Mr.  Lincoln  to 
respect  this  neutrality.  He  not  only  avouched  the  fact  of  Lincoln's 
promise,  but  his  own  belief  that  it  would  be  faithfully  kept.  Davis 
was  highly  respected  in  Kentucky  as  an  honorable  man,  and  his  decla 
ration  carried  great  weight ;  but  Mr.  Lincoln  subsequently  denied  and 
repudiated  the  arrangement. 

The  same  issue  arose  between  General  Buckner  and  General  McClel- 


302  SITUATION  IN  THE   WEST. 

Ian,  lit  regard  to  the  terms  of  an  oral  agreement  made  between  them 
June  8th,  resulting,  it  is  to  be  presumed,  from  such  misunderstand 
ing  as  all  oral  communications  are  liable  to.  General  Buckner  took 
active  measures  to  carry  out  his  part  of  the  convention.  On  the  10th 
of  June  he  advised  Governor  Magoffin  of  its  stipulations,  and,  on  the 
llth,  engaged  Governor  Harris,  of  Tennessee,  to  consent  to  the  same 
terms,  and  give  assurances  on  the  part  of  the  South  that  the  neutrality 
of  Kentucky  should  be  respected.  This  agreement  enabled  General 
Buckner  to  arrest  a  movement  of  General  Pillow,  who  was  about  to 
seize  Columbus,  Kentucky,  with  Tennessee  troops.  The  inhabitants  of 
this  commanding  site  were  strongly  Southern  in  feeling,  and,  under  a 
violent  apprehension  that  their  town  was  in  danger,  had  induced  Gen 
eral  Pillow  to  consent  to  occupy  it.  He  now  suspended  his  move 
ment,  and  General  Buckner  placed  Colonel  Tilghmaii  there,  with  six 
companies  of  the  State  Guard,  with  orders  to  enforce  neutrality,  give 
protection  to  all  citizens  claiming  it,  and  "  restrain  our  own  citizens 
from  all  acts  of  lawless  aggression." 

The  active  partisans  on  either  side  were  not  deceived  by  the  pre 
tense  of  neutrality.  The  Federal  faction  organized  the  "  Union  Club," 
a  secret  society,  with  ramifications  throughout  the  State,  which,  backed 
by  the  money  and  patronage  of  the  Government,  made  converts  rap 
idly  ;  and,  to  quote  Van  Home,  in  his  "  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  "  was 
potent,  if  not  decisive,  in  saving  Kentucky  from  secession."  It  reached 
the  Legislature  with  its  influence.  At  the  election  for  Congressmen, 
July  1st,  the  Union  candidates  were  elected  by  an  overwhelming  major 
ity,  by  denouncing  and  pretending  to  abhor  abolitionism,  Republican 
ism,  coercion,  and  war.  And  so  with  those  elected  to  the  Legislature. 
Their  commission  from  the  people  was  to  keep  the  peace.  They  exe 
cuted  it  by  an  immediate  and  unconditional  surrender  to  the  war  party 
of  the  North. 

Immediately  after  Lincoln's  first  call  for  volunteers,  two  regiments 
were  recruited  in  Ohio,  near  Cincinnati,  known  as  the  First  and  Second 
Kentucky  Regiments.  Early  in  June,  Lovell  H.  Rousseau  established 
Camp  "Joe  Holt,"  in  Indiana,  opposite  Louisville,  and  began  to  recruit 
the  Louisville  Legion.  The  first  overt  attempt  to  organize  Federal 
troops  on  Kentucky  soil  was  on  the  2d  of  July,  when  2,000  men  assem 
bled  at  Camp  "  Dick  Robinson,"  near  the  centre  of  the  State.  Lieuten 
ant  William  Nelson,  of  the  Navy,  afterward  a  major-general,  was  the 
secret  agent  through  whom  the  Union  men  were  organized  and  armed. 

Seeing  the  drift  of  public  sentiment  and  the  popularity  of  neutrality 
in  Kentuckv,  the  more  ardent  secessionists  left  the  State  and  entered 
the  Confederate  army.  Camp  Boone  was  established  in  Tennessee, 
near  the  State  line,  not  far  from  Clarksville.  The  Southern  party  in 
Kentucky  were  careless  as  to  the  abstract  right  of  secession.  Their 


MILITARY  PREPARATIONS.  303 

distinctive  struggle  was  for  constitutional  liberty,  and,  regarding  the 
Administration  as  a  revolutionary  propaganda  and  the  State  authorities 
as  traitors  to  their  trust,  they  left  the  soil  of  the  Commonwealth  with 
out  hesitation,  certain  that  the  march  of  events  and  the  voice  of  the 
people  would  speedily  demand  their  return. 

Events  now  began  to  move  very  rapidly.  The  crisis  had  arrived 
when  Buckner  was  compelled  to  decide  whether  he  would  inaugurate 
revolution  with  the  State  Guard,  or  leave  the  solution  of  the  tangled 
maze  to  destiny.  He  would  not  cut  the  Gordian  knot,  nor  yet  consent 
to  become  the  tool  of  party  managers.  He  resigned  July  20th.  The 
State  Guard  elected  Colonel  Thomas  L.  Crittenden  to  succeed  him; 
but,  when  it  was  found  that  they  could  not  be  used  to  carry  out  the 
purposes  of  the  North,  they  were  disbanded,  and  their  arms  and  equip 
ments  were  turned  over  to  the  loyal  "  Home  Guard,"  which  harassed  the 
State  for  the  next  four  years.  Most  of  the  soldiers  of  the  State  Guard 
found  their  way  into  the  Southern  army  during  the  first  year  or  two  of 
the  war,  singly  or  in  squads ;  but  all  the  advantages  of  their  excellent 
organization  were  lost.  Nevertheless,  under  other  names,  the  heroic 
men  who  composed  it  made  for  their  State  a  record  of  surpassing  brill 
iancy,  even  in  the  peerless  annals  of  Confederate  achievement. 

Governor  Magoffin,  on  the  19th  of  August,  addressed  letters  to  the 
Presidents  of  the  rival  sections,  endeavoring  to  secure  the  promised 
neutrality.  Mr.  Davis  expressed  a  willingness  to  leave  Kentucky 
untrammeled,  but  Mr.  Lincoln's  reply  intimated  somewhat  supercili 
ously  that  the  farce  of  neutrality  had  ended. 

While  the  United  States  Government  had  been  secretly  perfecting 
its  military  preparations  in  Kentucky,  it  had  anxiously  postponed  a 
collision.  On  the  28th  of  May,  Major  Robert  Anderson,  promoted  to 
brigadier-general,  had  been  assigned  to  the  "  Department  of  Kentucky," 
with  his  headquarters  at  Cincinnati.  He  was  a  native  of  Kentucky, 
conservative  in  opinions,  and  had  conducted  himself  with  dignity  at  the 
surrender  of  Fort  Sumter.  He  did  not  directly  interfere  with  the  affairs 
of  the  State,  and  this,  together  with  his  absence,  seemed  a  confirma 
tion  of  the  neutrality  policy.  Meanwhile,  Nelson,  Rousseau,  and  the 
Union  committees  were  secretly  enlisting  troops  and  introducing  arms 
and  ammunition. 

Those  who  had  been  indulging  in  dreams  of  peace  were  now  rudely 
awakened.  On  the  1st  of  September,  Anderson  removed  his  headquar 
ters  to  Louisville,  and  Nelson  was  made  a  brigadier-general  and  began 
to  organize  a  force  at  Maysville  to  operate  in  Eastern  Kentucky.  He 
was  replaced  at  Camp  Dick  Robinson  by  Brigadier-General  George  H. 
Thomas,  a  soldier  of  ability,  vigor,  and  experience.  Thomas  was  a 
native  of  Southampton  County,  Virginia,  a  West-Pointer,  and  a  man  of 
mark  in  the  old  army.  He  was  the  junior  major  of  the  Second  Cav- 
21 


304  SITUATION  IN  THE  WEST. 

airy,  General  Johnston's  regiment  ;  and,  having  decided  to  adhere  to 
the  Federal  cause  in  the  civil  war,  was  rapidly  promoted  to  the  rank 
of  brigadier-general.  His  position  at  Camp  Dick  Robinson  was  cen 
tral  and  important.  The  country  east  of  him  was  friendly  to  the  Union ; 
and  that  in  his  rear,  Northwestern  Kentucky,  greatly  divided  in  senti 
ment,  was  now  nearly  surrounded  by  a  cordon  of  Federal  encampments, 
ready,  at  any  moment,  to  be  drawn  in  upon  it.  Camp  Dick  Robinson, 
which  had  until  now  been  regarded  as  a  threat  rather  than  a  real  peril, 
at  once  assumed  its  true  character  of  a  military  stronghold.  It  dom 
inated  the  political  centre  at  Frankfort,  where  an  obsequious  Legislature 
eagerly  registered  the  decrees  of  the  military  commander,  while  the 
State  sank  to  the  condition  of  a  subjugated  province. 

The  reproach  which  fell  upon  Kentucky  that  it  suffered  such  a  body 
to  make  sport  of  its  destiny  was  due  to  the  division  of  sentiment  in  the 
State,  and  to  a  laudable  unwillingness  to  begin  a  civil  war.  The  conse 
quent  hesitation  accrued  to  the  advantage  of  the  party  in  actual  pos 
session  of  the  government,  and  the  United  States  used  this  advantage 
with  energy  and  skill. 

An  examination  of  the  map  will  show  the  great  peril  of  the  situation 
to  the  Southern  sympathizers  in  the  State.  The  people  of  its  eastern 
section,  from  the  Ohio  River  to  the  Tennessee  line,  Democratic  at  the 
opening  of  the  contest,  and  Southern  in  their  sympathies,  though  non- 
slaveholding  like  their  neighbors  of  West  Virginia  and  East  Tennessee, 
had  been  won  over  to  the  Unionists.  Hence  the  Southern  party  was 
chiefly  prevalent  in  the  western  half  of  the  State,  in  a  district  project 
ing  like  a  peninsula,  and  surrounded  by  non-slaveholding  and  hostile 
regions.  It  may,  also,  be  said  in  a  word,  what  might  be  proved  in  a 
volume,  that,  while  the  centralizing  Lincoln  Administration  spared  no 
efforts  or  means  of  influence  to  control  the  action  of  the  State,  the  Con 
federate  Government,  either  from  inability  to  assist,  or  on  some  extreme 
theory  of  independent  State  action,  or  regarding  Kentucky,  for  politi 
cal  reasons,  as  a  better  boundary  than  the  Ohio  River,  did  not  turn  its 
hand  either  for  aid  or  counsel  to  the  secessionists  in  that  Commonwealth. 
Without  the  power  to  revolutionize  the  State,  they  were  compelled  to 
stand  fast  and  see  her  bound  to  the  car  of  conquest.  Henceforth  her 
people  were  treated  as  a  conquered  population,  and  pillaged,  oppressed, 
and  insulted,  at  the  will  of  every  lawless  officer. 

To  rehearse  the  story  of  those  times  is,  at  best,  a  melancholy  duty, 
in  which  no  Kentuckian  can  find  satisfaction.  The  humiliation  of  a 
proud  people  is  a  painful  spectacle  ;  but  it  was  the  inevitable  result  of 
their  own  political  folly  in  clinging  to  faithless  leaders,  instead  of  fol 
lowing  the  generous  impulses  that  would  have  placed  them  in  the  van 
of  battle.  There  was  a  time  when  her  resolute  demand  for  peace,  in 
armed  conjunction  with  the  other  border  States,  might  have  stayed  the 


THE   MOCK  NEUTRALITY   ENDS.  305 

hand  of  war ;  but  the  vacillation  and  imbecility  of  her  counsels  reduced 
her  to  the  condition  of  an  unwilling  auxiliary  in  the  abolition  crusade. 
Providence  protected  the  people  of  Kentucky  from  degradation,  by 
subjecting  them  to  a  purgation  of  fire;  "for  there  was  not  a  house 
where  there  was  not  one  dead."  But  despoiled,  outraged,  and  bewail 
ing  their  sons  slain  in  battle,  they  remembered  the  traditions  of  State- 
rights  and  constitutional  Democracy,  and  have  since  testified  thereto, 
through  good  and  evil  report. 

This  rapid  sketch  of  the  condition  of  Kentucky  will  serve  to  show 
the  causes  that  paralyzed  her  action,  humbled  her  people,  and  ultimately 
duped  the  leaders  who  were  employed  by  the  Federal  Government  to 
secure  her  unnatural  adhesion  to  the  side  of  the  North. 

The  mock  neutrality  of  Kentucky  was  ended  early  in  September. 
Major-General  Polk,  the  Confederate  commander  in  West  Tennessee, 
having  information  that  the  Federal  force  at  Cairo  was  about  to  seize 
Columbus,  a  strategic  point  of  great  importance  in  Southwestern  Ken 
tucky,  crossed  the  State  line,  occupied  Hickman  on  the  5th  of  Septem 
ber,  and  on  the  7th  secured  Columbus.  General  Grant,  who  had  just 
taken  command  at  Cairo,  where  he  had  arrived  on  the  2d  of  September, 
thus  anticipated  and  foiled  in  that  quarter,  promptly  seized  Paducah,  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Tennessee  River,  September  6th,  with  a  detachment, 
following  it  with  additional  forces  next  day.  General  Polk  made  a 
respectful  representation  of  the  facts  to  Governor  Magoffiri,  offering  at 
the  same  time  to  withdraw  the  Confederate  forces  from  Kentucky  pro 
vided  the  Federal  forces  also  withdrew  simultaneously,  with  a  mutual 
guarantee  not  to  enter  or  occupy  any  point  in  Kentucky  in  the  future. 
He  was  warned  by  the  proclamation  of  the  Governor,  September  13th, 
in  obedience  to  a  resolution  of  the  General  Assembly,  "that  Ken 
tucky  expects  the  Confederate  or  Tennessee  troops  to  be  withdrawn 
from  her  soil  unconditionally."  This  defiance  was  thrown  at  the  Con 
federate  general,  under  the  dishonest  pretext  that  "Kentucky's  peace 
and  neutrality  have  been  wantonly  violated,"  etc.,  "by  the  so-called 
Southern  Confederate  forces."  Thus  Kentucky  formally  threw  down 
the  gage  of  battle,  and  arrayed  herself  with  the  North. 


306  MILITARY  SITUATION  IX  KENTUCKY. 


CHAPTER    XX. 

MILITARY    SITUATION   IN   KENTUCKY. 

THE  command  intrusted  to  General  Johnston  was  imperial  in  ex 
tent,  his  discretion  as  to  military  movements  was  unlimited,  and  his 
powers  were  as  large  as  the  theory  of  the  Confederate  Government  per 
mitted.  He  lacked  nothing,  except  men  and  munitions  of  war,  and  the 
means  of  obtaining  them.  His  army  had  to  be  enlisted,  before  it  could 
be  led.  Subsistence  could  be  obtained,  it  is  true,  through  his  com 
missaries  ;  but  the  country  was  already  drained  of  material  of  war  to 
supply  its  first  levies.  Even  soldiers  were  to  be  recruited  only  through 
the  machinery  of  the  States,  by  requisitions  on  their  Governors  ;  and 
to  be  armed  and  equipped,  by  demands  on  the  empty  arsenals  of  the 
Confederacy.  The  means  which  he  adopted  to  carry  out  his  purposes, 
and  the  causes  that  impeded  his  success,  will  be  detailed  as  they  arise. 

General  Johnston  proceeded  to  Nashville,  stopping  in  Knoxville 
only  long  enough  to  confer  with  General  Felix  K.  Zollicofler,  who  com 
manded  in  East  Tennessee,  and  to  approve  of  the  arrangements  already 
made  by  that  officer  for  an  advance  into  Kentucky  by  way  of  Cumber 
land  Gap. 

On  the  14th  of  September  General  Johnston  reached  Nashville. 
He  had  been  looked  for  with  the  greatest  anxiety  by  both  the  people 
and  the  State  authorities ;  and  his  arrival  was  greeted  with  a  general 
and  spontaneous  enthusiasm.  An  immense  multitude  gathered  about 
the  precincts  of  the  Capitol,  and  he  was  compelled  to  show  himself  to 
the  excited  concourse,  and  to  make  a  brief  response  to  their  words  of 
welcome.  Although  not  a  public  speaker,  his  words  were  apt  to  have 
the  ring  in  them  that  gives  the  key-note  to  popular  thought.  On  this 
occasion  he  began  : 

Fellow-soldiers— I  call  yon  soldiers,  because  you  all  belong  to  the  reserve 
corps. 

The  public  intelligence  apprehended  the  twofold  significance  of  the 
phrase  ;  it  was  a  people's  war,  and  the  whole  people  would  be  called 
upon  to  maintain  it.  One  of  the  more  sober  journals,  commenting  upon 
it,  observed  : 

This  was  a  well-timed  remark,  and  showed  that,  as  a  military  man,  lie  knew 
what  was  coming.  The  South  will  need  all  of  her  force.  Every  able-bodied 
man  may  as  well  make  up  his  mind  to  it,  and  that  soon. 


THE  DEFENSE  OF  TENNESSEE.  307 

The  great  exaltation  of  public  sentiment  on  this  occasion  had  an 
assuring  and  inspiring  effect  on  General  Johnston's  hopeful  tempera 
ment. 

This  was  the  last  day  that  I  ever  saw  my  father — the  only  day  after 
his  return  from  California.  I  was  on  my  way  to  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia,  in  which  I  held  a  commission,  and  saw  him  for  a  few  hours. 
He  was,  of  course,  full  of  the  cares  and  business  of  that  eventful  day  ; 
but,  in  a  full,  free,  and  confidential  conversation,  I  learned  the  outline 
of  much  that  had  happened  to  him,  and  of  the  matters  then  in  his 
mind.  He  was  advised  by  friends  to  put  me  on  his  staff,  as  I  had  met 
some  disappointment  at  the  hands  of  the  War  Department.  But  he 
thought,  and  I  agreed  with  him  at  the  time,  that,  for  my  own  sake,  and 
to  avoid  even  the  semblance  of  partiality,  it  was  better  for  me  to  forego 
the  pleasure  of  this  association,  and  serve  in  the  position  I  had  made 
for  myself.  This  decision,  proper  as  it  was  in  its  general  aspects,  I 
have  often  since  regretted,  for  obvious  reasons ;  most  of  all,  that  I  was 
riot  with  him  in  the  painful  season  of  his  reverses,  for  such  use  as  I 
might  have  been  to  him,  and  for  the  lessons  I  might  have  learned  in 
his  example.  The  occasion  will  be  my  apology  to  the  generous  reader 
for  these  personal  remarks. 

When  the  war  began,  it  was  at  the  extremities  of  the  northern 
frontier  of  the  Confederacy  that  the  United  States  had  massed  its 
armies,  and  hither  had  flocked  the  Southern  youth  who  had  sprung  to 
arms  at  the  first  note  of  the  conflict.  But  the  centre,  the  line  of  Ten 
nessee  from  Cumberland  Gap  to  the  Mississippi  River,  had  been  left 
temporarily  to  such  protection  as  the  neutrality  of  Kentucky  afforded. 
A  few  camps  of  instruction,  in  which  unarmed  recruits  were  learning 
the  "  goose-step,"  were  magnified  by  the  excited  apprehensions  of  rus 
tics  into  armies  of  invasion,  and  accepted  as  such  by  opposing  generals. 
Neutrality,  so  long  as  it  lasted,  served  well  enough  as  a  breakwater, 
but  when  this  was  swept  away  there  was  a  gap  suddenly  left,  and  an 
army  had  to  be  created  to  fill  it.  Now  that  the  pretense  of  neutrality 
was  cast  aside  by  the  United  States  Government,  it  was  evident  that 
its  plans  were  ripe  for  a  forward  movement  upon  some  point  of  this 
line.  The  time  had  come,  therefore,  when  the  Tennessee  frontier  must 
be  protected  by  a  competent  Confederate  force  so  placed  as  to  be  most 
effective,  and  when  its  detached  corps  must  be  moved  in  unison,  or 
be  destroyed  in  detail. 

The  occupation  of  Columbus  by  General  Polk  has  already  been  re 
lated.  This,  and  the  simultaneous  seizure  of  Paducah  by  General  Grant, 
opposing  two  hostile  armies  on  the  soil  of  Kentucky,  had  ended  the  sup 
posed  neutrality  of  that  State.  With  a  strong  body  at  Camp  Dick  Rob 
inson,  and  their  troops  in  possession  of  all  the  important  points  on  the 
Ohio  River,  an  advance  of  the  Federals  seemed  imminent.  Although 


308  MILITARY  SITUATION  IN  KENTUCKY. 

General  Johnston  had  no  force  able  to  cope  with  that  in  his  front,  a 
bold  forward  movement  and  the  establishment  of  a  strong  line  might 
convince  his  adversary  that  he  was  beginning  an  offensive  campaign, 
and  thus  procure  such  delay  as  was  required  for  the  levy  and  organiza 
tion  of  an  army.  The  few  troops  under  his  control,  ready  for  service, 
used  as  a  skirmish-line,  would  cover  his  real  operations ;  and  there 
were  both  moral  and  material  advantages,  for  which  much  might  be 
hazarded,  to  be  secured  by  striking  the  first  blow.  A  fertile  and  pop 
ulous  district  in  Kentucky  would  be  occupied,  and  the  semblance  even 
of  military  power  might  keep  at  arm's-length  the  troops  designed  for 
the  invasion  of  Tennessee.  General  Johnston,  therefore,  determined, 
while  in  reality  only  acting  on  the  defensive,  to  obtain  as  many  as  pos 
sible  of  the  advantages  of  an  aggressive  movement.  The  result  proved 
that  he  had  not  miscalculated  the  effects  of  his  policy. 

General  Johnston  arrived  in  Nashville  September  14th,  and  on  the 
same  day  determined  to  seize  Bowling  Green.  He  placed  General  S. 
B.  Buckner  in  charge  of  the  column  of  advance,  telegraphing  to  Rich 
mond  for  his  appointment  as  brigadier-genera],  which  was  made  next 
day,  September  loth. 

The  grounds  of  his  intended  movement  were  given  by  General  John 
ston  to  the  President,  the  day  before  it  was  made,  in  the  following- 
letter  : 

NASHVILLE,  TENNESSEE,  September  16,  1SC1. 

ME.  PEESIDENT:  Your  dispatch  of  the  13th  instant  was  received  at  Chat 
tanooga.  After  full  conference  with  Governor  Harris,  and  "  after  learning  the 
facts,  political  and  military,"  I  am  satisfied  that  the  political  bearing  of  the  ques 
tion  presented  for  my  decision  has  been  decided  by  the  Legislature  of  Kentucky. 
The  Legislature  of  Kentucky  has  required  the  prompt  removal  of  all  Confederate 
forces  from  her  soil,  and  the  Governor  of  Kentucky  has  issued  his  proclamation 
to  that  effect.  The  troops  will  not  be  withdrawn.  It  is  not  possible  to  with 
draw  them  now  from  Columbus  in  the  west  and  from  Cumberland  Ford  in  the 
east,  without  opening  the  frontiers  of  Tennessee  and  the  Mississippi  Eiver  to 
the  enemy ;  and  this  is  regarded  as  essential  to  our  present  line  of  defense,  as 
well  as  to  any  future  operations.  So  far  from  yielding  to  the  demand  for  the 
withdrawal  of  our  troops,  I  have  determined  to  occupy  Bowling  Green  at  once. 

Information  I  believe  to  be  reliable  has  just  been  received  that  General  Polk 
has  advanced  upon  Paducah  with  7,500  men.  The  indications  are  distinct  lead 
ing  to  the  conclusion  that  the  enemy  design  to  advance  on  the  Nashville  Rail 
road,  and  will  immediately  occupy  Bowling  Green  if  not  anticipated. 

I  design  to-morrow  (which  is  the  earliest  practicable  moment)  to  take  posses 
sion  of  Bowling  Green  with  5,000  troops,  and  prepare  to  support  the  movement 
with  such  force  as  circumstances  may  indicate,  and  the  means  at  my  command 
may  allow. 

Full  reports  of  the  forces  of  my  department  will  be  made  at  the  earliest  prac 
ticable  moment. 

But  enough  is  already  apparent,  I  respectfully  submit,  considering  the  in- 


THE   CONFEDERATE  LINE.  309 

tended  line  of  our  defenses,  and  the  threatening  attitude  and  increasing  forces 
of  the  enemy  in  Missouri  and  Kentucky,  to  authorize  and  require  of  me  the  as 
surance  to  you  that  we  have  not  over  half  the  armed  forces  that  are  now  likely 
to  be  required  for  our  security  against  disaster. 

I  feel  assured  that  I  can  command  the  requisite  number  of  men,  but  we  are 
deficient  in  arms. 

By  letter  of  the  15th  instant,  borne  by  a  special  messenger,  I  have  called 
earnestly  upon  the  Governors  of  Georgia  and  Alabama  for  arms  which  I  am 
assured  they  possess.  If  I  fail  with  them,  I  shall  appeal  to  your  Excellency  for 
your  support  and  assistance.  I  believe  that  those  States  have  quite  a  number  of 
arms,  and  that  a  portion,  at  least,  of  them  ought  to  be  spared  to  this  line  of  our 
defenses. 

Having  no  officer  that  I  could  place  in  command  of  the  movement  on  Bowl 
ing  Green,  I  have  been  compelled  to  select  and  appoint  General  Simon  B.  Buck- 
ner  a  brigadier-general,  subject  to  your  approval,  which  I  hope  it  may  meet. 

The  occupation  of  Bowling  Green  is  an  act  of  self-defense,  rendered  necessary 
by  the  action  of  the  government  of  Kentucky,  and  by  the  evidences  of  intended 
movements  of  the  Federal  forces. 

I  would  be  glad  to  have  the  services  of  G.  W.  Smith,  if  it  is  in  the  power  of 
your  Excellency  to  assign  him  to  my  command. 

Any  orders  of  your  Excellency  will  be  executed  promptly,  and  any  sugges 
tions  you  may  make  will  be  received  with  pleasure. 
With  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  S.  JOHNSTON",  General  G.  S.  A. 

His  Excellency  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

A  few  days  prior  to  Buckner's  movement,  General  Felix  K.  Zolli- 
coffer,  in  accordance  with  arrangements  previously  made,  advanced  to 
Cumberland  Ford  with  about  four  thousand  men.  In  the  "west,  Felici- 
ana,  thirty  miles  east  of  Columbus,  Fort  Henry,  Fort  Donelson,  and 
Hopkinsville,  were  garrisoned  with  small  bodies  of  troops  ;  and  the 
territory  between  Columbus  and  Bowling  Green  was  occupied  by  mov 
ing  detachments,  which  created  a  vague  apprehension  of  military  force 
and  projected  enterprises.  These  dispositions  gave  the  Confederates, 
when  Bowling  Green  was  occupied,  an  angular  base,  with  its  extremities 
at  Columbus  and  Cumberland  Ford,  and  its  salient  at  Bowling  Green. 
The  passes  of  the  Cumberland  Mountains  into  Southwest  Virginia,  also 
committed  to  General  Johnston's  care,  were  intrusted  to  about  three 
hundred  militia,  enlisted  in  Virginia  for  three  months  for  local  defense. 
The  movement  upon  Bowling  Green  was  committed  to  General  S.  B. 
Buckner,  as  already  stated. 

Buckner,  after  his  resignation,  and  after  some  ineffectual  attempts 
to  secure  the  promised  neutrality  of  Kentucky,  had  gone  South,  but 
with  no  settled  purpose  of  taking  up  arms.  He  had  refused  a  com 
mission  of  brigadier-general  ;  but,  at  General  Johnston's  request,  he 
now  threw  himself  into  the  cause,  thinking  the  moment  for  action 
had  arrived.  Like  many  others  who  made  great  sacrifices  for  peace, 


310  MILITARY   SITUATION  IX  KENTUCKY. 

he  suffered  more  obloquy  than  fiercer  spirits ;  but  the  man  who  ques 
tions  Buckner's  integrity  invites  doubt  of  his  own  honesty  or  intel 
ligence. 

General  Johnston's  instructions  to  him  were  as  follows : 

You  will,  in  order  to  cover  the  northern  line  occupied  by  the  Confederate 
army  in  this  department,  and  threatened  hy  the  army  of  the  United  States, 
concentrate  your  command  at  Bowling  Green,  Kentucky,  and  secure  and  hold 
this  important  point  in  our  line  of  defense.  .  .  .  Secrecy  in  preparation  and! 
promptness  in  execution  give  the  best,  if  not  the  only,  promise  of  success  ;  and 
the  general  is  confident  you  will  be  wanting  in  neither. 

Buckner  moved  on  the  17th  of  September  by  rail,  and  entered  Bowl 
ing  Green  on  the  18th, -at  10  A.M.  He  had  some  4,000  men,  about 
3,000  of  whom  were  Tennessee  troops  from  Camp  Trousdale,  near  Nash 
ville,  and  the  remainder  Kentuckians,  composed  of  the  Second  Ken 
tucky  Regiment,  Byrne's  battery,  and  part  of  the  Third  and  Fourth 
Kentucky  Regiments,  the  greater  part  being  left  behind  unarmed.  Colo 
nel  Hawes  was  thrown  forward  with  the  Second  Kentucky  Regiment 
and  Byrne's  battery,  as  an  outpost,  to  the  Green  River  railroad  bridge, 
where  these  troops  staid  two  weeks,  when  they  were  withdrawn  to 
Bowling  Green.  A  train  carrying  some  troops  to  Horse  Cave,  to  recon 
noitre  and  recruit,  was  thrown  from  the  track  by  a  displaced  rail.  This 
slight  accident,  of  no  special  import,  has  passed  into  Federal  history 
as  a  discomfiture  that  prevented  the  capture  of  Louisville,  and  arrested 
a  whole  plan  of  campaign. 

Buckner's  movement  produced  an  excitement  out  of  all  proportion 
to  his  force.  It  had  all  the  effect  of  a  surprise,  causing  the  utmost  con 
fusion  among  the  enemy.  His  scouts  burned  the  bridge  over  Salt  River, 
thirty  miles  from  Louisville,  in  which  city  the  wildest  rumors  were 
afloat  and  his  vanguard  was  hourly  expected.  His  advance  was  sig 
nificantly  interpreted  as  an  answer  to  the  defiance  launched  by  the 
Legislature  one  week  before.  General  Sherman  says  (vol.  i.,  page  197) : 

This  was  universally  known  to  be  the  signal  for  action.  For  it  we  were  utterly 
unprepared,  whereas  the  rebels  were  fully  prepared.  General  Sidney  Johnston 
immediately  crossed  into  Kentucky,  and  advanced  as  far  as  Bowling  Green,  which 
he  began  to  fortify,  and  thence  dispatched  General  Buckner  with  a  division  for 
ward  toward  Louisville. 

Van  Home,  speaking  of  Buckner,  says,  "  He  advanced  to  capture 
Louisville." 

The  Comte  de  Paris  tells  us  his  purpose  was — 

To  traverse  the  whole  State  of  Kentucky  by  rail,  so  as  to  reach  Louisville 
with  a  sufficient  number  of  troops  to  take  possession  of  that  city,  and  to  hoist 
the  Confederate  flag  on  the  banks  of  the  Ohio.  ...  It  failed  of  success.  .  .  . 


CONFEDERATE  ADVANCE. 

Learning  that  his  movements  were  known,  and  that  the  enemy  was  on  the  watch 
for  him,  Buckner,  who  had  already  reached  the  suburbs  of  Elizabethtown,  not 
far  from  the  Ohio,  halted,  and  fell  back  upon  Bowling  Green. 

When  it  is  remembered  that  these  eminent  Federal  military  writers 
published  their  volumes  more  than  thirteen  years  after  the  events  nar 
rated,  and  that  the  facts  could  have  been  easily  learned  by  inquiry,  it 
will  be  seen  how  profound  and  permanent  an  impression  the  miscon 
ception  of  the  time  made  upon  them. 

General  Johnston's  whole  available  force — 4,000  men — a  mere  skir 
mish-line  to  mask  his  preparations  from  the  enemy,  was  thrown  for 
ward  with  Buckner.  About  4,000  more  Tennesseeans  were  already  in 
camp  in  Middle  Tennessee,  but  not  half  of  them  were  armed,  and  these 
with  country  rifles  and  shot-guns ;  they  were  not  yet  fully  organized  or 
equipped;  and  nearly  half  their  number  were  on  the  sick-list  with 
measles  and  other  camp  epidemics.  One  regiment  (foreigners),  at  Fort 
Henry,  was  in  open  mutiny.  Besides  these  troops  there  were  also  some 
unarmed  Kentuckians  in  Tennessee. 

On  taking  possession  of  Bowling  Green,  General  Buckner,  in  Gen 
eral  Order  No.  2,  September  19th,  particularly  charged  his  soldiers — 

To  respect  the  civil  rights  of  every  citizen  of  Kentucky,  without  regard  to 
political  sentiments.  Any  invasion  of  these  rights  on  their  part  will  be  visited 
by  the  severest  penalties. 

General  Buckner  issued  a  stirring  proclamation,  September  18th,  re 
citing  the  breaches  of  neutrality  by  the  Legislature,  and  the  despotic 
acts  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  and  offering  to  retire  from 
the  State  if  the  Federal  forces  would  do  likewise.  But,  of  course,  this 
was  no  longer  expected  by  anybody. 

General  Johnston  issued  the  following  manifesto  : 

PROCLAMATION. 

Whereas,  The  armed  occupation  of  a  part  of  Kentucky  by  the  United  States, 
and  the  preparations  which  manifest  the  intention  of  their  Government  to  in 
vade  the  Confederate  States  through  that  territory,  has  imposed  it  on'these  last 
as  a  necessity  of  self-defense  to  enter  that  State  and  meet  the  invasion  upon  the 
best  line  for  military  operations ; 

And  whereas,  It  is  proper  that  the  motives  of  the  Government  of  the  Con 
federate  States  in  taking  this  step  should  be  fully  known  to  the  world : 

Now,  therefore,  I,  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  general  and  commander  of  the 
Western  Department  of  the  army  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America,  do 
proclaim  that  these  States  have  thus  marched  their  troops  into  Kentucky  with 
no  hostile  intention  toward  its  people,  nor  do  they  desire  or  seek  to  control 
their  choice  in  regard  to  their  union  with  either  of  the  Confederacies,  or  to  sub 
jugate  their  State,  or  hold  its  soil  against  their  wishes.  On  the  contrary,  they 
deem  it  to  be  the  right  of  the  people  of  Kentucky  to  determine  their  own  posi- 


312  MILITARY  SITUATION  IN  KENTUCKY. 

tion  in  regard  to  the  belligerents.  It  is  for  them  to  say  whether  they  will  join 
either  Confederacy,  or  maintain  a  separate  existence  as  an  independent  and  sov 
ereign  State.  The  armed  occupation  of  their  soil,  both  as  to  its  extent  and  dura 
tion,  will,  therefore,  be  strictly  limited  by  the  exigencies  of  self-defense  on  the 
part  of  the  Confederate  States.  These  States  intend  to  conform  to  all  the  re 
quirements  of  public  law,  and  international  amity  as  between  themselves  and 
Kentucky,  and  accordingly  I  hereby  command  all  who  are  subject  to  my  orders 
to  pay  entire  respect  to  the  rights  of  property  and  the  legal  authorities  within 
that  State,  so  far  as  the  same  may  be  compatible  with  the  necessities  of  self- 
defense.  If  it  be  the  desire  of  the  people  of  Kentucky  to  maintain  a  strict  and 
impartial  neutrality,  then  the  effort  to  drive  out  the  lawless  intruders  who  seek  to 
make  their  State  the  theatre  of  war  will  aid  them  in  the  attainment  of  their 
wishes.  If,  as  it  may  not  be  unreasonable  to  suppose,  those  people  desire  to 
unite  their  fortunes  with  the  Confederate  States,  to  whom  they  are  already 
bound  by  so  many  ties  of  interest,  then  the  appearance  and  aid  of  Confederate 
troops  will  assist  them  to  make  an  opportunity  for  the  free  and  unbiased  ex 
pression  of  their  will  upon  the  subject.  But  if  it  be  true,  which  is  not  to  be 
presumed,  that  a  majority  of  those  people  desire  to  adhere  to  the  United  States 
and  become  parties  to  the  war,  then  none  can  doubt  the  right  of  the  other 
belligerent  to  meet  that  war  whenever  and  wherever  it  may  be  waged.  But 
harboring  no  such  suspicion,  I  now  declare,  in  the  name  of  the  Government 
which  I  serve,  that  its  army  shall  be  withdrawn  from  Kentucky  so  soon  as  there 
shall  be  satisfactory  evidence  of  the  existence  and  execution  of  a  like  intention 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States. 

By  order  of  the  President  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America : 

A.  S.  JOHNSTON, 

General  of  the  Western  Department  of  the  Army  of  the 
Confederate  States  of  America. 

In  determining  his  line  of  operations,  General  Johnston  had  to  con 
sider  the  geography  of  the  theatre  of  war,  the  political  complexion  of 
the  population,  and  the  strength  and  disposition  of  the  forces  opposed 
to  him.  Each  of  these  conditions  was  of  such  a  character  as  to  put  him 
at  a  disadvantage. 

There  were  moral  and  political  as  well  as  physical  considerations 
entering  into  the  situation,  which  made  the  more  advanced  positions 
impracticable.  It  is  true  that  Federal  writers  have  constantly  spoken 
of  the  ease  with  which  the  line  of  the  Ohio  River  might  have  been 
taken  by  the  Confederates,  but  it  is  always  on  the  assumption  that 
General  Johnston  had  a  large  and  well-appointed  force,  which  was  not 
the  case.  The  political  attitude  of  the  Commonwealth  of  Kentucky 
gave  a  decided  advantage  to  the  Federal  cause  ;  but  the  peculiar  dis 
tribution  of  political  sentiment  by  geographical  strata  also  operated  to 
strengthen  the  Unionists  and  to  disable  the  Southern  sympathizers. 
An  inspection  of  the  map  will  reveal  how  powerful  this  influence  was, 
and  what  an  element  of  weakness  it  became  to  the  Confederacy  on 
General  Johnston's  line. 


THE  THEATRE   OF  WAR.  313 

The  Alleghany  Mountains  and  their  western  side-ranges  form  a  huge 
quadrangle,  extending  from  Pennsylvania  southwest wardly  into  Georgia 
and  Alabama,  and  embracing  Western  Virginia,  East  Tennessee,  and 
Eastern  Kentucky.  Its  population,  the  overflow  by  emigration  of  the 
poorer  classes  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina,  was  rude,  hardy,  and 
ignorant.  A  sort  of  clanship,  based  on  association  and  kinship,  pre 
vailed  among  this  primitive  people,  who  followed  with  blind  confidence 
local  leaders,  eminent  for  wealth  or  popular  arts.  Hence  they  usually 
voted  and  acted  in  masses.  It  is  sufficient  to  say  that  the  United 
States  Government,  more  clearly  than  the  Confederate,  appreciated 
the  character  and  importance  of  these  mountaineers,  and  secured  the 
adhesion  of  their  leaders  to  the  Federal  side.  The  consequence  was, 
the  loss  of  the  whole  population,  from  the  crests  of  the  Alleghanies  to 
their  western  foot-hills,  and  the  creation  of  a  disloyal  and  hostile  sec 
tion,  severing  the  East  from  the  West,  and  converting  the  Gibraltar 
of  the  South  into  a  stronghold  for  its  foes. 

A  line  from  the  mouth  of  the  Big  Sandy  River,  where  West  Vir 
ginia,  Ohio,  and  Kentucky  corner,  to  Bowling  Green,  roughly  indicates 
the  western  edge  of  this  Union  district.  But  a  belt  of  country  through 
Western  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  from  the  Ohio  River  to  the  State 
of  Mississippi,  was  also  full  of  Unionists  ;  and,  indeed,  in  all  Western 
Kentucky  county  was  set  against  county,  and  every  house  was  divided 
against  itself.  The  whole  land  was  become  a  debatable  ground.  The 
chief  Confederate  element,  however,  was  contained  in  a  narrow  district 
along  the  Ohio  River,  fifty  or  sixty  miles  wide,  almost  isolated  from 
the  South,  and  surrounded  by  hostile  regions.  Wealthy  and  slavehold- 
ing,  this  population  was  much  demoralized  by  the  course  of  events  and 
by  Federal  military  occupation ;  and  no  effectual  assistance  could  be 
rendered  it,  without  an  invasion  in  force  and  a  Confederate  army  on 
the  banks  of  the  Ohio.  As  this  was  not  possible,  the  only  practical 
question  was,  how  much  territory  could  be  included  in  the  Southern 
lines,  and  how  far  these  could  be  advanced  without  rashness,  and  with 
out  disclosing  the  insufficiency  of  the  Confederate  force. 

Every  circumstance  pointed  to  Cumberland  Gap  as  a  strategic  point 
of  the  first  importance ;  and  a  fortified  camp  was  established  there  as 
the  right  of  General  Johnston's  line,  and  a  barrier  to  the  invasion  of 
East  Tennessee. 

The  water-lines  of  the  West  were  a  source  of  great  weakness  to 
the  Confederacy.  The  converging  currents  of  so  many  rivers,  uniting 
at  Cairo  in  one  great  flood,  enabled  the  United  States  Government  to 
collect  flotillas  of  gunboats,  which  searched  out  every  navigable  stream, 
and  overawed  communities  unaccustomed  to  war.  The  line  of  defen 
sive  works  in  progress  at  different  points  from  Columbus  to  Memphis 
might  be  expected  to  defy  this  fresh-water  navy  ;  but  the  river  system 


314:  MILITARY  SITUATION  IN  KENTUCKY. 

of  Kentucky  itself  was  tributary  to  the  North.  The  Cumberland  and 
the  Tennessee  Rivers,  rising  in  the  Alleghanies,  flow  first  southwest, 
and  thence  by  sharp  bends  to  the  north,  traversing  respectively  the 
northern  and  southern  portions  of  Tennessee,  and  finally  emptying  close 
together  into  the  Ohio  near  its  mouth.  The  history  of  the  attempt  to 
defend  these  rivers  by  forts  at  Donelson  and  Henry  will  be  given  in  de 
tail  hereafter.  General  Grant  had  possession  of  Smithland  and  Padu- 
cah,  at  their  mouths.  Indeed,  the  outlets  and  navigable  waters  of  all 
the  rivers  of  Kentucky,  the  Sandy,  Licking,  Kentucky,  and  Green,  were 
in  the  hands  of  the  Federals,  and  gave  them  the  great  military  advan 
tage  of  easy  communication  with  their  base  by  water-ways.  Green  and 
Barren  Rivers,  locked  and  dammed,  cut  the  Louisville  &  Nashville  Rail 
road,  so  as  to  render  any  point  in  advance  of  Bowling  Green  unsafe  ; 
while  Bowling  Green  itself,  situated  on  the  turnpike,  railroad,  and  river, 
was  a  good  position  for  defense.  Thus,  as  Columbus  and  the  Cumberland 
Mountains  had  become  the  extremities  of  the  Confederate  line  by  force 
of  natural  conditions,  so  Bowling  Green,  likewise,  became  its  salient. 
The  communications  to  the  rear  of  this  point  by  railroads  and  by  a 
macadamized  turnpike,  and  the  facilities  for  transportation  by  land  and 
water,  were  as  good  and  as  safe  as  could  be  expected.  The  line  was 
not  all  that  could  be  wished;  it  ran  through  an  unfriendly  or  lukewarm 
population,  and  it  was  pierced  by  two  great  rivers,  whose  mouths  were 
in  the  possession  of  the  enemy ;  but  every  other  line  had  equal  or 
greater  disadvantages.  In  war,  as  elsewhere,  we  must  take  things  as 
we  find  them,  not  as  we  would  have  them. 

But  to  the  other  considerations  already  mentioned  must  be  added 
the  great  disparity  in  the  numbers  and  resources  of  the  opponents. 
The  Federal  forces  in  General  Johnston's  front  were  everywhere  about 
double  the  numbers  he  could  bring  to  bear  against  them  ;  and  their 
superiority  in  arms,  equipments,  transportation,  organization,  and  dis 
cipline,  was  still  greater.  The  United  States  troops  opposed  to  him 
were  over  36,000  strong,  while  his  own  available  force  was  less  than 
20,000  men.  General  Fremont  reports  that  he  had,  September  14, 
1861,  at  and  near  Cairo,  12,831  men,  and  at  Paducah,  7,791  men  ;  to 
gether,  20,622  men,  under  General  U.  S.  Grant.1  General  Robert  An 
derson  commanded  the  Central  Department.  The  fortune  of  war, 
which  gave  General  Johnston  his  former  room-mate  at  West  Point  as 
his  second  in  command,  confronted  him  thus  with  his  early  friend  An 
derson  as  his  antagonist.  Anderson  was  able  to  oppose  to  Buckner, 

1  "Report  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,"  part  iii.,  p.  41.  In  this  estimate  he  only 
puts  the  forces  in  his  department  at  55,000  men.  General  McClellan,  in  his  "  Eeport  of 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac,"  p.  48,  estimates  Fremont's  forces,  from  the  best  information 
at  the  War  Department,  at  80,000  men,  or  about  45  per  cent.  more.  This  rate  of  increase 
would  give  General  Grant  30,000  men. 


STRENGTH  OF  ARMIES.  315 

at  the  tap  of  the  drum,  Rousseau's  brigade,  1,200  strong,  1,800  Home 
Guards  from  Louisville,  and  several  companies  led  by  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  R.  W.  Johnson,  under  General  W.  T.  Sherman,  at  Muldrough's 
Hill,  to  whom  he  also  sent,  within  a  week,  the  Sixth,  Thirty-eighth, 
and  Thirty-ninth  Indiana  Regiments,  the  Forty-ninth  Ohio  Regiment, 
and  the  Twenty-fourth  Illinois  Regiment  (not  less  than  3,000  men), 
making  over  6,000  effectives  in  all.1  General  Thomas  had  at  Camp 
Dick  Robinson  four  Kentucky,  two  East  Tennessee,  and  "several" 
regiments  from  Ohio  and  Indiana ; a  probably  6,000  men.  He  had  also 
a  large  auxiliary  force  of  Home  Guards,  useful  "  to  protect  roads  and 
keep  the  disloyal  element  in  awe."  General  William  Nelson  had  six 
regiments  of  infantry,  besides  cavalry  and  artillery,  at  and  near  Mays- 
ville,  probably  4,000  men.3  Here  we  have  34,000  volunteers ;  and, 
with  home  guards,  probably  over  40,000  troops. 

To  oppose  this  force  General  Johnston  had,  available  under  Polk, 
11,000  troops  (estimated)  ;  under  Buckner,  4,000  men  ;  and  under  Zol- 
licoffer,  4,000  more.  The  whole  force  in  Zollicoffer's  district  of  East 
Tennessee  consisted  nominally  of  ten  regiments  of  infantry,  seventeen 
companies  of  cavalry,  and  a  six-gun  battery  of  six-pounders  ;  but  only 
five  regiments,  the  artillery,  and  twelve  companies  of  cavalry,  were  in 
condition  to  move  into  Kentucky — less  than  4,000.  There  was  not  a 
quartermaster  or  engineer  in  the  command,  and  the  arms  and  equip 
ments  were  very  poor.  At  Pound  Gap,  300  Virginia  militia,  enlisted 
for  three  months,  constituted  the  sole  defense.  Thus,  General  John 
ston's  available  force,  from  the  Big  Sandy  to  the  Mississippi,  was  only 
about  19,000  men. 

It  is  thus  apparent  that  the  real  question  to  be  determined  was  not 
as  between  an  offensive  and  a  defensive  campaign  ;  this  had  already 
been  settled  by  the  physical  and  political  considerations  mentioned, 
and  by  the  preponderance  in  the  Federal  strength,  organization,  and 
resources.  The  real  questions  were,  how  and  where  to  maintain  the  sem 
blance  of  a  force  sufficient  for  defense  until  an  army  could  be  created. 

It  has  been  alleged  that  Louisville  might  have  been  captured  by  a 
bold  stroke.  This  is  possibly  true  ;  but  this  event,  so  much  dreaded 
by  the  Federals,  must  have  been  followed  by  a  concentration  of  their 
troops,  by  the  precipitate  retreat  and  demoralization  of  the  Confeder 
ates,  and  by  an  exposure  of  weakness  that  must  have  led  to  disaster. 
It  is  evident  that,  until  an  adequate  force  could  be  collected,  actual 
collision  was  to  be  avoided.  The  strength  of  the  Confederate  line  has 
been  recognized  by  their  adversaries  ;  and  there  can  scarcely  be  a 
doubt  that  it  was  the  most  judicious  that  could  have  been  adopted 
under  the  circumstances. 

1  "  History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  vol.  i.,  p.  29. 

2  Ibid.,  vol.  i.,  pp.  27-37.  3  Ibid.,  vol.  i.,  pp.  74,  73. 


316  MILITARY  SITUATION  IN  KENTUCKY. 

Among  General  Johnston's  papers  are  certain  memoranda,  in 
tended  as  the  basis  of  his  reply  to  an  inquiry  instituted  by  the  Con 
federate  Congress  as  to  why  he  did  not  inaugurate  an  offensive  cam 
paign.  Though  applying  to  his  conduct  at  a  later  period,  they  contain 
substantially  his  reasons  for  the  adoption  and  maintenance  of  the  de 
fensive  line  established  by  him.  With  the  explanations  already  given, 
these  ought  to  settle  the  question  : 

MEMORANDUM. 

I  took  command  at  Bowling  Green  on  the  28th  day  of  October,  1861,  the 
force  being  nearly  12,000  men.  From  the  best  information  we  could  get,  the 
forces  of  the  enemy  were  estimated  at  nearly  twice  the  number  of  our  own  when 
I  assumed  command.  There  were  many  reasons  why  Bowling  Green  was  held 
and  fortified.  It  was  a  good  base  of  military  operations ;  was  a  proper  depot 
for  supplies ;  was  capable,  if  fortified,  of  being  held  against  largely  superior 
numbers.  If  the  army  should  be  such  that  a  forward  movement  was  prac 
ticable,  it  could  be  held  by  a  garrison,  and  our  effective  force  be  left  free  to 
operate  against  an  enemy  in  the  field.  It  was  in  supporting  distance  of  Ten 
nessee,  from  and  through  which  reinforcements  and  munitions  must  come,  if 
the  people  of  Kentucky  should  be  either  hostile  or  neutral.  My  force  was  too 
weak  and  too  illy  appointed  to  advance  against  greatly  superior  numbers,  per 
fectly  equipped  and  provided,  and  being  much  more  rapidly  reenforced  than  my 
own.  Our  advance  into  Kentucky  had  not  been  met  by  the  enthusiastic  up 
rising  of  friends,  which  we,  and  many  in  and  out  of  that  State,  had  believed 
would  take  place.  Arms  were  scarce,  and  we  had  none  to  give  them.  Xo 
prudent  commander  would  thus  hazard  the  fate  of  an  entire  army,  so  much 
weaker  than  the  enemy,  and  dependent  upon  support  not  certain  to  come,  and 
wanting  in  arms  and  discipline  if  it  should. 

Muldrough's  Hill  possessed  no  strategic  importance,  was  worthless  as  a 
base  of  operations,  and  I  had  ordered  General  Buckner,  in  the  first  place,  not 
to  advance  to  that  position,  because  the  Green  River,  flowing  directly  across  the 
line  between  Bowling  Green  and  Muldrough's  Hill,  and  being  navigable,  gave 
the  enemy  every  desirable  facility  to  cut  the  line  in  two  in  the  rear  of  any  force 
at  Muldrough's  Hill.  Buckner's  force  was  small,  was  illy  armed,  had  no  trans 
portation  except  by  rail,  was  deficient  in  many  necessary  appointments  for 
making  a  campaign,  and  many  of  his  men  were  fresh  from  home  and  wholly 
undisciplined.  The  enemy's  forces  increased  much  more  rapidly  than  Buck 
ner's;  and  the  ratio  of  increase  was  fully  preserved  after  I  took  command. 

In  another  rough  memorandum,  General  Johnston  states  that  Buck 
ner's  force  was  at  first  only  4,000  strong.  He  adds  : 

Arrived  14th  of  October ;  took  command,  28th.  Force,  17th  of  October, 
about  12,000;  same  on  28th.  Enemy's  force  reported  by  Buckner,  on  4th  of 
October,  advancing,  12,000  to  14,000  ;  28th  of  October,  estimated  at  double  our 
own,  or  about  24,000.  The  enemy's  force  increased  much  more  rapidly  than 
our  own  ;  so  that  by  the  last  of  November  it  numbered  50,000,  and  continued  to 
increase  until  it  ran  up  to  between  75,000  and  100,000.  Force  was  kept  down 
by  disease,  so  that  it  remained  about  22,000. 


FEDERAL  PLANS.  317 

Tennessee  was  threatened  on  four  lines  :  by  the  Mississippi,  the 
Cumberland  and  Tennessee,  the  Louisville '&  Nashville  Railroad,  arid 
East  Tennessee.  These  four  approaches  were  covered,  as  far  as  pos 
sible,  by  the  three  corps  already  mentioned  :  Polk  at  Columbus, 
Buckner  at  Bowling  Green,  and  Zollicoffer  at  Cumberland  Gap.  The 
enemy  was  much  the  stronger,  and  was  operating  on  interior  lines.  It 
was  desirable  to  strengthen  the  centre  ;  but  Zollicoffer  required  all  of 
his  little  army  for  the  service  in  which  he  was  employed,  and  more  too. 
Its  successes  in  Western  Virginia  and  Missouri  had  encouraged  the 
United  States  Government  to  plan  an  invasion  of  East  Tennessee, 
which  should  cut  the  only  Confederate  line  of  railroad  communication 
between  Virginia  and  the  South  west  of  the  Blue  Ridge,  and  stir  up 
the  disaffected  inhabitants  to  insurrection.  Already  two  regiments  of 
East  Tennesseeans  had  found  their  way  to  Camp  Dick  Robinson ;  and, 
at  that  time,  the  presence  of  a  United  States  army  would  have  roused 
a  numerous  and  warlike  population  in  revolt  against  the  Confederacy. 

Van  Home  says  ("Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  vol.  i.,  page  37)  : 

General  Thomas  suggested  to  General  Anderson  the  importance  of  con 
centrating  for  an  advance  to  Knoxville,  Tennessee,  to  seize  the  East  Tennessee 
&  Virginia  Railroad,  destroy  all  the  bridges  east  and  west  from  Knoxville,  and 
then  to  turn  upon  Zollicoffer,  while  in  the  passes  of  the  Cumberland  Mountains, 
and,  by  getting  between  him  and  his  supplies,  effect  the  capture  or  dispersion  of 
his  army.  The  desirableness  .of  this  movement  was  enhanced  by  the  fact  that 
Nashville  had  recently  been  made  a  base  of  supplies  for  the  Confederate  army 
in  Virginia.  Its  success  would  sever  the  most  direct  connection  between  the 
Confederate  armies  East  and  "West,  and  relieve  from  tyranny  the  loyal  people  of 
East  Tennessee. 

The  same  pages  show  that  this  design  was  kept  constantly  in  view, 
and  demonstrate  the  necessity  for  a  Confederate  army  in  that  quarter 
to  guard  the  entrances  to  the  land.  It  certainly  never  had  force  to 
spare. 

On  the  loth  of  September,  1861,  in  Orders  No.  1,  General  Johnston 
assumed  command  of  the  department,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  W.  W. 
Mackall  was  announced  as  assistant  adjutant-general  and  chief  of  staff. 
A  little  later,  Order  No.  2,  as  follows,  was  issued : 

HEADQUARTERS,  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT,  » 

COLUMBUS,  KENTUCKY,  September  26,  1861.  j 

The  following  officers  are  announced  as  the  personal  and  departmental  staff 
of  General  Albert  S.  Johnston,  commanding,  viz. : 

PEESOXAL  STAFF.— Aide-de-Camp :  R.  P.  Hunt,  lieutenant  C.  S.  Army.  Vol 
unteer  Aides:  Colonels  Robert  W.  Johnson,  Thomas  C.  Reynolds,  Samuel  Tate; 
Majors  George  T.  Howard,  D.  M.  Haydon,  and  Edward  W.  Munford. 

DEPARTMENT  or  ORDERS.— Assistant  Adjutant- Generals :  Lieutenant-Colonel 
"W.  W.  Mackall,  Captain  H.  P.  Brewster,  First-Lieutenant  N.  Wickliffe  (acting). 


318         GENERAL  POLK  AXD  COLUMBUS,  KENTUCKY. 

QUARTERMASTER'S  DEPARTMENT. — Principal  Quartermaster:  Major  Albert 
J.  Smith. 

COMMISSARY  DEPARTMENT. — Principal  Commissary :  Captain  Thomas  K. 
Jackson. 

ENGINEER'S  CORPS. — First-Lieutenant  Joseph  Dixon. 

By  command  of  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

W.  "W.  MACKALL,  Assistant  Adjutant-General. 

The  appointments  of  "  volunteer  aides  "  were  made  chiefly  to  secure 
intelligent  advice  on  the  political  affairs  of  the  department,  each  State 
of  which  was  represented  on  the  staff. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

GENERAL   POLK   AND    COLUMBUS,    KENTUCKY. 

As  General  Polk  felt  unwilling  to  leave  his  post  at  Columbus,  just 
at  this  juncture,  and  as  General  Johnston  wished  to  obtain  as  full  a 
knowledge  as  possible  of  his  line  of  defense,  he  went  thither  on  the 
18th  of  September.  It  was  a  great  pleasure  to  him  to  meet  again,  after 
the  lapse  of  many  years,  his  old  comrade.  It  was  no  small  consideration 
to  feel  that  he  had  in  so  responsible  a  position  a  friend  to  whose  loyalty 
of  heart  and  native  chivalry  he  could  trust  entirely,  and  one  who,  if 
long  unused  to  arms,  was  yet,  by  virtue  of  early  training,  and  a  bold, 
aggressive  spirit,  every  inch  a  soldier. 

General  Folk's  great  services,  his  close  public  and  private  relations 
with  the  subject  of  this  memoir,  his  anomalous  position  as  bishop  and 
general,  and  the  wide  misapprehension  of  his  life  and  character  by  those 
who  knew  only  one  side  or  the  other,  warrant  a  more  extended  notice. 

Leonidas  Polk  was  descended  from  a  family  noted  in  our  Revolution 
ary  annals.  It  came  from  the  north  of  Ireland  about  1722,  to  Maryland; 
and  about  1753,  Thomas,  the  son  of  William  Polk,  found  a  congenial 
home  in  the  Scotch-Irish  settlement  of  Mecklenburg  County,  in  the 
province  of  North  Carolina.  Here  he  married  and  prospered,  attaining 
wealth  and  eminence  among  his  people.  It  may  be  recollected  that  for 
Mecklenburg  County  is  claimed  the  honor  of  making  the  first  Declara 
tion  of  Independence  from  the  mother-country.  According  to  the  his 
torian  of  these  events,  Colonel  Thomas  Polk  convoked  the  meeting  that 
took  this  first  step  in  treason.  He  was  a  prime  mover  for  resistance,  an 
active  patriot  and  soldier  in  the  War  of  the  Revolution,  and  rose  to  the 
rank  of  brigadier-general  in  the  State  forces. 


LEONIDAS  POLK.  319 

William  Polk,  his  eldest  son,  then  a  lad  not  seventeen  years  old,  left 
college  in  April,  1775,  to  become  a  lieutenant  in  the  South  Carolina 
line.  He  was  actively  engaged  to  the  end  of  the  war,  toward  the  close 
as  lieutenant-colonel,  and  was  twice  desperately  wounded,  once  in  the 
shoulder  and  again  in  the  mouth.  In  1783,  he  was  made  Surveyor-Gen 
eral  of  Middle  Tennessee,  and  removed  to  where  Nashville  now  stands. 
He  returned,  however,  to  North  Carolina,  where  he  held  various  honor 
able  and  important  trusts,  and  died  at  Raleigh  in  1834,  aged  seventy-six 
years.  Like  his  father,  he  was  a  fine  type  of  that  sturdy  and  tenacious 
Scotch-Irish  stock  which  knows  so  well  how  to  subdue  the  opposing 
forces  of  Nature  and  man,  and  to  maintain  its  rights  against  all  odds. 

Leonidas  Polk  was  the  fourth  son  of  Colonel  William  Polk,  and  was 
born  in  Raleigh,  North  Carolina,  April  10,  1806.  He  was  an  ardent, 
energetic,  athletic  youth ;  and,  after  spending  one  year  at  the  famous 
college  at  Chapel  Hill,  North  Carolina,  went  to  West  Point  in  1823. 
Here,  as  has  been  previously  told,  he  became  the  room-mate  of  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston,  who,  though  one  year  his  senior  in  the  Academy,  and 
several  years  older,  regarded  him  with  an  affection  that  ripened  into 
life-long  friendship.  He  applied  himself  with  zeal  to  his  studies,  and 
stood  among  the  first  for  more  than  two  years ;  but  some  neglect  of 
duty  lost  him  his  stand,  and  he  fell  into  a  brief  state  of  indifference  and 
disappointment.  Looking  into  the  future  from  this  gloom,  he  began  to 
contemplate  the  mysteries  of  life  and  death,  the  solution  of  which  he 
found  in  the  religion  of  Christ.  He  entered  on  his  new  walk  in  life 
with  enthusiasm,  and  it  served  as  an  incentive  to  every  honorable  deed. 
He  even  went  beyond  his  strength,  and,  persevering  in  duty  while  ill, 
brought  on  an  attack  of  pneumonia  that  impaired  his  health  for  years. 
He  was  graduated  eighth  in  his  class  in  1827. 

The  young  soldier,  after  a  little  delay,  resigned  his  commission,  re 
solving  to  devote  himself  to  the  ministry.  At  this  time  he  engaged 
himself  to  Miss  Devereaux,  to  whom  he  had  been  attached  from  early 
boyhood ;  but  the  marriage  was  postponed  until  he  had  finished  'his 
theological  education  at  Alexandria.  He  was  married  in  May,  1830,  and 
ordained  in  the  Monumental  Church,  Richmond,  Virginia,  by  Bishop 
Moore,  to  whom  he  became  episcopant.  To  those  who  remember  the 
stately  presence  and  powerful  form  of  the  warrior-bishop  thirty  years 
later,  it  may  sound  strange  to  hear  that  for  years  he  was  often  disabled 
by  ill-health,  and  more  than  once  pronounced  on  the  verge  of  the  grave. 
He  was  ordained  priest  May  31, 1831,  but  soon  betook  himself,  on  horse 
back,  to  the  Valley  of  Virginia  and  thence  to  Philadelphia,  in  search  of 
health.  He  was  advised  by  eminent  physicians  that  a  sea-voyage  and  rest 
from  all  labor  could  alone  save  his  life,  and  at  once  sailed  for  Europe. 

Mr.  Polk  remained  more  than  a  year  abroad,  traveling  in  France, 
Germany,  Italy,  and  England,  and  returned  greatly  improved  in  health, 


320  GENERAL  POLK  AND   COLUMBUS,   KENTUCKY. 

in  October,  1832.  He  was  still  warned  that  the  open  air  alone  would 
save  him,  and  in  1834  settled  as  a  farmer  on  a  large  tract  of  land  in 
Maury  County,  Tennessee,  which  Colonel  William  Polk  divided  between 
four  of  his  sons.  Here  these  brethren  dwelt  in  unity,  as  affluent  farmers. 
His  restless  energy  remaining  unsatisfied  by  the  management  of  a  large 
estate  and  many  slaves,  he  established  a  saw  and  grist  mill,  a  steam 
flouring-mill,  and  a  bagging-factory,  and  interested  himself  in  other 
kindred  enterprises.  He  also  projected  and  raised  the  funds  to  build 
the  Columbia  Institute,  a  seminary  for  girls.  Though  Columbia  was 
seven  miles  distant,  he  preached  in  the  church  there,  and  also  weekly 
to  the  negroes ;  attending  likewise  the  General  Convention,  and  per 
forming  other  ministerial  duties.  These  labors  brought  on  two  attacks 
of  illness,  in  May,  1836,  and  he  was  obliged  to  desist.  But  he  persuaded 
Bishop  Otey  to  take  the  church  in  Columbia,  while  he  still  preached  to 
his  own  servants,  and  devoted  himself  to  good  works.  He  was,  in 
very  truth,  a  pillar  of  his  Church ;  and  his  genial  and  affectionate  tem 
per  cast  a  pleasant  light  over  his  happy  and  hospitable  household,  and 
throughout  his  neighborhood. 

In  1838  he  was  made  Missionary  Bishop  of  the  Southwest,  and  was 
consecrated  on  the  8th  of  December.  Though  he  had  embarrassed  him 
self  by  a  security  debt  for  $30,000,  his  means  were  still  ample,  and  he 
entered  with  energy  upon  a  field  embracing  Louisiana,  Arkansas,  Texas, 
and  the  Indian  Territory.  Hardship,  danger,  and  privation,  were  con 
stant  attendants  of  his  missionary  work ;  and  not  only  his  salary,  but 
much  more,  went  to  build  up  the  infant  church.  In  1841  he  was  elected 
Bishop  of  Louisiana,  and  his  usefulness  was  increased  by  this  concen 
tration  of  effort. 

A  series  of  providential  visitations,  not  necessary  to  be  recounted 
here,  had  crippled  Bishop  Folk's  large  estate  ;  but  his  pecuniary  losses 
neither  shook  his  earnest  faith  nor  abated  his  hope  and  zeal  in  all  good 
works. 

The  chief  business  of  Bishop  Folk's  life  for  five  or  six  years  before 
the  war,  though  not  to  the  detriment  of  his  duties  as  bishop,  was  in 
developing  the  plan  and  procuring  tthe  endowment  of  the  University  of 
the  South,  at  Sewanee,  on  the  Cumberland  Mountains,  in  Tennessee. 
He  secured  5,000  acres  of  land,  and  subscriptions  for  $400,000,  and 
gave  the  start  to  an  institution  which  is  now  doing  a  very  useful  work, 
and  has  before  it  a  career  of  most  excellent  promise,  but  which  he 
designed  making  second  to  none  in  this  country — a  place  where  South 
ern  youth  could  obtain  all  those  advantages  of  the  higher  university 
education  which  they  were  then  seeking  at  the  North  or  abroad.  The 
building  up  of  this  institution  had  now  become  the  great  end  of  his 
life,  when  the  war  broke  in  upon  his  labors. 

He  was  largely  engaged  in  sugar  and  cotton  planting,  and  was 


THE  BISHOP-SOLDIER.  321 

growing  old  gracefully  in  the  beneficent  exercise  of  two  responsible  func 
tions,  as  a  patriarchal  master  of  many  slaves,  and  as  an  overseer  of  part 
of  Christ's  flock,  when  the  clangor  of  war  called  him  to  the  field  of  battle. 
Considerable  surprise  was  created  by  Bishop  Folk's  action  in  taking 
a  military  command  early  in  the  war.  The  circumstances  were  as  fol 
lows,  as  they  are  detailed  to  the  writer  by  Dr.  William  M.  Polk,  the 
bishop's  son,  himself  a  gallant  soldier  of  the  "  Lost  Cause  :  " 

In  June,  1861,  Bishop  Polk  went  to  Virginia  to  visit  the  Louisiana  troops  in 
his  episcopal  capacity.  Governor  Harris,  of  Tennessee,  had  asked  him  to  call 
upon  Mr.  Davis,  and  urged  upon  him  prompt  measures  for  the  defense  of  the 
Mississippi  Valley.  This,  together  with  a  desire  to  see  his  old  friend,  induced 
him  to  call  on  the  President.  The  bishop,  knowing  the  transcendent  ability  of 
General  Johnston,  urged  Mr.  Davis  to  reserve  that  most  important  field  for  him. 
As  it  was  known  that  the  general  could  not  reach  us  for  some  time,  the  question 
came  up  as  to  who  should  be  sent  out  to  take  the  position  pending  his  arrival. 
To  Bishop  Folk's  utter  surprise,  Mr.  Davis  urged  it  upon  him.  Suffice  it  to  say, 
that,  after  mature  deliberation,  he  deemed  it  his  duty  to  accept  the  position,  and  he 
did  so ;  it  being  understood  that,  so  soon  as  General  Johnston  had  assumed  full  con 
trol,  General  Polk  should  be  allowed  to  resign  and  return  to  his  episcopal  work. 

In  November,  1861,  General  Polk,  feeling  that  there  was  no  longer  a  neces 
sity  for  his  remaining  in  the  army,  and  anxious  to  be  permitted  to  return  to  his 
episcopal  work,  sent  in  his  resignation  to  the  President.  Mr.  Davis  declined  to 
receive  it,  however,  and  gave  such  reasons,  backed  up  by  those  of  other  mem 
bers  of  the  Government,  as  to  convince  General  Polk  that  it  was  not  proper,  at 
that  time,  to  urge  the  matter  further.  He  therefore  consented  to  hold  his  posi 
tion  until  such  time  as  the  Government  should  feel  disposed  to  release  him. 
Upon  two  subsequent  occasions  he  made  like  attempts,  but  with  like  results. 
Proceeding  to  Memphis,  he  assumed  command  of  his  department. 

Bishop  Polk,  at  this  time,  wrote  to  the  patriarchal  Meade,  Bishop 
of  Virginia,  justifying  his  course.  He  said,  "  When  I  accept  a  com 
mission  in  the  Confederate  army,  I  not  only  perform  the  duties  of  a 
good  citizen,  but  contend  for  the  principles  which  lie  at  the  foundation 
of  our  social,  political,  and  religious  polity. "  He  did  not  resign  his 
bishopric,  and  always  hoped  to  resume  its  functions.  He  said,  not  long 
before  his  death  :  "  I  feel  like  a  man  who  has  dropped  his  business 
when  his  house  is  on  fire,  to  put  it  out ;  for,  as  soon  as  the  war  is 
over,  I  will  return  to  my  sacred  calling."  This  was  not  to  be  ;  he  died 
in  harness.  But  his  great  work  went  on  in  his  example  as  a  soldier  ; 
for  self-sacrifice  is  the  highest  consecration  known  to  the  Christian 
world.  He  had  his  martyrdom,  which,  if  doubtful  in  the  eyes  of  many, 
is  yet  veritable  with  those  for  whom  he  fought  and  died. 

Many  anecdotes  are  told  of  him,  illustrating  his  martial  energy, 
while  he  was  still  a  missionary  bishop.  His  tall  and  powerful  form, 
his  resolute  gray  eye,  broad,  square,  intellectual  brow,  aquiline  fea 
tures,  massive  jaw,  and  air  of  command,  made  him  a  striking  figure, 


322  GENERAL  POLK  AND   COLUMBUS,   KENTUCKY. 

whether  in  the  pulpit  or  in  the  saddle.  His  manner  combined  suavity, 
vivacity,  and  resolute  will.  When  a  missionary  in  the  Southwest,  he 
stopped  to  dine  at  the  house  of  Mr.  McMacken,  a  planter.  His  host, 
addressing  him  as  "  general,"  was  corrected,  and  told  he  was  "  JBishop 
Polk ;  "  but  replied,  quickly,  "  I  knew  he  was  a  commanding  officer  in 
the  department  to  which  he  belonged." 

He  was  once  at  church,  where  he  heard  a  brother  bishop  preach, 
the  subject  of  the  discourse  being  principally  the  travels  of  the  speaker 
in  Europe.  As  they  were  coming  out  of  the  building,  a  friend  asked 
Bishop  Polk,  sarcastically,  "  Do  you  call  that  the  gospel  ?  "  To  which 
he  replied  :  "  Oh,  no  !  that  is  the  Acts  of  the  Apostles  !  " 

The  following  is  an  illustration  of  the  piety  and  earnestness  of  his 
character,  as  well  as  of  the  charm  of  his  manner  :  After  having,  in 
the  course  of  his  travels,  staid  at  the  house  of  a  gentleman,  previously 
unknown  to  him,  as  the  bishop  drove  from  the  gate  his  host  remarked, 
"  I  now  realize  what  the  apostle  meant  when  he  said,  '  Some  have  en 
tertained  angels  unawares.'  " 

In  this  brief  sketch  and  these  anecdotes  may  be  discovered  the  signs 
of  an  heroic  nature.  Polk  believed  that  no  calling  gave  the  citizen 
exemption  from  the  duty  of  defending  his  home  and  country.  As  a 
priest,  he  had  always  remembered  that  he  was  a  gentleman  and  a 
soldier  of  Christ  ;  as  a  soldier,  he  never  forgot  that,  though  consecrated 
to  a  mission  of  patriotism,  he  was  first  of  all  a  Christian.  It  certainly 
does  not  become  any  preaching  zealot,  wTho  served  as  a  trumpeter  call 
ing  others  to  the  fray,  to  condemn  or  censure  him  who  took  up  the 
sword.  While  Cornelius,  the  centurion,  is  accounted  righteous,  or 
Abraham  is  justified  for  rescuing  Lot,  the  Southern  people  will  hold 
dear  the  memory  of  the  soldier-bishop.  Henceforth,  General  Polk  was 
the  right  arm  of  his  commander.  The  currents  of  these  two  lives  that 
had  so  nearly  touched  toward  their  sources,  and  afterward  had  parted 
so  widely,  moved  thereafter  with  a  common  purpose  to  a  common  end. 
Their  friendship  was  founded  upon  mutual  esteem.  When  General 
Polk  came  from  Europe,  he  brought  with  him  a  beautiful  onyx  cameo — 
the  head  of  Washington — which  he  gave  to  General  Johnston  on  his 
return,  saying  :  "  I  could  find  nothing  so  appropriate  as  a  present  for 
you  ;  for  I  have  never  known  any  one  whose  character  so  closely  re 
sembled  Washington's  in  all  respects  as  your  own."  A  very  dear 
friend  confirms  this  view  of  General  Johnston  thus :  "  Did  you  ever 
see  Jefferson's  estimate  of  the  character  of  Washington  ?  It  is  better 
than  the  best  for  General  Johnston." 

When  General  Polk  took  command  in  West  Tennessee,  his  depart 
ment  extended  from  the  mouth  of  the  Arkansas  River,  on  both  sides 
of  the  Mississippi,  to  the  northern  limits  of  Confederate  authority,  and 
east  as  far  as  the  Mobile  &  Ohio  Railroad,  For  the  following  account 


ORGANIZATION  OF  TENNESSEE  TROOPS.  323 

of  his  services,  previous  to  General  Johnston's  arrival,  I  am  again  in 
debted  to  Dr.  William  M.  Polk : 

The  force  which  he  found  in  his  command  was  mainly  composed  of  a  part 
of  the  Tennessee  State  army,  together  with  some  few  Confederate  troops  in 
Mississippi.  General  Pillow,  as  the  representative  of  the  Tennessee  State  forces, 
was  in  chief  command  at  Memphis ;  and  the  credit  of  all  that  had  been  done 
prior  to  that  time  is  clearly  his.  A  man  of  marked  energy  and  executive  abil 
ity,  he  was  in  a  position  to  be  of  signal  service  to  General  Polk  in  the  work 
that  lay  before  him.  Isham  G.  Harris,  the  Governor  of  the  State,  was  in  truth 
a  "  war  Governor."  Filled  with  energy  and  of  great  ability,  he  had  done  much 
toward  organizing  an  efficient  force  throughout  his  State.  This  was  now  trans 
ferred  to  the  Confederate  Government,  that  portion  belonging  to  West  Ten 
nessee  coming  under  General  Polk's  jurisdiction.  He  at  once  set  himself  to 
work  to  increase  his  army,  and  perfect  its  organization.  Much  had  been  done, 
but  much  remained  to  be  accomplished  before  we  could  be  in  condition  to  make 
headway  against  the  enemy.  Everything  was  in  embryo.  Seizing  upon  the 
materials  at  hand,  General  Polk  set  himself  to  work  to  create  out  of  it  an 
efficient  army,  and  to  prepare  his  department  for  offensive  or  defensive  opera 
tions,  as  occasion  might  require.  Recruiting  was  pushed  night  and  day ;  the 
entire  country  was  ransacked  for  small-arms,  and  metal  from  which  to  man 
ufacture  field-ordnance;  nitre-beds  were  opened;  and,  under  the  supervision 
of  Colonel  Hunt,  ordnance-officer,  arrangements  for  the  manufacture  of  all  kinds 
of  ordnance  material  were  completed.  Thus  did  General  Polk  obtain  a  large 
proportion  of  the  ordnance-supplies  for  his  entire  command.  Under  the  man 
agement  of  Major  Thomas  Peters,  quartermaster,  aided  by  Major  Anderson,  and 
of  Major  J.  J.  Murphy,  commissary,  quartermaster  and  commissary  supplies 
•were  abundantly  accumulated.  "When  it  is  remembered  that  this  successful  or 
ganization,  not  only  of  an  army  but  of  the  departments  necessary  to  equip  an 
army,  was  the  work  of  a  few  months,  all  being  created  from  the  raw  material, 
one  can  afford  to  smile  at  those  who  pretend  that  the  Southern  people  are 
without  energy. 

One  of  the  pleasantest  moments  of  General  Polk's  life  was  at  Columbus, 
where  General  Johnston,  after  inspecting  his  department,  complimented  him 
upon  what  had  been  done.  They  had  been  talking  of  the  affairs  of  the  Western 
Department,  and  General  Polk,  in  the  full  confidence  of  that  friendship  which 
he  knew  General  Johnston  entertained  for  him,  expressed  himself  concerning 
certain  criticisms  of  the  management  of  the  affairs  of  his  command.  General 
Johnston  replied  to  him  affectionately  :  "  Never  mind,  old  friend ;  I  understand 
and  appreciate  what  you  have  done,  and  will  see  that  you  are  supported." 

At  a  later  period,  when  the  concentration  at  Corinth  took  place,  it  was 
chiefly  from  the  ordnance,  quartermaster,  and  commissary  supplies  belonging  to 
this  department  that  the  army  was  supplied.  This  was  especially  the  case  in 
regard  to  that  all-important  element  of  an  army's  success — field  transportation. 

The  troops  under  General  Polk's  command  were  chiefly  the  State 
troops  transferred  by  Tennessee  to  the  Confederate  service — the  equiv 
alent  of  about  ten  regiments  of  all  arms,  with  3,000  muskets,  and  a 
brigade  of  Mississippians  under  Brigadier-General  Charles  Clark.  Polk 


324:  GENERAL  POLK  AND   COLUMBUS,   KENTUCKY. 

had  taken  command  on  July  13th,  and,  two  weeks  after,  sent  General 
Pillow  with  6,000  men  to  New  Madrid,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Mis 
sissippi.  This  point  was  important,  because  its  occupation  prevented 
any  movement  by  the  enemy  on  Pocahontas,  by  the  way  of  Chalk 
Bluffs.  While  it  was  expected  to  make  the  campaign  in  Tennessee 
defensive,  the  intention  was  to  carry  on  active  operations  in  Missouri 
by  a  combined  movement  of  the  armies  of  Price,  McCullcch,  Hardee, 
and  Pillow,  aided  by  Jeff  Thompson's  irregular  command.  It  has 
already  been  seen  that  this  plan  failed  through  want  of  cooperation. 
Both  Generals  Polk  and  Pillow  felt  the  pressing  necessity  for  the  occu 
pation  of  Columbus,  and  on  August  28th  Pillow  wrote  to  Polk  urging 
its  immediate  seizure.  This  had  been  Polk's  own  view  for  some  time, 
but  orders  from  the  War  Department  had  restrained  him.  It  was  only, 
therefore,  when  an  hour's  delay  might  have  proved  fatal,  and  when  it 
was  too  late  to  prevent  the  seizure  of  Paducah  by  the  Federals,  that 
General  Polk  felt  justified  in  exceeding  his  instructions,  and  thus  dis 
turbing  the  pretended  neutrality  of  Kentucky.  The  Secretary  of  War 
and  Governor  Harris  both  remonstrated  ;  but  President  Davis  replied 
to  his  explanations,  "  Necessity  justifies  your  action."  Polk  was  rapidly 
fortifying,  when  General  Johnston  arrived  at  Columbus.  About  this 
time,  September  10th,  Grant  wrote  to  Fremont,  proposing  to  attack 
Columbus,  which,  under  the  circumstances,  seems  to  the  writer  judicious 
though  apparently  bold ;  but  Fremont  took  no  notice  of  his  application.1 
After  the  failure  of  the  campaign  projected  against  St.  Louis,  in 
the  summer  of  1861,  General  Polk  turned  his  attention  toward  per 
fecting  the  river-defenses.  Missouri  and  Arkansas  were  added  to  his 
department,  but  he  was  unable  to  avail  himself  of  these  increased  pow 
ers,  as  the  defense  of  the  Mississippi  was  his  main  object,  and  occu 
pied  all  his  resources.  Dr.  Polk  says  : 

Finding  in  Island  No.  10  a  most  advantageous  position,  works  were  begun 
there.  His  design  now  was  to  make  that  the  advanced  point  of  defense— hold 
ing  Fort  Pillow  as  a  position  to  fall  back  upon,  in  the  event  he  was  driven  to 
it.  With  those  two  points  thoroughly  fortified,  he  saw  that  the  bulk  of  his 
force  would  be  left  free  for  aggressive  movements  upon  the  enemy.  While 
engaged  in  this  work,  the  opportunity  for  seizing  Columbus  presented  itself. 
He  promptly  availed  himself  of  it,  and  held  on  to  it  until  his  conduct  was 
approved  by  his  superiors.  General  Polk's  plan  for  the  defense  of  the  river  was 
now  this:  Columbus,  the  advanced  and  most  important  point,  was  to  be  most 
thoroughly  fortified.  The  lines  in  the  rear,  covering  the  batteries  command 
ing  the  river,  were  to  be  so  constructed  as  to  permit  of  their  being  held  by 
a  fraction  of  his  force,  the  larger  portion  remaining  free  to  operate  in  the  open 
field.  Island  No.  10  was  to  be  fortified  as  a  reserve  to  Columbus ;  New  Mad 
rid  to  be  fortified,  so  as  to  prevent  the  enemy  getting  possession  of  the  Mis 
souri  shore  at  that  point,  and  thus  obstructing  river  navigation  below  No.  10; 

1  Badeau's  "  Life  of  Grant,"  vol.  i.,  p.  13. 


GENERAL  JOHNSTON  AT  COLUMBUS.  325 

while  Fort  Pillow  was  to  form  the  last  stronghold  in  the  chain.  Most  of  the 
winter  was  spent  in  strengthening  these  positions.  From  the  nature  of  the  sur 
rounding  country  the  larger  portion  of  the  work  was  required  upon  Columbus 
and  Pillow  ;  and  a  proportionate  amount  was  put  on  No.  10  and  New  Madrid  ; 
so  that  when  the  time  came  to  occupy  them,  they,  as  well  as  Fort  Pillow,  were 
in  a  proper  state  of  defense. 

General  Folk's  share  in,  this,  campaign  will  appear  as  the  events 
arise.  Of  his  valuable  and  conspicuous  services  after  the  battle  of 
Shiloh,  it  is  not  within  the  scope  of  this  work  to  give  a  detailed  ac 
count.  At  Perryville,  at  Murfreesboro,  at  Chickamauga,  in  baffling 
Sherman  in  February,  1864,  and  in  General  J.  E.  Johnston's  retreat  from 
North  Georgia,  his  courage  and  skill  made  him  one  of  the  main  sup 
ports  of  the  Confederate  cause  in  the  West.  Whoever  was  at  the 
head,  it  was  upon  Polk  and  Hardee,  the  corps  commanders,  as  upon 
two  massive  pillars,  that  the  weight  of  organization  and  discipline 
rested.  General  Polk  was  made  a  lieutenant-general,  October  10, 
1862,  and  was  killed  by  a  shell  aimed  at  him,  June  14,  1864,  near 
Marietta,  Georgia,  while  boldly  reconnoitring  the  enemy's  position. 

Hon.  Thomas  C.  Reynolds,  the  constitutional  Lieutenant-Governor 
of  Missouri,  and,  after  Governor  Jackson's  death,  its  legal  Governor,  has 
given  the  writer  his  recollections  of  General  Johnston  at  Columbus. 
Himself  a  gentleman  of  fine  talents  and  culture,  Governor  Reynolds's 
opinions  and  impressions  cannot  fail  to  receive  consideration  : 

My  recollections  of  your  illustrious  father  are  of  little  or  no  historical  inter 
est.  Soon  after  he  arrived  at  Columbus,  Kentucky,  he  did  me  the  honor  of 
inviting  me  to  come  upon  his  staff  as  honorary  aide-de-camp,  with  the  rank  of 
colonel ;  at  the  same  time  he  appointed  on  his  staff  other  gentlemen  holding 
high  political  offices  in  Kentucky,  Arkansas,  or  in  some  other  State  within  his 
department.  He  stated  to  me  that  he  had  made  those  appointments  in  order  to 
have  near  to  him  gentlemen  of  position,  who  could  advise  him  on  the  condi 
tion,  politically  and  otherwise,  of  any  State  in  which  he  might  be  carrying  on  a 
campaign,  so  that  he  might  take  it  into  consideration  in  deciding  on  his  mili 
tary  operations.  This  was  one  of  the  many  incidents  which  showed  me  that  he 
was  a  complete  general ;  for,  while  no  true  soldier  will  permit  any  merely  politi 
cal  influences  around  him,  yet  an  able  commander  should  always  take  into 
consideration,  and  be  minutely  and  accurately  informed  of,  the  condition,  re 
sources,  etc.,  of  the  country  in  which  he  operates.  At  that  time  General  John 
ston  contemplated  a  campaign  in  Missouri,  General  Price  having  taken  Lexing 
ton  about  that  time,  and  Fremont  being  the  Federal  commander  in  this  State. 
I  accepted  the  position  on  his  staff  with  the  understanding  that  I  should  not 
be  expected  to  serve  on  it,  except  in  such  a  campaign.  We  both  thought  my 
position,  as  Lieutenant-Governor  of  Missouri,  might  lead  to  misconstruction  of 
my  course,  should  I  serve  in  any  other  State.  The  Missouri  Unionists,  we  be 
lieved,  would  endeavor  to  dampen  the  hopes  of  the  Confederate  element  in  the 
State,  by  representing  that  the  second  officer  of  its  government  had  so  little 
confidence  in  our  holding  it,  that  he  had  joined  a  campaign  in  some  other  quarter. 


326        GENERAL  POLK  AND  COLUMBUS,  KENTUCKY. 

The  only  incident  at  all  resembling  actual  hostilities  during  General  John 
ston's  stay  at  Columbus,  Kentucky,  occurred  on  October  11,  1861.  A  'Federal 
gunboat  commenced  shelling  the  fortifications  we  were  erecting  on  the  high 
bluff  immediately  north  of  the  town.  That  shelling  continued  only  about  an 
hour.  During  all  of  it  he  and  his  immediate  staff  remained  near  the  battery 
of  Captain  Bankhead,  which  from  the  bluff  was  answering  the  fire  of  the  gun 
boat.  We  stood  close  by  the  battery ;  and,  after  a  shell  had  exploded  near  to 
it,  Captain  Bankhead  came  up  to  the  general  and  remarked  to  him  that  the 
gunboat  was  evidently  "  getting  its  range,"  and  he  should  not  expose  his  per 
son  needlessly.  The  general  very  calmly  answered,  "  Captain,  we  must  all  take 
our  risks."  Afterward,  the  manner  of  his  death  at  Shiloh  impressed  the  inci 
dent  permanently  on  my  memory.  But,  in  fact,  his  conduct  on  that  occasion 
was  not  rash,  but  wise.  He  doubtless  was  aware  of  that  defect  of  new  troops  (to 
which  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  subsequently  alluded  in  a  conversation  with 
Colonel  Freemantle),  in  refusing  full  confidence,  even  to  a  commander-in-chief, 
unless  they  had  seen  him  under  fire.  The  rising  ground  back  of  the  bluff  was 
filled  with  those  soldiers  who  were  not  under  arms  or  on  duty  at  the  time,  and 
their  admiration,  as  they  saw  the  tall  form  of  the  general,  standing  in  full  uniform 
next  the  battery,  and  in  full  view  from  the  gunboat,  was  evidenced  by  loud  cheers. 

On  one  occasion  only  did  General  Johnston  have  a  case  presented  to  him  in 
which  my  knowledge  of  the  border  States  could  be  of  any  use  to  him.  Some 
Unionist  of  local  prominence  (whose  name  I  forget)  had  been  brought  in  as  a 
civilian  prisoner,  and,  as  usual  in  such  cases,  there  was  a  local  clamor  for  harsh 
treatment  of  him.  The  general  advised  with  me  concerning  the  policy  to  be 
pursued  in  such  cases,  frankly  stating  his  own  preference,  on  military  grounds, 
for  the  exemption  of  civilians  from  molestation  of  any  kind.  lie  was  evidently 
much  gratified  by  my  entirely  agreeing  with  him  on  political  grounds,  and 
assuring  him  that  I  believed  he  would  be  sustained  in  such  a  policy  by  the 
civil  authorities  of  Missouri  and  Kentucky,  at  least  on  the  Confederate  side. 

His  habit  was  to  spend  an  hour  or  two  after  tea  with  his  immediate  staff, 
and  his  conversations  in  those  social  reunions  gave  me  the  very  highest  opinion 
of  his  profound  judgment.  He  was  a  man  of  stately  but  winning  courtesy, 
although  occasionally  indulging  in  pleasantry.  At  present  I  can  recall  but  two 
of  those  conversations.  One  evening  we  received  a  St.  Louis  paper  containing 
a  general  order  of  General  Fremont,  announcing  his  staff— a  numerous  body, 
composed  largely  of  gentlemen  with  foreign  names.1  After  the  list  was  read 
over  to  him,  the  general,  with  an  expressive  smile,  remarked,  u  There  is  too 
much  tail  to  that  kite."  I  believe  the  United  States  Government  soon  afterward 
came  to  the  same  conclusion.  On  another  evening,  some  of  his  staff  were  dis 
cussing  the  question  of  the  probable  boundary-line  of  the  Confederate  States, 
in  the  final  treaty  of  peace ;  none  then  doubted  their  achievement  of  indepen 
dence.  The  general's  opinion  being  requested,  he  answered :  "  In  the  begin 
ning  of  a  great  war  like  this,  I  never  try  to  prognosticate  final  results.  I  do  the 
duty  which,  for  the  time  being,  lies  before  me,  and  I  leave  the  rest  to  Providence." 

He  possessed,  in  an  admirable  degree,  the  habit  of  reticence — so  essential  in 
a  commander.  When  he  left  Columbus  for  Bowling  Green,  his  departure  was 

1  As,  for  instance,  General  Asboth,  Colonel  De  Alma,  Majors  Kappner  and  Blome, 
Captains  Emavic  Meizaras,  Kalmanuezze,  Zagonyi,  Vanstein  Kiste,  Sacche,  and  Geister, 
Lieutenants  Napoleon  Westerburg,  Addone,  Kroger,  etc. 


PERSONAL.  327 

conducted  at  night  with  such  privacy  that  I  doubt  if  any  one  of  those  he  left  at 
the  former  place,  except  the  officer  in  command,  had  even  a  suspicion  of  his 
intention  to  transfer  his  headquarters.  A  few  days  before  we  left,  he  called  me 
out  one  afternoon  into  the  lawn,  to  a  distance  from  the  house,  beyond  the  possi 
bility  of  being  overheard  by  any  one,  and  remarked  to  me :  "  Colonel,  you  may 
desire  to  go  to  Richmond ;  I  called  you  here  to  tell  you  that  there  is  no  need  at 
present  of  your  remaining  with  me ;  for  a  long  time  to  come  there  will  be  no 
active  operations  on  this  line,  if  I  can  prevent  them;  we  have  no  powder." 
We  had  then  been  so  long  together,  and  had  become  so  well  acquainted,  that  he 
knew  he  did  not  need  to  enjoin  secrecy  on  me.  It  was  accordingly  arranged 
that  I  should  have  an  indefinite  leave  of  absence,  but  return  to  the  staff  should 
he  enter  on  a  campaign  in  Missouri.  I  accompanied  him  a  part  of  the  way 
toward  Bowling  Green,  and  then  went  on  to  Eichmond,  Virginia. 

While  he  was  not  a  martinet,  his  enforcement  of  discipline  was  admirable, 
and  yet  extremely  quiet.  When  he  reached  Columbus,  the  discipline  of  the  con 
siderable  forces  assembled  there  had  been  visibly  relaxed.  Within  a  week  after 
lie  had  assumed  command,  a  great  change  was  apparent,  and  was  noticed  by 
every  one,  although  few  could  understand  precisely  how  it  was  effected.  I  pre 
sume  it  was  done  simply  by  calling  the  attention  of  the  higher  officers  to  the 
enforcement  of  the  army  regulations.  Much  also  was  due  to  his  habit  of  per 
sonal  inspection.  He  once  remarked  to  me  that  he  did  not  feel  entirely  well 
unless  he  rode  every  day  about  twenty  miles.  The  figure  may  seem  large,  but  I 
remember  it  perfectly.  Every  afternoon,  in  the  fine  October  weather,  he  rode 
with  some  of  his  staff  about  the  camps,  quietly  inspecting;  his  eye  seemed  to  be 
everywhere.  He  had  nothing  whatever  of  the  military  demagogue  in  his  com 
position  ;  every  one  under  him  was  quietly  but  firmly  kept  to  his  proper  posi 
tion.  I  remember  that,  from  the  moment  I  joined  his  staff  until  I  left  it,  he 
invariably  addressed  me  as  "colonel,"  dropping  the  use  of  his  previous  saluta 
tion  of  me  as  "  Governor."  The  entire  army,  as  by  some  instinct,  soon  conceived 
the  greatest  admiration  of  and  confidence  in  him ;  he  looked  like  a  great  soldier, 
but  had  also  a  kindly  face  and  high-bred  courtesy  which  gained  him  the  affec 
tion  of  all  who  came  near  him. 

He  paid  great  attention  to  the  health  of  his  troops  and  the  sanitary  condition 
of  his  camps.  But  a  little  incident  made  me  suspect  that,  in  his  reliance  on  his 
iron  constitution,  he  was  not  equally  careful  of  his  own  health  and  comfort. 
The  night  on  which  we  left  Columbus  was  very  cold,  and  the  car  on  which  we 
traveled  had  no  stove  in  it,  or  a  very  small  one.  He  complained  of  cold  feet, 
and  I  at  once  took  from  my  valise  a  pair  of  stout  woolen  socks,  and  put  them 
over  his  boots.  He  said  that  he  had  never  heard  of  that  expedient,  and,  soon 
finding  himself  relieved,  got  me  to  explain  how  the  effect  was  produced;  of 
course,  he  was  perfectly  familiar  with  the  atmospherical  laws  which  elucidated  it. 

A  very  warm  friendship  grew  up  between  General  Johnston  and  myself;  my 
admiration  of  his  character  and  military  abilities  is  such  that  I  consider  his 
death  to  have  been  the  greatest  blow  which  the  Confederacy  received.  More 
than  any  other  officer  that  I  have  met,  he  appreciated  the  great  military  fact 
that  the  occupation  of  Missouri,  flanking  the  somewhat  disaffected  Northwest, 
might  have  totally  changed  the  course  of  the  war. 

I  remain,  my  dear  colonel,  sincerely  your  friend, 

THOMAS  C.  REYNOLDS. 

Colonel  WILLIAM  PRESTON  JOHNSTON,  Lexington,  Virginia. 


328  EFFORTS  TO  GET  ARMS  AND  TROOPS. 

CHAPTER  XXII. 

EFFORTS  TO  GET  ARMS  AND  TROOPS. 

IT  has  already  been  shown  that,  when  the  Confederate  troops  ad 
vanced  into  Kentucky  and  established  their  line  of  operations,  it  was 
with  the  confident  hope  that  the  people  of  that  Commonwealth  would 
promptly  join  them  in  large  numbers,  and  also  that  a  strong  army,  ral 
lied  in  the  South,  would  speedily  follow  to  support  them.  The  first 
illusion  was  soon  dispelled.  The  causes  of  inaction  in  Kentucky,  already 
made  sufficiently  plain  in  Chapter  XIX.,  continued,  and  destroyed  the 
hope  of  any  considerable  accession  of  volunteers  from  that  quarter. 
But  the  disappointment  was  even  more  grievous  at  the  want  of  appre 
ciation  of  the  danger,  and  of  the  means  necessary  for  defense,  exhibited 
by  the  Gulf  States. 

General  Johnston  fully  foresaw  the  difficulties  and  dangers  of  his 
position,  and  his  first  steps  on  arriving  at  Nashville  were  to  procure 
men  and  arms.  It  will  be  made  manifest  in  this  chapter  that  he  neg 
lected  no  lawful  means  to  that  end.  In  his  address  to  the  Memphis 
Historical  Society,  Colonel  Munford,  General  Johnston's  aide-de-camp, 
states  the  essential  question,  and  answers  it : 

To  those  who  ask  why  so  able  a  man  lost  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  and 
seemed  to  fail,  four  words  will  answer,  namely — he  had  no  army. 

Colonel  Munford  then,  in  a  powerful  and  convincing  statement  of 
facts,  which  the  writer  has  largely  followed,  shows  that  this  failure  to 
assemble  an  army  equal  to  the  emergency  was  not  due  to  General  John 
ston.  While  the  writer  will  have  occasion  frequently  to  employ  this  in 
teresting  historical  monograph,  it  is  thought  best  to  produce  the  origi 
nal  correspondence,  which  conclusively  demonstrates  that  in  no  point 
of  vigilance,  decision,  or  energy,  was  General  Johnston  at  fault.  The 
narrative  of  military  operations  is  therefore  postponed,  and  the  facts  in 
regard  to  General  Johnston's  efforts  to  obtain  men  and  arms  are  here 
grouped  together,  that  the  reader  may  arrive  at  his  own  conclusion  as 
to  where  the  responsibility  rests. 

The  only  legal  mode  by  which  a  Confederate  general  could  raise 
troops  or  secure  munitions  of  war  was  through  the  instrumentality  of 
the  State,  or  the  General  Government.  Of  his  own  motion  he  could  do 
nothing.  He  had  not  the  power  to  commission  a  lieutenant,  to  raise  a 
company  of  soldiers,  or  to  buy  a  gun,  except  through  the  intermediary 
channels  of  the  civil  service.  Experience  had  taught  General  Johnston, 


BEGGIXG  FOR  ARMS.  329 

what  subsequent  events  of  the  war  proved  to  other  generals,  that  the 
Southern  people  deeply  resent  any  breach  of  legality  ;  and,  moreover, 
he  was  not  the  man  to  transcend  his  authority.  Without  compulsory 
power  of  enlistment,  his  only  resource  was  to  induce  the  Governors  of 
States  and  the  Confederate  Administration  to  send  him  such  force  as 
he  required. 

Before  relating  his  efforts  to  raise  troops,  it  will  be  proper  to  show 
the  means  used  by  General  Johnston  to  procure  arms.  This  will  be 
best  done,  though  at  the  risk  of  some  prolixity,  by  an  exhibit  of  his 
correspondence.  He  arrived  at  Nashville  on  the  14th  of  September ; 
on  the  15th  he  dispatched  Messrs.  T.  H.  Hunt  and  D.  P.  Buckner,  who 
had  been  prominent  members  of  the  Kentucky  State  Guard,  and  were 
afterward  distinguished  officers  in  the  Confederate  service,  as  special 
messengers  to  obtain  arms.1  The  following  letter  was  addressed  to 
the  Governor  of  Alabama,  a  duplicate  being  sent  to  the  Governor  of 
Georgia,  and  a  similar  communication  to  General  Bragg,  commanding 
at  Pensacola  : 

NASHVILLE,  TENNESSEE,  September  15, 1861. 

SIR  :  The  condition  of  the  defenses  of  our  northern  frontier  requires  every 
possible  assistance  from  the  South.  We  have  men  in  large  numbers.  We  are 
deficient  in  arms.  I  understand  that  your  Excellency  has  a  considerable  num 
ber  in  your  arsenal.  I  feel  justified  by  the  circumstances  in  making  the  strongest 
appeal  to  your  Excellency's  patriotism  to  aid  me  in  this  respect.  I  shall  beg  to 
rely  upon  your  Excellency  to  furnish  us  as  rapidly  as  possible  at  this  point  with 
every  arm  it  may  be  in  your  power  to  provide — I  mean  small-arms  for  infantry 
and  cavalry. 

I  view  the  matter  of  such  urgent  necessity  that  I  send  this  letter  by  a  special 
messenger,  who  will  confer  freely  with  you  upon  this  subject. 

I  am,  etc.,  (Signed)  A.  S.  JOHXSTOX. 

A.  B.  MOOBE,  Governor  of  Alabama. 

EXECUTIVE  DEPARTMENT,  » 

MONTGOMEBT,  ALABAMA,  September  23, 1861.  | 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  yours  of  the  15th  inst., 
and,  fully  recognizing  the  necessity  of  speedy  and  energetic  action  in  the  direc 
tion  contemplated  hy  your  letter,  regret  that  it  is  out  of  the  power  of  Alabama 
to  afford  you  any  assistance  in  the  way  of  arms.  Our  own  coast  is  threatened 
with  invasion  by  the  Federal  forces;  and  within  the  last  ten  days  we  have  been 
called  upon  to  arm  two  regiments  for  the  defense  of  this  State.  When  this  is 
done,  I  shall  not  have  one  hundred  stand  of  muskets  left  which  are  fit  for  use. 
Our  cavalry  and  sabre  arms  are  entirely  exhausted ;  and  I  am  now  waiting  to 
forward  sabres  to  Tennessee,  which  I  have  contracted  for  in  Georgia. 

Very  respectfully, 

A.  B.  MOOEE. 

General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  General  C.  S.  A.,  Nashville. 

Governor  Brown  made  the  following  reply,  from  Atlanta,  Septem 
ber  18th  : 

1  See  letter  of  September  16th  to  the  President,  p.  308. 


330  EFFORTS  TO   GET  ARMS  AND   TROOPS. 

SIR:  Your  letter  of  the  15th  instant,  in  which  you  make  the  request  that  I 
will  forward  to  you  such  arms  as  may  be  at  my  disposal  for  defense  of  our 
northern  frontier,  has  been  handed  to  me  by  Colonel  Hunt  and  Captain  Buckner. 

In  reply,  I  beg  leave  to  state,  and  I  do  so  with  much  regret,  that  it  is  utterly 
impossible  for  me  to  comply  with  your  request.  There  are  no  arms  belonging 
to  the  State  at  my  disposal ;  all  have  been  exhausted  arming  the  volunteers  of 
the  State  now  in  the  Confederate  service  in  Virginia,  at  Pensacola,  and  on  our 
own  coast — in  all  some  twenty-three  regiments.  Georgia  has  now  to  look  to 
the  shot-guns  and  rifles  in  the  hands  of  her  people  for  coast-defense,  and  to  guns 
which  her  gunsmiths  are  slowly  manufacturing.  I  deeply  regret  this  state  of 
things,  for  to  respond  to  your  call  with  the  arms  you  need  would  afford  me  the 
greatest  gratification. 

I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JOSEPH  E.  BROWN. 

The  Governors  of  these  two  great  States  felt  that  their  coasts  were 
more  immediately  threatened,  and  that  the  defense  of  them  was  of  more 
vital  importance  than  an  obscure  and  distant  danger  in  Kentucky,  and 
trusted  to  fortune  for  the  protection  of  the  postern  to  their  citadel. 
General  Bragg's  reply  discusses  the  aspects  of  the  situation  so  well, 
for  the  most  part,  that  it  is  here  given  entire : 

HEADQUARTERS,  NEAR  PENSACOLA,  FLORIDA,  ) 
September  27, 1861. 

DEAE  SIR  :  Colonel  D.  P.  Buckner  called  on  me  yesterday  in  behalf  of  your 
self  and  our  great  cause  in  Kentucky.  His  accounts  of  our  affairs  there  are  by 
no  means  cheering ;  but,  with  the  blessing  of  Providence  and  your  exertions, 
we  yet  expect  a  great  deal  in  that  direction. 

It  is  in  my  power  to  do  but  little  for  you.  We  have  no  spare  arms,  and  are 
still  deficient  in  ammunition.  I  have  men,  and  can  get  any  number;  and  those 
who  have  been  with  us  some  months  are  well-instructed,  fine  soldiers.  Weeks 
ago  I  offered  four  of  these  regiments  to  the  President  for  an  equal  number  of 
new  men,  believing  that  the  cause  would  be  advanced  by  such  a  move.  This 
was  all  I  could  do,  and  all  I  can  do  now ;  but  no  reply  has  reached  me,  though 
I  learn  from  an  officer  who  has  been  to  Richmond  that  the  department  thinks 
the  short  time  my  men  have  to  serve  would  not  justify  the  expense.  Upon 
hearing  this,  I  again  wrote,  requesting  that  I  might  offer  the  alternative  to 
them,  satisfied  a  very  large  proportion  will  stay  ufor  the  war."  To  this  I 
ought  to  hear  very  soon. 

The  mission  of  Colonel  Buckner  will  not  be  successful,  I  fear,  as  our  extreme 
southern  country  has  been  stripped  of  both  arms  and  men.  We  started  early 
in  this  matter,  and  have  wellnigh  exhausted  our  resources.  Besides,  there  is  a 
general  apprehension  of  invasion  this  fall  and  winter,  and  every  means  in  the 
country  is  being  devoted  to  defense — some  of  it  very  injudiciously.  Mobile  and 
New  Orleans  are  being  fortified  at  great  expense,  when  they  should  be  defended 
in  Kentucky  and  Missouri. 

The  unfortunate  state  of  affairs  which  has  caused  our  troops  to  fall  back  in 
the  latter  State  is  deeply  to  be  deplored.  We  are  bound  to  accept  it  as  neces 
sary,  though  we  may  not  see  the  reason.  It  would  have  been  a  great  diversion 


SCANT  RESULTS.  331 

in  favor  of  the  movements  in  Kentucky.  In  both  these  States  all  depended  on 
rapid  movement,  to  save  our  friends  before  the  enemy  could  disarm  and  dis 
organize  them.  "We  fear  that  procrastination  has  cost  us  much  ;  but  look  with 
great  confidence  to  the  future  under  your  control. 

Deep  solicitude  is  felt  on  the  subject  of  an  appointment  to  the  War  Office. 
The  health  of  the  President  is  such  that  he  cannot  give  his  personal  attention  to 
the  details  of  service ;  and  it  is  essential  that  he  should  have  a  man  of  the  highest 
abilities,  and  of  great  nerve  and  self-reliance. 

The  policy  of  the  enemy  seems  now  to  be  defensive  at  the  North,  relying  on 
the  winter  to  check  us  there,  while  he  will  operate  by  naval  expeditions  through 
out  the  South. 

Wishing  you  full  success  in  the  arduous  and  responsible  task  before  you, 
I  am,  most  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

BEAXTON  BBAGG. 

General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  Nashville,  Tennessee. 

But,  that  no  stone  might  be  left  unturned  to  effect  his  object,  the 
following  dispatch  was  addressed  by  telegraph  to  the  President,  Sep 
tember  19th,  from  Columbus,  Kentucky,  by  General  Johnston,  giving 
reports  received  from  his  agents  in  Georgia : 

A  steamer  has  arrived  at  Savannah  with  arms  from  Europe.  Thirty  thou 
sand  stand  are  a  necessity  to  my  command.  I  beg  you  to  order  them,  or  as  many 
as  can  be  got,  to  be  instantly  procured  and  sent  with  dispatch,  one-half  to  Nash 
ville,  and  the  other  to  Trenton,  on  the  Mobile  &  Ohio  Railroad. 

The  President  replied  as  follows  : 

The  steamer  was  a  merchant-vessel.  We  have  purchased  as  much  of  the 
shipment  as  we  could  get,  less  than  a  sixth  of  your  requisition ;  some  of  the  lot 
pledged  the  troops  already  in  service.  You  shall  have  what  can  be  sent  to  you. 
Rely  not  on  rumor.  JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 

The  Secretary  of  War  replied  thus,  more  fully,  but  even  less  satis 
factorily  : 

WAS  DEPARTMENT,  CONFEDERATE  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  ? 
RICHMOND,  September  27, 1861.         » 

SIR  :  The  President  has  communicated  to  me  your  request  for  small-arms 
supposed  by  you  to  have  arrived,  per  Bermuda,  at  Savannah. 

The  whole  number  received  by  us  was  1,800,  and  we  purchased  of  the  own 
ers  1,780,  making  in  all  3,500  Enfield  rifles,  of  which  we  have  been  compelled 
to  allow  the  Governor  of  Georgia  to  have  1,000  for  arming  troops  to  repel  an 
attack,  now  hourly  threatened,  at  Brunswick,  Georgia. 

Of  the  remaining  2,500,  I  have  ordered  1,000  sent  to  you,  leaving  us  but 
1,500  for  arming  several  regiments  now  encamped  here,  and  who  have  been 
awaiting  their  arms  for  several  months.  I  state  these  facts  to  evince  our  so 
licitude  to  furnish  you  every  aid  in  our  power,  and  our  disposition  to  share  with 
you  all  our  resources. 

We  are  hourly  in  hope  of  hearing  of  the  arrival  of  small-arms,  and  the 
arsenal  here  is  now  turning  them  out  at  the  rate  of  1,000  per  month.  We 
will  receive  the  first  delivery  in  about  ten  days.  I  have  ordered  1,200  Texan 


332  EFFORTS  TO  GET  ARMS  AND  TROOPS. 

Rangers  under  Terry  and  Lubbock,  fully  armed  and  equipped,  to  report  to  you 
for  service,  understanding  from  them  that  you  can  furnish  horses,  which  is  out 
of  our  power. 

"We  have  not  an  engineer  to  send  you.  The  whole  Engineer  Corps  com 
prises  only  six  captains,  together  with  three  majors,  of  whom  one  is  on  bureau 
v\uty.  You  will  be  compelled  to  employ  the  best  material  within  your  reach, 
b}  x,  detailing  officers  from  other  corps,  and  by  employing  civil  engineers,  for 
whom  pay  will  be  allowed. 

Your  obedient  servant, 

J.  P.  BENJAMIN,  Acting  Secretary  of  War. 

General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  Columbus,  Kentucky. 

Thus,  it  will  be  seen,  the  only  immediate  result  of  this  appeal  in  so 
many  quarters  for  armament  was  1,000  stand  of  arms.  Late  in  No 
vember,  3,650  Enfield  rifles  were  received  from  the  War  Department. 
The  Ordnance  Bureau,  ably  conducted  by  Colonel  Gorgas,  used  ener 
getic  measures  to  supply  munitions  of  war,  and  eventually  was  quite 
successful  in  the  importation  of  siege-guns,  and  in  the  purchase  and 
manufacture  of  powder  and  other  materiel.  The  chief  defect  was  a 
lack  of  small-arms.  This  was  never  fully  supplied  so  far  as  General 
Johnston  was  concerned,  though  he  received  some  on  the  eve  of  the 
battle  of  Shiloh. 

The  energetic  steps  taken  by  the  State  government  of  Tennessee, 
immediately  after  secession,  now  afforded  a  partial  basis  of  supply.  A 
percussion-cap  factory  had  been  started  in  Nashville  by  Mr.  Samuel 
Morgan,  a  wealthy  and  patriotic  citizen,  and  had  done  good  work. 
Ordnance-shops  and  workshops  had  been  established  at  Nashville  and 
Memphis,  which  were  transferred  to  the  Confederate  Government,  and 
proved  of  the  greatest  service.  Under  the  efficient  command  of  Cap 
tains  M.  H.  Wright  and  W.  R  Hunt,  everything  possible,  with  the 
means  at  command,  was  accomplished.  Twelve  or  fourteen  batteries 
were  fitted  out  at  Memphis  by  the  1st  of  October.  At  the  same  date, 
the  powder-mills  at  Nashville  were  making  400  pounds  of  powder  a 
day,  and  this  production  was  afterward  largely  increased. 

The  State  government  of  Tennessee  cooperated  with  the  Confeder 
ate  authorities  with  the  utmost  zeal ;  and  General  Johnston  often  cor 
dially  acknowledged  the  aid  received  from  this  source.  The  Governor 
of  Tennessee,  Isham  G.  Harris,  was  a  man  of  courage,  decision,  re 
source,  and  executive  ability.  Backed  by  the  Legislature,  he  forwarded 
with  untiring  energy  all  of  General  Johnston's  designs  for  recruiting 
and  equipping  an  army.  Laws  were  passed  and  enforced  to  impress 
and  pay  for  the  private  arms  scattered  throughout  the  State,  and  the 
utmost  efforts  were  employed  to  collect  these  rude  and  imperfect 
weapons,  and  to  adapt  them  to  military  uses.  Though  far  below  the 
necessities  of  the  occasion,  the  success  of  these  efforts,  under  all  the 


DEFICIENT  ARMAMENT.  333 

circumstances,  was  admirable.  The  reports  of  Captain  Wright,  under 
whose  direction  the  arms  were  altered  and  repaired,  show  the  almost 
insuperable  difficulties  of  equipping  an  improvised  army.  He  says  : 

About  one-fourth  of  the  arms  brought  in  were  without  lock  or  stock,  much 
worn,  and  utterly  worthless;  and  these  weapons,  generally  fowling-pieces, 
squirrel-rifles,  etc.,  were  very  poor  in  quality,  even  when  put  in  order. 

The  reports  and  inspection  returns  make  it  evident  that,  during 
most  of  the  autumn  of  1861,  fully  one-half  of  General  Johnston's 
troops  were  unarmed,  and  whole  brigades  remained  without  weapons 
for  months.  Terry's  Texas  Rangers,  one  of  the  best-equipped  and 
most  efficient  regiments  at  the  front,  report,  October  30th,  twenty  vari 
eties  of  fire-arms  in  their  hands — shot-guns  and  Colt's  navy  six-shooters 
being  most  numerous.  Other  regimental  reports  show  a  similar  state 
of  things.  This  one  circumstance,  with  the  resulting  confusion  and 
diversity  in  ammunition,  will  indicate  to  any  soldier  a  fruitful  source  of 
inefficiency  and  confusion. 

The  Government  could  not  arm  its  troops,  because  of  the  inability 
of  its  agents  to  procure  sufficient  serviceable  arms  in  the  markets 
of  Europe.  They  were  there  before  the  agents  of  the  North,  but 
good  arms  were  not  for  sale  to  any  considerable  extent.  They, 
therefore,  made  contracts  for  their  manufacture  as  rapidly  as  was  prac 
ticable.  They  can  hardly  be  blamed  for  not  buying  the  condemned 
arms  offered  them. 

The  war  suddenly  assumed  an  unexpected  magnitude,  and  the 
blockade  interrupted  this  traffic.  When  it  is  considered  that  the  South 
was  an  agricultural  country,  the  aptness,  ingenuity,  and  resource  it 
displayed  in  the  development  of  the  means  of  defense,  astonished 
friend  and  foe  alike.  But  neither  by  importation  nor  manufacture  was 
the  deficiency  in  number  or  quality  of  fire-arms  remedied  in  General 
Johnston's  lifetime.  It  was  a  constant  obstacle  to  his  success,  prevent 
ing  not  merely  military  operations,  but  even  the  enlistment  of  troops. 

It  has  already  been  shown  that  General  Johnston  was  confronted  by 
a  powerful  force,  while  his  own  line  of  defense  was  merely  masked  by 
Buckner's  and  Zollicoffer's  small  commands.  Hence,  it  became  his 
first  duty  to  organize  an  army  for  their  support.  The  following  pages 
will  evince  that  he  exhausted  every  legal  means  to  that  end.  He  com 
prehended  the  magnitude  of  the  war,  and  the  tenacity  of  the  assailant, 
as  well  as  any  man  on  either  side.  His  uniform  utterances  bore  testi 
mony  to  this  fact.  To  a  staff-officer,  who  spoke  of  the  struggle  as  an 
affair  of  one  campaign,  he  said,  "  It  is  more  likely  to  be  a  seven  years' 
war."  His  correspondence,  his  conversations,  and  his  scheme  of  prep 
aration,  all  prove  his  conviction  of  the  formidable  character  of  the  con 
test.  He  was  equally  impressed  with  the  necessity  for  prompt  and 


334  EFFORTS   TO    GET   ARMS  AND   TROOPS. 

decisive  action.  He  felt  that,  to  meet  the  enemy,  he  required  a  large 
number  of  troops,  and  he  required  them  at  once.  It  will  now  be  shown 
that  his  measures  to  recruit  an  army  were  not  less  energetic  than  his 
attempts  to  obtain  arms  and  munitions  of  war.  The  urgency  of  his 
appeals  for  men  was  in  singular  contrast  to  the  apparent  apathy  of  the 
people. 

General  Johnston's  first  step  was  to  concentrate  his  men.  Hardee's 
command  was  drawn  in  from  Northeastern  Arkansas,  where  it  had  been 
lying  in  the  swamps  for  six  months,  sick  and  crippled,  and  was  added 
to  the  nucleus  of  an  army  at  Bowling  Green.  Terry's  splendid  regi 
ment  of  Texan  Rangers,  which  was  detained  in  Louisiana,  dismounted, 
was,  at  its  own  request  and  on  General  Johnston's  application,  allowed 
to  report  to  him  on  condition  that  he  would  supply  it  with  horses.  It 
was  brought  to  the  front,  and  in  November  was  on  active  picket-ser 
vice.  On  Buckner's  advance,  about  five  hundred  Kentuckians  joined 
him  at  once  ;  and  the  Fifth,  Sixth,  Seventh,  Eighth,  and  Ninth  Ken 
tucky  Regiments,  were  gradually  formed  and  filled  up.  John  Morgan, 
too,  joined  Buckner  with  a  cavalry  company,  the  origin  of  that  famous 
command  which  so  often  carried  consternation  within  the  Federal  lines. 
But,  under  existing  arrangements,  the  main  reliance  for  recruiting  an 
army  was  the  machinery  of  the  State  governments. 

In  a  letter  of  the  same  date  with  General  Johnston's  assignment  to 
command,  September  10th,  the  adjutant-general  says  to  him  : 

You  have  authority  to  call  for  troops  from  Arkansas,  Tennessee,  and  such  por 
tion  of  Mississippi  as  may  be  within  the  limits  of  your  command.  You  have  also 
authority  to  receive  into  the  service  such  troops  as  may  be  offered  from  the 
States  of  Missouri  and  Kentucky,  and  to  call  on  the  naval  service  for  such  assist 
ance  and  material  of  war,  including  boats,  as  may  be  required  for  the  defense  of 
the  Mississippi  River. 

General  Johnston  was  further  directed  by  the  President,  by  telegram 
of  the  13th,  "  to  go  by  Nashville,  confer  with  Governor  Harris,  and 
then  decide  upon  the  steps  to  be  taken." 

Acting  in  exact  conformity  with  these  orders,  he  made  requisitions 
for  50,000  men — 30,000  from  Tennessee,  10,000  from  Mississippi,  and 
10,000  from  Arkansas.  Had  they  been  promptly  furnished,  how  differ 
ent  might  have  been  the  result !  The  letter  to  Governor  Harris  is  here 
given ;  those  to  Governors  Pettus  and  Rector  were  identical,  except  in 
the  number  of  troops  named,  the  places  of  rendezvous,  and  the  clause 
referring  to  conversations  about  arms,  which  was  omitted. 

HEADQTJARTKRS,  PEPAETMENT  No.  2,      | 
COLUMBUS,  KENTUCKY,  September  21, 1801.  ) 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  your  Excellency  that,  under  date  of  Septem 
ber  10,  1861,  I  was  authorized  by  the  President  of  the  Confederate  States  to 


LETTERS   TO   THE   GOVERNORS.  335 

call  upon  the  Governor  of  Tennessee  for  troops  for  the  defense  of  the  Mississippi 
River,  and  the  States  included  in  this  military  department. 

The  defenseless  condition  of  this  department  was  patent,  from  the  moment  I 
arrived  and  had  a  hasty  view  of  the  field. 

The  necessity  for  a  strong  and  efficient  army  is  present  and  pressing.  I 
therefore  avail  myself  of  the  permission  above  cited,  to  call  upon  your  Excel 
lency  to  furnish  for  the  service  of  the  Confederate  States  30,000  men.  I  would 
prefer  volunteers  for  the  present  war,  as  securing  hetter-disciplined,  more  skilled, 
and  effective  forces ;  and,  if  any  such  shall  volunteer  by  companies,  they  will  be 
gladly  accepted,  under  the  act  of  May  8th.  But  dispatch,  now,  is  of  the  first  im 
portance,  and  therefore  companies,  battalions,  and  regiments,  offering  for  twelve 
months,  will  be  at  once  received. 

After  the  full  conversations  I  have  had  with  your  Excellency,  I  need  say 
nothing  more  of  my  deficiency  in  arms,  except  that  it  exists  to  the  same  extent 
still.  I  beg  your  influence  with  the  volunteers  to  induce  them  to  bring  into  the 
field  every  effective  arm  in  their  possession.  Rifles  and  shot-guns — double-bar 
reled  guns  in  particular — can  be  made  effective  weapons  in  the  hands  of  your 
skilled  horsemen.  These  arms  will  be  replaced  in  the  hands  of  the  troops  by 
uniform  arms  at  the  shortest  practicable  period. 

I  have  selected  the  following  points  in  your  States  for  the  rendezvous  of  this 
force,  viz. :  Knoxville,  Nashville,  Jackson,  Trenton,  and  Memphis.  At  each  of 
these  places  officers  will  be  in  readiness  to  muster  in  companies,  battalions,  and 
regiments,  as  soon  as  organized,  for  the  war,  or  for  twelve  months,  as  they  de 
cide  to  serve. 

At  these  designated  places  provision  will  be  made  for  supplies,  and  the  in 
struction  of  the  troops  will  be  prosecuted  until  they  can  be  armed  and  prepared 
to  move  to  the  frontier.  The  proportion  of  troops  to  be  ordered  to  these  dif 
ferent  points,  depending  upon  the  districts  from  which  the  volunteers  are  drawn, 
I  leave  to  the  determination  of  your  Excellency,  asking  to  be  informed  of  the 
probable  numbers  you  may  be  likely  to  assemble  at  each,  in  order  that  my  prep 
arations  for  their  wants  may  be  in  proportion. 

I  am,  with  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

(Signed)  A.  S.  JOHXSTOX,  General. 

I.  G.  HA.ERIS,  Governor  of  Tennessee,  Nashville. 

The  Arkansas  troops  were  directed  to  be  sent  to  the  aid  of  McCul- 
loch,  for  the  defense  of  their  own  frontier.  Major  Howard,  aide-de 
camp,  was  sent  with  orders  conferring  on  McCulloch  as  large  powers  as 
General  Johnston  himself  had  for  mustering,  organizing,  equipping, 
and  supporting  troops  from  Arkansas  and  Missouri  ;  and  he  was  direct 
ed  to  call  on  the  supply-officers  at  Memphis  for  whatever  he  could  not 
otherwise  procure.  All  the  Governors  called  on  took  steps  to  comply 
with  the  requisitions,  but  with  what  tardy  and  incomplete  success  will 
be  seen  hereafter. 

Governor  Pettus,   of  Mississippi,  sent   two  regiments,  armed  and 

equipped,  immediately,  and  two  more  at  a  later  date.     But  this  source 

of  supply  was  soon  closed  by  the  following  correspondence.     On  the 

16th  of  October  the  Secretary  of  War  wrote  the  following  letter  to 

23 


336  EFFORTS  TO   GET  ARMS  AND  TROOPS. 

General  Johnston,  disapproving  of  his  requisition  on  Mississippi,  though 
it  had  been  made  in  accordance  with  the  instructions  given  September 
10th,  and  heretofore  quoted  : 

Your  call  for  troops  on  Mississippi  and  other  States  will,  I  am  informed,  pro 
duce  embarrassment.  "When  General  Polk  was  sent  to  take  command  of  the 
department  now  under  your  orders,  he  was  instructed  that  he  might  use  his  own 
discretion  in  the  calls  on  Arkansas  and  Tennessee,  but  not  to  draw  on  Missis 
sippi,  Alabama,  Louisiana,  or  Georgia,  without  the  consent  of  this  department. 
The  reason  for  this  was,  that  Arkansas  and  Tennessee  had  not  yet  been  sub 
jected  to  any  considerable  drain  of  men,  whereas  the  other  States  mentioned 
had  been  furnishing  largely  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and  it  was  desired 
to  proportion  the  calls  on  the  different  States  with  a  due  regard  to  their  numbers 
of  men  capable  of  bearing  arms. 

I  much  lament  that  we  are  still  so  straitened  for  arms.  As  soon  as  we  can 
get  any  you  shall  have  your  full  share.  I  shall  order  four  thirty-two  pounders 
at  once  to  be  sent  to  you,  for  the  defense  of  your  works  at  Bowling  Green,  or 
such  other  point  as  you  may  desire  to  fortify  with  heavy  guns. 

Rely  on  the  active  cooperation  of  this  department  to  the  full  extent  of  its 
disposable  means. 

Your  obedient  servant, 

J.  P.  BENJAMIN,  Acting  Secretary  of  War. 

General  A.  8.  JOHNSTON,  Bowling  Green,  Kentucky. 

General  Johnston's  reply  was  as  follows : 

In  making  the  call  for  troops,  I  asked  from  the  Governors  of  Tennessee, 
Mississippi,  and  Arkansas,  respectively,  as  follows:  Tennessee,  30,000;  Missis 
sippi,  10,000;  Arkansas,  10,000 — confining  my  call  strictly  to  those  States. 
The  call  upon  Mississippi  was  small  compared  with  that  on  Tennessee,  as  only  a 
part  of  that  State  is  within  the  limits  of  my  department. 

I  had  no  means  of  ascertaining  the  relative  proportion  of  troops  furnished 
before  by  each  State,  nor  was  I  aware  that  instructions  had  been  given  Major- 
General  Polk  to  refrain  from  making  further  calls  upon  Mississippi.  I  was  de 
sirous  that  the  furnishing  of  the  quotas  should  operate  as  little  onerously  as  pos 
sible  upon  the  several  States  of  this  department. 

The  States,  as  far  as  I  know,  had  previously  furnished  troops  promptly  to 
meet  the  exigencies  of  the  Government,  and  I  did  not  know  that  there  had  been 
any  considerable  disparity  in  proportion  to  population.  I  have  asked  for  no 
troops  from  States  other  than  those  in  this  department.  I  have  accepted  the 
services  of  two  regiments,  by  special  authority  of  the  War  Department,  and  a 
few  detached  companies,  without  any  special  sanction,  from  (I  believe)  Alabama. 
Terry's  regiment  has  joined;  the  other,  De  Veuve's,  from  Louisiana,  has  not. 

I  presume  it  could  not  be  spared. 

• 

Being  thus  excluded  from  Mississippi,  and  having  ordered  the  Ar 
kansas  contingent  to  report  to  General  McCulloch,  General  Johnston 
was  confined  to  Tennessee  as  a  recruiting-ground.  All  the  departments 
of  the  State  government  entered  zealously  on  the  work,  but  the  imme- 


CONDITION  OF  THE   TROOPS.  337 

diate  results  hardly  corresponded  with  their  efforts.     Colonel  Munford 
says:   ; 

Up  to  the  middle  of  November,  General  Johnston  mustered  in  only  three 
regiments,  under  this  call. 

This,  probably,  does  not  include  the  men,  waiting  arms,  in  camp, 
"when  the  call  was  made.  Colonel  Hamby,  the  Adjutant-General  of 
Tennessee  in  1876,  estimated  that  his  State  contributed  to  that  army, 
before  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  thirty-two  regiments  of  infantry,  ten  regi 
ments  of  cavalry,  fourteen  companies  of  artillery,  and  three  engineer 
companies — about  33,600  men,  exclusive  of  some  6,000  men  with  Zolli- 
coffer.  But  this  estimate  included  the  troops  under  General  Polk. 
General  B.  R.  Johnson,  in  charge  of  the  organization  of  Tennessee 
troops  in  1861,  reported,  on  the  29th  of  November,  that  one  hundred 
and  twenty-seven  companies  had  been  raised  under  the  call  of  30,000 
men,  sixty-five  of  which  were  fully  organized,  and  the  remainder  nearly 
ready.  On  Christmas-day  he  reported  that  12,000  or  15,000  men  had 
gone  forward  under  the  call.  On  the  same  day,  Adjutant-General 
Whitthorne  wrote  him,  estimating  that  fifty  regiments  were  in  the 
field  from  Tennessee.  This  must  have  included  the  troops  in  all  quar 
ters  and  in  every  stage  of  organization  borne  upon  the  rolls,  militia  as 
well  as  volunteers.  On  November  28th,  Governor  Rector,  of  Arkansas, 
reported  five  companies  and  a  battalion  as  organized  and  ready  to  go 
to  the  support  of  McCulloch.  About  the  same  time,  General  Polk 
obtained,  as  a  loan  for  a  few  weeks,  from  General  Lovell,  at  New 
Orleans,  two  regiments,  1,500  strong. 

But  the  organization,  equipment,  and  condition  of  these  troops  were 
not  such  as  at  any  time  to  afford  an  effective  force.  It  was  not  possible 
for  the  Confederate  States  to  improvise  army  establishments.  It  was 
hard  to  clothe  the  soldiers  properly.  Inspection-reports,  official  corre 
spondence,  and  the  memories  of  men,  testify  how  these  poorly-clad  vol 
unteers  bore  the  chilling  nights  of  autumn  and  the  drenching  storms  of 
winter  without  overcoats,  often  with  but  a  single  blanket.  This  poor 
and  insufficient  clothing  added  to  the  ravages  of  camp  epidemics,  es 
pecially  of  the  measles,  which  severely  afflicted  this  army.  Thousands 
of  recruits  were  prostrated  at  once,  often  to  the  extent  of  one-half  of  a 
command,  and  of  those  who  were  furloughed  as  convalescents  a  heavy 
percentage  did  not  return  to  their  regiments.  The  commander  at  Hop- 
kinsville  reported  that  he  had  scarcely  enough  men  well  to  do  guard- 
duty.  Under  such  circumstances,  effective  organization  was  seriously 
embarrassed.  As  it  advanced,  and  discipline  improved,  many  of  the 
hardships  incident  to  raw  levies  were  mitigated,  and  a  better  state  of 
things  ensued  ;  but  some  of  the  difficulties  were  never  removed. 

The  enthusiasm  of  revolution,  which  had  drawn  together  its  fiercest 
and  most  eager  spirits  to  meet  the  first  shock  of  arms,  had  begun  to 


338  EFFORTS   TO   GET  ARMS   AND   TROOPS. 

subside.  The  victory  of  Manassas  had  begotten  a  vainglorious  confi 
dence  ;  and  the  people,  fondly  dreaming  that  no  necessity  existed  for 
extraordinary  effort,  did  not  urge  their  youth  to  the  field.  Those  at  the 
head  of  affairs  could  not  arouse  them  to  the  peril  of  the  situation  and 
the  necessity  for  action.  In  1861  the  South  was  exultant  and  careless. 
Ignorant  of  the  requirements  of  the  hour,  and  undisciplined  by  suffer 
ing,  it  wasted  the  period  of  preparation  and  the  opportunity  for  success. 
Calamity  was  needed  to  stir  it  to  its  depths,  and  to  rouse  that  spirit  of 
resistance  which  proved  equal  to  the  sublimest  efforts. 

A  month  after  Buckner's  advance,  the  army  at  Bowling  Green  num 
bered  only  12,000  men,  4,000  of  whom  were  obtained  not  from  recruits, 
but  from  the  transfer  of  Hardee's  army  to  that  point.  In  his  letter  of 
October  17th  to  the  adjutant-general,  given  hereafter,  General  Johnston 
concludes  thus  : 

I  will  use  all  means  to  increase  my  force,  and  spare  no  exertion  to  render  it 
effective,  at  any  point ;  but  I  cannot  assure  you  that  this  will  be  sufficient,  and, 
if  reinforcements  from  less  endangered  or  less  important  points  can  be  spared, 
I  would  be  glad  to  receive  them. 

General  Johnston  had  from  the  first  felt  the  embarrassments  of  dis 
tant  control  in  many  minor  matters.  It  now  touched  him  in  a  point 
which  he  believed  to  be  vital,  and  which  proved  so.  On  the  25th  of 
October,  more  than  a  month  after  his  requisitions  on  the  Governors,  the 
Secretary  of  War  addressed  him  the  following  letter,  laying  down  as 
the  policy  of  the  Confederate  Government  certain  restrictions  on  enlist 
ment  that  did  as  much  to  obstruct  the  organization  of  this  army  as  any 
other  assignable  cause.  Mr.  Benjamin  presents  his  line  of  action,  and 
the  reasons  for  it,  with  his  accustomed  force  : 

CONFEDERATE  STATES  OF  AMERICA,  WAR  DEPARTMENT,  I 
EICHMOND,  October25, 1661. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL:  .  .  .  There  is  another  point  connected  with  your  procla 
mation  calling  for  troops,  of  which  I  was  not  aware  at  the  time,  and  winch  I 
fear  is  going  to  give  us  great  embarrassment. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  war  we  have  been  struggling  against  the  enlist 
ment  of  men  for  a  less  period  than  the  war  or  three  years.  "We  were  tolerably 
successful,  although  this  policy  was  strongly  combated  in  some  of  the  States. 
This  struggle  lasted,  however,  only  so  long  as  the  States  had  arms  to  furnish. 
"When  armed  men  were  offered  for  twelve  months,  necessity  forced  their  ac 
ceptance,  for  we  were  deficient  in  arms.  But  the  admirable  ardor  of  our  people 
in  defense  of  their  rights  is  such,  that  now,  when  they  can  no  longer  get  arms 
from  the  Governors  of  States,  they  offer  us  their  services  "for  the  war,"  if  we 
will  arm  them.  I  have  about  10,000  men  now  in  camps  of  instruction  await 
ing  arms,  and  am  daily  adding  to  their  number ;  but  in  Mississippi  and  Ten 
nessee  your  unlucky  offer  to  receive  unarmed  men  for  twelve  months  has 
played  the  deuce  with  our  camps.  I  have  just  heard  from  Hon.  Wiley  P.  Harris, 
a  member  of  the  Congress  from  Mississippi,  that  several  "war"  regiments, 


TWELVE   MONTHS  VOLUNTEERS.  339 

nearly  completed,  have  been  broken  up,  and  the  men  are  tendering  themselves 
for  twelve  months.1 

There  is  this  unfortunate  result  also.  We  are  on  the  eve  of  winter.  These 
men  will  be  in  camp  four  or  five  months,  fed  and  paid  by  us,  transported  at  great 
cost,  provided  with  clothing,  and  then,  when  fairly  able  to  do  us  service,  we 
shall  have  to  muster  them  out,  and  transport  them  back  home  at  great  expense.2 
However,  I  need  not  dilate  to  a  man  of  your  military  knowledge  on  the  vast 
advantage  of  "war"  enlistments  over  those  for  twelve  months. 

Now  our  Treasury  is  sorely  pressed,  and  I  want  to  avoid  the  very  heavy 
drain  that  will  be  caused  by  accumulating  all  these  twelve  months  men,  whose 
term  of  service  may  possibly  expire  without  our  arming  them,  for  we  shall  cer 
tainly  give  arms  on  all  occasions  to  the  "war"  volunteers  in  preference.  Of 
course,  I  want  to  avoid  every  appearance  also  of  running  counter  to.  your  meas 
ures.  It  occurs  to  me,  therefore,  that  all  further  embarrassments  will  be  best 
avoided  by  some  proclamation  from  yourself,  in  which  you  could  announce  that 
you  were  now  satisfied  that  the  people  of  Kentucky  were  prepared  to  take  up 
arms  in  defense  of  their  liberties  in  much  greater  numbers  than  you  had  antici 
pated,  and  that  it  was  no  longer  necessary  to  appeal  to  her  sister  States  of  the 
South,  etc.,  etc.  I  beg  you  will  act  promptly  in  this  or  some  other  manner, 
as  shall  seem  to  you  best,  but  to  get  rid  of  the  twelve  months  unarmed  men,  and 
I  will  engage  to  furnish  you  as  many  for  the  war  as  you  can  arm.  It  is  not  men 
we  lack,  but  muskets.  In  the  mean  time  I  inclose  you  a  copy  of  a  circular  let 
ter  prepared  by  me,  which  will  put  you  in  possession  of  our  policy  about  accept 
ing  troops,  etc.,  so  that  we  may  preserve  uniformity  and  regularity  in  all  our 
movements.  I  am,  with  great  regard,  yours  truty, 

J.  P.  BEXJAHIX. 

General  A,  S.  JOHNSTON,  Bowling  Green,  Kentucky. 

The  circular  accompanying  this  letter  states : 

1.  No  unarmed  troops  can  be  accepted  for  a  less  period  than  during  the  war. 

2.  Unarmed  troops  (infantry)  offered  for  the  war  are  accepted  by  companies, 
battalions,  or  regiments,  and  when  mustered  into  service  are  ordered  into  camp 
of  instruction  until  equipped  for  the  field. 

General  Johnston,  on  November  2d,  issued  orders  to  all  mustering- 
officers,  and  wrote  to  the  Governors,  directing  them  to  disband  the  un 
armed  twelve  months  volunteers,  and  informed  the  Secretary  of  his 
action.  But,  on  the  5th,  he  wrote  to  him  to  say  he  would  suspend  the 
order  for  fifteen  days.  This  was  in  consequence  of  Governor  Harris's 
strong  hope  of  arming  these  troops. 

1  The  writer  is  confident  that  Mr.  Harris  was  in  error.  Mississippi  is  the  only  State 
to  which  it  could  possibly  apply ;  and  in  all  General  Johnston's  voluminous  correspond 
ence  the  only  case  of  the  sort  is  a  petition  of  some  officers  there  for  time  to  arm  one  bat 
talion,  on  the  ground  that  they  would  probably  have  been  able  to  enlist  their  men  for  the 
war,  but  for  the  permission  to  enlist  for  twelve  months.  As  the  object  was  to  raise  men 
promptly,  the  fact  that  volunteers  preferred  the  twelve  months  term  made  rapid  enlist 
ment  easier  under  it,  and  hence  it  was  injudicious  to  prohibit  it. 

!  The  secretary  ignores  the  necessity  of  drill,  discipline,  and  service,  which  will  be 
alluded  to  in  General  Johnston's  letter  of  January  12th  (p.  347). 


340  EFFORTS  TO   GET  ARMS  AND   TROOPS. 

Colonel  Munford,  in  his  historical  address  already  mentioned,  sums 
up  the  consequences  of  Mr.  Benjamin's  order  as  follows  : 

General  Johnston  believed  the  war  would  be  protracted,  and  wished  to  call 
out  troops  to  serve  during  the  war.  He  was  advised,  however,  by  leading  men 
with  whom  he  consulted,  not  to  call  for  war-men  ;  that  the  enemy  had  already  a 
considerable  army  in  the  field  in  his  immediate  front,  and  were  in  such  a  state  of 
forwardness  with  their  preparations  that  it  was  all-important  he  should  lose  not 
a  moment  in  getting  troops ;  that  to  volunteer  for  twelve  months  was  a  habit 
familiar  to  the  popular  mind  ;  that  most  of  these  men  would  reeulist  if  needed  ; 
and  that  his  most  successful  course  would  be  to  follow  what  seemed  the  estab 
lished  practice.  .  .  . 

The  Governors  of  the  three  States  promptly  responded  to  the  call,  camps  were 
established,  and  volunteering  began.  It  progressed,  however,  much  more  slowly 
than  was  anticipated.  It  must  be  confessed  that,  after  the  first  spasm  of  excite 
ment  upon  the  breaking  out  of  the  war,  the  popular  ardor  seemed  to  cool  down. 
This  fact  was  so  clear,  that  General  Johnston  one  day  said  to  me:  "I  am  dis 
appointed  in  the  state  of  public  sentiment  in  the  South.  Our  people  seem  to 
have  suffered  from  a  violent  political  fever,  which  has  left  them  exhausted. 
They  are  not  up  to  the  revolutionary  point."  I  replied,  "  The  logic  of  your  re 
mark,  general,  is  that  you  doubt  our  success?  "  He  looked  at  me  gravely  for  a 
moment,  and  said,  "If  the  South  wishes  to  ~be  free,  she  can  le  free" 

Just  at  this  juncture  (the  middle  of  November)  an  order  was  received  from 
the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Benjamin,  notifying  General  Johnston  that  no  more 
twelve  months  volunteers  would  be  armed  by  the  Confederate  Government,  or 
mustered  into  service,  and  that  he  must  communicate  this  information  to  the 
Governors  of  Tennessee,  Mississippi,  and  Arkansas,  that  they  might  disband 
such  volunteers  of  that  description  as  were  then  in  camps.  He  obeyed  the 
order  at  once,  though,  for  obvious  reasons,  he  deeply  regretted  the  necessity. 
In  Arkansas  and  Mississippi  the  camps  were  at  once  broken  up ;  but  Governor 
Harris,  of  Tennessee,  refused  to  comply,  saying:  "  Not  a  man  shall  be  released. 
If  the  Confederate  Government  has  no  use  for  them,  I  know  Tennessee  will 
soon  need  every  one  of  them,  and  not  a  camp  shall  be  broken  up."  He  also, 
through  his  adjutant-general,  Whitthorne,  addressed  an  energetic  protest  to 
the  Government  against  the  enforcement  of  the  order. 

Many  ill  effects  were  produced  by  it.  It  not  only  extinguished  General 
Johnston's  hopes  of  being  able  to  assume  the  offensive,  or  of  even  successfully 
maintaining  the  line  of  defense  he  'had  chosen,  but  lulled  the  country  into  a 
false  sense  of  security  at  a  time  when  it  should  have  been  roused  as  with  a  trum 
pet.  It  also  caused  it  to  be  bruited  abroad,  and  generally  believed,  that  Gen 
eral  Johnston  had  all  the  troops  he  wanted.  It  went  from  lip  to  lip,  "  He  has 
notified  the  Governors  that  he  will  receive  no  more  men." 

General  Johnston,  as  an  old  soldier,  as  a  regular  officer,  was  fully 
aware  of  the  disadvantages  of  accepting  twelve  months  volunteers. 
In  his  requisition  he  had  said  : 

I  prefer  volunteers  for  the  war,  as  securing  better  disciplined,  more  skilled, 
and  more  effective  forces.  But  dispatch,  now,  is  of  the  first  importance ;  and, 
therefore,  companies,  battalions,  and  regiments,  offering  for  twelve  months  will 
be  at  once  received. 


DISTANT  CONTROL.  341 

It  was  a  choice  of  evils.  There  was  a  wide-spread  prejudice  against 
an  indefinite  term  of  service.  Thousands  would  enlist  for  twelve 
months  where  hundreds  only  would  enlist  for  the  war.  But,  having 
once  entered  the  service,  these  same  volunteers  were  retained  in  it, 
some  by  reenlistment  for  the  war  at  the  end  of  their  term,  the  others 
by  force  of  the  conscript  act. 

Even  if  General  Johnston  had  made  a  mistake,  it  was  one  sanc 
tioned  by  the  practice  and  precedents  of  every  State,  and  of  every  army 
in  the  field,  and  should  have  been  overlooked  by  his  superiors.  The 
enforcement  of  the  order  annulled  all  of  his  arrangements  for  enlist 
ment,  unsettled  the  views  of  recruits,  and  delayed,  and,  it  may  even 
be  said,  prevented  the  organization  of  an  army  adequate  to  the  emer 
gency.  General  Johnston's  hope  lay  in  the  rapid  assemblage  of  a 
large  armv.  The  Administration  hesitated  at  the  expense  of  the  force 
demanded,  and  at  the  difficulties  of  armament.  It  still  relied  on  the 
achievement  of  independence  through  diplomacy.  General  Johnston 
trusted  to  the  diplomacy  of  the  sword  alone. 

No  censure  is  implied  in  these  remarks  on  the  Secretary  of  War, 
much  less  on  the  President.  No  man,  no  cabinet  of  councilors,  is  in 
fallible.  Differences  of  opinion  exist  among  the  wisest.  In  this  case, 
they  were  inevitable  from  the  different  standpoints  of  the  parties. 
The  writer  can  bear  testimony  to  the  zeal,  patriotism,  and  versatile  tal 
ents,  of  Mr.  Benjamin.  Mr.  Davis's  cordial  affection  and  confidence 
were  too  often  and  too  clearly  demonstrated  for  a  doubt  to  rest  upon 
the  loyalty  of  his  friendship  to  General  Johnston.  Nevertheless,  both 
the  importance  and  the  danger  of  the  situation  in  Tennessee  were  under 
estimated  by  the  Confederate  Government.  The  extreme  Southern 
States  entered  on  the  war  under  the  idea  that,  as  the  right  of  peaceable 
secession  was  theirs,  no  serious  attempt  at  conquest  would-be  made, 
and  its  political  leaders  adhered  to  this  opinion  till  the  vastness  of  the 
actual  war  dispelled  the  illusion.  Mr.  Davis,  indeed,  better  foresaw  the 
magnitude  of  the  contest,  and  had  predicted  and  endeavored  to  prepare 
for  a  long  and  great  war  ;  but  at  this  time  he  was  rather  the  chairman 
of  a  junta  modeled  for  counsel  instead  of  action,  than  the  real  ruler  of 
the  country.  His  marked  individuality  gradually  asserted  itself,  but 
when  he  became  permanent  President  it  was  too  late.  Hence  we  find 
the  preparations  for  defense  in  1861  by  no  means  equal  to  the  ability 
or  opportunities  of  the  South. 

But,  apart  from  these  general  considerations,  it  was  natural  for  the 
Administration  to  regard  the  defense  of  Tennessee  as  of  secondary 
importance.  The  political  reasons  for  holding  the  capital,  the  early 
pressure  upon  that  point,  and  the  great  host  marshaling  under  McClel- 
lan  at  Washington,  induced  the  Government  to  hazard  every  other 
interest  for  the  protection  of  Richmond.  The  Gulf  States  would 


342  EFFORTS  TO   GET  ARMS  AXD   TROOPS. 

scarcely  consider  any  other  danger  than  that  to  their  sea-coast,  and  this 
influence  was  so  powerful  at  Richmond  that  troops  were  left  in  them 
to  defend  lines  of  no  general  importance.  In  a  parliamentary  and  con 
federated  government  it  is  almost  impossible  to  ignore  local  interests 
for  the  sake  of  the  general  welfare,  even  when  all  is  at  stake.  If  the 
President  had  left  bare  the  coast  to  concentrate  in  Tennessee,  he  would 
have  encountered  the  opposition  of  the  State  governments,  alienation 
of  sympathy  in  the  exposed  districts,  and  the  hostility  of  Congress. 
It  was  a  difficult  problem.  The  Government  had  to  conduct  a  great 
war  and  a  political  campaign  at  the  same  time.  It  was  the  error  of 
the  Administration  not  to  have  perceived  that  the  defense  of  Tennes 
see  was  vital,  and  that  it  was  in  more  immediate  peril  even  than  Vir 
ginia — that  a  stab  in  the  back  is  as  fatal  as  one  in  the  breast.  Still,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  Government  was  in  great  difficulties,  and 
that  the  primary  cause  of  want  of  troops  was  the  apathy  of  the  South 
ern  people. 

It  is  no  more  than  just  to  Mr.  Benjamin  to  say  that  his  letters  to 
General  Johnston  convey  the  constant  assurance  of  cooperation  to  the 
extent  of  his  means  ;  and,  with  his  sanguine  temper,  the  danger  not 
being  under  his  direct  observation,  he  naturally  expected  these  to  be 
equal  to  the  occasion  when  it  should  arise.  Again,  the  fearful  odds 
against  the  Confederacy  required  that  heavy  risks  should  be  taken 
somewhere,  and  it  was  a  matter  of  judgment,  and  to  some  extent  of 
chance,  where  these  could  be  best  assumed. 

In  a  letter  to  Mr.  Benjamin,  November  loth,  in  allusion  to  these 
matters,  General  Johnston  says  : 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  reception  of  your  telegram  of  this 
date,  and  to  express  the  gratification  which  the  announcement  of  soon  being 
provided  with  a  few  thousand  Enfield  rifles  affords  me.1 

I  shall  endeavor,  as  far  as  practicable,  in  the  urgency  for  immediate  arma 
ment,  to  give  those  arms  into  the  hands  of  the  troops  for  the  war,  who  are 
now  in  service  and  not  efficiently  armed,  and  then  distribute  the  remainder 
among  the  volunteers  for  shorter  periods. 

I  have  not  been  able  yet  to  ascertain  how  many  men  have  joined  the  differ 
ent  rendezvous  under  the  call  upon  the  Governor  of  Tennessee;  so  far  as 
heard  from,  I  believe,  not  a  large  fraction  of  the  number  called,  and  very  poorly 
armed.  Under  the  belief  that  by  proper  exertions  many  of  them  might  be 
furnished  with  arms,  and  at  the  request  of  the  Governor,  I  suspended  my  order 
for  mustering  out  the  unarmed  men,  for  fifteen  days,  in  Tennessee.  The  call 
upon  Mississippi  not  being  approved,  the  order  for  the  discharge  of  the  unarmed 
there  was  not  suspended ;  except  for  those  at  the  rendezvous,  I  shall  further 
extend  the  time  to  give  the  opportunity  of  arming  them  if  possible. 

1  Thirty-six  hundred  and  fifty  rifles  and  112,000  pounds  of  ammunition  were  soon  after 
received. 


CALL  FOR  MILITIA. 

But  this  condition  of  affairs  could  not  continue.  The  military  press 
ure  became  so  great,  and  an  increase  of  force  so  urgent,  that  further 
delay  was  impossible.  All  the  information  received,  and  all  other  in 
dications,  pointed  to  a  speedy  advance  in  force  by  the  enemy.  General 
Johnston  determined,  therefore,  to  attempt  a  levy  en  masse  in  his  de 
partment,  by  a  method  always  popular  in  those  States — subject,  how 
ever,  to  the  condition  prescribed  by  Mr.  Benjamin's  order  in  regard  to 
arms.  Accordingly,  on  November  19th,  he  made  a  requisition  on  Gov 
ernor  Harris : 

To  call  forth  every  loyal  soldier  of  the  militia  into  whose  hands  arms  can 
be  placed,  or  to  provide  a  volunteer  force  large  enough  to  use  all  the  arms  that 
can  be  procured.  A  volunteer  force  is  more  desirable,  if  it  can  be  raised  as 
promptly  as  the  militia,  as  more  economical  and  producing  less  inconvenience 
to  the  citizen  ;  but  now  time  is  of  the  first  importance,  that  I  may  cover  the 
homes  of  your  citizens,  and  save  them  from  the  sufferings  always  attending  an 
invasion. 

The  same  call  was  made  on  the  Governors  of  Alabama  and  Missis 
sippi. 

General  Johnston  requested  also  that  the  troops  of  North  Alabama, 
and  slave-laborers  recruited  in  the  same  region,  should  be  sent  forward 
to  Fort  Henry,  on  the  Tennessee  River  ;  thus  indicating,  as  clearly  as  it 
was  possible,  that  it  was  to  guard  its  own  gate  that  the  military  force 
of  the  State  was  drawn  upon. 

On  the  29th  of  November,  General  Johnston  says  £o  the  secretary : 

We  are  making  every  possible  effort  to  meet  the  forces  the  enemy  will  soon 
array  against  us,  both  on  this  line  and  at  Columbus.  Had  the  exigency  for  my 
call  for  50,000  men  in  September  been  better  comprehended  and  responded  to, 
our  preparations  for  this  great  emergency  would  now  be  complete. 

At  the  close  of  an  important  letter,  written  to  the  secretary  on 
Christmas-day,  General  Johnston  uses  the  following  language  : 

Efforts  have  been  incessantly  made  by  me  for  the  last  four  months  to  aug 
ment  my  force  in  the  different  army  corps  to  an  adequate  degree  of  strength  ; 
but,  while  the  Governors  of  States  have  seconded  my  appeals,  the  response  has 
been  feeble,  perhaps  because  the  people  did  not  feel  or  understand  the  great 
exigency  that  exists. 

I  have  again  to-day  urged  most  earnestly  the  Governors  of  Mississippi  and 
Tennessee  to  send  me  reinforcements ;  for  a  company  now  is  worth  a  regiment 
next  year;  and  if  our  force  can  be  increased  to  one-half  that  of  the  enemy,  the 
frontier  of  Tennessee  will  be  safe,  and  shall  be  successfully  defended  here. 

In  conclusion,  I  would  respectfully  request  that  the  Government  will  ear 
nestly  and  zealously  aid  me  in  my  efforts  to  procure  additional  reinforcements, 
by  communications  addressed  to  the  Governors  of  Mississippi,  Tennessee,  and 
elsewhere  ;  and  that  every  influence  should  be  brought  to  bear  to  convince  them 
and  their  gallant  people  that  a  decisive  battle  must  probably  be  fought  here  for 


344  EFFORTS  TO   GET  ARMS  AND   TROOPS. 

the  freedom  of  the  South,  and  that  every  man  sent  forward  here  is  of  impor 
tance  to  the  Confederacy. 

With  great  respect,  your  ohedient  servant, 

(Signed)  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  General  C.  8.  A. 

General  Johnston  did  not  permit  the  Executives  of  the  Southern 
States  to  remain  ignorant  of  his  weakness  and  of  the  vast  interests 
imperiled  by  a  tardy  or  inadequate  response  to  his  demands.  He 
made  known  to  them  the  strength  of  the  enemy,  his  own  weakness, 
and  the  scope  of  his  designs,  with  unreserved  frankness.  Under  the 
pressure  of  distress,  he  was  obliged  to  abandon  that  silence  which  is  so 
important  an  element  of  military  success,  and  disclose  his  entire  situa 
tion  in  many  quarters.  It  is  proper  to  say,  however,  that  no  indis 
cretion  enabled  the  enemy  to  profit  by  this. 

The  following  is  his  letter  to  the  Governor  of  Mississippi  : 

HEADQUARTERS,  "WESTERN  DEPARTMENT,         > 
BOWLING  GREEN,  KENTUCKY,  December  24, 1861.  j 

SIR:  On  assuming  command  of  this  department  it  was  my  chief  object  to 
collect  a  sufficient  force  to  shield  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi  from  the  enemy, 
and  assure  its  safety.  Calls 'were  made  hy  me  upon  the  Governor  of  Mississippi 
and  other  States  of  the  Confederacy  for  troops;  but,  notwithstanding  the  patri 
otic  efforts  of  the  Governors,  the  response  has  not  been  such  as  the  emergency 
demands ;  and,  in  consequence,  there  is  not  now  a  force  at  my  disposition  equal 
to  the  emergency  of  my  situation. 

It  was  apprehended  by  me  that  the  enemy  would  attempt  to  assail  the  South, 
not  only  by  boats  and  troops  moving  down  the  river,  to  be  assembled  during  the 
fall  and  winter,  but  by  columns  inarching  inland  threatening  Tennessee,  by  en 
deavoring  to  turn  the  defenses  at  Columbus.  Further  observation  confirms  me  in 
this  opinion  ;  but  I  think  the  means  employed  for  the  defense  of  the  river  will 
probably  render  it  comparatively  secure.  The  enemy  will  energetically  pusli 
toward  Nashville  the  heavy  masses  of  troops  now  assembled  between  Louisville 
and  this  place.  The  general  position  of  Bowling  Green  is  good  and  commanding ; 
but  the  peculiar  topography  of  the  place,  and  the  length  of  the  line  of  the  Barren 
Elver  as  a  line  of  defense,  though  strong,  require  a  large  force  to  defend  it. 
There  is  no  equally  defensible  position  as  this  place,  nor  line  of  defense  as  the 
Barren  Eiver,  between  the  Barren  and  the  Cumberland  at  Nashville ;  BO  that 
this  place  cannot  be  abandoned  without  exposing  Tennessee,  and  giving  vastly 
the  vantage-ground  to  the  enemy.  It  is  manifest  that  the  Northern  generals 
appreciate  this ;  and,  by  withdrawing  their  forces  from  Western  Virginia  and 
East  Kentucky,  they  have  managed  to  add  them  to  the  new  levies  from  Ohio, 
Indiana,  and  Illinois,  and  to  concentrate  a  force  in  front  of  me  variously  es 
timated  at  from  60,000  to  100,000  men,  and  which,  I  believe,  will  number 
75,000.  To  maintain  my  position,  I  have  only  about  17,000  men  in  this  neigh 
borhood.  It  is  impossible  for  me  to  obtain  additions  to  my  strength  from 
Columbus;  the  generals  in  command  in  that  quarter  consider  that  it  would  im 
peril  that  point  to  diminish  their  force,  and  open  Tennessee  to  the  enemy. 

General  Zollicoffer  cannot  join  me,  as  he  guards  the  Cumberland,  and  pre 
vents  the  invasion  and  possible  revolt  of  East  Tennessee.  Notwithstanding 


LETTERS.  345 

these  adverse  circumstances,  relying  upon  the  firm  purpose  that  animates  the 
hearts  of  my  troops  to  maintain  the  cause  of  the  country,  I  will  not  relinquish 
my  position  without  a  battle ;  and  your  Excellency  can  well  conceive  the  mo 
mentous  importance  of  my  situation.  If  troops  are  given  to  me — if  the  people 
can  be  made  to  feel  how  much  suffering  and  calamity  would  be  avoided  by  the 
presence  now  in  my  camp  of  10,000  or  15,000  more  brave  men,  so  that  I  could 
attack  the  enemy,  and  not,  from  a  disparity  of  force,  be  compelled  to  await  it — 
it  seems  to  me  that  the  same  generous  ardor  that  induced  them  to  embark  in 
the  great  struggle  for  our  independence  would  give  me  such  succors  that  vic 
tory  would  be  certain.  I  therefore  ask  that,  for  the  coming  struggle,  every 
man  shall  be  sent  forward.  A  decisive  battle  will  probably  be  fought  on  this 
line ;  and  a  company  on  that  day  will  be  more  than  a  regiment  next  year.  If 
the  enemy  does  not  attack,  the  North  embarrassed  at  home,  menaced  with  war 
by  England,  will  shrink  foiled  from  the  conflict,  and  the  freedom  of  the  South 
will  be  forever  established.  If,  however,  the  battle  of  independence  is  to  be 
fought  here,  the  history  of  Mississippi  and  the  character  of  her  gallant  people 
compel  me  to  believe  that  they  would  be  among  the  first  and  stanchest  to  stand 
by  their  brethren  in  arms. 

I  have  intrusted  this  letter  to  the  care  of  the  Hon.  the  Chief-Justice  of 
your  State,  Judge  Smith,  to  deliver,  with  my  request  to  inform  your  Excellency 
of  all  such  details  as  are  of  importance,  and  to  urge  upon  you  the  necessity  of 
sending  forward  to  this  place  every  armed  man  that  can  be  spared  from  Missis 
sippi  at  the  earliest  moment. 

With  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  General  C.  S.  A. 

His  Excellency  J.  J.  PETTUS,  Governor  of  Mississippi. 

A  letter  to  the  same  purport  was  addressed  to  Governor  Harris, 
with  a  full  recognition  of  "  the  energetic  and  efficient  cooperation  "  he 
had  all  along  received  from  him.  The  following  extract  is  from  Gen. 
eral  Johnston's  letter  of  January  5,  1862,  to  the  secretary  : 

I  desire  to  ask  your  attention  to  the  vast  and  methodized  preparation  of  the 
Northern  Government  to  carry  on  the  war  against  the  Confederacy  with  a  pur 
pose  as  inflexible  as  malignant. 

Their  large  and  well-appointed  army,  only  now  held  back  till  the  highest 
point  of  efficiency  is  attained  by  instruction  and  discipline,  must  make  every 
patriot  contemplate  its  forward  movement  with  apprehension  for  the  safety  of 
the  country,  unless,  awakened  to  the  peril  that  menaces  it,  we  make  a  corre 
sponding  effort  to  meet  their  forces  and  beat  them  back,  by  an  immediate  de 
velopment  and  application  of  all  the  military  resources  of  the  South,  both  of 
material  and  men,  to  that  purpose.  The  rapid  and  energetic  concentration  of 
the  force  of  the  country  to  meet  the  mighty  exigencies  of  the  present  movement 
must  be  brought  to  bear  to  sustain  our  cause,  which  every  one  feels  will  justify 
every  sacrifice  for  its  attainment. 

In  the  great  questions  of  liberty  and  national  existence,  the  magnitude  of 
them  will,  I  hope,  suggest  to  the  wisdom  of  the  representatives  of  the  people 
the  necessity  of  augmenting  the  Executive  authority  sufficiently  to  meet  the 
occasion,  which  now  urgently  calls  for  its  exercise. 

If  necessary,  let  us  convert  our  country  into  one  vast  camp  of  instruction  for 


346  EFFORTS  TO   GET  ARMS  AND   TROOPS. 

the  field,  of  every  man  able  to  bear  arms,  and  fix  our  military  establishment 
upon  a  permanent  basis. 

Whenever  a  people  will  make  the  necessary  sacrifices  to  maintain  their  lib 
erty,  they  need  have  no  fear  of  losing  it. 

On  the  5th  of  January,  General  Johnston  was  reenforced  by  Floyd's 
brigade,  which,  with  Maney's  brigade,  was  sent  him  from  Western  Vir 
ginia.  On  January  9th  he  dispatched  Colonel  Liddell,  of  Louisiana,  of 
General  Hardee's  staff,  in  whom  he  had  great  confidence,  with  a  letter 
of  introduction  to  the  President.  He  says,  "  Colonel  Liddell  is  charged 
with  a  letter  from  me  to  the  Secretary  of  War  on  a  subject  of  vital  im 
portance  to  my  command."  He  also  commends  him  as  thoroughly  and 
confidentially  informed  on  the  condition  of  things  at  headquarters. 
Colonel  Liddell's  mission  was  conducted  with  energy  and  tact,  and  wac 
beneficial.  But  it  was  too  late  ;  one  blow  after  another  was  struck  with 
intelligence  and  vigor  by  the  Northern  commanders,  and  a  series  of 
misfortunes  followed  that  will  be  narrated  in  their  place.  These  two 
letters  were  evidently  written  as  the  last  resort  against  the  impending 
disasters : 

HEADQUARTERS,  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT,  i 
BOWLING  GREEN,  January  8, 1S62.      ) 

SIR  :  The  calls  made  upon  the  Government  from  every  assailable  point  on  our 
frontier  for  additional  force  would  make  me  hesitate  to  add  to  your  embarrass 
ment  by  asking  for  reinforcements,  were  the  gravity  of  the  occasion  less  which 
urges  me  to  press  upon  your  attention  the  effort  about  to  be  made  by  the  Federal 
Government  with  a  large  army  (estimated  on  reliable  data  at  not  less  than  80,000) 
to  invade  the  Confederacy  through  Central  Kentucky  toward  Tennessee.  They 
have  justly  comprehended  that  the  seat  of  vitality  of  the  Confederacy,  if  to  be 
reached  at  all,  is  by  this  route.  It  is  now  palpable  that  all  the  resources  of  that 
Government  will,  if  necessary,  be  employed  to  assure  success  on  this  line.  The  line 
of  the  Barren  affords  the  means  of  a  strong  defense,  but  my  force  (23,000)  is  not 
sufficient  to  enable  me  to  avail  myself  of  it.  I  do  not  ask  that  my  force  shall  be 
made  equal  to  that  of  the  enemy ;  but,  if  possible,  it  should  be  raised  to  50,000  men. 

I  have  hoped  to  be  able  to  raise  an  adequate  force  by  the  aid  of  the  Governors 
of  the  several  States  of  this  department;  but,  notwithstanding  zealous  efforts  on 
their  part,  thus  far  I  have  been  able  to  draw  to  this  place  only  a  force  which, 
when  compared  in  number  to  the  enemy,  must  be  regarded  as  insufficient. 
There  are  three  or  four  regiments  still  to  come  forward  from  Tennessee,  armed 
with  guns  collected  from  the  people,  and  some  others  waiting  for  their  arms. 
These  men  are  reaching  us  too  late  for  instruction;  and,  liable  to  measles,  etc., 
they  are  as  likely  to  be  an  element  of  weakness  as  of  strength. 

If  the  public  service  would  permit,  I  beg  leave  to  suggest  that  a  few  regi 
ments  might  be  detached  from  the  several  armies  in  the  field  and  ordered  here, 
to  be  replaced  by  new  levies.  No  doubt,  the  strongest  attack  the  enemy  is 
capable  of  making  will  be  made  against  this  place ;  we  ought  not,  surely,  to  put 
in  jeopardy  the  result,  by  failing  to  meet  it  with  a  force  sufficient  to  place  suc 
cess  beyond  hazard.  "With  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

(Signed)  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  General  C.  8.  A. 

Hon.  J.  P.  BENJAMIN,  Secretary  of  War. 


LETTERS.  34-7 

The  stringency  with  which  the  Secretary  of  "War  enforced  his  order 
against  twelve  months  volunteers  may  be  inferred  from  the  following 
correspondence  : 

HEADQUARTERS,  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT,  > 
BOWLING  GREEN,  January  12, 1862.     j 

SIP.  :  Adjutant-General  Whitthorne,  of  Tennessee,  has  inclosed  me  a  copy  of 
the  order  issued  by  Acting  Assistant  Adjutant-General  Groner,  directing  that  no 
twelve  months  volunteer  company,  battalion,  or  regiment,  shall  be  mustered 
into  the  Confederate  service,  unless  armed ;  and,  also,  giving  notice  that  General 
Carroll  has  been  directed  to  muster  out  of  service  Colonel  Gillespie's  regiment. 

Believing  as  I  do  that  the  public  interest  requires  that  the  department  over 
which  you  preside  should  fully  comprehend  the  practical  operation  of  this  order, 
I  beg  leave  to  state  the  facts  in  the  midst  of  which  I  have  had  to  discharge  the 
duties  of  a  commander  in  raising  forces  to  repel  the  threatened  invasion. 

Tennessee  is  generally  sparsely  populated.  For  this  reason,  it  is  often  im 
practicable  to  raise  even  whole  companies  in  the  same  neighborhood ;  hence, 
squads  have  sometimes  been  transported  to  some  common  point  to  form  a  com 
pany.  The  people,  too,  are  both  unwilling  and  often  unable  to  subsist  them 
selves  at  their  own  expense,  after  they  have  left  their  homes  as  volunteers,  and 
are  awaiting  organization  and  arms.  Nor  will  volunteers  long  remain  together 
unless  put  under  the  control  of  law ;  this  fact  is  attested  by  every  one  who  has 
commanded  volunteer  forces.  For  these  reasons  it  has  sometimes  been  necessary 
to  transport,  subsist,  and  muster  into  the  service,  volunteers  as  they  present 
themselves.  Neither  the  Confederate  Government  nor  the  State  of  Tennessee 
was  in  possession  of  public  arms  to  put  in  the  hands  of  the  men,  so  as  to  make 
the  arming  and  mustering  coincident.  Indeed,  in  the  great  scarcity  of  public 
arms,  the  Legislature  of  Tennessee  found  it  necessary  to  pass  an  act  by  which 
the  private  arms  in  the  State  could  be  impressed  and  afterward  paid  for.  The 
Governor  of  that  State  and  myself  conferred  together  on  that  subject,  and  both 
concluded  there  was  but  one  mode  by  which  it  was  possible  to  get  the  volun 
teers  and  arm  them ;  and  I  am  happy  to  say  that  both  the  Governor  and  the 
Legislature  of  that  State  have  most  zealously  and  patriotically  cooperated  with 
me.  These  arms  have  been,  and  still  are  being,  gathered  in  from  the  people. 
Those  fit  for  use  are  at  once  put  in  the  hands  of  organized  volunteers,  and  those 
arms  requiring  repairs  have  been,  and  are  being,  repaired  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

While  this  was  going  on,  the  volunteers  were  being  collected  at  the  rendez 
vous,  for  the  purpose  of  being  organized  and  armed.  These  squads,  companies, 
and  battalions,  were  not  brought  together  as  independent  organizations,  but 
with  the  distinct  understanding  and  for  the  express  purpose  of  consolidation, 
organization,  and  arming.  The  Government  thus  secured  their  services.  Oth 
erwise  they  could  not  have  been  procured ;  and  the  time  between  mustering 
in  and  arming  was  profitably  employed  in  giving  the  men  all  practicable  in 
struction  in  their  duties  as  soldiers.  This,  it  will  be  readily  perceived,  was 
quite  as  necessary  to  their  efficiency  in  the  field  as  placing  arms  in  their  hands. 

If  the  mustering  in  of  these  volunteers  had  been  postponed  in  every  instance 
till  arms  were  ready  to  be  placed  in  their  hands,  or  such  regiments  as  had  been 
mustered  in  without  arms  had  been,  on  that  account,  mustered  out  of  service  and 
disbanded,  we  would  to-day  have  been  without  a  force  to  check  the  advance  of 
the  enemy,  and  our  borders  would  have  been  open  to  the  invaders.  In  refer- 


348  EFFORTS  TO   GET  ARMS  AND   TROOPS. 

ence  to  Colonel  Gillespie's  regiment,  it  is  proper  to  state  that  General  Carroll 
had  reported  it  to  me  as  armed,  and  I  had  ordered  it  to  this  place ;  and  it  is 
earnestly  hoped  that  neither  this  nor  any  other  regiment  will  be  disbanded,  for 
the  reason  that  the  men  have  not,  at  the  day  of  mustering,  arms  in  their  hands. 
The  Governor  of  Tennessee  is  using  every  exertion  to  arm  all  the  men  who  vol 
unteer,  and  he  informs  me  that  he  has  every  prospect  of  success. 

In  view,  therefore,  of  these  facts,  and  that  the  enemy  are  immediately  in  my 
front  in  great  numbers,  and  that  we  need  every  man  it  is  possible  to  get,  I  reit 
erate  a  respectful  but  earnest  hope  that  the  order  will  not  be  enforced  by  the 
department.  I  am,  sir,  with  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

(Signed)  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  General  C.  S.  A. 

Hon.  J.  P.  BENJAMIN,  Secretary  of  War. 

It  appearing  in  the  correspondence  that  Colonel  Gillespie's  regiment 
had  been  raised  under  State,  not  Confederate  authority,  the  secretary 
promptly  revoked  his  order  to  disband  it.  His  letter  to  Adjutant- 
General  Whitthorne  concluded  as  follows  : 

Pray  present  this  apology  to  Governor  Harris,  and  tell  him  that,  if  he  knew 
the  incessant  and  ingenious  attempts  to  force  by  indirection  the  acceptance  of 
twelve  months  unarmed  men  against  the  steady  refusal  of  the  department,  he 
would  not  be  surprised  at  any  effort  to  repress  promptly  such  disingenuous 
practices. 

General  Johnston's  letter,  however,  evoked  no  reply  as  to  the  other 
matters  involved.  The  secretary  had  probably  said  in  a  former  letter, 
of  December  22d,  all  that  he  had  to  say  on  the  subject.  These  are  his 
words : 

Zollicoffer  reports  himself  in  almost  undisputed  possession  of  the  banks  of 
the  Cumberland,  from  the  forks  near  Somerset,  all  the  way  down  to  the  Ten 
nessee  line,  and  seems  able  to  guard  your  right  flank,  so  that  your  front  alone 
appears  to  be  seriously  threatened,  and  I  had  hoped  you  had  sufficient  force  in 
your  intrenched  lines  to  defy  almost  any  front  attack. 

I  have  not,  unfortunately,  another  musket  to  send  you.  "We  have  an  im 
mensely  valuable  cargo  of  arms  and  powder  in  Nassau,  blockaded  there  by  a 
Yankee  gunboat,  that  I  am  trying  to  get  out.  But,  if  we  succeed,  it  will  be  too 
late  for  your  present  needs,  and  in  the  interval  we  must  put  our  trust  in  our 
just  cause  and  such  means  as  we  have  in  hand.  We  know  that  whatever  can  be 
done  will  be  done  by  you,  and  rest  content. 

Yours,  etc.,  J.  P.  BENJAMIN,  Secretary  of  War. 

It  seems  evident,  from  the  foregoing  correspondence,  that  General 
Johnston  had  lost  no  opportunity  to  press  upon  the  authorities,  State 
and  Confederate,  the  whole  truth  in  regard  to  his  situation.  He  ex 
hausted  his  legal  powers  in  trying  to  raise  men,  and,  though  he  failed 
in  securing  a  sufficient  force,  his  efforts  were  not  -without  important 
results.  But  for  the  steps  taken  by  him  in  the  fall  of  1861,  it  is  prob 
able  that  many  of  the  battalions  gathered  at  Shiloh  would  not  have 
been  in  time  to  share  in  that  battle. 


SMALL.  RESULTS.  349 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 

BOWLING   GEEEN. 

GENERAL  JOHNSTON'S  command  in  Kentucky  consisted  of  three 
armies  :  Folk's  on  the  left,  at  Columbus  ;  Buckner's  in  the  centre, 
about  Bowling  Green ;  and  Zollicoffer's,  on  the  right,  at  Cumberland 
Ford.  Early  in  October,  Polk  had  some  10,000  men  to  protect  Colum 
bus  from  Grant's  20,000  or  25,000  troops  at  and  near  Cairo.  Buckner's 
force  had  increased  to  6,000,  against  double  that  number  of  adversaries 
under  Sherman ;  and  Zollicoffer's  4,000  men  had  8,000  or  10,000  men 
opposed  to  them  in  Eastern  Kentucky,  under  General  Thomas.  Polk 
had  small  permanent  camps  at  Feliciana  and  Mayfield,  to  guard  his 
flank.  Similar  posts  were  established  at  Fort  Henry  on  the  Tennessee 
River,  and  Fort  Donelson  on  the  Cumberland,  near  the  State  line. 
General  J.  T.  Alcorn  had  two  or  three  regiments,  principally  Missis- 
sippians,  at  Hopkinsville.  These  commands  reported  to  Buckner. 
Colonel  Stanton's  regiment,  and  some  companies,  watched  the  roads 
to  Jamestown  and  Jacksboro,  in  Central  Tennessee,  and  reported  to 
Zollicoffer.  In  Eastern  Kentucky  a  small  force  was  recruiting. 

The  transfer  of  Hardee's  army  from  Arkansas  to  Kentucky  has  al 
ready  been  mentioned.  This  was  not  done  without  exciting  local  jeal 
ousy,  and  drawing  forth  from  Arkansas  politicians  a  vigorous  remon 
strance.  General  Johnston  was  not  indifferent  to  the  military  situation 
west  of  the  Mississippi.  He  was  alive  to  its  importance  in  a  general 
plan  of  operations,  as  was  evinced  in  his  requisition  on  Arkansas  for 
10,000  men  for  McCulloch.  Indeed,  could  he  have  secured  the  Tennes 
see  line,  it  was  his  wish  to  exchange  the  seat  of  war  thence  for  an 
offensive  campaign  in  Missouri.  But  Fortune  denied  him  this  advantage. 

Although  his  military  necessities  compelled  him  to  withdraw  Har- 
dee  from  Arkansas,  General  Johnston  refused  other  applications  for 
transfer  thence  to  Kentucky.  He  was,  at  this  time,  encouraged  to 
hope  something  from  Jeff  Thompson's  activity,  which  promised  fair, 
but  was  soon  after  extinguished  by  defeat.  He  ordered  Thompson, 
September  29th,  to  "  remove  his  forces  to  the  vicinity  of  Farmington, 
on  the  route  to  St.  Louis,  in  order  to  relieve  the  pressure  on  Price  ; 
and  to  keep  the  field  as  long  as  he  was  able  to  do  so  with  safety  to  his 
command." 

General  Johnston  remained  at  Columbus  superintending  its  fortifi 
cations,  and  directing  the  movement  and  organization  of  troops,  until 
October  12th.  Early  in  October  Buckner  advised  him  that  the  enemy 
was  about  to  advance  against  Bowling  Green.  He  replied  :  "  Hold  on 


350 


BOWLING  GREEN. 


Bowling  Green  and  its  Surroundings  —  General  Johnston's  Map. 

to  Bowling  Green.     Make  your  stand  there.    All  the  troops  I  can  raise 
will  be  with  yoti." 

To  the  adjutant-general  he  made  the  following  report  by  telegraph  : 


October  12,  1S61. 

The  troops  here  are  still  actively  engaged  in  preparation  for  the  defense  of 
this  point,  and  I  hope  to  have  the  work  complete  soon.  I  anticipate  no  immedi 
ate  advance  of  the  enemy  on  this  line,  but,  learning  they  are  advancing  in  con 
siderable  force  on  Bowling  Green,  I  have  ordered  thither  the  available  force 
without  weakening  this  point  materially,  and  will  to-night  repair  there  and 
take  command  in  person. 

General  Hardee  has  already  arrived  there,  and  by  to-night  three-fifths  of  his 
command  will  have  arrived,  and  the  whole  of  the  remainder  will  be  en  route  to 
morrow.  Deficiency  of  rolling-stock  did  not  permit  me  to  make  his  movement 
more  compact.  Respectfully, 

A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  General  C.  S.  A. 

General  COOPER,  Adjutant-General,  Eichmond. 

The  following  letter  to  the  adjutant-general  discloses  more  fully 
General  Johnston's  situation  at  this  date  : 

HEADQUARTERS,  WESTERN  DIVISION,        ) 
BOWLING  GEEEN,  KENTWCKY,  October  17,  1861.  ) 

GENEEAL:  I  informed  you  by  telegraph,  on  the  12th,  that,  in  consequence  of 
information  received  from  General  Buckner  of  the  advance  of  the  enemy  in  con 
siderable  force,  I  had  ordered  forward  ah1  my  available  force  to  his  support. 
Hardee's  division  and  Terry's  regiment  have  arrived.  Here,  and  in  advance,  our 
force  may  be  estimated  at  12,000  men.  Correct  returns  cannot  be  obtained 
until  after  a  little  organization.  Two  Tennessee  regiments  (Stanton's  from 


ARMY  AT  BOWLING   GREEN.  351 

Overton  County,  and  one  from  Union  City)  are  yet  to  arrive,  and  may  reach 
this  in  two  or  three  days,  and  give  an  increase  of  about  2,000  men. 

I  cannot  expect  immediately  any  additional  force  under  the  call  of  last 
month  on  the  Governors  of  Tennessee  and  Mississippi.  The  men  will  doubtless 
present  themselves  promptly  at  the  rendezvous,  but  I  cannot  suppose  any  con 
siderable  portion  will  be  armed.  When  I  made  the  call,  I  hoped  that  some 
might  come  armed ;  I  cannot  now  conjecture  how  many  will  do  so. 

The  call  was  made  to  save  time,  and  in  the  hope  that,  by  the  time  they  were 
organized  and  somewhat  instructed,  the  Confederate  Government  would  be  able 
to  arm  them.  As  at  present  informed,  the  best  effort  of  the  enemy  will  be 
made  on  this  line,  threatening  at  the  same  time  the  communications  between 
Tennessee  and  Virginia  covered  by  Zollicoffer,  and  Columbus  from  Cairo  by 
river,  and  Paducah  by  land,  and  maybe  a  serious  attack  on  one  or  the  other ; 
and  for  tjiis  their  command  of  the  Ohio  and  all  the  navigable  waters  of  Ken 
tucky,  and  better  means  of  transportation,  give  them  great  facilities  of  concen 
tration.  As  my  forces  at  neither  this  nor  any  of  the  other  points  threatened 
are  more  than  sufficient  to  meet  the  force  in  front,  I  cannot  weaken  either  until 
the  object  of  the  enemy  is  fully  pronounced. 

You  now  know  the  efforts  I  anticipate  from  the  enemy,  and  the  line  on 
which  the  first  blow  is  expected  to  fall,  and  the  means  adopted  by  me  with  the 
forces  at  my  disposal  to  meet  him. 

I  will  use  all  means  to  increase  my  force,  and  spare  no  exertions  to  render 
it  effective  at  every  point;  but  I  cannot  assure  you  that  ttfis  will  be  suffi 
cient  ;  and,  if  reinforcements  from  less  endangered  or  less  important  points  can 
be  spared,  I  would  be  glad  to  receive  them. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  General  G.  8.  A. 

General  S.  COOPER,  Adjutant  and  Inspector-General,  Eichmond. 

The  Confederate  army  assembled  near  Bowling  Green  numbered,  as 
stated,  12,000  men.  This  included  about  6,000  under  Buckner;  4,000 
under  Hardee,  who  had  left  1,600  behind  him,  half  of  them  sick ;  and 
some  other  reinforcements.  The  strength  of  the  Kentucky  contingent 
had  now  begun  to  define  itself.  General  Johnston  thus  expresses  his 
disappointment  at  the  apathy  of  Kentucky,  in  a  letter  to  the  Secretary 
of  War,  October  22d : 

We  have  received  but  little  accession  to  our  ranks  since  the  Confederate 
forces  crossed  the  line ;  in  fact,  no  such  demonstrations  of  enthusiasm  as  to  jus 
tify  any  movements  not  warranted  by  our  ability  to  maintain  our  own  commu 
nications.  It  is  true  that  I  am  writing  from  a  Union  county,  and  it  is  said  to 
be  different  in  other  counties.  They  appear  to  me  passive,  if  not  apathetic. 
There  are  thousands  of  ardent  friends  of  the  South  in  the  State,  but  there  is 
apparently  among  them  no  concert  of  action.  I  shall,  however,  still  hope  that 
the  love  and  spirit  of  liberty  are  not  yet  extinct  in  Kentucky. 

General  Johnston  now  addressed  himself  to  the  reorganization  of  his 
army,  which  is  given  in  Special  Order  No.  51,  issued  at  Bowling  Green, 
October  28, 1861.    It  is  given  in  full,  as  it  not  only  exhibits  something  of 
24 


352  BOWLING  GREEN. 

the  personnel  of  its  officers,  but  assists  in  a  verification  of  the  strength 
of  the  army,  and  will  elucidate  its  movements  : 

FIRST  DIVISION. 
Major-General  HAEDEE,  commanding. 

Cavalry. 
Adams's  regiment  and  Phifer's  battalion. 

Artillery. 
Swett's,  Twigg's,  Hubbard's,  and  Byrne's  batteries. 

Infantry. 

First  Brigade.— Brigadier-General  Hindman,  commanding. 
Second  Arkansas  Regiment,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bocage. 

"  "  "          Colonel  A.  T.  Hawthorne. 

Arkansas  Battalion,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Marmaduke. 

Second  Brigade. — Colonel  P.  R.  Cleburne,  commanding. 
First  Arkansas  Regiment,  Colonel  Cleburne. 
Fifth        "  "          Colonel  D.  C.  Cross. 

Seventh  Mississippi  Regiment,  Colonel  J.  J.  Thornton. 

Third  Brigade. — Colonel  R.  G.  Shaver,  commanding. 
Seventh  Arkansas  Regiment,  Colonel  Shaver. 
Eighth          "  "          Colonel  W.  R.  Patterson. 

Twenty-fourth  Tennessee  Regiment,  Colonel  R.  D.  Allison. 
Ninth  Arkansas  Regiment,  Colonel  J.  J.  Mason. 

SECOND  DIVISION. 
Brigadier-General  BIJCKNEK,  commanding. 

Cavalry. 

Kentucky  Regiment,  Colonel  B.  H.  Helm. 
Tennessee        "          Major  Cox. 

Artillery. 

Lyon's  and  Porter's  batteries. 

Infantry. 

First  Brigade. — Colonel  Hanson,  commanding. 
Hanson's,  Thompson's,  Trabue's,  Hunt's,  and  Lewis's  Kentucky 
Regiments. 

Second  Brigade. — Colonel  Baldwin,  commanding. 
Fourteenth  Mississippi  Regiment,  Colonel  Baldwin. 
Twenty-sixth  Tennessee        "        Colonel  Lillard. 

Third  Brigade. — Colonel  J.  C.  Brown,  commanding. 
Third  Tennessee  Regiment,  Colonel  Brown. 
Twenty-third  Tennessee  Regiment,  Colonel  Martin. 
Eighteenth  "  u          Colonel  Palmer. 


WILLIAM  JOSEPH  HARDEE.  353 

RESERVE. 

Texas  Regiment  of  Cavalry,  Colonel  B.  F.  Terry. 
Artillery — Harper's  and  Spencer's  batteries. 
Infantry — Tennessee  Regiment,  Colonel  Stanton. 

By  command  of  General  JOHNSTON  : 

W.  "W.  MACKALL,  Assistant  Adjutant- General. 

General  Johnston  assumed  the  chief  command  at  Bowling  Green, 
devolving  the  active  duties  of  the  field  upon  his  two  division-command 
ers.  Buckner  has  already  been  spoken  of.  But,  though  Hardee  has 
been  mentioned  more  than  once,  his  relations  to  General  Johnston  enti 
tle  him  to  fuller  notice.  William  Joseph  Hardee  was  of  a  good  Georgia 
family,  and  was  born  in  1815.  He  was  graduated  at  West  Point  in 
1838,  when  he  was  commissioned  second-lieutenant  in  the  Second  Dra 
goons.  He  also  attended  the  cavalry-school  of  Saumur,  in  France. 
He  served  in  Florida  and  on  the  Plains ;  he  was  with  Taylor  at  Monte 
rey,  and  with  Scott  from  Vera  Cruz  to  the  city  of  Mexico,  and  was  twice 
brevetted  for  "  gallant  and  meritorious  service,"  coming  out  of  the 
Mexican  War  captain  and  brevet  lieutenant-colonel.  In  1855  he  was 
made  major  of  the  Second  Cavalry,  and  in  1856  commandant  of  the 
Corps  of  Cadets  at  West  Point,  where  he  remained  until  1860.  He  was 
best  known  as  the  author  of  the  standard  book  on  military  tactics.  On 
the  secession  of  Georgia,  he  promptly  followed  the  fortunes  of  his  State. 

Hardee  was  first  sent  to  command  in  Mobile  Bay,  but,  in  June,  1861, 
was  promoted  to  brigadier-general,  to  take  command  in  Eastern  Ar 
kansas.  Here  the  diseases  of  camp  and  want  of  cooperation  among 
the  commanders  prevented  any  valuable  achievement.  Under  General 
Johnston,  however,  Hardee  was  with  a  superior  officer,  whom  he  knew, 
under  whom  he  had  served  before,  and  who  esteemed  him  highly.  His 
subsequent  career  is  that  of  the  Army  of  the  West,  and  deserves  a 
biography  from  some  faithful  and  judicious  hand.  The  more  exact,  the 
more  balanced,  the  more  temperate  in  plan  and  tone,  the  better  would 
such  a  work  portray  the  man. 

The  writer's  estimate  of  General  Hardee,  based  upon  both  social 
and  official  intercourse,  is  very  high.  His  personal  appearance  was 
striking.  In  form  he  was  tall  and  sinewy,  and  his  bearing  was  emi 
nently  military.  His  features  were  somewhat  harsh  in  repose,  but  his 
frank  and  genial  smile  lit  them  with  a  most  winning  expression.  He 
was  good-tempered,  friendly,  and  intelligent  in  conversation  with  men, 
and  very  charming  with  women.  His  deference  and  gallantry  were  of 
the  old  school.  His  social  success  belonged  to  his  perfect  poise,  in 
which  were  mingled  frankness,  amiability,  and  tact — qualities  which,  a 
classmate  says,  already  characterized  him  while  a  cadet  at  West  Point. 


354:  BOWLING  GREEN. 

Hardee  was  an  accomplished  soldier.  His  qualities  were  such  as 
command  respect.  He  was  an  excellent  horseman,  an  impressive  figure 
on  the  field.  Though  somewhat  stern  and  exacting  as  a  disciplinarian, 
expecting  full  performance  of  duty,  he  was  reasonable,  and  his  judg 
ment  was  sound.  He  thoroughly  knew  the  business  of  war  in  the  camp 
and  on  the  battle-field.  He  was  a  real  teacher,  disciplinarian,  and 
organizer,  with  the  troops  of  the  West.  While  fond  of  recreation  and 
social  enjoyment,  no  delight  could  tempt  him  from  the  work  of  war. 

He  was  a  perfectly  courageous  man,  cool  and  calculating  in  victory 
or  defeat.  His  idea  was  to  hurt  the  enemy  and  save  his  own  men. 
Not  anxious  to  push  doubtful  points,  he  was  shrewd  to  see  his  own  ad 
vantage,  and  hammered  heavily  on  a  discomfited  foe.  Some  in  the  old 
army  thought  Hardee  ambitious.  If  so,  his  ambition  was  well  regulated. 
He  doubted  his  own  fertility  of  original  suggestion,  and  certainly  did 
not  value  himself  more  highly  than  he  was  valued  by  others.  He  did 
not  wish  independent  command,  and,  when  appointed  as  General  Bragg's 
successor  at  Dalton,  refused  the  honor.  There  was  no  better  lieuten 
ant-general  in  the  Confederate  army,  Stonewall  Jackson  excepted. 

Among  the  subordinates  were  many  meritorious  officers,  and  some 
who  afterward  rose  to  deserved  distinction.  Hindman,  who  commanded 
the  advance,  was  a  man  of  energy,  audacity,  and  restless  ambition. 
He  had  been  a  lawyer  at  Helena,  Arkansas,  and  a  member  of  Congress. 
Cleburne,  who  likewise  practised  law  at  Helena,  was  an  Irishman  by 
birth,  had  served  in  the  British  army,  and  was  a  man  of  broad,  sober, 
noble  nature.  He  died  sword  in  hand  at  the  head  of  his  division  in  the 
assault  on  the  Federal  intrenchments  at  Franklin,  Tennessee.  Mar- 
maduke  was  here  as  a  lieutenant-colonel ;  and  John  C.  Brown  was  a  colo 
nel,  who  since  the  war  has  been  twice  elected  Governor  of  Tennessee 
in  successive  terms,  and  President  of  the  Constitutional  Convention 
which  relieved  the  people  from  reconstruction  disabilities  to  vote  and 
hold  office.  All  of  these  were  subsequently  major-generals.1 

1  The  estimation  in  which  Cleburne  was  held  by  the  soldiers  is  illustrated  in  the  fol 
lowing  anecdote,  told  the  writer  by  General  Randal  L.  Gibson :  When  the  Federal  army 
made  a  stand  at  Franklin,  Tennessee,  Cleburne's  and  Brown's  divisions  were  pushed  for 
ward  on  the  turnpike,  and  captured  the  outer  works  and  part  of  the  second  line  after  a 
desperate  conflict,  in  which  bayonet  and  clubbed  musket  were  freely  used.  The  carnage 
was  terrible.  Twelve  Confederate  general  officers  were  disabled.  General  Gibson,  in 
leading  forward  the  advance  next  morning,  stopped  at  early  dawn  where  the  Confederate 
line  occupied  the  works.  The  ditch  was  full  of  the  Confederate  dead.  Here  he  heard  an 
Arkansas  veteran  relating  to  his  comrades,  in  the  cold  gray  of  the  morning,  the  story  of 
yesterday's  fight.  The  soldier  ended  it  thus :  "  You  see  we  were  on  this  side  of  the  works, 
and  the  enemy  was  on  the  other  side  of  the  works ;  and  we  kept  getting  over,  but  they 
would  reenforce  and  drive  us  out.  And  finally  we  said,  *  Let's  pass  the  word  along  the 
line  to  keep  quiet  till  General  Cleburne  gives  the  word  to  charge,  so  we'll  all  get  over 
together ;  then  we  know  we'll  drive  them.  And  we  waited,  and  we  waited,  and  we  waited. 


ZOLLICOFFER'S  OPERATIONS.  355 

General  Zollicoffer  entered  Kentucky  with  orders  to  fortify  Cumber 
land  Gap,  Cumberland  Ford,  and  the  intervening  passes,  so  as  to  ren 
der  them  tenable  by  the  smallest  practicable  force.  It  was  General 
Johnston's  intention  that  he  should  then  be  moved  to  where  he  could 
act  in  cooperation  with  Buckner.  Zollicoffer  was  deficient  in  facilities 
for  effective  fortification,  and  was  prompted  by  an  ardent  and  enterpris 
ing  temper  to  more  active  operations.  In  the  centre  of  a  hostile  pop 
ulation,  and  of  a  poor,  mountainous  country,  he  was  urged  both  by  the 
want  of  supplies  and  the  necessity  for  vigilance  to  send  out  frequent 
expeditions.  One  of  these  brought  on  the  first  hostile  collision  in  Ken 
tucky. 

General  Zollicoffer  sent  out  Colonel  J.  A.  Battle,  who,  with  about 
800  men,  on  the  17th  of  September,  attacked  and  dispersed  a  carnp 
of  300  Home  Guards  at  Barboursville,  eighteen  miles  distant  from 
the  position  of  the  main  body  of  the  Confederates.  The  Confed 
erates  lost  two  killed  and  three  wounded,  and  reported  the  known 
loss  of  the  enemy  as  twelve  killed  and  two  prisoners.  Having  captured 
twenty  fire-arms,  and  destroyed  "  Camp  Andrew  Johnson,"  they  returned 
to  Cumberland  Ford. 

On  September  26th  an  expedition,  sent  by  Zollicoffer  to  get  salt, 
broke  up  a  large  encampment  at  Laurel  Bridge,  capturing  its  baggage, 
a  few  prisoners,  8,000  rounds  of  ammunition,  and  200  barrels  of  salt. 
Zollicoffer  reported  that  some  plundering  occurred  on  this  expedition, 
which  he  regretted,  and  would  punish.  It  was  alike  his  interest  and 
his  desire  to  conciliate  the  population.  Captain  Bledsoe,  with  a  com 
pany  of  Tennessee  cavalry  stationed  near  Jamestown,  Tennessee,  on 
September  30th,  attacked  and  routed  a  camp  of  Federals  near  Albany, 
Kentucky,  capturing  some  sixty  muskets.  Zollicoffer  was  active  in 
these  minor  operations,  breaking  up  and  capturing  small  bodies  of  Union 
recruits. 

General  Johnston  was  anxious  to  fortify  rapidly  and  formidably  the 
strategic  points  in  his  line,  so  as  to  mobilize  his  troops.  The  strong 
points  about  Cumberland  Gap,  thus  secured,  would  dominate  a  disloyal 
region,  arrest  an  invader,  and  release  an  army  for  service  elsewhere. 
But  Zollicoffer's  enthusiastic  temperament  impelled  him  to  follow  up 
the  small  advantages  he  had  gained  in  the  field,  and  he  obtained  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  permission  to  fight  when  it  seemed  right  to  him,  &  dis 
cretion  not  to  be  withheld  from  the  general  of  a  detached  army  of  obser 
vation. 

As  soon  as  Zollicoffer  received  this  authority,  he  sought  the  enemy. 
Deficient  in  staff,  in  organization,  in  transportation,  and  in  subsistence, 

And  the  boys  kept  crying  for  the  word,  and  they  wondered  why  it  didn't  come.  But, 
when  it  didn't  come,  I  knew  Pat  Cleburne  was  dead ;  for,  if  he  had  been  living,  he  would 
have  given  that  order.'  And,  sure  enough,  he  was  dead,  and  all  his  staff  with  him." 


356  BOWLING  GREEN. 

he  moved  slowly  over  the  mountain-paths  of  the  rugged  and  barren 
"  Wilderness  "  of  Kentucky.  Bad  roads,  broken  wagons,  and  short 
rations,  impeded  his  march  ;  but,  on  the  20th  of  October,  he  found  him 
self  at  Rockcastle  River,  eight  miles  from  the  enemy.  On  that  same 
day,  General  Johnston  wrote  him  that  there  were  probably  4,000  Fed 
erals  at  Rockcastle  Hills,  6,000  at  Dick  Robinson,  and  a  formidable  re 
serve  in  Northern  Kentucky.  But  this  was  too  late,  of  course,  to  reach 
him. 

General  Thomas,  who  had  his  headquarters  at  Dick  Robinson,  had 
been  anxious  to  assume  the  offensive.  His  plan  was  to  penetrate  East 
Tennessee,  cut  the  railroad  communications  east  and  west,  and  raise  the 
Unionists  there  in  revolt.1  It  is  hardly  doubtful  that  all  the  arrange 
ments  for  this  scheme  had  been  made.  Thomas  had  pushed  forward 
his  advance  to  Rockcastle  Hills,  where,  on  notice  of  Zollicoffer's  ap 
proach,  the  commander,  General  Albin  Schoepf,  took  a  strong,  in 
trenched  position,  known  as  "  Wild  Cat,"  with  six  regiments,  number 
ing  from  3,500  to  4,000  men.  Zollicoffer  had  5,500  men,  but  believed 
that  only  two  Federal  regiments  were  at  "  Wild  Cat,"  not  knowing 
that  the  rest  of  the  vanguard  had  been  concentrated  there,  the  whole 
strength  of  which  he  estimated  at  3,300  men.  He  reported  to  General 
Johnston  that  he  "  threw  forward  two  regiments  and  a  battalion  to  feel 
the  enemy."  This  force  assaulted  the  Federal  position  on  the  21st  of 
October,  but,  finding  it  too  strong  to  be  taken,  withdrew  with  the  loss  of 
eleven  killed  and  forty-two  wounded.9  He  took  forty  prisoners  and 
some  arms.  General  Schoepf  reported  his  loss  as  five  killed  and  eleven 
wounded. 

As  this  affair  has  been  much  exaggerated,  the  following  brief  sketch 
from  the  pen  of  Colonel  Albert  S.  Marks  is  here  given.  Colonel  Marks 
was  a  thoughtful  and  gallant  officer,  and  has  since  the  war  attained 
distinction  on  the  bench  of  Tennessee.  He  says  : 

The  hill  which  the  enemy  had  fortified  was  at  the  head  of  a  gorge  about  one- 
fourth  of  a  mile  wide.  This  fortified  hill  commanded  the  road  over  Rockcastle 
Hills.  The  day  before  the  enemy  was  reached  we  found  the  road  approaching 
the  Hills,  miles  away  from  it,  obstructed  by  fallen  trees.  A  pioneer  corps  was 
put  to  work  to  clear  them  away.  The  men  were  not  allowed  to  eat  or  sleep 
until  the  enemy  was  reached  next  morning.  When  as  much  as  a  hundred  yards 
was  cleared  away,  the  brigade  would  be  moved  up,  and  this  process  went  on  the 
whole  night.  When  the  hill  was  reached,  the  road  was  found  utterly  impassable 
with  fallen  timber. 

The  regiment  to  which  I  belonged,  the  Seventeenth  Tennessee  Infantry,  was 
put  in  line  of  battle  to  the  right  of  the  road.  The  advance  was  through  the 
woods.  When  the  hill  was  reached,  it  was  found  that  the  face  of  it  was  a  pre 
cipitous  bluff.  At  the  centre  of  the  regiment  where  my  company  was,  the  hill 

1  Van  Home's  "  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  vol.  i.,  p.  37. 

8  Howison's  "History  of  the  War." — Southern  Literary  Messenger,  1862,  p.  203. 


REPULSE  AT   "WILD  CAT."  357 

was  accessible.  My  company,  with  a  part  of  the  companies  on  the  right  and 
left  of  it,  could  ascend  the  hill.  "We  did  so.  As  soon  as  the  crest  of  the  hill 
was  reached  we  found  the  intrenchments  of  the  enemy  about  sixty  yards  from 
the  crest  with  a  solid  abattis  in  front.  I  pressed  my  company  into  the  abattis. 
The  firing  went  on  for  half  an  hour.  I  had  six  men  killed,  and  over  twenty 
wounded.1  The  balance  of  the  killed  were  out  of  the  fragments  of  the  compa 
nies  with  me.  Their  officers  were  with  me,  and  the  men  would  have  been 
there,  but  our  line  covered  the  whole  assailable  ground.  There  was  no  attempt 
to  support  us.  There  was  no  assault  or  attempt  at  assault  elsewhere.  Indeed,  it 
was  impossible.  I  was  ordered  to  withdraw  my  company,  and  did  so,  and  thus 
ended  the  affair.  We  did  not  have  out  a  skirmisher.  The  hill  could  have  been 
turned  either  way  without  trouble,  and  if  it  had  been  attempted  the  enemy 
would  have  abandoned  the  place. 

The  skirmish  at  "  Wild  Cat "  was  a  misadventure,  the  ill  effects  of 
which  were  not  measured  by  its  magnitude.  The  Confederates  retreated 
to  Cumberland  Ford  depressed,  and  with  loss  of  reputation  in  a  region 
where  prestige  was  everything.  The  Federals,  believing,  or  pretending 
to  believe,  that  they  had  repulsed  Zollicoffer's  whole  army,  took  heart 
and  exulted  in  their  prowess.  Their  projects  of  invasion  were  resumed, 
and  the  angry  and  elated  Unionism  of  East  Tennessee  broke  into  open 
revolt. 

Zollicoffer,  in  accordance  with  orders  from  General  Johnston,  Octo 
ber  28th  and  November  7th,  having  left  about  2,000  men  at  Cumber 
land  Gap,  moved  eastward,  and  finally  took  position  guarding  the 
Jamestown  and  Jacksboro  roads,  in  defense  of  which  line  he  carried  on 
his  subsequent  operations.  From  this  point  he  advanced,  slowly  feel 
ing  his  way,  until  he  established  himself  at  Mill  Spring  on  the  Cumber 
land.  On  November  24th  Major-General  George  B.  Crittenden  assumed 
command  of  this  military  district,  having  been  assigned  thereto  by  the 
War  Department. 

A  general  attack  along  the  whole  Federal  line  was  attempted  early 
in  November,  in  concert  with  an  insurrection  in  East  Tennessee.  Al 
though  the  various  combats  and  enterprises  of  this  movement  are  re 
corded  by  the  Federal  annalists,  their  simultaneous  and  concerted  char 
acter  is  not  alluded  to,  if  it  was  observed,  by  any  of  them.  When  the 
movement  proved  abortive,  neither  General  Grant  nor  General  Sher 
man  felt  it  necessary  to  call  attention  to  that  fact,  nor  to  disclose  their 
purpose  in  it.  Yet  a  simple  narrative  of  the  events  of  the  different  ex 
peditions  made  under  these  commanders  will,  in  time,  character,  and 
relation,  evince  concert,  as  parts  of  a  general  plan. 

Grant's  movement,  beginning  on  November  3d,  by  an  expedition 
from  Cape  Girardeau  into  Missouri,  under  Oglesby,  and  closing  with 
the  battle  of  Belmont,  November  7th,  will  be  related  in  the  next  chap 
ter.  Sherman's  central  army  gave  every  evidence  of  preparation  for  an 
1  About  one-half  the  entire  loss. 


358  BOWLIXG  GREEN. 

advance.  On  the  Cumberland  and  Lower  Green  River  the  gunboats  and 
cavalry  showed  unusual  activity.  On  the  26th  of  October  a  gunboat 
expedition,  under  Major  Phillips,  was  made  against  a  Confederate  re 
cruiting-station,  near  Eddyville,  Kentucky.  Phillips,  with  three  com 
panies  of  the  Ninth  Illinois  Regiment,  surprised  and  broke  up  the  sta 
tion,  where  Captain  Wilcox  had  assembled  about  seventy-five  men, 
capturing,  killing,  or  wounding,  a  third  of  their  number,  with  slight  loss 
to  his  own  command.  On  October  28th  Colonel  Burbridge,  with  300 
men,  crossed  Green  River  at  Woodbury,  and  Colonel  McHenry,  with 
200,  at  Morgantown,  and  engaged  some  small  scouting-parties  in  that 
quarter.  These  were  inconsiderable  skirmishes.  On  Sherman's  right 
flank,  Schoepf  was  .pushed  forward,  by  Thomas,  to  London.  At  the 
same  time  the  Unionists  of  East  Tennessee  burned  the  railroad-bridges 
and  took  up  arms.  But  this  episode  will  be  given  hereafter. 

While  Grant  was  counting  his  losses  on  the  day  after  Belmont, 
another  contest  was  occurring  at  the  other  extremity  of  the  hostile 
lines  in  Kentucky.  Although  the  eastern  part  of  the  State  had  ad 
hered  with  great  unanimity  to  the  Federal  cause,  many  localities  and 
families  were  favorable  to  the  South.  About  1,000  men,  poorly  armed 
and  equipped,  had  enrolled  themselves  as  Confederate  soldiers  at 
Piketon,  near  the  head  of  the  Big  Sandy  River.  Their  commander, 
Colonel  John  S.  Williams,  was  endeavoring  to  supply  and  equip  them 
from  the  resources  of  the  neighborhood.  But  he  was  not  to  be  left 
unmolested.  Brigadier-General  Nelson,  who  had  advanced  to  Preston- 
burg  with  a  Federal  force,  now  pushed  forward,  and  attacked  Williams 
on  the  8th  of  November.  Nelson  had  four  large  regiments,  a  battalion, 
and  two  sections  of  artillery — nearly  4,000  men.  Williams  made  a 
stand  for  time  to  get  off  his  stores,  which  he  did  with  little  loss.  A 
sharp  fight  ensued  ;  and  Williams  finally  fell  back,  having  suffered 
little.  He  admitted  a  loss  of  eleven  killed,  eighteen  wounded,  and 
some  forty  missing.  The  Federal  accounts  are  inconsistent.  One  of 
them  acknowledged  a  loss  of  thirteen  killed  and  thirty-five  wounded. 
Williams  conducted  his  retreat  with  success ;  and  reached  Pound  Gap 
on  the  13th  of  November  with  835  men,  the  rest  having  scattered. 
Here  he  was  met  by  Brigadier-General  Humphrey  Marshall,  who  had 
lately  been  assigned  to  the  command  of  that  district.  Marshall  had 
1,600  men,  500  of  them  unarmed.  With  these  troops  he  took  position 
in  observation,  secure  in  these  mountain  fastnesses,  but  without  power 
for  an  advance. 

It  will  be  observed  that  all  these  events  took  place  in  the  last  days 
of  October  or  early  in  November.  General  (then  Colonel)  John  C. 
Brown  informs  the  writer  that,  at  this  juncture,  he  was  accompanying 
General  Johnston  on  a  reconnaissance,  from  Bowling  Green,  up  the 
Big  Barren  River,  and  through  the  country  toward  Glasgow.  The 


GENERAL   FEDERAL  ADVANCE.  359 

general  was  enjoying  the  recreation  of  the  march,  and  the  pleasures  of 
the  bivouac,  when,  late  one  "night,  while  they  were  sitting  around  the 
camp-fire,  a  telegram  was  handed  him,  advising  him  of  Grant's  move 
ment  upon  Belmont.  After  reading  it  carefully,  he  passed  it  round  to  the 
other  officers,  and  remarked,  "  This  indicates  a  simultaneous  movement 
along  the  whole  line."  He  at  once  ordered  Colonel  Brown  to  take  100 
mounted  men,  before  daylight  the  next  morning,  and  proceed  down  the 
Big  Barren  River  to  Bowling  Green — about  fifty  miles  by  the  meanders 
of  the  river — examine  every  ford  upon  the  river,  and  report  to  him  that 
night  at  Bowling  Green.  Colonel  Brown  said  th.at  he  would  prefer 
not  to  have  more  than  half  a  dozen  men  ;  to  which  General  Johnston 
replied,  "  Well,  as  my  friend  Captain  Jack  Hays  used  to  say,  on  the 
plains  of  Texas,  when  about  leaving  camp  of  a  morning,  looking  at  his 
revolvers — '  Perhaps  I  will  not  need  you  to-day  ;  but,  if  I  do,  I  will  need 
you  damned  badly  ' — so  with  you  and  the  cavalry,  Colonel  Brown ;  you 
may  not  need  them  at  all  ;  but,  if  you  do,  you  will  need  them  quick 
and  very  badly  ;  so  you  had  better  take  them  along  with  you."  Colonel 
Brown  accepted  the  escort,  examined  the  fords,  and  reported  promptly 
at  Bowling  Green  that  night,  whither  General  Johnston  had  preceded 
him  with  all  speed. 

Discerning  the  signs  of  a  general  movement  against  his  lines  be 
fore  it  began,  General  Johnston  took  such  steps  as  were  in  his  power 
to  frustrate  it.  He  knew  that  he  had  a  force  of  20,000  men  opposed 
to  him  on  his  front,1  and  that  he  was  threatened  on  both  flanks ;  but 
he  felt  able  to  repel  a  direct  attack  on  Bowling  Green,  and  considered 
Columbus  secure.  At  Columbus  there  were  some  12,000  effectives,  in 
a  commanding  position,  behind  strong  fortifications,  and  with  sufficient 
heavy  artillery.  Indeed,  not  having  been  properly  informed  of  the 
reductions  in  the  garrison  from  sickness  and  other  causes,  he  estimated 
the  force  there  at  16,000  men,  and  sought  to  strengthen  his  line  where 
most  vulnerable  by  a  detachment  from  it.  For  this  purpose,  he  ordered 
Polk  to  send  Pillow,  with  5,000  men,  to  Clarksville,  where,  with  the 
troops  at  Fort  Donelson  and  Fort  Henry,  he  could  defend  that  section 
from  sudden  irruption.  The  battle  of  Belmont,  however,  intervened, 
delaying  Pillow's  removal  ;  after  which,  on  the  ground  of  an  imperious 
necessity,  all  his  generals  concurring,  Polk  suspended  the  order.  It 
was  represented  to  General  Johnston  that  but  6,000  effectives  would 
be  left  at  Columbus,  confronted  by  25,000  men,  who  were  being  largely 
reenforced  from  Missouri.  In  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  No 
vember  15th,  General  Johnston  thus  explains  his  situation  : 

I  therefore  revoked  my  order.  General  Folk's  force  is  stated  far  below 
what  I  have  estimated  it ;  and,  with  a  knowledge  of  the  case  as  he  presents  it, 

1  Sherman  had  in  all,  including  Thomas,  40,000  men,  fully  organized.  (See  Appendix 
A,  p.  364.) 


360  BOWLING  GREEN. 

I  had  left  bat  the  choice  of  difficulties — the  great  probability  of  defeat  at  Colum 
bus  or  a  successful  advance  of  the  enemy  on  my  left.1  I  have  risked  the  latter. 
The  first  would  be  a  great  misfortune,  scarcely  reparable  for  a  long  time ;  the 
latter  may  be  prevented.  I  have,  however,  at  Nolin,  on  my  front,  about 
twenty-seven  regiments,  and  a  large  auxiliary  force  at  Columbia,  on  my  right. 

The  force  on  my  front  will  await  the  success  of  movements  on  my  left.  My 
force  must  soon  be  put  in  motion.  I  am  making  every  preparation  with  that 
object.  It  has  taken  much  time  to  provide  transportation  (which  is  nearly 
accomplished),  and  all  else,  for  a  force  suddenly  raised.  A  portion  of  my  force 
is  well  armed  and  instructed ;  the  remainder  badly  armed,  but  improving  in  all 
other  respects.  A  good  spirit  prevails  throughout. 

General  Zollicoffer  is  taking  measures  to  suppress  the  uprising  of  the  dis 
affected  in  Rhea  and  Hamilton  Counties,  Tennessee ;  and,  if  it  is  true  that  Williams 
has  retreated  through  Pound  Gap,  Marshall  could  easily  suppress  the  insurrection 
in  Carter,  Johnson,  and  other  counties,  and  then  unite  his  force  with  Zollicoffer. 
The  force  under  Zollicoffer,  as  everywhere  else  on  this  line,  should  be  reenforced ; 
but  this  you  know  without  my  suggestion.  The  effective  force  here  is  12,500. 

It  was  not  without  cause  that  General  Johnston  regarded  the  left 
centre  of  his  line  with  apprehension.  A  full  narrative  of  the  defenses 
of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  Rivers  will  be  given  in  another 
chapter.  Here,  it  is  only  necessary  to  state  that  there  were  garrisons 
at  the  forts  and  obstructions  in  the  rivers,  thought  to  be  sufficient  to 
prevent  the  passage  of  gunboats.  But  the  country  in  front,  between 
the  Cumberland  and  Green  Rivers,  was  a  debatable  ground,  in  which 
the  Federals  had  recruited  more  soldiers  than  the  Southern  army.  It 
was  continually  menaced  by  these  native  corps,  and  also  by  gunboat 
expeditions  up  these  rivers  from  the  Ohio.  Small  commands  were 
kept  at  Russell ville  and  Hopkins ville  ;  but  these,  as  well  as  the  gar 
risons  at  the  forts,  suffered  extremely  from  disease. 

Brigadier-General  J.  T.  Alcorn,  who  was  stationed  at  Hopkinsville 
with  two  or  three  regiments,  to  protect  that  region  from  the  approach 
and  depredations  of  the  enemy,  th'us  describes  his  ill  success,  and  the 
causes  for  it,  in  one  of  his  reports  : 

My  command,  after  furnishing  nurses  for  the  sick,  is  reduced  to  a  battalion. 
It  appears  that  every  man  in  my  camp  will  directly  be  down  with  the  measles. 
The  thought  of  a  movement  in  my  present  condition  is  idle.  I  am  not  more 
than  able  to  patrol  the  town.  In  relation  to  the  movements  of  the  enemy  at 
Eddyville,  I  have  reliable  information.  The  gunboat  steamed  up  to  the  town, 
and  steamed  back  again.  A  company  or  squad  of  twenty-five  cavalry,  from 
Smithland,  marched  within  four  miles  of  Eddyville,  took  all  the  double-barreled 
guns  they  could  find,  robbed  some  women  of  their  jewelry,  seized  several  horses 
and  mules,  destroyed  some  property,  insulted  some  women,  captured  one  citizen 
as  prisoner,  and  returned  to  Smithland. 

He  reports  at  Calhoun,  Owensboro,  and  Henderson,  about  3,000 
Federal  troops,  "  who  shift  from  one  post  to  another,  and  wben  mov- 

1  At  Donelson  or  Henry. 


WESTERN  DISTRICT.  361 

ing  steal  everything  that  they  meet,  and  take  everything  valuable  that 
they  can  carry."  This  is  not  an  unfair  sample  of  the  reported  conduct 
of  the  Federal  troops  on  this  line.  Brigadier-General  Tilghman,  who 
succeeded  Alcorn  in  command  at  Hopkinsville,  reported,  November  2d, 
that  he  was  threatened  by  a  heavy  body  of  the  enemy.  He  adds  that 
he  had  750  sick,  and  only  285  for  duty.  To  meet  a  scouting-party  of 
the  enemy  he  raked  up  a  battalion  of  400  men,  but  the  surgeon  de 
clared  that  only  one-half  of  them  were  fit  for  duty.  Tilghman  de 
scribed  them  as  "  the  poorest  clad,  shod,  and  armed  body  of  men  I  ever 
saw,  but  full  of  enthusiasm."  Four  days  later,  Gregg  reached  him, 
under  orders  from  General  Johnston,  with  749  Texans,  after  marches 
of  almost  unexampled  speed  from  their  homes.  Forrest,  too,  passed 
to  the  front  on  a  scout. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  western  district  of  his  de 
partment  when  General  Johnston  wrote,  as  above,  November  15th.  He 
could  trust  for  protection  against  marauders  to  this  force  and  the  troops 
at  the  forts.  They  would  of  course  be  inadequate  to  meet  a  column, 
bat  that  risk  he  had  to  take.  He  depended  a  good  deal  on  the  char 
acter  of  the  country  between  Columbus  and  the  Cumberland  River  for 
its  defense.  It  was  generally  covered  by  heavy  forest  and  under 
growth,  and  intersected  by  numerous  roads,  and  thus  capable  of  defense 
by  a  force  inferior  to  the  invader. 

General  Johnston,  desiring  to  improve  the  organization  of  the 
army,  had  directed  its  withdrawal  from  its  advanced  positions  near 
Green  River  ;  but,  upon  consideration,  he  countermanded  this  order, 
for  the  reasons  given  in  the  following  letter,  which  also  indicates  his 
policy  at  the  time  : 

HEADQTTARTEBS,  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT,       | 
BOWLING  GBEHN,  KENTUCKY,  October  21, 1861.  > 

SIR  :  I  am  instructed  by  General  Johnston  to  say  that  his  order  to  you  was 
based  on  the  great  deficiency  in,  and  the  great  necessity  for,  organization  of 
this  army  corps.  But,  on  further  reflection,  this  must  yield  to  other  considera 
tions,  and  be  effected  by  other  means. 

The  backward  movement  from  Green  River  might,  and  probably  would,  be 
interpreted  by  the  enemy  into  a  retreat,  and,  if  it  did  not  encourage  them  to  a 
move  in  rapid  advance,  would  discourage  our  friends  and  elate  our  enemies  in 
Kentucky.  He  therefore  arrests  it.  He  desires  you  to  maintain  yourself  in 
observation  of  Green  River,  disposing  of  the  forces  now  with  you  so  as,  in  your 
judgment,  will  best  accomplish  this,  and  impress  the  enemy  with  an  expectation 
of  an  advance  by  us.  Secure  yourself  at  the  same  time  from  his  enterprise  on 
your  rear  from  the  right  and  left. 

Let  that  portion  of  your  command  which,  for  want  of  teams,  depends  for 
transportation  on  the  railroad  be  posted  at  Dripping  Springs. 
I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

W.  W.  MACKALL,  A.  A.  General. 

Brigadier-General  W.  J.  HAJJDKE,  commanding,  etc. 


362  BOWLING  GEEEN. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  execution  of  these  orders  was  effective  in 
arresting  the  combined  movement  projected  against  him  at  this  time. 

General  Johnston's  policy  from  the  beginning  had  been  to  keep  up 
such  an  aspect  of  menace  as  would  deter  the  enemy  from  an  advance. 
A  crushing  blow  delivered  by  Sherman,  on  any  part  of  his  line,  would 
discover  his  weakness  ;  and  his  wish  was  to  parry,  rather  than  to  meet, 
such  a  blow.  It  could  only  be  averted  by  inspiring  the  enemy  with  an 
exaggerated  notion  of  the  Confederate  strength,  and  with  such  expecta 
tion  of  immediate  attack  as  would  put  him  on  the  defensive.  Having 
no  sufficient  force  to  make  formidable  demonstrations,  the  same  result 
was  attained  by  frequent  rapid  expeditions  through  a  wooded  and 
sparsely-settled  country,  spreading  rumors  that  had  their  effect  at  the 
Federal  headquarters. 

These  enterprises  were  too  numerous  and  uneventful  to  enter  into 
this  narrative.  Among  others,  may  be  mentioned  that  of  Colonel  Alli 
son  who,  with  250  men  of  the  Twenty-fourth  Tennessee  Regiment,  and 
120  cavalry,  routed  a  large  camp,  known  as  Jo  Underwood's,  on  Octo 
ber  24th.  Besides  killing  and  wounding  some  Federals,  he  captured 
fourteen  prisoners  and  some  arms. 

In  pursuance  of  this  policy,  on  the  9th  of  November  General 
Johnston  sent  Colonel  Cleburne,  with  1,200  infantrj',  half  a  section  of 
artillery,  and  a  squadron  of  Terry's  Rangers,  on  a  reconnaissance.  He 
was  to  go  to  Jamestown,  Kentucky,  and  Tompkinsville,  while  Zollicoffer 
was  coming  westward  by  Jacksboro  and  Jamestown,  Tennessee.  Five 
hundred  of  the  enemy  were  reported  at  Jamestown,  and  500  at  Tomp 
kinsville.  His  orders  ran : 

If  the  enemy  are  there,  attack  and  destroy  them.  .  .  .  Create  the  impression 
in  the  country  that  this  force  is  only  an  advanced  guard. 

Cleburne  marched  as  directed,  but  the  Federals  did  not  wait  for 
him.  They  moved  off  at  his  approach,  carrying  reports  of  an  advan 
cing  host.  He  found  the  people  bitterly  hostile.  The  able-bodied 
men  had  run  away  or  joined  the  enemy.  The  women  and  children,  ter 
rified  by  calumnies  that  recited  the  atrocities  of  the  Southern  troops, 
hid  in  the  woods  or  collected  in  crowds,  imploring  mercy.  Cleburne 
says: 

Everybody  fled  at  our  approach  ;  but  two  people  were  left  in  Tompkinsville  ; 
not  a  friend  from  there  to  Jamestown.  One  old  woman  met  us  with  an  open 
Bible,  saying  she  was  ready  to  die. 

Of  course,  he  treated  every  one  kindly.  Trunks  found  in  the  woods 
by  the  flankers  were  restored  to  the  houses  with  labels  stating  the 
fact.  A  few  articles  were  stolen  by  teamsters  or  camp-followers ;  but 
Cleburne  at  once  paid  for  them  out  of  his  own  pocket.  This  conduct 
reassured  the  people,  and  he  found  a  very  good  feeling  on  his  return. 


SHERMAN   PARALYZED.  363 

This  reconnaissance  of  Cleburne,  and  other  movements  of  troops, 
produced  the  effect  intended.  Sherman  was  greatly  troubled  with  the 
apprehension  of  an  attack  upon  him  by  overwhelming  numbers.  The 
following  extracts  from  his  "  Memoirs "  prove  conclusively  that  he 
thought  exactly  what  General  Johnston  wished  him  to  think  in  regard 
to  the  Confederate  army.  His  statement,  probably  unintentional,  is 
liable  to  convey  an  erroneous  impression,  where  he  says  only  about 
18,000  men  were  allotted  to  him,  if  his  remarks  apply  to  this  period. 
The  Secretary  of  War  reports  that  his  force,  November  10th,  was 
49,617  men,1  and  his  own  statements  show  that  his  force  was  not  less.2 

General  Sherman  says  in  his  "  Memoirs  "  (vol.  i.,  page  199)  : 

As  to  a  forward  movement  that  fall,  it  was  simply  impracticable ;  for  we 
were  forced  to  use  divergent  lines,  leading  our  columns  farther  and  farther 
apart ;  and  all  I  could  attempt  was  to  go  on  and  collect  force  and  material  at 
the  two  points  already  chosen,  viz.,  Dick  Kobinson  and  Elizabethtown.  General 
George  H.  Thomas  still  continued  to  command  the  former,  and  on  the  12th  of 
October  I  dispatched  Brigadier-General  A.  McD.  McCook  to  command  the  lat 
ter,  which  had  been  moved  forward  to  Nolin  Creek,  fifty-two  miles  out  of  Lou 
isville,  toward  Bowling  Green.  .  .  . 

I  continued  to  strengthen  the  two  corps  forward  and  their  routes  of  supply ; 
all  the  time  expecting  that  Sidney  Johnston,  who  was  a  real  general,  and  who 
had  as  correct  information  of  our  situation  as  I  had,  would  unite  his  force  with 
Zollicoffer,  and  fall  on  Thomas  at  Dick  Robinson,  or  McCook  at  Nolin.  Had  he 
done  so  in  October,  1861,  he  could  have  walked  into  Louisville,  and  the  vital 
part  of  the  population  would  have  hailed  him  as  a  deliverer.  Why  he  did  not, 
was  to  me  a  mystery  then  and  is  now;  for  I  know  that  he  saw  the  move,  and 
that  his  wagons  loaded  up  at  one  time  for  a  start  toward  Frankfort,  passing 
between  our  two  camps.  Conscious  of  our  weakness,  I  was  unnecessarily 
unhappy,  and  doubtless  exhibited  it  too  much  to  those  near  me.  (Page  200.) 

McClellan  had  100,000  men,  Fremont  60,000,  whereas  to  me  had  only  been 
allotted  about  18,000.  I  argued  that,  for  the  purpose  of  defense,  we  should 
have  60,000  men  at  once,  and,  for  offense,  would  need  200,000  before  we  were 
done.  .  .  .  (Page  203.) 

I  complained  that  the  new  levies  of  Ohio  and  Indiana  were  diverted  East 
and  West,  and  we  got  scarcely  anything ;  that  our  forces  at  Nolin  and  Dick  Rob 
inson  were  powerless  for  invasion,  and  only  tempting  to  a  general,  such  as  we 
believed  Sidney  Johnston  to  be ;  that,  if  Johnston  chose,  he  could  march  to 
Louisville  any  day.  (Page  202.) 

General  Sherman,  under  the  conviction  that  General  Johnston  was 
about  to  move  on  him  in  force,  on  the  llth  of  November  ordered 
Thomas  to  withdraw  behind  the  Kentucky  River;  and  Thomas  ordered 
Schcepf,  who  was  at  London,  to  retire  to  Crab  Orchard.  Schcepf  fell 
back,  but  with  such  precipitation  as  to  produce  all  the  features  and 
consequences  of  a  rout.  The  weather  was  inclement ;  the  roads  very 
bad  ;  and  the  order  of  march  ill  preserved.  Tons  of  ammunition  and 
1  See  Appendix  A.  2  See  Appendix  B. 


364  BOWLING   GREEX. 

vast  quantities  of  stores  were  thrown  away.  Broken  teams  and  other 
abandoned  property  marked  the  line  of  retreat.  A  Federal  reporter 
says : 

Our  march  has  temporarily  disabled  the  entire  brigade,  and  large  numbers 
will  be  in  hospital  in  a  day  or  two.  So  ends  the  great  Cumberland  Gap  ex 
pedition. 

The  men  became  demoralized ;  and  the  retreat  degenerated  into  a 
flight.  Some  soldiers  died  of  exhaustion,  and  many  were  disabled.1 
Zollicoffer's  repulse  at  Wild  Cat  and  this  "Wild-cat  stampede,"  as  it 
was  called,  were  offsets  to  each  other  in  moral  effect. 

The  conspiracy  for  a  general  insurrection  in  East  Tennessee  was 
rendered  abortive  by  Scboepf  *s  sudden  retreat  and  Zollicoffer's  posses 
sion  of  the  Gaps.  With  Schoepf 's  column  were  Andrew  Johnson  and 
other  civilian  leaders,  whose  presence  was  expected  to  give  a  powerful 
impulse  to  a  great  popular  uprising.  As  they  sullenly  retired,  this 
hope  faded  from  the  minds  of  their  followers.  Nevertheless,  the  ar 
rangements  for  revolt  were  too  forward  to  be  arrested  without  some 
outbreaks,  as  the  first  steps  had  already  been  taken  on  the  day  ap 
pointed.  Bands  and  squads  of  the  hardier  and  bolder  spirits  had  as 
sembled  in  arms  and  begun  the  work  of  bridge-burning,  which  was  to 
be  the  first  chapter  in  the  programme  of  this  counter-revolution. 

On  the  night  of  November  8th  five  railroad-bridges  were  burned : 
two  over  Chickamauga  Creek,  one  over  Hiwassee  River,  on  the  Georgia 
State  Railroad,  one  on  Lick  Creek,  and  another  over  Holston  River, 
on  the  Virginia  &  East  Tennessee  Railroad.  At  Strawberry  Plains  a 
single  sentinel,  James  Keelan,  guarded  the  bridge.  It  is  said  that  six 
teen  incendiaries  attacked  him  at  midnight  on  the  platform  of  the  tres 
tle-work.  He  defended  the  bridge,  and  killed  the  ringleader  in  the  act 
of  setting  fire  to  it.  He  received  three  bullet-wounds,  and  many  cuts 
and  gashes,  and  his  hand  was  nearly  severed  from  his  wrist ;  but  he 
fought  his  assailants  so  fiercely  that  at  last  they  fled.  He  reached  the 
house  of  the  railroad  agent,  where,  as  he  sank  down  bleeding  and  ex 
hausted,  he  said,  "  They  have  killed  me,  but  I  have  saved  the  bridge" 
Happily,  he  recovered  from  his  wounds. 

General  Johnston  ordered  General  Carroll  from  Memphis  with  his 
brigade.  After  Carroll's  arrival  in  East  Tennessee,  there  were  6,000 
Confederate  soldiers  there,  and,  a  month  later,  7,000  ;  but  only  1,000  of 
them  were  fully  armed.  Among  2,000  men  at  Knoxville,  only  600  had 
any  arms.  The  insurgents  were  said  to  consist  of  half  a  dozen  bands, 
numbering  from  500  to  2,000  men  each.  These  numbers  were,  probably 
greatly  exaggerated,  the  more  so  because  they  rose  in  scattered  bands. 
Some  slight  skirmishes  took  place ;  but  they  made  no  effective  stand. 

1  "  Rebellion  Record,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  394. 


EAST  TENNESSEE  INSURRECTION.  365 

Everywhere  they  dispersed  on  the  approach  of  troops,  and  hid  in  their 
mountain  retreats;  or,  following  by-paths,  escaped  to  the  enemy  in 
Kentucky.  Some  of  the  ringleaders  were  arrested,  and  a  few  men  were 
captured  in  arms ;  but  there  was  no  disposition  on  the  part  of  the 
authorities  to  treat  them  with  severity,  and,  after  a  brief  detention, 
most  of  them  were  released  on  taking  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the 
Confederate  States. 

General  W.  H.  Carroll,  commanding  at  Knoxville,  proclaimed  mar 
tial  law  on  the  14th  of  November ;  but,  becoming  satisfied  that  there 
was  no  longer  a  necessity  for  its  enforcement,  rescinded  the  order  on 
the  24th  of  November.  His  order  said : 

It  is  not  the  purpose  of  the  commanding  general  at  this  post  to  impose  any 
restrictions  or  enforce  any  law  not  required  by  stern  necessity.  Those  persons 
who  remain  at  home,  submitting  to  the  established  laws  of  the  country,  will  not 
be  molested,  whatever  their  previous  political  opinions  may  have  been. 

Though  there  was  considerable  ferment  and  disloyalty  in  East  Ten 
nessee,  requiring  the  presence  of  troops,  its  disloyalty  demanded  no 
further  active  measures  of  repression.  The  Governor  of  Tennessee,  by 
his  firm,  judicious,  and  temperate  conduct,  aided  greatly  in  restoring 
order  to  the  disaffected  region. 

APPENDIX   A. 

Through  the  politeness  of  the  Secretary  of  "War,  Mr.  Belknap,  the  writer 
received  the  following  statement  of  the  strength  of  Sherman's  command  on  the 
10th  of  November : 

WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE,  } 
WASHINGTON,  December  14,  1S75.        ) 

Official  transcript  from  the  return  of  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland, 
showing  the  strength,  present  and  absent,  on  the  10th  day  of  November,  1861, 
the  date  of  the  last  report  received  at  this  office  before  Brigadier-General  Sher 
man  was  relieved  of  that  command  : 

No.  in  commands  that  furnished  returns  to  department  headquarters,       30,917 

not  furnishing  returns,  about 9,100 

Regiments  in  process  of  formation,  estimated     .        .        .        .        .        9,600 

Total        . 49,617 

E.  D.  TOWXSEND,  Adjutant- General. 

APPENDIX    B. 

General  Sherman  (vol.  i.,  pp.  206-208)  undertakes  to  give  a  statement  of  his 
strength,  about  the  3d  or  4th  of  November.  He  states'that  General  McCook 
had  at  Nolin  four  brigades,  consisting  of  fourteen  regiments  of  volunteers  and 
some  regulars,  besides  artillery — a  force  13,000  strong.  General  Sherman  also 
furnishes  a  tabulated  list  of  the  regiments  under  his  command,  which  must 


36 G  THE  BATTLE   OF  BELMOXT. 

have  been  compiled  from  imperfect  sources.  He  mentions  eleven  regiments  in 
easy  supporting  distance  of  HcCook,  and  assigns  seven  to  Thomas  at  Dick 
Robinson,  with  three  more  near  by,  besides  seven  others  at  different  points. 
This  makes  forty-two  regiments.  Nelson's  command,  elsewhere  mentioned  as 
containing  five  regiments,  of  which  three  contained  2,650  men,  is  probably 
intentionally  excluded  from  this  table.  But  the  list  contains  no  mention  of  a 
number  of  Kentucky  regiments  then  actually  or  nearly  completed,  some  of  which 
were  then  doing  service,  such  as  those  commanded  by  Garrard,  Pope,  Ward, 
Hobson,  Grider,  McHenry,  Jackson,  Burbridge,  Bruce,  and  others. 

By  reference  to  Van  Home's  work,  it  will  be  found  that  a  number  of  these 
were  brigaded  December  3d.  Nor  is  any  account  taken  of  the  numerous  or 
ganizations  of  Home  Guards.  General  Sherman  estimated  the  Confederate 
force  from  Bowling  Green  to  Clarksville  at  from  25,000  to  30,000  men — double 
their  real  numbers. 

APPENDIX    B    (2). 

General  Johnston  estimated  the  Federal  force  in  his  front  at  15,000  to 
20,000 ;  in  the  Lower  Green  River  country  at  3,000  ;  near  Camp  Dick  Robinson, 
at  10,000  ;  and  elsewhere  in  Northern  Kentucky,  at  10,000.  These  figures  were 
substantially  correct. 

Sherman's  command,  from  his  own  account,  may  be  tabulated  thus  : 

Fourteen  regiments  at  Nolin  (his  figures) 13,000 

Twenty-eight  regiments  mentioned  (estimated) 26,000 

Nelson's  command 4,000 

Ten  regiments  not  mentioned 6,000 

Total          -.        .  48,000 

This  does  not  include  Home  Guards. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

THE    BATTLE    OF   BELMONT. 

ON  the  7th  of  November,  1861,  a  battle  was  fought  at  Belmont, 
Missouri,  opposite  Columbus,  Kentucky.  General  Grant's  reports  and 
authorized  biographies  claim  this  as  a  victory,  and  that  it  was  the  cul 
mination  of  an  expedition  undertaken  for  good  strategic  reasons,  and 
justified  by  complete  success.  It  is  admitted  that  such  was  not  the 
popular  estimate  of  the  time ;  and  elaborate  apologies  have  been  framed 
to  prove  the  substantial  advantages  gained  by  the  fight.  The  merits 
of  a  hard  fighter,  of  boldness,  persistence,  and  coolness,  will  be  cheer 
fully  accorded  to  General  Grant  by  friend  and  foe  alike  ;  and  his  repu 
tation  as  a  soldier  need  not  rest  on  this  battle.  His  first  essay  was  a 


OUTLINE  OF  BATTLE.  36J 

disaster  to  his  arms.     The  verdict  of  the  hour  must  be  the  verdict  of 
history. 

General  Folk's  dispatch,  announcing  the  battle  of  Belmont,  and 
summing  up  its  results,  was  as  follows  : 

HEADQUARTERS  FIRST  DIVISION,  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT,  ) 
COLUMBUS,  KENTUCKY,  November  7, 1861.         > 

The  enemy  came  down  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river  to  Belmont  to-day, 
about  7,500  strong,  landed  under  cover  of  gunboats,  and  attacked  Colonel  Tap- 
pan's  camp.  I  sent  over  three  regiments  under  General  Pillow  to  his  relief; 
then  at  intervals  three  others,  then  General  Cheatham. 

I  then  took  over  two  others  in  person,  to  support  a  flank  movement  which  I 
had  directed.  It  was  a  hard-fought  battle,  lasting  from  half-past  10  A.  M.  to  5 
p.  M.  They  took  Beltzhoover's  battery,  four  pieces  of  which  were  recaptured- 
The  enemy  were  thoroughly  routed.  We  pursued  them  to  their  boats,  seven 
miles,  and  then  drove  their  boats  before  us.  The  road  was  strewed  with  their 
dead  and  wounded,  guns,  ammunition,  and  equipments.  Our  loss,  considerable  ; 
theirs,  heavy. 

L.  POLK,  Major- General  commanding. 

To  general  headquarters,  through  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

This  report,  made  on  the  day  of  battle,  is  substantially  accurate, 
except  that  the  force  of  the  enemy  is  over-estimated. 

General  Grant  represents  his  purpose  and  procedure  in  this  move 
ment  as  follows,  in  his  report  from  Cairo,  of  November  12,  1861 : 

On  the  evening  of  the  6th  instant  I  left  this  place  with  2,850  men,  of  all 
arms,  to  make  a  reconnaissance  toward  Columbus.  The  object  of  the  expedition 
was  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  sending  out  reinforcements  to  Price's  army  in 
Missouri,  and  also  from  cutting  off  columns  that  I  had  been  directed  to  send  out 
from  this  place  and  Cape  Girardeau,  in  pursuit  of  Jeff  Thompson.  Knowing 
that  Columbus  was  strongly  garrisoned,  I  asked  General  Smith,  commanding 
at  Paducah,  Kentucky,  to  make  demonstrations  in  the  same  direction.  He  did 
so  by  ordering  a  small  force  to  Mayfield,  and  another  in  the  direction  of  Colum 
bus,  not  to  approach  nearer,  however,  than  twelve  or  fifteen  miles.  I  also  sent 
a  small  force  on  the  Kentucky  side,  with  orders  not  to  approach  nearer  than 
Elliott's  Mills,  some  twelve  miles  from  Columbus. 

The  expedition  under  my  immediate  command  was  stopped  about  nine  miles 
below  here  on  the  Kentucky  shore,  and  remained  until  morning.  All  this  served 
to  distract  the  enemy,  and  led  him  to  think  he  was  to  be  attacked  in  his  strongly- 
fortified  position.  At  daylight  we  proceeded  down  the  river  to  a  point  just  out 
of  range  of  the  rebel  guns  and  debarked  on  the  Missouri  shore.  From  here  the 
troops  were  marched  by  flank  for  about  one  mile  toward  Belmont,  and  then 
drawn  up  in  line  of  battle,  a  battalion  also  having  been  left  as  a  reserve  near  the 
transports.  Two  companies  from  each  regiment,  five  skeletons  in  number,  were 
then  thrown  out  as  skirmishers,  to  ascertain  the  position  of  the  enemy.  It  was 
but  a  few  moments  before  we  met  him,  and  a  general  engagement  ensued. 

On  the  3d  of  November  Grant  had  sent  Colonel  Oglesby  with  four 
regiments  (3,000  men)  from  Commerce,  Missouri,  toward  Indian  Ford, 
25 


368  THE  BATTLE   OF  BELMONT. 

on  the  St.  Francis  River,  by  way  of  Sikestown.  On  the  6th  he  sent 
him  another  regiment,  from  Cairo,  with  orders  to  turn  his  column  tow 
ard  New  Madrid,  and,  when  he  reached  the  nearest  point  to  Columbus, 
to  await  orders.  The  ostensible  purpose  of  this  movement  was  to  cut 
off  reinforcements  going  to  General  Price,  and  to  pursue  Jeff  Thomp 
son.  There  could  not  have  been  at  this  time  any  serious  apprehension  of 
Jeff  Thompson,  whose  band  had  dissolved  ;  and,  as  there  were  no  such 
reinforcements  going  to  Price,  the  detachment  was,  in  these  points  of 
view,  futile — as,  indeed,  was  the  entire  expedition.  Oglesby's  position 
and  strength  might  have  supported  Grant  in  case  of  successful  lodg 
ment,  or  have  afforded  him  a  secure  line  of  retreat,  in  case  he  had  been 
cut  off  from  his  gunboats ;  but  no  such  intentions  have  been  admitted 
by  General  Grant.  Unless  the  whole  movement  was  tentative,  with 
ulterior  designs  on  New  Madrid,  it  does  not  seem  clear  why  so  large  a 
contingent  should  not  rather  have  been  massed  with  Grant's  command 
in  his  assault  on  Belmont. 

General  Grant  says  his  object  was  "  to  make  a  reconnaissance." 
Badeau  says  : 

At  two  o'clock,  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  he  received  intelligence  that  the 
rebels  had  been  crossing  troops  from  Columbus  to  Belmont  the  day  before,  with 
the  purpose  of  cutting  off  Oglesby.1  He  at  once  determined  on  converting  the 
demonstration  on  Belmont  into  an  attack,  as  it  was  now  necessary  to  be  prompt 
in  preventing  any  further  efforts  of  the  rebels  either  to  reenforce  Price  or  to 
interrupt  Oglesby.  He  still,  however,  had  no  intention  of  remaining  at  Belmont, 
which  was  on  low  ground,  and  could  not  have  been  held  an  hour  under  the  guns 
at  Columbus.  His  idea  was  simply  to  destroy  the  camps,  capture  or  disperse 
the  enemy,  and  get  himself  away  before  the  rebel  garrison  could  be  reenforced. 

Belmont  was  the  inappropriate  name  given  a  settlement  of  three 
houses  on  the  western  bank  of  the  Mississippi  River,  opposite  Columbus. 
It  was  situated  in  a  dreary,  flat  "  bottom-land,"  cut  up  with  sloughs, 
heavily  timbered,  and  approached  from  the  river  by  two  natural  ter 
races  or  banks.  On  the  upper  bank,  a  clearing  had  been  made  in  the 
forest  of  some  700  acres.  In  this  clearing  was  the  encampment  of 
Colonel  Tappan's  Thirteenth  Arkansas  Regiment,  and  a  light  battery 
named  "  Watson's,"  under  Colonel  Beltzhoover,  placed  there  as  an 
outpost  of  the  stronghold  at  Columbus. 

General  Polk  had  information  that  led  him  to  expect  an  attack  on 
Columbus.  Learning,  early  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  of  Oglesby's 
march,  he  believed  the  attack  would  be  general,  and  this  opinion  was 
confirmed  by  the  Federal  demonstrations  on  the  Kentucky  side  of  the 
river.  The  approach  of  Grant's  gunboats  and  transports  was  observed, 

1  If  such  information  was  conveyed  to  General  Grant,  it  is  sufficient  to  say  it  was 
without  foundation. 


THE   COLLISION.  309 

though  a  bend  in  the  river  and  an  intervening  forest  concealed  the 
landing  and  subsequent  movements  of  his  troops.  While  preparations, 
thought  sufficient  to  defend  the  position  at  Belmont  against  Grant's 
column,  were  made,  General  Polk  was  unwilling  to  weaken  the  force  at 
Columbus  too  much,  lest  the  weight  of  the  attack  should  fall  there. 
Accordingly,  he  retained  the  greater  part  of  his  troops  at  Columbus, 
until  the  failure  of  the  enemy  to  advance  against  it  and  the  necessities 
of  the  case  developed  at  Belmont  induced  him  to  cross  over  in  force. 

The  language  of  General  Pillow's  report  will  best  describe  the 
opening  of  the  battle  on  the  Confederate  side.  He  says : 

Under  instructions  delivered  in  person  by  Major-General  Polk,  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  7th  inst.,  I  crossed  to  the  village  of  Belmont,  on  the  Missouri  shore, 
four  regiments  of  my  division,  and,  as  rapidly  as  possible,  placed  them  in  posi 
tion  about  four  hundred  yards  from  the  river-bank,  in  line  with  Colonel  Tappan's 
regiment  and  Beltzlioover's  battery,  to  receive  the  large  force  of  the  enemy  ad 
vancing  on  the  small  encampment  at  that  place.  These  regiments,  from  measles 
and  diseases  incident  to  the  Mississippi  bottom,  and  absentees,  had  been  reduced 
below  500  men  for  duty,  as  shown  by  the  daily  morning  report.  They  were 
formed  into  line  of  battle,  with  Colonel  Wright's  regiment  on  the  left  of  Beltz- 
hoover's  battery,  and  with  Colonels  Pickett's,  Freeman's,  Tappan's,  and  Russell's 
regiments  (the  last  now  under  command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bell),  on  the 
right  of  the  battery.  These  regiments,  all  told,  numbered  about  2,500. 

General  Pillow  threw  forward  three  companies  of  skirmishers,  who 
disputed  the  ground  until  his  alignment  was  hastily  made.  He  was 
unacquainted  with  the  ground  and  hurried  for  time.  The  Confederate 
line  of  battle  was  formed  in  somewhat  crowded  order,  in  the  edge  of 
the  forest,  nearly  parallel  with  the  river,  with  the  "  clearing,"  or  open 
ground,  behind  it.  The  Federal  column  had  landed  around  a  bend  of 
the  river,  and  followed  the  road,  which  ran  from  that  landing  nearly 
parallel  with  the  course  of  the  river  at  Belmont,  and  a  couple  of  miles 
back  from  it.  A  line  of  ponds  and  sloughs  extended  through  the  for 
est  from  the  landing  to  Belmont,  and  the  road  turned  the  head  of 
these  ponds  and  entered  the  Confederate  position  on  its  extreme  left. 
When  Grant  was  opposite  to  the  Confederate  position,  he  formed  line 
of  battle,  and  entered  the  woods  to  attack  it.  The  sloughs,  at  this 
season,  were  dry,  and  offered  no  serious  obstacle.  He  engaged  the 
skirmishers  sent  out  by  Pillow,  at  twenty  minutes  past  nine  o'clock, 
and  at  about  ten  o'clock  encountered  his  line  of  battle. 

Grant's  strength  was  apparently  greatly  over-estimated  by  both 
Polk  and  Pillow,  and  by  the  Confederates  generally,  who  placed  it  at 
7,500.  Grant,  in  his  report,  puts  it  at  2,850,  and,  in  a  letter  to  his 
father,  at  3,000.  Badean  says  there  were  3,114  men.  A  soldier  corre 
spondent,  writing  from  the  battle-field,  states  the  force  engnged  at  3,500. 
General  Badeau's  statement,  as  the  most  deliberate,  ought  to  be  the 


370  THE   BATTLE   OF  BELMONT. 

most  correct,  though  much  below  the  average  strength  of  Federal  regi 
ments  at  that  time.  The  "  skeleton  "  regiments,  as  General  Grant  calls 
them,  were  made  up  of  picked  men.  The  Confederate  exaggeration  of 
their  numbers  may  well  be  accepted  by  these  hardy  Northwestern  vol 
unteers  as  a  high  tribute  to  their  prowess,  which  on  that  day  was  very 
great.  But  it  was  in  part  due  to  their  more  open  formation  in  line  of 
battle.  The  Federal  regiments  were  separated  in  their  advance  by  the 
nature  of  the  ground,  and  the  men  themselves  were  compelled  to  em 
ploy  a  looser  order. 

The  Federal  force  was  composed  of  five  regiments  of  infantry,  Tay 
lor's  battery  of  light  artillery,  and  two  squadrons  of  cavalry.  The  cav 
alry,  following  the  road,  in  advance  and  skirmishing,  turned  the  Con 
federate  left.  The  infantry  was  arranged  as  follows :  On  the  right,  the 
Twenty-seventh  Illinois,  Colonel  N.  B.  Buford ;  next,  the  Thirty-first 
Illinois,  Colonel  John  A.  Logan  ;  next,  the  Thirtieth  Illinois,  Colonel 
Philip  B.  Fouke — making  a  brigade,  under  command  of  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  John  A.  McClernand.  The  rear  of  the  column,  forming  the  left 
wing,  was  composed  of  the  Twenty-second  Illinois,  Colonel  H.  Dough 
erty,  and  the  Seventh  Iowa,  Colonel  Lauman,  and  was  commanded  by 
Colonel  Dougherty.  The  first  attack  was  made  by  the  right  wing  ; 
but,  as  it  advanced,  the  Twenty-seventh  Illinois,  in  passing  around 
the  head  of  a  pond,  was  separated  from  the  command,  and  found  itself 
on  the  left  flank  of  the  Confederates.  McClernand's  other  two  regi 
ments  struck  them  on  the  right  flank  and  front ;  and  Dougherty's  bri 
gade,  passing  behind  the  Thirtieth  and  Thirty-first  Illinois  to  their  right, 
occupied  the  interval,  and  thus  became  the  centre. 

Whether  there  was  really  a  greater  disparity  of  force  than  the  Fed 
eral  writers  suppose,  or,  whatever  the  cause,  the  Federal  army  pre 
sented  the  greater  front,  and  attacked  both  in  front  and  on  each  flank 
of  the  Confederates  at  the  same  time.  Such  is  Pillow's  statement,  and 
it  is  corroborated  by  the  reports  of  the  Northern  generals.  McClernand 
was  disappointed  that  the  movement  of  the  Second  Brigade  was  not 
made  on  the  left,  as  originally  intended,  "  which,"  he  says,  "  would 
have  perfected  a  line  sufficient  to  inclose  the  enemy's  camp  on  all  sides 
accessible  to  us,  thus  enabling  us  to  command  the  river  above  and  below 
them,  and  prevent  the  crossing  of  reinforcements  from  Columbus,  in 
suring  his  capture  as  well  as  defeat."  Later  on  he  says,  "A  combined 
movement  was  now  made  upon  three  sides  of  the  enemy's  works." 

The  battle  opened  at  about  half-past  ten  o'clock,  with  an  assault 
upon  the  right  front  and  flank  of  the  Confederate  line,  by  the  Thirtieth 
and  Thirty-first  Illinois  and  the  artillery,  led  by  General  McClernand. 
He  says,  "  The  struggle,  which  was  continued  for  half  an  hour  with 
great  severity,  threw  our  troops  into  temporary  disorder,  but  they  were 
promptly  rallied."  They  were,  in  fact,  repulsed  by  Tappan's  and  Rus- 


THE   FIRST  ENGAGEMENT.  371 

sell's  regiments.  On  the  Confederate  left,  Buford's  Twenty-seventh 
Illinois,  aided  by  the  cavalry,  assailed  Wright's  regiment,  which  was 
•supported  by  Beltzhoover's  guns,  and  partially  defended  by  a  rough 
abattis.  This  attack  was  also  repulsed. 

Colonel  Dougherty  led  the  Second  Brigade  in  such  a  direction  that 
he  encountered  the  Confederate  centre,  composed  of  the  regiments  of 
Pickett  and  Freeman.  The  whole  Federal  line  advanced  through  rough 
forest  and  fallen  timber,  which,  though  it  impeded  and  annoyed,  gave 
great  advantages  of  shelter.  This  applied  especially  to  the  Second  Bri 
gade.  Pickett's  and  Freeman's  regiments,  being  in  the  cleared  ground, 
were  more  exposed.  They  were  broken  several  times  by  the  vigorous 
assault  of  Dougherty's  men,  but  were  as  often  rallied  by  the  officers, 
and  by  General  Pillow  in  person.  Dougherty,  in  his  report,  says: 

The  enemy  for  some  time  obstinately  resisted  any  advance  at  this  point,  and 
a  storm  of  musketry  raged  along  the  whole  line  of  the  Second  Brigade.  .  .  . 
Step  by  step  we  drove  them,  until  they  reached  a  secondary  bank,  such  as  abound 
through  the  river-bottoms  of  the  West,  under  which  they  were  protected  from 
our  fire ;  and,  when  they  made  another  desperate  stand  for  about  thirty  minutes, 
our  fire  became  so  hot  that  they  retreated  to  some  open  ground  near  their  en 
campment,  covered  by  a  rude  abattis  of  felled  timber,  strewing  the  ground  as 
they  went  with  guns,  coats,  and  canteens.  Our  brave  troops  followed  them 
with  shouts,  pouring  volley  after  volley  into  them.  Here  the  enemy's  movements 
at  this  point  gave  unmistakable  evidence  of  being  panic-stricken  and  defeated, 
retreating  to  the  river  and  up  the  river-bank  behind  the  shelter  of  some  brush 
and  timber. 

The  resistance  was,  indeed,  even  more  resolute  than  this  Federal 
report  concedes.  The  artillery-ammunition  gave  out,  and  a  regiment 
and  battalion  also  fell  short  of  ammunition.  Pillow  ordered  a  bayonet- 
charge,  which  was  made  gallantly,  driving  back  the  Federal  line.  But 
it  retired  with  such  a  deadly  fire  that  the  Confederates  in  turn  fell  back 
to  their  original  position.  This  was  repeated  a  second  and  a  third  time, 
the  Federals  being  each  time  driven  back,  but,  in  the  final  charge,  pre 
vailing.  Pillow  says  he  ordered  his  line  to  fall  back  to  the  river-bank. 
Of  course,  raw  troops  could  not,  under  such  circumstances,  successfully 
execute  this  manoeuvre,  and  his  line  reached  the  river-bank  a  broken 
and  disordered  mass. 

The  resistance  to  the  attack  on  the  right  and  left  had  been  similar  but 
even  more  stubborn.  Indeed,  the  lines,  after  the  first  shock,  were  contin 
uous,  and  the  contest  general.  The  Thirtieth  and  Thirty-first  Illinois, 
led  and  encouraged  by  both  Grant  and  McClernand,  thrice  attacked, 
and  were  thrice  driven  back  by  the  bayonet.  At  length,  the  entire 
Federal  army  was  united  in  a  final  combined  attack,  before  which  the 
Confederates  gave  way.  This  was  about  two  o'clock.  The  Federal 
army,  emerging  from  the  woods,  captured  the  abandoned  guns  of  the 


372  THE  BATTLE   OF  BELMONT. 

Watson  Battery,  and  entered  the  Confederate  encampment  on  three 
sides,  almost  simultaneously,  the  honor  being  conceded  to  the  Twenty- 
seventh  Illinois  of  being  the  first  to  break  through  the  obstacles,  and* 
snatch  the  prize  of  victory.  Thus  ended  the  first  engagement  of  the 
day,  in  the  apparent  rout  and  total  defeat  of  the  Confederates. 

It  is  very  probable  that  the  Union  army  would  not  have  allowed  the 
Confederates  to  escape  up  the  river-bank  without  pursuit,  if  their  on 
ward  career  had  not  been  sharply  checked  at  the  secondary  bank.  Just 
as  the  shattered  Confederates  took  refuge  behind  this  bank,  Pillow, 
who  had  sent  to  Polk  for  an  additional  regiment,  found  Knox  Walker's 
regiment,  the  Second  Tennessee,  coming  to  his  support.  He  pushed  it 
forward  to  the  edge  of  the  bank,  and  it  sustained  the  attack  of  the  Fed 
erals,  until  the  dispersed  and  beaten  Confederates  had  made  their  way 
through  the  timber,  up  the  river-bank,  and,  with  the  tenacity  of  Ameri 
can  soldiers,  had  rallied  for  a  renewal  of  the  contest.  But,  though 
Walker's  regiment  maintained  itself  stubbornly  for  a  while,  it  could  not 
bear  the  entire  brunt  of  the  contest  under  the  deadly  fire  of  the  Feder 
als,  flushed  with  success.  At  last  it  retired  up  the  bank,  keeping  up  a 
steady  fire  as  it  fell  back. 

When  the  Federals  had  obtained  possession  of  the  whole  river-front 
of  the  camps,  they  advanced  to  the  bank,  and  opened  an  artillery-fire 
on  Columbus,  and  on  some  crossing  transports,  which  they  drove  back. 
The  heavy  guns  at  Columbus  now  opened  on  the  Federals  with  serious 
purpose.  So  crushing  was  this  cannonade,  plunging  in  from  the  com 
manding  heights  opposite,  that  the  Federals  rapidly  recoiled.  It  was 
seen  that  their  position  at  Belmont  was  not  tenable.  At  the  same 
time,  they  learned  that  General  Polk  had  been  crossing  reinforcements, 
and  was  landing  them  some  distance  above,  with  the  evident  design  of 
cutting  off  the  retreat  to  the  transports.  Badeau  says,1  Grant's  troops 
were  "  plundering,"  while  their  colonels,  "  equally  raw,  shouted,  and 
made  stump-speeches  for  the  Union."  Grant  was  more  complimentary 
at  the  time,  attributing  much  of  the  gallantry  of  his  troops  "  to  the  cool 
ness  and  presence  of  mind  of  the  officers,  particularly  the  colonels." 
Doubtless,  they  were  a  good  deal  disorganized.  Badeau  continues  : 

He  (Grant)  was  anxious  to  get  back  to  his  own  steamers  before  these  reen- 
forcements  could  arrive,  and  strove  to  reform  his  men,  but  in  vain ;  they  be 
haved  like  so  many  schoolboys,  until,  finally,  to  stop  the  plundering,  he  ordered 
his  staff-officers  to  set  the  camps  on  fire. 

Gathering  their  booty  and  captured  guns,  the  column  began  its  re 
treat  to  the  transports  and  the  protection  of  the  gunboats. 

The  account  of  this  retreat  is  not  related  in  the  Federal  reports  with 
candor.  It  is  hard  to  see  the  fruits  of  victory  wrested  away  ;  and  the 

1  "  Life  of  Grant,"  vol.  i.,  p.  16. 


FEDERAL   RETREAT  AND   ROUT.  373 

disastrous  rout  they  suffered  is  denied,  or  glozed  over,  in  all  these  nar 
ratives.  The  facts  are  these  :  During  the  retreat  of  his  beaten  regi 
ment,  Pillow  found  at  the  landing,  some  distance  above  the  battle 
ground,  two  regiments — Marks's  Eleventh  Louisiana  and  Carroll's  Fif 
teenth  Tennessee.  Pillow  determined  to  try  to  retrieve  the  fortunes 
of  the  day,  and  ordered  Colonel  Marks  to  lead  these  two  regiments  in 
pursuit,  while  he  would  support  him  with  the  fragments  of  the  regi 
ments  then  reforming.  His  directions  were,  "  to  lead  the  advance  in 
double  quick  time  through  the  wood  and  to  the  enemy's  rear,  and  to 
attack  him  writh  vigor." 

The  discrepancies  between  the  Federal  and  Confederate  accounts  of 
this  second  engagement  can  be  reconciled  only  by  supposing  that,  in 
approaching  the  Federals  through  the  woods,  Marks's  line  of  battle  en 
countered  the  head  of  their  column  at  such  an  angle  that  his  extreme 
flankers  on  the  right  were  interposed  on  the  line  of  retreat.  These,  of 
course,  offered  no  serious  obstacle  to  that  column  going  home.  They 
were  pushed  aside.  When  the  column  came  in  collision  with  it,  Badeau 
says : 

It  was  instantly  cried,  ""We  are  surrounded!"  and  at  first  some  confusion 
prevailed.  An  officer  of  Grant's  staff,  lately  from  civil  life,  rode  up,  a  little 
flustered,  with  the  intelligence.  "  Well,"  said  Grant,  "  if  that  is  so,  we  must  cut 
our  way  out  as  we  cut  our  way  ic."  The  men  were  brave  enough,  but  it  had 
not  occurred  to  them  before  that,  being  surrounded,  there  was  anything  to  do 
but  surrender. 

Colonel  Dougherty,  in  his  report  made  at  the  time,  attributes  this 
remark  to  himself ;  and  a  newspaper  reporter  puts  it  in  the  mouth  of 
Colonel  Logan ;  so  that,  after  all,  there  was  a  consensus  here  in  a  senti 
ment  as  old  as  Pelopidas — or  at  least  as  his  biographer.  Badeau  adds: 

As  soon  as  the  troops  found  that  their  leader  meant  to  fight,  the  confusion 
was  past ;  they  promptly  charged  and  dispersed  the  rebel  line,  which  made  but 
a  faint  resistance,  not  half  so  vigorous  as  that  of  the  morning,  and  disappeared  a 
second  time  over  the  banks. 

The  Confederates  know  nothing  of  this  engagement,  and  it  is  not 
to  be  explained  except  as  above,  unless  it  was  a  mere  stampede  oc 
casioned  by  the  appearance  of  some  squad  of  stragglers,  which,  lost  in 
the  woods,  fired  before  it  fled. 

There  was  an  engagement,  however,  which,  though  almost  ignored 
by  their  writers,  was  disastrous  enough  to  Grant's  army.  Pillow  says  : 

Marks  attacked  the  column,  and  the  enemy  after,  a  feeble  resistance,  broke 
and  fled,  in  great  disorder,  and  was  Lotly  pursued  by  our  troops. 

In  this  pursuit,  Marks's  command  was  aided  by  the  troops  that  had 
been  rallied  by  Pillow,  and  by  General  Cheatham,  who  had  preceded  his 


THE  BATTLE  OF  BELMONT. 

brigade,  and  gave  his  personal  assistance  in  this  action.  They  assailed 
the  Federals  on  both  flanks,  and  routed  them.  Polk,  in  his  report,  de 
scribes  this  part  of  the  field,  over  which  he  passed  later,  as  strewed  with 
wounded  and  dead. 

Badeau  denies  any  rout,  and  says,  "  The  hot  pursuit  was  after  the 
national  troops  got  aboard."  General  Grant  says  in  his  letter  to  his 
father : 

There  was  no  hasty  retreating  or  running  away.  Taking  into  account  the 
object  of  the  expedition,  the  victory  was  complete. 

General  McClernand,  with  more  frankness,  says : 

In  passing  through  the  woods,  the  Thirtieth,  the  Seventh,  and  the  Twenty- 
second,  encountered  a  heavy  fire  on  their  right  and  left  successively,  which  was 
returned  with  such  vigor  and  effect  as  to  drive  back  the  superior  force  of  the 
enemy,  and  silence  his  firing,  but  not  until  the  Seventh  and  Twenty-second  had 
been  thrown  into  temporary  disorder.  Here  Lieutenant-Colonel  Wentz,  of  the 
Seventh,  and  Captain  Markley,  of  the  Thirtieth,  with  several  privates,  were 
killed,  and  Colonel  Dougherty,  of  the  Twenty-second,  and  Major  McClurken,  of 
the  Thirtieth,  who  was  near  me,  were  severely  wounded. 

General  McClernand  this  day  lost  three  horses. 
Colonel  Dougherty  says  : 

At  this  time  the  Seventh  Iowa  was  in  rear  of  the  Twenty-second  Illinois,  and 
was  somewhat  confused;  all  the  field-officers  and  many  of  the  company-officers 
of  that  brave  regiment  being  either  killed,  wounded,  or  taken  by  the  enemy. 

Colonel  Dougherty  was  called  away  ;  but,  after  an  interval,  returned 
to  this  command*  He  continues  his  account  thus : 

On  my  return  I  found  many  of  the  Seventh  Iowa  considerably  scattered ; 
while  cheering  them  up  and  hurrying  them  forward,  I  received  a  small  shot  in 
the  shoulder,  and  one  on  the  elbow,  and  shortly  afterward  a  ball  through  the 
ankle ;  my  horse  was  also  shot  in  several  places,  which  fell  with  me,  and  soon 
expired.  I  found  myself  unable  to  travel,  and  was  consequently  captured  by  the 
rebels,  who  treated  me  with  respect  and  kindness. 

The  rear-guard  of  the  Federals  did,  in  fact,  make  a  stubborn  defense, 
and  suffered  severely,  but  were  so  beaten  and  broken  that  they  fled 
into  the  woods.  Pillow  halted  his  men  to  reform,  and  drew  them  off 
to  await  the  arrival  of  the  reinforcements  which  had  landed  and  were 
now  advancing  under  General  Polk  in  person.  There  had  been  delay 
in  landing  the  reinforcements,  and  a  failure  to  get  ashore  some  artillery, 
owing  to  neglect  of  the  transport  to  provide  staging,  and  from  the 
nature  of  the  river-bank  there.  Polk,  as  soon  as  he  got  his  men  ashore, 
attempted  to  lead  them  so  as  to  interpose  them  between  Grant  and  his 
transports,  but  the  haste  of  the  retreat  saved  the  Federal  column.  On 


GRANT'S  ESCAPE.  375 

coming  up  with  Pillow,  Polk  ordered  the  pursuit  to  be  renewed,  himself 
taking  command  and  directing  the  movement.  The  troops  he  had 
brought  up  were  Smith's  One  Hundred  and  Fifty-fourth  Tennessee 
Militia  Regiment,  Neeley's  Fourth  Tennessee,  and  Blythe's  Mississippi 
Battalion.  These  were  part  of  Cheatham's  command.  As  the  Confed 
erates  advanced,  they  found  the  road  strewed  with  abandoned  plunder 
and  material  of  war.  The  hospital  of  the  enemy  was  captured,  with 
some  seventy  wounded.  Four  of  the  six  guns  lost  in  the  morning  were 
recovered,  and  one  of  the  enemy's  guns  was  taken.  Every  evidence  of 
precipitate  retreat  was  found. 

The  gunboats  Taylor  and  Lexington,  which  had  convoyed  the 
transports,  thrice  engaged  the  Confederate  batteries  during  the  day, 
and  received  some  shells  which  killed  and  wounded  several  men.  The 
transports  also  found  themselves  within  range  of  the  batteries,  and  all 
drew  off  farther  up  the  river  than  the  point  of  debarkation. 

When  the  retreating  column  came  up,  it  found  the  small  reserve 
already  on  board,  and  a  hasty  embarkation  began.  Before  it  was  con 
cluded,  the  whole  Confederate  force  suddenly  appeared  from  a  corn 
field,  in  which  it  had  been  deployed,  and  fronting  along  the  river-bank, 
in  line  of  battle  more  than  a  mile  in  length,  opened  a  heavy  fire  upon 
the  transports.  The  cables  were  cut,  and  the  boats  put  off  hastily, 
the  gunboats  firing,  and  doing  what  they  could  to  cover  the  retreat. 
General  Grant  was  one  of  the  last  on  board.  Sliding  his  horse  down 
the  bank,  he  went  in  on  a  plank  pushed  ashore  for  him.  The  boats  ran 
the  gantlet,  and,  when  well  up  the  river,  stopped  to  take  on  board  a 
mass  of  fugitives  who  had  fled  along  the  bank.  The  Confederates 
claimed  that  the  slaughter  on  the  transports  was  immense,  and  their 
own  loss  trifling.  Their  adversaries  insisted  that  they  themselves  had 
met  no  serious  loss,  but  that  the  slaughter  on  shore  was  dreadful.  It 
is  probable  that  the  troops  crowded  on  the  transports  suffered  more 
than  those  in  line  of  battle.  It  was  sunset  when  the  action  ended. 

The  Confederates  had  on  the  west  bank  of  the  river  that  day  ten 
regiments  and  a  battalion,  possibly  5,500  men.  It  has  been  seen  that 
in  the  first  engagement  the  Federals  had  the  advantage  of  numbers 
and  of  the  ground.  In  the  second  encounter,  though  the  Confederate 
attack  was  made  by  only  two  regiments  and  the  fragments  of  the  routed 
arrny,  and  three  Federal  regiments  were  certainly  engaged,  yet  it  was 
upon  the  rear-guard  of  a  retreating  column,  so  that  the  contest  was  not 
greatly  unequal.  The  third  engagement  was  merely  a  parting  salute 
to  an  escaped  foe.  Had  Folk's  force  been  at  that  landing  half  an  hour 
sooner,  he  would  probably  have  struck  there  a  decisive  blow. 

Six  hours  of  hard  fighting  had  inflicted  cruel  losses  on  both  sides. 
In  Beltzhoover's  battery  45  horses  were  killed,  and  all  but  one  wounded. 
The  Confederates  lost  105  men  killed,  419  wounded,  and  117  missing 


376  TnE  BATTLE  OF  BELMOXT. 

— total,  641 ;    of  whom  562  were  in  the  five  regiments  originally  en 
gaged. 

General  Polk  says  in  his  report : 

The  number  of  prisoners  taken  by  the  enemy,  as  shown  by  their  list  fur 
nished  us,  was  106,  all  of  whom  have  returned  by  exchange. 

After  making  a  liberal  exchange  of  prisoners  with  the  enemy,  100  of  their 
prisoners  still  remain  in  my  hands,  one  stand  of  colors,  and  a  fraction  over 
1,000  stand  of  arms,  with  knapsacks,  ammunition,  and  other  military  stores. 

The  Rev.  P.  C.  Headley,  in  his  "Life  of  Grant,"  says,  "  The  rebels 
lost  2,800  men." 
"Badeau  says : 

At  Belmont,  General  Grant  lost  485  men  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing; 
125  of  his  wounded  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  rebels;  he  carried  off  175  prison 
ers  and  two  guns. 

General  Polk,  writing  November  10,  1861,  could  not  be  mistaken  as 
to  the  number  of  prisoners.  The  number  of  dead  must  have  been  much 
over  100  ;  and,  if  the  wounded  were  in  any  ordinary  ratio  to  the  other 
losses,  the  writer  is  constrained  to  believe  that  General  Badeau  is  in 
error  in  his  statement  of  the  losses  of  Grant's  army  at  Belmont.  The 
universal  testimony  of  those  who  remained  masters  of  the  field  made 
it  much  greater  that  he  sets  it  down. 

General  Grant,  writing  to  his  father  soon  after  the  battle,  says : 

General  McClernand  and  myself  each  had  our  horses  shot  under  us.  Most  of 
the  field-officers  met  with  the  same  loss,  besides  one-third  of  them  being  killed 
and  wounded. 

Pillow,  in  his  report,  says  : 

"We  buried  of  the  enemy,  295.  The  enemy,  under  a  flag  of  truce,  were  en 
gaged  at  the  same  labor  a  large  portion  of  the  day.  We  have  near  200  Federal 
prisoners. 

Major  J.  D.  Webster,  making  report  to  General  Grant  of  the  flag  of 
truce  sent,  asking  permission  to  bury  their  dead,  says  he  had  a  working- 
party  on  the  9th  thus  employed ;  and  learns  from  the  Confederate  com 
missioner  that  "the  number  (of  Federals)  reported  buried  by  them  (the 
Confederates)  on  the  field  yesterday,  was  68." 

General  Polk  estimates  the  Federal  loss  at  1,500.  Howison,  a  care 
ful  writer,  comparing  the  current  accounts  of  the  day,  says: 

The  Federal  loss,  as  stated  in  their  own  accounts,  was  607 ;  but  this  is  far 
below  the  truth.  According  to  this  account  they  had  64  killed,  while  it  is  cer- 


RESULTS.  377 

tain  more  than  200  of  their  dead  were  found  on  the  battle-field.    According  to 
the  usual  proportion,  their  total  loss  was  probably  not  less  than  1,200. 

Those  interpreters  of  Scripture  who  find  in  every  event  of  their  own 
time  a  fulfillment  of  prophecy,  noted  a  curious  verbal  coincidence  in 
the  fact  that  the  troops  of  Southern  Illinois,  popularly  known  as 
Egypt,  were  slain  and  buried  by  Tennessee  soldiers,  many  of  whom  were 
recruited  at  Memphis :  "  Egypt  shall  gather  them,  and  Memphis  shall 
bury  them." 

Grant  showed  his  usual  bravery  and  coolness  on  the  field.  On  the 
other  side,  Pillow  displayed  conspicuous  gallantry,  and  but  one  of  his 
staff  escaped  untouched.  General  Polk  complimented  Pillow  and  his 
officers  for  their  courage. 

A  member  of  Taylor's  battery  (Federal),  writing  home  next  day,1 
tells  his  friend  : 

We  returned  home  last  night  from  the  hardest-fought  battle  our  troops  have 
had  since  Wilson's  Creek.  It  is  the  old  story.  We  were  overpowered  by  supe 
rior  numbers  and  driven  from  the  field,  leaving  many  of  our  dead  and  dying, 
although  we  had  once  fairly  gained  the  victory.  .  .  .  The  whole  thing  was  an 
awful  "  bungle." 

This,  possibly,  may  be  the  criticism  of  many  a  military  (or  non- 
military)  reader  of  the  varied  accounts  of  this  opening  battle  of  the 
campaign. 

Whatever  other  comment  may  be  made,  or  lesson  drawn  from  it, 
its  story  is  highly  honorable  to  the  individual  courage,  tenacity,  and 
intelligence,  of  the  American  soldier.  Those  Western  troops,  who, 
fighting  forward  among  fallen  timber,  broke  through  a  Confederate 
line  not  much  weaker  than  their  own,  were  no  ordinary  men.  The 
shattered  and  routed  Southerners,  who,  after  an  hour's  interval,  were 
ready  to  join  in  an  irresistible  charge  that  reversed  the  fortunes  of 
the  day,  evinced  the  spirit  that  made  them  famous  on  so  many  fields. 
Federal  and  Confederate  alike  may  look  back  and  feel  that  there  was 
nothing  to  be  ashamed  of  in  the  fighting  at  Belmont. 

It  is,  indeed,  conceded  by  the  Federal  writers  that  the  prestige  of 
the  day  remained  with  the  Confederates.  Although  they  admit  this 
fact,  they  claim  that  it  was  unjust,  and  that  Grant  and  his  men  learned 
valuable  lessons  in  warfare  that  day,  which  is  doubtless  true.  Before 
the  battle,  General  Polk,  in  the  interests  of  humanity,  had  proposed  an 
exchange  of  prisoners,  to  which  General  Grant  made  a  haughty  reply, 
that  he  recognized  no  "  Southern  Confederacy."  After  the  battle,  how 
ever,  Grant  had  himself  to  send  a  flag  of  truce  to  reopen  the  negotia 
tions  he  had  spurned.  It  is  believed  he  ever  after  recognized  the  Con 
federates  as  belligerents. 

1  "  Rebellion  Record,"  vol.  Hi.,  p.  293. 


378  THE  FALL  CAMPAIGN. 

President  Davis,  on  the  8th  of  November,  replied  to  General  Folk's 
dispatch  announcing  the  victory  of  Belmont  : 

Your  telegraph  received.  Accept  for  yourself,  and  the  officers  and  men 
under  your  command,  my  sincere  thanks  for  the  glorious  contribution  you  have- 
just  made  to  our  common  cause.  Our  countrymen  must  long  remember  grate 
fully  the  activity  and  skill,  courage  and  devotion,  of  the  army  at  Belmont. 

J.  DAVIS. 

General  Johnston,  in  General  Order  No.  5,  after  thanks  and  congratu 
lations  to  Generals  Polk  and  Pillow,  and  to  the  men  engaged,  concludes  : 

This  was  no  ordinary  shock  of  arms ,  it  was  a  long  and  trying  contest,  in 
which  our  troops  fought  by  detachments,  and  always  against  superior  numbers. 
The  Tth  of  November  will  fill  a  bright  page  in  our  military  annals,  and  be  re 
membered  with  gratitude  by  the  sons  and  daughters  of  the  South. 

At  Belmont  the  gallant  Major  Edward  Butler  fell  mortally  wounded. 
He  was  a  man  of  splendid  presence  and  chivalric  nature,  the  grandson 
of  one  of  "  Washington's  four  colonels."  He  said  to  his  brother,  "  Take 
my  sword  to  my  father,  and  tell  him  I  died  like  a  gentleman  and  a 
Butler." 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

THE     FALL     CAMPAIGN. 

IT  has  been  seen  that  the  early  part  of  November  was  a  season  of 
hostile  activity  with  the  enemy.  It  was  also  marked  by  important 
changes  in  the  assignment  of  their  generals.  On  November  1st  Major- 
General  George  B.  McClellan  was  assigned  to  the  chief  command  of  the 
army,  in  place  of  Lieutenant-General  Scott,  retired.  On  November  9th 
the  Department  of  the  Cumberland  was  discontinued  by  the  United  States 
War  Department,  and  the  Department  of  the  Ohio  constituted,  em 
bracing  the  States  of  Ohio,  Michigan,  Indiana,  Kentucky  (east  of  the 
Cumberland  River),  and  Tennessee ;  and  Brigadier-General  D.  C.  Buell 
was  assigned  to  its  command,  which  he  assumed  November  15th.1  At 
the  same  time  General  H.  W.  Halleck  superseded  Fremont  in  command 
of  the  Department  of  the  West.  Sherman  was  removed  from  Kentucky, 
and  sent  to  report  to  Halleck.  His  memoirs  evince  that  he  left  Ken 
tucky  in  disappointment  and  bitterness  of  spirit,  and  deeply  distrusted 
by  his  Government — a  distrust  which  it  required  all  the  great  political 
influence  of  his  family  to  remove. 

Buell,  Sherman's  successor,  had  sterling  qualities — integrity,  ability, 
and  a  high  sense  of  the  soldierly  calling.  He  had  a  fine  faculty  for 
organization,  improved  by  long  training  as  an  assistant  adjutant-gen- 

1  "Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  vol.  i.,  p.  46. 


THE  REFUGEES.  379 

eral.  He  was  calm  and  resolute,  and  a  formidable  antagonist  for  any 
general.  Much  of  the  subsequent  efficiency  of  that  army  was  due  to 
the  share  Buell  had  in  its  formation. 

It  was  to  General  Johnston's  advantage  that  Buell  knew  him  only 
as  an  officer  cautious  and  provident  in  military  conduct,  and  that  he 
could  not  presume  him  to  have  taken  such  risks  as  he  did.  It  happens 
to  be  within  the  writer's  knowledge  that  General  Johnston  regarded 
what  he  conceived  to  be  Buell's  opinion  of  him  as  one  of  the  considera 
tions  to  be  weighed  in  determining  his  own  course  of  action. 

The  camp  at  Bowling  Green  was  a  city  of  refuge  for  Kentuckians 
whose  sense  of  duty  forced  them  to  side  with  the  South  in  the  pending 
contest.  When  Buckner  entered  Kentucky,  in  the  middle  of  Septem 
ber,  the  Union  leaders  and  the  United  States  military  authorities  feared 
greatly  an  immediate  revolt  of  the  State-rights  party.  Breckinridge 
was  counseling  the  people,  but  with  his  usual  prudence,  to  organize 
against  encroachments  on  their  State-rights.  William  Preston  and 
Humphrey  Marshall,  with  more  vehemence,  were  urging  them  to  meas 
ures  of  resistance.  Southern  sympathizers  everywhere  denounced  the 
fraud  which  had  been  practised  in  the  name  of  neutrality.  A  dan 
gerous  excitement  existed,  which,  if  left  longer,  might  have  produced 
serious  results.  But  the  propitious  moment  had  long  passed  when  suc 
cessful  revolt  was  possible  in  Kentucky.  The  time  had  come  when  the 
Federal  Government  could  give  the  final  blow  to  the  cherished  doctrine 
of  neutrality,  and  it  did  not  hesitate  at  stern  measures  of  repression, 
altogether  alien  to  American  ideas.  It  took  its  warrant  in  its  fears. 

On  September  19th  Hon.  Charles  A.  Morehead,  a  man  eminent  for 
character  and  ability,  was  seized  at  his  home,  near  Louisville,  and,  with 
out  warrant  of  law,  was  hurried  off  to  prison  in  Boston  Harbor.  More- 
head  had  been  Governor  of  the  Commonwealth,  and  the  intimate  friend 
of  Clay.  Though  a  strong  sympathizer  with  the  South,  he  had  been 
conservative  and  opposed  to  disunion.  His  arrest  gave  a  great  shock  in 
Kentucky,  in  proportion  to  its  rude  lawlessness.  It  evinced  that  in  war 
the  laws  are  silent,  and  that  no  bulwark  was  left  against  the  terrorism  of 
brute  force.  On  the  same  night,  Reuben  T.  Durrett,  formerly  editor  of 
the  Louisville  Courier,  and  Martin  W.  Barr,  of  the  telegraph -office,  were 
arrested ;  and  these  arrests  were  rapidly  followed  by  others,  of  aged, 
wealthy,  and  eminent  citizens,  who  were  carried  off  to  captivity  in  the 
free  States.  On  the  same  day,  September  19th,  Colonel  Bramlette, 
with  his  command,  reached  Lexington,  to  arrest  Breckinridge,  Preston, 
and  other  Southern-rights  men.  But  these  received  timely  intimation 
of  their  danger,  and  escaped.  Humphrey  Marshall,  George  B.  Hodge, 
John  S.  Williams,  Haldeman  and  McKee,  of  the  Courier,  and  many 
other  Southern  sympathizers,  warned  by  these  events,  or  by  secret 
friendly  messages,  also  found  their  way  to  the  Confederate  lines. 


380  THE  FALL   CAMPAIGN. 

These  fugitives  resorted  either  to  Richmond  or  to  Bowling  Green, 
according  to  the  direction  of  their  escape,  or  for  other  reasons.  Breck- 
inridge,  after  a  short  stay  in  Richmond,  went  to  Bowling  Green,  where, 
on  October  8th,  he  issued  a  noble  and  stirring  address  to  the  people  of 
Kentucky.  It  recites  the  causes  that  drove  so  many  loyal  and  patriotic 
citizens  into  that  attitude  of  armed  resistance  to  the  United  States  Gov 
ernment  which  Northern  people  are  pleased  to  call  rebellion.  The 
writer  would  be  glad  to  embody  this  address  here,  but  space  does  not 
permit.  It  may  be  found  in  the  "  Rebellion  Record,"  vol.  iii.,  page  254. 
In  concluding  his  address,  Breckinridge  used  this  language  : 

For  those  who,  denied  by  the  Legislature  the  protection  due  to  the  humblest 
citizen,  have  been  delivered  over  to  the  tender  mercies  of  foreign  mercenaries, 
and  hunted  like  partridges  on  the  mountains,  what  remains,  but  imprisonment, 
exile,  or  resistance?  As  one  of  them,  I  intend  to  resist.  I  will  avoid  conflict 
with  Kentuckians,  except  in  necessary  self-defense,  but  I  will  unite  with  my  fel 
low-citizens  to  resist  the  invaders  who  have  driven  us  from  our  homes.  To  this 
course  we  are  impelled  by  the  highest  sense  of  duty  and  the  irresistible  instincts 
of  manhood.  To  defend  your  birthright  and  mine,  which  is  more  precious  than 
domestic  ease,  or  property,  or  life,  I  exchange,  with  proud  satisfaction,  a  term  of 
six  years  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States  for  the  musket  of  a  soldier. 

Breckinridge  returned  to  Richmond  soon  after  issuing  this  address. 
He  wras  appointed  a  brigadier-general,  and  sent  to  General  Johnston, 
who  assigned  him  to  the  command  of  the  Kentucky  Brigade,  November 
14th.  We  here  behold  a  man,  who  had  lately  been  Vice-President  and 
a  candidate  for  President,  exchanging  the  senatorial  rank  for  the  com 
mand  of  a  little  band  of  exiles,  in  obedience  to  principle  ;  and  this  they 
call  treason ! 

In  Breckinridge's  eloquent  peroration,  quoted  above,  there  was  an 
antithesis  that  struck  agreeably  on  the  popular  ear.  A  friend  has  sent 
the  \vriter  a  shrewd  remark  of  General  Johnston  in  regard  to  it.  To 
one  inquiring  of  him  what  had  become  of  Breckinridge,  he  replied,  "He 
has  gone  to  Richmond  to  get  his  musket" 

General  Johnston  set  a  high  value,  however,  on  the  talents  as  well 
as  the  prestige  of  Breckinridge.  His  calmness  and  reticence,  his  manly 
courtesy  and  high  courage,  his  good  judgment  and  tenacity,  not  less 
than  more  striking  qualities,  commended  him  to  his  commander.  Hence 
General  Johnston  gave  him  exceptional  opportunities  for  distinction, 
and  on  his  own  last  great  day  at  Shiloh  gave  him  a  corps  to  command, 
with  which  Breckinridge  made  a  record  that  fixed  his  reputation  as  a 
soldier. 

Besides  Breckinridge  and  others  who  entered  the  army,  many  civil 
ians  had  gathered  at  Bowling  Green.  Some  of  these  were  men  of  mark 
in  the  State  ;  very  mam^  had  a  local  importance  that  pointed  them  out 


KENTUCKY  PROVISIONAL  GOVERNMENT.  381 

to  the  vengeance  of  the  Federal  Government,  and  almost  all  were  em 
bittered  by  exile,  disappointment,  and  wounded  patriotism.  They  saw 
the  recreant  Legislature  registering  orders  from  military  headquarters 
as  legislative  acts  against  them,  which,  if  impotent,  were  yet  insulting 
— a  burlesque  on  law-making — statutes  for  divorce  from  their  wives, 
statutes  threatening  the  penitentiary  as  a  penalty,  statutes  condemning 
them  to  death.  It  was  suggested  that  a  provisional  government,  repre 
senting  the  Southern  outlawed  element  of  the  people,  would  serve  as  a 
rallying-point  for  Confederate  sentiment,  and  give  color  of  legality  to 
many  things  necessary  to  be  done. 

The  plan  of  a  provisional  government  was  privately  proposed  to 
General  Johnston,  and  the  leaders  of  the  movement  were  much  aston 
ished  and  disappointed  to  find  that  he  disapproved  of  it.  In  fact,  though 
he  could  not  make  known  to  them  his  reasons,  he  already  contemplated 
the  contingency  of  being  driven  from  the  State,  and  foresaw  the  aggra 
vated  force  with  which  this  disappointment  would  react  on  Kentuckians, 
and  he  did  not  desire  the  additional  embarrassment  of  the  perambulating 
pageant  of  a  State  government  on  wheels.  Hence  he  offered  such  dis 
couragement  as  he  could  to  the  project,  without  taking  any  open  or 
active  stand  against  it  ;  recognizing  indeed,  too,  the  good  side  of  the 
scheme.  It  was  not  possible  to  arrest  the  movement  without  an  ungra 
cious  thwarting  of  men  ardent  in  the  cause  of  the  South  and  devoted 
to  its  interests.  Hence  it  was  gradually  determined,  from  the  various 
motives  that  control  men  under  such  circumstances,  to  establish  the 
provisional  government. 

A  conference  was  held  at  Russellville,  October  29th,  in  accordance 
with  previous  notice,  which  was  numerously  attended,  and  over  which 
presided  Henry  C.  Burnett,  who  had  retired  from  the  United  States 
Congress.  Resolutions  were  passed,  denouncing  the  United  States 
Government  and  the  State  government,  and  recommending  that  a  con 
vention  should  meet  November  18th.  Accordingly,  a  convention,  irreg 
ularly  chosen,  it  is  true,  and  professedly  revolutionary,  met  on  Novem 
ber  18th  at  Russellville.  Henry  C.  Burnett  again  presided,  and  Robert 
McKee  was  secretary.  An  ordinance  of  secession  was  passed,  and  a 
provisional  government  was  set  up,  with  a  Governor  and  ten  council- 
men  of  ample  powers,  including  authority  to  negotiate  a  treaty  with 
the  Confederate  States,  and  to  elect  Senators  and  Representatives  to 
its  Congress. 

The  Governor  elected  by  the  convention  was  George  W.  Johnson, 
of  Scott  County.  He  was  a  nephew  of  Richard  M.  Johnson,  who  had 
been  Vice-President  under  Van  Buren,  and  belonged  to  a  numerous, 
wealthy,  and  powerful  connection,  in  Kentucky  and  the  South.  George 
\V.  Johnson  was  of  a  very  lofty  and  noble  nature.  He  was  impetuous 
and  sensitive,  and  his  impassioned  temperament  sometimes  warped  the 


382  THE  FALL  CAHPAIGK 

correctness  of  his  judgment ;  but  his  talents  were  fine,  his  impulses 
generous,  and  his  ideas  of  public  duty  very  high.  He  had  received  an 
excellent  education,  and  had  acted  as  a  professor  of  mathematics  in  his 
youth.  He  was  fond  of  reading,  and  had  both  wealth  and  culture. 
Dispensing  liberal  hospitality,  he  yet  practised  for  himself  a  total  absti 
nence  from  all  liquors.  He  was  a  friend  of  General  Johnston,  and  per 
sonally  every  way  acceptable  to  him.  Much  beloved  by  the  Kentuck- 
ians  in  life,  his  self-sacrifice  and  heroic  death  endeared  to  them  his 
memory. 

An  act  had  been  passed  by  the  Confederate  Government,  August 
28th,  appropriating  a  million  dollars  to  aid  Kentucky  in  repelling  inva 
sion.  It  was  five  or  six  months  too  late.  Employed  early  enough,  it 
might  have  been  a  fair  offset  to  the  millions  used  in  the  State  by  the 
United  States  Government.  By  an  act  of  Congress,  approved  Decem 
ber  10th,  Kentucky  was  "  admitted  a  member  of  the  Confederate  States 
of  America  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  other  States  of  this  Confed 
eracy." 

On  November  llth  a  large  Dahlgren  gun  burst  at  Columbus,  killing 
Captain  Reiter,  Lieutenant  Snowden,  and  five  gunners.  General  Polk 
was  injured,  the  shock  producing  deafness,  sickness,  and  great  nervous 
prostration,  which  lasted  several  weeks.  In  the  mean  time  his  duties 
devolved  on  General  Pillow.  Polk  offered  his  resignation,  which  was 
declined.  He  wrote  to  General  Johnston,  November  28th,  "  I  have 
waived  my  resignation,  as  Davis  seems  very  much  opposed  to  it,  and 
shall  endeavor  to  do  my  duty." 

A  reference  to  Chapter  XXII.  will  show  that  General  Johnston  was 
earnestly  striving  to  raise  troops  during  November  and  December,  and 
it  was  about  this  time,  November  19th,  that  he  called  on  Tennessee, 
Mississippi,  and  Alabama,  to  furnish  him  militia,  using  the  most  urgent 
appeals. 

On  the  27th  of  November  he  wrote  the  Secretary  of  War,  reporting 
a  continued  increase  of  the  enemy's  force,  which  had  augmented  in  his 
front  to  thirty-seven  regiments.  The  rest  of  the  letter  is  as  follows  : 

I  suppose  a  change  of  the  plan  of  operations  has  been  made,  and  that  the 
force  intended  for  East  Tennessee  will  now  be  combined  with  the  force  on  this 
line,  making  an  aggregate  strength  of  probably  more  than  50,000  men  to  be  ar 
rayed  against  my  forces  here. 

If  the  forces  of  the  enemy  are  manoeuvred  as  I  think  they  may  be,  I  may  be 
compelled  to  retire  from  this  place' to  cover  Nashville  with  the  aid  of  the  volun 
teer  force  now  being  organized,  which  could  in  that  way  be  brought  in  coop 
eration. 

It  is  understood  that  General  Halleck,  who  will  command  at  Columbus,  and 
General  Buell,  who  is  in  command  on  this  line,  will  make  a  simultaneous  attack. 

I  doubt  if  Buell  will  make  a  serious  attack  on  my  position  here.  I  hope  he 
may.  I  have  requested  General  Crittenden  to  send  a  portion  of  his  force  to 


MORGAN  AND  DUKE.  333 

Nashville,  if  in  his  judgment  it  can  be  done  without  weakening  his  force  too 
much.  .  .  . 

We  still  have  a  great  many  sick,  but  the  measles  which  so  afflicted  our  troops 
spreads  much  more  slowly.  The  workmen  of  the  enemy  are  rebuilding  the 
railroad-bridge  over  Green  River. 

At  daybreak,  on  the  4th  of  December,  a  body  of  forty  or  fifty  Fed 
eral  Home  Guards,  under  Captain  Netter,  attacked  Whippoorwill 
Bridge,  five  or  six  miles  from  Russellville,  on  the  railroad  from  Bowling 
Green  to  Memphis.  It  was  guarded  by  a  detail  of  thirteen  men  from 
the  Ninth  Kentucky  Infantry  (Confederate).  All  were  asleep,  except 
four  on  guard.  These  fired  on  the  assailants,  with  effect,  as  was  sup 
posed.  A  volley  was  returned,  which  killed  two  and  wounded  another 
of  the  guard.  The  rest,  being  surrounded,  surrendered.  The  enemy 
then  set  fire  to  the  bridge,  but  left  too  hurriedly  to  do  it  much  damage. 
Some  of  the  prisoners  escaped. 

On  the  6th  of  December  Captain  John  H.  Morgan,  with  105  men, 
crossed  Green  River,  near  .Munfordsville,  and  made  a  dash  on  Bacon 
Creek  railroad-bridge,  which  was  within  the  enemy's  lines,  and  had 
just  been  rebuilt.  This  he  burned  and  utterly  destroyed,  and  then  re 
turned  to  his  camp  without  loss. 

John  H.  Morgan  was  the  captain  of  a  volunteer  company  in  the 
Kentucky  State  Guard,  at  Lexington.  His  brother-in-law,  Basil  W. 
Duke,  had  been  prominent  in  St.  Louis  as  a  secessionist  before  the 
discomfiture  of  his  party  there.  He  then  came  to  Kentucky,  and  en 
tered  Morgan's  company  as  a  lieutenant.  Both  became  brigadier- 
generals  during  the  war.  It  was  a  question  among  Confederates  which 
of  the  two  was  the  more  excellent  as  a  partisan  leader.  In  truth,  both 
had  the  qualities  that  make  success  in  this  form  of  warfare — audacity, 
wariness,  enterprise,  and  unfailing  resources.  Morgan  lost  his  life  in 
the  war,  and  his  friend  and  comrade  became  his  biographer.  Duke's 
"  Life  of  Morgan,"  without  any  attempt  at  art,  has  the  rare  merit  of 
combining  truth  and  picturesqueness  in  narration.  It  is  the  work  of  an 
intelligent  soldier  and  an  honest  gentleman. 

When  Bramlette  invaded  Lexington,  .Morgan  secured  his  arms  and 
got  away  with  his  company  on  the  20th  of  September.  He  was  joined 
at  Bardstown  by  Captain  Wickliffe's  company,  and  they  reached  Buck- 
ner  in  safety  on  the  30th  of  September.  Morgan  was  soon  put  in  com 
mand  of  a  squadron,  composed  of  his  own  company,  Captain  Bowles's, 
and  Captain  Allen's,  and  did  excellent  service  on  outpost  duty,  getting 
here  the  training  that  afterward  made  him  famous.  It  has  already 
been  mentioned  that  seven  regiments  of  Kentucky  infantry  were  re 
cruited  at  Bowling  Green  during  the  autumn  of  1861,  though  some  of 
them  were  feeble  in  numbers. 

To  carry  out  General  Johnston's  designs  alreadv  indicated,  and  for 
26 


384  THE  FALL  CAMPAIGN. 

the  special  purpose  of  breaking  up  the  railroad  south  of  Woodsonville, 
General  Hindman  moved  on  that  place,  December  17th,  with  1,100 
infantry,  250  cavalry,  and  four  pieces  of  artillery.  Woodsonville  is 
the  railroad-station  on  the  south  bank  of  Green  River,  and  was  occupied 
by  Willich's  Thirty-second  Indiana  Regiment.  Willich  seems  to  have 
been  an  officer  of  merit ;  and  his  regiment  of  Germans,  commanded  in 
this  affair  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Von  Trebra,  showed  soldierly  quali 
ties.  Having  lost  some  pickets  a  few  days  before,  they  were  on  the 
alert ;  and,  on  the  approach  of  Hindman,  threw  out  some  companies  as 
skirmishers.  The  Federal  advance  was  in  force  on  the  north  bank. 
The  south  bank  was  fringed  with  timber,  in  front  of  which  were  open 
fields,  bordered  by  another  forest.  Through  this  Hindman  advanced 
almost  to  the  edge  of  the  opening;  but  halted,  while  still  concealed  in 
the  woods,  three-quarters  of  a  mile  from  the  river. 

Von  Trebra's  skirmishers  were  driven  in  by  a  vollejr.  Hindman's 
purpose  was  to  decoy  the  Federals  up  the  hill,  out  of  range  of  the 
enemy's  batteries,  where  he  could  employ  his  infantry  and  artillery 
against  them  ;  and  he  gave  Colonel  Terry  orders  to  that  effect.  The 
Confederate  cavalry  were  chiefly  used  as  flankers,  watching  the  fords. 
But  Terry  took  seventy-five  of  his  Rangers,  and  fell  upon  a  body  of  the 
enemy,  said  in  their  account  Jo  be  a  company,  deployed  as  skirmishers. 
When  he  found  himself  in  front  of  a  foe,  Terry's  fierce  and  impetuous 
courage,  trained  in  the  border  warfare  of  the  West,  broke  through  the 
rules  of  prudence.  The  spirit  of  combat  was  upon  him  ;  and,  charging 
with  half  a  dozen  comrades  in  advance,  he  rushed  upon  the  squads,  or 
"nests,"  as  he  called  them,  who  were  rallying  by  fours,  using  his  re 
volver  with  deadly  effect.  Bursting  upon  one  of  these  "nests,"  he 
killed  two  Germans,  when  he  was  himself  slain  by  a  ball  through  the 
brain.  A  companion  instantly  avenged  his  death.  The  Federals  fled 
to  the  shelter  of  their  guns,  and  the  Texans  bore  the  dead  body  of  their 
chief  from  the  field.  Thus  fell  a  fearless  leader. 

McCook  now  began  to  send  over  troops  to  the  support  of  Von 
Trebra  ;  and,  after  some  further  skirmishing  and  artillery-practice,  the 
firing  ceased  on  both  sides.  The  opponents  remained  awhile  in  observa 
tion  ;  when  Hindman,  having  accomplished  the  chief  purposes  of  his 
demonstration,  and  finding  that  nothing  more  was  to  be  done  without 
drawing  upon  himself  the  whole  weight  of  the  Federal  force,  which  he 
did  not  desire,  slowly  withdrew  without  being  followed.  His  loss  was 
four  killed  and  ten  wounded,  all  from  Terry's  regiment  except  two 
slightly  wounded  in  Marmaduke's  battalion.  The  Federal  loss  was  ten 
killed,  twenty-two  wounded,  and  eight  prisoners. 

The  Texan  Rangers  had  been  allowed,  at  their  own  request,  to 
report  to  General  Johnston.  Terry  was  his  personal  friend.  They  had 
since  been  very  actively  and  usefully  employed  on  this  front  ;  but  in 


TEXAX  RANGERS  AND   FORREST'S  CAVALRY.  385 

this,  their  first  engagement,  they  had  the  misfortune  to  lose  their 
colonel.  They  left  Houston  1,160  strong,  and  were  augmented  during 
their  term  of  service  by  500  recruits;  they  shared  in  more  than  one 
hundred  engagements  from  first  to  last  ;  and  finally  surrendered,  at  the 
close  of  the  war,  244  men  in  all,  with  but  one  deserter  during  that  time  ! 
This  is  a  noble  record  ;  but  their  fame  was  dearly  bought  with  the 
blood  of  most  of  these  peerless  horsemen,  who,  following  the  example 
of  their  chivalric  leader,  rode  gayly  and  dauntlessly  down  to  death. 

In  the  second  week  in  October  a  cavalry  battalion  of  eight  com 
panies  was  organized  at  Memphis,  of  which  Nathan  Bedford  Forrest 
was  elected  lieutenant-colonel.  It  was  soon  after  increased  to  a 
regiment.  Both  this  command  and  its  leader  were  greatly  distinguished 
during  the  war.  Forrest's  biography 1  has  been  written,  and  his  ex 
ploits  are  well  known.  He  was  a  man  whose  indomitable  energy  and 
eager  spirit  would  have  won  distinction  in  any  active  vocation.  With 
out  the  aid  of  influence  or  education,  he  had  achieved  wealth  and  local 
power  in  time  of  peace.  Without  military  training,  or  special  ad 
vantages,  he  became  famous  in  a  four  years'  war  as  a  bold  and  enter 
prising  trooper,  and  a  formidable  soldier  wherever  he  crossed  swords. 

Forrest  was  forty  years  of  age  when  the  war  broke  out.  Deter 
mined  to  raise  a  cavalry  command,  he  ventured  to  Louisville,  Kentucky, 
after  the  battle  of  Manassas,  and  with  his  own  money  bought  and 
brought  away  the  arms  and  equipments  requisite  to  put  them  in  the 
field.  His  eight  companies  numbered  650  men,  Alabamians,  Tennes- 
seeans,  Kentuckians,  and  Texans — a  mixed  command.  They  rendez 
voused  at  Fort  Donelson  late  in  October,  and,  moving  thence  to  Hop- 
kinsville,  were  thrown  forward,  about  the  middle  of  November,  by 
General  Tilghman,  commanding  there,  to  observe  the  section  between 
the  Green  and  Cumberland  Rivers. 

Major  Kelly,  with  one  squadron,  traversed  the  country  to  the  Ohio 
River,  where  he  captured  a  supply-transport,  well  loaded.  Having 
rejoined  Forrest,  they  attacked  the  Federal  gunboat  Conestoga  at  Can 
ton  Landing.  The  novel  sight  was  there  witnessed  of  a  fight  between 
cavalry  and  a  gunboat  ;  the  latter  belching  thunders  from  nine  heavy 
guns,  the  former  rattling  her  iron  sides  with  a  four-pounder  and  show 
ers  of  Minie-balls.  Little  damage  was  done  on  either  side ;  and,  after 
six  hours'  firing,  the  gunboat  retired. 

Forrest  was  almost  constantly  on  picket  until  the  28th  of  Decem 
ber,  when  he  had  a  heavy  skirmish  at  Sacramento,  which  further  en 
couraged  the  Confederates.  General  T.  L.  Crittenden  was  reported 
at  Calhoun,  on  the  north  bank  of  Green  River,  with  a  large  force,  and 
with  designs  looking  to  an  advance.  General  Johnston  ordered  a  cav 
alry  reconnaissance,  and  Forrest  moved,  December  26th,  with  300  men, 
J  "Life  of  General  N.  B.  Forrest,"  by  Colonel  Thomas  Jordan. 


386  TnE  FALL  CAMPAIGN. 

over  muddy,  icy  roads,  toward  Greenville,  which  he  reached  on  the 
28th.  Learning,  about  eight  miles  beyond  Greenville,  that  some  400  or 
500  Federal  cavalry  were  not  far  off,  Forrest  went  forward  rapidly 
along  the  heavy  roads  to  overtake  them.  Near  the  village  of  Sacra 
mento,  a  young  girl,  full  of  patriotic  ardor,  galloped  down  to  point  out 
to  the  Southerners  the  enemy's  position. 

When  Forrest  overtook  the  rear-guard  of  the  Federal  cavalry,  his 
dash  of  thirty  miles  had  left  him  but  150  men.  He  drove  the  rear 
guard  into  the  village  where  the  Federals  had  posted  themselves. 
Charging  up,  he  found  the  enemy  too  strong  for  his  jaded  and  scat 
tered  command,  and  retired  to  reform  it.  The  elated  Federals  took 
heart,  and,  leaving  their  vantage-ground,  followed  him.  But  Forrest, 
by  this  time  reenforced  by  the  arrival  of  many  stragglers,  turned  upon 
his  pursuers,  routed  them,  and  chased  them  pell-mell  from  the  field  for 
three  miles.  In  this  hot  pursuit  Forrest  was  among  the  foremost ;  and 
is  said,  single-handed,  to  have  engaged  three  adversaries  at  once,  kill 
ing  a  trooper,  mortally  wounding  Captain  Bacon,  and  overthrowing 
and  capturing  Captain  Davis.  The  story  is  not  improbable,  as  his  per 
sonal  prowess  was  extraordinary.  Forrest's  report  puts  the  Federal 
loss  at  sixty-five  killed  and  thirty-five  wounded  and  captured  ;  includ 
ing  a  captain  and  lieutenant  killed,  and  a  captain  and  lieutenant 
wounded.  Captain  Albert  Bacon  was  from  Frankfort,  Kentucky,  and 
his  courage  and  soldierly  conduct  are  noticed  by  Forrest.  On  the 
Confederate  side  the  chivalric  Captain  Meriweather  and  private  Terry 
were  killed,  and  three  privates  wounded. 

Forrest  returned  to  Hopkinsville,  and  was  employed  in  routine  duty 
until  January  10,  1862.  He  then  made  another  reconnaissance  toward 
Green  River,  where  he  found  a  heavy  Federal  force,  and,  in  returning, 
burned  the  bridges  over  Pond  River,  a  tributary  of  Green  River. 
When  General  Clark  retired  from  Hopkinsville  to  Clarksville,  Febru 
ary  7th,  Forrest  covered  his  retreat.  Thence  he  went  to  Fort  Donel- 
son,  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  defence  there. 

The  following  letters  to  the  Secretary  of  War  explain  the  situation 
in  Kentucky  in  December.  It  will  be  remembered  that  it  was  at  the 
date  of  the  second  of  these  letters,  Christmas-day,  that  General  John 
ston  addressed  his  energetic  appeal  for  aid  to  the  Southern  Governors : 

HEADQUARTERS,  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT,  > 
BOWLING  GREEN,  December  8, 1861.     f 

SIB  :  The  enemy,  from  the  best  information  I  am  able  to  obtain,  have  made 
no  material  change  in  the  disposition  of  their  forces  in  front  or  on  either  flank. 
Their  advance  in  front  is  six  miles  north  of  Bacon  Creek,  near  the  Lonisville 
Railroad,  a  large  force  at  Nolin,  and,  farther  north,  toward  Louisville,  they  are 
massed  in  considerable  force  at  different  points  convenient  for  concentrating 
them.  I  do  not  doubt  that  the  Federal  Government  is  augmenting  their  force 
in  Kentucky  in  this  direction  to  the  extent  of  their  ability. 


LETTERS  TO   SECRETARY  BENJAMIN.  387 

The  inclosed  letter  will  serve  to  show  the  disposition  they  are  making  of 
different  army  corps,  which  have  been  elsewhere  employed.  As  to  the  estimate 
of  their  forces,  I  suppose  it  is  a  gross  exaggeration.  "With  the  addition  of  Nel 
son's  and  Eosecrans's  columns  their  force  on  this  immediate  line  I  believe  ought 
not  to  be  estimated  over  65,000  men. 

Our  returns  at  this  place  show  a  force  of  between  18,000  and  19,000,  of 
which  about  5,000  are  sick  (about  3,600  at  Nashville),  and  our  effective  force  is 
under  13,000  men. 

The  volunteers,  I  hear,  are  turning  out  well,  but  the  time  taken  up  in  pro 
curing  arms  has  thus  far  prevented  much  accession  to  our  force  from  that 
source.  .  .  . 

To  the  Hon.  J.  P.  BENJAMIN,  Secretary  of  War. 

HEADQUARTERS,  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT,  1 
BOWLING  GREEN,  December  25, 1861.     J 

SIE  :  The  recent  movement  of  the  enemy,  and  the  concentration  of  heavy 
masses  of  troops,  indicated  an  early  advance ;  and  the  weather,  which  has  been 
unusually  fine,  resembling  the  fall  rather  than  winter,  rendered  it  probable  that 
a  battle  would  be  fought  in  this  vicinity. 

Information  from  various  sources  shows  that  every  effort  has  been  made  by 
General  Buell  to  concentrate  all  his  strength  for  a  movement  upon  Tennessee 
through  Central  Kentucky,  and  that  not  less  than  75,000  men  are  assembled  in 
front  of  me,  while  I  have  not  more  than  1T,000  men  for  active  operations. 

After  a  careful  examination,  I  have  found  the  line  of  the  Barren  River  the 
only  good  defensible  one  between  Green  River  and  Nashville.  Bowling  Green, 
from  its  topography,  is  naturally  a  strong  position,  and  gives  command  over 
Central  Kentucky,  south  of  Green  River,  and  has  easy  communication  by  rail 
road  and  turnpike  to  Nashville.  Its  local  advantages  for  defense  are  good, 
though  requiring  a  large  force  for  that  purpose,  as  it  is  situated  in  an  amphi 
theatre  of  some  extent.  The  place  has  been  strengthened  by  good  defensive 
works,  requiring  about  4,000  men  for  their  defense,  and  to  be  supported  by  a 
large  force.  I  have,  as  a  further  precaution,  ordered  intrenchments  to  be 
thrown  up,  under  the  direction  of  my  chief-engineer,  Major  Gilmer,  at  Nash 
ville.  These  arrangements  are  such  that  they  perhaps  double  the  efficiency  of 
my  force  for  the  defense  of  this  line. 

The  enemy  have  recently  reconstructed  the  bridge  between  Green  River  and 
Louisville,  and  have  thrown  forward  a  strong  advance  to  Woodsonville,  with 
which  Terry's  cavalry  had  a  successful  rencounter  on  the  17th  instant,  in  which 
we  had  the  misfortune  to  lose  the  gallant  leader  of  it.  These  forces,  in  heavy 
masses,  are  stationed  at  Woodsonville,  Bacon  Creek,  Nolin,  etc.  There  is  also  a 
corps  of  about  6,000  men  at  Columbia,  which  is  being  rapidly  reenforced. 
There  is  another  considerable  force  at  Lebanon,  at  the  terminus  of  the  Louis 
ville  Railroad,  and  another  at  Somerset.  The  banks  of  Green  River  from  Mun- 
fordsville  down  are  unoccupied,  as  the  country  is  quite  rugged,  except  by  a  force 
under  General  T.  L.  Crittenden. 

These  dispositions  of  their  troops  are  in  accordance  with  information  re 
ceived  from  various  sources,  and  lead  to  the  belief  that  a  forward  movement 
will  very  soon  be  made  in  this  direction  ;  but,  at  present,  I  can  only  conjecture 
whether  they  will  make  their  attack  here,  or  turn  my  right,  or,  relying  upon 
their  superiority  of  numbers,  attempt  both  at  the  same  time.  If  Floyd's  bri- 


388  THE  FALL  CAMPAIGN. 

gade,  from  Virginia,  and  Bowen's  division,  en  route  from  Columbus,  reach 
here  as  I  expect  in  a  few  days,  they  will  be  compelled  to  attack  me  here  with 
my  force  thus  considerably  increased.  I  do  not  think  they  will  attempt  to 
turn  my  position. 

General  Hindman,  with  his  brigade  of  Hardee's  division,  is  at  Bell's,  on  the 
railroad  and  pike,  with  Swett's  battery ;  his  front  is  covered  with  the  Texas  and 
Arkansas  Cavalry.  Breckinridge,  with  his  brigade  of  Buckner's  division,  is  at 
Oakland,  ten  miles  in  rear  of  Hindman's,  with  Morgan's  cavalry,  in  the  direction 
of  Brownsville.  Helm,  with  his  regiment  of  Kentucky  Cavalry,  has  been  or 
dered  back  to  Skegg's  Creek  bridge  and  the  Barren  bridge,  on  the  route  from 
Scottsville  to  Glasgow.  His  scouts  keep  the  country  under  observation  toward 
Woodsonville  and  Columbia.  Should  the  enemy  move  in  force  on  this  route, 
the  bridge  across  the  Barren  and  other  streams  toward  Glasgow  will  be  burned. 
The  remainder  of  the  divisions  of  Ilardee  and  Buckner,  and  the  sixty  days'  State 
troops  from  Mississippi,  recently  arrived,  under  the  command  of  Major-General 
R.  Davis,  are  stationed  here — my  whole  force  amounting,  as  before  remarked,  to 
17,000  men. 

A  brigade,  under  General  Clark,  is  posted  at  Hopkinsville,  to  guard  against 
the  movements  of  the  enemy  on  the  Lower  Green  River  toward  Clarksville,  and 
to  follow  their  movements  should  they  attempt  to  cooperate  with  the  movements 
of  the  enemy  in  my  front ;  his  force  should  be  much  greater  for  these  purposes. 

The  measures  adopted  at  Columbus  render  that  place  comparatively  secure 
from  any  immediate  attempt  of  the  enemy. 

The  position  of  General  Zollicoffer  on  the  Cumberland  holds  in  check  the 
meditated  invasion  and  hoped-for  revolt  in  East  Tennessee,  but  I  can  neither 
order  Zollicoffer  to  join  me  here,  nor  withdraw  any  more  force  from  Columbus, 
without  imperiling  our  communications  toward  Richmond,  or  endangering  Ten 
nessee  and  the  Mississippi  Valley.  This  I  have  resolved  not  to  do,  but  have 
chosen,  on  the  contrary,  to  post  my  inadequate  force  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
hold  the  enemy  in  check,  guard  the  frontier,  and  hold  the  Barren  till  the 
winter  terminates  the  campaign ;  or,  if  any  fault  in  his  movements  is  com 
mitted,  or  his  line  become  exposed  where  his  force  is  developed,  to  attack  him 
as  opportunity  offers. 

If  the  campaign  closes  without  any  striking  success  to  their  arms,  and  with 
out  any  impression  on  our  territory,  the  North  must  shrink  disheartened  from 
the  contest,  and,  with  embarrassed  relations  if  not  hostile  attitude  toward  Eng 
land,  the  first  step  toward  our  independence  is  gained.  The  contest  here  must 
be  relinquished  for  the  winter  by  the  enemy,  or  a  decisive  blow  soon  struck ; 
to  make  the  latter  is  their  true  policy.  .  .  . 

To  the  Hon.  J.  P.  BENJAMIN,  Secretary  of  War. 

On  the  23d  of  December  the  office  and  storehouse  of  the  Ordnance 
Department  at  Nashville  were  set  on  fire  by  an  incendiary,  and  entirely 
consumed.  "  The  loss  was  heavy  :  between  400  and  600  sets  of  artil 
lery-harness,  10,000  to  12,000  sets  of  accoutrements  and  equipments  for 
infantry,  300  cavalry-saddles,  2,000,000  percussion-caps,  6,000  friction- 
primers,  besides  numerous  other  articles  of  supply."  l 

1  Report  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  M.  H,  Wright,  December  23,  1861. 


ANECDOTES.  389 

The  following  little  anecdote  is  furnished  by  a  friend,  as  an  illustra 
tion  of  General  Johnston's  natural  fitness  for  command,  and  quiet  mode 
of  self-assertion.  It  was  related  to  him  by  a  gallant  Louisiana  colonel : 

"In  the  days  around  Bowling  Green,"  said  ,  "I  was  in  command  of 

the  —  -  Louisiana  Cavalry,  and  was  required  to  picket  over  an  extensive  dis 
trict.  The  work  was  onerous,  and  I  became  restive  under  it,  and  made  several 
requests  and  suggestions  with  the  view  to  being  relieved ;  none  of  which,  how 
ever,  were  approved.  Feeling  myself  aggrieved,  and  not  having  yet  acquired 
even  the  small  modicum  of  discipline  which  later  on  we  learned,  I  determined 
to  call  at  headquarters  and  state  my  grievances  in  person.  As  I  entered  the  gen 
eral's  tent,  I  saw  a  tall,  soldierly  man  writing,  with  his  back  to  me.  Full  of  my 
own  consequence  and  fancied  wrongs,  I  broke  forth,  'I  would  like  to  know, 
General  Johnston,  why  all  my  suggestions  and  recommendations  are  over 
slaughed  or  treated  with  silent  contempt?  '  Looking  around,  with  due  delibera 
tion,  he  quietly  asked,  '  Was  your  remark  addressed  to  me,  sir  ? '  Fortunately," 
added  ,  "there  was  a  camp-stool  convenient,  into  which  I  dropped,  mem- 
Ira  dejecta,  as  if  a  Minie  had  struck  me.  The  truth  flashed  across  me,  as  if  by 
intuition,  that  I  was  in  the  presence  of  the  greatest  man  in  the  world,  and  first 
impressions  were  confirmed  by  subsequent  intercourse.  The  first  was  the  last 
time  that  ever  I  essayed  'to  beard  the  lion  in  his  den,  the  Douglas  in  his  hall.' " 

Another  friend  has  related  to  me  the  following  incident  as  occurring 
at  Bowling  Green : 

A  distinguished  Tennessee  politician  called  on  General  Johnston,  and  re 
quested  him  to  make  a  contract  with  parties  in  Nashville  for  the  manufacture  of 
spears,  with  a  billhook  or  sickle  attached  to  the  head,  with  which  foot-soldiers 
could  attack  cavalry,  the  sickle  to  be  used  in  cutting  the  bridle-reins  and  pulling 
the  troopers  from  their  horses.  He  also  demanded  General  Johnston's  opinion 
on  the  plan.  General  Johnston  endeavored  to  avoid  a  discussion  of  the  merits 
of  the  plan  for  which  the  gentleman  was  warmly  enlisted,  by  assuring  him  that 
it  was  a  matter  for  the  Ordnance  Department  to  decide,  and  by  referring  him 
to  that  bureau.  But  the  petitioner  would  take  no  denial,  repeating  and  reiter 
ating  the  merits  of  his  "plan."  General  Johnston  could  only  adhere  to  his 
original  suggestion.  At  last  the  gentleman  made  a  sarcastic  allusion  to  "  red- 
tape,"  when  General  Johnston  asked  him,  "What  do  you  think  the  Federal 
horsemen  would  be  doing  with  their  revolvers,  while  our  spearmen  were  trying 
to  cut  their  bridle-reins? "  But,  though  there  was  no  sufficient  answer  to  this 
question,  gentlemen  of  this  class  are  not  to  be  satisfied  with  such  considerations, 
and  he  left,  convinced  of  the  red-tape  of  headquarters. 


390  BATTLE  OF  FISHING  CREEK. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 

BATTLE     OF    FISHING    CHEEK. 

THE  movement  of  the  Federal  army,  which  had  been  frustrated  in 
November,  was  renewed  with  better  success  early  in  January.  General 
Johnston  was  now  confronted  by  Halleck  in  the  West,  and  by  Buell  in 
Kentucky.  With  the  exception  of  the  army  sent  under  Curtis  against 
Price  in  Southwestern  Missouri,  about  12,000  strong,  the  whole  re 
sources  of  the  Northwest,  from  Pennsylvania  to  the  Plains,  were  turned 
against  General  Johnston's  lines  in  Kentucky.  Halleck,  with  armies  at 
Cairo  and  Paducah,  under  Grant  and  C.  F.  Smith,  threatened  equally 
Columbus,  the  key  of  the  Mississippi  River,  and  the  water-lines  of  the 
Cumberland  and  Tennessee,  with  their  defenses  at  Forts  Donelson  and 
Henry.  Buell's  right  wing  also  menaced  Donelson  and  Henry,  while 
his  centre  was  directed  against  Bowling  Green,  and  his  left  was  advan 
cing  against  Zollicoffer  at  Mill  Spring  on  the  Upper  Cumberland.  If 
this  last-named  position  could  be  forced,  the  way  seemed  open  to  East 
Tennessee  by  either  the  Jacksboro  or  the  Jamestown  routes,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  to  Nashville  on  the  other.  At  the  northeastern  corner  of 
Kentucky  there  was  a  Federal  force,  under  Colonel  Garfield,  of  Ohio, 
opposed  to  Humphrey  Marshall's  command.  Here  it  was  that  the  fight 
ing  first  began  again. 

General  Johnston  had  requested  Marshall  to  send  him  a  regiment, 
but  Marshall  replied  that  "  to  send  him  a  single  man  was  to  risk  the 
ruin  of  his  whole  command  ;  "  so  that  the  matter  was  dropped.  Mar 
shall  had  nearly  3,200  men  in'  the  district  under  his  command,  including 
350  enlisted  for  special  service  in  Virginia,  who  would  not  leave  that 
State,  and  were,  therefore,  retained  at  Pound  Gap  ;  but  all  of  his  troops 
were  not  available.  Humphrey  Marshall  was  the  grandson  of  one  of 
the  earliest  Senators  from  Kentucky,  a  cousin  of  Chief-Justice  Marshall. 
He  was  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  and  had  served  in  the  Black-Hawk 
War,  and  afterward  as  a  colonel  of  Kentucky  volunteer  cavalry  in  the 
Mexican  War,  and  at  Buena  Vista  had  won  distinction.  He  was  a 
very  vigorous  and  able  lawyer,  a  shrewd  politician,  and  a  man  of  wit, 
humor,  acumen,  and  judgment.  In  fact,  his  mind  was  essentially  judi 
cial.  The  writer  has  rarely  known  any  man  who  impressed  him  so 
strongly  in  this  regard.  But  he  was  not  a  man  of  action.  Besides,  his 
unwieldy  size,  weighing  as  he  did  some  300  or  350  pounds,  unfitted 
him  for  the  field. 

Marshall  moved  forward  to  Paintsville,  on  the  Big  Sandy  River,  about 


MAP  OF  THE  BATTLE   OF  FISHING   CREEK. 


391 


BATTLE  OF  FISHING  CEEEK, 

as  prepared  by 
Captain  N.  MICHLKE.  U.  S.  A. 


392  BATTLE  OF  FISHING  CREEK. 

the  middle  of  December.  This  place  was  thirty-three  miles  above 
Louisa,  and  sixty  from  the  Ohio  River.  At  and  near  the  mouth  of  the 
Big  Sandy,  and  in  the  intervening  region,  were  clustered  some  half- 
dozen  towns  of  from  1,000  to  5,000  inhabitants  each.  The  industries 
supporting  this  population  were  chiefly  the  working  of  coal  and  iron, 
with  capital  furnished  by  Ohio  men.  Hence,  the  people  were  generally 
hostile  to  the  South.  Marshall's  force,  when  he  reached  Paintsville, 
was  2,240  in  number;  but  his  effectives  were  only  1,967  on  January  3, 
1862.  The  following  is  his  force  in  detail  : 

Trisrgs's  Fifty-fourth  Virginia  Regiment 578 

Williams's  Kentucky  Regiment 594 

Moore's  Twenty-ninth  Virginia  Regiment 327 

Simms's  Mounted  Battalion 360 

Jeffries's  battery  (four  guns) 58 

Worsham's  company 50 

Total 1,967 

This  force  was  still  further  reduced  to  about  1,600  effectives,  by  mumps 
and  measles,  before  the  engagement  with  the  enemy. 

About  the  same  time  that  Marshall  advanced  into  Kentucky,  Buell 
organized  an  expedition  up  the  Big  Sandy,  under  Colonel  J.  A.  Garfield. 
This  officer  moved  up  that  river,  on  December  22d,  with  the  Forty- 
second  Ohio  Regiment,  the  Fourteenth  Kentucky,  and  McLaughlin's 
battalion  of  Ohio  Cavalry,  about  1,500  strong.  After  delaying  a  week 
at  George's  Creek,  he  passed  on  to  Paintsville.  He  was  reenforced  by 
Bolles's  West  Virginia  Cavalry,  300  men,  and  by  300  men  of  the  Twenty- 
second  Kentucky  Regiment.  While  this  column  was  moving  up  the 
Big  Sandy,  another,  consisting  of  the  Fortieth  Ohio  Regiment  and 
three  battalions  of  Wolford's  cavalry,  advanced  from  Mount  Sterling  to 
take  Marshall  in  the  rear.  To  avoid  this  danger,  Marshall  fell  back 
some  fifteen  miles,  and  took  position  on  Middle  Creek,  near  Preston- 
burg.  On  the  3d  of  January  the  Confederates  captured  a  sergeant  and 
three  men  of  McLaughlin's  cavalry,  with  their  horses,  in  front  of  Paints 
ville.  On  January  7th  Bolles's  cavalry  engaged  the  Confederate  cavalry- 
pickets,  with  a  loss  of  two  or  three  on  each  side. 

On  the  9th  of  January  Garfield  advanced  against  Marshall's  position 
at  Prestonburg,  and  on  the  next  day  attacked  him.  The  engagement 
was  not  a  serious  one.  Garfield  reported  that  he  fought  all  day,  engag 
ing  only  about  900  of  his  own  men,  inflicting  a  heavy  loss  on  the  Con 
federates,  and  losing  only  one  man  killed  and  twenty  wounded.  Gar- 
field's  report  claimed  a  victory.  He  says  : 

At  half-past  four  o'clock  he  (Marshall)  ordered  a  retreat.  My  men  drove  him 
down  the  slopes  of  the  hills,  and  at  five  o'clock  he  had  been  driven  from  every 
point. 


BATTLE  OF  PRESTOXBURG.  393 

He  also  claimed  to  have  captured  stores  of  value.  On  the  next  day, 
however,  Garfield  retired,  and  fell  back  to  Paintsville. 

General  Marshall's  report,  made  to  General  Johnston,  differs  radi 
cally  from  this.  Writing  from  his  camp  in  Letcher  County,  January 
23d,  he  says  : 

GENERAL  :  Since  I  last  wrote,  the  enemy  assailed  me  in  largely  superior  force, 
and  was  effectually  and  gallantly  repulsed  by  the  troops  under  my  command. 
My  loss  in  the  action  of  the  10th  of  January  is  accurately  stated  at  ten  killed  and 
fourteen  wounded.  The  loss  of  the  enemy  was  severe. 

Garfield  had  stated  that  he  captured  one  captain  and  twenty-five 
soldiers.  Marshall  in  his  report  replies  to  this  that  the  captain  was  a 
sick  man,  too  ill  for  removal,  and  that  the  prisoners  were  not  soldiers, 
but  citizens — 

who  have  been  running  ever  since  the  war  began  like  frightened  hares— afraid 
to  take  arms,  afraid  to  offer  a  single  effort  of  resistance — and  who,  if  pressed 
to  it,  would  submit  to  have  their  ears  cropped  to  show  they  have  a  master. 

The  report  continues : 

The  firing  was  kept  up,  with  some  intervals,  for  about  four  hours,  and  was, 
occasionally,  very  sharp  and  spirited.  My  troops  behaved  remarkably  well,  had 
decided  advantage  in  the  situation,  and  maintained  it  throughout  the  day.  .  .  . 
The  enemy  did  not  move  me  from  any  one  position  I  assumed,  and  at  nightfall 
withdrew  from  the  field,  leaving  me  just  where  I  was  in  the  morning.  After  he 
had  withdrawn,  I  called  my  troops  down  from  the  hills,  and  pursued  the  march 
which  I  was  executing  when  the  enemy  came  in  sight. 

I  see  by  the  telegraphic  dispatches  that  the  enemy  represents  his  achievement 
of  a  victory  over  me  upon  the  occasion  to  which  I  am  referring,  and  says  that 
my  troops  fled  in  confusion,  etc.  I  state  that  this  is  not  only  false,  but  it  is  an 
after-thought.  ...  He  came  to  attack,  yet  came  so  cautiously  that  my  left  wing 
never  fired  a  shot,  and  he  never  came  up  sufficiently  to  engage  my  centre  or  left 
wing.  His  force  was  fired  upon  by  the  twelve-pounder  howitzer,  and  at  once 
cleared  my  front ;  but,  concealed  by  a  point  of  the  hills  from  my  artillery,  con 
fined  his  further  efforts  to  assaults  upon  my  right  wing,  by  which  he  was  re 
pulsed  three  times. 

General  Marshall  goes  on  to  state  that  he  sent  forward  Trigg's 
regiment  ;  but  the  enemy  withdrew,  and  did  not  dispute  the  ground  on 
which  the  fight  had  taken  place  : 

The  repulse  was  final.  It  proved  final,  for  he  has  never  since  that  day  sought 
in  any  manner  or  form  to  reengage. 

Garfield  is  said  to  have  fallen  back  fifteen  miles  to  Paintsville  ;  Mar 
shall,  seven  miles,  where  he  remained  two  days  at  the  foot  of  a  lofty 
mountain.  He  then  slowly  pursued  his  retreat.  He  informed  General 


394:  BATTLE  OF  FISHING   CREEK. 

Johnston  that  he  could  not  advance  with  less  than  5,000  men ;  and  he 
could  not  procure  subsistence  in  the  mountains  for  the  men  he  had. 
He  then  fell  back,  through  Pound  Gap,  into  Virginia.  Thus  Marshall's 
report  is  a  denial  and  a  contradiction,  general  and  specific,  of  Garfield's 
report ;  and,  as  it  is  impossible  to  reconcile  the  discrepancies  between 
them,  the  reader  is  left  to  draw  his  own  conclusion. 

While  Garfield  was  at  Paintsville,  he  was  ordered  by  General  Buell 
to  advance,  and  got  as  far  as  Piketon  in  February.  A  month  later,  he 
advanced  to  Pound  Gap,  with  600  infantry  and  100  cavalry ;  and, 
having  displayed  himself  in  force  there,  returned  down  the  Big  Sandy, 
without  an  engagement,  and  was  withdrawn,  with  his  forces,  to  another 
theatre  of  action. 

General  Felix  Kirk  Zollieoffer,  who  commanded  the  corps  in  Eastern 
Kentucky,  was  the  popular  idol  of  the  hour  in  Tennessee,  and  on  many 
accounts  deservedly  so.  He  was  of  a  Swiss  family ,  of  knightly  rank, 
settled  in  North  Carolina  before  the  Revolutionary  War,  in  which  his 
grandfather  was  a  captain.  His  father  was  a  prosperous  farmer  in 
Maury  County,  Tennessee,  where  Zollicoffer  was  born  May  19.  1812. 
He  began  life  as  a  printer,  and  in  1835  was  elected  Printer  for  the 
State.  After  several  essays  in  journalism,  he  became  editor  of  the 
Republican  JSanner  in  1842,  and  was  noted  as  a  champion  of  the  Whig 
party.  He  was  then  elected  Controller  of  the  State,  which  position 
he  held  until  1847.  In  1848  he  was  elected  a  State  Senator,  and  in 
1852  a  Representative  in  the  United  States  Congress,  to  which  posi 
tion  he  was  reflected.  When  war  seemed  almost  inevitable,  he  was 
elected  by  the  General  Assembly  of  Tennessee  as  a  commissioner  to 
the  Peace  Congress,  from  which  he  returned  dejected  by  its  failure  to 
accomplish  any  useful  purpose.  Governor  Harris  offered  to  appoint 
him  a  major-general ;  but  he  would  only  accept  the  place  of  brigadier, 
on  account  of  his  inexperience.1 

It,  however,  fell  to  General  Zollicoffer's  lot  to  command  a  separate 
army.  No  man  could  have  brought  a  more  unselfish  devotion  or  a 
braver  heart  to  the  task ;  but  talents  which  might  have  rendered  the 
highest  services  on  another  arena  were  here  neutralized  by  want  of 
adaptation  to  the  particular  work  in  hand.  What  he  might  have  ac 
complished  as  a  commander,  under  more  favorable  circumstances,  it  is 
hard  to  estimate.  He  certainly  had,  however,  exceptional  difficulties 
to  contend  with  of  every  possible  description  ;  and  the  tests  to  which 
he  was  subjected  might  well  have  overborne  native  ability  of  a  high 
order,  if  unversed  in  the  habits  and  knowledge  of  the  camp.  But  the 
habits  of  Zollicoffer's  entire  life  and  thought  had  been  bent  not  only  into 
a  different,  but  into  an  opposite  direction.  He  could  not  drill  a  squad 

1  These  facts  are  taken  from  a  spirited  sketch  in  Ware's  Valley  Monthly  (April,  1876), 
by  General  Marcus  J.  Wright. 


FELIX  K.   ZOLLICOFFER.  395 

himself,  nor  was  his  brigade  ever  drilled  or  put  in  line  of  battle  by 
anybody.  Though  he  had  a  splendid  courage,  and  traits  that  endeared 
him  to  his  troops,  the  cast  of  his  mind  was  no  more  military  than  his 
training.  But  he  was  a  good,  brave,  noble,  patriotic  man  ;  and  his 
memory  deserves  well  of  his  country. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  General  Zollicoffer,  having  fortified  the 
gaps  of  the  Cumberland  Range,  had  moved  westward,  under  instruc 
tions  from  General  Johnston,  with  the  view  of  taking  position  where 
he  could  command  the  approaches  toward  both  East  Tennessee  and 
Nashville  from  Central  Kentucky ;  while,  at  the  same  time,  he  might, 
to  some  extent,  protect  the  right  of  the  position  at  Bowling  Green. 
The  lack  of  telegraphic  communication,  and  the  wretched  character  of 
the  roads,  made  any  rapid  correspondence,  much  more  any  effective 
cooperation,  almost  impossible.  Still,  Zollicoffer  could  not  be  drawn  in 
nearer  to  Bowling  Green,  without  laying  open  to  the  enemy  a  choice 
of  roads  into  East  Tennessee.  General  Johnston  desired  to  place  Zol 
licoffer,  with  his  limited  supplies  and  half-disciplined  troops,  in  observa 
tion  merely,  until  such  time  as  he  could  reenforce  his  army  or  incor 
porate  it  with  the  main  body  under  his  own  command. 

As  Zollicoffer  proceeded  north,  through  Jamestown,  Tennessee,  and 
Albany,  Kentucky,  he  reported  that  the  country  in  Tennessee  was 
sterile  and  unproductive  ;  while  Wayne  and  Clinton  Counties,  and  part 
of  Pulaski  County,  in  Kentucky,  were  comparatively  abundant  in  for 
age  and  subsistence.  The  Cumberland  River,  making  a  big  bend  to 
the  north  from  Cumberland  Ford,  describes  almost  a  semicircle  before 
it  enters  Tennessee,  near  Martinsburg.  At  one  of  its  most  advanced 
salients  to  the  north  is  Mill  Springs,  on  the  south  bank  of  the  river. 
Zollicoffer  describes  this  point  as  commanding  the  converging  roads 
from  Somerset  and  Columbia,  as  in  a  fertile  and  well-stocked  country, 
with  provisions  plenty  and  cheap,  and  as  possessing  the  advantage  of  a 
grist  and  saw  mill,  which  would  aid  materially  in  supplying  food  for 
his  army  and  lumber  for  huts.  He  stated  that  there  was  plenty  of  wood 
and  water,  and  that  the  position  was  capable  of  easy  defense.  Already, 
on  the  24th  of  November,  before  he  reached  Albany  on  his  march,  he 
had  been  warned  by  snow,  succeeding  the  cold  rains,  that  winter  was 
at  hand. 

On  November  30th,  Zollicoffer,  writing  from  Mill  Springs,  tells 
General  Johnston  that  his  cavalry  had  failed  to  seize  the  ferry-boats  on 
the  river  ;  but  that  he  is  "  preparing  to  provide  the  means  of  crossing 
the  river."  He  also  says,  "  So  soon  as  it  is  possible,  I  will  cross  the 
river  in  force."  But  it  was  not  clear  from  the  context  whether  he  was 
going  to  cross  for  a  lodgment,  or  merely  on  an  expedition  to  harass  the 
enemy. 

General  Johnston  had  written  a  letter  to  General  Zollicoffer,  on 


396  BATTLE   OF  FISHING  CREEK. 

December  4th,  approving  entirely  of  every  one  of  his  moves  so  far,  and 
informing  him  of  the  steps  taken  to  send  him  supplies,  etc.     He  adds : 

The  most  essential  route  to  be  guarded  is  that  leading  through  Somerset  and 
Monticello,  as,  in  my  opinion,  most  practicable  for  the  enemy. 

On  the  same  day,  General  Johnson  wrote  again,  using  this  lan 
guage: 

Mill  Springs  would  seem  to  answer  best  to  all  the  demands  of  the  service  ; 
and  from  this  point  you  may  be  able  to  observe  the  river,  without  crossing  it,  as 
far  as  Burkesville,  which  is  desirable. 

On  the  9th  of  December  ZollicofFer  informed  General  Johnston  that 
he  had  crossed  the  Cumberland  that  day,  with  five  infantry  regiments, 
seven  cavalry  companies,  and  four  pieces  of  artillery,  about  two-thirds 
of  his  whole  force,  which  in  all  reached  less  than  6,000  effectives.  On 
December  10th  he  wrote  again  : 

Your  two  dispatches  of  the  4th  reached  me  late  last  night.  I  infer  from 
yours  that  I  should  not  have  crossed  the  river,  lut  it  is  now  too  late.  My  means 
of  recrossing  are  so  limited  I  could  hardly  accomplish  it  in  face  of  the  enemy. 

Major-General  George  B.  Crittenden  had  been  assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  this  district  by  the  President.  The  high  rank  given  him  has 
been  cited  by  Pollard,  who  speaks  of  him  as  a  captain  in  the  old  army, 
as  a  piece  of  favoritism.  But  this  is  an  error.  He  was  one  of  the 
senior  officers  w7ho  resigned.  He  was  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  of  the 
year  1832.  He  resigned,  and  was  reappointed  a  captain  in  the  Mounted 
Rifles  in  1846,  was  b  re  vetted  major  for  "  gallant  and  meritorious  con 
duct  in  the  battles  of  Contreras  and  Churubusco,  Mexico,"  was  made  a 
major  in  1848,  and  lieutenant-colonel  in  1856.  He  was  a  Kentuckian, 
of  a  family  distinguished  for  gallantry  and  talents,  and  known  as  an 
intelligent  and  intrepid  officer;  and  it  was  hoped  that  his  long  service 
would  enable  him  to  supplement  the  inexperience  of  the  gallant  Zol- 
licoffer.  Crittenden  took  command  of  the  district,  November  24th, 
and  made  his  headquarters  at  Knoxville.  Thither  General  Johnston 
telegraphed  him  to  dispatch  without  delay  the  supplies  and  intrench- 
ing-tools  sent  there  for  ZollicofFer,  and  to  send  at  once  a  regiment 
and  battery  to  his  support.  He  added  this  significant  intimation, 
sufficient  for  a  trained  soldier:  "He  has  crossed  the  Cumberland  at 
Mill  Springs  ;  has  the  enemy  in  front  and  the  river  behind,  and  is  se 
curing  his  front."  Still,  General  Johnston  did  not  contemplate  any 
aggressive  movement  by  ZollicofFer,  after  the  instructions  given,  unless, 
of  course,  the  enemy  could  be  taken  at  disadvantage. 

Had  ZollicofFer,  when  he  reached  the  Cumberland,  succeeded  in 
seizing  the  ferry-boats,  as  he  attempted,  and,  crossing  promptly,  at- 


MILL  SPRINGS.  397 

tacked  Schoepf  at  once,  he  would  probably  have  met  but  slight  re 
sistance.  Schoepf  had  three  regiments,  a  battery,  and  some  cavalry, 
scattered  through  that  neighborhood.  Zollicoffer,  as  related  above, 
was  delayed  in  crossing.  The  movements  then  made  by  his  forces  re 
vealed,  to  a  great  extent,  both  his  strength  and  his  purposes  to  his 
adversary.  While  constructing  his  ferries  he  sent  some  troops,  on 
December  2d,  and  shelled  a  small  force  of  the  enemy  posted  on  the 
north  bank,  and  compelled  it  to  move.  On  the  4th  he  threw  over  a 
small  cavalry-picket,  which  drove  back  the  Federal  horse,  and  caused 
a  precipitate  retreat  of  the  Seventeenth  Ohio,  which  was  advancing  on 
reconnaissance.  Next  day  the  pickets  wounded  and  captured  Major 
Helvetti  and  Captain  Prime,  engineer-officers,  and  along  with  them  a 
corporal.  On  the  7th  and  8th  the  cavalry  crossed  Fishing  Creek  and 
reconnoitred  the  Federal  camps  near  Somerset.  On  the  8th,  at  Fishing 
Creek,  the  cavalry  was  fired  on  by  Wolford's  cavalry  and  the  Thirty- 
fifth  Ohio  Infantry,  but  charged  these  forces,  killing  ten  and  capturing 
sixteen,  inclusive  of  the  wounded.  One  Confederate  was  wounded, 
and  two  horses  killed.  On  the  llth  an  expedition  sent  out  by  Zolli 
coffer  attacked  a  small  body  of  Federals,  who  were  posted  at  Lairsville, 
thirty  miles  distant  toward  Columbia.  It  routed  the  Federals,  killing 
three  and  capturing  ten.  One  Confederate  was  drowned,  the  only  loss 
sustained. 

In  the  mean  time  Schoepf,  overawed  and  put  upon  his  guard,  retired 
three  miles  behind  Somerset,  intrenched  himself  in  a  strong  position, 
and  called  loudly  in  every  quarter  for  reinforcements.  General  Carter, 
who  was  at  London,  brought  two  regiments  to  his  aid,  arriving  on  the 
7th.  Thomas  sent  him  a  regiment  and  a  battery,  and  on  the  llth  another 
regiment.  Several  regiments  also  concentrated  at  Columbia  under  Gen 
eral  Boyle.  Zollicoffer's  letters  correctly  estimate  the  force  of  the  ene 
my  at  Somerset  at  seven  infantry  regiments  and  some  cavalry,  which 
agrees  with  Van  Home's  account.  He  expected  to  be  attacked,  but 
kept  his  force  divided,  five  regiments  in  his  intrenchments,  and  two  on 
the  south  bank  to  protect  his  communications. 

General  Thomas's  command,  occupying  the  country  east  of  Lebanon, 
consisted  at  this  time  of  a  division  made  up  of  sixteen  infantry  regi 
ments,  a  regiment  and  squadron  of  cavalry,  and  three  batteries.  The 
force  at  Columbia  was  not  included  in  this  estimate.  On  the  18th 
Schoepf  discovered,  by  a  reconnaissance  in  force,  that  Zollicoffer  was 
intrenching,  and  justly  reached  the  conclusion  that  his  purpose  was  de 
fensive. 

On  the  29th  of  December  General  Buell  ordered  Thomas  to  advance 
against  Zollicoffer,  moving  by  Columbia,  and  to  attack  his  left  so  as  to 
cut  him  off  from  his  bridge,  while  Schoepf  attacked  him  in  front.  He 
adds : 


398  BATTLE  OF  FISHING  CREEK. 

The  result  should  be  at  least  a  severe  blow  to  him,  or  a  hasty  flight  across 
the  river.  But,  to  effect  the  former,  the  movement  should  be  made  rapidly  and 
secretly,  and  the  blow  should  be  vigorous  and  decided.  There  should  be  no 
delay  after  your  arrival. 

On  December  31st  General  Thomas  started  from  Lebanon.  His 
column  consisted  of  eight  and  a  half  regiments  ;  namely,  Manson's 
brigade  of  four  regiments,  three  of  McCook's  regiments,  Wolford's  cav 
alry,  a  battalion  of  Michigan  engineers,  and  three  batteries  of  artillery. 
Rains,  high  water,  and  bad  roads,  impeded  their  progress  ;  so  that  it 
was  the  17th  of  January  before  they  reached  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  ten 
miles  from  Zollicoffer's  intrenched  camp.1  Here  Thomas  took  position  to 
await  four  of  his  regiments  that  had  not  come  up.  To  secure  himself 
he  communicated  with  Schoepf,  and  obtained  from  him  a  reinforcement 
of  three  regiments  under  General  Carter,  and  a  battery.  This  gave  him 
eleven  regiments,  and  a  battalion,  besides  artillery.  The  remainder  of 
Schoepf's  force  must  have  been  near  by,  and  in  supporting  distance,  as 
they  joined  in  the  pursuit.  Such  was  Thomas's  position  on  the  morning 
of  the  19th  of  January. 

About  New-Year's-day  General  Crittenden  had  arrived  at  Zollicoffer's 
headquarters  at  Beech  Grove.  In  his  letter  of  December  10th  Zolli- 
coffer  had  written  as  follows : 

This  camp  is  immediately  opposite  to  Mill  Springs,  one  and  a  quarter 
mile  distant.  The  river  protects  our  rear  and  flanks.  We  have  about  1,200 
yards'  fighting  front  to  defend,  which  we  are  intrenching  as  rapidly  as  our  few 
tools  will  allow.  ...  I  will  endeavor  to  prevent  the  forces  at  Somerset  and 
Columbia  from  uniting.  The  proximity  of  the  terminus  of  the  railroad  at  Leb 
anon  would  seem  to  give  them  the  means  of  rapidly  reenforcing  my  front.  The 
position  I  occupy  north  of  the  river  is  a  fine  basis  for  operations  in  front.  It 
is  a  much  stronger  natural  position  for  defense  than  that  on  the  south  bank.  I 
think  it  should  be  held  at  all  hazards.  But  I  ought  to  have  a  stronger  force. 

With  further  reference  to  this  position,  General  Zollicoffer  said  : 

Fishing  Creek  runs  south  into  the  Cumberland,  five  miles  below9  Mill 
Springs,  and  lies  between  onr  position  and  Somerset.  It  is  more  than  thirty 
miles  long,  runs  in  a  deep  ravine  200  to  300  feet  deep,  and  its  summit  level  on 
the  east  ranges  from  half  a  mile  to  one  and  a  half  mile  distant  from  that  on  the 
west.  There  are  two  crossings  to  Somerset,  seven  and  eleven  miles  from  here. 

Crittenden's  weekly  return  for  January  7,  1862,  of  the  troops  at 
Beech  Grove,  shows  some  increase  of  force.  He  had  eight  infantry 
regiments,  four  battalions  of  cavalry  (seventeen  companies),  and  two 
artillery-companies  ;  an  aggregate,  present  and  absent,  of  9,417  men, 

1  The  particulars  of  Thomas's  movements  are  from  his  official  reports,  and  from  Yan 
Home's  "  Army  of  the  Cumberland." 
9  Probably  a  slip  of  the  pen  for  above. 


BEFORE  THE  BATTLE.  399 

but,  numbering  effectives  (present  for  duty),  of  333  officers  and  6,111 
rank  and  file.  As  his  army  was  composed  of  the  same  commands  on 
the  day  of  the  battle,  the  above  numbers  give  his  approximate  force  at 
that  time. 

General  Crittenden  informs  the  writer  that,  as  soon  as  he  learned 
that  Zollicoffer  had  crossed  the  river,  he  sent  a  courier  post-haste  order 
ing  him  to  recross.  When  he  arrived  at  Mill  Springs  he  found  Zolli 
coffer  still  on  the  north  side,  waiting  his  arrival  before  retiring.  Crit 
tenden  immediately  detailed  parties  to  construct  boats,  but  they  were 
not  ready  when  he  learned  of  Thomas's  approach. 

His  first  intimation  to  General  Johnston  of  Thomas's  approach  was 
the  following  letter,  written  January  18th  : 

SIR  :  I  am  threatened  by  a  superior  force  of  the  enemy  in  front,  and,  finding 
it  impossible  to  cross  the  river,  I  shall  have  to  make  the  fight  on  the  ground  I 
now  occupy.  If  you  can  do  so,  I  would  ask  that  a  diversion  be  made  in  my 
favor. 

A  diversion  was  made  by  Hindman,  on  the  receipt  of  this,  but 
with  no  important  consequences,  as  the  next  day  decided  the  fate  of 
Crittenden's  army. 

Crittenden's  letter  was  inaccurately  worded,  and  must  probably  have 
referred  rather  to  the  impossibility  of  removing  his  stores  and  artil 
lery  than  to  the  feasibility  of  retiring  with  his  troops  from  the  posi 
tion  at  Beech  Grove.  He  had  a  stern-wheel  steamboat  sufficient  for 
the  latter  purpose,  though  probably  not  available  for  the  former.  In 
fact,  on  the  morning  of  the  18th,  he  did  take  over  three  regiments 
from  the  south  to  the  north  bank  of  the  river;  and  between  midnight 
and  daylight  on  the  19th  his  whole  army,  though  demoralized,  and 
with  many  wounded,  was  carried  over  by  it.  His  supplies  were  scanty, 
but  not  exhausted  ;  and,  though  his  communications  with  Nashville 
were  threatened  by  Thomas's  approach,  he  had  time  and  means  to  re 
tire  upon  supports  more  easily  before  than  after  a  battle,  though  not 
without  such  loss  of  artillery  and  prestige  as  no  general  would  incur 
except  in  the  most  desperate  circumstances. 

It  was  stated  apologetically,  after  the  battle,  that  the  ground  in 
front  of  the  intrenchments  gave  no  range  for  the  Confederate  artil 
lery,  and  yet  offered  no  formidable  obstacle  to  an  infantry  assault. 
This  would  imply  a  serious  error  in  the  estimate  of  the  strength  of 
their  position  by  the  Confederate  generals — in  Zollicoffer's  selection, 
and  Crittenden's  maintenance  of  it.  Another  statement  was,  that 
the  Confederate  force  was  insufficient  to  man  the  intrenchments.  Zolli 
coffer  states  the  length  of  his  line  at  1,200  yards.  Six  thousand 
men  would  fully  man  2,000  yards,  and,  according  to  the  Confederate 
notions,  double  that  distance.  Crittenden,  however,  arrived  at  the  con- 
27 


400  BATTLE  OF  FISHING  CREEK. 

elusion  to  assail  Thomas  after  a  full  consultation  and  the  unanimous 
approval  of  his  officers. 

While  awaiting  the  attack  of  the  enemy,  a  heavy  winter  rain  fall 
ing,  Crittenden  learned  that  a  rise  in  Fishing  Creek  was  inevitable, 
and  would  separate  Thomas  from  Schoepf.  It  was  afterward  alleged 
that  he  was  deceived  by  a  treacherous  guide,  but  this  rumor  is  suffi 
ciently  accounted  for  by  the  ill-success  of  the  expedition,  and  an 
incident  related  by  General  Walthall  which  will  be  given  in  its  place. 
Crittenden,  therefore,  came  to  the  sudden  resolution  of  marching  out 
and  attempting  to  take  the  enemy  in  detail,  attacking  Thomas  first. 
He  called  a  council  of  officers,  however,  and  laid  the  matter  before 
them.  All  of  them  were  in  favor  of  the  movement  under  the  cir 
cumstances,  and  many  of  them  thought  the  attack  the  best  thing 
to  be  done  under  any  circumstances.  General  Crittenden's  special 
error  was  not  in  attacking  at  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  instead  of  defend 
ing  Beech  Grove ;  it  was  in  being  caught  on  the  north  side  of  the 
river,  and  having  to  fight  at  all.  General  Johnston's  instructions 
looked  to  a  defensive  campaign  by  that  corps,  and  there  was  nothing 
in  its  condition  to  warrant  an  aggressive  movement. 

It  is  apparent  to  us  now  that  Thomas,  after  thirty-six  hours'  delay 
at  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  would  be  in  full  communication  with  and  sup 
porting  distance  of  Schoepf,  and  that  to  surprise  or  rout  him  there 
was  almost  hopeless ;  but  such  was  not  the  information  on  which  Crit 
tenden  acted,  and  we  should  guard  our  censure  of  the  general  who 
leads  his  whole  force  to  attack,  even  when  he  fails. 

The  men  had  been  standing  all  day  in  the  trenches  exposed  to  a 
constant  and  pelting  rain,  and,  having  been  suddenly  called  to  arms 
and  hourly  expecting  an  attack,  had  had  neither  time  nor  opportu 
nity  to  prepare  food.  They  were  now  hurriedly  put  in  motion.  At 
midnight,  on  the  18th  of  January,  the  Confederate  army  marched 
against  the  enemy  in  this  order  :  First,  with  Bledsoe's  and  Saunders's 
independent  cavalry  companies  as  a  vanguard,  Zollicoffer's  brigade  ;  thus 
Walthall's  Fifteenth  Mississippi  Regiment  in  advance,  followed  by 
Rutledge's  battery,  and  Cummings's  Nineteenth,  Battle's  Twentieth^ 
and  Stanton's  Twenty-fifth  Tennessee  Regiments.  Then  came  Carroll's 
brigade,  as  follows  :  Newman's  Seventeenth,  Murray's  Twenty-eighth, 
and  Powell's  Twenty-ninth  Tennessee  Regiments,  with  two  guns  under 
Captain  McClung,  and  Wood's  Sixteenth  Alabama  Regiment  in  reserve. 
Branner's  and  McClelland's  battalions  of  cavalry  were  placed  on  the 
flanks  and  rear. 

A  cold  rain  continued  to  fall  upon  the  thinly-clad  Confederates, 
chilling  them  to  the  marrow,  but  they  toiled  painfully  along.  The 
road  was  rough,  and  very  heavy  with  the  long  rain  following  severe 
freezes.  Unencumbered  with  artillery,  the  infantry  would  have  made 


THE   ATTACK.  401 

poor  progress  in  the  darkness,  rain,  and  mud,  but,  as  the  guns  from  the 
first  began  to  mire  down,  the  foot-soldiers  were  called  on  to  help  them 
along.  Hence  it  was  six  o'clock,  or  daylight,  before  the  advance- 
guard  struck  the  enemy's  pickets,  two  miles  in  front  of  the  Federal 
camps.  It  had  been  six  hours  getting  over  eight  miles,  and  the  rear 
was  still  fully  three  miles  behind. 

When  the  Mississippians  under  Walthall,  followed  by  Battle's  Ten 
nessee  Regiment,  encountered  the  Federal  pickets,  they  met  no  re 
sistance,  and,  pressing  rapidly  forward  in  obedience  to  orders,  in 
creased  the  interval  between  themselves  and  the  next  regiment  in  the 
column  to  about  one  mile.  It  was  thus  that  Walthall's  and  Battle's 
regiments  came  upon  the  first  line  Thomas  had  thrown  forward  to  re 
ceive  them. 

General  Thomas's  troops  were  encamped  on  each  side  of  the  road, 
with  a  wood  in  their  front  from  one-fourth  to  a  half  a  mile  through. 
In  front  of  the  wood  were  fields  about  300  yards  across,  and  beyond 
this,  again,  a  low  ridge  parallel  with  the  wood.  The  Confederates 
promptly  crossed  the  ridge  and  fields,  and  found  a  force  in  the  edge  of 
the  wood  in  their  front.  This  consisted  of  the  Fourth  Kentucky  and 
Tenth  Indiana  Regiments.  General  Crittenden  had  warned  them,  in  the 
council  of  war,  of  the  danger  of  firing  into  their  friends,  especially  as 
many  of  the  Southern  troops  wore  blue  uniforms,  and  to  avoid  this 
risk  they  had  adopted  as  a  password  "  Kentucky."  The  morning  was 
dark  and  misty,  and  nothing  could  be  seen  of  the  opposing  force  ex 
cept  a  line  of  armed  men.  The  skirmishers  reported  to  Walthall  that 
this  was  Battle's  command.  Walthall  made  his  regiment  lie  down 
behind  a  slight  elevation,  and,  going  forward  to  some  high  ground, 
hailed  the  troops  in  his  front,  "What  troops  are  those?"  The  an 
swer  was,  "Kentucky."  He  called  again,  "Who  are  you?"  and  the 
answer  came  as  before,  "Kentucky."  He  then  went  back  and  got  his 
colors,  and,  returning,  once  more  asked  the  same  question,  and  received 
the  same  answer.  He  then  unfurled  his  flag,  and  immediately  the 
Federal  line  opened  upon  him  with  a  volley.  He  turned  to  order  for 
ward  his  regiment,  and  found  that  Lieutenant  Harrington,  who  had 
followed  him  without  his  knowledge,  was  lying  dead  by  him,  pierced 
by  more  than  twenty  balls.  The  flag  was  riddled,  and  the  staff  cut, 
but  Colonel  Walthall  was  untouched.  It  was  this  incident  that  led 
to  the  belief  that  the  password  was  betrayed  to  the  enemy  by  the 
guide ;  but  the  answer,  coming  from  the  Fourth  Kentucky,  was  the 
natural  and  proper  one. 

The  Mississippians  drove  this  regiment  from  its  cover,  and,  after  a 
severe  struggle,  it  fell  back  fighting.  In  the  mean  time  the  Tenth 
Indiana  Regiment,  coming  to  the  aid  of  the  Fourth  Kentucky,  was 
met.  by  the  Mississippians  and  Battle's  Twentieth  Tennessee,  which 


402  BATTLE   OF  FISHIXG   CREEK. 

had  formed  on  their  right.  A  strenuous  combat  ensued  at  the  forks  of 
the  road,  Wolford's  cavalry  supporting  the  Federal  troops.  The  Ninth 
Ohio  also  became  engaged  ;  but,  after  a  desperate  conflict,  the  whole 
Federal  line  was  driven  back.  It  now  appeared  as  if  the  Southern 
troops,  having  carried  the  rest  of  the  field,  were  about  to  win  the  crest 
of  a  hill,  which  was  the  key  to  the  position.  Just  then  the  Second 
Minnesota  came  up,  and  held  the  ground  until  the  beaten  regiments 
could  rally  upon  it,  which  they  did  with  spirit.  The  Confederates  still 
seemed  for  a  good  while  on  the  point  of  gaining  the  summit,  where 
the  Federals  made  a  desperate  stand,  but  were  unable  to  carry  it. 

In  the  mean  time  the  Nineteenth  Tennessee  had  come  up  on  the 
left  of  the  Mississippians,  and  found  itself  opposed  in  the  woods  to  the 
Fourth  Kentucky,  which  had  returned  to  the  conflict.  In  the  dark 
ness  of  the  morning  it  was  difficult  to  distinguish  between  the  Federals 
and  Confederates,  many  of  the  latter  still  wearing  blue  uniforms.  Gen 
eral  Zollicoffer  was  convinced  that  the  regiment  in  his  front  was  Con 
federate,  and  peremptorily  ordered  the  Nineteenth  Tennessee  to  cease 
firing,  as  they  were  firing  upon  their  own  troops.  He  then  rode  across 
toward  the  Federal  line  to  put  a  stop  to  the  firing  there.  Just  as  he 
entered  the  road,  he  met  a  Federal  officer,  Colonel  Speed  S.  Fry,  of  the 
Fourth  Kentucky,  and  said  to  him  quietly,  "  We  must  not  shoot  our 
own  men."  General  Zollicoifer  wore  a  white  gum  overcoat,  which  con 
cealed  his  uniform,  and  Colonel  Fry,  supposing  him  to  be  a  Federal 
officer,  replied,  "  I  would  not,  of  course,  do  so  intentionally."  Zollicof 
fer,  then,  pointing  to  the  Nineteenth  Tennessee,  said,  "  Those  are  our 
men."  Colonel  Fry  then  started  toward  his  regiment  to  stop  their 
firing,  when  Major  Fogg,  Zollicoffer's  aide,  coming  out  of  the  wood  at 
this  instant,  and  clearly  perceiving  that  Fry  was  a  Federal,  fired  upon 
him,  wounding  his  horse.  Fry,  riding  away  obliquely,  saw  his  action, 
and  turning,  discharged  his  revolver.  The  ball  passed  through  Gen 
eral  Zollicoffer's  heart,  and  he  fell  exactly  where  he  had  stood.  Zolli 
coffer  was  near-sighted,  and  never  khew  that  Fry  was  an  enemy.  His 
delusion  was  complete,  as  Major  Fogg  and  others  had  remonstrated 
with  him  about  going  to  the  front.  Major  Fogg  was  also  wounded. 

The  Nineteenth  Tennessee  now  stood  waiting  for  orders,  without 
firing  a  gun,  until  it  was  flanked  and  broken.  In  the  mean  time  the 
Twenty-fifth  Tennessee  entered  the  wood  without  direction,  and  en 
gaged  the  enemy.  Immediately  its  colonel  was  severely  wounded; 
and,  being  without  support  on  either  flank,  it,  too,  suffered  and  retired. 
The  remainder  of  the  column  had  come  up  and  taken  position  in  reserve, 
and  toward  the  left  of  the  field  Murray's  regiment,  which  last  entered 
the  fight,  now  experienced  the  same  fate  with  the  Twenty-fifth  Tennes 
see.  Rutledge's  battery,  which  had  been  for  some  time  in  position  in 
reserve,  retired  under  orders,  as  is  said,  of  General  Crittenden,  without 


THE  RETREAT.  403 

having  fired  a  gun.  The  Federal  right,  in  pressing  upon  the  front  and 
left  flank  of  the  Tennesseeans,  was  able  to  come  to  very  close  quarters 
without  much  loss,  while  their  adversaries  suffered  a  good  deal,  owing 
to  the  disparity  in  arms.  The  Tennesseeans  were  armed  with  old  flint 
lock  muskets,  which  having  got  wet  were  almost  useless.  Nevertheless, 
the  Federal  line  was  arrested  at  about  one  hundred  yards'  distance,  and 
held  at  bay  some  twenty  minutes.  The  Confederate  line  then  gave 
way,  and  was  allowed  to  retreat  without  pursuit.  On  the  Confederate 
right,  WalthalPs  regiment  had  continued  its  struggle  with  the  Second 
Minnesota,  and  Battle's  regiment  had  held  Carter's  brigade  at  bay, 
until  these  three  regiments  closed  upon  its  flank  and  almost  in  its  rear, 
and  it,  too,  retired.  Walthall,  now  finding  one  of  these  regiments 
almost  across  his  path,  and  his  command  nearly  surrounded,  also  with 
drew  his  men,  having  with  him  in  his  retreat  a  portion  of  Battle's  regi 
ment,  under  Captain  Rice. 

The  Mississippi  Regiment  and  Battle's  Twentieth  Tennessee  had 
borne  the  brunt  of  the  day.  The  former  had  lost  over  220  men  out 
of  400  who  had  gone  into  battle.  The  Twentieth  Tennessee  lost  half 
as  many  more,  those  two  regiments  thus  suffering  over  three-fourths 
of  all  the  casualties  on  that  day.  They  had  the  advance,  and  were 
better  armed  than  the  other  troops.  But,  had  they  been  supported  by 
the  remainder  of  the  column  with  half  the  valor  and  determination 
which  the  same  troops  subsequently  exhibited  on  other  fields,  the  re 
sult  would  probably  have  been  different.  Their  inferior  arms,  want  of 
discipline,  bad  handling,  and  fatigue,  sufficiently  account  for  their  ill- 
success. 

The  defeated  army  was  followed  by  the  victorious  Federals  nearly 
to  the  intrenchments  at  Beech  Grove.  In  the  pursuit,  if  their  cau 
tious  advance  can  be  so  called,  checked  as  it  was  repeatedly  by  a 
rear-guard  formidable  even  in  defeat,  the  Fourteenth  Ohio  and  Tenth 
Kentucky,  with  General  Schoepf 's  whole  brigade,  joined.  Approaching 
the  intrenched  camp  at  Beech  Grove,  General  Thomas  opened  an 
artillery-fire  on  it,  to  little  purpose,  however.  He  also  made  his  ar 
rangements  to  assault  it  next  morning. 

The  situation  of  the  Confederate  army  was  now  extremely  perilous. 
In  its  disorganized  condition  it  could  not  have  resisted  the  combined 
attack  of  Thomas  and  Schoepf.  There  was  but  one  thing  to  be  done, 
and  that  was  to  get  away.  The  troops  remained  quietly  in  the  intrench 
ments  until  midnight,  and  then  between  that  hour  and  daylight  escaped, 
by  means  of  a  steamer  and  some  barges  at  the  landing,  without  having 
excited  the  suspicions  of  the  enemy.  Crittenden  got  his  whole  force 
safely  across  the  river,  including  all  the  wounded  able  to  travel  ;  but 
he  was  compelled  to  leave  behind  him  all  of  his  badly  wounded,  all  of 
his  cannon,  his  supplies,  and,  indeed,  whatever  constitutes  the  equip- 


404:  BATTLE   OF  FISHING  CREEK. 

ment  of  an  army.  Having  thus  saved  the  remnant  of  his  command,  he 
burned  his  boats,  and  moved  his  tired  army,  on  the  Monticello  road, 
toward  Nashville. 

The  condition  of  the  Confederate  army  was  truly  deplorable.  On 
the  night  of  the  18th  it  had  marched  ten  miles;  and  on  the  19th,  after 
a  fierce  battle,  had  retreated  to  its  camp.  That  night  it  had  stood  at 
the  breastworks  till  midnight,  then  crossed  the  river;  and  now,  without 
sleep  and  without  food,  it  struggled  through  the  rain  and  cold  of  a 
winter  night  to  reach  some  place  where  it  might  be  secure  from  as 
sault.  For  several  days  the  troops  endured  terrible  hardships.  The 
scanty  supplies  of  a  wasted  country,  hastily  collected  and  issued  with 
out  system,  were  insufficient  for  the  subsistence  of  the  army;  and, 
though  the  commissary  department  made  extraordinary  efforts,  many 
of  the  troops  had  nothing  better  than  parched  corn  to  sustain  life. 
Crittenden  marched  his  army  through  Monticello  and  Livingston  to 
Gainsboro,  and,  finally,  by  General  Johnston's  orders,  took  position  at 
Chestnut  Mound,  where  he  was  in  reach  of  relief  from  Nashville.  Dur 
ing  his  retreat  his  army  became  much  demoralized,  and  two  regiments, 
whose  homes  were  in  that  neighborhood,  almost  entirely  abandoned 
their  organization,  and  went  every  man  to  his  own  house.  A  multitude 
deserted,  and  the  tide  of  fugitives  filled  the  country  with  dismay. 

The  battle  fought  at  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  also  called  the  battle  of 
Fishing  Creek,  or  of  Mill  Springs,  was  most  disastrous  to  the  Confed 
erate  arms.  General  Thomas  lost  39  killed  and  207  wounded  in  the 
five  regiments  most  hotly  engaged.  The  casualties  are  not  reported  in 
other  organizations.  General  Crittenden  thought  the  Confederate  loss 
was  about  300.  It  was  estimated  by  some  as  high  as  500.  At  the  time, 
it  was  stated  in  the  Confederate  accounts  that  the  loss  was  115  killed, 
116  wounded,  and  45  prisoners.  This  could  not  have  included  many  of 
the  wounded  who  escaped  with  the  army.  Van  Home  says :  "  He  lost,  in 
killed,  wounded,  and  prisoners,  392  men.  Of  this  aggregate,  192  were 
killed."  The  writer  is  not  aware  of  the  data  on  which  Van  Home 
bases  his  statement,  but  is  inclined  to  think  his  estimate  of  the  aggre 
gate  loss  nearly  correct.  In  every  point  of  view,  the  large  number  of 
killed  compared  to  the  wounded  is  a  very  striking  fact,  and  indicates 
fighting  at  close  quarters,  and  the  superiority  of  the  firearms  of  the 
Federals.  Van  Home  also  reports  the  capture  of  "  twelve  pieces  of  ar 
tillery,  a  heavy  amount  of  ammunition,  a  large  number  of  small-arms, 
150  wagons,  more  than  a  thousand  horses  and  mules,  and  abundant 
quartermaster  and  commissary  stores." 

The  death  of  Zollicoffer  was  a  great  blow  to  the  Tennesseeans.  He 
was  more  than  a  mere  popular  leader ;  he  was  a  patriot,  full  of  noble 
and  generous  qualities.  His  people  felt  his  death  as  a  personal  bereave 
ment,  and  still  cherish  his  memory  with  tender  and  reverent  regret.  His 


ZOLLICOFFER  AND   CRITTENDEN".  405 

fall  and  the  Confederate  slaughter  were  treated  with  indecent  and 
ferocious  exultation  by  camp-followers  who  wrote  for  the  Northern 
press,  and  by  others.  But  a  better  and  more  generous  spirit  also  pre 
vailed,  which,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  more  truly  represented  the  feelings  of 
the  brave  men  who  won  the  victory.  Zollicoffer's  body  was  borne  into 
a  tent,  by  Thomas's  orders,  and  identified  by  Colonel  Connell,  of  the 
Seventeenth  Ohio,  and  others  who  knew  him.  An  eye-witness,  writing 
to  the  Cincinnati  Enquirer,  thus  describes  him : 

A  tall,  rather  slender  man,  with  thin  brown  hair,  high  forehead  somewhat 
bald,  Roman  nose,  firm,  wide  mouth,  and  clean-shaved  face.  A  pistol-ball  had 
struck  him  in  the  breast,  a  little  above  the  heart,  killing  him  instantly.  His 
face  bore  no  expression  such  as  is  usually  found  on  those  who  fall  in  battle — no 
malice,  no  reckless  hate,  not  even  a  shadow  of  physical  pain.  It  was  calm, 
placid,  noble.  But  I  have  never  looked  on  a  countenance  so  marked  with  sad 
ness.  A  deep  dejection  had  settled  on  it. 

General  Zollicoffer's  body  was  embalmed,  carried  around  by  Leba 
non,  and  sent  by  General  Buell  through  his  lines  under  flag  of  truce.  A 
negotiation  for  an  exchange  of  prisoners  was  begun  by  General  Buell, 
during  which  he  accepted  a  proposal  of  General  Johnston  to  exempt 
from  captivity  surgeons  in  charge  of  the  wounded.  General  Buell's 
conduct  and  this  correspondence  evince  that  the  usages  and  amenities 
of  civilized  warfare  had  not  been  forgotten  in  these  armies. ' 

Crittenden  had  a  lot  still  harder  for  a  brave  soldier  than  that  of  his 
dead  colleague.  Skulking  slanderers  were  charging  him,  up  and  down 
the  country,  with  cowardice  and  treasonable  correspondence  with  the 
enemy.  He  was  also  charged  with  drunkenness ;  but  the  writer  has 
the  evidence  of  impartial  witnesses,  who  saw  him  on  that  day,  that  he 
was  perfectly  sober.  No  shadow  of  doubt  rests,  in  any  fair  mind,  on 
his  simple  fidelity,  his  spotless  integrity,  and  his  dauntless  courage. 
Though  unfortunate,  he  was  a  stout  soldier  and  an  honorable  gentle 
man.  With  most  of  his  troops,  personal  devotion  to  a  leader  was  almost 
essential  to  success.  He  was  new  and  strange  to  them ;  and,  when  Zol- 
licoffer  fell,  they  were  ready  to  despair. 

One  circumstance  in  connection  with  this  battle,  which  has  not  been 
sufficiently  pointed  out,  deserves  consideration.  It  is  the  great  dispar 
ity  in  arms.  While  the  Federals  were  fully  equipped  and  well  supplied 
with  good  weapons,  the  Confederates,  with  the  exceptions  already  men 
tioned,  had  but  few  good  arms ;  the  remainder,  old  squirrel-rifles  and 
fowling-pieces.  Such  disparity  makes  an  incalculable  difference  in  effec 
tiveness  of  fire  ;  and,  with  anything  like  equal  numbers  and  equal 
prowess,  such  effectiveness  must  decide  most  battles.  Raw  troops, 
decimated  before  they  can  bring  the  enemy  within  range,  become  dis 
heartened  and  demoralized,  and  are  beaten  before  they  strike  a  blow. 
Such  was  the  case  in  this  instance  with  most  of  the  Southern  troops. 


406  BATTLE  OF  FISHING  CREEK. 

Crittenden's  attack  on  Thomas  was  as  much  a  surprise  to  General 
Johnston  as  the  result  could  have  been  to  the  defeated  commander.  His 
line  was  broken ;  his  position  at  Bowling  Green  apparently  turned  on 
that  flank,  and  an  army  on  which  he  counted  demolished.  His  corre 
spondence,  however,  shows  no  vestige  of  reproach,  no  trace  of  harsh 
ness  that  might  add  to  the  pain  of  his  unsuccessful  subordinate.  This 
biography  has  evinced  that  he  was  singularly  tolerant  of  the  faults  of 
others,  and  he  was  too  wise  to  treat  calamity  as  a  crime.  It  is  true 
that  Crittenden,  stung  by  popular  clamor,  demanded  a  court  of  inquiry, 
which  was  subsequently  ordered  by  the  Secretary  of  War.  But  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  letters  make  no  allusion  to  the  defeat.  That  was  past. 
His  whole  attention  was  turned  to  saving  what  could  be  saved  of  that 
army ;  and  all  his  letters  were  directed  to  the  business  of  restoring  its 
efficiency — to  its  proper  location,  to  its  commissariat,  transportation,  re 
armament,  and  reorganization. 

General  Johnston,  in  writing  to  General  Crittenden,  February  3d, 
after  enumerating  the  various  steps  taken  for  his  assistance,  closes  thus : 

"When  Colonel  Claiborne  returns,  I  shall  be  informed  of  all  the  wants  of 
your  command,  and  take  measures  to  have  you  amply  provided. 

Writing  about  the  same  time  to  the  adjutant-general,  he  concludes 
his  letter : 

I  have  taken  every  measure  necessary  to  reorganize  and  place  immediately 
on  an  efficient  footing  the  command  of  Major-General  Crittenden. 

Schoepf  followed  Crittenden  to  Monticello,  and  then  returned. 
Thomas  did  not  pursue  his  victory,  for  reasons  sufficiently  obvious.  The 
season  of  the  year,  the  rugged  and  exhausted  country,  drained  of  its 
supplies,  the  almost  impassable  roads,  and  the  danger  of  concentration 
against  him  by  forces  of  whose  strength  he  was  ignorant,  made  a  further 
advance  hazardous.  Moreover,  his  troops  could  be  more  efficiently  em 
ployed  on  another  field,  and  he  was  recalled  by  General  Buell  to  take 
part  in  a  combined  movement  against  Bowling  Green.  Before  his  com 
mand  reached  there,  the  condition  of  affairs  had  changed;  and  it  was 
moved  round  by  water,  in  the  early  days  of  March,  to  Nashville,  which, 
by  that  time,  had  fallen  into  Buell's  hands. 


LOCATION  OF  THE  FORTS.  407 


CHAPTER  XXVII. 

FORT   HENRY. 

WHEN  Tennessee  seceded,  her  authorities  assembled  volunteers  at 
the  most  assailable  points  on  her  borders,  and  took  measures  for  guard 
ing  the  water-entrances  to  her  territory.  All  the  strong  points  on  the 
Mississippi  were  occupied  and  fortified — Memphis,  Randolph,  Fort 
Pillow,  and  Island  No.  10.  The  last-named  place,  though  a  low-lying 
island,  was  believed  to  be  a  very  strong  position.  Captain  Gray,  the 
engineer  in  charge  when  General  Johnston  assumed  command  (Sep 
tember  18th),  reported  that  Island  No.  10  was  "one  of  the  finest  stra 
tegic  positions  in  the  Mississippi  Valley,"  and,  "properly  fortified, 
would  offer  the  greatest  resistance  to  the  enemy  ;"  and  that  "its  in- 
trenchments  could  not  be  taken  by  a  force  four  or  five  times  superior 
in  number."  It  is  not  necessary  here  to  enter  upon  a  narrative  of  the 
defenses  of  the  Mississippi  River.  Columbus  was  relied  upon  as  the 
chief  barrier  against  invasion  ;  and  was  found  sufficient,  until,  for  stra 
tegic  reasons,  it  was  deemed  expedient  to  abandon  it.  The  defense  of 
the  points  lower  down  the  Mississippi,  however  important  in  a  general 
history  of  the  war,  did  not  greatly  influence  the  catastrophe  of  this 
biography,  and  hence  may  be  here  omitted. 

In  the  location  of  her  water-defenses,  comity  forbade  Tennessee  to 
invade  the  soil  of  another  sovereign  State  under  the  plea  of  fortifying 
for  her  own  defense  ;  so  that,  despite  the  supreme  value  of  Columbus 
to  her  security,  the  Southern  troops  did  not  seize  that  stronghold  until 
the  last  shadow  of  neutrality  vanished,  and  its  occupation  became  an 
absolute  necessity.  The  same  consideration  governed  the  selection  of 
points  for  the  defense  of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  Rivers.  Gov 
ernor  Harris  wished  to  locate  the  forts  as  near  the  Kentucky  line  as  he 
could  find  suitable  sites  for  them,  and  sent  General  Daniel  S.  Donelson,  a 
West  Point  graduate,  and  a  man  of  influence  and  standing,  to  select 
proper  situations.  He  reported  Donelson  as  the  strongest  position  on  the 
Cumberland  near  the  State  line,  and  that  there  was  no  good  position  on 
the  Tennessee  River  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  State.  General  Don 
elson  wished  to  build  a  fort  in  Kentucky,  on  better  ground  ;  but,  under 
the  Governor's  orders,  adopted  the  site  at  Fort  Henry  as  the  best  in 
Tennessee  near  the  Kentucky  line,  and  because  of  the  convenience  for 
mutual  support  between  it  and  Fort  Donelson.  These  locations  are 
said  to  have  been  approved  by  General  Bushrod  R.  Johnson  also.  In- 


408  FORT   HENRY. 

deed,  there  was  not  time  for  very  deliberate  or  well-considered  engi 
neering.  Crudities,  the  offspring  of  haste  and  inexperience,  character 
ized  a  great  deal  of  the  earlier  military  preparation  for  the  conflict;  and 
so  great  were  the  demands  upon  the  few  who  had  the  requisite  training, 
that  they  could  not  do  their  best.  And  this  was  especially  the  case  in 
a  branch  of  the  military  art  so  scientific  and  technical  as  engineering. 

Hence  the  two  forts  were  placed  within  the  limits  of  Tennessee ; 
Henry  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  Donelson  on  the  west  bank 
of  the  Cumberland,  only  twelve  miles  apart.  The  gates  to  the  State 
were  thus  set  as  near  its  outer  edge  as  was  possible  under  the  circum 
stances.  Near  their  mouths,  not  far  from  Smithland  and  Paducah, 
the  rivers  approach  within  three  miles  of  each  other.  Here,  it  is 
said,  an  intrenched  camp  might  have  commanded  both  streams  ;  but 
this  position  was  on  the  soil  of  Kentucky,  and  Tennessee  had  neither 
the  right  to  take  nor  the  strength  to  maintain  it. 

A  look  at  the  map  will  show  that  the  boundary  between  these  two 
States  is  nearly  a  straight  line  westward  from  Virginia  to  the  Tennessee 
River;  it  then  follows  this  stream  almost  due  south  some  twelve  or 
fourteen  miles,  when  it  resumes  its  original  direction  and  runs  westward 
to  the  Mississippi  River.  Within  a  mile  of  the  angle  of  this  offset  of 
Kentucky,  about  sixty  miles  above  Paducah,  stood  Fort  Henry.  The 
Tennessee  River  traverses  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  by  a  course  almost 
due  north.  The  Cumberland,  flowing  westwardly  near  their  dividing 
line,  turns  to  the  north  as  it  approaches  the  Tennessee,  to  which  it  runs 
parallel  to  its  mouth.  At  the  great  bend,  on  very  good  ground,  Fort 
Donelson  was  established  ;  so  that  the  two  forts  helped  mutually  to 
determine  their  relative  locations.  The  governing  considerations  were 
evidently  political  rather  than  strategic,  and  depended  more  upon 
geography  than  topography.  Nevertheless,  even  from  a  strategic  point 
of  view,  they  were  exceedingly  well  situated.  Whether  the  Barren 
River,  and  a  line  from  Bowling  Green  to  Columbus,  should  be  adopted 
for  defense,  or  that  of  the  Cumberland  and  thence  west  to  the  Missis 
sippi,  these  points  were  equally  commanding.  They  were  also  near  to 
and  in  front  of  the  railroads  from  Bowling  Green  and  Nashville,  running 
west. 

The  topography  of  the  two  forts  was  not  so  good,  though  not  justly 
amenable  to  the  censure  that  the  defeated  generals  visited  upon  it  after 
its  surrender.  Floyd,  in  his  reports,  said  of  Fort  Donelson  : 

Tt  was  ill  conceived,  badly  executed,  and  still  worse  located.  I  consider  the 
place  illy  chosen,  out  of  position,  and  entirely  indefensible  by  any  reenforce- 
ments  which  could  be  brought  there  to  its  support. 

General  Tilghman  spoke  in  his  report  in  still  more  disparaging 
terms  of  the  fortifications  at  Fort  Henry : 


TOPOGRAPHY  OF  THE  FORTS.  409 

Its  -wretched  military  position,  ...  its  unfortunate  location,  etc.  The  his 
tory  of  military  engineering  records  no  parallel  to  this  case.1  Points  within  a 
few  miles  of  it,  possessing  great  advantages  and  few  disadvantages,  were  totally 
neglected ;  and  a  location  fixed  upon  without  one  redeeming  feature  or  filling 
one  of  the  many  requirements  of  a  work  such  as  Fort  Henry. 

The  remark  of  General  Floyd  may,  under  the  circumstances,  be 
dismissed  as  a  hastily-formed  opinion,  though  it  is  due  to  him  to  say 
that  he  expressed  great  distrust  of  the  position  as  soon  as  he  arrived 
at  Fort  Donelson.  But  Tilghman  was  a  graduate  of  West  Point,  and 
a  civil  engineer  by  profession.  He  had  had  some  experience  in 
fortification  in  the  Mexican  War  and  as  an  artillery-officer,  so  that, 
under  other  circumstances,  his  opinion  would  be  entitled  to  weight. 
But,  when  it  is  remembered  that,  as  an  officer,  he  was  not  slow  to  find 
fault,  and  indeed  had  done  so  with  unusual  vehemence  as  to  the  ord 
nance,  transportation,  clothing,  medical  and  other  staff  departments, 
and  had  been  engaged  in  an  altercation  with  the  Engineer  Department 
on  other  points,  and  yet  had  never  objected  to  the  location  of  the  forts 
until  after  his  surrender,  his  censure  must  be  received  with  a  grain  of 
allowance. 

Donelson  was  well  enough.  It  was  placed  on  high  ground  ;  and, 
with  the  plunging  fire  from  its  batteries,  was  sufficiently  safe  on  the 
water-side.  But  from  the  land-side  it  was  not  equally  strong,  and  re 
quired  extensive  outworks  and  a  considerable  garrison  for  its  main 
tenance  against  an  attack  in  that  quarter. 

Fort  Henry  was  on  the  low  grounds  of  a  river  liable  to  great  floods 
or  "freshets,"  during  which  it  was  almost  surrounded  bv  water.  While 
this  was  to  some  extent  a  protection  against  a  land-assault,  yet,  bring 
ing  the  combat  to  the  water-level,  it  deprived  the  fort  of  any  advantage 
of  elevation.  The  engineers,  following  the  traditions  of  their  craft, 
were  soon  to  be  confronted  with  a  problem  new  to  them — the  power  of 
iron-clad  gunboats  against  land-defenses.  They  had  not  estimated  cor 
rectly  the  advantage  of  long-range  guns,  which  enable  the  vessels  to 
select  positions  for  attack,  so  as  to  enfilade  almost  any  possible  line  of 
defense,  and  easily  to  render  a  bastioned  fort,  for  instance,  untenable. 
Fort  Henry  was  also  commanded  by  high  ground  on  the  left  flank  ;  but 
this  was  intended  to  be  occupied  by  troops  in  case  of  a  land-attack. 

Fort  Henry  could  not  have  been  made  impregnable  to  gunboats, 
except  at  the  cost  of  much  time,  labor,  and  expense.  But  it  would  be 
unjust  to  hold  the  engineers  responsible  for  what  became  manifest  only 
in  the  light  of  subsequent  events.  Why  it  was  retained  will  appear 
as  we  go  on.  Though  probably  not  the  best  location,  on  the  two  riv 
ers,  each  successive  commander  found  it  easier  to  improve  them  than 

1  The  italics  are  his. 


410  FORT  HENRY. 

to  begin  anew  elsewhere.  But  a  simple  narrative  of  facts  relating  to 
the  history  and  progress  of  the  river-defenses  ought  to  give  a  correcter 
view  of  the  case  than  any  argument  in  the  interest  of  any  individual. 
At  one  time  there  was  a  profound  consciousness  in  the  Southern  peo 
ple  that,  in  this  campaign,  the  immediate  commanders  at  these  forts 
had  not  proved  equal  to  the  emergency.  Doubtless  time  has  partially 
effaced  the  conviction,  but,  whatever  individual  shortcomings  may  ap 
pear  herein,  the  public  dereliction  is  manifest.  The  same  apathy  that 
kept  back  from  the  field  men  who  subsequently  gave  their  lives  to  the 
cause,  at  that  period  withheld  even  the  negro  slaves  demanded  as  la 
borers,  and  seemed  to  paralyze  every  arm  and  bring  to  naught  the  most 
earnest  efforts  and  the  most  judicious  counsel. 

Not  long  before  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  General  Polk,  in  whose  mili 
tary  district  these  events  had  occurred,  made  a  report  that  contains  a 
very  fair  summary  of  many  important  facts  in  relation  to  the  defenses 
of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson.  It  reads  as  follows  : 


HEADQUARTERS,  FIRST  CORPS,  ARMY  or  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
CORINTH,  MISSISSIPPI,  April  1, 1862.         f 

GENERAL:  In  conformity  with  your  order  to  report  to  you  on  the  defenses 
of  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  Rivers  at  the  time  of  my  taking  command  in 
the  West,  I  have  to  say  that  those  defenses  were  at  that  time  not  included  in  my 
command,  nor  were  they  until  after  you  assumed  the  charge  of  the  Western 
Department.  My  command  up  to  that  time  was  limited  on  the  north  and  east 
by  the  Tennessee  River. 

Shortly  after  you  took  command  of  the  Western  Department,  Lieutenant 
Dixon,  of  the  Corps  of  Engineers,  was  instructed  by  you  to  make  an  examina 
tion  of  the  works  at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  and  to  report  upon  them. 
These  instructions  were  complied  with,  and  he  reported  that  the  former  fort, 
which  was  nearly  completed,  was  built,  not  at  the  most  favorable  position,  but 
that  it  was  a  strong  work,  and  instead  of  abandoning  it  and  building  at  another 
place,  he  advised  that  it  should  be  completed,  and  other  works  constructed  on 
the  high  lands  just  above  the  fort  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  river.  Measures 
for  the  accomplishment  of  this  work  were  adopted  as  rapidly  as  the  means  at 
our  disposal  would  allow.  A  negro  force,  which  was  offered  by  planters  on  the 
Tennessee  in  North  Alabama,  was  employed  on  the  work,  and  efforts  were 
made  to  push  it  to  completion  as  fast  as  the  means  at  command  would  allow. 

Lieutenant  Dixon  also  made  a  similar  reconnaissance  on  the  Cumberland, 
and  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that,  although  a  better  position  might  have  been 
chosen  for  the  fortifications  on  that  river,  yet,  under  the  circumstances  then 
surrounding  our  command,  it  would  be  better  to  retain  and  strengthen  the 
position  chosen.  He  accordingly  made  surveys  for  additional  outworks,  and 
the  service  of  a  considerable  slave-force  was  obtained  to  construct  them.  This 
work  was  continued  and  kept  under  the  supervision  of  Lieutenant  Dixon. 
Lieutenant  Dixon  also  advised  the  placing  of  obstructions  in  the  Cumberland  at 
a  certain  point  below,  where  there  was  shoal  water,  so  as  to  afford  protection  to 
the  operatives  engaged  on  the  fortifications  against  the  enemy's  gunboats.  This 


FOLK'S  EEPORT  OF  THE  DEFENSES.  411 

was  done,  and  it  operated  as  a  check  to  the  navigation,  so  long  as  the  water 
continued  low. 

You  are  aware  that  efforts  were  made  to  obtain  heavy  ordnance  to  arm  these 
forts  ;  but,  as  we  had  to  rely  on  supplies  from  the  Atlantic  sea-coast,  they  came 
slowly,  and  it  became  necessary  to  divert  a  number  of  pieces  intended  for  Co 
lumbus  to  the  service  of  those  forts. 

The  principal  difficulty  in  the  way  of  a  successful  defense  of  the  rivers  in 
question  was  the  want  of  an  adequate  force — a  force  of  infantry  and  a  force  of 
experienced  artillerists.  They  were  applied  for  by  you,  and  also  by  me ;  and 
the  appeal  was  made  earnestly  to  every  quarter  whence  relief  might  be  hoped 
for.  Why  it  was  not  furnished  others  must  say.  I  believe  the  chief  reason,  so 
far  as  the  infantry  was  concerned,  was  the  want  of  arms.  As  to  experienced 
artillerists,  they  were  not  in  the  country,  or,  at  least,  to  be  spared  from  other 
points. 

When  General  Tilghman  was  made  brigadier-general,  he  was  assigned  by 
you  to  the  command  of  the  defenses  on  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland.  It  was 
at  a  time  when  the  operations  of  the  enemy  had  begun  to  be  active  on  those 
rivers,  and  the  difficulty  of  communicating  as  rapidly  as  the  exigencies  of  the 
service  required,  through  the  circuitous  route  to  Columbus,  made  it  expedient 
for  him  to  place  himself  in  direct  communication  with  the  general  headquar 
ters.  Nevertheless,  all  the  support  I  could  give  him,  in  answer  to  his  calls, 
was  afforded.  He  received  from  Columbus  a  detachment  of  artillery-officers 
as  instructors  of  his  troops  in  that  arm,  on  two  several  occasions,  and  all  the 
infantry  at  my  command  that  could  be  spared  from  the  defense  of  Columbus. 

The  importance  of  gunboats,  as  an  element  of  power  in  our  military  opera 
tions,  was  frequently  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  Government.  One  trans 
port-boat,  the  Eastport,  was  ordered  to  be  purchased  and  converted  into  a  gun 
boat  on  the  Tennessee  River,  but  it  was,  unfortunately,  too  late  to  be  of  any 
service. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

L.  POLK,  Major-  General  commanding. 

To  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  commanding  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  Corinth,  Mississippi. 

A  rigid  examination  of  all  the  data  confirms  this  report  in  its  most 
important  particulars.  On  the  17th  of  September  General  Johnston 
ordered  Lieutenant  Dixon,  a  young  engineer  of  extraordinary  skill, 
courage,  and  character,  to  report  at  Fort  Donelson  for  engineer  duty. 
Immediately  afterward  he  applied  to  the  adjutant-general  for  other 
engineer-officers,  but  for  some  time  in  vain.  They  were  scarce,  and 
otherwise  assigned.  From  this  time  these  defenses  never  ceased  to  be 
the  subject  of  extreme  solicitude  to  General  Johnston.  The  prepara 
tions  for  resistance  were  necessarily  enlarged  with  the  magnitude  of 
the  operations  directed  against  them. 

The  following  extracts  from  his  correspondence  will  serve  to  show 
that  General  Johnston  not  only  did  not  lose  sight  of  this  vulnerable 
point,  but  did  all  that  he  could  with  the  means  at  his  command.  It 
will  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  points  of  pressure,  during  this  period, 
were  elsewhere,  and  that  the  Federal  commanders  themselves  came  to 


412  FORT   HENRY. 

a  very  sudden  and  unpremeditated  resolution  to  make  this  their  chief 
point  of  attack. 

On  October  8th,  Lieutenant  Dixon  having  been  temporarily  em 
ployed  elsewhere,  Colonel  Mackall,  assistant  adjutant-general,  wrote  to 
General  Polk  : 

General  Johnston  directs  you  to  send  Lieutenant  Dixon  to  Fort  Donelson 
instantly,  with  orders  to  mount  the  guns  at  that  place  for  the  defense  of  the 
river. 

Lieutenant  -  Colonel  McGavock  was  also  ordered  to  "  remain  in 
vigilant  command."  Another  letter,  of  October  17th,  says  : 

General  Johnston  orders  you  to  hasten  the  armament  of  the  works  at  Fort 
Donelson,  and  the  obstructions  below  the  place  at  which  a  post  was  intended. 
The  operations  of  the  enemy  on  the  Tennessee  show  that  the  necessity  of  in 
terrupting  the  Cumberland  is  urgent.  .  .  .  The  general  has  been  informed  that 
the  experiments  made  with  the  torpedoes  at  Memphis  have  been  very  success 
ful.  Should  you,  on  inquiry,  find  this  to  be  the  case,  you  are  authorized  to 
employ  them  to  any  extent  necessary  on  the  Mississippi,  Tennessee,  and  Cum 
berland  Rivers.  For  the  present,  do  not  move  the  regiment  from  Fort  Henry. 
The  men  are  accustomed  to  the  guns.  New  ones  might  not  be  so  efficient. 

A  dispatch  from  Colonel  Mackall  to  Major-General  Polk,  Columbus, 
Kentucky,  October  28th,  says  : 

General  Johnston  directs  me  to  say  that  he  wishes  you  to  keep  a  vigilant  eye 
on  the  Tennessee  River.  If  possible,  fortify  opposite  to  Fort  Henry,  to  protect 
it  from  being  overlooked  by  the  enemy.  It  can  be  held  with  part  of  the  gar 
rison  of  Henry.  Lieutenant  Dixon,  who  is  familiar  with  the  country,  will  be 
able  to  point  out  the  proper  position.  No  time  should  be  lost. 

General  Johnston  wrote  to  General  Polk,  October  31st,  as  follows  : 

Your  front,  and  particularly  your  right  flank,  requires  incessant  watching, 
and  may  at  any  moment  demand  all  the  force  at  your  disposal.  The  Cumber 
land  and  Tennessee  Rivers  aiford  lines  of  transportation  by  which  an  army  may 
turn  your  right  with  ease  and  rapidity,  and  any  surplus  you  may  be  able  to 
spare  from  the  left  flank  on  the  Mississippi  can  well  be  used  to  secure  you 
against  such  movements. 

In  the  latter  part  of  October  Major  Jeremy  F.  Gilmer  reported  to 
General  Johnston,  as  his  chief-engineer.  Gilmer  was  a  North  Carolin 
ian,  and  had  been  graduated  at  the  Military  Academy  in  1839,  fourth 
in  his  class,  next  below  H.  W.  Halleck.  After  subaltern  service,  he  had 
served  as  captain  in  the  Engineer  Corps  since  1853,  and  was  esteemed 
an  officer  of  great  merit.  General  Johnston  first  knew  him  in  California. 
They  met  next  at  Bowling  Green.  Gilmer  had  skill  and  judgment,  and 
his  military  career  was  full  of  usefulness  to  the  cause  he  espoused.  At 


GILMER'S  OPERATIONS.  413 

the  close  of  the  war  he  was  at  the  head  of  the  engineer  department  of 
the  Confederate  army. 

General  Johnston  was  well  pleased  with  this  assignment  to  him  of  a 
trained  soldier,  on  whose  scientific  knowledge  he  could  rely.  After  a 
full  conference  with  him  on  the  plan  of  defense  already  adopted,  he 
promptly  sent  him  back  to  establish  a  second  defensive  line  along  the 
Cumberland  from  Nashville  to  Donelson  and  thence  to  Henry,  which 
might  prove  not  only  a  secure  place  of  retreat  in  case  of  disaster,  but 
an  effectual  barrier  to  the  invader.  General  Johnston  gave  him  letters 
to  Governor  Harris  at  Nashville  and  Senator  G.  A.  Henry  at  Clarks- 
ville,  explaining  his  business  and  invoking  their  aid  and  influence,  and 
suggesting  the  employment  of  slave-labor  on  the  fortifications,  to  hasten 
their  construction.  Gilmer's  orders  were : 

"To  arrange  the  works  for  the  defense  and  obstruction  of  the  river"  at 
Donelson,  Clarksville,  and  Nashville,  and  to  intrust  the  constructicn  to  subordi 
nates.  He  was  u  to  spare  no  cost,  procuring  barges,  steamboats,  and  whatever 
else  may  aid  in  the  work."  His  orders  ran :  "  Arrange  a  plan  of  defensive  works 
for  Nashville,  and  urge  them  forward  by  all  the  means  you  can  command.  If 
you  find  tbat  the  work  of  troops  will  be  useful,  report  at  once  here  the  numbers 
you  can  use,  that  they  may  be  sent  you." 

General  and  specific  directions  were  also  issued  to  all  the  staff  de 
partments  to  furnish  Major  Gilmer  funds,  tools,  materials,  subsistence, 
transportation,  and  other  facilities  for  the  construction  of  the  defenses  ; 
and  Lieutenant-Colonel  McGavock  was  ordered  to  work  his  troops  day 
and  night  until  the  guns  at  Fort  Donelson  were  protected  by  parapets. 

The  objections  to  the  sites  of  the  forts  were  quite  apparent ;  but  the 
purpose  to  maintain,  instead  of  removing  them,  was  not  the  result  of  a 
blind  or  careless  policy,  but  of  a  deliberate  weighing  of  difficulties  and 
advantages.  General  Johnston  could  not  give  the  matter  his  personal 
attention,  owing  to  the  pressure  elsewhere;  but,  even  if  he  had  done 
so,  his  only  course,  as  a  sober-minded  man,  would  have  been  to  concur 
in  the  calm  decision  of  his  chief -engineer,  an  able  and  skillful  officer, 
who,  with  all  the  lights  before  him,  concluded  to  retain  positions  al 
ready  established,  in  preference  to  attempting  the  construction  of  new 
forts  elsewhere. 

Major  Gilmer,  in  a  report  of  November  3d,  says : 

As  to  the  defenses  of  the  Cumberland  River  below  Clarksville,  they  should  be 
at  least  as  low  down  as  Fort  Donelson.  Our  efforts  for  resisting  gunboats  should 
be  concentrated  there ;  and,  to  this  end,  Captain  Dixon  will  do  everything  in  his 
power  to  hasten  forward  the  works  at  that  point.  Lineport,  fifteen  miles  below 
Donelson,  presents  many  advantages  for  defending  the  river;  but,  as  the  works 
at  Fort  Donelson  are  partially  built,  and  the  place  susceptible  of  a  good  defense 
landward,  I  advised  Captain  Dixon  to  retain  the  position,  and  construct  the  ad 
ditional  defenses  as  rapidly  as  possible. 


4:14:  FORT   HENRY. 

To  obstruct  the  Cumberland  at  points  below  Donelson,  old  "barges"  and 
"flats"  have  been  sunk  at  Ingraham's  Shoals,  a  few  miles  above  Eddyville,  and 
at  Line  Island,  three  miles  below  Lineport.  In  all  ordinary  stages  of  water  the 
obstructions  render  the  river  impassable  for  gunboats,  and  for  any  other  boats  at 
this  time.  Such,  at  least,  is  the  judgment  of  Captain  Dixon,  who  superintended 
the  sinking  of  the  barges. 

Three  of  the  barges  sunk  were  one  hundred  and  twenty-seven  feet 
long  by  twenty-seven  feet  wide  and  eight  feet  deep.  These,  with  two 
smaller  boats,  loaded  with  about  1,200  tons  of  stone,  made  a  sufficient 
obstruction  for  the  time  ;  but  one  difficulty  of  these  waters  is,  that  a 
flood  will  almost  always  wash  out  a  new  channel. 

Major  Gilmer  reported,  November  4th,  that  the  armament  of  Fort 
Donelson  was  four  thirty-two-pounders  and  two  naval  guns,  and  recom 
mended  that  it  should  be  doubled.  He  added,  "  There  are  also  two  small 
iron  guns  and  a  battery  of  field-pieces  for  the  land-defenses  ; "  and 
recommended  an  additional  supply  of  twelve-pounder  guns,  mounted 
on  siege-carriages,  and  some  howitzers  for  throwing  shells.  General 
Johnston  sent  four  more  thirty-two-pounders  within  the  next  four  days. 
Within  the  same  period  the  gunboats  of  the  enemy  were  stopped  by  the 
obstructions  near  Eddyville. 

General  G.  A.  Henry,  Confederate  States  Senator  from  Tennessee, 
a  resident  of  Clarksville,  and  deeply  interested  in  the  defense  of  the 
Cumberland,  accompanied  Major  Gilmer  on  this  tour  of  inspection.  He 
wrote  to  General  Johnston  as  follows : 

Fort  Henry  is  in  fine  condition  for  defense,  the  work  admirably  done,  as  Ma 
jor  Gilmer  thinks.  .  .  .  Fort  Donelson  is  in  a  very  bad  condition.  No  work 
has  been  done  of  any  account,  though  Lieutenant  Dixon,  a  young  officer  of  great 
energy,  will  soon,  I  hope,  have  it  put  in  a  fine  state  of  defense.  Captain  Harrison, 
an  old  steamboat-captain  familiar  with  the  river,  concurs  with  Lieutenant  Dixon 
that  the  work  of  obstruction  is  effectually  done.  They  think  it  will  be  impossi 
ble  for  the  gunboats  to  pass  Ingraham's  Shoals,  even  when  the  water  is  ten  feet 
higher  than  it  is  now.  Though  Donelson  is  unfortunately  located  on  the  river, 
it  certainly  possesses  great  advantages  against  a  land-attack.  A  succession  of 
deep  ravines  nearly  surrounds  it,  including  some  ten  or  twelve  acres  of  land, 
thickly  lined  with  trees  in  the  right  place  (for  an  abattis). 

Again,  Major  Gilmer  wrote  on  the  16th  of  November: 

At  Clarksville  I  also  employed  a  competent  person  to  establish  a  timber- 
obstruction  in  the  Cumberland  River,  under  the  range  of  the  guns  of  Fort  Don 
elson. 

He  adds  that  he  had  chartered  "  a  steamer  to  go  to  Fort  Donelson 
to  be  employed  in  placing  the  obstructions  in  the  river." 

Each  of  the  forts  was  garrisoned  by  a  regiment  of  infantry,  support 
ing  the  artillery-companies  stationed  in  them.  When  the  movement  of 


GENERAL  LLOYD  TILGHHAN.  415 

the  Federal  army  was  made  along  the  lines,  early  in  November,  General 
Johnston,  fearing  an  attack  on  the  Cumberland,  ordered  Pillow  from 
Columbus,  with  5,000  men,  to  defend  this  line.  Why  this  movement 
was  not  made  has  already  been  explained  in  a  previous  chapter ;  but 
the  following  extract  from  a  letter  of  General  Johnston  to  the  Secretary 
of  War,  November  15th,  is  not  out  of  place  here.  He  said: 

I  had  left  but  the  choice  of  difficulties — the  great  probability  of  defeat  at 
Columbus,  or  a  successful  advance  of  the  enemy  on  ray  left.  I  have  risked  the 
latter.  The  first  would  be  a  great  misfortune,  scarcely  reparable  for  a  long  time ; 
the  latter  may  be  prevented. 

On  the  17th  of  November  Brigadier-General  Lloyd  Tilghman,  who 
had  been  in  command  at  Hopkinsville,  was  ordered  to  turn  over  his 
command  there  to  General  Charles  J.  Clark,  and  proceed  to  the  Cum 
berland  River,  to  take  charge  of  Forts  Donelson  and  Henry  and  their 
defenses,  and  the  intermediate  country,  under  General  Polk,  the  division 
commander.  Tilghman's  orders  continue  : 

The  utmost  vigilance  is  enjoined,  as  there  has  been  gross  negligence  in  this 
respect.  .  .  .  You  will  push  forward  the  completion  of  the  works  and  their 
armament  with  the  utmost  activity,  and  to  this  end  will  apply  to  the  citizens  of 
the  surrounding  country  for  assistance  in  labor,  for  which  you  will  give  them 
certificates  for  amounts  of  such  labor. 

Authority  was  also  given  to  make  all  needful  requisitions. 

General  Tilghman  had  been  assigned  to  General  Johnston  with 
considerable  'edat.  General  Johnston,  desiring  a  proper  commander  for 
the  defenses  of  Columbus,  had  very  strongly  recommended  for  that  pur 
pose  the  promotion  of  Major  A.  P.  Stewart  to  be  a  brigadier-general. 
On  the  llth  of  October  Mr.  Benjamin  replied  as  follows  : 

I  have  your  letter  asking  for  the  appointment  of  a  brigadier  to  command  at 
Columbus,  Kentucky,  in  your  absence.  Your  recommendation  of  Major  A.  P. 
Stewart  has  been  considered  with  the  respect  due  to  your  suggestions,  but  there 
is  an  officer  under  your  command  whom  you  must  have  overlooked;  whose 
claims  in  point  of  rank  and  experience  greatly  outweigh  those  of  Major  Stewart, 
and  whom  we  could  not  pass  by,  without  injustice — I  refer  to  Colonel  Lloyd 
Tilghman,  whose  record  shows  longer  and  better  service,  and  who  is,  besides, 
as  a  Kentuckian,  specially  appropriate  to  the  command  of  Columbus.  He  has, 
therefore,  been  appointed  brigadier-general,  but  of  course  you  will  exercise  your 
own  discretion  whether  to  place  him  in  command  at  Columbus  or  not. 

Though  General  Johnston  had  no  objection  to  Tilghman's  promo 
tion,  knowing  that  Polk  had  previously  recommended  him,  he  accepted 
the  secretary's  letter  as  a  rebuke.     Polk  urged,  October  31st,  that 
Tilghman  should  be  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  defenses  of  the 
23 


416  FORT  HENRY. 

Tennessee  and  Cumberland,  which  General  Johnston  ordered,  as  soon 
as  the  pending  movements  by  the  Federals  permitted. 

As  soon  as  Tilghman  took  command  he  stopped  the  work  of  ob 
struction  on  the  Cumberland,  which  led  to  a  sharp  remonstrance  from 
Gilmer,  and  a  direction  from  headquarters  not  to  interfere  with  Gilmer. 
General  Johnston,  on  November  21st,  ordered  Lieutenant  Dixon  to  lay 
out  a  field-work  on  the  commanding  ground  opposite  Fort  Henry;  and  on 
the  29th  telegraphed  Gilmer  that  "  these  works  should  not  be  stopped. 
Push  them  on  at  the  same  time  with  the  obstructions  at  Fort  Donelson." 
Tilghman,  on  the  same  day,  wrote,  pointing  out  the  necessity  of  a  small 
field-work  on  this  eminence,  and  the  want  of  a  field-battery  there  ;  but 
did  not  suggest  a  removal  of  the  forts,  or  any  other  change. 

As  General  Johnston  desired  the  line  of  the  Cumberland  to  rally  on 
in  case  of  retreat,  he  gave  directions  for  the  construction  of  extensive 
field-works,  so  located  that  they  might  be  occupied  and  held  by  brave 
but  undisciplined  militia,  without  the  necessity  of  performing  tactical 
manoeuvres  in  the  field.  But  it  was  impossible  to  convince  the  people 
of  their  value.  Their  construction  required  a  large  amount  of  labor. 
The  troops  worked  reluctantly,  and  the  slave-owners  hired  their  negroes 
grudgingly,  and  were  continually  demanding  their  return.  Fifteen  hun 
dred  laborers  were  needed  at  Nashville,  as  many  at  Clarksville,  1,000 
were  called  for  at  Fort  Donelson  by  Lieutenant  Dixon,  November  loth, 
and  the  same  number  could  have  been  usefully  employed  at  Fort  Henry. 
Instead  of  5,000,  not  500  could  be  got  together  in  all.  Much  of  the 
work  was  done  by  the  soldiers,  at  the  cost  of  health,  drill,  and  discipline. 

The  authorities  of  Tennessee  and  Alabama  did  what  they  could  to 
obtain  the  labor  demanded.  Official  action  was  supplemented  by  patri 
otic  voluntary  effort.  A  committee  of  leading  citizens  of  North  Alabama 
and  Tishomingo  County,  Mississippi,  headed  by  General  Samuel  D. 
Weakley,  appealed  to  the  people  in  a  private  circular  letter,  November 
23d, 'to  furnish  negro-laborers  and  volunteers  to  build  and  defend  the 
works  at  Fort  Henry.  They  plainly  said  that  these  defenses  were  im 
portant  and  unsafe,  and  that  no  time  could  be  lost.  They  said  : 

If  our  people  were  convinced  as  we  are  that  a  deadly  struggle  for  our  homes 
and  property  is  impending — that  the  enemy  in  a  few  days  will  put  forth  his 
whole  strength  for  our  subjugation — they  would  rally  en  masse  for  the  public 
defense. 

But  the  American  people  are  so  used  to  rhetorical  exaggeration, 
that  fervor  of  language  has  ceased  with  them  to  be  taken  as  a  measure 
of  earnestness  of  conviction.  The  response  was  tardy  and  feeble.  An 
insufficient  number  of  negroes  reached  Fort  Henry  early  in  January. 
Still,  if  their  labor  had  then  been  vigorously  applied,  it  would  have 
made  a  difference  in  the  preparation. 


ABORTIVE  ATTEMPTS  AT  DEFENSE. 

Governor  Harris,  with  that  inflexible  courage  which  he  ever  dis 
played,  dared  to  tell  the  Legislature  and  people  of  Tennessee,  in  his 
next  message,  these  truths,  in  reference  to  the  loss  of  the  forts  : 

Many  weeks  before  this  crisis  in  our  affairs,  General  Johnston  sent  a  highly 
accomplished  and  able  engineer,  Major  Gilmer,  to  Nashville,  to  construct  forti 
fications  for  the  defense  of  the  city.  Laborers  were  needed  for  their  construc 
tion.  I  joined  Major  Gilmer  in  an  earnest  and  urgent  appeal  to  the  people  to 
send  in  their  laborers  for  this  purpose,  offering  full  and  fair  compensation.  This 
appeal  was  so  feebly  responded  to,  that  I  advised  General  Johnston  to  impress 
the  necessary  labor;  but,  owing  to  the  difficulty  in  obtaining  the  laborers,  the 
works  were  not  completed ;  indeed,  some  of  them  little  more  than  commenced, 
when  Fort  Donelson  fell. 

General  Johnston  did  order  the  impressment  of  1,500  negroes  near 
Nashville ;  but  not  more  than  fifty  were  collected  for  some  time,  and 
never  more  than  200  in  all. 

It  may  be  thought  strange  that,  when  the  formidable  naval  prepara 
tions  of  the  United  States  for  operations  on  the  Western  rivers  were 
well  known  to  the  Confederate  authorities,  very  slight  efforts  were  made 
to  meet  them  with  similar  gunboats  or  with  rams.  While  it  is  true 
that  this  application  of  public  money  was  excluded  by  the  language  of 
the  appropriation  bill  passed  by  Congress,  yet  the  Government  could 
have  confidently  relied  on  a  deficiency  bill  covering  any  necessary  ex 
penses  in  this  direction.  The  true  reason  was  a  lack  of  skilled  labor, 
of  docks,  and  of  materials  for  construction,  which  could  not  be  im 
provised  in  a  beset  and  blockaded  country. 

Proposals  were  considered  both  for  building  gunboats  and  for  con 
verting  the  ordinary  side-wheel  high-pressure  steamboats  into  gunboats. 
Though  anxious  to  avail  itself  of  this  means  of  defense,  the  engineer 
department  decided  that  it  was  not  feasible.  Steamboats  in  armor,  like 
the  ass  dressed  in  the  lion's  hide,  would  incur  more  danger  than  they 
would  do  damage.  There  was  not  plate-iron  with  which  to  armor  a 
single  iron-clad,  and  even  railroad-iron  could  not  be  spared.  The  weight 
of  these  steamboats  made  their  draught  so  great  that  they  could  only 
be  used  in  floods  ;  and,  unless  a  fleet  could  be  built  to  match  the  en 
emy's,  the  vessels  could  only  be  used  as  floating  batteries  under  the 
guns  of  the  forts,  where  they  would  enjoy  no  advantage  over  the  land- 
batteries.  It  was  thought  best  to  concentrate  the  resources  on  what 
seemed  practicable.  One  iron-clad  gunboat,  however,  the  Eastport,  was 
undertaken  on  the  Tennessee  River,  but  under  so  many  difficulties  that, 
after  the  surrender  of  Fort  Henry,  while  still  unfinished,  it  was  destroyed 
lest  it  should  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy. 

While  these  feebly-sustained  attempts  at  defense  were  in  progress, 
the  mighty  wealth  and  energy  of  the  North  were  concentrating  them 
selves  for  one  supreme  effort  of  invasion.  All  summer  and  fall  the 


418  FORT   HENRY. 

ring  of  hammer  and  anvil  told  of  the  toil  of  thousands  of  skilled  me 
chanics  and  sturdy  laborers  in  the  great  work  of  preparation  and  arma 
ment.  The  best  talents  of  the  country  were  employed  in  the  work  of 
construction,  organization,  and  equipment,  and  in  training  and  fighting 
the  iron-clad  fleet  that  was  to  pierce  the  barriers  of  the  Western  rivers.1 
As  early  as  May  16,  1861,  Commander  John  Rodgers  had  been  sent 
West  by  the  United  States  Government  to  provide  an  armed  flotilla,  to 
serve  on  the  Western  rivers.  He  bought  steamboats,  which  were 
fitted,  armored,  and  armed  as  gunboats.  On  the  30th  of  August  Cap 
tain  Andrew  H.  Foote,  of  the  United  States  Navy,  was  ordered  to  take 
command  of  the  naval  operations  upon  the  Western  waters.  When 
Foote  took  command  there  were  three  wooden  vessels  in  commission, 
and  nine  iron-clad  gunboats  and  thirty-eight  mortar-boats  in  process 
of  construction.  This  is  not  the  place  to  relate  the  history  of  the 
United  States  Navy  in  the  civil  war  ;  but,  as  an  illustration  of  the  mag 
nitude  and  celerity  of  its  preparations,  it  may  be  stated,  on  the  author 
ity  of  Prof.  Hoppin,  Foote's  biographer,  that  600  vessels  "  were,  in  a 
space  of  time  to  be  reckoned  by  months,  made  ready  for  efficient  ser 
vice."  The  fleet  of  gunboats  on  the  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries,  when 
finally  completed,  "  consisted  of  twelve  gunboats,  seven  of  them  iron 
clad,  and  able  to  resist  all  except  the  heaviest  solid  shot,  and  costing 
on  an  average  889,000  each.  The  boats  were  built  very  wide  in  pro 
portion  to  their  length,  so  that  on  the  smooth  river-waters  they  might 
have  almost  the  steadiness  of  stationary  land-batteries  when  discharg 
ing  their  heavy  guns."  a  This  flotilla  carried  143  guns  ;  some  sixty- 
four-pounders,  some  thirty-two  pounders,  and  some  seven-inch  rifled 
guns  carrying  eighty-pound  shells.  Each  boat  had  also  a  Dahlgren  ten- 
inch  shell-gun.  Eight  of  the  boats  were  powerful  engines  of  war.  They 
were  of  about  "  600  tons  burden  each,  drawing  six  feet,  carrying  thir 
teen  heavy  guns,  plated  with  iron  two  and  a  half  inches  thick,  and  to 
steam  nine  miles  per  hour.  They  were  175  feet  long,  51J  feet  wide  ; 
the  hulls  of  wood  ;  their  sides  projected  from  the  bottom  of  the  boat 
to  the  water-line  at  an  angle  of  about  thirty-five  degrees,  and  from  the 
water-line  the  sides  fell  back  at  about  the  same  angle  to  form  a  slant 
ing  casemate,  the  gun-deck  being  about  a  foot  above  water.  This  slant 
ing  casemate  extended  across  the  hull,  near  the  bow  and  stern,  forming 
a  quadrilateral  gun-deck.  Three  nine  or  ten  inch  guns  were  placed  in 
the  bow,  four  similar  ones  on  each  side,  and  two  smaller  ones  astern. 
The  casemate  inclosed  the  wheel,  which  was  placed  in  a  recess  on  the 
stern  of  the  vessel."  J  To  build  this  powerful  squadron,  all  the  resources 

1  Most  of  the  details  in  regard  to  these  naval  operations  are  from  Hoppin's  "  Life  of 
Admiral  Foote." 
9  Ibid.,  p.  157. 
3  Boynton's  "  History  of  the  Navy  during  the  Rebellion." 


PRECAUTIONS  FOR   RIVER  DEFENSE.  419 

of  the  forests,  mines,  rolling-mills,  founderies,  machine-shops,  and  dock 
yards,  of  the  Northwest  were  brought  under  full  requisition. 

As  early  as  the  beginning  of  September,  the  Federal  gunboats 
were  cruising  on  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi,  overawing  and  distressing 
the  people  along  the  banks.  On  the  12th  of  October  the  gunboat 
Conestoga,  Lieutenant  Phelps,  ascended  the  Tennessee,  and  made  a 
reconnaissance  of  Fort  Henry.  In  November  the  fleet  took  part  in 
the  battle  of  Belmont,  as  has  been  related. 

About  the  middle  of  January  the  United  States  forces  developed 
an  intention  of  moving  on  the  Confederate  lines  by  way  of  the  Ten 
nessee  and  Cumberland  Rivers,  and  early  in  February  carried  out  the 
design.  This  danger  was  one  that  General  Johnston  had  foreseen,  and 
had  attempted  to  provide  against.  While  this  is  abundantly  evinced 
even  in  the  allusions  in  his  correspondence  given  herein  to  illustrate 
other  aspects  of  the  campaign,  it  will  not  be  amiss  to  add  some  brief 
extracts  bearing  directly  on  this  subject. 

As  early  as  October  27,  1861,  he  wrote  the  adjutant-general, 
pointing  out  the  three  lines  in  Kentucky  on  which  "the  enemy  seem 
to  design  to  operate :  "  first,  against  Zollicoffer  ;  second,  by  the  Louis 
ville  &  Nashville  Railroad ;  "  and  the  other  against  Polk,  and  will  per 
haps  endeavor  to  use  the  Tennessee  in  aid  of  the  movement." 

For  some  time  after  this  the  rivers  were  too  low  to  be  used  by  the 
heavy  armored  flotilla  ;  and  the  movements  of  the  enemy  seemed  to  be 
directed  from  South  Carrollton  against  Clarksville  as  the  objective 
point.  But  as  the  rainfall  and  the  advance  of  winter  made  the  roads 
difficult  and  the  rivers  navigable,  the  danger  evidently  became  more 
imminent  at  the  forts  and  less  so  at  Clarksville  ;  and  military  move 
ments  and  preparations  were,  of  course,  modified  accordingly. 

On  the  10th  of  December  General  Johnston,  writing  to  General  Polk, 
pointed  out  the  lines  by  which  the  enemy  might  attempt  to  turn  and 
carry  Columbus  :  first,  by  a  force  from  Cape  Girardeau  to  New  Madrid; 
second,  by  another  moving  on  the  west  bank  to  a  point  below  Colum 
bus,  to  cut  off  supplies  ;  and,  third,  by  a  movement  on  transports  up 
the  Tennessee  to  the  ferry,  and  thence  to  Paris.  "  This  movement  they 
would  probably  cover  by  a  demonstration  toward  Columbus." 

He  urged  General  Polk,  in  this  last  contingency,  to  compel  the 
column  to  give  him  battle  on  ground  of  his  own  choosing,  or  to  impede 
and  harass  it,  and  engage  it  at  a  disadvantage.  It  will  be  seen,  by  his 
correspondence  in  January,  that  General  Johnston  used  every  endeavor 
to  animate  his  subordinates  and  guard  against  an  attack  by  the  rivers. 

The  respective  advocates  of  Grant,  Sherman,  Foote,  Halleck,  and 
Buell,  have  debated  with  considerable  heat  the  question,  "Who  is  en 
titled  to  the  credit  of  the  movements  against  Forts  Henry  and  Donel- 
son  ?  "  The  movement  seems  so  obvious  that  the  writer  always  sup- 


420  FORT  HENRY. 

posed  it  was  a  long-settled  purpose,  deliberately  carried  out.  Indeed, 
it  was  but  part  of  a  general  plan  early  matured  in  the  mind  of  a  person 
who  seems  to  have  been  lost  sight  of  by  the  later  generation  of  great 
men.  It  was  well  known  at  General  Johnston's  headquarters  that  Gen 
eral  Winfield  Scott  told  General  William  Preston,  in  August,  1861,  that 
his  plan  was  to  bisect  the  Confederacy  by  opening  and  holding  the  Missis 
sippi  River,  and  then  to  divide  its  eastern  half  diagonally.  It  was  now 
evident  that  the  bisection  by  the  Mississippi  was  effectually  stopped  by 
Columbus  with  its  140  guns.  The  diagonal  movement  must,  therefore, 
be  made  first ;  but  winter  rendered  a  mountain  campaign  through  East 
Tennessee  clearly  impracticable.  It  was,  therefore,  left  to  the  Federal 
commanders  to  force  the  position  at  Bowling  Green  at  great  sacrifice, 
or  to  attempt  to  reduce  the  forts  on  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland. 
What  more  natural  than  that  the  Federal  commanders,  arrested  in  their 
advance  elsewhere,  and  seeking  a  weaker  point  in  the  defensive  line, 
should  discover  it  on  these  interior  rivers  that  marked  the  second  line 
of  advance  laid  down  in  General  Scott's  original  scheme  of  invasion  ? 

General  Sherman  gives  a  picturesque  narrative  of  the  origin  of  this 
movement  in  his  "Memoirs"  (vol.  i.,  page  220).  He  says  that,  in  a 
council  between  Generals  Halleck,  Cullom,  and  himself — 

General  Halleck  had  a  map  on  his  table,  with  a  large  pencil  in  his  hand,  and 
asked,  "Where  is  the  rebel  line?"  Cullom  drew  the  pencil  through  Bowling 
Green,  Forts  Donelson  and  Henry,  and  Columbus,  Kentucky.  "That  is  their 
line,"  said  Halleck.  "Now,  where  is  the  proper  place  to  break  it?"  And 
either  Cullom  or  I  said,  "Naturally,  the  centre."  Halleck  drew  a  line  perpen 
dicular  to  the  other  near  its  middle,  and  it  coincided  nearly  with  the  general 
course  of  the  Tennessee  River,  and  he  said,  "  That  is  the  true  line  of  operations." 
This  occurred  more  than  a  month  before  General  Grant  began  the  movement; 
and,  as  he  was  subject  to  General  Halleck's  orders,  I  have  always  given  Halleck 
the  full  credit  for  that  movement,  which  was  skillful,  successful,  and  extremely 
rich  in  military  results ;  indeed,  it  was  the  first  real  success  on  our  side  in  the 
civil  war. 

General  H.  V.  Boynton,  in  his  volume  entitled  "  Sherman's  His 
torical  Raid"  (Chapter  II.),  denies  the  justice  of  this  claim.  He  gives 
the  credit  to  General  Grant ;  but  also  shows,  from  the  correspondence 
of  Buell  and  Halleck,  that,  on  the  3d  of  January,  Buell  proposed  a  com 
bined  attack  on  the  centre  and  flanks  of  Johnston's  lines.  Buell  esti 
mated  the  Confederate  force  at  double  its  actual  strength,  and  con 
cluded  his  note,  "  The  attack  upon  the  centre  should  be  made  by  two 
gunboat  expeditions,  with,  I  should  say,  20,000  men  on  the  two  rivers." 

Bovnton  also  quotes  a  letter  from  Halleck  to  McClellan,  January  20, 
1862,  which  says : 

The  idea  of  moving  down  the  Mississippi  by  steam  is,  in  my  opinion,  im 
practicable,  or  at  least  premature.  It  is  not  the  proper  line  of  operations,  at 


' 


FEDERAL  PLANS  AXD  MOVEMENTS.  421 

least  now.  A  much  more  feasible  plan  is  to  move  up  the  Cumberland  and  Ten 
nessee,  making  Nashville  the  present  objective  point.  This  would  threaten 
Columbus,  and  force  the  abandonment  of  Bowling  Green.  .  .  .  This  line  of  the 
Cumberland  and  Tennessee  is  the  great  central  line  of  the  "Western  theatre  of  the 
war,  with  the  Ohio  below  the  mouth  of  Green  River  as  the  base,  and  two  great 
navigable  rivers  extending  far  into  the  theatre  of  operations. 

These  views  were  eminently  judicious  ;  but  Halleck,  overrating 
General  Johnston's  force  and  means  of  resistance,  adds,  "But  the  plan 
should  not  be  attempted  without  a  large  force — not  less  than  60,000 
effective  men." 

Halleck's  plan  was  to  move  against  the  Confederate  lines  with  de 
liberation  and  in  force.  But,  as  this  plan  was  slowly  maturing  in  the 
brain  of  the  chief,  the  conflict  was  precipitated  by  the  more  eager  and 
active  temper  of  his  subordinates  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio.  These 
were  three  of  the  ablest  and  boldest  officers  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States:  Grant,  C.  F.  Smith,  and  Foote.  These  enterprising  officers, 
finding  by  due  pressure  the  weak  point  of  a  strong  line  to  be  on  their 
own  immediate  front,  were  not  slow  to  seize  the  advantage. 

Early  in  January,  McClellan,  the  general-in-chief,  directed  Halleck, 
commanding  the  Western  Department,  to  make  a  demonstration  in 
Western  Kentucky  which  should  prevent  reinforcements  being  sent  to 
Bowling  Green,  toward  which  Buell  was  still  reaching  out.  Grant,  under 
orders  from  Halleck,  sent  McClernand,  with  6,000  men,  from  Cairo  to 
Milburn,  to  menace  Columbus  ;  and  C.  F.  Smith,  with  two  brigades,  from 
Paducah  toward  Mayfield  and  Murray,  threatening  Fort  Henry  and  the 
country  from  there  to  Columbus. 

McClernand's  expedition  occupied  the  time  from  January  10th  to 
January  20th,  the  infantry  marching  about  seventy -five  miles,  the  cav 
alry  farther.  Smith's  movement  took  a  little  longer.  These  commands 
were  moved  with  extraordinary  precautions.  Although  there  was  no 
fighting,  the  soldiers  suffered  greatly  from  cold,  and  from  the  effects  of 
a  violent  storm  of  rain  and  snow.  They  subsisted  chiefly  on  plunder.1 
General  Polk  believed  that  the  retreat  of  these  columns  was  due  to  a 
movement  toward  their  rear  by  1,000  cavalry  and  some  Confederate  in 
fantry  regiments  sent  out  by  him.  But,  as  the  demonstration  had  pro 
duced  its  effect,  impressing  the  garrison  at  Columbus  with  the  appre 
hension  of  an  advance  in  force  on  that  point,  besides  having  resulted  in 
valuable  information  of  the  defenses  of  the  Tennessee  River,  it  is  more 
probable  that  the  columns  retired  because  they  had  accomplished  their 
objects.  Their  movements  were  too  cautious  and  insufficiently  devel 
oped  to  allow  General  Polk  to  follow  General  Johnston's  instructions 
of  December  10th,  and  harass  or  attack  them.  These  expeditions,  un- 

1  Badeau's  "  Life  of  Grant,'1  vol.  i.,  p.  25 ;  McClellan's  report,  "  Rebellion  Record," 
vol.  iv.,  p.  49. 


422  FORT  HENRY. 

dertaken  in  the  depth  of  winter,  improved  the  morale  of  the  Federal 
troops,  and  accustomed  them  to  the  hardships  of  a  winter  campaign. 

In  this  demonstration,  C.  F.  Smith  moved  his  column  in  concert 
with  the  gunboats,  returning  by  the  left  bank  of  the  Tennessee  to  Pa- 
ducah.  Lieutenant  Phelps,  of  the  Conestoga,  after  a  reconnaissance  as 
far  as  the  Tennessee  State  line,  made  on  the  7th  of  January,  reported 
"  the  water  barely  sufficient  to  float  this  boat,  drawing  five  feet  five 
inches."  He  says,  "  Fort  Henry  I  have  examined,  and  the  work  is  for 
midable."  Again,  on  the  16th,  he  "proceeded  up  the  river,  accom 
panied  by  the  transport-steamer  Wilson,  having  on  board  a  force  of  500 
— infantry  and  artillery — under  Major  Ellston,  and  anchored  for  the 
night  near  where  the  Tennessee  line  strikes  the  right  bank  of  the  river." 
The  next  day  they  proceeded  up  the  river,  shelling  the  banks,  and  fired 
a  few  shells  at  Fort  Henry,  at  two  and  a  half  miles  distance,  without 
effect.1 

The  transport  then  landed  the  troops  a  few  miles  below,  at  Aurora, 
whence  they  proceeded  to  Murray,  and  threatened  Paris.  This  move 
ment,  in  conjunction  with  the  demonstration  against  Columbus,  exactly 
verified  the  prediction  of  General  Johnston  in  his  letter  of  December 
10th.  The  columns,  moving  by  the  west  bank  of  the  Mississippi,  ad 
vanced  later.  But  the  blow  struck  against  Zollicoffer  at  this  very  date 
had  also  been  pointed  out,  October  27th,  by  General  Johnston,  as 
probable. 

On  their  return  from  these  January  expeditions,  Grant  telegraphed 
Halleck,  January  28th,  from  Cairo : 

With  permission,  I  will  take  Fort  Henry,  on  the  Tennessee,  and  establish 
and  hold  a  large  camp  there. 

On  the  same  day  Foote  telegraphed  Halleck  that  Fort  Henry  could 
be  carried  with  four  iron-clad  gunboats  and  troops  to  permanently  oc 
cupy  it,  and  for  authority  to  move. 

On  January  29th  Grant  wrote  Halleck  fully,  urging  an  immediate 
advance  and  attack  on  Fort  Henry,  and  thence  on  Fort  Donelson,  Mem 
phis,  or  Columbus. 

Halleck  gave  the  fullest  authority,  and  instructions,  also,  for  the 
execution  of  the  plan.  Badeau  says : 

On  the  2d  of  February  Grant  started  from  Cairo  with  17,000  men  on 
transports.  Foote  accompanied  him  with  seven  gunboats,  and  on  the  4th  the 
debarkation  began  at  Bailey's  Ferry,  on  the  east  bank,  three  miles  below  Fort 
Henry. 

The  only  practicable  approaches  to  the  fort  by  land  were  double 
this  distance.  Grant  himself  took  command  on  the  east  bank,  with 

1  Hoppin's  "Life  of  Foote,"  pp.  191,  192,  and  Confederate  archives. 


RIVER  DEFENSES.  423 

the  main  column  ;  while  C.  F.  Smith,  with  two  brigades — some  5,000 
or  6,000  men — landed  on  the  left  bank,  with  orders  to  take  the  earth 
work  opposite  Fort  Henry,  known  as  Fort  Heiman.  During  the.  de 
barkation  on  the  4th  three  of  the  gunboats  approached  the  forts  and 
tried  the  range  of  their  guns,  throwing  solid  shot  and  nine-inch  shells 
at  a  mile's  distance,  and  burying  their  shot  in  the  fort,  but  doing  no 
other  damage.  The  fort  replied  with  a  columbiad  and  a  rifle-gun,  without 
effect,  but  had  to  stop  firing  on  account  of  an  injury  to  a  clamp  of  the 
carriage  of  the  columbiad.  On  the  5th  the  landing  was  completed,  and 
the  noon  of  the  next  day  was  fixed  as  the  time  of  attack.  Some  delay 
had  occurred  while  coming  up  the  river,  in  fishing  up  the  torpedoes  an 
chored  a  little  below  the  surface.  Lieutenant  Phelps,  who  had  expe 
rience  with  river-obstructions,  took  up  eight. 

General  Johnston's  letters  had  constantly  urged  upon  his  subordi 
nates  the  prompt  construction,  and  upon  the  bureaus  the  proper  arma 
ment,  of  the  forts.  But  the  needs  of  the  country  for  ordnance  were  so 
much  greater  than  the  ability  to  supply  it,  that  Columbus  alone  was  as 
yet  in  a  state  of  defense.  The  fortifications  had  been  delayed  for  lack 
of  labor,  and  from  the  difficulty  of  employing  efficiently  troops  unused 
and  unwilling  to  build  them.  The  call  for  slaves  for  this  purpose  had 
been  responded  to  slowly  and  feebly,  as  has  been  shown. 

The  condition  of  the  Confederates  in  that  quarter  may  be  under 
stood  from  an  extract  from  a  letter  of  General  Polk  to  General  John 
ston,  dated  January  11,  1862 : 

My  available  force  is  greatly  reduced  by  sickness  and  absence.  .  .  .  There 
are  many  regiments  in  my  division  who  are  without  arms,  and  several  poorly 
armed.  The  unarmed  regiments  are  stationed  at  Forts  Pillow,  Donelson,  and 
Henry;  at  Trenton,  Union  City,  and  Henderson  Station.  In  my  return  you  will 
find  embraced  the  brigade  of  Brigadier-General  Alcorn.  His  men  are  sixty-day 
troops  from  Mississippi,  who  are  armed  with  every  variety  of  weapon.  They 
are  sick  with  measles,  raw,  and  undisciplined.  This  brigade  cannot  be  expected 
to  be  very  effective. 

I  also  send  you  a  weekly  report  of  the  troops  at  this  post,  and  am  sorry  to 
remark  that  they  have  been  much  reduced  by  sickness.  My  effective  force  is 
now,  as  you  will  see,  only  about  12,000. 

On  the  18th  of  January  Colonel  Munford,  aide  to  General  Johnston, 
received  the  following  letter,  written  the  day  before,  by  the  Hon.  James 
E.  Saunders: 

NASHVILLE,  January  IT,  1862. 

DEAR  SIR  :  I  am  just  starting  for  Fort  Heiman,  opposite  Fort  Henry,  where 
I  have  been  for  some  time.  I  was  sent  for  ammunition  and  equipments  (which 
I  have  obtained),  as  none  of  the  officers  could  be  spared. 

We  carried  a  large  negro  force  down.  They  have  literally  done  nothing,  for 
want  of  the  intrenchments  being  laid  off  ready  to  commence  work  as  soon  as 


424  FORT  HENRY. 

the  shelters  were  made.  When  the  engineer,  Captain  Hayden,  was  urged  to  his 
work,  the  answer  was  that  General  Tilghman  had  not  passed  on  the  plan.  A 
courier  was  sent  to  General  Tilghman  on  the  3d  or  4th  of  January,  advising  him 
that  laborers  were  then  in  transitu  from  North  Alabama.  The  general  came  to 
Fort  Henry  on  the  15th — and  then  it  was,  when  I  left,  debated  whether  it  was  not 
too  late  to  throw  up  works  on  the  west  side,  as  contemplated  by  Captain  Dixon 
and  every  general  who  knows  anything  of  the  position  of  the  fort.  All  did  con 
cur  in  the  opinion  that  a  failure  to  occupy  the  heights  would  be  equivalent  to 
abandoning  Fort  Henry. 

The  Alabama  troops  are  raw  and  undisciplined.  In  my  poor  opinion,  a  dis 
ciplined  regiment  should  be  sent  to  Fort  Heiman,  and  another  or  two  to  Rick- 
man's  furnace,  half-way  between  Forts  Donelson  and  Henry,  six  miles  from  each, 
where  there  is  a  village  of  houses  to  shelter  the  men. 

Hurriedly,  your  friend,  JAMES  E.  SATJNDEKS. 

P.  S. — The  Alabama  volunteers  will  have  finished  their  100  cabins  by  the  time 
I  get  back.  Taking  care  of  the  men  is  of  prime  importance  at  this  season  of  the 
year. 

Colonel  E.  W.  MUNFOED. 

General  Johnston  could  not  neglect  this  warning  from  a  zealous 
and  intelligent  citizen,  and  telegraphed  Tilghman  immediately  : 

Occupy  and  intrench  the  heights  opposite  Fort  Henry.  Do  not  lose  a  mo 
ment.  "Work  all  night. 

General  Johnston  certainly  had  some  right  to  feel  disappointed  at 
Mr.  Saunders's  account  of  the  condition  of  things  at  Fort  Henry. 
Tilghman  had  written  him,  December  28th,  before  the  arrival  of  the 
Alabama  negroes,  arid  while  as  yet  he  had  only  slaves  borrowed  in  the 
neighborhood,  giving  an  encouraging  account  of  the  progress  of  the 
fortifications  at  Fort  Donelson.  The  arrival  of  the  Alabama  negroes 
gave  him  the  means  of  doing  at  least  as  much  at  Fort  Henry.  At 
Clarksville  some  300  negroes  were  employed,  but  the  works  there 
seem  not  to  have  been  pushed  vigorously.  Slaves,  reluctantly  loaned, 
slothful  in  habits,  and  badly  organized,  could  not  be  expected  to  prove 
very  efficient  laborers. 

The  demonstrations  from  Cairo  and  Paducah,  and  the  simulated 
attack  on  Fort  Henry,  January  17th,  made  it  clear  that  this  position 
was  liable  to  attack  at  any  moment.  General  Johnston  telegraphed, 
January  19th,  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  an  accurate  account  of  the 
enemy's  movements  and  strength.  He  adds: 

I  desire  the  Government,  if  it  be  possible,  to  send  a  strong  force  to  Nash 
ville,  and  another  t9  Memphis. 

On  January  27th  General  Johnston  wrote  Polk,  Tilghman's  imme 
diate  commander : 


CONFEDERATE   ARMY.  425 

Urge  upon  General  Tilghman  the  necessity  of  immediate  attention  to  the 
discipline  and  instruction  of  his  command.  A  grave  disaster  has  just  befallen 
our  arms  at  Mill  Springs  on  our  right,  by  neglect  of  this  essential. 

Next  day  he  wrote  Tilghman : 

As  you  have  now  a  large  number  of  raw  troops  on  hand,  push  forward  their 
instruction  as  earnestly  as  possible. 

He  also  authorized  him  to  employ  special  instructors,  and  ordered 
him  to  recall  all  absent  medical  officers,  and  employ  skillful  surgeons, "  as 
he  would  soon  want  all  his  medical  skill  at  Forts  Donelson  and  Henry." 

The  information  received  throughout  January,  from  both  Polk  and 
Tilghman,  based  on  intelligence  received  through  the  lines,  was  positive 
as  to  a  projected  attack  on  Columbus,  and  indicated  a  strong  probabil 
ity  of  a  simultaneous  assault  on  Forts  Donelson  and  Henry.  This  was 
the  plan  proposed  by  Buell  to  Halleck,  which  the  latter  did  not  feel 
strong  enough  to  attempt.  At  the  same  time,  Lovell  recalled  to  New 
Orleans  two  regiments  loaned  for  the  defense  of  Columbus  at  a  critical 
time.  Hence  Polk  called  for  reinforcements,  which  were  collected  for 
him  from  scattered  recruiting-stations,  and  small  detached  commands. 
The  same  relief  was  sent  to  Henry  and  Donelson,  and  men  and  artil 
lery  were  also  drawn  from  Columbus  to  their  aid. 

On  the  20th  of  January  General  Johnston  detached  8,000  men, 
Floyd's  brigade  and  part  of  Buckner's,  from  his  army  at  Bowling 
Green.  The  infantry,  artillery,  and  baggage,  were  sent  to  Russellville 
by  rail,  the  cavalry  and  artillery  horses  moving  by  land.  General 
Johnston's  army  at  Bowling  Green  had  numbered,  December  8th,  18,000 
men,  including  5,000  sick.  December  24th,  his  effective  force  had  in 
creased  to  17,000 ;  December  30th,  to  19,000  ;  and  January  8th,  by  reen- 
forcements — Bowen's  brigade  from  Polk,  and  Floyd's  brigade  sent  from 
Western  Virginia  by  the  War  Department — his  army  attained  the  great 
est  strength  it  ever  had,  23,000  effective  troops.  On  January  20th  it  had 
fallen  off  to  22,000  from  camp-diseases,  and  these  numbers  were  again 
reduced,  by  the  detachment  above  named,  to  14,000.  With  this  force 
he  faced  Buell's  army,  estimated  at  80,000  men,  for  three  weeks  longer. 

The  following  letter  from  General  Johnston  to  the  adjutant-gen 
eral,  written  January  22d,  gives  his  own  conception  of  the  situation  at 
that  time.  After  recounting  Zollicoffer's  defeat,  he  says  : 

Movements  on  my  left,  threatening  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  and  Clarks- 
ville,  have,  I  do  not  doubt,  for  their  ultimate  object,  the  occupation  of  Nash 
ville.  I  have  already  detached  8,000  men  to  make  Clarksville  secure  and  drive 
the  enemy  back,  with  the  aid  of  the  force  at  Clarksville  and  Hopkinsville ;  but 
to  make  another  large  detachment  toward  my  right  would  leave  this  place  un 
tenable.  The  road  through  this  place  is  indispensable  to  the  enemy  to  enable 
them  to  advance  with  their  main  body.  They  must  have  river  or  railroad 


426  FORT  HENRY. 

means  of  transportation  to  enable  them  to  invade  with  a  large  force.  "While 
it  is  of  vital  importance  to  keep  back  the  main  body,  it  is  palpable  this  great 
object  cannot  be  accomplished  if  detachments  can  turn  my  position,  and  attack 
and  occupy  Nashville  and  the  interior  of  the  State,  which  it  is  the  special  ob 
ject  of  this  force  to  defend.  A  reserve  at  Nashville  seems  now  absolutely 
necessary  to  enable  me  to  maintain  this  position. 

A  successful  movement  of  the  enemy  on  my  right  would  carry  with  it  all 
the  consequences  which  could  be  expected  by  the  enemy  here,  if  they  could 
break  through  my  defenses.  If  I  had  the  force  to  prevent  a  flank  movement, 
they  would  be  compelled  to  attack  this  position,  which  we  doubt  not  can  make 
a  successful  defense. 

If  force  cannot  be  spared  from  other  army  corps,  the  country  must  now 
be  roused  to  make  the  greatest  effort  that  it  will  be  called  upon  to  make  dur 
ing  the  war.  No  matter  what  the  sacrifice  may  be,  it  must  be  made,  and  with 
out  loss  of  time.  Our  people  do  not  comprehend  the  magnitude  of  the  danger 
that  threatens.  Let  it  be  impressed  upon  them. 

The  enemy  will  probably  undertake  no  active  operations  in  Missouri,1  and 
may  be  content  to  hold  our  force  fast  in  their  position  on  the  Potomac  for  the 
remainder  of  the  winter ;  but,  to  suppose,  with  the  facilities  of  movement  by 
water  which  the  well-filled  rivers  of  the  Ohio,  Cumberland,  and  Tennessee, 
give  for  active  operations,  that  they  will  suspend  them  in  Tennessee  and  Ken 
tucky  during  the  winter  months,  is  a  delusion.  All  the  resources  of  the  Con 
federacy  are  now  needed  for  the  defense  of  Tennessee. 

With  great  respect,  etc., 

A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

At  the  time  of  the  attack  upon  Fort  Henry,  it  had  been  well  forti 
fied,  though  not  strongly  enough  for  the  force  brought  against  it.  Hop- 
pin,  in  his  "  Life  of  Foote,"  following  Lossing,  says  : 

It  lay  in  a  bend  of  the  stream,  and  was  at  times  almost  surrounded  by 
water ;  its  guns  commanded  a  reach  of  the  river  below,  toward  "  Panther 
Island,"  for  about  two  miles.  It  was  a  strong  earthwork,  constructed  with 
much  scientific  skill,  covering  ten  acres,  with  five  bastions  from  four  to  six 
feet  high,  the  embrasures  knitted  firmly  together  with  sand-bags. 

If  the  work  was  not  strong,  the  responsibility  rested  chiefly  with 
the  officer  in  charge,  General  Tilghman,  who  had  been  in  immediate 
command  for  two  months  and  a  half. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  F.  Gilmer  was  ordered  by  General  Johnston, 
January  29th,  to  proceed  to  Fort  Henry  to  inspect  the  works  and  direct 
what  was  necessary  to  be  done.  He  met  General  Tilghman  there  on 
the  31st.  His  report  upon  the  defenses  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson, 
made  March  17,  1862,  presents  an  intelligent  and  dispassionate  account 
of  these  transactions.  He  says  : 

By  the  exertions  of  the  commanding  general,  aided  by  Lieutenant  Joseph 
Dixon,  his  engineer-officer,  the  main  fort  (a  strong  field-work  of  five-bastion 

1  General  Johnston  had  no  advices  from  the  West,  indicating  an  active  campaign. 


GILMER'S  REPORT.  427 

front)  had  been  put  in  a  good  condition  for  defense,  and  seventeen  guns  mounted 
on  substantial  platforms ;  twelve  of  which  were  so  placed  as  to  bear  well  on 
the  river.  These  twelve  guns  were  of  the  following  description  :  one  ten-inch 
columbiad,  one  rifled-gun  of  twenty-four-pounder  calibre  (weight  of  ball  sixty- 
two  pounds),  two  forty-two-pounders,  and  eight  thirty-two-pounders,  all  ar 
ranged  to  fire  through  embrasures,  formed  by  raising  the  parapet  between  the 
guns  with  sand-bags  carefully  laid. 

In  addition  to  placing  the  main  work  in  good  defensive  order,  I  found  that 
extensive  lines  of  infantry  cover  had  been  thrown  up  by  the  troops  forming 
the  garrison,  with  a  view  to  hold  commanding  ground,  that  would  be  danger 
ous  to  the  fort  if  possessed  by  the  enemy.  These  lines  and  the  main  work  were 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  river,  and  arranged  with  good  defensive  relations,  mak 
ing  the  place  capable  of  offering  a  strong  resistance  against  a  land-attack  com 
ing  from  the  eastward. 

On  the  left  bank  of  the  river  there  was  a  number  of  hills  within  cannon- 
range,  that  commanded  the  river-batteries  on  the  right  bank.  The  necessity  of 
occupying  these  hills  was  apparent  to  me  at  the  time  I  inspected  Fort  Henry, 
early  in  November  last;  and  on  the  21st  of  that  month  Lieutenant  Dixon,  the 
local  engineer,  was  ordered  from  Fort  Donelson  to  Fort  Henry  to  make  the 
necessary  surveys,  and  construct  the  additional  works.  .  .  . 

The  surveys  were  made  by  the  engineer,  and  plans  decided  upon  without 
delay ;  but,  by  some  unforeseen  cause,  the  negroes  were  not  sent  until  after  the 
1st  of  January  last.  Much  valuable  time  was  thus  lost,  but,  under  your  urgent 
orders  when  informed  of  the  delay,  General  Tilghman  and  his  engineers  pressed 
these  defenses  forward  so  rapidly  night  and  day,  that,  when  I  reached  the  fort 
(January  31st),  they  were  far  advanced,  requiring  only  a  few  days'  additional 
labor  to  put  them  in  a  state  of  defense.  But  no  guns  had  been  received  that 
could  be  put  in  these  works,  except  a  few  field-pieces;  and,  notwithstanding 
every  effort  had  been  made  to  procure  them  from  Richmond,  Memphis,  and  other 
points,  it  was  apprehended  they  would  not  arrive  in  time  to  anticipate  the 
attack  of  the  enemy,  which,  from  the  full  information  obtained  by  General 
Tilghman,  was  threatened  at  an  early  day  either  at  Fort  Henry  or  Fort  Donel 
son,  or  possibly  on  both  at  the  same  time.  The  lines  of  infantry- cover,  how 
ever,  which  had  been  thrown  up,  were  capable  of  making  a  strong  resistance, 
even  without  the  desired  artillery,  should  the  attack  be  made  on  that  (the  left) 
bank  of  the  river.  A  defect  was  found  in  the  carriage  of  the  ten-inch  colum 
biad,  which  was  partially  remedied.  With  this  exception,  the  guns  were  in 
fair  working  order. 

After  the  batteries  of  the  main  work  were  mounted  General  Tilghman  found 
much  difficulty  in  getting  competent  artillerists  to  man  them,  and  he  was  not 
supplied  with  a  sufficient  number  of  artillery-officers. 

It  is  proper  to  state  that  an  Alabama  regiment  of  300  artillerists 
was  ordered  from  Tuscumbia,  Alabama,  January  18th,  but,  for  some 
reason,  probably  a  deficiency  in  organization  and  equipment,  did  not  go 
to  Fort  Henry. 

Impressed  with  the  great  deficiency  in  the  preparations  for  defending  the 
passage  of  the  river,  the  commanding  officer  expressed  to  me  his  fears  that  it 


4:28  FORT  HENRY. 

might  cause  disaster  if  the  place  were  vigorously  attacked  by  the  enemy's  gun 
boats.  This  he  thought  his  greatest  danger.  In  conjunction  with  General  Tilgh- 
man,  I  made  every  effort  during  the  three  days  I  remained  at  Fort  Henry  to 
get  all  the  works  and  batteries  in  as  good  condition  for  defense  as  the  means  at 
hand  would  permit.  The  3d  of  February  we  went  over  to  Fort  Donelson  to  do 
the  same. 

On  the  4th  General  Tilghman  was  startled  by  heavy  firing  at  Fort 
Henry,  at  10J-  A.  M.,  and  by  a  message  from  Colonel  Heiman,  received 
at  3|-  P.  M.,  that  the  enemy  were  landing.  He  and  Gilmer  returned  to 
Fort  Henry  that  night,  arriving  there  at  midnight.  The  5th  of  Febru 
ary  and  the  morning  of  the  6th  were  spent  in  preparations  and  dispo 
sitions  for  defense,  and  in  the  instruction  of  the  various  commands  in 
the  duties  assigned  them.  Tilghman  seemed,  up  to  this  time,  to  have 
feared  the  effects  of  the  overflow  on  the  mud  walls  of  his  fort  more 
than  the  gunboats,  and  the  gunboats  more  than  Grant's  army. 

General  Tilghman  says  in  his  report  in  one  place  that  his  force  was 
2,734  effective  troops  at  Fort  Henry,  in  another  that  it  was  2,610  ;  and 
General  Gilmer  puts  it  at  about  3,200.  A  careful  examination  of  the 
returns  satisfies  the  writer  that  the  latter  statement  is  nearly  correct, 
and  that  Tilghman  had  about  3,400  men  present  at  Fort  Henry,  and 
2,300  or  2,400  more  at  Fort  Donelson.  On  January  31st  he  had  3,033 
effectives  at  Henry,  and  1,956  at  Donelson.  The  Fiftieth  Tennessee, 
numbering  386,  was  transferred  from  Henry  to  Donelson,  leaving 
2,647  at  the  former  and  2,342  at  the  latter.  Subsequently,  there 
arrived  at  Fort  Henry  reinforcements  from  General  Polk,  the  Forty- 
eighth  and  Fifty-first  Tennessee,  and  the  Fifteenth  Arkansas,  which 
added  some  700  or  800  effectives  to  his  numbers,  and  gave  him  at  the 
two  forts  about  5,750  men. 

In  his  report  of  the  bombardment  of  Fort  Henry  General  Tilghman 
says : 

Had  I  been  reenforced,  so  as  to  have  justified  my  meeting  the  enemy  at  the 
advanced  works,  I  might  have  made  good  the  land-defense  on  the  east  bank. 

In  his  supplemental  report  he  says  : 

The  failure  of  adequate  support,  doubtless  from  sufficient  cause,  cast  me  on 
my  own  resources. 

All  the  telegrams  from  Colonel  Heiman,  commanding  at  Fort  Henry, 
and  from  General  Tilghman,  during  the  4th  and  5th  of  February, 
breathe  a  confident  spirit.  In  transmitting  Colonel  Heiman's  dis 
patch,  General  Tilghman  telegraphed,  4  P.  M.,  February  4th,  to  Colonel 
Mackall : 

Better  send  two  regiments  to  Danville,  subject  to  my  orders. 


GENERAL  LLOYD  TILGHMAN.  429 

An  hour  later  he  telegraphed  : 

The  landing  of  the  enemy  is  between  rivers,  perhaps  from  both  rivers.  Give 
me  all  the  help  you  can,  light  battery  included.  Off  for  Henry. 

On  the  5th,  at  8  A.  M.,  General  Tilghman  telegraphed  from  Fort 
Henry : 

My  force  in  good  spirits,  but  badly  armed.  I  will  hold  my  position  to  the 
last,  but  should  be  reenforced  amply,  at  once,  if  possible. 

At  midnight,  before  his  surrender,  General  Tilghman  again  tele 
graphed  : 

Our  scouts  engaged  advanced  posts  of  the  enemy  yesterday  afternoon.  Our 
cavalry  retired.  I  reenforced,  and  enemy  retired.  We  lost  one  man.  Enemy 
fortifying  three  miles  below.  They  were  reenforced  yesterday.  I  hope  not  to 
lose  the  chance  proposed  to  the  general  yesterday.  I  must  have  reinforcements 
and  with  well-drilled  troops.  The  green  men  with  me  are  wellnigh  worthless. 
More  of  them  would  be  in  my  way.  The  high  water  threatens  us  seriously. 
Enemy  evidently  intend  to  prevent  us  landing  troops  or  supplies  at  fort,  and 
they  can  do  it.  If  you  can  reenforce  strongly  and  quickly,  we  have  a  glorious 
chance  to  overwhelm  the  enemy.  Move  by  Clarksville  to  Donelson,  and  across 
to  Danville,1  where  transports  will  be  ready.  Enemy  said  to  be  intrenching 
below.  My  plans  are  to  concentrate  closely  in  and  under  Henry. 

This  dispatch  was  received  on  February  6th  by  General  Johnston. 
A  few  hours  later  Fort  Henry  surrendered. 

General  Tilghman's  requests  were  not  neglected  ;  indeed,  they  were 
anticipated,  but  too  late  to  save  Fort  Henry.  There  was  a  delay  of 
three  or  four  hours  in  transmitting  dispatches  by  courier  from  Fort 
Henry  to  Donelson,  and  a  further  delay  thence  to  the  nearest  telegraph- 
office.  On  the  5th  General  Johnston  ordered  a  regiment,  just  armed, 
from  Nashville  to  Donelson,  and  on  the  6th  Colonel  Smith's  regiment 
from  Tuscumbia,  Alabama.  He  also  ordered  Floyd,  on  the  6th,  to  pro 
ceed  with  his  command  from  Russellville  to  Clarksville,  without  a  mo 
ment's  delay,  and  at  the  same  time  sent  all  the  rolling-stock  he  could 
command  to  take  the  troops.  Before  any  concentration  could  possibly 
have  been  made,  Tilghman  had  surrendered. 

On  leaving  Fort  Donelson  Tilghman  ordered  Colonel  Head  to  hold 
his  own  and  Sugg's  regiment,  together  about  750  strong,  ready  to  move 
at  a  moment's  notice,  with  two  pieces  of  artillery ;  and  on  the  morning 
of  the  5th  he  ordered  him,  if  no  advance  had  been  made  against  Fort 
Donelson,  to  take  position  at  the  Furnace,  half-way  on  the  road  to 
Fort  Henry.  This  gave  him  more  than  4,000  men  confronting  Grant 
with  his  column  of  12,000  men,  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Tennessee ; 
though,  of  course,  it  was  in  Grant's  power  to  draw  reinforcements  from 

1  Tennessee  River  railroad-crossing,  twenty  miles  above  Henry. 


430  FORT  HENRY. 

Smith,  who  was  on  the  west  bank.  The  Confederate  force  was  raw, 
badly  armed,  and  imperfectly  disciplined  ;  but  it  is  not  improbable  that, 
if  well  handled,  they  could  have  held  the  assailants  at  bay  on  the  nar 
row  approaches  of  that  overflowed  country,  and  with  the  advantage  of 
breastworks  to  retire  to.  Even  when  not  meeting  a  show  of  resistance, 
Grant  advanced  slowly,  cautiously,  and  painfully,  making  no  attempt 
even  to  carry  the  intrenchments  until  after  the  surrender.  Indeed,  he 
could  not  have  done  so  without  exposing  himself  to  a  fire  from  the  five 
heavy  guns  of  the  fort  mounted  landward. 

General  Tilghman  complained  that  the  small  force  at  his  command 
did  not  enable  him  to  avail  himself  of  his  line  of  defenses.  Neverthe 
less,  he  drew  in  all  his  troops  from  the  west  bank,  and  placed  his  whole 
command  in  the  rifle-pits.  He  says,  "  Minute  instructions  were  given, 
not  only  to  brigades,  but  to  regiments  and  companies,  as  to  the  exact 
ground  each  was  to  occupy."  It  is  evident  that,  on  the  5th,  Tilghman 
meant  to  dispute  Grant's  advance.  But  on  the  6th,  just  before  the 
attack  by  the  gunboats,  he  changed  his  purpose,  abandoned  all  hope 
of  a  successful  defense,  and  made  arrangements  for  the  escape  of  his 
main  body  to  Fort  Donelson,  while  the  guns  of  Fort  Henry  should  re 
turn  the  fire  of  the  gunboats. 

There  had  been  some  inconsiderable  skirmishing  on  the  5th,  and  on 
the  morning  of  the  6th  it  was  plain  that  a  combined  attack  was  impend 
ing.  Tilghman  ordered  Colonel  Heiman  to  withdraw  the  command  to 
Fort  Donelson>  while  he  himself  would  obtain  the  necessary  delay  for  the 
movement  by  standing  a  bombardment  in  Fort  Henry.  For  this  purpose, 
he  retained  his  heavy  artillery  company — seventy-five  men — to  work  the 
guns  ;  a  number  quite  unequal  to  the  strain  and  labor  of  the  defense,  as 
was  demonstrated.  It  was  probably  impossible  to  repair  the  oversight 
of  not  having  more  men  who  had  been  trained  at  the  guns,  but  the 
presence  of  mere  laborers  would  have  helped  the  tired  and  discouraged 
artillerists. 

Whatever  may  have  been  Tilghman's  want  of  earnestness  in  prep 
aration  during  the  two  months  and  a  half  he  held  command  at  Fort 
Henry,  and  of  judgment  and  steadiness  of  purpose  in  the  final  hours  be 
fore  the  attack,  he  perfectly  vindicated  his  personal  gallantry  and  self- 
devotion  in  the  hour  of  imminent  peril. 

Noon  was  fixed  as  the  time  of  attack  ;  but  Grant,  impeded  by  the 
overflow,  and  unwilling  to  expose  his  men  to  the  heavy  guns  of  the 
fort,  held  back  his  troops  in  the  wet  woods  until  the  result  of  the 
gunboat  attack  should  develop  some  point  of  weakness  in  the  defense. 
In  the  mean  time  the  Confederate  troops  were  in  retreat. 

On  February  6th,  at  11  A.  M.,  the  fleet  set  forward  in  two  divis 
ions.  The  first,  under  Captain  Foote,  consisted  of  the  flagship  Cincin 
nati,  the  Carondelet,  and  the  St.  Louis,  each  carrying  thirteen  guns, 


BOMBARDMENT  OF  FORT  HEXRY.  431 

and  the  Essex  of  nine  guns,  all  iron-plated  gunboats.  The  second, 
under  Lieutenant  Phelps,  three  unarmored  gunboats,  each  with  nine 
guns,  followed  at  the  distance  of  about  half  a  mile.  At  11.45  A.  M. 
the  main  division  opened  fire,  at  1,700  yards,  with  their  bow-guns,  and 
kept  firing  as  they  slowly  steamed  up,  until  within  600  yards.  Here 
they  took  position  abreast,  firing  with  all  their  might,  to  dismount  the 
guns  of  the  fort.  The  unarmored  boats,  at  safer  distance,  kept  up  a 
bombardment  of  shells  that  fell  within  the  works.  The  firing,  which 
had  increased  in  rapidity  and  precision  on  both  sides,  now  became  ter 
rible  indeed.  The  armored  boats,  each  carrying  three  ten-inch  guns  in 
its  bow,  sent  their  formidable  missiles,  at  short  range,  five  or  six  a 
minute,  some  400  in  all,  into  the  fort.  This  heavy  cannonading,  be 
sides  the  bursting  of  shells,  taxed  the  utmost  energy  of  officers  and 
men  inside  the  fort.  They  were  not  slow  to  respond,  and  as  many  as 
fifty-nine  of  their  shot  were  counted  by  the  Federal  officers  as  striking 
the  gunboats.  "Where  these  hit  the  iron  armor  they  bounded  harmless 
from  the  surface.  One  thirty-two-pound  shot,  entering  at  the  bow  of 
the  flagship,  ranged  its  whole  length,  killing  one  seaman.  In  the  course 
of  the  action,  nine  more  seamen  were  wounded  on  this  vessel.  One 
man  was  killed  on  the  Essex  by  a  cannon-ball  ;  and  a  shot  through  the 
boiler  caused  an  explosion  that  scalded  Commander  Porter,  twenty-eight 
seamen,  and  nineteen  soldiers,  many  of  whom  died.  The  Essex  was 
thus  forced  to  retire. 

Five  minutes  after  the  fight  began  in  earnest,  that  is,  at  twenty-five 
minutes  before  one  o'clock,  the  twenty-four-pounder  rifle-gun,  one  of 
the  most  prized  in  the  fort,  burst,  disabling  every  man  at  the  piece. 
Then  a  shell,  entering  the  embrasure,  exploded  at  the  muzzle  of  one  of 
the  thirty-two-pounders,  ruining  the  gun,  and  killing  or  wounding  all 
the  men  at  the  piece.  About  the  same  moment,  a  premature  discharge 
occurred  at  one  of  the  forty-two-pounder  guns,  killing  three  men  and 
seriously  injuring  others.  But  now  occurred  a  still  greater  loss.  A 
priming-wire  was  jammed  and  broken  in  the  vent  of  the  ten-inch  co- 
lumbiad,  the  only  gun  able  to  match  the  artillery  of  the  assailants.  An 
heroic  blacksmith  labored  for  a  long  time,  with  great  coolness,  to  re 
move  it,  under  the  full  fire  of  the  enemy,  but  in  vain. 

The  men  had  fought  with  courage  and  enthusiasm ;  but  they  now 
became  both  weary  and  discouraged.  They  lost  confidence  in  their 
guns,  and  some  of  them  ceased  to  work  the  thirty-two-pounders, 
thinking  them  useless  against  the  invulnerable  mail  of  the  gunboats. 
Seeing  this,  Tilghman  did  what  was  possible  to  encourage  the  men, 
serving  himself  at  a  thirty-two-pounder  some  fifteen  minutes.  Only 
four  guns  were  now  replying  to  the  rapid  fire  of  the  enemy,  which  was 
telling  with  powerful  effect.  The  men  were  exhausted,  they  lost  all 
hope,  and  there  were  none  to  replace  them.  Tilghman's  spirit  rose  with 
29 


432  FORT  HENRY. 

the  danger.  To  a  suggestion  to  surrender,  he  answered,  "  I  shall  not 
give  up  the  works."  He  sent  out  to  try  to  get  volunteers  from  his  re 
treating  forces,  to  replace  his  exhausted  artillerists  at  the  deserted  guns. 
But  it  was  too  late.  The  retiring  troops  already  felt  the  demoraliza 
tion  of  a  retreat. 

Tilghman  struggled  on,  but  there  is  a  limit  to  human  endurance. 
Though  but  four  of  his  guns  were  disabled,  six  stood  idle  for  want  of 
artillerists,  and  but  two  guns  were  replying  to  the  enemy.  At  five 
minutes  before  two  o'clock,  after  an  engagement  of  two  hours  and  ten 
minutes,  he  ceased  firing  and  lowered  his  flag.  He  had  certainly  done 
all  that  was  necessary  to  vindicate  his  personal  prowess  and  honor,  and 
to  cover  the  retreat  of  his  command ;  but  the  fort  was  gone,  the  Ten 
nessee  River  was  open,  and  a  base  by  short  lines  was  established  against 
Fort  Donelson. 

Tilghman's  casualties  were  five  killed  and  sixteen  wounded  ;  those 
of  the  enemy  were  sixty-three  of  all  kinds.  Twelve  officers  and  sixty- 
six  non-commissioned  officers  and  privates  were  surrendered  with  the 
fort.  Captain  Foote  treated  his  prisoners  with  courtesy,  though  the 
contrary  has  sometimes  been  alleged/  In  a  letter  written  to  General 
Pillow,  February  10th,  Colonel  Gilmer  expressed  the  opinion  that  the 
comparatively  small  damage  done  to  the  gunboats  "  was  due  in  great 
measure  to  the  want  of  skill  in  the  men  who  served  the  guns,  and  not 
to  the  invulnerability  of  the  boats  themselves." 

When  the  surrender  was  determined  on,  Colonel  Gilmer  and  a  few 
others,  unwilling  to  be  included  in  it,  escaped,  and  made  their  way  on 
foot  to  Fort  Donelson.  The  troops  retreating  to  Fort  Donelson  lost 
twenty  or  thirty  stragglers,  captured  by  the  Federal  cavalry,  and  left 
some  guns  on  the  road,  on  account  of  the  mud.  Their  precipitate  re 
treat  demoralized  these  brave  but  undisciplined  soldiers,  and  prepared 
them  to  accept  a  greater  disaster.  On  the  other  hand,  the  unexpected 
rapidity  and  brilliancy  of  their  naval  success  at  Fort  Henry  filled  the 
Northern  troops  with  exultation,  and  inspired  them  with  an  eager  de 
sire  to  surpass  it  with  still  brighter  achievements.  This  signal  victory 
gave  great  prestige  to  the  gunboats,  and  added  to  their  assault  at  Fort 
Donelson,  under  entirely  different  circumstances,  a  moral  weight  far  be 
yond  their  real  power. 

Foote,  with  his  usual  vigor,  ordered  Phelps  to  push  up  the  Tennes 
see  River  with  his  three  gunboats,  while  he  himself  returned  to  Padu- 
cah  with  his  iron-armored  gunboats  to  make  ready  for  the  attack  on 
Fort  Donelson.  The  Tennessee  River  was  open  to  the  keels  of  Phelps's 
flotilla,  and  he  ascended  that  stream,  destroying  whatever  could  be  use 
ful  to  the  Confederate  defense,  and  spreading  as  much  terror  among 
the  simple  inhabitants  as  any  marauding  viking  a  thousand  years  before 
along  the  coast  of  France.  General  Johnston  telegraphed  to  the  author- 


MOVEMENTS  OF  TROOPS.  433 

ities  of  the  principal  towns  on  the  Tennessee  River,  on  the  day  of  the 
fall  of  Fort  Henry,  warning  them  to  send  all  boats  up  the  river,  and 
to  take  other  proper  precautions  ;  but  the  disaster  seemed  to  paralyze 
the  faculties  and  energies  of  the  most  patriotic,  so  that  the  gunboats 
swept  the  Tennessee  River  with  impunity. 


CHAPTER  XXVIII. 

FORT   DOIS'ELSON. 

THE  fall  of  Fort  Henry  made  it  manifest  that  a  combined  attack  on 
Donelson  by  land  and  water  would  soon  follow.  Such  attack  could  not 
be  otherwise  than  formidable.  Indeed,  the  success  of  the  gunboats  at 
Henry  had  produced  an  exaggerated  impression  of  their  power  ;  while 
the  real  strength  of  the  Northern  armies  was  too  well  known  at  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  headquarters  to  leave  any  doubt  of  their  ability  to  move 
overwhelming  forces  on  both  Bowling  Green  and  Donelson.  Still,  if 
the  line  of  the  Cumberland  could  be  maintained  from  Nashville  to  Don 
elson  for  even  a  few  weeks,  General  Johnston  hoped  that  the  awakened 
spirit  of  the  country  would  supply  him  with  the  long-demanded  re- 
enforcements.  Grant's  movable  column  at  Fort  Henry,  stated  by  his 
biographer,  Badeau,  at  15,000  men,  was  receiving  accessions  from  Hal- 
leek,  while  Buell  was  also  reinforcing  him. 

Forrest  had  reported  the  enemy  concentrating  10,000  men  at  South 
Carrollton  for  a  forward  movement  toward  Russellville ;  and,  to  meet 
this  movement,  General  Johnston  detached  Floyd,  on  January  20th, 
with  his  own  brigade  and  part  of  Buckner's — 8,000  men  in  all.  Gen 
eral  Johnston  retained  14,000  men  to  restrain  the  advance  of  Buell. 
Floyd  was  sent  to  Russellville,  with  orders  to  protect  the  railroad  line 
from  Bowling  Green  to  Clarksville.  It  was  added : 

He  must  judge  from  after-information  whether  he  shall  inarch  straight  upon 
the  enemy,  now  reported  at  South  Carrollton,  or  wait  for  further  developments 
of  his  intention.  It  is  sufficient  to  say,  he  must  get  the  best  information  of  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  southward  from  the  river,  and  beat  them  at  the  earliest 
favorable  opportunity. 

Toward  the  close  of  January,  General  Pillow,  who  had  been  for 
some  time  sick  in  Nashville,  was  placed  in  command  at  Clarksville. 
On  February  6th  Brigadier-General  Bushrod  R.  Johnson  was  placed 
in  command  at  Fort  Donelson.  Next  day,  on  account  of  the  attack  at 
Fort  Henry,  Pillow  was  ordered  to  move  from  Clarksville,  with  all  the 
troops  there,  to  Donelson,  and  assume  command.  Brigadier-General 


434 


FORT  DONELSON. 


Clark  was  also  charged  to  move  at  once  from  Hopkinsville  to  Clarks- 
ville  with  his  command,  something  over  2,000  men ;  and  Floyd  was 
directed  to  take  his  force  from  Russellville  to  Clarksville  without  a 
moment's  delay.  Floyd  was  given  authority  to  determine  his  move 
ments  as  he  might  think  judicious  ;  at  the  same  time  it  was  indicated 
to  him  that  he  should  concentrate  his  forces  at  Clarksville,  and  move  to 
the  support  of  Donelson.  He  was  directed  to  encamp  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  Cumberland,  so  as  to  leave  open  the  route  to  Nashville  in  case 


PREPARATIONS  AT   DONELSON.  435 

of  the  loss  of  the  fort.  Suggestions  were  also  made  for  obstructions 
and  submarine  batteries,  which,  however,  the  engineers  found  them 
selves  unable  to  carry  out.  All  these  dispositions  were  made  as  soon 
as  General  Johnston  heard  of  the  advance  upon  Fort  Henry,  and  before 
he  had  learned  of  its  fall. 

Events  were  moving  so  rapidly,  and  proper  military  action  was  so 
dependent  on  accurate  information  of  the  enemy,  that  it  was  necessary 
to  leave  the  immediate  commander  untrammeled.  Floyd  was,  there 
fore,  invested  with  the  fullest  authority.  Pillow  reported  that  the 
troops  at  Donelson  were  much  demoralized  by  the  transactions  at 
Henry,  and  this  was  true.  They  were  the  rawest  militia,  reduced  by 
disease  and  disheartened  by  retreat.  Pillow  wrote  that  a  naval  officer, 
who  had  witnessed  the  surrender,  told  him  (February  7th)  "  that  we 
had  troops  enough  at  Donelson,  and  that  they  are  powerless  to  resist 
the  gunboats." 

General  Johnston,  presuming  that  Grant  would  follow  up  his  suc 
cess  at  Fort  Henry  by  an  immediate  attack  on  Donelson,  took  his 
measures  on  the  supposition  that  Donelson  was  no  longer  tenable,  and 
already  virtually  lost.  But,  though  his  advices  gave  him  little  con 
fidence  of  the  ability  of  the  batteries  to  prevent  the  passage  of  the 
gunboats,  General  Johnston  said  what  he  could  by  way  of  encourage 
ment.  He  telegraphed  to  Pillow : 

Your  report  of  the  effect  of  shots  at  Fort  Henry  should  encourage  the  troops, 
and  insure  our  success.  If,  at  long  range,  we  could  do  so  much  damage,  with 
the  necessary  short  range  on  the  Cumberland,  we  should  destroy  their  boats." 

Gilmer,  after  his  escape  from  Henry,  stopped  at  Donelson  ;  and,  with 
General  Johnston's  authority,  engaged  actively  in  preparations  for  its 
defense.  Pillow  arrived  on  the  9th,  and  pressed  forward  the  works. 
Additional  lines  of  infantry  cover  were  constructed,  to  embrace  the 
town  of  Dover  ;  and  two  heavy  guns  were  mounted — the  only  guns 
there  effective  against  the  armor  of  the  gunboats.  All  this  was  accom 
plished  by  the  night  of  the  12th. 

Pillow  says  that,  at  the  time  of  his  arrival — 

Deep  gloom  was  hanging  over  the  command,  and  the  troops  were  greatly 
depressed  and  demoralized  by  the  circumstances  attending  the  fall  of  Fort 
Henry,  and  the  manner  of  retiring  from  that  place.  ...  I  imparted  to  the  work 
all  the  energy  which  it  was  possible  to  do,  working  day  and  night  with  the 
whole  command. 

But  Pillow,  bold  and  sanguine  in  temper,  saw  difficulties  vanishing, 
and  gave  assurances  of  an  improved  and  improving  condition  of  affairs. 
Senator  Bailey  of  Tennessee,  then  colonel  of  the  Forty-ninth  Ten 
nessee  Regiment,  informs  the  writer  that  the  restoration  of  confidence 


436  FORT  DONELSON. 

among  the  men  in  the  power  of  the  garrison  to  resist  the  passage  of 
the  gunboats  was  chiefly  due  to  Lieutenant  Dixon,  who  lost  his  life 
during  the  siege.  On  February  8th  Buckner  conveyed  to  General 
Johnston  information,  derived  from  friends  in  Louisville,  that  there  were 
not  more  than  12,000  Federals  on  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee 
Rivers.  In  fact,  the  strength  of  the  movement  against  Donelson  was 
not  developed.  To  meet  it,  General  Johnston  sent  a  force,  which  he 
estimated  moderately  at  17,000  men,  reserving  for  himself  only  14,000 
men  to  perform  the  more  delicate  task  of  retiring  before  a  larger  army, 
ably  commanded.  Even  after  reenforcing  Grant  with  thirteen  regi 
ments,  General  Buell,  had  left  seventy  regiments  of  infantry,  besides 
artillery  and  cavalry — fully  55,000  men.  Certain  is  it,  therefore,  that 
General  Johnston  took  himself  the  place  of  greater  hazard,  and  left  to 
his  subordinates  the  opportunity  of  glory.  If  it  terminated  otherwise, 
it  was  no  fault  of  his.  He  had  sent  all  the  troops  he  could  possibly 
spare,  with  abundance  of  ammunition  and  supplies.  Under  the  circum 
stances,  the  army  at  Donelson  might  well  be  thought  sufficient.  At  all 
events,  General  Johnston  felt  that  he  had  done  all  that  he  could  do  ; 
and  he  awaited  the  issue  with  composure. 

The  criticism  has  been  made  that  General  Johnston  should  have 
concentrated  his  forces,  and  made  an  aggressive  campaign.  The  fore 
going  facts  show  that  this  could  not  properly  have  been  done  at  Don 
elson  ;  and  they  make  it  almost  as  plain  that  the  attempt  would  have 
been  equally  as  futile  at  Bowling  Green.  This  subject  will  be  briefly 
considered,  however,  in  its  proper  place. 

But  there  was  no  reason  for  General  Johnston  to  feel  that  he  had 
fallen  short  of  the  requirements  of  the  occasion.  Pillow  telegraphed 
him  on  the  10th,  the  day  after  his  arrival : 

My  position  undisturbed  by  enemy.  Am  pushing  ray  work  day  and  night. 
Will  make  my  batteries  bomb-proof,  if  allowed  a  little  time.  Have  my  guns 
mounted,  and  satisfactory  trial  of  all  my  guns. 

Pillow  wrote  to  Floyd  to  the  same  effect.  He  stated  that  he  was 
apprehensive  that  the  enemy  might  cross  the  country  south  of  him,  and 
cut  his  communication  by  river,  though  the  country  was  so  rough  and 
broken  as  to  be  nearly  impracticable.  He  believed  that  the  difficulty 
of  procuring  supplies  insured  his  safety.  He  says : 

The  conflict  of  yesterday  between  our  cavalry  and  that  of  the  enemy  resulted 
in  three  of  ours  wounded,  and  twenty  taken  prisoners  by  being  thrown  from 
their  horses ;  and  in  three  of  the  enemy  killed  and  six  mortally  wounded.  .  .  . 
I  hope  you  will  order  forward  at  once  the  tents  and  baggage  of  General  Buck- 
ner's  command,  as  they  are  suffering  very  much  this  cold  weather. 

Writing  to  General  Johnston  the  same  day,  the  10th,  Colonel  Gil- 
mer  says  : 


HOPES   OF   SUCCESS.  437 

The  attack  expected  here  is  a  combined  one — gunboats  by  water,  and  a  land- 
force  in  their  rear.  The  greatest  danger  is,  in  my  opinion,  from  the  gunboats, 
which  appear  to  be  well  protected  from  our  shot.  The  effect  of  our  shot  at 
Fort  Henry  was  not  sufficient  to  disable  them,  or  any  one  of  them,  so  far  as  I 
can  ascertain.  This  was  due,  I  think,  in  a  great  measure,  to  the  want  of  skill 
in  the  men  who  served  the  guns,  and  not  to  the  invulnerability  of  the  boats 
themselves.  .  .  . 

With  the  preparations  that  are  now  being  made  here,  I  feel  much  confidence 
that  we  can  make  a  successful  resistance  against  a  land-attack.  The  attack  by 
water  will  be  more  difficult  to  meet.  Still,  I  hope  for  success  here  also.  .  .  . 
We  are  making  Herculean  efforts  to  strengthen  our  parapets,  making  narrow 
embrasures  with  sand-bags. 

He  also  announced  the  landing  of  troops.  Pillow  wrote  at  the 
same  time: 

This  position  can  be  made  stronger  than  Columbus  is  now,  by  water,  if  we 
had  more  heavy  artillery.  The  advantage  is  in  the  narrowness  of  the  stream, 
and  the  necessity  of  the  boats  approaching  our  works  by  a  straight  and  narrow 
channel  for  one  and  a  half  mile.  No  more  than  three  boats  could  possibly 
bring  their  guns  to  bear  upon  our  position  at  once ;  thus  admitting  the  con 
struction  of  very  narrow  embrasures. 

A  difference  of  opinion  arose  between  Pillow  and  Floyd  as  to  the 
proper  disposition  of  the  troops,  Buckner  concurring  with  Floyd.  Pil 
low  believed  that  the  defense  of  the  river  should  and  could  be  made  at 
Donelson  ;  the  other  two  seem  to  have  given  up  the  idea  of  a  successful 
defense  of  the  river  before  the  enemy  appeared.  Floyd  proposed  to 
withdraw  Buckner's  troops  from  Donelson  to  Cumberland  City,  where 
the  railroad  diverged  from  the  river,  whence  a  retreat  might  be  easily 
made  to  Nashville.  He  intended  to  leave  Pillow  to  defend  the  fort. 
But  Pillow  thought  if  the  whole  of  Floyd's  army  could  not  defend  Don 
elson,  half  of  it  could  not,  and  that  such  a  course  must  involve  his  capt 
ure.  So,  when  Buckner  arrived,  on  the  night  of  the  llth,  to  carry  off 
his  division,  Pillow  refused  to  allow  it,  and  appealed  to  General  John 
ston  by  telegraph.  He  also  went  by  steamer  to  Floyd  at  Cumberland, 
leaving  Buckner  temporarily  in  command,  and  persuaded  Floyd  to  con 
centrate  all  his  troops  at  Donelson.  Floyd  consented,  though  probably 
with  hesitation.  General  Johnston,  that  night,  telegraphed  Floyd  to 
go  to  Donelson  ;  and  he  replied  that  he  had  anticipated  the  order. 

General  Pillow,  in  a  letter  dated  March  28,  1877,  gives  the  present 
writer  the  following  information : 

The  orders  of  General  Johnston  at  Bowling  Green,  delivered  personally, 
were  for  me  to  proceed  directly  to  Donelson,  to  assume  command  of  the  forces 
there,  to  do  all  that  was  possible  to  protect  his  rear  by  holding  that  place;  that 
he  would  give  me  all  the  force  it  was  possible  for  him  to  spare  from  his  posi 
tion  ;  when  it  was  no  longer  possible  to  hold  that  place,  to  evacuate  the  position 
and  march  the  army  by  way  of  Charlotte  to  Nashville. 


438  FORT   DONELSON. 

General  Pillow's  recollection  of  his  verbal  orders  is  sustained  by 
the  correspondence,  telegraphic  and  by  letter,  between  General  John 
ston  and  his  subordinates  on  the  Cumberland.  These  matters  will  be 
made  clearer  by  reference  to  the  correspondence  here  following. 

On  the  12th,  Pillow,  being  still  in  command,  telegraphed  : 

If  I  can  retain  my  present  force,  I  can  hold  my  position.  .  .  .  Let  me  re 
tain  Buckner  for  the  present.  If  now  withdrawn,  will  invite  an  attack.  Enemy 
cannot  pass  this  place  without  exposing  himself  to  flank-attack.  If  I  am  strong 
enough  to  take  field,  he  cannot  ever  reach  here ;  nor  is  it  possible  for  him  to 
subsist  on  anything  in  the  country  to  pass  over,  nor  can  he  possibly  bring  his 
subsistence  with  him.  With  Buckner's  force,  I  can  hold  my  position.  Without 
it,  cannot  long. 

General  Johnston,  at  three  o'clock  that  day,  communicated  the 
above  dispatch  to  General  Floyd,  adding : 

I  do  not  know  the  wants  of  General  Pillow,  nor  yours,  nor  the  position  of 
General  Buckuer.  You  do.  You  have  the  dispatch.  Decide.  Answer. 

Floyd  replied  : 

I  am  moving  all  my  troops  except  two  Tennessee  regiments,  as  fast  as  it 
is  possible  with  the  means  at  command.  The  force,  except  what  is  abso 
lutely  necessary  for  the  fort,  I  think  (General  Buckner  concurs),  ought  to  be  at 
Cumberland  City,  whither  we  go  from  all  directions. 

At  10.30  P.  M.,  February  12th,  General  Johnston  again  telegraphed 
General  Floyd  : 

My  information  from  Donelson  is  that  a  battle  will  be  fought  in  the  morning. 
Leave  a  small  force  at  Clarksville,  and  take  the  remainder,  if  possible,  to  Donel 
son  to-night.  Take  all  the  ammunition  that  can  be  spared  from  Clarksville. 
The  force  at  Elkton  and  Whippoorwill  Bridge  has  been  ordered  to  Clarksville. 

Three  hours  later,  Floyd  replied  from  Cumberland  : 

I  anticipated  your  order,  which  overtook  me  here  shipping  the  balance  of  the 
troops  from  this  point  to  Fort  Donelson.  I  will  reach  there  before  day,  leav 
ing  a  small  guard  here. 

On  the  13th,  at  9.50  A.  M.,  Floyd  telegraphed  from  Fort  Donelson  : 
The  enemy's  gunboats  are  advancing.     They  are  in  force  around  our  entire 

works.     Our  field-defenses  are  good.     I  think  we  can  sustain  ourselves  against 

the  land-forces.     I  reached  here  this  morning  at  daylight. 

It  is  sufficient  to  say  in  this  connection  that  the  telegrams  contin 
ued  favorable  until  the  16th,  when,  at  the  hour  of  the  surrender, 
General  Johnston  was  suddenly  apprised  of  that  great  reverse. 

When  Floyd  was  subsequently  hard  pressed  by  public  indignation 
for  the  fatal  issue  of  Donelson,  he  published  a  letter  written  by  him 
on  the  12th  to  General  Johnston,  as  explanatory  of  his  plans.  In  the 


WHEN   TO   FIGHT?  439 

rush  of  events,  he  probably  forgot  their  sequence.     In  this  letter  he 
says  : 

The  best  disposition  to  make  of  the  troops  on  this  line  was  to  concentrate 
the  main  force  at  Cumberland  City — leaving  at  Fort  Donelson  enough  to  make 
all  possible  resistance  to  any  attack  which  may  be  made  upon  the  fort,  but  no 
more.  The  character  of  the  country  in  the  rear  and  to  the  left  of  the  fort  is 
such  as  to  make  it  dangerous  to  concentrate  our  whole  force  there ;  for,  if 
their  gunboats  should  pass  the  fort  and  command  the  river,  our  troops  would 
be  in  danger  of  being  cut  off  by  a  force  from  the  Tennessee.  In  this  event, 
their  road  would  be  open  to  Nashville,  without  any  obstruction  whatever. 

He  proposed,  therefore,  to  concentrate  at  Cumberland  City,  and 
threaten  the  flank  of  any  force  attacking  the  fort ;  while,  as  the  rail 
road  diverged  from  the  river  at  Cumberland,  he  could  effect  a  retreat 
to  Nashville  without  molestation  from  gunboats. 

The  radical  defect  of  this  plan  was  that  it  assumed  that  no  resist 
ance  could  be  offered  to  the  approach  from  Henry,  and  that  Donelson 
must  be  yielded  without  resistance,  or  with  a  mere  show  of  resistance. 
The  loss  of  Donelson  involved  the  surrender  of  the  whole  Cumberland 
Valley  ;  and,  moreover,  the  plan  was  based  upon  an  apprehension  of 
dangers  which  did  not  cause  the  fall  of  the  fort.  The  boats  did  not 
pass  the  fort,  and  Floyd's  army  was  not  called  upon  to  meet  any  flank 
ing  army,  but  only  Grant's  direct  attack  and  investment. 

But  as  Floyd's  letter  was  written  previous  to  his  conference  with 
Pillow,  and  was  not  received  by  General  Johnston  until  after  Floyd's 
movement,  and  as  he  changed  his  plan  before  hearing  from  General 
Johnston,  whose  order  he  anticipated,  he  ought  not  to  have  claimed 
credit  for  this  vacillation,  which  impeded,  instead  of  fully  carrying 
out,  General  Johnston's  conception  of  defending  Nashville  at  Donel 
son — the  only  armed  barrier  on  the  Cumberland.  It  seems  plain 
enough  that  the  duty  of  the  hour  was  to  concentrate  rapidly  at  Donel 
son,  dispute  vigorously  the  roads  from  Henry,  fortify  as  strongly  and 
speedily  as  possible,  secure  a  transit  across  the  Cumberland,  and  a  line 
of  retreat  along  its  south  bank,  and  then  fight  for  Donelson  as  became 
men  who  held  the  gateway  to  the  land — in  a  word,  to  defend  Nash 
ville  at  Donelson. 

General  Floyd  said  in  his  report  :  "The  position  of  the  fort  .... 
was  by  no  means  commanding,  nor  was  the  least  military  significance 
attached  to  the  position." 

General  Floyd  could  not  have  meant  that  it  had  no  strategic  im 
portance,  but  merely  that  it  was  not  judiciously  located ;  for  Gilmer 
says  in  his  report  what  was  quite  evident,  "The  surrender  of  Fort 
Donelson  made  Nashville  untenable." 

Fort  Donelson,  it  must  be  recollected,  was  situated  on  the  left  bank 


440  FORT  DOXELSON. 

of  the  Cumberland,  near  its  great  bend,  and  about  forty  miles  from  the 
mouth  of  the  river.  It  was  about  one  mile  north  of  the  village  of 
Dover,  where  the  commissary  and  quartermaster's  supplies  were  in 
depot,  on  a  commanding  bluff,  at  a  bend  of  the  river.  The  fort  con 
sisted  of  two  water-batteries  on  the  hill-side,  protected  on  the  rear,  or 
land-side,  by  a  bastioned  earthwork  of  irregular  outline,  on  the  summit 
of  the  hill,  inclosing  about  one  hundred  acres.  The  water-batteries 
were  admirably  placed  to  sweep  the  river-approaches,  with  an  arma 
ment  of  thirteen  guns;  eight  thirty-two-pounders,  three  thirty-two- 
pound  carronades,  one  ten-inch  columbiad,  and  one  rifled-gun  of  thirty- 
two-pound  calibre.  The  field-work,  which  was  intended  for  infantry- 
supports,  occupied  a  plateau  about  100  feet  above  the  river,  command 
ing  and  protecting  the  water-batteries  at  close  musket-range.  These 
works  afforded  a  fair  defense  against  gunboats  and  marauding-parties  ; 
but  they  were  not  designed  or  adapted  for  resistance  to  a  land-attack 
or  investment  by  an  army. 

The  field-work  at  Donelson,  elevated  as  it  was,  was  commanded  by  a 
series  of  eminences,  the  crests  of  a  range  of  hills  three-quarters  of  a 
mile  farther  inland.  On  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  this  was  selected  as 
a  line  of  defense  for  the  Confederate  troops,  arriving  hourly,  and  was 
continually  strengthened  by  the  labors  of  the  soldiers,  until  Donelson 
itself  was  surrendered.  Gilmer  laid  off  the  works  with  his  accustomed 
judgment  and  skill ;  and,  although  rudely  and  tardily  executed,  owing 
to  the  bad  weather  and  scanty  supply  of  tools,  they  were  really  for 
midable  when  well  defended.  Buckner  says  : 

The  defenses  were  in  a  very  imperfect  condition.  The  space  to  be  defended 
by  the  army  was  quadrangular  in  shape,  being  limited  on  the  north  by  the  Cum 
berland  River,  on  the  east  and  west  by  small  streams,  now  converted  into  deep 
sloughs  by  the  high  water;  and  on  the  south  by  our  line  of  defense.  The  river- 
line  exceeded  a  mile  in  length ;  the  line  of  defense  was  about  two  miles  and  a 
half  long,  and  its  distance  from  the  river  varied  from  one-fourth  to  three- 
fourths  of  a  mile.  The  line  of  intrenchments  consisted  of  a  few  logs  rolled 
together,  and  but  slightly  covered  with  earth,  forming  an  insufficient  protec 
tion  even  against  field-artillery.  Not  more  than  one-third  of  the  line  was  com 
pleted  on  the  morning  of  the  12th.  It  had  been  located  under  the  direction 
of  that  able  engineer-officer,  Major  Gilmer,  near  the  crests  of  a  series  of 
ridges  which  sloped  backward  to  the  river,  and  were  again  commanded  in  sev 
eral  places  by  other  ridges  at  a  still  greater  distance  from  the  river.  This 
chain  of  heights  was  intersected  by  deep  valleys  and  ravines,  which  materially 
interfered  with  communications  between  different  parts  of  the  line.  Between 
the  village  of  Dover  and  the  water-batteries,  a  broad  and  deep  valley  extend 
ing  directly  back  from  the  river,  and  flooded  by  the  high  water,  intersected  the 
quadrangular  area  occupied  by  the  army,  and  almost  completely  isolated  the 
right  wing.  That  part  of  the  line  which  covered  the  land-approach  to  the 
water-batteries  and  constituted  our  right  wing  was  assigned  to  me  with  a  por 
tion  of  my  division. 


DEFENSES   AND    TROOPS.  441 

Pillow  describes  these  defensive  works  as  "  consisting  of  rifle-pits 
and  abattis  for  infantry,  detached  on  our  right,  but  continuous  on  our 
left,  with  defenses  for  light  artillery."  The  artillery-defenses  were 
slight  and  incomplete ;  but  the  abattis  was  difficult,  and  offered  serious 
obstruction  to  an  assailant.  The  hill-sides  were  cleared  by  simply  fell 
ing  the  trees ;  but  time  did  not  allow  the  chopping  to  be  carried  far 
enough  to  the  front,  and  the  assailants  had  ample  cover  in  the  woods 
on  the  opposite  hills.  Unfortunately,  a  similar  abattis  had  been  made 
around  the  inclosed  field-work,  so  that,  when  the  new  line  of  intrench 
ments  was  made,  the  inclosed  area  was  partly  filled  with  this  felled 
and  tangled  timber,  and  the  movements  of  the  defenders  were  greatly 
retarded  and  embarrassed  by  it.  This  obstruction,  with  the  back-water 
in  the  sloughs,  destroyed  the  means  of  rapid  communication,  and  im 
peded  manoeuvres  inside  the  works. 

When  the  Confederate  army  had  assembled  at  Donelson,  on  the 
13th  of  February,  Buckner  commanded  the  right  wing  and  Pillow  the 
left.1 

That  part  of  the  line  which  covered  the  land-approach  to  the  water- 
batteries — the  right  front — was  assigned  to  Buckner's  division,  whose 
right  flank  was  protected  by  an  impassable  stream,  called  Hickman 
Creek.  Buckner  had  with  him  Brown's  brigade  and  part  of  Baldwin's, 
the  rest  of  that  brigade  being  detached  to  the  left  under  its  com 
mander.  Those  of  his  regiments  which  remained  were  attached  to 
Brown's  brigade.  Buckner  gave  his  presence  and  supervision  to  these 
troops.  Buckner  says  : 

The  work  on  my  lines  was  prosecuted  with  energy,  and  was  urged  forward 
as  rapidly  as  the  limited  number  of  tools  would  permit,  so  that  by  the  morning 
of  the  13th  my  position  was  in  a  respectable  state  of  defense.  My  disposition  of 
the  troops  was  as  follows :  Hanson's  regiment  on  the  extreme  right ;  Palmer's 
regiment,  with  its  reserve,  in  position  to  reenforce  Hanson ;  Porter's  battery 
occupying  the  advanced  salient,  sweeping  the  road  which  led  to  the  front,  and 
flanking  the  intrenchments  both  to  the  right  and  to  the  left.  The  reserve  of  the 
Fourteenth  Mississippi  was  held  as  its  support ;  Brown's,  Cook's,  and  Farquhar- 
son's  regiments  were  on  the  left;  Graves's  battery  occupied  a  position  near  the 
extreme  left  of  the  intrenchments  on  the  declivity  of  the  hill,  whence  it  swept 
the  valley  with  its  fire,  and  flanked  the  position  of  Colonel  Heiman  to  the  east 
of  the  valley.  From  three  to  five  companies  of  each  regiment  were  deployed 
as  skirmishers  in  the  rifle-pits.  The  other  companies  of  each  regiment  were 
massed  in  columns,  sheltered  from  the  enemy's  fire  behind  the  irregularities  of 
the  ground,  and  held  in  convenient  positions  to  reenforce  any  portion  of  the  line 
that  might  be  seriously  threatened. 

1  Certain  regiments  were  held  more  or  less  in  reserve,  and  others  were  advanced  or 
retired  according  to  the  outline  of  the  trenches,  which  conformed  to  the  undulations  of 
the  ground.  Many  interesting  particulars  in  regard  to  these  regiments  will  be  found  in 
the  tables  in  the  appendix  to  this  chapter. 


442  FORT  DOXELSON. 

To  Buckner's  left,  and  separating  him  from  the  left  wing,  was  a 
broad  and  deep  valley,  500  yards  wide,  extending  back  from  the  river, 
and  flooded  by  the  high  water.  Pillow  commanded  the  left  wing,  con 
taining  about  two-thirds  of  the  army,  organized  in  seven  brigades.  He 
was  assisted  by  Brigadier-General  B.  R.  Johnson,  whom  he  had  super 
seded.  The  right  of  Pillow's  line  was  held  by  the  brigade  of  Colonel 
Heiman,  about  1,700  strong.  Heiman's  position,  as  he  himself  describes 
it,  was  as  follows  : 

A  hill,  somewhat  in  the  shape  of  a  V,  with  the  apex  at  the  angle,  which  was 
the  advance  point  as  well  as  the  centre  of  my  command,  and  nearly  the  centre 
of  the  whole  line  of  defense.  From  this  point  the  ground  descended  abruptly 
on  each  side  to  a  valley.  The  valley  on  my  right  was  about  500  yards  in  width, 
and  divided  my  command  from  General  Buckner's  left  wing.  The  one  on  my 
left  was  about  half  that  width,  and  ran  between  my  left  wing  and  the  brigade 
commanded  by  Colonel  Drake.  These  two  valleys  united  about  half  a  mile  in 
the  rear.  The  ground  in  front  of  my  line  (2,600  feet  in  length)  was  sloping 
down  to  a  ravine,  and  was  heavily  timbered.1 

The  Forty-ninth  Tennessee,  Colonel  Bailey,  and  the  Fiftieth,  Colo 
nel  Sugg,  with  Colms's  Tennessee  Battalion,  were  assigned  as  a  garri 
son  to  the  fort — in  all,  some  700  or  800  strong.  The  heavy  artillery 
was  served  by  details  from  the  infantry  regiments 2  and  light  artillery.3 
Forrest  commanded  all  the  cavalry — his  own  regiment,  Gantt's  Ten 
nessee  Battalion,  and  three  or  four  small  companies — altogether  800  or 

1  Heiman's  brigade  was  arranged  as  follows,  from  right  to  left :  Tenth  Tennessee,  Lieu 
tenant-Colonel  McGavock  ;  Fifty-third  Tennessee,  Colonel  Abernethy  ;  battery  light  artil 
lery,  Captain  Frank  Maney ;  eight  companies  of  the  Forty-eighth  Tennessee,  Colonel 
Voorhies  ;  eight  companies  of  the  Twenty-seventh  Alabama,  Colonel  Hughes.  Quarles's 
regiment,  the  Forty-second  Tennessee,  .came  up,  in  reserve  to  this  brigade.  To  the  left 
of  Heiman,  in  the  valley,  was  the  Thirtieth  Tennessee,  Colonel  Head  ;  and  to  his  left,  on 
the  adjoining  eminence,  Drake's  brigade  was  posted  in  the  following  order  :  Fourth  Mis 
sissippi,  Major  Adair ;  four  pieces  of  light  artillery,  Captain  French  ;  Fifteenth  Arkansas, 
Colonel  Gee ;  two  companies  of  Alabama  Battalion,  Major  Garvin ;  and  the  Tennessee 
Battalion,  Colonel  Browder.  The  brigade  organization  was  not  preserved  regularly 
beyond  this  point.  The  next  commands  in  order  were  the  Fifty-first  Virginia,  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  Massie ;  Third  Mississippi,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Wells ;  first  division  of 
Green's  battery,  Captain  Green  ;  four  pieces  of  light  artillery,  Captain  Guy  ;  Eighth  Ken 
tucky,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Lyon ;  Seventh  Texas,  Colonel  Gregg ;  Fifty-sixth  Virginia, 
Captain  Daviess  ;  First  Mississippi,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hamilton ;  second  division  of 
Green's  battery,  Lieutenant  Perkins  ;  Twenty-sixth  Mississippi,  Colonel  Reynolds.  Besides 
the  Forty-second  Tennessee,  already  mentioned,  the  Twentieth  Mississippi,  Thirty-sixth 
Virginia,  and  Twenty-sixth  Tennessee,  were  also  held  in  reserve.  The  Fiftieth  Virginia 
was  also  in  position  on  the  left ;  as  was  Browders  battalion  (Fifty-first  Tennessee). 

2Bidwell's  company  of  the  Thirtieth  Tennessee,  and  Beaumont's  of  the  Fiftieth  Ten 
nessee. 

3  Ross's  company,  116  strong.  Captain  Stankiewitz  had  about  twenty-five  men  in  the 
field-work,  with  some  light  pieces. 


CONFEDERATE   STRENGTH.  443 

1,000  strong.  He  bad  arrived  with  his  regiment  only  on  the  10th. 
Scott's  Louisiana  Cavalry  Regiment  was  in  observation  on  the  right 
bank  of  the  Cumberland. 

The  aggregate  of  this  force  has  been  variously  stated.  General 
Johnston  estimated  it  at  17,000,  thus : 

Garrisons  of  Henry  and  Donelson 5,000 

Floyd's  and  Buckner's  command 8,000 

Pilllow's,  from  Clarksville 2,000 

Clark's,       "      Hopkinsville ,     .  2,000 

17,000 

To  these  must  be  added  Folk's  reinforcements ,  not  included  in 
Tilghman's  returns — 1,600  men — making  18,600  men.  The  generals 
commanding  at  Donelson  estimated  the  force  there  at  from  12,000  to 
15,000  men.  General  Brown,  General  Palmer,  and  some  other  intelli 
gent  Tennesseeans  present  in  the  battle,  put  the  effectives  at  13,500,  and 
some  as  low  as  11,000.  General  Johnston  accounted  for  this  shrinkage 
by  the  prevalence  of  camp-diseases  and  the  losses  incident  to  winter 
campaigning.  He  found  that,  in  the  retreat  from  Bowling  Green  to 
Nashville,  his  own  army  fell  off  from  14,000  to  10,OQO  effectives.  At 
Donelson  there  were  other  causes  also  at  work,  usual  among  raw  and 
demoralized  recruits.  Three  of  Tilghman's  regiments  decreased,  from 
January  14th  to  January  31st,  from  2,199  effectives  to  1,421,  principally 
from  measles  ;  and  in  many  commands  the  effective  strength  after  the 
fall  of  Fort  Henry  continued  to  diminish.  An  investigation  of  the  ta 
bles  in  Appendix  A  to  this  chapter  will  enable  any  clear-headed  person 
to  arrive  at  an  approximate  calculation  of  the  Confederate  strength. 
The  writer  furnishes  all  the  data  accessible  to  him,  and  offers,  as  his 
own  opinion,  from  careful  computation  and  comparison  of  such  data,  that 
the  effective  force  of  the  Confederates  during  the  siege  of  Donelson 
was  from  14,500  to  15,000. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  Federal  army  at  Henry.  Grant,  elated  by 
success,  telegraphed  Halleck  :  "  I  shall  take  and  destroy  Fort  Donelson 
on  the  8th,  and  return  to  Fort  Henry."  Badeau  says,  "  This  was  the 
first  mention  of  Fort  Donelson,  whether  in  conversation  or  dispatches, 
between  the  two  commanders."  This  statement  is  erroneous.  Halleck 
telegraphed  Buell,  January  31st :  "  I  have  ordered  an  advance  on  Fort 
Henry  and  Dover.  It  will  be  made  immediately."  He  frequently  calls 
Fort  Donelson  Dover.  He  also  says,  February  2d,  "  It  is  only  proposed 
to  take  and  occupy  Fort  Henry  and  Dover,"  etc.  Buell,  however,  had 
recommended  the  same  movement  to  Halleck,  as  early  as  January  3d, 
and  had  already  voluntarily  started  thirteen  regiments  to  aid  Grant  in 
it.  Halleck  was  also  sending  reinforcements,  and  he  replied  to  Grant 
on  the  8th : 


44:4:  FOI*T  DONELSON. 

Some  of  the  gunboats  from  Fort  Holt  will  be  sent  up.  Beenforcements  will 
reach  you  daily.  Hold  on  to  Fort  Henry  at  all  hazards.  Impress  slaves,  if 
necessary,  to  strengthen  your  position  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

On  the  10th  he  again  promised  "  large  reinforcements." 

Grant  was  not  able  to  make  good  his  promise.  His  biographer 
attributes  his  delay  to  the  impassable  condition  of  the  roads.  The  rains 
must  have  made  them  very  bad  in  the  marshy  country  immediately 
around  Fort  Henry ;  but,  after  the  first  mile  or  two,  they  were  excel 
lent  for  the  season  ;  so  that  it  is  probable  he  was  awaiting  the  promised 
re  enforcements.  But  Grant  and  Foote,  learning  that  the  Confederates 
were  reenforcing  Donelson,  hurried  their  preparations  for  attack ;  and, 
as  soon  as  the  first  reinforcements  arrived,  began  their  expedition 
against  Donelson. 

Foote  started  on  the  llth,  with  his  fleet,  and  transports  carrying  six 
regiments  of  reinforcements.  Near  Paducah  they  were  met  by  eight 
more  transports  loaded  with  troops,  which  accompanied  them  to  Donel 
son.  Federal  writers  place  this  force  at  10,000  men.  They  were  to 
land  near  Donelson,  and  cob'perate  with  the  army  that  marched  across 
the  country  from  Henry. 

On  the  same  day  Grant  sent  forward  his  vanguard,  under  McCler- 
nand,  three  or  four  miles,  and,  early  on  the  morning  of  the  12th,  moved 
with  his  main  column.  His  force  was  15,000  strong,  with  eight  light 
batteries  ;  and  he  left  a  garrison  of  2,500  men  at  Henry.  He  marched 
unincumbered  with  tents  or  baggage,  with  but  few  wagons,  and  "  no 
rations  save  those  in  the  haversacks.  ...  No  obstacle  was  opposed  to 
the  march,  although  nothing  would  have  been  easier  than  to  prepare 
obstructions."  ' 

The  column  which  marched  from  Henry  was  composed  of  two  di 
visions,  commanded  by  Generals  McClernand  and  C.  F.  Smith,  each  of 
three  brigades.3 

Surgeon  Stearn 3  reports  the  infantry  strength  of  Oglesby  at  3,130, 
and  of  McArthur  at  1,395.  Colonel  Wallace  reported  3,400  effectives 
of  all  arms.  Add  to  this,  for  Oglesby,  cavalry  and  artillery,  500,  and 
we  have  the  strength  of  this  division,  8,425  men  (see  Appendix  B  to 


1  Badeau's  "  Life  of  Grant,"  vol.  i.,  p.  36. 

2  McClernand's  first  brigade,  commanded   by  Colonel  Oglesby,  was  formed  of  the 
Eighth,  Eighteenth,  Twenty-ninth,  Thirtieth,  and  Thirty-first  Illinois  Regiments,  Swartz's 
and  Dresser's  batteries,  and  four  cavalry-companies.     The  Second  Brigade,  Colonel  W. 
II.  L.  Wallace,  included  the  Eleventh,  Twentieth,  Forty-fifth,  and  Forty-eighth  Illinois 
Regiments;  the  Fourth  Illinois  Cavalry;  the  First   Illinois  Artillery,  and  McAllister's 
battery.     The  Third  Brigade,  Colonel  McArthur,  contained  only  the  Seventeenth  and 
Forty-ninth  Illinois. 

3  "  Medical  History  of  the  War,"  Part  L,  medical  volume,  Appendix,  p.  34. 


FEDERAL  STRENGTH.  445 

this  chapter).  Smith's  brigades  were  commanded  by  Colonels  J.  G. 
Lauman,  Morgan  L.  Smith,  and  J.  Cook.1 

To  these  divisions  were  soon  added  the  Third,  commanded  by  Gen 
eral  Lew  Wallace,  with  Colonels  Cruft  and  Thayer  as  brigade  command 
ers,  composed  of  troops  sent  forward  from  Henry,  and  others  trans 
ported  by  way  of  the  Cumberland  River.3 

When  all  these  troops  were  arrayed  in  front  of  Donelson,  McCler- 
nand  occupied  the  Federal  right,  Smith  the  left,  and  Wallace  the  centre. 

It  is  extremely  difficult  to  arrive  at  a  correct  conclusion  as  to  the 
actual  force  of  an  army  by  any  system  of  estimate,  or  indeed  by  any 
other  means  than  investigation  of  the  returns  of  commands.  As  these 
were  not  accessible  to  the  writer  when  this  memoir  was  prepared,  he 
has  no  means  of  verifying  the  statements  made  by  Federal  writers.  He 
gives  such  data  as  he  has. 

In  a  memorandum  furnished  Hon.  Montgomery  Blair  by  the  War 
Department,  for  the  information  of  the  writer,  General  Grant's  effective 
force  at  Donelson  is  placed  at  "  about  24,400."  In  a  memorandum 
furnished  the  writer  by  the  War  Department  (see  Appendix,  Chapter 
XXXI.),  it  is  placed  at  27,113.  General  Buell,  in  his  letter  of  August 
31,  1865,  published  in  the  New  York  World,  September  5,  1865,  es 
timates  the  reinforcements  sent  by  him  to  Grant  at  10,000  men,  and 
Grant's  force  at  from  30,000  to  35,000. 

Badeau  says  : 

On  the  last  day  of  the  fight  Grant  had  27,000  men,  whom  he  could  have  put 
into  battle ;  some  few  regiments  of  these  were  not  engaged.  Other  reenforce- 
ments  arrived  on  the  16th,  after  the  surrender,  swelling  his  number  still  further. 

In  this  estimate  no  account  is  taken  of  the  cooperating  naval  forces, 
nor  of  troops  landed  and  supporting,  but  not  engaged.  There  was  no 
doubt  in  the  mind  of  any  Southerner  engaged  in  the  defense  that  the 
Federal  force  was  much  greater  than  this.  The  conviction  of  all  the 
Confederate  leaders  that  they  fought  50,000  men  was  probably  exag 
gerated  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case  ;  but  General  Badeau's  figures 
will  prove,  on  a  rigid  investigation,  below  the  mark.3 

1  Lauman  had  the  Second,  Seventh,  and  Fourteenth  Iowa ;  the  Twenty-fifth  and 
Fifty-sixth  Indiana ;  Birge's  regiment  of  sharp-shooters,  and  Stone's  Missouri  Battery. 
M.  L.  Smith  had  the  Eighth  Missouri  and  Eleventh  Indiana ;  and  Cook  had  the  Sev 
enth  and  Fiftieth  Illinois,  the  Twelfth  Iowa,  the  Fifty-second  Indiana,  and  the  Thirteenth 
Missouri. 

3  His  first  brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  Charles  Cruft,  comprised  the  Thirty-first 
and  Forty-fourth  Indiana  Regiments,  and  the  Seventeenth  and  Twenty-fifth  Kentucky  Reg 
iments.  Colonel  John  M.  Thayer  commanded  a  double  brigade  ;  the  second,  made  up  of 
the  Forty-sixth,  Fifty-seventh,  and  Fifty-eighth  Illinois  Regiments,  and  his  own,  the  third, 
composed  of  the  First  Nebraska,  and  the  Fifty-eighth,  Sixty-eighth,  and  Seventy-sixth  Ohio. 

'Badeau's  "  Life  of  Grant,"  vol.  i.,  p.  36. 


446  FORT  DONELSON. 

After  leaving  the  bottom-lands  around  Fort  Henry,  a  broad,  good 
road,  built  by  Tilghman,  passed  through  a  country  of  hill  and  valley, 
thickly  wooded,  to  Donelson.  It  was  sandy,  and  now  dry ;  and  the 
troops  moved  swiftly  over  it  in  the  bracing  air  of  a  warm  winter  day. 
Forrest,  with  all  the  Southern  cavalry,  had  posted  himself  about  two 
miles  in  front  of  the  intrenchments,  where  the  Eighth  Illinois,  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  Rhodes,  of  Oglesby's  brigade,  advancing  in  line  of  battle, 
encountered  him,  and  drove  in  the  Confederate  outposts,  with  little 
loss  on  either  side.  It  was  certainly  unfortunate  that  the  few  roads  to 
Henry  were  not  obstructed  and  vigorously  disputed,  as  a  short  deten 
tion  would  have  caught  the  Federal  army  on  the  march  in  exceedingly 
severe  weather,  and  might  have  broken  up  the  expedition. 

Oglesby's  brigade  was  deployed  and  moved  forward  through  the 
oak-woods  until  it  found  itself  opposite  Heiman's  position,  near  the 
Confederate  centre.  His  artillery,  Swartz's  and  Dresser's  batteries, 
opened;  and  Graves's  and  Maney's  replied  from  the  trenches.  This 
artillery  duel  did  little  damage ;  but  it  was  sufficient,  with  the  fire  of 
the  sharp-shooters,  to  interrupt  the  work  on  the  trenches.  The  ad 
vanced  brigades  worked  their  way  to  the  right,  harassing  with  a  con 
tinuous  fire  the  fatigue-parties  of  the  Confederates,  who,  with  some 
loss,  had  to  suspend  their  labor  until  night.  No  resistance  was  offered 
to  the  investment ;  and,  before  the  dusk  of  a  winter's  day,  the  army 
which  had  left  Henry  in  the  morning  unfolded  itself  along  the  entire 
Confederate  front  at  Donelson.  McClernand's  division  was  on  the 
Federal  right,  opposite  Pillow,  and  reaching  nearly  around  to  Dover. 
Smith's  brigades,  as  they  came  up,  drew  off  to  the  left,  and  rested  with 
their  flank  on  Hickman's  Creek,  facing  Buckner.  Grant's  headquarters 
were  in  the  rear  of  Smith's  line.  Such  was  the  situation  on  the  night 
of  February  12th.  The  opposing  hosts,  that  night,  lay  on  their  arms. 
The  bivouac  was  under  the  shadow  of  the  oaks  and  pines.  A  bright 
moon  was  overhead  ;  and  the  still,  mild  air  had  in  it  scarcely  a  breath 
of  winter.  The  Federals  rested;  the  Confederates  plied  shovel  and 
mattock  to  build  a  barrier  against  the  next  day's  storm  of  lead  and 
iron.  Saving  the  random  shot  of  some  startled  picket,  all  was  quiet — 
the  seemingty  peaceful  prelude  to  days  and  nights  of  deadly  struggle. 

"  THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  TRENCHES,"  as  Pillow  styles  it,  began  at 
dawn  on  the  13th.  Floyd  arrived  before  daylight  with  the  troops  from 
Cumberland  City ;  but,  before  they  had  taken  position,  the  fighting  had 
begun. 

Thursday  morning,  the  13th,  was  clear  and  mild  ;  and,  at  earliest 
dawn,  the  Federal  skirmishers  came  down  from  the  hills,  where  they 
had  slept,  into  the  valley  between  the  lines,  and  commenced  firing ; 
while  their  artillery  opened  from  every  hill  along  the  front.  Oglesby's 


BATTLE   OF   THE   TRENCHES.  447 

brigade  on  the  right,  and  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's,  next  to  it,  moved  to  the 
right,  along  the  road  to  Dover,  keeping  up  a  constant  cannonade  as 
they  advanced.  Birge's  sharp-shooters,  a  picked  corps,  deployed  as 
skirmishers,  annoyed  the  Confederates  greatly,  compelling  them  to  lie 
low  behind  their  intrenchments.  But  skillful  Southern  marksmen  vol 
unteered  to  occupy  their  attention,  and  finally  forced  them  to  retire. 
Jordan  says  that  two  of  Forrest's  companies  were  thus  engaged. 

About  half -past  eight  o'clock  the  Twelfth  Iowa,  of  Cook's  brigade, 
made  a  reconnaissance  against  the  centre,  as  if  about  to  assault,  but 
retired  before  a  few  well-directed  shots  from  Graves's  battery.  About 
ten  o'clock  in  the  morning,  Smith  made  an  attack  on  Hanson's  position, 
but  was  repulsed  with  heavy  loss.  Hanson  had  built  rapidly  and 
roughly  some  rifle-pits  to  the  right  and  in  front  of  the  original  line  of 
defense.  Here  he  was  again  attacked,  this  time  by  three  strong  regi 
ments  ;  but  the  Second  Kentucky,  now  aided  by  Palmer's  Eighteenth 
Tennessee,  again  repulsed  the  assault.  A  third  time  the  Federals  came 
to  the  charge,  with  the  same  result.  Porter's  battery  played  a  con 
spicuous  part  in  the  defense.  Buckner  says  in  his  report : 

The  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery  and  riflemen  was  incessant  throughout  the 
day ;  but  was  responded  to  by  a  well-directed  fire  from  the  intrenchments, 
which  inflicted  upon  the  assailant  a  considerable  loss,  and  almost  silenced  his 
fire  late  in  the  afternoon.  My  loss  during  the  day  was  thirty-nine  in  killed  and 
wounded. 

Heiman's  position  has  already  been  described.  A  salient  to  the 
Confederate  centre,  it  was  the  most  elevated  and  advanced  point  on 
the  line.  Here  was  posted  his  brigade :  the  Tenth  Tennessee,  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  McGavock  ;  the  Forty-eighth  Tennessee,  Colonel  Voorhies; 
the  Fifty-third  Tennessee,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Winston ;  the  Twenty- 
seventh  Alabama,  Colonel  Hughes  ;  and  Maney's  light  battery — in 
all  about  1,700  strong.  Badeau  says  of  the  Federal  operations : 

Skirmishers  were  thrown  out  actively  in  front,  and  several  smart  fights  oc 
curred,  but  with  no  result  of  importance.  They  were  in  no  case  intended  for 
real  assaults,  but  simply  as  attempts  to  discover  the  force  and  position  of  the 
enemy,  and  to  establish  the  national  line.  An  attempt  was  made  by  McClernand 
to  capture  the  ridge-road  on  which  Grant  moved,  but  this  was  without  orders, 
and  unsuccessful,  though  gallantly  made  ;  three  regiments  were  engaged  in  the 
affair.  On  the  first  two  days  Grant  lost  about  300  men  in  killed  and  wounded. 

The  assault  by  Smith  on  Buckner  was  one  of  these  "  smart  fights ;  " 
that  of  McClernand  on  Heiman  was  another.  The  facts  are  these  : 

As  Wallace  was  moving  to  the  right,  McClernand  detached  Colonel 
Hayne,  with  his  regiment,  the  Forty-eighth  Illinois,  to  support  McAl 
lister's  battery,  and  giving  him,  in  addition,  the  Seventeenth  Illinois, 
Major  Smith,  and  the  Forty-ninth  Illinois,  Colonel  Morrison,  ordered 
30 


448  FORT  DONELSON. 

him  to  storm  Heiman's  position.  The  approach  to  Heiman's  left  wag 
along  a  ridge,  obstructed  with  abattis  ;  against  his  right,  it  was  through 
a  dense  wood,  across  a  valley,  and  up  a  hill-side.  The  advance  of  this 
column  was  first  discovered  by  Colonel  John  C.  Brown,  who  notified  Colo 
nel  Heiman.  Brown  ordered  the  batteries  of  Graves  and  Porter  to  open 
upon  the  column,  which  they  did  with  great  effect,  contributing  ma 
terially  to  the  repulse.  The  Federal  regiments  came  to  the  charge 
right  gallantly,  mounting  the  acclivity  on  every  side.  Maney's  battery 
now  opened  a  rapid  fire  on  them  ;  but  his  position  on  the  point  of  the 
hill  was  an  exposed  one,  and  their  sharp-shooters  brought  down  the  men 
at  his  guns  with  deadly  aim.  Both  of  his  lieutenants  fell.  Still,  the 
Illinoisians  rushed  on  almost  up  to  the  breastworks,  and  until  they  met, 
at  close  quarters,  the  blaze  of  musketry  from  the  trenches.  Entangled 
in  the  felled  timber,  they  wavered,  and,  after  a  struggle  of  some  fifteen 
minutes,  gave  way.  The  Forty-fifth  Illinois,  Colonel  Smith,  was  brought 
up  to  their  support,  and  again  they  attempted  to  assault.  But  Quarles's 
Forty-second  Tennessee  had  arrived  on  the  ground,  in  the  mean  time,  to 
Heiman's  assistance ;  and  a  destructive  fire  drove  back  the  Federals. 
They  made  a  third  ineffectual  assault,  when  Colonel  Morrison,  who  had 
bravely  led  his  men,  having  been  severely  wounded,  they  finally  re 
tired,  after  a  combat  of  two  hours,  during  nearly  an  hour  of  which  "  the 
entire  line  had  been  held  under  a  brisk,  galling  fire."  The  Federals 
lost  200  killed  and  wounded,  while  the  Confederates  lost  not  more  than 
thirty  or  forty.  These  were  chiefly  in  Maney's  battery  and  the  Fifty- 
third  Tennessee.  The  dry  leaves  on  the  ground  caught  fire  from  the 
cannonading.  The  Confederates  rescued  the  wounded  as  far  as  they 
could  venture  out  from  the  rifle-pits ;  but,  unhappily,  some  of  the  Fed 
eral  wounded  perished  in  the  flames.  After  the  retreat,  Heiman's 
pickets  collected  sixty  muskets  and  other  equipments  left  on  the  field. 

The  artillery-firing  continued  all  day,  and,  at  intervals,  during  the 
night.  Nearly  every  Confederate  regiment  reported  a  few  casualties 
from  the  shot  and  shell,  which  came  incessantly  ;  and,  doubtless,  the 
other  side  suffered  equally.  Though  the  attack  on  Heiman  was  so  se 
verely  repulsed,  it  was,  in  the  end,  fortunate  for  the  Federals.  Their 
determined  attitude  concealed  the  inadequacy  of  their  force  ;  and,  while 
but  a  small  part  of  their  army  was  engaged,  they  interrupted  the  Con 
federate  fortification,  and  put  the  whole  line  of  defense  upon  a  strain, 
Badeau  comments  on  the  fact  that  there  was — 

no  effort  to  molest  Grant,  allowing  him  to  continue  the  investment  at  his 
leisure— a  blunder  almost  equal  to  that  of  opposing  no  obstacle  to  the  march 
from  Fort  Henry. 

While  these  operations  were  going  on  at  the  trenches  on  Thurs 
day,  the  Carondelet,  Captain  Walke,  a  thirteen-gun  vessel,  preceding 


A  WINTER  STORM.  449 

Foote's  flotilla,  arrived  at  Donelson  early  in  the  morning,  and  opened 
the  siege  by  water.  Taking  position  behind  a  headland,  she  threw  138 
shots,  until  a  128-pound  shot  came  crashing  through  one  of  her  ports, 
injuring  her  machinery,  and  sending  her  off  crippled.  No  damage  was 
done  to  the  fort,  except  that  a  shot  disabled  a  gun,  and  killed  Captain 
Joseph  H.  Dixon,  a  valuable  young  engineer,  whose  name  has  been  men 
tioned  in  connection  with  the  fortification  of  the  place.  Educated,  enthu 
siastic,  and  full  of  talents  and  purpose,  his  loss  was  generally  deplored. 

Thus  far  the  weather  had  been  warm  for  the  season ;  but,  on  Thurs 
day  afternoon,  it  turned  cold  and  began  to  rain  heavily,  and  that 
night  a  great  and  sudden  change  occurred.  The  thermometer  fell  to 
10°  above  zero  ;  and  a  driving  storm  of  snow,  hail,  and  sleet,  set  in. 
An  icy  wind  came  howling  from  the  north,  beating  with  uninterrupted 
fury  upon  the  two  armies.  They  were  both  fully  exposed  to  the  tem 
pest,  and  both  ill-prepared  to  meet  it.  The  Federals  were  bivouacking 
in  the  woods  ;  but,  though  they  were  comparatively  well  clothed,  many 
of  them  had  thrown  away  their  blankets  during  the  previous  genial 
weather.  The  Southerners,  poorly  clad,  and  less  fitted  in  constitution 
to  endure  the  buffetings  of  a  winter's  storm,  were  kept  in  the  trenches 
to  guard  against  surprise  ;  though,  indeed,  there  were  no  quarters  or 
other  refuge  for  them.  Many  of  them  were  working  on  the  trenches  ; 
and  the  Forty-second  Tennessee  built  a  redoubt  to  protect  the  point 
where  Maney's  battery  had  suffered  so  much.  No  fires  could  be  built, 
lest  they  should  serve  as  targets  for  the  sharp-shooters,  crouching  in 
easy  range.  But,  in  the  dark,  and  cold,  and  storm,  the  work  of  death 
went  on  ;  and  more  than  one  struggle  between  the  combatants  mingled 
the  noises  of  battle  with  the  turmoil  of  the  tempest.  Some  of  the 
soldiers  were  frozen ;  and  the  wounded  between  the  lines  suffered  the 
extremest  pangs  that  belong  to  our  mortal  lot.  Those  thus  stricken 
down  lay  with  raw  and  gaping  wounds,  perhaps  scorched  in  the  blaze 
of  the  conflagration  that  had  swept  through  the  fallen  timber,  and 
aching  from  the  frozen  rain  and  icy  wind.  On  that  fearful  night  they 
endured  isolation,  hunger,  pain,  and  exhaustion,  so  that  death  brought 
a  blessed  relief.  These  are  some  of  the  horrors  of  war ;  and  yet  it  is  to 
the  sentimental  philanthropists  that  the  occasions  of  war  are  oftenest 
due. 

During  the  evening  of  the  13th  Commodore  Foote's  flotilla  arrived, 
with  the  reinforcements,  10,000  strong  or  more.  These  were  assigned 
to  General  Lew  Wallace,  who  had  also  brought  over  the  troops  from 
Fort  Henry.  Part  of  them  were  landed  before  daylight ;  and  Friday, 
the  14th,  was  spent  in  putting  them  in  position  on  the  centre,  between 
Smith  and  McClernand.  These  arrangements  occupied  the  whole  day. 
The  snow  lay  more  than  two  inches  deep,  and  the  north  wind  still  blew 
with  chilly  breath.  The  torpor  of  cold  and  fatigue  seemed  to  cling  to 


450  FORT  DONELSON". 

both  antagonists.  Nevertheless,  though  no  assault  was  made,  a  ram 
bling  and  ineffective  fire  was  kept  up.  But,  though  the  land-forces  were 
thus  paralyzed  by  the  rigor  of  the  season,  Donelson  was  not  permitted 
to  enjoy  a  day  of  rest.  Foote,  exultant  with  his  easy  triumph  at  Henry, 
rushed  in,  hoping  to  crush  the  defenders  with  his  heavy  guns,  and 
crown  the  navy  with  another  victory.  But  the  audacious  policy  which 
has  once  succeeded  may,  when  essayed  again,  recoil  with  ruin  on  its 
author.  It  was  so  with  Foote. 

"THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  GUNBOATS  " 1  began  about  3  P.M.,  on  Fri 
day,  the  14th  of  February.  The  United  States  flotilla  consisted  of  the 
four  heavy-armored  iron-clad  gunboats  St.  Louis,  Carondelet,  Pitts- 
burg,  and  Louisville,  thirteen  guns  each,  and  the  gunboats  Conestoga, 
Taylor,  and  Lexington,  nine  guns  each.  Any  one  of  these  boats  was 
more  than  a  match  for  the  fort  in  armament.  They  were  armed  with 
eight,  nine,  and  ten  inch  guns,  three  in  the  bow  of  each.  The  Caron 
delet  had  three  nine  inch  and  four  eight  inch  smooth-bore  and  two 
100-pounder  rifled  guns.  In  the  fort  the  columbiad  and  the  rifled  gun 
were  the  only  two  pieces  effective  against  the  armor  of  the  gunboats. 
The  Confederates  could  merely  pepper  them  with  their  lighter  guns, 
ten  in  number,  whose  missiles,  for  the  most  part,  rattled  harmlessly 
against  the  iron  sheathing. 

The  four  iron-clads,  followed  by  two  gunboats,  made  the  attack. 
They  drove  directly  toward  the  water-batteries,  firing  with  great  weight 
of  metal.  Foote's  purpose  was  to  silence  these  batteries,  pass  by,  and 
take  a  position  where  he  could  enfilade  the  faces  of  the  fort  with  broad 
sides.2  The  gunboats  opened  at  a  mile  and  a  half  distance,  and  ad 
vanced  until  within  three  or  four  hundred  yards.  Colonel  J.  E.  Bai 
ley,  of  the  Forty-ninth  Tennessee,  now  United  States  Senator  from 
Tennessee,  commanded  the  garrison.  It  was  in  bad  plight  from 
cold,  hunger,  and  protracted  watching,  but  was  resolute  in  spirit. 
Captain  Culbertson,  a  West  Point  graduate,  commanded  the  artillery 
after  the  death  of  Dixon.  Under  him  were  Captains  Ross,  Bidwell,  and 
Beaumont,  who  commanded  the  batteries.  Stankiewitz,  a  gallant  Pole, 
had  two  six-pounders  and  an  eight-inch  howitzer  on  the  hill.  They  held 
their  fire,  under  Pillow's  orders,  until  the  boats  came  within  about  1,000 
yards;  then,  at  a  given  signal,  they  delivered  the  fire  of  the  heavy  guns 
with  accuracy  and  effect ;  and,  at  about  750  yards,  the  lighter  guns 
opened  also.  Stankiewitz  likewise  helped  to  divert  the  enemy's  fire  by 
a  few  discharges  of  his  pieces. 

1  Boynton's  "  History  of  the  United  States  Navy,"  and  Hoppin's  "  Life  of  Foote," 
give  the  Federal  version  of  this  conflict.  Colonel  Jordan  shows  conclusively,  in  his 
Life  of  Forrest,"  pages  67-69,  the  Federal  superiority  in  armament. 

3  Hoppin's  "  Life  of  Foote,"  p.  222. 


REPULSE  OF  THE   GUNBOATS.  451 

The  boats  steamed  up  with  great  confidence,  based  on  their  ex 
perience  at  Fort  Henry  ;  but,  although  the  number  of  guns  opposed  to 
them  was  the  same,  a  brief  contest  taught  them  a  woful  lesson.  Their 
shot  and  shell  roared,  and  tore  up  the  earthworks,  but  did  no  further 
injury.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Confederate  guns,  aimed  from  an  eleva 
tion  of  not  less  than  thirty  feet,  by  cool  and  careful  hands,  fell  with  de 
structive  power  on  the  decks  of  the  gunboats.  The  thirty-two-pound 
shot  generally  rebounded  from  the  plated  armor  ;  but  even  these,  enter 
ing  the  port-holes,  or  striking  at  favorable  angles,  or  on  unprotected  parts 
of  the  roof,  shook  loose  the  fastenings,  and  aided  in  the  work  of  demo 
lition.  While  the  iron-clads  could  use  grape  and  canister  against  the 
Confederates  on  the  parapets,  and  their  gunboats  were  throwing  shells 
at  long  range,  which  burst  in  the  fort  with  novel  terrors  to  the  untried 
soldiers  there,  nothing  but  solid  shot  told  against  the  sides  of  the  ves 
sels.  But  the  furious  cannonade  of  the  fleet,  while  terrific,  was  harm 
less,  though  each  moment  it  seemed  that  it  must  sweep  away  gunners 
and  batteries  together.  Soldiers  and  generals  alike  looked  with  appre 
hension  for  the  catastrophe,  when  their  guns  should  be  silenced,  and 
the  fleet,  steaming  by,  take  them  in  reverse.  Still,  the  fascination  of 
the  scene  riveted  to  the  spot,  as  spectators,  hundreds  who  witnessed  it 
with  breathless  suspense  and  anxiety.  As  the  heavy  metal  smote  the 
iron  mail  of  the  water-monsters,  it  rang  with  a  mighty  and  strange 
sound — a  new  music  in  the  horrid  orchestra  of  strife  and  death,  unheard 
before,  and  terrible  to  the  hearer.  Old  fables  seemed  to  live  again ;  in 
which  giants,  with  clash  of  hammer  on  linked  scales,  fought  the  dragons 
of  the  great  deep. 

But  the  elevation  of  the  batteries,  and  the  courage  and  coolness 
of  their  gunners,  overcame  all  the  Federal  advantages  in  number  and 
weight  of  guns.  The  bolts  of  their  two  heavy  guns  went  crashing 
through  iron  and  massive  timbers  with  resistless  force,  and  scattering 
slaughter  and  destruction  through  the  fleet. 

In  the  hottest  of  the  engagement  a  priming-wire  became  lodged  in 
the  vent  of  the  rifle-gun,  through  the  inexperience  of  the  artillerists,  who 
had  seen  but  two  days'  service  at  the  guns.  Sergeant  Robert  Cobb 
mounted  the  piece  and  vainly  endeavored  to  extract  it.  He  continued 
his  efforts  under  a  fire  of  grape  at  point-blank  range,  until  the  close  of 
the  action.  He  was  afterward  distinguished  as  a  captain  of  artillery. 

A  Northern  writer,  who  was  on  board  the  Louisville,  thus  describes 
what  he  saw : 

We  were  within  point-blank  range,  and  the  destruction  to  our  fleet  was 
really  terrible.  One  huge  solid  shot  struck  our  boat  just  at  the  angle  of  the 
upper  deck  and  pilot-house,  perforated  the  iron  plating,  passed  through  the 
heavy  timbers,  and  buried  itself  in  a  pile  of  hammocks  just  in  front  and  in  a 
direct  line  with  the  boilers.  Another,  a  shell,  raked  us  from  bow  to  stern, 


452  FORT  DONELSOX. 

passed  through  the  wheel-house,  emerged,  dropped,  and  exploded  in  the  river 
just  at  our  stern.  Then  a  ten-inch  solid  shot  entered  our  starboard  bow-port, 
demolished  a  gun-carriage,  killed  three  men  and  wounded  four  others,  traversed 
the  entire  length  of  the.  boat,  and  sank  into  the  river  in  our  wake.  Then  a  shell 
came  shrieking  through  the  air,  striking  fair  into  our  forward  starboard-port, 
killing  one  man,  wounding  two,  and  then  passed  aft,  sundering  our  rudder- 
chains,  and  rendering  the  boat  unmanageable.  "We  were  compelled  to  drop 
astern  and  leave  the  scene  of  action,  and,  so  far  as  we  were  concerned,  the 
battle  was  over. 

One  of  their  shells  entered  and  exploded  directly  in  the  pilot-house  of  the 
St.  Louis,  killing  the  pilot,  and  wounding  Flag-Officer  Foote  severely  in  the  leg. 
Two  of  the  shots  entered  the  Pittsburg  below  the  guards,  causing  her  to  leak 
badly,  and  it  is  probable  she  will  sink  before  morning.  Another  entered  the 
Carondelet,  killing  four  men  and  wounding  eight  others. 

Commodore  Foote  tells  me  that  he  has  commanded  at  the  taking  of  six  forts, 
and  has  been  in  several  naval  engagements,  but  he  never  was  under  so  severe  a 
fire  before.  Fifty-seven  shots  struck  his  vessel,  his  upper  works  were  riddled, 
and  his  lower  decks  strewed  with  the  dead  and  wounded.1 

Hoppin  says  (page  223)  : 

The  Louisville  was  disabled  by  a  shot,  which  cut  away  her  rudder-chains, 
making  her  totally  unmanageable,  so  that  she  drifted  with  the  current  out  of 
action.  Very  soon  the  St.  Louis  was  disabled  by  a  shot  through  her  pilot 
house,  rendering  her  steering  impossible,  so  that  she  also  floated  down  the 
river.  The  other  two  armored  vessels  were  also  terribly  struck,  and  a  rifled 
cannon  on  the  Carondelet  burst,  so  that  these  two  could  no  longer  sustain  the 
action ;  and,  after  fighting  for  more  than  an  hour,  the  little  fleet  was  forced  to 
withdraw.  .  .  .  Foote,  it  is  said,  wept  like  a  child  when  the  order  to  withdraw 
was  given. 

The  St.  Louis  was  struck  fifty-nine  times,  the  Louisville  thirty-six  times, 
the  Carondelet  twenty-six,  the  Pittsburg  twenty,  and  four  vessels  receiving 
no  less  than  141  wounds.  The  fleet,  gathering  itself  together,  and  render 
ing  mutual  help  to  its  disabled  members,  proceeded  to  Cairo  to  repair  dam 
ages,  intending  to  return  immediately  with  a  stronger  naval  force  to  continue 
the  siege. 

We  learn  also,  from  Hoppin's  narrative,  that  Foote  was  twice 
wounded,  once  in  the  arm  and  once  in  the  leg  ;  and,  from  Footers 
report,  that  his  loss  was  fifty-four  killed  and  wounded.  The  fight 
lasted  an  hour  and  ten  minutes.  Foote  believed  he  could  have  taken 
the  fort  in  fifteen  minutes  more  ;  but  he  was  mistaken — further  contest 
would  have  insured  the  destruction  of  his  fleet.  Gilmer's  report  tells 
us: 

Our  batteries  were  uninjured,  and  not  a  man  in  them  killed.  The  repulse 
of  the  gunboats  closed  the  operations  of  the  day,  except  a  few  scattering  shots 
along  the  land-defenses. 

1  Howison's  "  History  "  (Southern  Literary  Messenger,  1862),  p.  323. 


GENERAL  JOHNSTON'S  PLAN.  453 

Pillow  telegraphed  to  General  Johnston  to  the  same  effect.  But 
the  Confederates  did  not  derive  all  the  encouragement  from  the  action 
that  their  successful  valor  and  skill  deserved,  for  they  were  not  aware 
of  the  full  extent  of  the  damage  to  the  fleet  ;  and,  in  fact,  expected 
a  renewal  of  the  attack.  Nevertheless,  they  took  heart.  The  gun 
boats  were  neither  invulnerable  nor  invincible,  and  congratulations  and 
rejoicings  went  through  the  camps. 

On  the  13th  Floyd  and  Pillow  each  sent  several  dispatches  to  Gen 
eral  Johnston.  Pillow's  breathed  a  very  confident  spirit :  "I  have  the 
utmost  confidence  of  success ; "  and,  at  the  close  of  the  day,  "  The 
men  are  in  fine  spirits."  Floyd  details  the  events  of  the  day  very 
calmly  ;  but  no  great  subtilty  of  interpretation  is  required  to  perceive 
his  distrust  of  the  situation,  in  such  words  as  the  following  :  "  We  will 
endeavor  to  hold  our  position,  if  we  are  capable  of  doing  so." 

Whether  prompted  by  this  dispatch  or  not — it  is  now  impossible  to 
say — General  Johnston  on  the  next  day  sent  him  the  following  tele 
gram,  which  is  in  effect  a  final  summing  up  of  all  his  previous  instruc 
tions,  and  in  exact  accordance  with  them  : 

If  you  lose  the  fort,  "bring  your  troops  to  Nashville  if  possible. 

How  far  this  dispatch  may  have  influenced  the  counsels  of  the  gen 
erals  the  writer  is  not  able  to  say,  as  no  mention  is  made  of  it  in  their 
reports ;  but,  on  the  morning  of  that  day,  as  appears  from  General 
Buckner's  report,  they  came  to  the  conclusion  to  cut  their  way  out, 
and  retreat  to  Nashville.  General  Johnston's  plan  was  general  in  its 
scope,  and  perfectly  simple.  He  wished  Donelson  defended  if  possible, 
but  he  did  not  wish  the  army  to  be  sacrificed  in  the  attempt.  Some 
thing  must  be  dared  for  the  maintenance  of  a  position  so  important, 
doubtful  though  he  felt  the  issue  must  be  ;  but  there  did  not  seem  any 
imminent  peril  to  a  vigilant  and  able  commander  of  not  being  able  to 
extricate  his  army  from  Donelson.  There  was  nothing  in  the  nature 
of  "  a  trap  "  in  the  situation,  if  the  commander  kept  his  resources  well 
in  hand,  and  his  communications  attended  to.  General  Johnston's 
orders  were  in  effect :  "  Do  not  lose  the  fortress,  if  it  can  be  helped ; 
but  do  not  lose  the  army  anyhow."  For  so  much  he  is  responsible. 
To  be  more  specific  would  have  been  to  embarrass,  not  to  help,  his  sub 
ordinates.  Throughout  his  whole  life,  General  Johnston's  only  demand 
for  himself  had  been  that  he  should  have  the  means  to  accomplish  an 
end,  with  full  responsibility  for  their  use.  He  could  not  apply  a  dif 
ferent  rule  to  men  intrusted  with  these  vast  interests.  He  had  no 
right  to  consider  them  unequal  to  their  charge.  The  general  who 
manages  a  battle  at  a  distance  from  the  scene  of  action  plays  the  game 
of  war  blindfold.  An  Aulic  Council  is  proverbially  a  curse  to  a  cam 
paign.  Human  foresight  and  calculation  may  provide  for  many  of  the 


454:  FORT  DONELSON. 

contingencies  of  war  ;  but  the  distant  control  of  details  must  ignore 
many  of  the  actual  conditions  of  a  contest.  Strategists  who,  whether 
a  week  or  a  year  beforehand  and  leagues  away,  plan  other  people's 
battles  for  them,  may  engage  in  the  business  of  prophecy,  whose  issues 
are  soon  forgotten,  but  not  safely  or  successfully  in  the  responsible 
work  of  high  military  command.  General  Johnston's  ability  to  divest 
himself  of  this  propensity  to  intermeddle  with  matters  that  belonged 
strictly  to  his  subordinates,  even  though  they  were  unlucky,  will  be  rec 
ognized  as  a  merit  by  any  soldier  who  has  had  the  misfortune  to  serve 
with  his  hands  tied,  under  a  superior  who  imagined  himself  omniscient. 
Buckner  says : 

The  enemy  were  comparatively  quiet  in  front  of  my  position  during  the 
14th.  On  the  morning  of  that  day  I  was  summoned  to  a  council  of  general 
officers,  in  which  it  was  decided  unanimously,  in  view  of  the  arrival  of  heavy 
reinforcements  of  the  enemy  below,  to  make  an  immediate  attack  upon  their 
right,  in  order  to  open  our  communications  with  Charlotte  in  the  direction  of 
Nashville.  It  was  urged  that  this  attack  should  be  made  at  once,  before  the  dis 
embarkation  of  the  enemy's  reenforcements — supposed  to  be  about  15,000  men. 
I  proposed  with  my  division  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  army,  should  the  sortie 
prove  successful.  I  made  the  necessary  dispositions  preparatory  to  executing 
the  movement;  but  early  in  the  afternoon  the  order  was  countermanded  by 
General  Floyd,  at  the  instance,  as  I  afterward  learned,  of  General  Pillow,  who, 
after  drawing  out  his  troops  for  the  attack,  thought  it  too  late  for  the  attempt. 

Neither  General  Floyd  nor  General  Pillow  alludes  to  this  council ; 
but  it  is  evident  that  the  foregoing  statement  is  substantially  correct, 
as  General  Pillow,  having  arranged  the  preliminaries  for  an  attack, 
actually  led  his  men  out,  and  afterward  withdrew  them.  Colonel  W. 
E.  Baldwin,  commanding  the  Second  Brigade,  says  in  his  report,  March 
12,  1862  : 

About  noon,  General  Pillow  directed  the  left  wing  to  be  formed  in  the  open 
ground  to  the  left  and  rear  of  our  position  in  the  lines,  for  the  purpose,  ap 
parently,  of  attacking  the  enemy's  right.  My  command,  to  which  the  Twentieth 
Mississippi,  Major  Brown,  was  temporarily  attached,  constituted  the  advance,  in 
the  following  order :  first,  the  Twenty-sixth  Mississippi ;  second,  the  Twenty- 
sixth  Tennessee;  third,  the  Twentieth  Mississippi.  Formed  in  column  by  pla 
toon,  we  advanced  in  a  road  leading  from  a  point  about  two  hundred  yards  from 
the  left  of  our  trenches,  and  approaching  nearly  perpendicularly  the  enemy's 
right.  We  had  proceeded  not  more  than  one-fourth  of  a  mile,  when  General 
Pillow  ordered  a  countermarch,  saying  it  was  too  late  in  the  day  to  accomplish 
anything,  and  we  returned  to  our  former  position  in  the  lines. 

Major  William  M.  Brown,  who  commanded  the  Twentieth  Missis 
sippi  in  this  brigade,  mentions  ten  o'clock  as  the  hour  when  he  received 
the  order  to  form  his  regiment.  He  says  : 

By  the  time  we  had  advanced  one  hundred  yards,  a  private  of  Company  D 
was  shot  down,  showing  that  the  enemy  was  close  at  hand.  We  continued  the 


THE  SORTIE  ABORTIVE.  455 

march  two  hundred  yards  more,  when  the  order  to  halt  was  given,  said  to  come 
from  General  Floyd,  with  the  explanation  that  we  did  not  have  time  to  accom 
plish  what  we  wanted. 

We  have  here,  in  the  abandonment  of  this  projected  sortie,  an  illus 
tration  of  that  vacillation  and  of  those  divided  counsels  which  brought 
about  the  loss  of  the  army  at  Fort  Donelson.  There  is  no  need  to  pur 
sue  with  unmerited  blame  any  of  the  generals  in  command.  While  the 
springs  of  human  action  remain  unchanged,  such  calamities  will  result 
from  unforeseen  combinations.  Floyd  was  of  a  bold  and  impetuous 
temper,  but  he  was  a  mountaineer  ;  and,  except  a  few  months'  expe 
rience  in  warfare  among  the  Alleghanies,  a  novice  in  military  opera 
tions.  The  moment  he  felt  himself  cooped  up  within  intrenchments,  his 
active  spirit  lost  its  spring.  The  correspondence  already  quoted  shows 
the  reluctance  with  which  he  came  to  Fort  Donelson.  When  he  went 
behind  breastworks,  he  was  already  half  beaten.  On  any  other  arena 
than  that  of  war,  Floyd  would  have  been  esteemed  at  least  the  equal 
of  his  associates.  In  a  charge,  he  would  not  have  fallen  behind  them 
in  gallantry.  But  he  was  a  very  sympathetic  man ;  and,  standing  be 
tween  them,  as  the  commander  of  both,  he  gave  ear  first  to  one  and 
then  to  the  other.  There  was  a  strong  antagonism  of  character  and 
feeling  between  Buckner  and  Pillow ;  and  the  influence  of  each  swayed 
Floyd,  as  he  came  within  its  atmosphere.  Buckner,  measuring  the 
power  of  resistance  by  military  precedents,  and  his  knowledge  of  the 
resources  of  the  United  States  Government,  apprehended  the  worst. 
He  wished  to  escape  from  what  might  become  a  trap.  He  therefore 
proposed  to  cut  his  way  out.  This  agreed  with  all  of  Floyd's  precon 
ceptions,  and  he  eagerly  embraced  the  proposal  ;  the  more  readily,  too, 
as  he  deferred  to  Buckner's  military  education  and  reputation,  and  had, 
in  a  close  association  with  him  during  the  month  previous,  learned  to 
appreciate  his  many  high  qualities.  Now,  why  was  this  movement 
suddenly  arrested  and  put  off  till  the  next  day?  The  writer  offers 
the  following  solution  as  an  hypothesis  merely  :  Pillow,  more  san 
guine  than  the  other  two,  believed  he  could  hold  the  fort;  and,  when 
he  pointed  out  to  Floyd  the  immense  consequences  of  its  loss,  no 
less  than  a  surrender  of  the  State  of  Tennessee,  Floyd,  perceiving  that 
to  stand  still  was  a  bolder  policy  than  to  attack  and  retreat,  probably 
consented  to  defer  the  sortie  and  defend  the  trenches.  If  they  could 
be  held,  the  losses  of  a  sortie  seemed  an  unavailing  sacrifice.  Hence, 
the  order  was  countermanded,  or  at  least  deferred. 

The  day  wore  away.  Reports,  greatly  exaggerated,  came  of  heavy 
reinforcements :  according  to  Grant's  statements,  they  were  12,000  or 
15,000  men  ;  according  to  the  estimates  of  the  besieged,  from  30,000 
to  50,000. 

Floyd  says,  in  his  report : 


456  FORT  DONELSON. 

"We  were  aware  of  the  fact  that  extremely  heavy  reinforcements  had  been 
continually  arriving,  day  and  night,  for  three  days  and  nights;  and  I  had  no 
doubt  whatever  that  their  whole  available  force  on  the  Western  waters  could 
and  would  be  concentrated  here,  if  it  was  deemed  necessary,  to  reduce  our  posi 
tion.  I  had  already  seen  the  impossibility  of  holding  out  for  any  length  of  time, 
with  our  inadequate  number  and  indefensible  position.  There  was  no  place 
within  our  intrenchments  but  could  be  reached  by  the  enemy's  artillery,  from 
their  boats  or  their  batteries.  It  was  but  fair  to  infer  that,  while  they  kept  up 
a  sufficient  fire  upon  our  intrenchments  to  keep  our  men  from  sleep  and  prevent 
repose,  their  object  was  merely  to  give  time  to  pass  a  column  above  us  on  the 
river,  both  on  the  right  and  left  banks,  and  thus  to  cut  off  all  our  communica 
tion,  and  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  egress. 

This  theory  of  investment  is  based  upon  the  hypothesis  of  the  suc 
cessful  cooperation  of  the  gunboats,  which  were  already  vanquished, 
and  on  a  degree  of  strength  and  activity  in  the  Federal  army  scarcely 
credible.  Knowing  General  Johnston's  want  of  troops  and  poverty  in 
means,  the  Confederate  generals  assumed,  perhaps  properly,  that,  if 
applied  to,  he  could  not  afford  any  relief  in  their  desperate  straits. 
Floyd  was  backed,  in  this  view  of  the  situation,  by  both  Pillow  and 
Buckner. 

Floyd  continues,  in  his  report  : 

I  thus  saw  clearly  that  but  one  course  was  left,  by  which  a  rational  hope 
could  be  entertained  of  saving  the  garrison,  or  a  part  of  it :  that  was,  to  dislodge 
the  enemy  from  the  position  on  our  left,  and  thus  to  pass  our  people  into  the 
open  "country  lying  southward  toward  Nashville.  I  called  for  a  consultation  of 
the  officers  of  divisions  and  brigades,  to  take  place  after  dark,  when  this  plan 
was  laid  before  them,  approved,  and  adopted ;  and,  at  which  time,  it  was  deter 
mined  to  move  from  the  trenches  at  an  early  hour  on  the  next  morning,  and 
attack  the  enemy  in  his  position.  It  was  agreed  that  the  attack  should  com 
mence  upon  our  extreme  left,  and  this  duty  was  assigned  to  Brigadier- General 
Pillow,  assisted  by  Brigadier-General  Johnson. 

The  conclusion  was  reached  and  the  specific  adjustment  of  the  de 
tails  of  the  plan  of  battle  settled  about  midnight.  The  whole  left 
wing  of  the  Confederate  urmy,  except  eight  regiments,  was  to  move 
out  of  the  trenches,  attack,  turn,  and  drive  the  Federal  right  until  the 
Wynn's  Ferry  road  which  led  to  Charlotte,  through  a  good  country,  was 
cleared,  and  an  exit  thus  secured.  In  this  movement,  Buckner  was  to 
assist,  by  bringing  his  command  to  the  left  of  Heiman's  position,  and 
thence  attacking  the  right  of  the  Federal  centre.  If  successful,  he  was 
to  take  up  a  position  in  advance  of  the  works  on  the  Wynn's  Ferry 
road,  cover  the  retreat  of  the  whole  army,  and  then  employ  his  division 
as  a  rear-guard.  While  the  combined  attack  was  going  on,  Heiman 
was  to  hold  his  own  position  with  his  brigade  and  the  Forty-second 
Tennessee.  Head's  regiment,  the  Thirtieth  Tennessee,  was  to  replace 


BATTLE  OF  DOVER.  457 

Buckner  in  the  trenches  ;  and  the  Forty-ninth  and  Fiftieth  Tennessee 
were  to  act  as  a  garrison  to  the  fort.  The  only  essentially  vicious  feat 
ure  of  this  plan  was  the  insufficient  force  left  in  Buckner's  lines. 
Most  of  the  garrison  of  the  Fort,  also,  might  well  have  been  posted  in 
the  rifle-pits.  Head's  position  was  the  shortest  and  weakest  line  of 
approach  to  the  fort,  and  in  more  immediate  danger  even  than  the 
water-batteries.  A  slight  concentration  at  that  point  would  probably 
have  prevented  or  repulsed  the  Federal  assault. 

The  Confederates  passed  another  bitter  cold  night  in  the  trenches, 
waiting  for  the  morrow's  conflict.  The  troops,  moving  in  the  small 
hours  of  the  night,  over  the  icy  and  broken  roads,  which  wound  through 
the  obstructed  area  of  defense,  made  slow  progress,  and  delayed  the 
projected  operations.  Before  daybreak  the  skirmishers  had  opened 
along  the  line.  Morning  was  to  see  bloody  work. 

Pillow  occupied  himself  chiefly  with  the  right  brigades  of  his  com 
mand,  where  Baldwin  led  the  attack,  the  two  small  Virginia  brigades 
supporting.  His  left,  composed  of  Simonton's  and  Drake's  brigades 
and  Forrest's  cavalry,  was  confided  to  Bushrod  Johnson,  who  here  first 
proved  himself  a  hard-hitter — a  character  he  bore  throughout  the  war. 
At  4  A.  M.,  on  Saturday,  the  15th  of  February,  Pillow's  troops  were 
ready,  except  one  brigade,  which  came  into  action  late. 

"  THE  BATTLE  OF  DOVER  "  was  so  called  by  General  Pillow  from  its 
initial  point.  Baldwin's  brigade  began  it.  Moving  out,  in  the  order  of 
the  day  before,  by  six  o'clock  he  was  engaged  with  the  enemy,  only  two 
or  three  hundred  yards  from  his  lines.  His  three  regiments,  the  Twen 
tieth  and  Twenty-sixth  Mississippi  and  the  Twenty-sixth  Tennessee,  mus 
tered  1,358  strong.  Starting  by  the  flank,  along  a  narrow  and  obstruct 
ed  by-road,  they  came  suddenly  and  unexpectedly  upon  the  enemy  in 
force — Oglesby's  stout  brigade.  While  two  companies  of  skirmishers 
tried  to  sustain  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  the  column  was  formed  by  com 
pany,  and  the  leading  regiment,  the  Twenty-sixth  Mississippi,  Colonel 
Reynolds,  attempted  to  deploy  into  line  to  the  right.  Three  times  it 
was  thrown  into  confusion  by  the  close  and  rapid  fire  of  the  enemy,  but 
was  rallied  and  formed  fifty  yards  to  the  rear.  The  Twenty-sixth  Ten 
nessee,  Colonel  Lillard,  formed  on  its  left,  across  the  road  ;  and  the 
Twentieth  Mississippi  advanced  on  the  left  of  the  Twenty-sixth  Ten 
nessee,  through  an  open  field,  where  it  was  exposed  to  a  destructive 
fire,  which  it  could  not  return.  McCausland,  supporting  Baldwin,  per 
ceived  the  emergency,  and  led  forward  his  troops,  the  Thirty-sixth  Vir 
ginia,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Reid,  and  the  Fiftieth  Virginia,  Major  Thor- 
burn,  and  formed  on  Baldwin's  right.  Wharton's  brigade,  the  Fifty- 
first  Virginia,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Massie,  and  the  Fifty-sixth  Virginia, 
Captain  Daviess,  also  moved  up  to  the  left,  on  very  bad  ground,  which 


458  FORT  DONELSON. 

they  held  tenaciously.  These  brigades  were  just  in  time  to  check  the 
Illinois  troops,  who,  encouraged  by  the  confusion  in  the  Southern  line, 
and  hoping  to  profit  by  it,  were  now  advancing. 

In  the  mean  time,  Brigadier  GeneralJohnson  was  leading  into  action 
still  farther  to  the  left,  and  consequently  over  greater  spaces,  Simon- 
ton's  and  Drake's  brigades,  while  Forrest's  cavalry  covered  their  flank, 
and  forced  their  horses  through  the  thick  undergrowth.  Simonton 
pushed  in  between  McCausland  and  Wharton,  arrayed  in  the  following 
order  from  right  to  left:  the  Third  Mississippi,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Webb ;  Eighth  Kentucky,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Lyori ;  Seventh  Texas, 
Colonel  Gregg  ;  and  First  Mississippi,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hamilton. 
To  the  left  of  Wharton,  Drake  put  into  action  his  brigade — the  Fourth 
Mississippi,  Major  Adair ;  Fifteenth  Arkansas,  Colonel  Gee ;  two  com 
panies  of  the  Twenty-sixth  Alabama,  under  Major  Garvin  ;  and  a  Ten 
nessee  battalion,  under  Colonel  Browder.  As  was  said,  Forrest  sup 
ported  the  extreme  left  flank.  In  this  disposition  of  the  forces,  the 
right  of  Pillow's  wing  rested  on  the  trenches  ;  and,  as  each  command 
took  its  position  to  the  left,  it  was  by  a  larger  circuit,  and  with  a  pro 
portionate  loss  of  time. 

On  the  Federal  .side,  McClernand's  whole  division  engaged  this  line 
as  it  advanced.  Oglesby's  brigade — the  Eighth,  Eighteenth,  Twenty- 
ninth,  Thirtieth,  and  Thirty-first  Illinois,  two  batteries,  and  four  com 
panies  of  cavalry — received  the  first  shock,  on  its  left.  Me  Arthur's 
brigade — the  Seventeenth  and  Forty -ninth  Illinois — next  became  en 
gaged;  and,  finally,  W.  H.  Wallace's  brigade — the  Eleventh,  Twentieth, 
Forty-fifth,  and  Forty-eighth  Illinois,  the  Fourth  Illinois  Cavalry, 
Taylor's  First  Illinois  Artillery,  and  McAllister's  battery — on  Oglesby's 
left.  According  to  the  data  of  Appendix  B  to  this  chapter,  McCler 
nand's  division  was  about  8,500  strong  of  all  arms.  The  attacking 
Confederate  left  wing,  according  to  the  writer's  estimate,  was  composed 
of  five  small  brigades  of  infantry,  5,360  strong,  and  about  1,000  cavalry. 
Jordan,  in  his  "  Life  of  Forrest,"  puts  the  cavalry  at  800.  Appendix  A 
will  show  the  grounds  for  this  estimate. 

The  antagonists  were  well  matched  in  courage,  confidence,  and  pride 
of  prowess.  Usually  one  or  the  other  of  two  opponents  promptly  per 
ceives  to  which  side  the  scales  of  victory  incline.  In  extreme  peril,  all 
the  senses  and  perceptions  of  brave  men  are  quickened  ;  and,  as  the 
Greeks  at  Salamis  saw  their  guardian  goddess  hovering  over  them,  so 
some  subtile  instinct  seems  to  say  to  men,  "  This  is  the  moment  of  your 
fate — press  on  " — or — "  yield."  As  Macbeth  says  of  Banquo  : 

" .  .  .  .  There  is  none  but  he 
Whose  being  I  do  fear  :  and  under  him 
My  genius  is  rebuked  ;  as,  it  is  said, 
Mark  Antony's  was  by  Caesar." 


DESPERATE  FIGHTING.  459 

But  these  hardy  soldiers,  kindred  in  blood,  equally  emulous  of  glory, 
and,  like  the  Roman  twins,  jealous  of  the  birthright  and  preeminence 
of  valor,  saw  nothing  in  any  foe  to  quell  the  hope  of  final  triumph. 
Each  side  believed  that  the  fierce  assault  or  stubborn  stand  was  proof 
that  the  weight  of  numbers  was  with  the  foe;  but,  nothing  daunted, 
trusted  to  manhood  for  success. 

As  has  been  seen,  when  Baldwin  first  struck  the  enemy,  instead  of 
encountering  pickets  or  skirmishers,  he  found  the  Federals  in  line  of 
battle,  on  the  alert,  and  ready  for  the  fray.  As  other  brigades  came  to 
his  aid,  or  entered  on  the  combat,  he  was  crowded  off  to  the  right,  and 
had  the  hard  measure  of  continually  meeting  new  regiments  eager  to 
receive  him — most  probably  the  men  of  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  brigade, 
who  became  engaged  about  seven  o'clock. 

Every  attempt  of  the  Confederate  line  to  advance  was  met  by  a 
heavy  raking  fire  from  an  enemy  who  seemed  animated  by  desperate 
resolution.  Overhead  was  the  lowering  sky  of  a  damp,  cold,  and  cheer 
less  day;  under  foot  the  trampled  and  blood-stained  snow.  The  air 
was  foul  with  mists  and  sulphurous  smoke?  Entangled  in  the  thick 
oak-woods,  whose  dense  undergrowth  shook  from  its  brown  leaves  the 
wet  snow  that  spoiled  the  priming  of  their  flint-locks,  the  Southerners 
pressed  forward  blindly  and  at  disadvantage.  As  they  struggled,  with 
irregular  and  spasmodic  charges,  up  a  slope,  to  assault  an  unseen  enemy, 
who  stubbornly  held  the  ground,  it  looked  for  a  long  time  as  if  the 
effort  would  prove  abortive. 

In  carrying  the  first  hill,  Simonton's  brigade,  separated  from  the 
troops  on  its  right,  received  the  full  force  of  the  Federal  fire.  Robert 
Slaughter's  company,  of  the  Eighth  Kentucky,  charged  straight  up  on 
two  pieces  of  artillery  and  suffered  severely,  but  the  guns  were  taken. 
Gregg's  Texans  met  heavy  losses  near  the  top  of  the  same  hill.  Here 
fell  the  brave  Lieutenant-Colonel  Clough  and  Lieutenant  Nowland  near 
together.  The  First  Mississippi  greatly  distinguished  itself ;  and  the 
Virginians  to  their  left  planted  their  colors  on  the  crest,  which  they 
carried  by  the  most  unflinching  resolution. 

At  length,  however,  the  Confederate  left  so  established  its  line  as  to 
turn  the  right  flank  of  the  Federals,  and,  by  an  almost  simultaneous 
assault  along  its  whole  length,  between  nine  and  ten  o'clock,  forced  the 
position  that  had  been  so  well  maintained  by  an  enveloping  movement, 
and  crushed  McClernand's  front  back  and  toward  his  left.  But  the 
brave  Illinoisans,  though  broken,  were  not  routed.  They  fell  back, 
fighting  by  companies  and  squads,  and  every  step  had  to  be  won  from 
them  at  the  price  of  blood. 

When  McClernand  found  the  crushing  process  beginning  on  his 
right  flank,  about  eight  o'clock,  he  sent  for  aid.  Grant  was  absent,  at 
the  river,  with  Foote ;  and  as  McClernand's  messages  became  more 


460  FORT   DONELSON. 

urgent,  General  Lew  Wallace,  commanding  the  central  division,  finding 
himself  unoccupied  in  front,  moved  Cruft's  brigade  up  to  the  right,  in 
support  of  the  retreating  Federals.  Cruft's  brigade  was  composed  of 
four  regiments — the  Thirty-first  Indiana,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Osborn  ; 
Seventeenth  Kentucky,  Colonel  McHenry  ;  Twenty-fifth  Kentucky, 
Colonel  Shackleford ;  and  Forty-fourth  Indiana,  Colonel  Reed — in  all 
about  2,300  strong.  They  came  into  position  about  ten  o'clock,  and 
found  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  retiring  in  comparatively  good  order.  But  the 
regiments  farther  to  their  right  were  badly  broken.  The  Twenty-fifth 
Kentucky,  which  was  carried  forward  rather  heedlessly,  on  the  extreme 
right,  and  attempted  to  .stem  the  tide  of  battle,  was  broken  into  frag 
ments  by  the  onset,  and  became  hopelessly  involved  in  the  crowd  of 
fugitives.  Cruft  bore  the  brunt  of  battle  for  some  time  ;  but,  at  length, 
he,  too,  had  to  give  back,  which  he  did  somewhat  broken,  but  in  good 
order. 

General  Lew  Wallace  says,  in  his  report : 

Soon  fugitives  from  the, battle  came  crowding  up  the  hill,  in  rear  of  my 
own  line,  bringing  unmistakable  signs  of  disaster.  Captain  Eawlins  TV  as  con 
versing  with  me  at  the  time,  when  a  mounted  officer  galloped  down  the  road, 
shouting :  '  We  are  cut  to  pieces !'  The  effect  was  very  perceptible.  To  prevent 
a  panic  among  the  regiments  of  my  Third  Brigade,  I  ordered  Colonel  Thayer  to 
move  on  by  the  right  flank.  He  promptly  obeyed. 

General  Wallace  acted  with  vigor  and  decision.  Meeting  McCler- 
nand's  whole  division  in  full  retreat,  with  Cruft  also  falling  back,  he 
threw  forward  Thaver's  strong  brigade,  to  receive  the  combined  attack 
of  Pillow  and  Buckner,  who  now  entered  on  the  contest.  The  direction 
of  the  Confederate  advance  was  now  parallel  with  their  intrenchments; 
so  that,  when  Thayer's  brigade  was  put  in  position,  it  stood  at  right 
angles  to  its  former  line  of  battle,  with  its  left  nearly  opposite  the 
centre  of  the  Confederate  trenches.  Here  it  awaited  the  final  assault. 

While  Pillow  and  B.  R.  Johnson  were  conducting  these  opera 
tions,  breaking  and  driving  the  Federals  by  steady  pressure,  Buck 
ner  also  shared  in  the  assault.  Head's  regiment  did  not  reach  him 
at  the  appointed  time,  thus  detaining  him  in  his  rifle-pits  ;  and  the 
icy  roads  still  further  delayed  his  movements.  His  advance  regiment, 
the  Third  Tennessee,  however,  was  in  the  trenches  out  of  which  Pil 
low's  troops  had  marched,  an  hour  before  daylight  and  the  last  regi 
ment  soon  after  daylight.  As  those  regiments  came  up,  he  formed 
them,  under  cover,  partly  in  line  and  partly  in  column.  In  his  front 
was  massed  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  brigade,  with  two  heavy  batteries. 
Between  these  and  Graves's  battery,  with  other  artillery,  a  severe  fire 
was  kept  up. 

Pillow  sent  messages   urging  Buckner  to  attack  ;  and  about  nine 


BROWN'S  AND  HANSON'S  ASSAULTS.  461 

o'clock  Colonel  Brown  ordered  the  Fourteenth  Mississippi  to  deploy  as 
skirmishers  under  direction  of  Major  Alexander  Casseday,  of  Buckner's 
staff.  The  Third  Tennessee,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Gordon,  and  the  Eigh 
teenth  Tennessee,  Colonel  Palmer,  both  of  Brown's  brigade,  advanced 
from  the  point  where  the  Wynn's  Ferry  road  crosses  the  trenches.  Pass 
ing  the  valley  in  front,  through  fallen  timber  and  open  ground,  under 
heavy  fire,  they  attacked  the  Federals  and  drove  them  from  their  posi 
tion,  but  not  without  considerable  loss.  The  Confederate  artillery,  di 
rected  over  their  heads,  embarrassed  them.  The  snow  on  the  bushes  wet 
the  priming  of  their  flint-locks  ;  and,  as  they  penetrated  the  thick  under 
growth,  where  the  Federals  had  been  posted,  the  heavy  fire  of  the  retiring 
foe  threw  them  into  some  disorder.  They  were  also  told  they  were  firing 
on  their  own  men.  Finally,  their  colonels  withdrew  them  to  the  trenches. 

About  noon,  as  the  tide  of  battle  bore  back  the  Federal  army  along 
and  across  the  Wynn's  Ferry  road,  General  Buckner  organized  another 
attack  to  the  right  of  that  road,  up  a  valley  to  the  left  of  Heiman's 
position.  Colonel  Brown  led  his  brigade,  the  Third  and  Eighteenth 
Tennessee,  and  the  Thirty-second  Tennessee,  supported  by  the  Forty- 
first  Tennessee,  against  a  battery  on  the  road,  which  was  supported  by 
a  very  heavy  infantry -force.  Brown's  brigade,  sheltered  by  the  ravine, 
advanced  until  within  one  or  two  hundred  yards,  when  with  a  murderous 
fire  it  drove  back  the  supports.  Opening  at  the  same  time  upon  the 
Federal  battery  with  a  cross-fire  from  Maney's,  Porter's,  and  Graves's 
batteries,  it  was  soon  disabled.  The  guns  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
infantry,  and  Graves  galloped  forward  on  the  road  with  his  battery,  and 
again  opened  at  close  quarters  with  grape  and  canister.  Thus  aided, 
Brown's  brigade  advanced,  delivering  well-directed  volleys. 

Here  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  brigade  still  clung  to  their  second  position, 
which  they  had  retained  firmly  against  Baldwin's  and  McCausland's 
attacks.  All  to  the  right  of  them  had  given  way.  Pillow's  line  was 
pressing  upon  their  right  and  front,  and  Buckner  on  their  left.  By  the 
retreat  of  Oglesby  and  McArthur,  they  had  become  the  salient  of  the 
Federal  line.  Still,  they  fought  so  well  that  Baldwin  and  McCausland, 
who  were  attacking  their  front,  called  for  reinforcements  and  ammuni 
tion  from  Roger  Hanson,  who  with  the  Second  Kentucky  stood  next 
to  them,  on  Buckner's  right.  Forrest  was  there,  too,  with  his  cavalry, 
and  had  made  two  gallant  but  unsuccessful  charges.  Hanson  had  no 
orders,  but,  seeing  them  sorely  pressed — a  hard-headed,  combative  man 
—he  gave  them  what  they  wanted.  To  render  the  needed  service,  he 
had  to  charge  across  an  open  field,  some  two  hundred  yards  in  width, 
against  an  enemy  posted  in  the  woods  and  brush  beyond.  Forrest,  with 
his  cavalry,  joined  in  the  assault  ;  and,  while  Hanson  attacked  the 
infantry-supports,  Forrest  charged  and  took  the  battery,  killing  the 
gunners,  and  recovering  some  Confederate  prisoners.  Hanson  says  : 


462  FORT  DOXELSON. 

I  directed  the  regiment,  when  the  command  was  given,  to  march  at  quick- 
time  across  this  space,  and  not  to  fire  a  gun  until  they  reached  the  woods  in 
which  the  enemy  were  posted.  The  order  was  admirably  executed,  and  although 
we  lost  fifty  men  in  killed  and  wounded,  in  crossing  this  space,  not  a  gun  was 
fired  until  the  woods  were  reached.  The  enemy  stood  their  ground  until  we 
were  within  forty  yards  of  them,  when  they  fled  in  great  confusion  under  a  most 
destructive  fire.  This  was  not,  strictly  speaking,  a  charge  bayonets,  but  it  would 
have  been  one  if  the  enemy  had  not  fled. 

While  Hanson  was  thus  assailing  Wallace's  front,  Buckner  continued 
the  movement  against  his  left.  Brown's  brigade,  charging  up  the  hill, 
through  a  dense  wood,  had  been  met  with  grape  and  canister  and  a 
heavy  musketry-fire,  much  of  which  passed  over  their  heads,  as  the 
men  lay  down  to  escape  the  missiles.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Gordon,  of 
the  Third  Tennessee,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Moore,  of  the  Thirty-second 
Tennessee,  fell  wounded,  the  latter  mortally,  with  some  fifty  men  killed 
and  wounded.  These  regiments,  reenforced  at  this  moment  by  the  Four 
teenth  Mississippi,  renewed  the  charge,  drove  the  Federal  force  from 
its  position,  and  captured  the  guns.  The  batteries,  and  Farquharson's 
Forty-first  Tennessee,  followed  the  movement.  In  all  this  fighting, 
Graves's  battery  was  splendid  in  its  gallantry  and  efficiency.  Rice  E. 
Graves  was  a  model  soldier;  inflexible  and  fervent  in  duty,  a  noble 
Christian  and  patriot.  He  left  West  Point  to  enlist  in  the  Southern 
cause,  and  no  man  of  his  years  and  rank  aided  it  more.  He  died  at  his 
guns  at  Chickamauga,  as  Breckinridge's  chief  of  artillery. 

It  was  then,  at  last,  that  Wallace's  brigade,  isolated  by  Buckner's 
movement  on  its  right  and  toward  its  rear,  fell  back  upon  its  supports, 
beaten,  cut  up,  and  much  disordered,  but  undismayed.  Indeed,  not 
only  Wallace's  command,  but  squads  from  all  the  others,  rallied  on 
Thayer's  brigade,  and,  with  Cruft's  brigade  and  these  fresh  troops, 
interposed  another  stout  barrier  to  a  further  Confederate  advance. 

Thayer's  brigade  formed,  under  the  direction  of  General  Lew  Wal 
lace,  as  described,  at  right  angles  to  the  intrenchments.  The  First 
Nebraska,  Lieutenant- Colonel  McCord,  and  the  Fifty-eighth  Illinois, 
were  on  the  right ;  Wood's  battery  in  the  centre  ;  and  to  the  left,  a  de 
tached  company  and  the  Fifty-eighth  Ohio,  Colonel  Steadman,  the  left 
of  the  line  being  obliquely  retired  so  as  to  front  an  approach  from 
the  trenches.  The  line  of  reserve  consisted  of  the  Seventy-sixth  Ohio, 
Colonel  Woods  ;  the  Forty-sixth  Illinois,  Colonel  Davis ;  and  the  Fifty- 
seventh  Illinois,  Colonel  Baldwin.  Cruft  reestablished  his  line  on  the 
right  of  Thayer. 

It  was  now  one  o'clock.  The  Federal  right  was  doubled  back.  The 
Wynn's  Ferry  road  was  cleared,  and  it  only  remained  for  the  Confeder 
ates  to  do  one  of  two  things.  The  first  was,  to  seize  the  golden  moment, 
and,  adhering  to  the  original  purpose  and  plan  of  the  sortie,  move  off 


CESSATION  OF  CONFLICT.  4-63 

rapidly  by  the  route  laid  open  by  such  strenuous  efforts  and  so  much 
bloodshed.  The  other  depended  upon  the  inspiration  of  a  master 
mind,  equal  to  the  effort  of  grasping  every  element  of  the  combat,  and 
which  should  complete  the  partial  victory  by  the  utter  rout  and  destruc 
tion  of  the  enemy.  It  is  idle  now  to  discuss  whether  the  mind,  the 
inspiration,  or  the  occasion,  was  the  one  thing  lacking. 

It  is  hardly  fair  now  to  say  what  could  or  should  have  been  done 
then ;  but  it  would  seem  that  had  Floyd  seized  this  critical  moment — 
the  hour  of  fate — and,  gathering  all  his  forces  for  a  final  assault,  hurled 
Pillow,  Buckner,  Heiman,  the  garrison — all — upon  the  crowded  front 
and  flanks  of  the  foe,  the  end  would  have  been  the  annihilation  of  the 
Federal  army,  or  a  sacrifice  so  costly  and  glorious  that  censure  would 
have  been  drowned  in  tears.  While  we  cannot  blame  a  commander 
who  does  not  choose  such  courses,  we  must  also  remember  that  the 
heavy  price  of  victory  is  human  blood.  General  Grant  never  forgot 
this,  at  Donelson  or  elsewhere,  and  he  got  what  he  paid  for. 

While,  to  us,  one  or  the  other  alternative  seems  now  to  have  been 
the  only  possible  safe  solution,  the  Confederate  commander  tried  neither. 
A  fatal  middle  policy  was  suddenly  but  dubiously  adopted,  and  not 
carried  out.  The  fate  which  seemed  always  to  arrest  the  best  en 
deavors  of  the  Confederate  arms,  and  render  fruitless  their  victories, 
interposed  at  this  juncture.  The  spirit  of  vacillation  and  divided  coun 
sels  again  prevented  that  unity  of  action  which  is  essential  to  success. 
Circumstances  were  largely  responsible  for  this.  The  point  of  view  has 
much  to  do  with  such  determinations.  For  seven  hours  the  Confeder 
ate  battalions  had  been  pushing  over  rough  ground  and  through  thick 
timber,  at  each  step  meeting  fresh  troops  massed,  where  the  discomfited 
regiments  manfully  rallied.  Hence,  the  fervor  of  assault  naturally  slack 
ened,  though  the  wearied  troops  were  still  ready  and  competent  to 
continue  their  onward  movement.  Ten  fresh  regiments,  over  3,000 
men,  had  not  fired  a  musket.  But  in  the  turmoil  of  battle  no  one  knew 
the  relations  of  any  command  to  the  next,  or  indeed  whether  his  neigh 
bor  was  friend  or  foe. 

Buckner  had  halted,  according  to  the  preconcerted  plan,  to  allow 
the  army  to  pass  out  by  the  opened  road,  and  to  cover  their  retreat. 
Bushrod  Johnson  was  following  up  the  tactics  of  the  morning,  which 
had  so  far  proved  successful,  and  was  pressing  Cruft  fiercely.  At  this 
point  of  the  fight,  Pillow,  finding  himself  at  Heiman's  position,  heard  of 
(or  saw)  preparations  by  C.  F.  Smith  for  an  assault  on  the  Confederate 
right,  where  Head  had  replaced  Buckner.  But  whether  he  understood 
this  to  be  their  purpose,  or  construed  the  movement  as  the  signs  of 
flight,  was  left  uncertain  by  his  language  at  the  time.  In  either  case, 
the  writer  is  not  prepared  to  explain  why  the  garrison  of  the  fort  was 
not  promptly  called  to  the  defense  of  this  point  to  which  it  was  nearest, 
31 


464  FORT  DONELSON. 

nor  why  Heiman's  command  was  not  dispatched  to  Head's  support  or 
put  into  the  fight.  What  occurred  was  this :  Pillow  ordered  the  regi 
ments  which  had  been  engaged  to  return  to  the  trenches,  and  instructed 
Buckner  to  hasten  to  defend  the  imperiled  point.  Buckner,  not  recog 
nizing  him  as  a  superior  authorized  to  change  the  plan  of  battle,  or  the 
propriety  of  such  change,  refused  to  obey,  and,  after  receiving  reiterated 
orders,  started  to  find  Floyd,  who  at  that  moment  joined  him.  He 
urged  upon  Floyd  the  necessity  of  carrying  out  the  original  plan  of 
evacuation.  Floyd  assented  to  this  view,  and  told  Buckner  to  stand 
fast  until  he  could  see  Pillow.  He  then  rode  back  and  saw  Pillow,  and, 
hearing  his  arguments,  yielded  to  them. 
Pillow  says,  in  his  supplemental  report : 

I  knew  that  the  enemy  had  twenty  gunboats  of  fresh  troops  at  liis  landing, 
then  only  about  three  miles  distant ;  I  kiiew,  from  the  great  loss  my  command 
had  sustained  during  the  protracted  fight  of  over  seven  hours,  my  command  was 
in  no  condition  to  meet  a  large  body  of  fresh  troops,  who  I  had  every  reason  to 
believe  were  then  rapidly  approaching  the  field.  General  Buckner's  command, 
so  far  as  labor  was  concerned,  was  comparatively  fresh,  but  its  disorganization, 
from  being  repulsed  by  the  battery,  had  unfitted  it  to  meet  a  large  body  of  fresh 
troops.  I  therefore  called  off  the  pursuit,  explaining  my  reasons  to  General 
Floyd,  who  approved  the  order. 

Floyd  simply  says  that  he  found  the  movement  so  nearly  executed 
that  it  was  necessary  to  complete  it.  Accordingly,  Buckner  was  re 
called.  In  the  mean  time,  Pillow's  right  brigades  were  retiring  to  their 
places  in  the  trenches,  under  orders  from  the  commanders. 

B.  R.  Johnson,  finding  himself  alone  with  Drake's  brigade  and  some 
cavalry,  and  unsupported  on  the  right,  sent  an  aide  for  reinforcements, 
but  received  instead  an  order  to  report  in  person  within  the  intrench- 
ments.  Johnson  then  went  and  asked  leave  to  attack,  but,  after  a  con 
ference,  Floyd  directed  him  to  display  Drake's  brigade  for  a  time  before 
the  enemy,  while  the  other  troops  took  their  positions  in  the  rifle-pits. 
This  Was  done  with  the  aid  of  Forrest's  cavalry.  The  Federal  accounts 
describe  assaults  and  fierce  struggles  led  by  Grant  in  person.  They  are 
mistaken.  General  Grant's  order  of  advance  was  decisive,  because  it 
was  an  advance,  and  revealed  the  absence  of  the  Confederates  from  the 
battle-field ;  but  the  contest  must  have  been  slight,  for  Drake's  brigade 
and  Forrest's  cavalry  alone  remained  on  the  field,  and,  after  holding  at 
bay  for  an  hour  or  two  Wallace's  division,  with  the  remnants  of  Mc- 
Clernand's,  slowly  retired,  under  orders,  over  some  800  yards  of  inter 
vening  ground  to  the  breastworks,  not  losing  a  man  while  falling  back. 
This  ended  the  conflict  on  the  left.  Three  hundred  prisoners,  5,000 
stand  of  small-arms,  six  guns,  and  other  spoils  of  victory,  had  been 
picked  up  by  the  Confederates.  But  the  Federals,  cautiously  advanc 
ing,  gradually  recovered  most  of  their  lost  ground. 


GRAXT  AND  C.   F.  SMITH.  465 

In  the  combats  at  Donelson,  Forrest,  with  his  cavalry,  showed  his 
usual  vigor  and  dash,  although  he  had  an  unusually  difficult  part  to 
perform  with  his  troopers  in  the  dense  and  tangled  woods.  The  artil 
lery  could  not  have  done  better.  Porter,  Graves,  and  Maney,  in  par 
ticular,  displayed  in  splendid  manner  their  soldierly  qualities  ;  and  the 
men  were  worthy  of  their  officers.  Their  losses  were  heavy,  and  Cap 
tain  Porter  was  himself  wounded. 

As  General  Grant  was  returning,  on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  from 
his  conference  with  the  wounded  commodore,  he  gave  little  heed  to  the 
heavy  firing  on  his  right,  which,  like  Lew  Wallace,  he  mistook  for  an 
attack  by  McClernand.  As  he  rode  leisurely  to  camp,  between  nine  and 
ten  o'clock,  he  met  an  aide  galloping  furiously  from  the  right  to  tell 
him  of  McClernand's  straits.  Grant,  being  near  C.  F.  Smith,  found 
him,  and  bade  him  hold  himself  in  readiness  to  attack  the  Confederate 
right. 

Grant  then  rode  to  his  right  wing,  where  all  was  confusion  and 
dismay.  After  examining  the  condition  of  things  there,  he  rode  back 
to  C.  F.  Smith,  whose  pupil  he  had  been,  and  who  was  a  man  from 
whom  no  soldier  need  feel  ashamed  to  take  counsel.  It  was  determined 
to  assault  the  advanced  work  on  the  extreme  right  of  the  Confederate 
line.  Grant  also  sent  word  to  Foote  that  part  of  his  army  was  demor 
alized,  and  begged  him  to  make  an  immediate  demonstration  with  his 
gunboats.  He  adds,  "  I  must  order  a  charge,  to  save  appearances." 
;'  Two  of  the  fleet  accordingly  ran  up  the.  river,  and  threw  a  few  shells 
at  long  range  "  (Badeau). 

Though  it  might  have  been  apparent  to  the  Confederates,  possibly 
by  two  or  three  o'clock,  that  an  assault  was  meditated  on  their  right, 
the  unfortunate  conflict  of  opinion  and  action  among  the  generals,  the 
confusion  in  their  commands,  and  the  icy  and  impeded  roads,  so  de 
layed  the  movement  of  troops  that  they  arrived  in  position  too  late  for 
the  purpose  of  their  recall.  It  was  four  o'clock  before  the  assault  on 
the  right  was  made  by  Smith ;  and  then  Hanson,  who,  under  Pillow's 
direct  orders,  preceded  the  rest  of  Buckner's  command,  had  the  mortifi 
cation  of  witnessing,  but  not  sharing  in,  the  combat,  when  the  Federal 
column  carried  the  advanced  work  he  had  constructed. 

The  manner  of  the  assault  was  this  :  Grant,  in  consultation  with 
C.  F.  Smith,  determined  on  it,  and  assigned  the  duty  to  that  fine  old 
soldier.  Whose  suggestion  it  was,  Grant's  or  Smith's,  has  been  made 
subject  of  dispute.  No  matter  :  the  inspiration  was  a  good  one.  C.  F. 
Smith  was  a  soldier  of  the  old  school ;  a  graduate  of  1825  from  West 
Point,  where  he  was  afterward  commandant  of  the  corps  when  Grant 
was  a  cadet.  He  was  frequently  brevetted  in  Mexico ;  and  got  promo 
tion,  as  lieutenant-colonel  of  the  Tenth  Infantry,  from  Mr.  Davis,  when 
he  was  Secretary  of  War.  The  vicissitudes  of  life  found  him,  at  this 


466  F°KT  DOXELSOX. 

early  stage  of  the  civil  war,  the  subordinate  of  his  former  pupil.     His 
own  career  in  it  was  brief  but  brilliant. 

Smith's  assaulting  column  consisted  of  the  six  regiments  that  com 
posed  Lauman's  brigade  :  the  Second  Iowa,  Colonel  Tuttle  ;  Twenty- 
fifth  Indiana,  Colonel  Veatch  ;  Seventh  Iowa,  Colonel  Parrott ;  Four 
teenth  Iowa,  Colonel  Shaw  ;  Fifty-second  Indiana,  and  Birge's  regiment 
of  sharp-shooters.  The  Second  Iowa  led  the  assault. 

Smith  formed  the  regiment  in  two  lines,  with  a  front  of  five  companies  each, 
thirty  paces  apart.  He  told  the  men  what  they  had  to  do,  and  took  his  position 
between  those  two  lines.  The  attack  was  made  with  great  vigor  and  success. 
The  ground  was  broken  and  difficult,  impeded  with  underbrush,  as  well  as  ex 
tremely  exposed.1 

The  veteran  Smith  led  the  charge  with  desperate  purpose.  As  the 
Federals  rushed  up  the  hill,  pushing  through  the  abattis,  Turner's  little 
battalion  poured  on  them  a  deadly  fire,  which  would  have  repulsed  a 
less  numerous  and  determined  foe.  The  rest  of  Buckner's  corps  had 
got  into  position  ;  but  when  Hanson's  regiment,  coming  from  the  ex 
treme  left  to  the  extreme  right,  was  hurrying  in  loose  order  to  its  aid, 
but  had  not  reached  the  ground,  a  torrent  of  blue-coats  poured  over  the 
breastworks,  driving  the  defenders  before  them.  Then  it  fell  upon 
Hanson's  regiment  as  it  approached,  so  that  it  recoiled  with  the  other 
fugitives.  A  few  minutes'  delay  by  the  Federals  would  have  saved 
the  day  ;  on  such  trifles  does  the  fate  of  armies  and  nations  hang. 

Buckner  says  of  the  Second  Kentucky : 

This  gallant  regiment  was  necessarily  thrown  back  in  confusion  upon  the 
position  of  the  Eighteenth  Tennessee.  At  this  period  I  reached  that  position  ; 
and,  aided  by  a  number  of  officers,  I  succeeded  in  hastily  forming  a  line  behind 
the  crest  of  the  hill  which  overlooked  the  detached  works,  which  had  been 
seized  by  the  enemy  before  Hanson  had  been  able  to  throw  Ms  regiment  into 
them.  The  enemy  advanced  gallantly  upon  this  new  position,  but  was  repulsed 
with  heavy  loss.  I  reenforced  this  position  by  other  regiments  as  they  suc 
cessively  arrived,  and  by  a  section  of  Graves's  battery,  while  a  section  of  Porter's 
battery  was  placed  in  its  former  position.  During  a  contest  of  more  than  two 
hours  the  enemy  threatened  my  left  with  a  heavy  column,  and  made  repeated 
attempts  to  storm  my  line  on  tbe  right ;  but  the  well-directed  fire  of  Porter's 
and  Graves's  artillery  and  the  musketry-fire  of  the  infantry  repelled  the  at 
tempts,  and  finally  drove  him  to  seek  shelter  behind  the  works  he  had  taken  and 
amid  the  irregularities  of  the  ground.  There  was  probably  no  period  of  the 
action  when  Ms  strength  was  not  from  three  to  five  times  the  strength  of  mine. 
Toward  the  close  of  the  action  I  was  reenforced  by  the  regiments  of  Colonels 
Quarles,  and  Sugg,  and  Bailey.3  Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow  also  visited  the 
position  about  tbe  close  of  the  action. 

1  Badeau's  "  Life  of  Grant,"  vol.  i.,  p.  46. 

2  The  Forty-second,  Forty-ninth,  and  Fiftieth  Tennessee  ;  the  two  latter  had  been  in 
the  fort. 


CLOSE   OF   THE   BATTLE.  467 

Head's  regiment,  the  Thirtieth  Tennessee,  occupied  Buckner's  line, 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  long.  In  the  advanced  work  he  had  placed 
Major  Turner  with  three  companies.  Head  says  in  his  report  that  his 
regiment  numbered  only  450  men.  This  was  the  number  in  line,  ex 
cluding  Bidwell's  company  of  sixty  men  in  the  batteries.  The  men 
were  very  raw,  mere  militia,  and  had  been  at  Fort  Henry.  Colonel 
Head  was  patriotic  and  able  in  civil  affairs,  but  in  no  sense  a  military 
man. 

Colonel  Bailey  saw  the  Second  Kentucky  retreating  in  great  dis 
order,  and  moved  Sugg's  regiment  to  the  face  of  the  works,  fronting 
the  enemy  ;  his  own  regiment  was  drawn  up  near  the  western  sally-port, 
and  prepared  for  a  sally,  under  the  impression  that  the  enemy  would 
follow  up  the  dispersion  of  the  Confederate  right  by  a  movement  against 
the  river  or  water  batteries.  These  dispositions  were  scarcely  com 
pleted,  when  Colonel  Head  in  person  galloped  into  the  fort,  and  di 
rected  the  Forty-ninth  Tennessee  to  move  to  the  front,  which  was  done 
at  a  double-quick.  The  regiment  was  formed  to  the  right  of  Brown's 
Third  Tennessee,  and,  moving  forward,  met  the  enemy's  skirmishers, 
now  advanced  nearly  to  the  crest  of  the  hill  on  which  the  Confederate 
line  was  being  established.  One  or  two  volleys  forced  the  enemy  to 
retreat  to  the  line  captured  from  Head  and  the  Second  Kentucky.  A 
brisk  fire  was  kept  up  until  sunset,  when  the  firing  ceased.  A  battalion 
of  Sugg's  regiment  reached  the  field  just  before  the  close  of  the  fight, 
and  deployed  to  the  right  of  the  Forty-ninth.  The  right  wing  was  like 
wise  reenforced  by  Major  Colms's  battalion.  Quarles's  regiment,  the 
Forty-second  Tennessee,  also  came  up  from  Heiman's  position,  and 
helped  Hanson  defend  the  second  line. 

In  this  last  engagement,  while  Smith  was  attacking  with  Lauman's 
brigade,  the  Twelfth  Iowa,  Colonel  Wood,  and  the  Fiftieth  Illinois, 
Colonel  Bane,  of  Cook's  brigade,  also  joined  in  the  attack  on  his  imme 
diate  right  ;  and  Morgan  L.  Smith's  brigade  farther  still  to  the  right. 
These  were  all  fresh  troops.  Besides  these,  Cruft's  brigade,  part  of 
Thayer's,  and  other  commands,  joined  in  the  attack  on  the  intrench- 
mente,  or  in  demonstrations  that  occupied  the  Confederate  regiments 
in  their  positions  at  the  breastworks. 

This  assault  was  met  by  a  determined  resistance  from  Brown's 
brigade.  The  writer  has  been  kindly  supplied  with  a  statement  of  this 
combat  carefully  prepared  in  conference  by  a  number  of  the  gallant 
participants.  The  following  extract  gives  its  essential  features : 

Within  a  short  time  after  Brown's  command  reoccupied  this  line,  and  about 
4  P.  M.,  the  extreme  right  of  the  line  resting  on  Hickman  Creek,  and  which 
had  been  occupied  by  Hanson,  was  suddenly  attacked.  That  part  of  the  line 
was  occupied  by  a  small  part  of  Head's  regiment,  under  command  of  Major 
Turner.  Hanson's  regiment  had  not  then  reached  the  works,  because  of  the 


468  FORT  DONELSOX. 

greater  length  of  march  and  roughness  of  the  road.  As  soon  as  the  assault  was 
discovered,  Captain  Porter  opened  an  enfilade  fire  on  the  advancing  column 
with  grape  and  canister.  Colonel  Palmer,  with  the  Eighteenth  Tennessee, 
posted  on  Brown's  extreme  right,  without  awaiting  the  dangerous  delay  of 
orders,  moved  immediately  to  relieve  Hanson,  who  was  about  going  into  position 
when  the  assault  began.  Colonel  Brown  moved  the  Third  Tennessee  at  double- 
quick  to  extend  Palmer's  line  already  formed  on  the  only  practicable  position 
for  defense,  so  as  to  form  a  secondary  line  to  Hanson's  works,  which  were  then 
already  in  possession  of  a  force  five  or  six  times  outnumbering  any  opposing 
troops  at  hand.  Hanson  rallied  on  this  interior  line,  the  stubborn  resistance  of 
which,  aided  by  the  well-directed  guns  of  Porter's  battery,  saved  the  line  and 
prevented  the  water-batteries  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the  Federals  that 
evening.  This  interior  line  had  timely  reinforcements  in  the  arrival  of  Bailey's, 
Quarles's,  Sugg's,  and  the  balance  of  Head's  regiments,  all  of  which  arrived  after 
the  forward  movement  of  the  Federal  column  was  checked,  but  before  the  for 
tunes  of  the  day  were  decided.  One  section  of  Graves's  battery,  which  had  been 
delayed  in  reaching  its  original  position,  with  the  other  pieces,  was  brought  up 
rapidly  to  the  intersection  of  the  new  with  the  main  line,  and  did  most  effective 
service  under  the  personal  direction  of  Captain  Graves.  At  the  same  time  that 
this  section  came  up,  the  remaining  section  of  Porter's  battery,  delayed  in  the 
same  way,  was  brought  into  position  by  Lieutenant  Morton,  under  a  very  heavy 
fire,  and  with  the  other  guns  continued  firing  until  nightfall.  It  was  in  this 
engagement  that  the  gallant  Captain  Thomas  E.  Porter  was  disabled  by  a  very 
severe  and  dangerous  wound,  and  was  borne  from  the  field.  Captain  Porter's 
marked  coolness  and  dash,  and  the  efficient  and  intelligent  manner  in  which  he 
handled  his  guns,  elicited  the  unbounded  admiration  of  all  who  saw  him;  and 
when  he  was  being  carried,  bleeding,  from  the  field,  he  exclaimed,  as  Jordan 
has  it,  to  the  only  unwounded  officer  left  with  his  battery,  Lieutenant  John  TT. 
Morton,  a  mere  lad  of  nineteen,  "Don't  let  them  have  the  guns,  Morton!" 
Lieutenant  Morton  replied,  "No,  captain,  not  while  I  have  one  man  left!  " 

This  battery,  from  its  advanced  and  exposed  position,  lost  eight  men  killed 
outright,  and  twenty-five  wounded,  out  of  forty-eight  officers,  non-commissioned 
officers,  and  men,  actively  engaged  ;  the  balance  of  the  company,  forty-two  men, 
were  drivers,  teamsters,  and  artificers,  protected  in  a  ravine  at  some  distance 
from  the  battery. 

Captain  Porter  was  educated  at  Annapolis,  and  was  an  officer  in  the  United 
States  Navy  up  to  the  breaking  out  of  the  war,  when  he  resigned  his  position  in 
the  navy  and  returned  to  his  native  State,  Tennessee,  to  offer  his  services  in  her 
behalf.  He  served  during  the  war  as  chief  of  artillery  to  Buckner,  and  after 
ward  to  Cleburne,  and  was  wounded  at  Hoover's  Gap.  He  subsequently  entered 
the  Confederate  Navy  as  executive  officer  of  the  Florida.  After  the  war  he 
commanded  a  California  merchant-steamer,  and  died  in  1869.  He  was  a  kind 
and  cultivated  gentleman,  and  a  gallant  soldier.  His  young  lieutenant,  Morton, 
before  the  close  of  the  war  became  chief  of  artillery  to  General  Forrest. 

Darkness  separated  the  combatants.  Jordan,  in  his  "  Life  of  For 
rest  "(page  86),  calls  the  works  gained,  "the  mere  narrow  foothold 
seized  on  the  extreme  right  of  th'e  trenches."  Buckner,  however,  con 
sidered  it  the  key  to  his  position,  which  it  probably  was. 


LOSSES  AND   RESULTS.  4(39 

The  loss  of  Lauman's  brigade,  exclusive  of  the  Fifty-second  Indiana, 
temporarily  attached  and  not  reported,  was  61  killed  and  321  wounded  ; 
the  Second  Iowa  alone  lost  198  men.  In  five  Federal  brigades,  re 
ported,  out  of  ten,  the  loss  during  the  siege  was  1,403  men.  Badeau, 
speaking  of  Grant,  says:  "His  entire  losses  during  the  siege  were 
3,041  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing ;  of  these,  425  were  killed." 
Medical  Director  Brinton  says  the  loss,  "  as  stated  officially,  amounted 
to  400  killed  and  1,785  wounded."1  If  to  these  are  added  the  300 
prisoners  captured  and  sent  to  Nashville  by  the  Confederates,  the  loss 
would  amount  to  over  2,500,  inclusive  of  the  fleet — fifty-six  more. 

In  the  subsequent  confusion  it  was  difficult  to  obtain  accurate  data 
of  the  Confederate  loss,  in  killed  and  wounded,  during  the  siege.  Floyd 
estimated  it  at  1,500.  Pillow,  in  his  supplemental  report,  put  it  at 
2,000.  In  two  tables  in  the  appendix,  the  loss  is  summed  up  respec 
tively  at  1,348  and  1,222.  The  writer's  estimate,  from  all  the  sources 
of  information  at  his  command,  is  325  killed  and  1,097  wounded.  Be 
sides  these,  several  hundred  were  missing  before  the  surrender,  of 
whom,  excluding  fugitives  and  prisoners,  probably  a  hundred  or  more 
perished;  so  that  the  actual  loss  by  death  and  wounds  was  about  1,500. 

At  the  close  of  the  day,  Floyd  and  Pillow  telegraphed  General 
Johnston  that  they  had  won  a  victory.  After  nightfall,  they  met  in 
consultation  with  Buckner.  Buckner  says  : 

It  was  unanimously  resolved  that,  if  the  enemy  had  not  reoccupiecl,  in 
strength,  the  position  in  front  of  General  Pillow,  the  army  should  effect  its 
retreat ;  and  orders  to  assemble  the  regiments  for  that  purpose  were  given  by 
General  Floyd. 

Forrest  was  ordered  to  make  a  reconnaissance  to  ascertain  the  posi 
tion  of  the  enemy.  Floyd  thus  states  the  situation  : 

There  were  but  two  roads  by  which  it  was  possible  to  retire.  If  they  went 
by  the  upper  road,  they  would  certainly  have  a  strong  position  of  the  enemy  to 
cut  through ;  .  .  .  and  if  they  retired  by  the  lower  road  they  would  have  to 
wade  through  water  three  feet  deep — which  ordeal  the  medical  director  stated 
would  be  death  to  more  than  one-half  of  the  command,  on  account  of  the  severity 
of  the  weather  and  their  physical  prostration. 

About  midnight  it  was  determined  to  carry  out  at  daybreak  the 
plan  of  the  day  before,  on  the  supposition  that  the  upper  road  was 
clear.  But  rumors  having  reached  the  generals  that  the  Federals  had 
reoccupied  their  positions,  two  sets  of  scouts,  one  after  the  other,  were 
sent  out  to  ascertain  the  facts.  General  Forrest  is  confident  that  the 
report  of  the  scouts  was  that  they  saw  no  Federals,  only  fires  in  the 
woods.  The  reports  of  the  three  generals,  however,  concur  that  all  the 

1  "  Medical  and  Surgical  History  of  the  War,"  Part  I.,  med.  volume,  Appendix,  p.  28. 


470  FORT  DONELSON. 

information  received  confirmed  the  complete  reinvestment  of  their  lines. 
These  discrepancies  readily  occur  among  honest  witnesses.  Inferences 
are  easily  mistaken  for  the  statements  from  which  they  were  drawn ; 
and,  in  the  mutations  of  opinion,  the  actual  sequence  is  often  lost.  The 
scouts,  who  examined  the  river  road,  reported  the  overflowed  valley 
about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  wide  and  half  leg  deep  in  mire,  and  the  wa 
ter  in  the  slough  one  hundred  yards  wide  and  up  to  the  saddle-skirts, 
and  the  crossing  impracticable  for  infantry.  From  subsequent  develop 
ments,  it  is  probable  that  the  investment  was  not  so  complete,  nor  es 
cape  so  hazardous,  as  was  reported  and  believed.  The  soldiers  did 
escape  in  large  numbers,  many  on  that  side  of  the  river.  The  people 
of  the  vicinage  came  to  the  battle-field,  some  from  curiosity,  but  gener 
ally  with  the  more  laudable  motive  of  helping  the  wounded ;  so  that 
the  moving  lights  carried,  and  the  fires  kindled,  by  friends  proved  false 
signals,  and  were  accepted  as  indications  of  the  presence  of  the  enemy. 
The  question  now  arose,  What  should  be  done  ?  Buckner  says  in  his 
report : 

Both  officers  have  correctly  stated  that  I  regarded  the  position  of  the  army 
as  desperate,  and  that  the  attempt  to  extricate  it  by  another  battle,  in  the  suffer 
ing  and  exhausted  condition  of  the  troops,  was  almost  hopeless.  The  troops  had 
been  worn  down  with  watching,  with  labor,  with  fighting.  Many  of  them  were 
frosted  by  the  intensity  of  the  cold ;  all  of  them  were  suffering  and  exhausted 
by  their  incessant  labors.  There  had  been  no  regular  issue  of  rations  for  a  num 
ber  of  days,  and  scarcely  any  means  of  cooking.  Their  ammunition  was  nearly 
expended.  We  were  completely  invested  by  a  force  fully  four  times  the  strength 
of  our  own.  In  tbeir  exhausted  condition  they  could  not  have  made  a  march. 
An  attempt  to  make  a  sortie  would  have  been  resisted  by  a  superior  force  of 
fresh  troops;  and  that  attempt  would  have  been  the  signal  for  the  fall  of  the 
water-batteries,  and  the  presence  of  the  enemy's  gunboats  sweeping  with  their 
fire  at  close  range  the  positions  of  our  troops,  who  would  thus  have  been  assailed 
on  their  front,  rear,  and  right  flank,  at  the  same  instant.1  The  result  would  have 
been  a  virtual  massacre  of  the  troops,  more  disheartening  in  its  effects  than  a 
surrender. 

In  this  opinion  General  Floyd  coincided  ;  and  I  am  certain  that  both  be  and 
I  were  convinced  that  General  Pillow  agreed  with  us  in  opinion.  General  Pil 
low  then  asked  our  opinion  as  to  the  practicability  of  holding  out  another  day. 
I  replied  that  my  right  was  already  turned,  a  portion  of  my  intrenchments  in 
the  enemy's  possession ;  they  were  in  a  position  successfully  to  assail  my  posi 
tion  and  the  water-batteries  ;  and  that,  with  my  weakened  and  exhausted  force. 
I  could  not  successfully  resist  the  assault  which  would  be  made  at  daylight  by  a 
vastly  superior  force. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  Pillow  proposed  to  repeat  the  onslaught  of 
the  day  before,  and  cut  their  way  out ;  though  he  seems  to  have  con- 

1  The  force  of  the  enemy  is  here  over-estimated  ;  and,  so  far  as  the  gunboats  are  COB- 
cevned,  it  is  apparent  that  this  was  an  error,  but  the  damage  done  the  fleet  was  not 
known  to  the  Confederates. 


COUNCIL    OF   WAR.  471 

curred  with  the  others  in  the  view  that  it  was  a  desperate  remedy  and 
could  succeed  only  with  great  loss  of  men.  Floyd  seems  also  to  have  held 
this  opinion  at  first,  but  to  have  deferred  to  Buckner's  representation  of 
the  condition  of  the  men,  and  the  inevitable  sacrifice  of  a  large  part  of  the 
command,  the  responsibility  of  which  he  would  not  assume.  Pillow 
probably  adhered  to  his  opinion,  but  did  not  insist  strongly  upon  it,  in 
view  of  the  opposition.  At  least  he  presented  no  plan  of  extrication. 
The  roads  were  thought  to  be  thoroughly  impracticable,  and  the 
steamers,  which  might  have  been  used  as  ferries,  had  been  sent  up  the 
river  with  the  prisoners  and  wounded ;  though  two  were  expected  to 
arrive  at  daylight. 

General  Pillow  states  that  he  proposed  to  make  the  attempt  to  hold 
out  another  day.  The  matter  was  discussed  ;  and,  certainly,  if  it  could 
have  been  done,  this  was  the  best  possible  counsel.  It  was  an  occasion 
for  a  supreme  effort.  War  has  its  chances  of  weal  as  well  as  of  woe. 
Xo  man  can  tell  what  a  day  may  bring  forth.  Success  so  often  crowns 
mere  tenacity  of  purpose  and  stubborn  endurance,  that  despair  is 
scarcely  a  word  for  the  soldier's  vocabulary.  At  the  same  time,  it  has 
to  be  confessed  that  there  is  a  limit  to  the  ability  of  troops  for  resist 
ance,  and  that  it  is  the  part  of  good  sense  to  know  when  this  point  has 
been  reached.  Buckner  was  satisfied  that  it  had  been  reached.  He 
was  a  man  of  good  judgment,  conversant  with  the  troops,  and,  if  his 
opinion  was  not  formed  upon  his  observation  of  too  small  a  part  of  the 
army,  it  may  well  be  accepted  as  conclusive  ;  as,  indeed,  it  was  by 
Floyd.  He  was  sustained  in  his  view  by  that  resolute  fighter,  Roger 
Hanson,  who,  however,  had  seen  his  own  regiment,  the  Second  Ken 
tucky,  suffer  very  severely.  Buckner  believed  that  his  command  would 
not  hold  out  for  an  hour  against  an  assault ;  and  that  a  sortie  would 
result  in  a  massacre.  From  this  point  of  view,  humanity  required  a 
surrender. 

It  is  true  that  another  view  might  well  be  taken  of  the  situation. 
The  entire  loss  was  not  more  than  one  in  nine  or  ten  ;  the  heaviest  in 
any  particular  command  was  not  more  than  one  in  four  or  five,  while 
later  in  the  war  these  same  troops  would  undergo  a  loss  of  one-third 
without  a  shudder.  Heiman's  entire  brigade,  at  the  least  1,575  strong, 
though  more  probably  1,700  in  number,  had  not  been  engaged  in  the 
battle  of  Saturday,  and  had  the  prestige  of  Thursday's  success  with 
the  loss  of  only  ten  men  killed  and  thirty-six  wounded.  In  addition, 
the  Forty-second  Tennessee,  498  strong,  had  met  but  eleven  casualties. 
The  Forty-ninth  and  Fiftieth  Tennessee,  numbering  1,022  for  action, 
had  lost  but  nine  killed  and  eighteen  wounded.  The  Forty-first  Ten 
nessee,  575  men,  had  two  killed  and  six  wounded.  Three  or  four  bat 
teries  had  had  no  casualties  at  all.  Here  was  a  force  of  some  3,700 
men,  fresh  as  to  mere  combat,  having  lost  but  ninety-two  men.  Other 


472  FORT  DONELSOK 

troops  were  coming,  and  400  did  arrive  at  daylight,  making  a  body 
over  4,000  strong.  "What  could  be  got  out  of  these  men  of  course  de 
pended  on  a  multitude  of  conditions,  many  of  which  cannot  now  be 
stated,  much  less  estimated.  Pillow,  who  was  the  most  sanguine  of 
these  leaders,  and  to  whose  division  these  troops  belonged,  said  he 
could  not  aid  Buckner  at  the  point  of  expected  assault  on  the  right, 
because  he  would  have  as  much  to  do  as  he  could  attend  to  in  defend 
ing  his  own  lines. 

It  should,  however,  be  remembered  that  these  troops  were  not  vet 
erans,  but  many  of  them  raw  levies,  not  only  undisciplined,  but  igno 
rant  of  drill,  armed  with  very  inferior  weapons  that  failed  them  in  the 
hour  of  greatest  need,  and  often  commanded  by  officers  as  inexperi 
enced  as  themselves.  They  had  been  from  three  to  eight  days  at  work 
in  the  trenches,  almost  without  sleep  or  rest,  in  the  wet  and  cold,  and 
many  were  frost-bitten.  The  men  were  so  worn  out  with  watching, 
cold,  and  fatigue,  that  they  fell  asleep  standing  on  their  feet,  under  a 
heavy  fire  from  the  enemy.  Three  days  of  battle  had  disabled  many 
and  demoralized  more.  Opposed  to  them  was  an  army,  superior  in 
numbers  and  in  all  the  appointments  of  war,  continually  augmented  by 
reinforcements,  and  thus  able  to  fight  by  relays  and  to  rest.  Many 
other  considerations  present  themselves  to  the  mind  now,  as  they  did 
then  to  the  leaders  of  the  besieged ;  but  it  is  useless  to  dwell  upon 
them.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  it  was  finally  decided  that  a  surrender  was 
inevitable,  and  that,  to  accomplish  its  objects,  it  must  be  made  before 
the  assault,  which  was  expected  at  daylight. 

But  when  it  came  to  the  question  of  who  should  make  the  surren 
der,  Flovd  and  Pillow  both  declared  they  would  not  surrender ;  they 
would  die  first.  Buckner  said  that  after  the  resistance  that  had  been 
made  the  army  could  be  honorably  surrendered.  "  General  Pillow  said 
he  never  would  surrender.  General  Floyd  said  that  he  would  suffer 
any  fate  before  he  would  surrender  or  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy 
alive."  Floyd  says  in  his  report  : 

I  felt  that  in  this  contingency,  while  it  might  be  questioned  whether  I 
should,  as  commander  of  the  army,  lead  it  to  certain  destruction  in  an  unavail 
ing  fight,  yet  I  had  a  right  individually  to  determine  that  I  would  not  survive 
a  surrender  there.  To  satisfy  both  propositions  I  agreed  to  hand  over  the  com 
mand  to  Brigadier-General  Buckner  through  Brigadier-General  Pillow,  and  to 
make  an  effort  for  my  own  extrication  by  any  and  every  means  that  might  pre 
sent  themselves  to  me.  I  therefore  directed  Colonel  Forrest,  a  daring  and 
determined  officer,  at  the  head  of  an  efficient  regiment  of  cavalry,  to  be  present 
for  the  purpose  of  accompanying  me  in  what  I  supposed  would  be  an  effort  to 
pass  through  the  enemy's  lines. 

To  Floyd's  declaration  that  he  would  not  be  taken  alive,  General 
Buckner  responded  that  such  considerations  were  personal,  intimating, 


THE   BREAKING   UP.  473 

at  least,  that  they  should  not  influence  a  commander.  Floyd  replied  : 
"  I  would  not  permit  such  reasons  to  cause  me  to  sacrifice  my  com 
mand  ;  but,  personal  or  not,  such  is  my  determination."  General  Buck- 
ner  then  said  that,  being  satisfied  that  nothing  else  could  be  done,  if 
the  command  was  devolved  on  him  he  would  surrender  the  army,  and 
that  his  sense  of  duty  required  him  to  share  its  fate.  Floyd  imme 
diately  asked  him  :  "  General  Buckner,  if  I  place  you  in  command, 
will  you  allow  me  to  draw  out  my  brigade  ? "  General  Buckner 
promptly  replied,  "  Yes,  provided  you  do  so  before  the  enemy  act  upon 
my  communication."  Floyd  said,  "  General  Pillow,  I  turn  over  the 
command."  Pillow,  regarding  this  as  a  mere  technical  form  by  which 
the  command  was  to  be  conveyed  to  Buckner,  then  said,  "  I  pass  it." 
Buckner  assumed  the  command,  sent  for  a  bugler,  pen,  ink,  and  paper, 
and  opened  the  negotiations  for  surrender. 

Pillow  advised  Forrest  to  cut  his  way  out,  and  let  all  escape  who 
could.  Taking  with  him  his  staff  and  Colonel  Gilmer,  he  crossed  the 
river  in  a  small  skiff,  and  escaped  by  land.  Floyd  says  in  his  supple 
mental  report: 

One  of  the  reasons  that  induced  me  to  make  this  transfer  to  General  Buck 
ner  was,  in  order  that  I  might  be  untrammeled  in  the  effort  I  was  determined  to 
make  to  extricate  as  many  of  the  command  as  possible  from  the  fort,  to  which 
object  1  devoted  myself  during  the  night  of  the  15th.  ...  I  supposed  it  to  be 
an  unquestionable  principle  of  military  action  that,  in  case  of  disaster,  it  is  bet 
ter  to  save  part  of  a  command  than  to  lose  the  whole.  The  alternative  propo 
sition  which  I  adopted  in  preference  to  surrendering  the  entire  army  was,  to 
make  my  way  out  of  the  beleaguered  camp  with  such  men  as  were  still  able  to 
make  another  struggle,  if  it  could  be  accomplished ;  and  if  it  could  not  be,  then 
to  take  any  consequences  that  did  not  involve  a  surrender.  .  .  .  Late  at  night 
it  was  ascertained  that  two  steamboats  would  probably  reach  the  landing  be 
fore  daylight.  Then  I  determined  to  let  Colonel  Forrest-' s  cavalry  proceed  on 
their  march  by  the  river-road,  which  was  impassa.ble  for  anything  but  cavalry 
on  account  of  the  back-water  and  overflow,  while  I  would  remain  behind  and 
endeavor  to  get  away  as  many  men  as  possible  by  the  boats.  The  boats  came 
a  short  time  before  daylight,  when  I  hastened  to  the  river  and  began  to  ferry 
the  men  over  to  the  opposite  shore  as  rapidly  as  possible. 

Floyd's  brigade,  which  had  been  drawn  up  near  the  river-bank,  pos 
sibly  with  this  intent,  was  nearest  the  landing.  Ilence  they  were  the 
first  to  enter  the  boats,  but  none  were  excluded.  All  who  came  were 
taken  on  board,  and  great  numbers  crossed  and  made  their  escape: 
1,175  men  of  the  Virginia  regiments  were  reported  at  the  siege,  and 
982  reported  at  Murfreesboro  ten  days  later,  accounting  thereby  for  all 
except  the  killed  and  wounded. 

When  it  was  determined  to  cut  their  way  out,  orders  had  been  sent 
to  General  B.  R.  Johnson,  and  between  one  and  two  o'clock  he  drew  up 


474  FORT  DONELSON. 

the  left  wing,  including  Heiman's  brigade,  for  the  sally.  By  3  A.  M.  it 
was  paraded  outside  the  intrenchments  by  column  of  regiments.  A 
little  later,  the  Virginia  regiments  were  withdrawn  by  Floyd  ;  and  John 
son,  sending  an  aide  to  state  that  he  was  ready  to  move,  learned  from 
Buckner  that  the  command  had  devolved  upon  him,  and  that  he  was 
negotiating  a  capitulation. 

Many  of  the  men  had  slept  or  rested,  in  order  to  be  able  to  renew 
the  contest  of  the  day  before,  and  their  victory  had  made  them  sanguine 
of  success.  When  they  learned  that  an  immediate  surrender  was  in 
store  for  them,  there  was  a  terrible  revulsion  of  feeling,  which  affected 
individuals  according  to  temperament,  physical  condition,  and  other 
circumstances.  Those  favored  by  proximity  to  the  boats,  endowed  with 
extraordinary  enterprise  and  decision  of  character,  or  cognizant  of  the 
actualities  of  prison-life  and  resolute  not  to  become  captives,  availed 
themselves  of  the  boats  to  cross  over,  or  escaped  by  land  that  night  or 
on  the  following  days.  Floyd  says  : 

All  who  came  were  taken  on  board  until  some  time  after  daylight,  when  I 
received  a  message  from  General  Buckner  that  any  further  delay  at  the  wharf 
would  certainly  cause  the  loss  of  the  boat,  with  all  on  board.  Such  was  the  want 
of  all  order  and  discipline  by  this  time  on  shore,  that  a  wild  rush  was  made  at 
the  boat,  which  the  captain  said  would  swamp  her,  unless  he  pushed  oft*  imme 
diately.  This  was  done;  and,  about  sunrise,  the  boat  on  which  I  was  (the  other 
having  gone)  left  the  shore,  and  steered  up  the  river. 

The  boats  employed  as  ferries  enabled  some  300  men  to  escape. 
Forrest  carried  off  by  the  river-road  500  of  his  own  cavalry,  who  could 
ford  the  slough,  and  some  200  of  other  commands  on  artillery-horses, 
or  aided  with  a  friendly  "  lift  "  by  the  mounted  men.  A  great  number 
threw  themselves  into  the  icy  waters  of  the  slough,  and  waded  over, 
waist-deep,  at  the  hazard  and  often  with  the  sacrifice  of  health  or  life. 
Many  others,  trusting  themselves  to  the  devious  by-paths  of  the  forest 
through  which  they  had  fought,  made  their  way  to  the  open  country 
beyond.  Little  more  than  one-half  of  the  defenders  of  Fort  Donelson 
went  into  Northern  prisons.  Badeau,  in  estimating  the  results  of  the 
victory,  says:  "  Sixty-five  %  guns,  17,600  small-arms,  and  nearly  15,000 
troops  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  victor."  This  must  be  an  error.  For,  even 
including  the  six  guns  and  5,000  small-arms  recaptured,  and  the  thirteen 
heavy  guns  in  the  fort,  the  total  artillery  would  fall  a  good  deal  short 
of  his  estimate.  He  says,  "Rations  were  issued  at  Cairo  to  14,623 
prisoners."  Very  likely  this  was  the  quartermaster's  return  ;  but,  if  so, 
it  was  based  on  muster-rolls,  not  men.  The  actual  number  of  captives 
did  not  exceed  7,000  or  8,000. 

To  Buckner' s  proposition  for  capitulation,  Grant  replied  :  "  No  terms, 
except  unconditional  and  immediate  surrender,  can  be  accepted.  I  pro- 


SURRENDER  AND   ITS  CONSEQUENCES.  475 

pose  to  move  immediately  upon  your  works."  Buckner  somewhat  re 
sentfully  submitted,  and  Grant  allowed  commissioned  officers  to  retain 
their  side-arms,  and  privates  their  clothing  and  blankets.  The  corre 
spondence  is  given  in  Appendix  A  to  this  chapter.  The  Federal  sol 
diers,  suddenly  lifted  from  the  borders  of  despair,  and,  after  all  their 
toils  and  sufferings,  exulting  in  a  first  great  victory,  gave  way  to  most 
unseemly  license.  Discipline  was  relaxed,  and  the  Confederate  camps 
became  the  scene  of  almost  indiscriminate  pillage.  It  was  this  demor 
alization  that  permitted  so  many  fugitives  to  evade  their  captors. 

The  escape  of  Brigadier-General  B.  R.  Johnson  illustrates  this  very 
well,  as  one  example  among  many.  He  had  taken  no  part  in  the  council, 
but  determined  at  the  time  of  the  surrender  to  remain  with  his  troops. 
He  says  that  after  the  officers  were  separated  from  the  men — 

I  concluded  that  it  was  unlikely  that  I  could  be  of  any  more  service  to  them. 
I,  however,  formed  no  purpose  or  plan  to  escape.  In  the  afternoon,  toward  sun 
set  of  the  18th  of  February,1 1  walked  out  with  a  Confederate  officer,  and  took 
my  course  toward  the  rifle-pits  on  the  hill  formerly  occupied  by  Colonel  Heiman, 
and,  finding  no  sentinels  to  obstruct  me,  I  passed  on  and  was  soon  beyond  the 
Federal  encampments.  I  had  taken  no  part  in  the  surrender,  had  received  no 
orders  or  instructions  from  the  Federal  authorities,  had  not  been  recognized  or 
even  seen  by  any  of  the  general  officers,  had  given  no  parole,  and  made  no 
promises. 

Whatever  opinions  may  have  been  held  as  to  the  correctness  of  Gen 
eral  Buckner's  judgment  as  to  the  necessity  of  surrender,  no  question 
could  be  made  as  to  the  manliness  and  propriety  of  his  conduct,  if  it 
was  inevitable.  His  military  education  and  well-balanced  character 
stood  him  in  good  stead  in  his  difficult  situation.  General  Grant  per 
sonally  treated  Buckner  with  the  decency  due  to  an  honorable  foe  ;  but, 
as  his  captivity  is  not  especially  pertinent  to  this  narrative,  it  suffices  to 
say  that  the  details  of  it  were  not  creditable  to  the  great. Government 
into  whose  hands  he  had  fallen  as  a  prisoner.  On  their  release  from 
captivity,  Colonels  Brown,  Hanson,  Baldwin,  and  Heiman,  were  promoted 
to  be  brigadier-generals,  for  their  conduct  at  Fort  Donelson. 

Floyd  and  Pillow,  however,  did  not  pass  uncensured.  Their  escape 
was  bitterly  resented  by  the  prisoners  and  their  friends.  The  Twentieth 
Mississippi,  who  had  acted  as  a  guard  during  the  embarkation,  and 
most  of  whom  were  left  behind  in  the  precipitate  departure  of  the  boat, 
naturally  felt  very  keenly  their  disappointment.  Federal  writers  gen 
erally  seem  to  feel  that  the  United  States  Government  had  suffered  some 
special  grievance  in  the  escape  of  Floyd  and  Pillow,  and  denounce  very 
vigorously  their  perfidy  and  cowardice.  What  was  of  more  concern  to 
them,  the  Confederate  Government  held  them  to  a  rigid  accountability, 
more  of  which  will  appear  hereafter. 

1  Two  days  aud  a  half  after  the  surrender. 


476  FORT  DONELSON. 

It  is  difficult  to  over-estimate  the  consequences  to  the  Federal  arms 
of  the  surrender  of  Donelson.  The  material  results  were  great;  but, 
great  as  they  were,  the  moral  effects  were  still  greater.  An  army  was 
demolished ;  nearly  one-half  of  the  Confederate  soldiers  in  Tennessee 
were  killed,  captured,  or  scattered  ;  the  line  of  defense  was  broken,  so 
as  to  open  the  whole  of  Kentucky,  and  a  great  part  of  Tennessee,  to  the 
Federal  arms;  Bowling  Green,  Nashville,  Columbus — all  were  turned  ; 
and  the  valley  of  the  Cumberland  was  rendered  untenable.  But,  mighty 
as  was  the  disaster,  its  consequences  on  the  minds  of  the  parties  to  the 
civil  strife  were  still  more  ominous  to  the  Confederate  cause.  Where 
now  were  the  impregnable  fortifications,  said  to  be  guarded  by  100,000 
desperate  Southerners ;  where  now  the  boasted  prowess  of  troops,  who 
were  to  quail  at  no  odds ;  where  the  inexhaustible  resources  that  were 
to  defy  all  methods  of  approach  ?  The  screen  was  thrown  down  ;  the 
inherent  weakness  and  poverty  of  the  South  were  made  manifest  to  all 
eyes ;  its  vaunted  valor  was  quelled,  it  wras  claimed,  by  inferior  num 
bers  and  superior  courage,  and  the  prestige  of  the  Confederate  arms  was 
transferred  to  their  antagonists. 

An  immense  stride  had  been  taken  toward  conquest.  The  North 
rang  with  self-gratulations  and  with  plaudits  to  the  triumphing  general 
and  army.  President  Lincoln  at  once  nominated  Grant  as  a  major- 
general,  and  the  Senate  confirmed  him  ;  and,  though  some  cabals  and 
military  rivalries  interposed  themselves  tfrnidly,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  his  promotion  was  honestly  won  ;  for,  by  decision,  force  of  will, 
and  tenacity  of  purpose,  he  had  held  up  the  sinking  courage  of  a  beaten 
army.  If  Fortune  helped  him,  his  case  was  not  different  from  that  of 
many  others  who  have  thus  become  famous. 

As  for  the  soldiers,  there  were  no  more  flings  or  jeers  on  either  side 
at  the  courage  of  the  other.  Each  was  compelled  to  testify  to  the  valor 
of  its  antagonist.  The  combats  in  the  shadows  of  the  dark  woods  of 
Donelson,  and  in  those  bosky  valleys,  where  the  snows  were  trampled 
and  blood-stained  in  the  doubtful  struggle,  bore  impartial  witness  to  a 
like  fearlessness  in  assault,  stubborn  resolution  in  resistance,  and  in 
domitable  spirit  in  retreat.  Mutual  respect  grew  up  from  the  horrors 
and  strife  of  that  field  of  carnage.  This  is  not  a  compensation  for  the 
awful  suffering  and  sorrow  of  war  ;  but  it  is  something.  Any  generous 
or  elevated  feeling  may  be  paid  for  by  a  nation  at  heavy  cost. 


CORRESPONDENCE.  477 


APPENDIX  A. 


GENERAL  BUCKNER  TO  GENERAL  GRANT. 

HEADQUARTERS,  FOET  Do  NELSON,  J 
February  16,  1S62.         f 

SIR  :  In  consideration  of  all  the  circumstances  governing  the  present  situation 
of  affairs  at  this  station,  I  propose  to  the  commanding  officer  of  the  Federal 
forces  the  appointment  of  commissioners  to  agree  upon  terms  of  capitulation  of 
the  forces  and  post  under  my  command,  and  in  that  view  suggest  an  armistice 
until  twelve  o'clock  to-day. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  B.  BUCKNER, 

Brigadier- General  C.  S.  A. 

To  Brigadier-General  U.  S.  GRANT,  commanding  United  States  forces  near  Fort  Donelson. 


GENERAL  GRANT  TO  GENERAL  BUCKNER. 

HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  IN  THE  FIELD,         ( 
FORT  DONELSON,  February  16, 1S62.  i 

SIR:  Yours  of  this  date,  proposing  armistice  and  appointment  of  com 
missioners  to  settle  terms  of  capitulation,  is  just  received.  No  terms  except 
unconditional  and  immediate  surrender  can  be  accepted.  I  propose  to  move 
immediately  upon  your  works. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

U.  S.  GRANT, 

Brigadier- General  commanding. 

General  S.  B.  BCCKNEB,  Confederate  Army. 


GENERAL  BUCKNER  TO  GENERAL  GRANT. 

HEADQUARTERS.  DOVER,  TENTCESSEE,  ) 
February  16,  1862.         I 

SIR:  The  distribution  of  the  forces  under  my  command,  incident  to  an  un 
expected  change  of  commanders,  and  the  overwhelming  force  under  your  com 
mand,  compel  me,  notwithstanding  the  brilliant  success  of  the  Confederate  arms 
yesterday,  to  accept  the  ungenerous  and  unchivalrous  terms  which  you  propose. 
I  am,  sir,  your  very  obedient  servant, 
S.  B.  BUCKNER, 

Brigadier-  General  commanding,  C.  S.  A. 

To  Brigadier-General  U.  S.  GRANT,  United  States  Army. 


478 


FORT  DOXELSOX. 


APPEXDIX     B. 

TABLE  I. 
Confederate  Killed  and  Wounded  at  Fort  Donclson. 

The  Nashville  Patriot  gives  the  following  as  a  corrected  copy  of  its  list  of  Confederate 
losses  at  Fort  Donelson : 


REGIMENT. 

Colonel. 

Acting  Commander. 

Number 
engaged. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Forty-eighth  Tennessee 

Voorhies 

280 

1 

498 

11 

Fifty-third 

Abernethy 

280 

6 

12 

Forty-ninth 

Bailey  

800 

4 

13 

Thirtieth 

Head 

654 

11 

80 

Eighteenth 

Palmer 

615 

4 

40 

Tenth 

Heiman  

750 

1 

5 

Twenty-sixth 

Li  liar  d 

400 

11 

85 

Forty-first 

Farquharson. 

450 

2 

6 

Thirty-second 

Cooke  .. 

558 

3 

35 

Third 

650 

12 

75 

Fifty-first               " 

Clark 

80 

Fiftieth                  " 

Suire 

650 

2 

4 

Second  Kentucky 

Hanson 

618 

18 

57 

Eighth          "        

Burnett  

Lieutenant-Colonel  Lyon  . 

300 

19 

GO 

Seventh  Texas 

300 

20 

30 

Fifteenth  Arkansas 

Gee 

270 

7 

17 

216 

1 

First  Mississippi 

Simonton 

Lieutenant-Col.  Hamilton. 

280 

17 

76 

Davidson 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Wells  . 

500 

5 

19 

Fourth       "         

Drake  
Baldwin 

Major  'DOSS* 

535 
475 

8 
17 

88 

84 

Twentieth            " 

Russell 

"     Brown 

562 

19 

59 

Twenty-sixth       "          
Fiftieth  Virginia 

Reynolds  .     . 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Boone 
Major  Thorburn 

484 
400 

12 

8 

71 

63 

Fifty-first      " 

Wbarton 

275 

5 

45 

Fifty-sixth    " 

Stewart 

850 

Thirty-sixth  " 

250 

i 

i 

Tennessee  Battalion 

Major  Colms  

270 

'*     Gowan  

60 

8 

3 

||      Cavalry.  . 

Gantt  
Captain  Milton  

227 
15 

1 

U                               U                        il 

Forrest                   

600 

8 

15 

Artillery 

80 

2 

Porter              

118 

9 

it 

Graves  

50 

4 

41 

100 

5 

9 

It 

84 

U 

Guy   

58 

|| 

ROSS               

166 

2 

2 

«                 

Green  

76 

1 

Total 

13,629 

281 

1,007 

By  error 

McCausland. 

Thirty  -sixth  Virginia  .... 

14 

56 

Stewart  

8 

87 

13,829 

248 

1,100 

1  Loss  not  known,  but  severe. 


TABLE  II. 
From  Surgeon-GencraVs  Report,  Part  /.,  Volume  /.,  Appendix,  page  35. 

"XXXIII.  Report  of  the  regiments  constituting  the  garrison  at  Fort  Donel 
son,  February,  1862.     [This  statement  of  the  killed,  wounded,  missing,  and  pris- 


CONFEDERATE   STRENGTH. 


479 


oners,  in  the  engagements  of  February  12-15,  1862,  at  Fort  Donelson,  Stewart 
County,  Tennessee,  was  forwarded  to  the  Surgeon-General's  office,  on  March  13, 
1866,  by  Surgeon  H.  V.  Gill,  U.  S.  V.,  with  the  following  indorsement:] 

"  This  is  an  exact  copy  of  a  report,  in  my  possession,  made  by  Major  John 
son,  First  Mississippi  Regiment.  I  procured  the  report  at  the  house  of  Dr. 
Jeter,  the  father-in-law  of  Major  Johnson,  in  the  spring  of  1864,  and  believe  it 
to  be  correct.  There  is  a  remarkable  item  in  it.  In  the  Fourth  Mississippi 
Regiment  there  were  forty  killed  and  but  thirty-eight  wounded,  the  only  in 
stance  of  the  kind  I  have  known." 


REGIMENT. 

Commander. 

Engaged. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Surren 
dered. 

Missing 
and 
escaped. 

Third  Tennessee 

Colonel  Brown  . 

650 
750 
685 
751 
536 
400 
575 
498 
291 
372 
650 
200 
420 
613 
850 
385 
804 
2SO 
352 
624 
605 
653 
562 
443 
350 
280 
400 
275 
270 
60 
15 
600 
340 
100 
116 
113 
70 
76 
54 
53 

12 
1 

4 
9 
3 
11 
2 
2     • 
1 
7 
2 

"a" 

13 
19 
20 
11 

'i»' 

5 

40 
17 
19 
12 

76 
5 
40 
10 
25 
85 
1 
9 
11 
14 
6 

'26' 
57 
41 
84 
23 
1 
66 
19 
33 
84 
59 
71 

558 
700 
615 
730 
557 
801 
552 
465 
270 
351 
547 
185 
8S2 
500 
290 
300 
270 
279 
267 
600 
550 
554 
4S4. 
3-34 

4 

44 
26 
2 
1 
3 
20 
•22 
9 

'95' 

15 
10 

43 

'si' 

'27' 

3 

'•26' 
350 
230 
3-24 

225 

'470 
31 
26 
2 
12 
16 
35 
54 
53 

Tenth          •'          

u        Heiman  
"        Palmer  

Eighteenth  Tennessee  

Thirtieth              '• 

Head  
14        Cooke  

Thirty-second      "        

Twenth-sixth      "              .   . 

Lillard  
"        Farquharson  .  . 
"        Quarles  
Voorhies  
Bailey  
Sugg  
Browder  

Forty-first           " 

Forty-second       ''         ...         .... 

Forty-eighth        "        

Forty-ninth         "        

Fiftieth                 " 

Fifty-first            "         
Fifty-third           "        

"        Abernethy  
"        Hanson 

Second  Kentucky  ... 

Fifhth           " 

"        Burnett  

"        Gregg.... 

Seventh  Texas  
Fifteenth  Arkansas 

"        G 
"        Hughes  
"        Simonton  
l;       Davidson  
'•        Drake.. 

Twenty-seventh  Alabama  
First  Mississippi 

Third          " 

Fourth        "          

Fourteenth  Mississippi  
Twentieth             "          

"        Baldwin  

Russell  
"        Reynolds  
"        Stewart  
'•        McCausland  

Twenty-sixth       "         

Sixtieth  Virginia  

Thirty-sixth  Virginia  

Fiftieth                 *' 

"s 

5 

8 

i 

5 
2 
7 

'63' 
45 

"i" 

15 

I 

2 
4 
4 
1 

'•2:6 

60 
14 
100 
803 
60 
110 
90 
50 
40 

Fifty-first             "       
Battalion  Tennessee  Infantry  

Company         "               " 
Battalion          "         Cavalry.   .. 
"    Ninth    " 
Company  Tennessee  Artillery  .  .  . 

44                               44                                   41 

Kentucky        " 
"         Virginia           "          ... 

Colonel  Wharton 

Major  Colms  
"      Gowan  

Captain  Milton  . 

Lieutenant-Col.  Forrest. 
"             "    Gantt  .  . 
Captain  Maney     

"       Ross 

"       Porter     

"       Graves 

"       Green  
"       Jackson.. 

"       Guy  

SUMMARY. 


STATE. 

i     Engaged.    ; 

Killed. 

Wounded.    ,  Surrendered. 

Missing  and 

escaped. 

Tennessee  

8  442 

85 

838             7  2°0 

7r>0 

Kentucky  

1114 

32 

103                8SO 

99 

Texas  

i          335     j 

2() 

84                800 

31 

Arkansas  

304 

11 

23                270 

Alabama  

1          280     ' 

1                 279 

Mississippi  

3  304     : 

11° 

337             2  789 

66 

Virginia  

1        1  417     ! 

13 

113 

1  291 

Total  

}      15  946 

273 

949            11  733 

2236 

32 


480 


FORT   DONELSON. 


TABLE  III. 
Confederate  Force  at  Donelson. 


REGIMENT. 

Colonel, 

Acting  Commander. 

•2" 

1 

•S 

^ 

m 
I~K. 

HI 

EH 
O 

No.  of  Effectives 
at  last  Report. 

Aggregate  at 
last  Report, 

Third  Tennessee  

Brown  .  . 

Lieutenant-Col  Gordon 

1. 

650 

650 

8, 

750 

4. 

5. 

Tenth          "        
Eighteenth  Tennessee  .  .  . 

Heiman  
Palmer 

Lieut.-Col.  McGavock.  .  . 

750 
615 

750 
685 

6^5 

7*2 

&14 

Twenty-sixth      " 

Lillard 

400 

400 

Thirtieth              " 

Head  

654 

751 

450 

4763 

sia 

Thirty-second     " 

Cooke. 

558 

586 

555 

Forty-first           " 

450 

575 

575 

Forty-second       "        ... 

Quarles. 

498 

498 

498 

Forty-eighth       " 

Voorhies 

230 

201 

Forty  -ninth         "         ... 

Bailey  

800 

872 

893* 

778 

Fiftieth 
Fifty-first            " 

Stacker  
Clark  

Lieutenant-Col.  Sugg.  .  . 
Browder  

650 
80 

650 
200 

5416 

838 

Fifty-third           " 
Second  Kentucky 

Abernethy  .  . 

Lieut.  -Colonel  Winston.. 

280 
618 

420 
618 

600  3 

348 

786 

Eighth          "        

Burnett 

Major  Lyon  .... 

800 

850 

Seventh  Texas 

800 

885 

355 

Fifteenth  Arkansas  

Gee 

270 

304 

Twenty-  seventh  Alabama 

Hughes  

216 

280 

51)6 

805 

First  Mississippi  

Sitnonton. 

Lieut.  -Colonel  Hamilton 

280 

352 

Third          "          

Davidson 

Lieutenant-Col   Webb 

500 

6-?4 

Fourth       "         

Drake  

Major  Adair     

535 

665 

584 

870 

Fourteenth  Mississippi 

Baldwin. 

"     Doss. 

475 

653 

650 

Twentieth           " 

Russell 

562 

502 

500 

Twenty-sixth      " 
Thirty-sixth  Virginia 

Reynolds. 
McCausland 

Lieutenant-Col.  Boone.. 
"             "    Reid. 

484 

250 

443 
280 

443 

250 

Fiftieth                "      .     . 
Fifty-first             "       .     . 
Fiftv-sixth           " 

Wharton. 
Stewart 

Major  Thorburn  
Lieutenant-Col.  Massie.. 
Captain  Daviess 

400 
275 
350 

400 
275 
850 

275 
350 

.... 

Tennessee  Battalion  .... 

Major  Colms  

270 

270 

'•     Garvin. 

60 

60 

72 

Battalion  Cavalry  

"     Gantt  

227 

340 

3  IS 

Captain  Milton  

15 

15 

4'2 

Ky  Batt  Cav    5  comp's 

2C6 

Tennessee  Reg't  Cavalry 

Forrest 

600 

600 

Artillery1 

Porter 

118 

113 

50 

70 

50 

Maney  

100 

100 

&5 

Jackson  

34 

54 

Guy 

58 

58 

Ross 

166 

116 

Green  

76 

76 

13,809 

15,246 

.... 

1  Scott's  Louisiana  Regiment  of  Cavalry  was  scouting  on  the  right  bank.  Colonel  Jordan  ("  Life  of 
Forrest,"  page  61),  in  an  intelligent  account  of  the  siege,  estimates  the  force  at  13,000  infantry  and  some 
what  over  1,000  cavalry  and  artillery. 

2  About.  s  January  14th,  833  effectives,  912  aggregate. 

4  January  14th,  680  effectives,  77  T  aggregate.  6  January  14th,  686  effectives,  847  aggregate. 

8.  In  6,011  men  in  sixteen  commands,  the  official  report,  column  3,  falls  below  column  2  only  forty-nine 
men.  It  agrees  with  column  2  in  seven  and  with  column  1  in  six  instances,  and  exceeds  column  1,  407 
men  in  the  other  ten. 

4.  In  3,565  men  in  nine  commands,  column  4  falls  498  men  below  column  2-4,603.  It  exceeds  column 
1,  54  men. 

Column  1.— The  Nashville  Patriot  list  is  found  in  "  The  Rebellion  Record,"  vol.  iv.,  p.  187. 

Column  2. — Major  Johnson's  Report;  Surgeon-General's  Report,  vol.  i.,  Appendix,  p.  85. 

Column  3. — Official  estimates  and  reports  of  men  engaged,  from  "  Battle  Reports." 

Column  4. — Last  official  return  before  battle  in  January. 

Column  5.— Last  official  return  before  battle  in  January. 


CONFEDERATE  STRENGTH. 


481 


TABLE  IV. 

FORT  DONELSON. 
Right  Wing. — BUCKNER. 


BRIGADES. 

Regiments  and  Commander*. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Writer's  esti 
mate  of 
Strength. 

(  Third  Tennessee  Gordon 

12 

76 

III. 

-<   Eighteenth  Tennessee,  Palmer  

10 

38 

BEOWN. 

(  Thirty-second  Tennessee,  Cook 

3 

36 

40i 

150 

1,990 

{  Second  Kentucky,  Hanson2  

24 

50 

600 

!   Fourteenth  Mississippi,  Doss      .         .       . 

17 

84 

650 

jl 

2 

6 

575 

(Half  attached  to 

Porter's  battery.         

8 

25 

113 

2 

4 

50 

Issaquena    "      .            ....         

3 

54 

\  Staff  etc.  not  included  . 

2 

15 

55 

187 

2,042 

1  The  writer  is  informed  by  General  Brown  that  the  casualties  in  this  brigade  are  known  to  exceed 
forty  killed  and  one  hundred  and  fifty  wounded,  and  he  is  doubtless  correct. 

2  In  eight  companies  of  the  Second  Kentucky,  nineteen  men  were  known  to  be  killed  and  forty 
wounded.    The  above  estimate  is  based  on  these  facts. 


FOET   DONELSON. 

Left  Wing.— PILLOW. 


BRIGADES. 

Regiments  and  Commanders. 

Killed. 

Wounded. 

Writer's  esti 
mate  of 
Strength 
(effective). 

I. 
HELM  AN. 

II. 

SIMONTON'S. 

III. 
DEAKE. 

IV. 

HEAD. 

V. 

WHARTON. 

f  Tenth  Tennessee,  McGavock  . 

750 
850 
250 
250 
100 

1   Fifty-third  Tennessee  Abernethy 

-|  Forty-eighth  Tennessee  (eight  companies)  Voorhies 
1  Twenty-seventh  Alabama,  Hughes    .   . 

f  Third  Mississippi  Webb 

10 

36 

l,700i 

5 
19 
20 
19 

19 
572 
34 
66 

624 
850 
385 
852 

J   Eighth  Kentucky,  Lyon                        

|   Seventh  Texas  Gregg 

t  First  Mississippi,  Hamilton  

f  Fourth  Mississippi  Adair                           

63 

176 

1,711 

88 
7 

"3" 

40 
17 

"a" 

584 

304 

72 
140 

1  Fifteenth  Arkansas  Gee 

1  Twenty-sixth  Alabama  (two  companies)  Garvin.  .  . 
[  Tennessee  Battalion  Browder 

Thirtieth  Tennessee.  Head 

48 

59 

1,100 

11 
4 

80 

7 

654 
498 

Forty-second  Tennessee,  Quarles  

Fifty-first  Virginia,  Massie.  .  . 

15 

87 

1,152 

9 
8 

48 

37 

275 
850 

Fifty-sixth  Virginia,  Daviess  

12 

80 

625 

(               1 

482 


FORT   DOXELSON. 


FORT  DONELSON. — Left  Wing — (Continued). 


BRIGADES. 

Regimonti  and  Commanders. 

KUled. 

Woundid. 

Writer's  esti 
mate  of 
Strength 
(effective). 

VI. 

McCAUSLAND. 
VII. 

BALDWIN. 
Not  brigaded  in  fort. 

Cavalry. 

Light  Artillery  bat 
teries. 

(  Thirty-sixth  Virginia  Reid 

14 

8 
20 

56 
63 

58 

250 

400 

•<  Fiftieth  Virginia,  Thorburn  .  . 

(  Twentieth  Mississippi,  Brown  

Twenty-sixth  Mississippi,  Eeynolds  

42 

182 

6503 

12 
11 

71 

65 

Twenty-sixth  Tennessee,  Lillurd 

f  Ross's  battery  

23 

156 

1,358 

116 

270 
372 

C50 

I  Tennessee  Battalion,  Colms  

"T" 

2 

'u 

4 

18 

1   Forty-ninth  Tennessee,  Bailey    .     .  . 

^  Fiftieth  Tennessee  bug" 

C  Forrest's  regiment 

9 

1,408 

8 

15 
1 

Cavalry 
1.000 

J  Ninth  Tennessee  Battalion  Gantt  

j  Thre'e  Kentucky  companies  . 

(  Greene's  seven  guns  . 

8 

16 

76 

58 

53 

•<  French,  four  guns.  .         ...           ....         

(  Guy,  four  guns 

192 

1  Colonel  Heiman  says  about  1,600.  2  B.  R.  Johnson's  Report. 

3  Attached  on  the  14th  to  Baldwin,  who  reports  the  Twentieth  and  Twenty-sixth  Mississippi,  and  the 
Twenty-sixth  Tennessee,  1,358  strong. 

RECAPITULATION. 

Killed 325 

Wounded 1,097 

Total  army 14,928 

TABLE  V. 

FEDERAL  ARMY  AT  DONELSOX. 

First  Division. — General  MCCLERNAND. 


BRIGADES. 

Regiments. 

Commanders. 

Strength 
in  Action. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Miu- 
ing. 

Aggre 
gate. 

II. 
W.  H.  L.  WAL 
LACE,  Colonel 

(  Eleventh  Illinois  
Twentieth  "  .... 
Forty-fifth  "  
Forty-eighth"  

Lt.-Col.  T.  E.  G.  Ransom 
Colonel  C.  C.  Marsh  
"        John  E.  Smith.. 
I.  N.  Hayne.  .  .  . 

5791 
753 
615 
512 

2464 

68 
18 
8 
2 

183 
109 
31 
20 

79 
6 
3 

336 
188 

42 
22 

commanding. 

Fourth  Illinois  Cav'ry 

Colonel  T  Lyle  Dickey") 

First         "   Artil'y  1 
Taylor's  battery...  j 
t  McAllister  . 

Captain  Ezra  Taylor.  .  I 
"       E.  McAllister  J 

936 

1 

8 
2 

9 
2 

8,4002 

III. 

Seventeenth  Illinois.... 

Major  Smith  

7501 

13 

62 

6 

81 

McARTHTTE.  . 

Forty-ninth       " 

Colonel  Morrison  

645 

13 

46 

9 

68 

1,395 

123 

461 

103 

687 







FEDERAL   STRENGTH. 


483 


FEDERAL  ARMY  AT  DONELSOX. — First  Division — (Continued). 


BRIGADES. 

Regiments. 

Commanders. 

Strength 
iu  Action. 

Killed. 

Wonnd- 
ed. 

Miss 
ing. 

Aggre 
gate. 

f  Eighth  Illinois  . 

Lieut  -Colonel  Rhoades. 

7513 

I 

1  Eighteenth  Illinois 

Colonel  Lawler 

671 

-<  Twenth-ninth  u 

"        Reardon  

542 

1  Thirtieth           " 

Lieut  -Colonel  Dennis 

568 

[  Thirty-first        '* 

598 

3,130 

Cavalry             .  .          {• 

Stewart,  Dollin,  O'Har- 

I  5004 

nett,  Carmichael. 

J 

1  Strength  of  these  commands  from  Surgeon  Stearns's  Eeport,  "  Medical  History  of  the  War,"  page  1, 
medical  vol.,  Appendix,  p.  34.    He  reports  the  aggregate  loss  of  this  division  at  1,491. 

2  The  Second  Brigade  had  3,400  effective  men  of  all  arms.    Wallace's  Eeport. 

3  New  York  Times  letter,  "Rebellion  Record,"  vol.  iv.,  p.  173. 
*  Estimated. 

Second  Division.— Brigadier-General  C.  F.  SMITH. 


BRIGADES. 

Regiments. 

Commanders. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Miss 
ing. 

Aggre 
gate. 

f  Second  Iowa 

Colonel  Tuttle  .  .  . 

41 

157 

198 

Twenty-fifth  Indiana 

44       Veatch.  .  . 

14 

101 

115 

IV. 

Seventh  Iowa  

-    Fourteenth  Iowa 

Lt.  -Col.  Parrot... 
Colonel  Shaw  

2 
3 

37 
23 

• 

3D 
26 

Colonel  J.  G.  LAFMAN. 

First  Sharp-shooters  

Lt.-Col.  Compton 

1 

3 

4 

Fifty-  sec1  d  and  Fifty-sixth  Ind. 
^  Stone's  Missouri  Battery 

(no  data) 

'i 

61 

821 

1 

383 

Y. 

I    Eighth  Missouri 

Col.  M  L  Smith 

9 

86 

45 

Col.  MORGAN  L.  SMITH. 
commanding. 

("  Eleventh  Indiana  

G.  F.  McGinnis  .  . 

4 

20 

24 

f  Twelfth  Iowa  

Col  J.  J.  Woods 

1 

27 

28 

|   Fiftieth  Illinois 

Colonel  Bane 

Colonel  J.  COOK,  com 
manding. 

-{   Seventh     "      
Thirteenth  Missouri  

(no  data) 

Fiftv-second  Indiana.  .  . 

u 

Third  Division. — General  LEW  WALLACE. 


BRIGADES. 

Regiments. 

Commanders. 

Strength. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Miss 
ing. 

Aggre 
gate. 

I. 

Col.  CIIAS.  CRUFT, 
commanding. 

f  Thirty-first  Indiana. 
J  Forty-fourth      " 
]  Seventeenth  Kent'y 
(  Twenty-fifth      " 

Lieut.  -Colonel  Osborn.  . 
Colonel  Hugh  R.  Reed.  . 
Col.  John  H.  McHenry. 
Col.  Jas.  M.  Shackleford 

727  1 
5i6'2 

18 

7 
4 
12 

51 
34 
33 
60 

5 
2 
3 
12 

69 
43 
40 

842 

86 

178 

22 

2363 

f  First  Nebraska  

Lieut.-Colonel  McCord.  . 

II.,  III.  and  IV.4 

j  Seventy-sixth  Ohio. 

Colonel  Woods 

Col.  J.  M.  TIIAYEK, 
commanding. 

1  Fifty-eighth  Ohio  1 

(.  Sixty-eighth     "     f 
(  Forty-sixth  Illinois 

44       Davis 

Second  Brigade  at 

•<  Fifty-seventh     " 

"       Baldwin 

tached. 

|  Fifty-eighth       " 

"       Lynch.. 

. 

1  "  The  Rebellion  Record,"  vol.  iv.,  p.  145. 

2  Regimental  Report.    Surgeon  Keenan  gives  approximate  strength  of  this  brigade  at  2,000. 

3  Killed  and  wounded — official,  Cruft's  Report. 
«  No  data. 


484  THE  RETREAT  FROM  BOWLING  GREEN. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

THE  RETREAT  FROM  BOWLING  GREEN. 

FORTS  Henry  and  Donelson  had  fallen,  and  the  great  water  high 
ways  were  opened  to  Nashville  and  to  North  Alabama.  This  gave 
access  to  the  rear  of  the  Confederate  armies,  and  turned  the  positions 
both  at  Bowling  Green  and  Columbus.  Of  course,  such  misfortunes 
could  not  happen  in  his  department  without  subjecting  General  John 
ston  to  the  severest  criticism,  and  we  shall  presently  see  to  what  heights 
of  excitement  and  depths  of  bitterness  the  tide  of  feeling  ran.  That 
mighty  surge  of  wrath  belonged  to  the  hour,  but  it  has  left  its  mark  on 
the  military  history  of  the  times,  and  in  the  criticism  which  sprang  out 
of  it.  The  writer  believes  that  the  plain  narrative  of  facts  he  has  given 
is  a  better  answer  to  the  censures  of  General  Johnston's  conduct  than 
the  most  elaborate  argument  would  be. 

Without  undertaking  to  answer,  in  form  and  controversially,  the 
objections  to  General  Johnston's  dispositions,  a  brief  reference  to  the 
considerations  which  controlled  him  will  not  be  inappropriate  in  this 
connection.  The  reasons  why  he  adopted  a  defensive  instead  of  an 
offensive  policy  have  been  set  forth  so  fully  in  these  pages  that  it  is 
not  necessary  to  recapitulate  them  here.  The  chief  were  inadequate 
forces  and  armament.  In  Colonel  Munford's  pointed  language,  "he 
had  no  army." 

General  Johnston's  largest  force  present  for  duty  at  any  one  time 
on  the  line  from  Bowling  Green  to  Columbus,  and  in  reserve,  was  never 
more  than  43,000  men.  But  the  facts  demonstrated  that  this  was  only 
the  number  capable  of  fighting  in  position,  not  the  force  available  for 
a  winter  campaign.  The  army  lost  twenty-five  per  cent,  by  the  mere 
act  of  moving  in  the  well-ordered  retreat  from  Bowling  Green  to  Nash 
ville.  Suppose  that  these  forces  could  have  been  collected  into  one 
compact  body  without  pursuit,  molestation,  or  other  interference  by  the 
enemy — a  result  manifestly  not  in  the  table  of  probabilities — and  led 
against  either  Buell  or  Grant,  what  would  have  been  the  chance  of  suc 
cess  ?  .  Buell  had  an  army  75,000  strong.  Grant  could  not  be  assailed 
in  his  fortifications  on  the  north  side  of  the  Ohio  ;  and,  even  if  his  in 
trenched  position  at  Paducah  had  been  attacked,  he  had  his  fleets  and 
25,000  men,  with  Buell  and  Halleck  to  draw  upon  for  any  required 
reinforcements  up  to  100,000  men  within  three  or  four  days'  call. 

Nevertheless,  it  has  been  urged  that  these  armies  should  have  been 
"  concentrated."  To  concentrate  them  for  any  merely  defensive  pur- 


STRATEGY.  435 

pose  strikes  the  writer  as  mere  fatuity.  But  this  aside,  at  what  one 
point  could  a  defense  of  this  line  have  been  made  ?  At  Columbus  ? 
Then  must  the  defense  of  Middle  Tennessee  have  been  abandoned  with 
out  an  effort  to  save  it.  At  Henry  and  Donelson  ?  The  same  result 
would  have  ensued,  for  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  BuelPs  advance, 
except  the  interposition  of  the  force  at  Bowling  Green.  But,  last  of 
all,  if  the  barrier  at  Columbus  had  been  abandoned  to  maintain  Bowling 
Green,  or  for  any  other  consideration  whatever,  it  opened  the  Mississippi 
River  to  the  invader  ;  and,  if  either  Henry  or  Donelson  were  given  up, 
the  rear  of  the  armies  at  Bowling  Green  and  Columbus  would  have 
been  uncovered.  Henry  had  no  value,  except  as  the  gateway  of  the 
Tennessee  River  ;  nor  Donelson,  save  as  an  outpost  of  Nashville. 

While  it  was  unnecessary  for  the  Federal  armies  to  feel  much  con 
cern  about  concentrating  to  meet  any  hypothetical  concentration  of  the 
Confederates,  inasmuch  as  they  were  sufficiently  strong  to  repel  any 
attack  in  position  without  it,  yet,  had  it  been  desirable,  their  means  of 
rapid  transit  were  so  much  greater  than  the  Confederate  that  they 
could  always  have  opposed  a  superior  force  to  any  assault.  The  "  in 
terior  lines  "  are  not  determined  by  a  scale  of  miles,  but  by  the  time 
required  to  convey  troops  over  the  intervals  between  commands. 
Facilities  of  transportation  more  than  distances,  therefore,  decide  what 
these  interior  lines  are.  An  unlimited  power  of  water-communication 
enabled  Halleck  and  Buell  to  cooperate  fully,  and  practically  to  place 
what  force  they  pleased  where  they  pleased.  Such  was  the  concentra 
tion  that  actually  took  place.  Forts  Donelson  and  Henry  were  nearly 
twice  as  far  from  Bowling  Green  by  land  as  from  the  Federal  strong 
holds  by  water.  Colonel  Robert  W.  Woolley,  in  a  letter  written  at  the 
time,  says  : 

The  railroad  was  almost  bare  of  transportation.  The  locomotives  had  not 
been  repaired  for  six  'months,  and  many  of  them  lay  disabled  in  the  depots. 
They  could  not  be  repaired  at  Bowling  Green,  for  there  is,  I  am  informed,  but 
one  place  in  the  South  where  a  driving-wheel  can  be  made,  and  not  one  where 
a  whole  locomotive  can  be  constructed. 

General  Johnston  did  all  that  was  possible  when  he  placed  Floyd's 
command  at  Russellville,  within  striking  distance  of  both  Bowling  Green 
and  Donelson,  which  were  alike  threatened.  Floyd  was  at  Donelson  in 
time,  and  could  have  been  at  Henry  with  any  reasonable  warning.  If 
there  were  not  enough  men  at  Donelson,  it  was  not  from  defect  of 
judgment,  but  from  want  of  adequate  means.  The  elements,  too, 
fought  for  the  Federals.  An  unprecedented  flood  favored  their  attacks 
by  water,  while  it  impeded  the  movements  of  the  Confederates.  No 
time  was  given  to  General  Johnston,  either  through  the  sluggishness  of 
the  enemy,  or  by  the  prolonged  resistance  of  his  own  troops,  to  repair 


486  THE   RETREAT  FROM  BOWLING   GREEN. 

disaster.  Grant  moved  February  3d ;  in  four  days  Henry  was  in  his 
hands.  Ten  days  only  intervened  between  General  Johnston's  first 
information  of  the  attack  on  Henry  and  the  surrender  of  Donelson. 
He  meant  "  to  defend  Nashville  at  Donelson,"  if  he  could,  and,  if  not, 
then  to  reunite  his  corps  and  to  fight  on  a  more  retired  line. 

A  very  astonishing  statement  is  made  by  Mr.  Swinton,  in  his  "  De 
cisive  Battles  of  the  War,"  page  65.  He  says  : 

In  this  condition,  outnumbered  on  both  lines,  Johnston  does  not  appear  to 
have  comprehended  that  a  defensive  attitude  could  only  result  fatally — that  his 
sole  ground  of  hope  rested  in  taking  advantage  of  his  interior  position  to  con 
centrate  the  gross  of  his  force  at  a  single  point,  and  assume  the  offensive  against 
one  or  the  other  of  the  two  Union  armies.  Connected  with  this  is  a  piece  of 
secret  history,  revealed  to  me  by  General  Beauregard  since  the  close  of  the  war, 
which  will  not  be  out  of  place  here. 

Toward  the  close  of  the  first  month  of  the  year  1862,  General  Beauregard 
was  transferred  from  Virginia  to  the  West,  to  take  charge,  under  Sidney  John 
ston,  of  the  defense  of  the  Mississippi  Valley.  En  route  he  visited  Johnston  at 
his  headquarters  at  Bowling  Green,  and  between  the  two  officers  a  prolonged 
conference  ensued,  touching  the  best  method  of  action.  It  was  with  the  liveliest 
concern  that  Beauregard,  who  had  understood  at  Eichmond  that  Johnston's 
force  numbered  60,000  men,  learned  that  in  reality  it  was  little  over  one-half 
that  aggregate.  But  that  officer  was  always  essentially  aggressive  in  his  military 
inspiration,  and  he  now  proposed  that  the  works  at  Columbus  should  be  so  re 
duced  that  their  defense  might  be  sustained  by  two  or  three  thousand  men ;  that 
the  remaining  12,000  should  be  brought  to  Bowling  Green  and  joined  to  the 
22,000  there,-  and  that  with  the  united  force  a  vigorous,  and,  if  possible,  a  crush 
ing  blow  should  be  dealt  to  Buell's  army,  which  was  regarded  at  the  time  as  the 
most  menacing,  for  Grant  and  Foote  had  not  yet  moved.  Johnston  fell  in  with 
this  plan,  and  Beauregard  proceeded  to  Columbus  to  put  it  in  train  of  execution. 
Scarcely,  however,  had  he  started  for  Columbus  when  the  thunder  of  the  Union 
guns  on  the  Tennessee  apprised  him  that  it  was  too  late,  and,  by  the  time  he 
reached  the  Mississippi,  Fort  Henry  had  fallen. 

Without  undertaking  at  all  to  solve  how  Mr.  Swinton  has  fallen 
into  such  errors,  a  few  facts  will  demonstrate  an  entirely  different  state 
of  case.  General  Beauregard  was  ordered,  January  26th,  by  letter  from 
Richmond,  to  report  to  General  Johnston,  and  to  take  command  at 
Columbus.  He  did  not  leave  Manassas  for  several  days,  and  probably 
arrived  at  Bowling  Green  about  February  5th  or  6th.  On  the  7th  he 
held  a  conference  with  Generals  Johnston  and  Hardee,  the  minutes  of 
which  are  here  given. 

It  will  be  observed  that,  on  February  4th  and  5th,  General  Johnston 
was  moving  troops  to  Clarksville  to  support  Tilghman,  and  on  the  6th 
ordered  Floyd's  entire  command  thither.  General  Beauregard  remained 
in  Bowling  Green  until  the  12th.  His  conference  with  General  John 
ston  did  not  take  place  until  February  7th,  when  they  both  knew  of 
the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  and  made  their  plans  with  reference  to  that  fact. 


CONFERENCE  AT  BOWLING  GREEN.  487 

MEMOEANDUM    OF    CONFERENCE    HELD    BY    GEXEEAL3    JOHNSTON,  BEAUEEGAED,  AND 

HAEDEE. 

BOWLING  GREEN,  KENTUCKY,  February!,  1862. 

At  a  meeting  held  to-day  at  my  quarters  (Covington  House),  by  Generals 
Johnston,  Hardee,  and  myself  (Colonel  Mackall  being  present  part  of  the  time), 
it  was  determined  that  Fort  Henry,  on  the  Tennessee  River,  having  fallen  yester 
day  into  the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  Fort  Donelson,  on  the  Cumberland  Paver, 
not  being  tenable,  preparations  should  at  once  be  made  for  the  removal  of  this 
army  to  Nashville  in  rear  of  the  Cumberland  River,  a  strong  point  some  miles 
below  that  city  being  fortified  forthwith  to  defend  the  river  from  the  passage  of 
gunboats  and  transports.  The  troops  at  present  at  Clarksville  should  cross  over 
to  the  south  side  of  that  river,  leaving  only  a  sufficient  force  in  that  town  to 
protect  the  manufactories  and  other  property,  in  the  saving  of  which  the  Con 
federate  Government  is  interested.  From  Nashville,  should  any  further  retro 
grade  movement  become  necessary,  it  will  be  made  to  Stevenson,  and  thence 
according  to  circumstances. 

It  was  also  determined  that  the  possession  of  the  Tennessee  River  by  the 
enemy,  resulting  from  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  separates  the  army  at  Bowling 
Green  from  the  one  at  Columbus,  Kentucky,  which  must  henceforth  act  inde 
pendently  of  each  other,  until  they  can  again  be  brought  together ;  the  first 
one  having  for  object  the  defense  of  the  State  of  Tennessee  along  its  line  of  opera 
tion  as  already  stated ;  and  the  other  one,  of  that  part  of  the  State  lying  between 
the  Tennessee  River  and  the  Mississippi.  But,  as  the  possession  of  the  former 
river  by  the  enemy  renders  the  lines  of  communication  of  the  army  at  Columbus 
liable  to  be  cut  off  at  any  time  from  the  Tennessee  River  as  a  base,  by  an  over 
powering  force  of  the  enemy,  rapidly  concentrated  from  various  points  on  the 
Ohio,  it  becomes  necessary,  to  prevent  such  a  calamity,  that  the  main  body  of 
that  army  should  fall  back  to  Humboldt,  and  thence,  if  necessary,  to  Grand 
Junction,  so  as  to  protect  Memphis  from  either  point,  and  still  have  a  line  of  re 
treat  to  the  -latter  place  or  to  Grenada,  Mississippi,  and,  if  necessary,  to  Jackson, 
Mississippi. 

At  Columbus,  Kentucky,  will  be  left  only  a  sufficient  garrison  for  the  defense 
of  the  works  there,  assisted  by  Hollins's  gunboats,  for  the  purpose  of  making  a 
desperate  defense  of  the  river  at  that  point.  A  sufficient  number  of  transports 
will  be  kept  near  that  place  for  the  removal  of  the  garrison  therefrom,  when  no 
longer  tenable  in  the  opinion  of  the  commanding  officer.  Island  No.  10  and 
Fort  Pillow  will  likewise  be  defended  to  the  last  extremity,  aided  also  by  Hol 
lins's  gunboats,  which  will  then  retire  to  the  vicinity  of  Memphis,  where  another 
bold  stand  will  be  made. 

(Signed)  G.  T.  BEAUREGABD, 

General  C.  S.  A. 
(Signed)  TV.  J.  HAEDEE, 

Major-  General. 

A  true  copy :  S.  TV.  FEEGUSON, 

Lieutenant  and  Aide-de-Camp. 

This  plan  of  campaign  embraced  the  defense  of  the  line  of  the  Cum 
berland,  if  possible  ;  or,  if  not,  then  a  retreat  to  Stevenson.  Beaure- 
gard  was  to  fall  back  southward  with  Folk's  army,  leaving  a  small 


488  THE  RETREAT  FROM  BOWLING  GREEN. 

garrison  at  Columbus.  The  immediate  evacuation  of  Bowling  Green 
was  now  inevitable.  His  correspondence  has  already  made  manifest 
that  General  Johnston  regarded  his  stay  at  Bowling  Green  as  a  mere 
question  of  time,  unless  he  should  be  promptly  reenforced  by  a  strong 
and  well-organized  corps.  The  defenses  at  Bowling  Green,  originally 
slight,  had  been  greatly  enlarged  by  the  addition  of  a  cordon  of  de 
tached  forts,  mounted  with  heavy  field-guns.  Though  its  strength  had 
been  magnified  by  common  report,  until  it  had  become  "  the  Gibraltar 
of  the  West,"  it  was  really  only  sufficiently  strong  to  withstand  an 
assault,  which  General  Johnston  desired,  but  did  not  expect,  and  which 
Buell  was  too  wary  to  make. 

General  Johnston's  line  of  retreat  was  safe,  so  long  as  his  flanks 
were  unbroken.  If  these  were  maintained,  he  hoped  by  a  skillful  de 
fense  to  hold  at  bay  the  heavy  odds  in  his  front  until  reenforced.  If 
anything  is  evinced  in  this  biography,  it  is  that  General  Johnston  pos 
sessed  that  admirable  equilibrium  of  judgment — boldness  combined 
with  caution — which  fitted  him  to  hold  a  desperate  position  to  the  last 
extremity,  and  yet  to  apprehend  distinctly  when  it  could  be  defended 
no  longer,  and  retire  from  it  in  time. 

Early  in  the  autumn,  the  difficulties  of  recruiting  becoming  appar 
ent,  made  it  plain  that  the  line  of  the  Barren  River  might  have  to  be 
given  up,  and  General  Johnston  endeavored  to  provide  a  second  line  of 
defense  on  the  Cumberland — with  how  little  effect  has  already  been 
seen.  On  this  second  line,  if  forced  to  retreat,  he  purposed  to  make 
his  stand  as  long  as  possible.  But  when  he  compared  the  unequal 
preparations  for  aggression  and  resistance,  and  perceived  that  no  warn 
ing  could  to  stir  the  Southern  people  to  a  just  sense  of  their  dan 
ger,  he  beheld  calamity  coming  as  the  clouds  gather  for  the  burst  of 
the  hurricane,  and,  with  almost  prophetic  vision,  saw  his  army  forced 
back  to  the  Cumberland,  and  beyond  to  the  southern  frontier  of  Ten 
nessee. 

Colonel  Frank  Schaller,  of  the  Twenty-second  Mississippi,  an  edu 
cated  soldier,  who  published  during  the  war,  at  Columbia,  South  Caro 
lina,  an  edition  of  Marmont's  "  Spirit  of  Military  Institutions,"  with 
valuable  annotations  pertinent  to  the  times,  illustrates  Chapter  III.  of 
Part  IV.  of  that  work,  which  describes  the  "  picture  of  a  general  who 
answers  to  all  the  requirements  of  the  command,"  by  a  review  of  the 
life  and  character  of  General  Johnston.1  He  begins  his  brief  but  ap 
preciative  memoir  as  follows  : 

Two  foreign  officers  in  the  service  of  the  Confederate  States  were  ordered  to 
report  for  duty  to  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  in  the  month  of  October, 
1861.  When  leaving  his  headquarters  at  Bowling  Green,  in  the  State  of  Ken- 

1  Colonel  Schaller  has  for  several  years  been  Professor  of  Modern  Languages  at 
the  University  of  the  South,  Sewanee,  Tennessee. 


MILITARY   PROPHECY.  489 

tucky,  having  then  seen  and  spoken  with  him  for  the  first  time,  they  simulta 
neously  exclaimed,  when  outside  of  the  inclosure  of  the  unpretending  quarters : 
"  He  is  the  very  'beau-ideal  of  a  general."  To  one  of  these  officers,  who  now 
feebly  attempts  to  pay  this  humble  tribute  to  the  memory  of  the  departed  hero, 
this,  his  first  impulsive  exclamation,  has  become  the  basis  of  the  greatest  vener 
ation  of  which  he  is  capable. 

After  describing  General  Johnston's  employment  of  his  time  at 
Bowling  Green,  Colonel  Schaller  adds : 

The  result  of  all  this  was  unshaken  confidence  on  the  part  of  the  troops  in 
their  commander.  But  what  endeared  him  most  to  his  soldiers  was  the  great 
justice  which  was  the  basis  of  all  his  decisions,  the  promptness  with  which 
wrongs  were  rectified,  and  the  facility  of  access  to  the  chief  commander,  as  well 
as  the  genuine  cordiality  and  dignity  with  which  every  one  was  met  by  him. 
Heavy  labors  on  forts  in  mid-winter  were  endured  without  a  murmur,  since 
every  soldier  knew  that  General  Johnston  would  never  hesitate  to  expose  him 
self  whenever  necessary.  His  headquarters  were  a  model  of  order,  simplicity, 
and  prompt  dispatch  of  business.  His  decisions  to  personal  applications  were 
immediate  and  final.  His  bearing  was  that  of  a  knight  of  the  olden  times.  The 
writer  will  never  forget  the  shouts  which  greeted  the  general  whenever  the 
troops  passed  in  review.  .  .  . 

The  enemy  had  only  been  awaiting  the  completion  of  the  fleet  of  gunboats 
to  make  demonstrations  by  water.  Long  before  Fort  Henry  fell,  in  view  of  the 
disappointments  to  which  General  Johnston  had  been  subjected,  he  was  fully 
aware  that  his  line,  unless  it  was  strongly  reenforced,  could  not  be  held ;  and 
in  the  month  of  January,  1862,  when  one  day  looking  with  Colonel  Bowen  upon 
a  map,  showing  the  course  of  the  Tennessee  River,  these  memorable  and  pro 
phetic  words  fell  from  his  lips  when  pointing  out  a  spot  marked  "Shiloh 
Church:  "  "Here  the  great  battle  of  the  Southwest  will  le  fought" 

The  present  writer,  struck  by  this  remarkable  incident,  applied  to 
Colonel  Schaller  for  more  explicit  information  in  regard  to  it,  and  re 
ceived  the  following  statement : 

KICHMOND,  VIRGINIA,  May  22,  1S63. 

COLONEL  :  I  give  to  you,  according  to  your  request,  with  great  pleasure  the 
following  statement  of  facts,  which  occurred  during  the  month  of  January,  1862, 
when  at  the  headquarters  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  in  the  town  of 
Bowling  Green,  Kentucky,  and  in  the  presence  of  then  Colonel  (now  General) 
John  S.  Bowen,  commanding  the  forts  and  the  town  of  Bowling  Green,  of  which 
former  my  regiment  garrisoned  "Fort  Buckner,"  a  strong  position  on  the  ex 
treme  left  of  the  fortifications. 

The  engineers,  who  had  been  ordered  by  General  A.  S.  Johnston  to  survey 
the  course  of  the  Tennessee  River  as  far  as  Florence,  Alabama,  where  its  navi 
gation  is  impeded,  had  completed  their  labors  and  submitted  a  fine  military  map 
to  the  general  commanding.  In  front  of  this  map,  the  general  and  Colonel 
Bowen  were  standing,  the  former  giving  evidently  an  explanation  of  its  mili 
tary  positions.  In  the  course  of  their  conversation,  General  Johnston  directed 
Colonel  Bowen's  attention  to  a  position  upon  this  map,  which  had  been  marked 


490  THE  RETREAT  FROM  BOWLING  GREEN. 

by  the  engineers,  "  SHILOH  CHURCH,"  and,  concluding  his  remarks,  he  laid  his 
finger  upon  this  spot,  and  quietly  but  impressively  pronounced  the  following 
words,  or  words  to  this  effect :  "Here  the  great  battle  of  the  Southwest  will  ~be 
fought."  This  opinion,  pronounced  by  so  distinguished  a  general,  could  not  but 
arrest  attention  at  the  time,  but  you  may  well  imagine  that  it  recurred  to  our 
memory  in  the  strongest  manner  when  Brigadier-General  Bowen  and  myself 
were  actually  engaged  in  the  terrible  conflict,  which  the  prophetic  words  of 
General  Johnston  had  fully  three  months  previously  predicted.  Meeting  Gen 
eral  Bowen  upon  the  battle-field  of  "  Shiloh  Church,"  shortly  after  he  (General 
Bowen)  had  been  wounded,  and  while  my  regiment  was  replenishing  its  ammu 
nition,  about  two  or  three  o'clock  p.  M.,  during  the  first  day's  battle,  and  before 
the  army  had  any  knowledge  of  the  fall  of  our  illustrious  leader,  General  Bowen 
recalled  the  circumstances  above  cited,  and  they  were  pronounced  remarkable. 

I  give  you  these  facts  simply  as  they  occurred,  without  any  addition  whatso 
ever  ;  but  you  must  permit  me  here  to  state  my  firm  conviction  that  this  inci 
dent  in  the  life  of  General  Johnston  was  not  a  singular  chance,  as  sometimes 
will  happen  in  the  life  of  man,  but  gloriously  illustrating  the  strategic  genius  of 
the  lamented  general.  With  the  information  at  his  command,  and  the  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  strength  of  his  line  of  defense,  as  well  as  of  the  topography 
of  the  country  which  he  occupied,  he  was  eminently  conscious  that,  without  a 
speedy  accession  of  strength  his  line  would  become  untenable,  and  that  a  new 
contracted  line  could  only  be  obtained  south  of  Tennessee  Eiver.  When  and 
by  whom  this  would  be  executed  was,  of  course,  beyond  the  bounds  of  human 
calculation ;  but  Corinth  afterward  did  become  the  strategic  point  of  the  cam 
paign,  and  Hamburg  Landing  was  the  most  convenient  port  whereby  to  reach 
it,  and  from  whence  it  could  be  threatened.  .  .  . 

With  sentiments  of  the  highest  esteem  I  am,  colonel,  very  respectfully, 
Tour  obedient  servant,  F.  SCHALLEE, 

Colonel  Twenty-second  Mississippi  Infantry,  P.  A.  C.  8. 
To  Colonel  WILLIAM  PEESTON  JOHNSTON,  Kichmond,  Virginia. 

The  writer  is  indebted  to  Colonel  Munford's  address,  so  frequently 
quoted,  for  the  following  important  incident : 

Not  very  long  before  the  evacuation  of  Bowling  Green,  the  general  and  my 
self  being  alone,  he  locked  the  door,  and  with  more  than  his  usual  gravity  said  : 
"  I  fear  I  will  have  to  evacuate  this  position.  I  wish  to  talk  with  you  on  that 
subject."  I  asked,  "With  or  without  a  battle,  general?"  "Oh!  without  a 
battle.  They  will  never  come  here  to  fight  me."  Pointing  westward,  he  con 
tinued,  "  They  will  operate  on  my  left,  by  the  rivers,  of  which  their  gunboats 
give  them  command."  After  reflecting,  I  said,  "  It  is  an  important  step,  and 
involves  the  gravest  consequences  to  both  the  South  and  yourself."  I  then 
sketched  the  connection  of  Kentucky  with  the  Confederacy ;  that  its  Governor 
and  Council  were  then  under  the  wing  of  his  army,  having  already  sent  Rep 
resentatives  and  Senators  to  our  Congress;  that  they  must  flee  with  him,  and 
leave  Kentucky  with  no  organized  representation  of  the  Southern  cause  on  its 
soil.  I  then  reminded  him  that  the  very  military  reasons  which  compelled  him 
to  leave  Bowling  Green  would  make  it  necessary  to  take  his  new  position  south 
of  the  Tennessee  Eiver ;  that  the  Governor  and  Legislature  would  have  to  flee 
from  Nashville,  the  enemy  would  occupy  that  capital,  and  thus  all  the  resources 


RESOLVE   TO  RETREAT. 

of  men  and  munitions  in  these  two  populous  States  would  at  one  and  the  same 
time  be  lost.  "  Two  States,  general !  It  is  a  fearful  stride  toward  subjugation  !  " 
I  told  him  frankly  too  that  I  believed  the  effect  upon  his  own  reputation  would 
be  serious  ;  that  the  public  believed  he  had  80,000  troops  then  with  him ;  that 
they  had  unbounded  confidence  in  his  success;  reminded  him  that  when  he  had 
ordered  his  chief-engineer,  Gilmer,  to  fortify  Nashville,  the  popular  sense  of 
security  was  such  that  Gilmer  was  laughed  at  for  suggesting  the  necessity  for 
fortifications,  was  called  in  derision  "Johnston's  dirt-digger,1'  and  had  to  aban 
don  the  attempt  in  despair.  "Now,  sir,"  said  I,  "your  retreat  will  startle  these 
people  like  a  thunderbolt ;  the  loss  of  positions  and  of  States,  so  unlocked  for, 
will,  with  as  mercurial  a  people  as  ours,  produce  a  clamor  the  like  of  which  you, 
perhaps,  have  never  heard,  and  I  sincerely  trust  it  may  not  strike  from  your 
grasp  the  sceptre  of  your  future  usefulness."  He  remained  silent  and  thoughtful 
for  several  minutes,  and  then  used  words  which  are  indelible  in  my  memory. 
"This,"  said  he,  "is  a  step  I  have  pondered  well,  and  such  a  step  as  no  man 
would  take  who  did  not  know  lie  was  right."  After  another  pause  he  said,  "I 
wish  I  had  80,000  men — I'd  be  to-day  upon  the  Lakes;  "  and,  after  yet  another 
pause,  he  added,  with  more  cheerfulness:  u  The  popular  clamor  of  which  you 
speak  is  not  unanticipated  by  me.  But  the  clamor  of  to-day  is  converted  into  the 
praises  of  to-morrow  by  a  simple  success.  All  I  require  to  rectify  that  is  to  get 
in  position  where  I  can  fight  a  battle,  and  I  think  all  will  be  well"  The  con 
versation  was  closed  by  his  assuring  me  he  would  hold  Bowling  Green  as  long 
as  it  was  safe  to  do  so — even  to  the  last  moment.  In  a  few  weeks  the  enemy's 
plans  were  developed  just  as  he  had  foretold,  and  that  moment  came. 

General  John  C.  Brown  informs  the  writer  that  he  was  sent  by 
General  Buckner,  between  the  1st  and  4th  of  February,  from  Russell- 
ville  to  Bowling-  Green,  in  order  to  have  a  full  conversation  with  Gen 
eral  Johnston  touching  the  reorganization  of  the  troops  and  some  other 
matters.  During  this  confidential  interview,  which  was  frank  and  ex 
tended,  General  Johnston  explained  to  him, the  positions  and  relative 
strength  of  Buell's  army  and  his  own,  and  read  to  him  a  good  deal  of 
his  correspondence  elucidating  these  points.  Among  other  things,  Gen 
eral  Johnston  told  him  that  if  he  should  lose  Henry  and  Donelson,  he 
should  fall  back  to  the  line  of  the  Cumberland  ;  but  that  he  feared 
that  Nashville  would  prove  untenable,  so  that  he  might  have  to  fall 
back  to  the  line  of  the  Tennessee ;  and,  in  that  event,  he  looked  to 
Corinth,  as  a  convenient  point  for  concentrating  his  troops.  This 
is  an  explicit  statement,  showing  that  General  Johnston  had  considered 
every  point,  and  sketched,  at  least,  in  his  own  mind,  the  plan  of  cam 
paign  which  he  afterward  carried  out,  before  General  Beauregard's 
arrival. 

The  memorandum  quoted  and  the  statements  of  General  Brown 
and  Colonels  Schaller  and  Munford  fully  prove  that  the  plan  of  cam 
paign,  presented  in  definite  shape  to  Beauregard  and  Hardee,  had  been 
long  maturing  in  General  Johnston's  mind.  To  defend  the  line  of  the 
Cumberland  was  his  first  intention  ;  should  that  fail,  to  fall  back  to 


492  THE   RETREAT  FROM  BOWLING  GREEN. 

Stevenson  by  the  railroad  from  Nashville,  and  thence  by  the  Charles 
ton  &  Memphis  Railroad  to  effect  a  junction  with  Folk's  command  at 
Corinth.  All  this  was  clearly  foreshadowed  in  his  conversations  with 
Brown,  Munford,  Bowen,  and  Schaller. 

The  preparations  for  retreat  were  begun.  But  these  could  not  be 
carried  out,  and  the  soil  of  Kentucky  abandoned  to  the  enemy,  without 
exciting  the  liveliest  emotions  of  anguish  and  dismay  in  the  breasts  of 
the  Southern  party  at  Bowling  Green.  The  soldiers,  though  depressed, 
received  the  fact  of  retreat  with  that  sullen  resolution  which  the  mil 
itary  life  engenders  ;  but  all  others  seemed  filled  with  despair.  The 
Provisional  Governor,  George  W.  Johnson,  a  warm  friend  and  admirer 
of  General  Johnston,  but  self-confident  and  enthusiastic,  regarded  the 
abandonment  of  the  soil  of  the  Commonwealth  as  an  act  of  political 
suicide,  and  all  the  civilians  shared  this  opinion.  He  appealed  to  Gen 
eral  Johnston  in  the  most  urgent  and  moving  terms  to  change  his  pur 
pose,  and  he  was  supported  by  the  protests  and  appeals  of  the  united 
voice  of  the  Kentucky  refugees.  General  Johnston  found  it  hard  to 
steel  himself  against  these  eager  petitioners,  who  had  given  up  their 
homes  to  follow  the  fortunes  of  his  army,  but  he  was  bound  to  do  what 
was  right  and  necessary.  A  letter  was  written  to  him  by  Governor 
Johnson,  in  the  very  spirit  of  Leonidas,  whom  he  emulated.  Sometimes 
it  is  harder  to  do  right  than  to  hold  a  Thermopylae.  General  Johnston 
was  inexorable.  It  is  sufficient  here  to  say  that  this  gallant  and  ex 
cellent  man  lived  long  enough  to  assure  General  Johnston  of  his  ap 
proval  of  the  strategy  he  then  condemned. 

Colonel  Robert  "W.  Woolley  (now  of  Louisville,  Kentucky),  who 
had  enjoyed  exceptional  advantages  of  observation,  in  a  communication 
to  the  JVew  Orleans  Picayune,  in  March,  1862,  in  describing  General 
Johnston's  work  at  Bowling  Green,  says  : 

An  army  must  be  obtained,  or  else  he  must  evacuate  the  citadel  that  guards 
Nashville.  A  small  army  was  obtained ;  but  where,  or  how,  it  will  puzzle  the 
historian  of  this  war  to  relate.  By  extraordinary  exertions'  he  secured  a  regi 
ment  here  and  another  there ;  but  few  with  any  drill,  and  only  five  of  them  for 
three  months  with  uniforms.  The  army  had  to  be  built  up  ;  and  the  general 
had  not  only  to  organize  the  troops,  but  had  himself  to  search  for  them.  Of 
transportation,  without  which  an  army  cannot  subsist,  he  had  none.  Eight 
hundred  wagons  were  needed.  He  had  no  workshops,  yet  he  got  the  wagons. 
Hospitals  and  a  medical  department  were  necessary,  for  the  sick  were  never 
less  than  twenty-five  per  cent.  The  great  object  was  to  secure  Bowling  Green 
against  attack,  until  it  could  be  fortified  and  succor  obtained.  This  was  most 
skillfully  done.  The  place,  in  front,  soon  became,  in  strength,  the  second  for 
tress  in  America,  and  impregnable  everywhere  had  infantry  been  sent  to  protect 
its  wings.  While  the  work  wras  progressing,  and  while  every  effort  was  being 
made  to  get  more  troops,  Johnston,  by  skillful  manoeuvres,  threw  his  men  near 
the  river  which  divided  the  two  armies,  and  made  the  forces  of  the  North  be- 


EVACUATION  OF  BOWLING   GREEN.  493 

lieve  that  he  was  trying  to  decoy  them  across,  and  then  attack  them,  with  a 
river  in  their  rear ;  when,  in  fact,  the  last  thing  he  wished  was  a  battle,  when 
the  odds  were  four  or  five  to  one.  His  strategy  succeeded. 

General  Johnston  held  on  to  Bowling  Green  till  the  last  moment. 
But  his  right  flank,  under  Crittenden,  was  broken.  Fort  Henry  was 
lost.  Donelson  was  about  to  be  attacked,  with  a  doubtful  prospect  of 
successful  resistance.  It  was  evident  that  the  time  for  the  evacuation 
of  Bowling  Green  had  come.  On  the  8th  of  February  General  John 
ston  wrote  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  informing  him  of  the  loss  of  Fort 
Henry,  and  the  condition  of  things  at  Donelson.  He  says,  further : 

The  occurrence  of  the  misfortune  of  losing  the  fort  will  cut  off  the  communi 
cation  of  the  force  here  under  General  Hardee  from  the  south  bank  of  the  Cum 
berland.  To  avoid  the  disastrous  consequences  of  such  an  event,  I  .ordered 
General  Hardee  yesterday  to  make,  as  promptly  as  it  could  be  done,  prepara 
tions  to  fall  back  to  Nashville  and  cross  the  river. 

The  movements  of  the  enemy  on  my  right  flank  would  have  made  a  retro 
grade  in.  that  direction  to  confront  the  enemy  indispensable  in  a  short  time. 
But  the  probability  of  having  the  passage  of  this  army  corps  across  the  Cumber 
land  intercepted  by  the  gunboats  of  the  enemy  admits  of  no  delay  in  making 
the  movement. 

Generals  Beauregard  and  Hardee  are  equally  with  myself  impressed  with  the 
necessity  of  withdrawing  our  force  from  this  line  at  once. 

Every  preparation  for  the  retreat  was  silently  made.  The  ordnance 
and  army  supplies  were  quietly  moved  southward  ;  and  measures  were 
also  taken  to  unburden  Nashville  of  the  immense  stores  accumulated 
in  depot  there.  The  weather  was  wet  and  cold,  and  very  trying  to 
men  unused  to  the  hardships  of  a  winter  campaign.  Only  500  were  in 
hospital  at  Bowling  Green ;  but,  before  the  army  reached  Nashville, 
5,400,  out  of  the  14,000,  fell  under  the  care  of  the  medical  authorities. 
Medical  Director  D.  W.  Yandell,  in  making  this  report  at  Nashville, 
February  18,  1861,  says  this  large  number  is  to  be  accounted  for  "  by 
the  immense  number  of  convalescents  and  men  merely  unfit  for  duty  cr 
unable  to  undertake  a  march." 

On  February  llth,  everything  being  in  readiness,  the  troops  began 
their  retreat,  Hindman's  brigade  covering  the  rear.  Breckinridge's 
command  passed  through  Bowling  Green  on  the  12th,  and  bivouacked 
on  the  night  of  the  13th  two  miles  north  of  Franklin.  It  was  on  that 
Thursday  night  that  the  weather  became  so  intensely  cold,  as  was  re 
lated  in  the  siege  of  Fort  Donelson.  The  next  day's  march  brought 
them  to  Camp  Trousdale,  where  they  occupied  the  huts ;  but  with  little 
profit,  as  some  atmospheric  condition  made  the  smoke  in  them  intoler 
able.  After  a  bad  night  from  smoke  and  the  bitter  cold,  they  marched 
twenty-seven  miles  next  day,  and  on  the  day  after,  the  16th,  through 
Nashville,  and  five  miles  beyond.  The  Kentuckians  retreated  sullenly.1 
1  Thompson's  "  History  of  the  First  Kentucky  Brigade,"  pp.  76-81. 


494  THE  RETREAT  FROM   BOWLING   GREEN. 

General  George  B.  Hodge,  then  Breckinridge's  assistant  adjutant- 
general,  in  an  interesting  account  of  that  brigade,  mentions  that — 

The  spirits  of  the  army  were  cheered  by  the  accounts  which  General  John 
ston,  with  thoughtful  care,  forwarded  hy  means  of  couriers  daily,  of  the  success 
ful  resistance  of  the  army.  The  entire  army  bivouacked  in  line  of  battle  on  the 
night  of  the  15th,  at  the  junction  of  the  Gallatin  and  Nashville  and  Bowling 
Green  and  Nashville  [turnpike]  roads,  about  ten  miles  from  Nashville. 

....  At  4  p.  M.,  on  the  16th,  the  head  of  the  brigade  came  in  sight  of  the 
bridges  at  Nashville,  across  which,  in  dense  masses,  were  streaming  infantry, 
artillery,  and  transportation  and  provision  trains,  but  still  with  a  regularity  and 
order  which  gave  promise  of  renewed  activity  and  efficiency  in  the  future.  At 
nightfall,  General  Johnston,  who  had  established  his  headquarters  at  Edgetield 
on  the  northern  bank  of  the  Cumberland,  saw  the  last  of  his  wearied  and  tired 
columns  defile  across  and  safely  establish  themselves  beyond.  .  .  .  He  had  with 
promptness,  unrivaled  military  sagacity,  and  yet  with  mingled  caution  and  celer 
ity,  dismantled  his  fortifications  at  Bowling  Green,  transmitted  his  heavy  artillery 
and  ammunition  to  Nashville,  and  extricated  his  entire  army  from  the  jaws  of 
almost  certain  annihilation  and  capture. 

General  Johnston  left  Bowling  Green  before  daylight  on  the  13th, 
and  made  his  headquarters  at  Edgefield,  opposite  Nashville.  Colonel 
Woolley,  in  the  article  before  mentioned,  says : 

The  evacuation  was  accomplished,  protected  by  a  force  so  small  as  to  make 
doubtful  the  fact.  Fifteen  hundred  sick  had  to  be  removed.  Large  quantities  of 
stores  and  ammunition  had  accumulated.  The  provisions  were  nearly  all  secured 
except  a  large  lot  of  spoiled  pickled  beef.  Not  a  pound  of  ammunition,  nor  a 
gun,  was  lost.  The  engineer  who  destroyed  the  bridge  in  front  of  the  town, 
told  me  that  there  was  not  powder  enough  left  to  explode  the  mines,  and  that 
he  succeeded  only  with  one  small  gun  and  seven  shells,  the  last  of  which  did 
the  work.  The  ammunition,  stores,  and  sick,  being  saved,  the  order  for  retreat 
was  given,  and  the  first  intimation  the  enemy  had  of  the  intended  evacuation, 
so  far  as  has  been  ascertained,  was  when  Generals  Hindman  and  Breckinridge, 
who  were  in  advance  toward  his  camp,  were  seen  suddenly  to  retreat  toward 
Bowling  Green.  The  enemy  pursued,  and  succeeded  in  shelling  the  town,  while 
Hindman  was  still  covering  the  rear.  Not  a  man  was  lost,  and  the  little  army 
reached  Nashville  only  in  time  to  hear  of  the  disaster  of  their  comrades  in  arms. 

While  mindful  of  whatever  might  aid  the  commanders  at  Donelson, 
General  Johnston  neglected  nothing  to  secure  the  retreat  of  his  own 
column.  He  brought  Crittenden's  command  back  within  ten  miles  of 
Nashville,  and  thence  to  Murfreesboro.  Besides  the  general  orders  for 
the  march,  he  instructed  Hardee  to 

Let  it  be  known  that  the  object  is  to  secure  the  crossing  of  the  Cumberland, 
and  no  apprehension  of  the  enemy  in  the  rear.  You  will  thus  preserve  their 
morale.  This  order  must  be  communicated  to  the  rear  of  the  column,  and  cav 
alry  must  be  left  in  rear  to  assist  the  sick  and  bring  up  stragglers. 


SURRENDER   OF  DOXELSON.  495 

At  noon,  on  the  14th  of  February,  the  Federal  vanguard  appeared 
opposite  Bowling  Green,  and  opened  fire  from  several  pieces  of  artillery 
on  the  town,  and  especially  on  the  railroad-depot,  which  was  subse 
quently  burned.  At  half-past  three  o'clock,  General  Hardee  retired 
from  the  town  with  the  last  of  his  troops,  in  perfect  order. 

When  General  Johnston  learned,  February  15th,  that  a  battle  was 
raging  at  Donelson,  he  assumed  that  Buell  might  attack  his  rear,  and 
placed  Bowen's  brigade,  which  had  the  head  of  column,  in  line  of  bat 
tle  on  each  side  of  the  road,  the  other  brigades  forming  on  it  as  they 
came  up.  Orders  were  issued  that  all  stragglers  should  be  stopped  at 
the  bridges  at  Nashville,  and  sent  under  guard  to  their  proper  rendez 
vous.  This  was  successful  for  a  time,  but  the  multitudes  of  fugitives 
from  Donelson  who  came  pouring  in  soon  overtaxed  the  efforts  of  the 
guards  to  control  and  organize  them.  Companies  applying  were  mus 
tered  in,  without  hesitation,  whether  their  organization  was  complete 
or  not.  These  judicious  arrangements  prevented  the  demoralization  of 
organized  commands,  and,  though  the  troops  were  wearied,  suffering, 
and  disconcerted,  they  were  kept  well  in  hand  for  a  fight,  had  an  attack 
been  made. 

In  this  brief  dispatch  to  General  Beauregard,  sent  on  the  morning 
of  the  16th,  General  Johnston  sums  up  the  fate  of  Donelson  :  "At  2 
A.  M.  to-day  Fort  Donelson  surrendered.  We  lost  all." 

Colonel  Munford,  who  was  General  Johnston's  aide-de-camp,  in  his 
address  at  Memphis,  thus  describes  the  announcement  of  the  surrender 
of  Donelson : 

General  Johnston's  headquarters  were  in  Edgefield,  opposite  Nashville. 
About  midnight  a  dispatch  was  received  from  General  Pillow,  announcing  a 
"  victory  complete  and  glorious."  We  were  jubilant  over  the  result.  All  went 
to  bed  happy,  the  general  and  myself  occupying  the  same  room.  Just  before 
daybreak,  we  were  awakened  by  another  messenger  with  "  dispatches  from 
Donelson."  I  lighted  a  candle,  and  at  the  general's  request  read  to  him  the 
astounding  official  statement  that  the  place  "  would  capitulate  at  daylight,  and 
the  army  be  surrendered  by  Buckner,  Floyd  and  Pillow  having  left  on  steam 
boats  for  Nashville !  "  The  general  was  lying  on  a  little  camp-bed  in  one  cor 
ner  ;  he  was  silent  a  moment,  and  then  asked  me  to  read  the  dispatch  again, 
which  I  did.  He  then  ordered  the  staff  to  be  awakened,  saying,  "  I  must  save 
this  army ;  "  had  runners  sent  to  the  different  commands,  and  troops  marched 
as  fast  as  practicable  across  the  river.  This  movement  was  effected  without  loss 
of  anything,  and  headquarters  established  in  Nashville.  .  .  .  The  people  of  the 
capital  were  joyous  over  the  news  of  the  night  before.  The  morning  papers 
were  full  of  the  "  glorious  victory."  In  the  midst  of  this  joy  came  the  news  of 
the  disaster.  Its  effects  can  be  imagined  ;  "  confusion  worse  confounded,"  nay, 
a  perfect  panic  prevailed,  and  people  rushed  here  and  there  in  a  delirium  of  fear. 
In  the  midst  of  these  unhappy  scenes  General  Johnston  remained  calm,  distrib 
uting  his  troops  into  proper  positions,  giving  orders  for  the  erection  of  batteries 
below  the  city  to  delay  the  gunboats,  for  the  removal  of  public  stores  and 
33 


496  THE  RETREAT  FROM  BOWLIXG  GREEN. 

property  of  all  sorts,  and  receiving  delegations  of  public  functionaries  and  private 
citizens  who  were  crowding  round  him  for  advice  under  the  changed  state  of 
affairs.  He  received  Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow  with  the  greatest  courtesy,  and 
made  the  former  commandant  of  the  post  at  Nashville.  The  excitement  and 
confusion  continued,  and  on  Monday  night  an  immense  mob  blocked  up  the 
street  in  front  of  his  headquarters ;  one  of  them,  seeming  to  be  half  drunk, 
mounting  the  steps,  and  exclaiming,  "  We  have  come  to  demand  of  our  generals 
whether  they  intend  to  fight  for  us  or  not;  "  and,  turning  to  the  crowd,  he 
continued :  "  Yes,  fellow-citizens,  we  have  a  right  to  know  whether  our  generals 
are  going  to  fight  for  us  or  intend  abandoning  us  and  our  wives  and  children  to 
the  enemy.  We  will  force  them  to  tell  iw."  A  wild  shout  of  approval  was  the 
response  from  the  mob.  Generals  Floyd,  Hardee,  and  myself,  had  to  make 
speeches  to  them  before  they  could  be  induced  to  disperse,  and  abandon  their 
futile  effort  to  extort  a  disclosure  of  plans.  It  was  considerably  after  midnight 
before  we  got  clear  of  them.  Dissatisfaction  was  general.  Its  mutterings, 
already  heard,  began  to  break  out  in  denunciations.  The  demagogues  took  up 
the  cry,  and  hounded  each  other  and  the  people  on  in  hunting  down  a  victim. 
The  public  press  was  loaded  with  abuse.  The  very  Government  was  denounced 
for  intrusting  the  public  safety  to  hands  so  feeble.  The  Lower  House  of  Congress 
appointed  a  select  committee  to  inquire  into  the  conduct  of  the  war  in  the  West 
ern  Department.  The  Senators  and  Representatives  from  Tennessee,  with  the 
exception  of  Judge  Swann,  waited  upon  the  President,  saying,  "  We  come  in 
the  name  of  the  people  to  demand  the  removal  of  Sidney  Johnston  from  com 
mand,  because  he  is  no  general."  The  President  replied  :  "  Gentlemen,  I  know 
Sidney  Johnston  well.  If  Tie  is  not  a  general,  we  had  better  give  up  the  war, 
for  we  have  no  general." 

Nashville  had  acquired,  during  the  progress  of  the  war,  a  high  degree 
of  importance.  It  was  the  capital  of  the  rich,  populous,  and  martial 
State  of  Tennessee.  As  the  base  of  Bowling  Green,  as  a  depot  of  sup 
plies  for  the  armies  of  the  East  as  well  as  of  the  West,  as  a  manufac 
tory  of  ordnance  and  army  stores,  as  a  place  of  refuge  for  thousands  of 
Kentuckians  and  Tennesseeans,  and  as  the  rendezvous  for  volunteers  for 
the  front,  it  had  come  to  be  looked  upon  in  the  West  as  Richmond  was 
in  the  East.  Its  original  population  of  some  30,000  had  probably  been 
doubled,  and,  from  a  rather  provincial  and  Union-loving  town,  it  had 
become  a  centre  of  furious  political  agitation.  The  people  were  war 
like  and  energetic  in  character,  and  circumstances  had  produced  in  them 
a  blind  and  overweening  confidence.  It  has  been  seen  how  impossible 
it  was  to  obtain  labor  in  order  to  provide  defenses  for  the  city.  Even 
when  General  Johnston's  army  was  found  retiring  upon  Nashville,  the 
good  news  from  Donelson  kept  the  public  mind  in  a  state  of  unnatural 
elation.  Even  as  late  as  February  15th  he  found  that  the  measures  he 
had  taken  to  obstruct  by  a  raft  the  Cumberland  River,  which  was  fall 
ing,  were  thwarted  by  the  dead  weight  of  popular  opposition,  directed 
by  the  "  river-men,"  who  as  a  class  resisted  it.  Reverse  seemed  impos 
sible.  When,  therefore,  the  blow  fell,  the  revulsion  of  feeling  produced 


PANIC:  497 

scenes  the  like  of  which  were  not  witnessed  again  in  the  war.  It  was 
like  the  first  crushing  calamity  in  a  family,  whose  traditions  of  honor 
and  prosperity  are  unbroken.  Shame,  grief,  rage,  and  terror,  were  min 
gled  in  the  bitter  draught.  Every  evil  that  marks  the  track  of  con 
quest  was  pictured  to  the  imagination  of  the  affrighted  people.  The 
public  mind  gave  way  first  to  panic,  then  to  frenzy.  Many  were  pos 
sessed  with  but  one  idea — that  of  escape  ;  and  a  frantic  exodus  began 
of  all  who  could  procure  the  means  of  flight :  carriages,  wagons,  open 
carts,  filled  with  delicate  women  and  tender  children,  unprovided  with 
ordinary  comforts,  set  out  in  the  gloom  of  a  winter  evening  and  the 
pelting  of  a  pouring  rain,  and  thronged  the  roads  that  led  southward. 
The  tramp  of  the  tired  and  angry  soldiers  and  the  roll  of  their  baggage- 
wagons  were  continuous  through  that  dreary  day  and  those  which  suc 
ceeded  it. 

Duke,  in  his  "  Life  of  Morgan  "  (page  113),  tells  what  he  saw,  in  his 
usual  animated  style.  He  says  : 

The  Tennessee  troops  were  naturally  most  influenced  by  the  considerations 
which  affected  the  citizens,  but  all  shared  the  feeling.  Some  wept  at  the  thought 
of  abandoning  the  city  to  a  fate  which  they  esteemed  as  dreadful  as  utter  de 
struction  ;  and  many,  infuriated,  loudly  advocated  burning  it  to  the  ground,  that 
the  enemy  might  have  nothing  of  it  but  its  ashes. 

During  the  first  night  after  the  army  reached  Nashville,  when  the  excitement 
and  fury  were  at  the  highest  pitch,  and  officers  and  privates  were  alike  influ 
enced  by  it,  it  seemed  as  if  the  bonds  of  discipline  would  be  cast  off  altogether. 
Crowds  of  soldiers  were  mingled  with  the  citizens,  who  thronged  the  streets 
all  night,  and  yells,  curses,  shots,  rang  on  all  sides.  In  some  houses  the  women 
were  pale  and  sobbing,  and  in  others  there  was  even  merriment,  as  if  in  defi 
ance  of  the  worst.  Very  soon  all  those  who  had  escaped  from  Donelson  began 
to  arrive.  .  .  .  The  arrival  of  these  disbanded  soldiers,  among  whom  it  was  diffi 
cult  to  establish  and  enforce  order,  because  no  immediate  disposition  could  be 
made  of  them,  increased  the  confusion  already  prevailing.  Eumors,  too,  of  the 
near  approach  of  the  enemy  were  circulated,  and  were  believed  even  by  officers 
of  high  rank. 

Upon  the  second  day,  matters  had  arrived  at  such  a  state,  and  the  excitement 
and  disorder  were  so  extreme,  that  it  became  necessary  to  take  other  precautions 
to  repress  the  license  that  was  prevailing,  besides  the  establishment  of  guards 
and  sentinels  about  the  camps  where  the  troops  lay;  and  General  Johnston  or 
dered  the  establishment  of  a  strong  military  police  in  Nashville.  The  First  Mis 
souri  Infantry,1  one  of  the  finest  and  best-disciplined  regiments  in  the  service, 
was  detailed  for  this  duty,  and  Morgan's  squadron  was  sent  to  assist  it.  Our 
duty  was  to  patrol  the  city  and  suburbs,  and  we  were  constantly  engaged  at  it 
until  the  city  was  evacuated. 

Floyd  had  no  common  task  in  holding  in  check  an  infuriated  mob, 
and  in  giving  coherence  to  the  routed  fugitives  of  Donelson.  His  duty 
was,  besides,  to  save  from  the  wreck  the  most  important  supplies  and 

1  Under  Colonel  Rich,  a  valuable  officer,  who  lost  his  life  at  Shiloh. 


498  THE  RETREAT   FROM  BOWLING  GREEN. 

stores.  He  impressed  all  means  of  transportation  available,  and  em 
ployed  them  in  saving  ordnance-stores  and  other  valuable  property. 
Among  other  articles,  he  saved  all  the  cannon,  caissons,  and  battery 
wagons.  He  found  all  restraints  of  civil  order  not  only  relaxed  but 
sundered.  A  mixed  mob  had  possession  of  the  city,  and  cupidity  was 
triumphant.  Floyd  says,  in  his  report  to  General  Johnston,  that  when 
he  came  in  view  of  the  landing  at  Nashville — 

The  rabble  on  the  wharf  were  in  possession  of  boats  loaded  with  government 
bacon,  and  were  pitching  it  from  these  boats  to  the  shore,  and  carrying  what  did 
not  fall  into  the  water,  by  hand  or  in  carts,  away  to  various  places  in  the  city. 

Floyd,  when  put  in  charge,  placed  guards  over  the  public  stores,  and 
made  extraordinary  efforts  to  save  them,  and  did  in  fact  save  great 
quantities — all  that  the  railroad-trains  could  transport  from  Monday 
morning  until  the  evening  of  Thursday,  the  20th  of  February.  Of 
course,  the  removal  of  the  sick  and  wounded  was  first  attended  to. 
Torrents  of  rain  impeded  the  work,  and  finally  the  washing  away  of  a 
railroad-bridge  stopped  it.  A  large  amount  of  transportation  and  a 
great  number  of  cattle  were  brought  from  the  north  side  of  the  river 
before  the  bridges  were  destroyed  on  the  night  of  the  19th. 

Fear  was  replaced  by  greed.     Duke  says,  in  his  graphic  way: 

Excitement  and  avarice  seemed  to  stimulate  the  people  to  preternatural 
strength.  I  saw  an  old  woman,  whose  -appearance  indicated  the  extremest  de 
crepitude,  staggering  under  a  load  of  meat  which  I  would  have  hardly  thought 
a  quartermaster's  mule  could  carry. 

This  plunder  of  the  public  stores  was  allowed  to  a  certain  extent, 
where  it  was  evident  that  they  could  not  be  carried  off,  as  it  was  better 
for  the  poorer  classes  to  have  them  than  that  they  should  fall  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy.  But  so  demoralizing  is  the  license  of  pillage, 
that  the  predatory  instinct  becomes  an  overpowering,  unreasoning  im 
pulse  ;  a  blind,  brute  appetite,  only  to  be  restrained  by  force  or  fear. 
Hence  this  permitted  spoliation,  when  limits  were  overstepped,  had  to 
be  kept  within  bounds  by  the  sternest  measures  of  repression.  Forrest 
came  into  personal  collision  with  mob-leaders,  and  his  cavalry  twice 
charged  the  mob  with  drawn  sabres. 

Duke  speaks  of  Floyd's  conduct  in  terms  of  the  highest  commenda 
tion.  He  says  : 

Nothing  could  have  been  more  admirable  than  the  fortitude,  patience,  and 
good  sense,  which  General  Floyd  displayed  in  his  arduous  and  unenviable  task. 
...  I  saw  a  great  deal  of  General  Floyd  while  he  was  commanding  at  Nashville, 
and  I  was  remarkably  impressed  by  him.  .  .  .  He  was  evidently  endowed  with 
no  common  nerve,  will,  and  judgment. 


EVACUATION  OF  NASHVILLE.  499 

Duke  illustrates  his  conclusions  about  Floyd  by  details  of  his  con 
duct,  highly  creditable  to  that  general.  He  continues  : 

At  last,  the  evacuation  was  completed ;  the  army  was  gotten  clear  of  Nash 
ville  ;  the  last  straggler  driven  out ;  all  the  stores  which  could  not  be  carried  off 
nor  distributed  to  the  citizens,  burned ;  and  the  capital  of  Tennessee  (although 
we  did  not  know  it  then)  was  abandoned  finally  to  the  enemy.  Morgan's  squad 
ron  was  the  last  to  leave,  as  it  was  required  to  remain  in  the  extreme  rear  of  the 
army,  and  pick  up  all  the  stragglers  that  evaded  the  rear-guards  of  the  infantry. 
Our  scouts,  left  behind  when  we,  in  our  turn,  departed,  witnessed  the  arrival  of 
the  Federals,  and  their  occupation  of  the  city. 

Forrest's  cavalry  was  very  useful  in  the  enforcement  of  order  and  in 
facilitating  the  removal  of  stores.  Their  reputation  and  morale  had 
both  been  enhanced  by  their  successful  escape  from  Donelson ;  and 
their  commander  had  qualities  which  peculiarly  fitted  him  for  rising 
above  the  tumult  of  civil  commotion.  His  regiment  remained  in  Nash 
ville  until  Friday,  and  Forrest  himself,  with  a  small  detachment,  staid 
until  Sunday,  the  23d  of  February,  when  the  enemy's  advance-guard 
appeared  in  Edgefield.  He  then  retired.  A  deputation  of  citizens, 
headed  by  the  mayor,  went  out  to  negotiate,  and  the  formal  surrender 
of  the  city  to  Buell  took  place  on  Tuesday,  the  25th.  Nashville  passed 
under  the  yoke  that  was  never  to  be  lifted. 

It  is  only  just  to  say  that  Governor  Harris  gave  General  Johnston 
all  the  assistance  in  his  power,  and  that  the  measures  he  took  were,  un 
der  the  circumstances,  bold  and  judicious.  The  following  is  Colonel 
Munford's  account  of  hie  share  in  the  transaction,  based  on  his  own 
personal  knowledge  : 

The  Governor  received  the  news  of  the  disaster  almost  or  quite  as  soon  as 
did  General  Johnston.  Very  early  in  the  morning  he  rode  over  to  the  general's 
headquarters  in  Edgefield  to  advise  with  him  as  to  the  best  course  under  the 
changed  circumstances.  I  heard  the  general  say  to  him  :  "  Your  first  duty,  Gov 
ernor,  is  to  the  public  trusts  in  your  charge.  I  regard  it  as  all-important  that 
the  public  archives  should  be  removed  to  some  place  of  safety,  and  for  this  pur 
pose  have  ordered  transportation  to  be  furnished  you.  The  Legislature  can  also 
adjourn  to  some  other  place.  You  can  do  no  further  good  here  now,  and  I 
think  you  should  take  the  public  archives  under  your  especial  charge."  The 
Governor  said  he  would  do  so,  went  back,  wrote  a  message  to  the  Legislature, 
took  charge  of  the  archives  as  he  had  promised,  put  them  in  a  place  of  safety, 
and  in  forty-eight  hours  was  back  at  the  capital,  though  in  that  time,  at  General 
Beauregard's  earnest  solicitation,  he  had  gone  through  Jackson,  Tennessee,  to 
confer  with  him. 

In  putting  Floyd  in  command  at  Nashville,  General  Johnston  used 
the  following  language,  as  appears  by  a  memorandum  taken  at  the  time 
by  Colonel  Mackall : 


500  FROM  MURFREESBORO  TO  CORINTH. 

I  give  you  command  of  the  city;  you  will  remove  the  stores.  My  only  re 
striction  is,  do  not  fight  a  battle  in  the  city. 

General  Johnston  also  telegraphed  Colonel  D.  P.  Buckner,  at  Clarks- 
ville,  February  16th  : 

Do  not  destroy  the  army  stores,  if  their  destruction  will  endanger  the  city. 
If  you  can  burn  the  army  stores  without  destroying  the  city,  do  it. 

Thus,  in  the  hour  of  his  own  deepest  distress,  he  was  vigilant  and 
solicitous  for  the  welfare  of  citizens  and  non-combatants. 

The  following  extract  is  from  General  Johnston's  letter  to  the  Sec 
retary  of  War  : 

HEADQUARTERS,  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT,  |_ 
NASHVILLE,  February  18, 1862.      ) 

SIR  :  In  conformity  with  the  intention  announced  to  the  department,  the 
corps  under  the  command  of  Major-General  Hardee  completed  the  evacuation 
of  Bowling  Green  on  the  14th  inst.,  and  the  rear-guard  passed  the  Cumberland 
at  this  point  yesterday  morning  in  good  order. 

I  have  ordered  the  army  to  encamp  to-night  midway  between  this  place  and 
Murfreesboro.  My  purpose  is,  to  place  the  force  in  such  a  position  that  the 
enemy  cannot  concentrate  his  superior  strength  against  the  command,  and  to 
enable  me  to  assemble  as  rapidly  as  possible  such  other  troops  in  addition  as  it 
may  be  in  my  power  to  collect.  The  complete  command  which  their  gunboats 
and  transports  give  them  upon  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland  renders  it  neces 
sary  for  me  to  retire  my  line  between  the  rivers.  I  entertain  the  hope  that  this 
disposition  will  enable  me  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check ;  and,  when  my  forces 
are  sufficiently  increased,  to  drive  him  back.  .  .  . 

Hon.  J.  P.  BENJAMIN,  Secretary  of  War,  Kichmond,  Virginia. 

A.  S.  JOHXSTON. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 

FROM   MURFREESBORO    TO    CORLNTH. 

IT  has  been  seen  that,  in  the  conference  of  February  7th,  with  Beau- 
regard,  the  plan  adopted  was  substantially  a  division  of  the  command, 
by  which  General  Johnston  should  face  Buell  and  cover  East  and  Mid 
dle  Tennessee,  while  General  Beauregard  should  defend  the  country 
west  of  the  Tennessee  River.  The  issue  at  Donelson  left  General  John 
ston  with  little  more  than  half  his  former  strength  in  array.  The  whole 
aspect  of  affairs  was  changed  by  the  surrender  there;  and  hence  a  modi 
fication  of  the  plan  of  operations  was  demanded  by  the  circumstances. 
A  contingency  had  happened  which  he  had  contemplated  and  was  pre 
pared  for,  though  he  had  not  expected  it  would  occur.  General  John- 


PLAX  OF  RETREAT.  501 

stem's  resolve  was  sudden,  and  has  the  appearance  of  a  military  inspira 
tion  ;  but  it  has  already  been  explained  by  General  Brown's  and  Colonels 
Schaller's  and  Munford's  reminiscences.  It  had  evidently  been  matured 
in  his  mind,  as  an  alternative.  To  retreat  south  of  the  Tennessee  and 
defend  that  line  had  been  his  plan,  with  Corinth  as  his  probable  centre. 
He  now  determined  to  concentrate  his  forces  there,  and,  uniting  his  own 
army  with  that  which  he  had  assigned  to  Beauregard,  to  hazard  a  battle. 
Soon  after  the  conference  at  Bowling  Green,  General  Beauregard 
addressed  a  letter  to  General  Johnston,  dated  February  12th,  which 
shows  how  strong  a  hold  General  Johnston's  views  had  taken  on  his 
mind.  Though  for  the  most  part  a  recapitulation  of  those  views,  there 
are  some  important  modifications  which  render  proper  the  insertion  here 
of  the  entire  letter.  It  will  be  found  that  before  the  loss  of  Fort  Donel- 
son  was  known,  or  the  capture  of  the  army  there  even  apprehended, 
General  Beauregard  suggests  the  probability  that  General  Johnston 
would  speedily  have  to  retreat  behind  the  Tennessee  River.  It  is  need 
less  to  say  that  it  was  not  the  purpose  of  General  Johnston  to  take  that 
step  unless  compelled  to  do  so.  But  as  soon  as  the  army  at  Donelson 
surrendered  the  time  had  come  when  this  move  must  begin,  with  as 
much  celerity  as  was  consistent  with  the  preservation  of  morale  and 
material  of  war.  It  must,  of  course,  have  been  agreeable  to  him  to  be 
sustained  beforehand  by  General  Beauregard's  formal  approval  of  a- re 
treat  under  much  less  stringent  circumstances  than  now  actually  existed. 
The  following  is  General  Beauregard's  letter: 

LETTEB    FROM    GENERAL   BEAUREGARD    TO    GENERAL    JOHNSTON. 

BOWLING  GBEEN,  KENTUCKY,  February  12, 1862. 

GENERAL:  By  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry  the  enemy  having  possession  of  the 
Tennessee  River,  which  is  navigable  for  their  gunboats  and  transports  to  Flor 
ence,  it  becomes  evident  that  the  forces  under  your  immediate  command  and 
those  under  General  Polk,  separated  unfortunately  by  that  river,  can  no  longer 
act  in  concert,  and  •will  be  unable  to  support  each  other. until  the  fortune  of  war 
shall  have  restored  the  Tennessee  River  to  our  possession,  or  combined  the  move 
ment  of  the  two  armies  in  the  rear  of  it. 

It  also  becomes  evident  that,  by  the  possession  of  that  river,  the  enemy  can 
concentrate  rapidly,  by  means  of  his  innumerable  transports,  all  his  disposable 
forces,  on  any  point  along  its  banks,  either  to  attack  Nashville  in  rear,  or  cut  off 
the  communications  of  Columbus  by  the  river  with  Memphis,  and  by  the  railroad 
with  the  Memphis  &  Charleston  Railroad.  Should  the  enemy  determine  on 
the  former  plan  of  operation,  your  army,  threatened  in  front  and  on  right  flank 
by  BuelPs  large  army,  will  be  in  a  very  critical  condition,  and  may  be  forced  to 
take  refuge  on  the  south  side  of  the  Tennessee  River,  in  Alabama  and  Georgia, 
or  Eastern  Tennessee.  But  should  Halleck  adopt  the  second  plan  referred  to, 
the  position  at  Columbus  will  then  become  no  longer  tenable  for  an  army  inferior 
in  strength  to  that  of  the  enemy,  and  it  must  fall  back  to  some  central  point 
where  it  can  guard  the  two  main  railroads  to  Memphis,  i.  e.,  from  Louisville 


502  FROM  MURFREESBORO   TO  CORINTH. 

and  from  Charleston  ;  Jackson,  Tennessee,  would  probably  be  the  best  position 
for  such  an  object,  with  strong  detachments  at  Humboldt  and  Corinth,  and  with 
the  necessary  advance-guards.  The  Memphis  &  Charleston  Railroad,  so  impor 
tant  on  account  of  its  extension  through  Eastern  Tennessee  and  Virginia,  must  be 
properly  guarded  from  luka  to  Tuscumbia,  and  even  to  Decatur,  if  practicable. 

Columbus  must  either  be  left  to  be  defended  to  the  last  extremity  by  its 
proper  garrison,  assisted  by  Hollins's  fleet  of  gunboats,  and  provided  with  pro 
visions  and  ammunition  for  several  months,  or  abandoned  altogether,  its  arma 
ment  and  garrison  being  transferred  if  practicable  to  Fort  Pillow,  which,  I  am 
informed,  is  a  naturally  and  artificially  strong  position,  about  one  hundred  miles 
above  Memphis.  Island  No.  10,  near  New  Madrid,  could  also  be  held  by  its 
garrison,  assisted  by  Hollins's  fleet,  until  the  possession  of  New  Madrid  by  the 
enemy  would  compel  that  position  to  be  evacuated.  I  am  clearly  of  the  opinion 
that  to  attempt  at  present  to  hold  so  advanced  a  position  as  Columbus,  with  the 
movable  army  under  General  Polk,  where  its  communications  can  be  so  readily 
cut  off  by  a  superior  force  acting  from  the  Tennessee  Eiver  as  a  new  base,  would 
be  to  jeopardize,  not  only  the  safety  of  that  army,  but  necessarily  of  the  whole 
Mississippi  Valley.  Hence  I  desire,  as  far  as  practicable,  specific  instructions  as 
to  the  future  movements  of  the  army  of  which  I  am  about  to  assume  the  com 
mand  ;  if  it  be  necessary  for  the  safety  of  the  country  to  make  with  all  my  forces 
a  desperate  stand  at  Columbus,  I  am  ready  to  do  so.  I  regret  much  that  illness 
has  prevented  me  from  being  already  at  my  post,  but  during  my  stay  here  I 
believe  I  have  made  myself  as  well  acquainted  with  your  general  views  and  in 
tentions  as  circumstances  have  permitted,  and  which  I  will  always  be  happy  to 
carry  into  effect  to  the  best  of  my  abilities.  I  am  general,  very  respectfully, 
Your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAITEEGABD,  General  C.  S.  A. 

General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  commanding  Western  Department,  Bowling  Green,  Kentucky. 

It  was  the  easier  for  General  Johnston  to  adopt  this  resolution  to 
get  behind  the  Tennessee,  as  the  War  Department,  aroused  by  the  fall 
of  Fort  Henry,  had  taken  steps  to  reenforce  him.  On  February  8th 
Secretary  Benjamin  wrote  him : 

The  condition  of  your  department,  in  consequence  of  the  largely  superior 
forces  of  the  enemy,  has  filled  us  with  solicitude,  and  we  have  used  every  pos 
sible  exertion  to  organize  some  means  for  your  relief. 

The  secretary  goes  on  to  state  that  eight  regiments  had  been 
ordered  to  East  Tennessee,  which  would  make  the  whole  force  there 
some  fifteen  regiments,  and  would  leave  Crittenden's  command  free  to 
act  with  the  centre.  He  continues : 

To  aid  General  Beauregard  at  Columbus,  I  send  orders  to  General  Lovell  to 
forward  to  him  at  once  five  or  six  regiments  of  his  best  troops  at  New  Orleans. 

He  also  promises  2,800  Enfield  rifles,  and  adds : 

We  have  called  on  all  the  States  for  a  levy  of  men  for  the  war,  and  think,  in 
a  very  few  weeks,  we  shall  be  able  to  give  you  heavy  reinforcements,  although 
we  may  not  be  able  to  arm  them  with  good  weapons. 


REVIEW  OF  CAMPAIGN.  503 

It  is  due  to  General  Lovell  to  say  that  he  used  diligence  in  obeying 
what  must  have  been  a  distasteful  order  to  him,  and  in  his  letter  to 
General  Johnston,  evinced  a  clear  perception  of  the  importance  of  Cor 
inth  as  a  strategic  point. 

To  use  a  homely  proverb,  the  action  of  the  War  Department  looked 
like  "  locking  the  stable-door  after  the  horse  was  stolen."  But,  as 
has  already  been  suggested,  in  a  popular  revolution,  based  on  the  idea 
of  State-rights  or  decentralization,  the  War  Department  was  greatly 
hampered  in  its  designs  by  local  public  opinion  operating  both  through 
the  State  Executives  and  through  Congress.  Colonel  Woolley,  in  the 
letter  already  quoted,  says  truly  and  forcibly : 

But  who  is  to  be  blamed  ?  The  answer  is  given  by  every  flash  of  lightning 
that  comes  from  the  coast.  I  shall  not  be  believed  if  I  state  the  number  of 
letters  General  Johnston  wrote  while  at  Bowling  Green,  urging  that  an  inde 
fensible  coast  and  unimportant  towns  be  abandoned,  and  that  troops  be  sent  to 
enable  him  to  give  battle  and  win  a  great  victory.  But  his  warning  was  un 
heeded,  his  requests  denied.  Nor  was  the  President  at  fault.  He  knew  what 
Johnston  knew.  Go  to  Kichmond,  and  the  truth  will  then  be  learned.  Each 
little  town  on  the  sea-coast  thought  that  upon  its  defense  depended  the  salvation 
of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  Senators  and  Congressmen,  afraid  of  unpopu 
larity,  demanded  that  the  troops  of  their  States  should  be  kept  for  home  protec 
tion.  They  formed  parties  against  the  President,  and  threatened  him  with  seri 
ous  opposition  if  he  did  not  conduct  the  war  as  they  recommended.  In  vain 
did  the  President  remind  them  of  the  fable  of  the  old  man  and  the  fagot  of 
sticks — singly  they  could  be  destroyed,  together  no  power  could  break  them. 
Except  a  few  large  towns  there  were  no  points  on  the  sea-coast  of  any  strategic 
importance.  The  presence  of  garrisons  at  little  places  only  invited  the  naval 
expeditions  of  the  enemy.  Had  there  been  no  troops  at  those  points  there  would 
have  been  no  attack. 

The  following  letters  from  General  Johnston  to  the  Secretary  of 
War  give  a  brief  but  comprehensive  view  of  his  situation  : 

HEADQUARTERS,  WESTERN  DEPARTMENT,    ) 
MURFREESBORO,  TENNESSEE,  February  27, 1862.  f 

SIR  :  The  fall  of  Fort  Donelson  compelled  me  to  withdraw  the  forces  under 
rny  command  from  the  north  bank  of  the  Cumberland,  and  to  abandon  the  de 
fense  of  Nashville,  which,  but  for  that  disaster,  it  was  my  intention  to  protect 
to  the  utmost.  Not  more  than  11,000  effective  men  were  left  under  my  com 
mand  to  oppose  a  column  of  General  Buell's  of  not  less  than  40,000  troops 
moving  by  Bowling  Green,  while  another  superior  force  under  General  Thomas 
outflanked  me  to  the  east,  and  the  armies  from  Fort  Donelson,  with  the  gun 
boats  and  transports,  had  it  in  their  power  to  ascend  the  Cumberland,  now  swol 
len  by  recent  floods,  so  as  to  interrupt  all  communications  with  the  south. 

The  situation  left  me  no  alternative  but  to  evacuate  Nashville  or  sacrifice 
the  army.  By  remaining,  the  place  would  have  been  unnecessarily  subjected 
to  destruction,  as  it  is  very  indefensible,  and  no  adequate  force  would  have  been 
left  to  keep  the  enemy  in  check  in  Tennessee. 


504:  FROM   MURFREESBORO  TO   CORINTH. 

Under  the  circumstances  I  moved  the  main  body  of  my  command  to  this 
place  on  the  17th  and  18th  instant,  and  left  a  brigade  under  General  Floyd  to 
bring  on  such  stores  and  property  as  were  at  Nashville,  with  instructions  to 
remain  until  the  approach  of  the  enemy,  and  then  to  rejoin  me.  This  has  been 
in  a  great  measure  effected,  and  nearly  all  the  stores  would  have  been  saved,  but 
for  the  heavy  and  unusual  rains  which  have  washed  away  the  bridges,  swept 
away  portions  of  the  railroad,  and  rendered  transportation  almost  impossible. 
General  Floyd  has  arrived  here.  The  rear-guard  left  Nashville  on  the  night  of 
the  23d.  Edgefield,  on  the  north  bank  of  the  Cumberland,  opposite  the  city, 
was  occupied  yesterday  by  the  advanced  pickets  of  the  enemy.  I  have  remained 
here  for  the  purpose  of  augmenting  my  forces  and  securing  the  transportation 
of  the  public  stores.  By  the  junction  of  the  command  of  General  Grittenden 
and  the  fugitives  from  Fort  Donelson,  which  have  been  reorganized  as  far  as 
practicable,  the  force  now  under  my  command  will  amount  to  about  17.000 
men.  General  Floyd,  with  a  force  of  some  2,500  men,  has  been  ordered  to  Chat 
tanooga  to  defend  the  approaches  toward  North  Alabama  and  Georgia,  and  the 
communications  between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Atlantic,  and  with  the  view  to 
increase  his  forces  by  such  troops  as  may  be  sent  forward  from  the  neighboring 
States.  The  quartermaster's,  commissary's,  and  ordnance  stores  which  are  not 
required  for  immediate  use  have  been  ordered  to  Chattanooga,  and  those  which 
will  be  necessary  on  the  march  have  been  forwarded  to  Huntsville  and  Decatur. 
I  have  ordered  a  depot  to  be  established  at  Atlanta  for  the  manufacture  of  sup 
plies  for  the  quartermaster's  department,  and  also  a  laboratory  for  the  manu 
facture  of  percussion-caps  and  ordnance-stores,  and,  at  Chattanooga,  depots  for 
distribution  of  these  supplies.  The  machinery  will  be  immediately  sent  for 
ward. 

Considering  the  peculiar  topography  of  this  State,  and  the  great  power  which 
the  enemy's  means  afford  them  upon  the  Tennessee  and  Cumberland,  it  will  be 
seen  that  the  force  under  my  command  cannot  successfully  cover  the  whole  line 
against  the  advance  of  the  enemy.  I  am  compelled  to  elect  whether  he  shall  be 
permitted  to  occupy  Middle  Tennessee,  or  turn  Columbus,  take  Memphis,  and 
open  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi.  To  me  the  defense  of  the  valley  seems  of 
paramount  importance,  and  consequently  I  will  move  this  corps  of  the  army,  of 
which  I  have  assumed  the  immediate  command,  toward  the  left  bank  of  the 
Tennessee,  crossing  the  river  near  Decatur,  in  order  to  enable  me  to  cooperate 
or  unite  with  General  Beauregard  for  the  defense  of  Memphis  and  the  Missis 
sippi.  The  department  has  sent  eight  regiments  to  Knoxville  for  the  defense  of 
East  Tennessee,  and  the  protection  of  that  region  will  be  confided  to  them  and 
such  additional  forces  as  may  be  hereafter  sent  from  the  adjacent  States.  Gen 
eral  Buckner  was  ordered  by  the  department  to  take  command  of  the  troops  at 
Knoxville,  but,  as  at  that  time  he  was  in  presence  of  the  enemy,  the  order  was 
not  fulfilled. 

As  it  would  be  almost  impossible  for  me  under  present  circumstances  to 
superintend  the  operations  at  Knoxville  and  Chattanooga,  I  would  respectfully 
suggest  that  the  local  commanders  at  those  points  should  receive  orders  from 
the  department  directly,  or  be  allowed  to  exercise  their  discretion. 

I  have  the  honor  to  remain,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  S.  JOHNSTOX,  General  C.  S.  A. 

Hon.  J.  P.  BENJAMIN,  Secretary  of  "War,  Eichmond. 


PLAN  OF   CONCENTRATION.  505 

HEADQTJABTERS  "WESTERN  DEPARTMENT,     ) 
MURFKEEBBORO,  TENNESSEE,  February  27, 1862.  J 

SIE  :  The  army  supplies  and  stores  which  were  forwarded  to  this  place,  hav 
ing  all  been  sent  forward  to  Chattanooga,  except  what  may  be  needed  for  the 
immediate  use  of  the  army  at  Huntsville  and  Decatur  and  points  farther  on 
toward  Memphis,  this  command  will  commence  the  march  to-morrow  toward 
Decatur. 

The  enemy  are  in  possession  of  Nashville  in  force — a  part  of  which  is  eight 
miles  on  this  side  of  the  city. 

With  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

(Signed)  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  General  G.  S.  A. 

Hon.  J.  P.  BENJAMIN,  Secretary  of  War,  Kichmond. 

Colonel  (afterward  Major-General)  William  Preston,  then  acting  on 
General  Johnston's  staff  as  a  volunteer  aide,  enjoyed  as  free  an  inter 
course  with  him  as  any  one  could.  Not  long  after  General  Johnston's 
death,  in  a  letter  (dated  April  18,  1862)  to  the  present  writer,  he  gave 
a  succinct  but  clear  account  of  the  campaign.  The  following  is  an  ex 
tract  from  it  : 

Nashville  was  indefensible.  General  Johnston  withdrew  to  Murfreesboro, 
determined  to  effect  a  junction  with  Beauregard,  near  Corinth.  His  two  chief 
staff-officers,  Colonels  Mackall  and  Gilmer,  deemed  it  impossible.  Johnston 
persevered.  He  collected  Crittenden  and  the  relics  of  his  command,  with 
stragglers  and  fugitives  from  Donelson,  and  moved  through  Shelbyville  and 
Fayetteville  on  Decatur.  Halting  at  those  points,  he  saved  his  provisions  and 
stores,  removed  his  depots  and  machine-shops,  obtained  new  arms,  and  finally, 
at  the  close  of  March,  joined  Beauregard  at  Corinth  with  20,000  men,  lifting 
their  aggregate  force  to  50,000. 

This  movement  having  been  completed,  though  General  Johnston  fully 
appreciated  its  hazard  if  the  enemy  had  interrupted  him  with  20,000  or  30,000 
men  between  Decatur  and  Corinth,  General  Johnston  found  himself  for  the 
first  time  at  the  head  of  an  army  capable  of  giving  battle.  In  the  mean  time,  he 
had  borne  with  unshaken  constancy  and  serenity  the  obloquy  leveled  at  him  by 
ignorant  assailants,  consoled  by  the  unwavering  confidence  reposed  in  him  by 
his  unalterable  friend  the  President,  and  upheld  by  his  own  manly  self-reliance 
in  the  midst  of  adversity. 

General  W.  C.  Whitthorne,  then  Adjutant-General  of  Tennessee, 
now  a  member  of  Congress  from  that  State,  has  addressed  to  the  writer 
the  following  communication  : 

After  the  fall  of  Nashville,  and  while  General  Johnston  was  at  Murfreesboro 
with  his  troops,  and  while  General  Forrest  was  at  Nashville  superintending  the 
removal  of  stores,  I  was  at  General  Johnston's  headquarters  in  Murfreesboro, 
having  some  business  with  his  staff-officers,  which  being  completed,  I  was  in 
the  act  of  leaving  the  house,  when  an  aide  of  General  Johnston  informed  me 
that  he  (General  Johnston)  wished  to  speak  to  me.  Upon  entering  his  room  he 
asked  if  I  was  going  to  leave  without  calling  upon  him.  I  replied,  "Yes,"  but 
excused  myself  upon  the  ground  that  I  knew  he  was  overwhelmedwith  business, 


506  FROM  MURFREESBORO   TO   CORINTH. 

etc.  He  at  once  inquired  as  to  the  feeling  and  views  of  the  people  of  Tennessee, 
spoke  feelingly  and  rapidly  of  the  situation;  informed  me  that  he  was  making 
arrangements  to  move  his  force  as  rapidly  as  possible  to  Corinth,  which  would 
leave  Middle  Tennessee  exposed ;  but  added,  or  rather  concluded,  by  saying, 
"  General  Whitthorne,  go  tell  your  people  that,  under  the  favor  of  Providence,  I 
will  return  in  less  than  ninety  days  and  redeem  their  capital."  I  remember  well 
his  confident  tone,  his  smile,  and  the  earnestness  of  his  manner.  I  had  such 
faith  and  confidence  in  him  that  I  believed  such  would  be  the  case.  And,  had 
he  lived,  my  conviction  is,  that  he  would  have  accomplished  his  purpose  and  his 
plan — the  recovery  of  Nashville. 

Governor  Harris,  on  the  fall  of  Nashville,  carried  the  State  archives 
to  Memphis  to  secure  them.  While  there,  on  February  20th,  General 
Johnston  telegraphed  him  to  consult  Beauregard,  and  call  out  the 
whole  strength  of  the  State  to  his  aid.  Governor  Harris  informs  the 
writer  that  he  received  a  telegram  from  General  Beauregard  asking  him 
on  his  return  to  Nashville  to  come  by  way  of  Jackson,  Tennessee,  which 
he  did  by  a  special  train.  General  Beauregard  requested  him  to  visit 
General  Johnston  at  Murfreesboro,  and  tell  him  that  he  (General  Beau- 
regard)  thought  he  had  best  concentrate  at  or  near  Jackson  or  Corinth, 
in  that  region.  Governor  Harris  went  to  Nashville,  where  he  remained 
a  short  time,  and  then  proceeded  to  Murfreesboro.  This  must  have 
been  before  the  23d  of  February,  when  Nashville  was  finally  abandoned. 
He  delivered  General  Beauregard's  message  to  General  Johnston,  who 
promptly  replied  that  such  was  his  intention,  and  that  he  was  then 
making  preparations  for  that  purpose. 

The  following  statement  of  facts  was  made  by  Colonel  Sam  Tate,  of 
Memphis,  March  7,  1878,  and  forwarded  to  the  writer : 

MEMPHIS,  March  6,  1S78. 

As  soon  after  the  fall  of  Donelson  as  practicable,  I  repaired  to  General  A.  S. 
Johnston's  headquarters  to  confer  with  him  as  to  his  future  probable  wants  in 
railroad  transportation,  my  appointment  on  his  staff  having  been  made,  as  he 
informed  me,  principally  with  reference  to  this  branch  of  duty.  I  met  him  at 
Murfreesboro,  where  he  had  arrived  the  day  previous.  I  well  remember  our  in 
terview,  which  began  by  my  frankly  avowing  no  wish  to  inquire  into  his  future 
plans,  but  that  I  thought  it  my  duty,  under  the  changed  state  of  the  campaign 
since  I  had  seen  him,  to  learn  as  far  as  he  thought  proper  to  inform  me  what 
provision  he  desired  me  to 'make,  if  any,  in  my  transportation  department,  for 
the  use  of  his  army.  He  replied :  "  I  have  no  desire  to  conceal  my  plans  from 
you.  It  is  my  purpose  to  concentrate  all  the  troops  which  the  Government  will 
permit  at  Corinth,  and  there,  or  in  that  vicinity,  fight  a  decisive  battle  as  soon  as 
possible."  He  then  made  minute  inquiry  of  me  about  the  railroad-bridge  over 
the  Tennessee  River  at  Decatur — the  practicability  of  crossing  his  army  over  it — 
especially  his  artillery  and  wagon  trains,  and  it  was  agreed  that  the  bridge  was 
to  be  floored  for  horses,  troops,  etc.,  and  flats  or  platform-cars  provided  for  the 
guns.  He  took  a  map,  and  also  made  minute  inquiries  as  to  the  river  below 
Decatur,  its  distance  from  the  railroad,  and  the  practicability  of  the  roads  lying 


CHOICE  OF  ROUTE.  507 

south  of  the  railroad  leading  in  the  direction  of  Corinth,  suggesting  that  if  the 
enemy  were  vigilant  and  enterprising  they  might,  through  their  command  of  the 
river  by  their  gunboats  and  their  superior  numbers,  seriously  interfere  with  his 
railroad  route,  and  force  him  to  take  the  more  dilatory  route  south  of  it.  It  may 
be  well  enough  also  to  state  that  in  the  course  of  this  conversation  he  stated  that, 
if  for  any  reason  he  might  be  compelled  to  fall  back  from  Corinth,  his  line  would 
be  from  Fort  Pillow  with  headquarters  at  Grand  Junction,  with  a  fixed  determi 
nation  at  all  hazards  to  hold  the  Mississippi  River  to  Port  Hudson,  and  keep  the 
line  of  communication  open  between  the  armies  east  and  west  of  that  river. 
These  are  the  facts.  SAM  TATE. 

Indeed,  General  Johnston's  letters  and  telegrams  show  quite  con 
clusively  that,  from  the  moment  of  his  arrival  at  Murfreesboro,  it  was 
his  settled  purpose  to  move  his  army  to  Corinth  by  the  way  of  Shelby- 
ville  and  Decatur. 

As  it  has  been  suggested  in  certain  quarters  that  General  Johnston 
ought  to  have  removed  his  army  from  Murfreesboro  by  the  railroad  to 
Stevenson  and  thence  to  Corinth,  the  writer  propounded  to  General 
Gilmer  the  question  of  the  practicability  of  such  a  move.  The  follow 
ing  is  his  reply : 

Being  thus  occupied,  I  had  no  conversation  with  your  father  at  Nashville  as 
to  the  after-movements  of  his  army ;  nor  did  I  have  on  the  march  to  Murfrees 
boro.  I  think  it  was  at  Murfreesboro  that  I  first  knew  of  the  decision  to 
make,  if  practicable,  a  junction  with  Beauregard  at  Corinth. 

As  to  the  movements  by  rail  from  Murfreesboro  to  Stevenson  and  thence  to 
Corinth,  by  the  Charleston  &  Memphis  Railroad,  it  was  simply  impossible  with 
out  sacrificing  the  supplies  and  munitions  on  which  the  subsistence  and  arma 
ment  of  the  command  depended.  The  entire  transportation  capacity  of  the 
railroads  was  taxed  to  the  utmost,  and  even  then  immense  quantities  of  meat 
and  other  commissary  supplies  were  left  at  Nashville,  Murfreesboro,  Shelby- 
ville,  Fayetteville,  and  Huntsville.  Again,  the  movement  was  made  over  the 
"metal"  roads  leading  to  Shelbyville,  Fayetteville,  and  Huntsville,  as  expedi- 
tiously,  considering  the  number  of  troops  to  be  transported,  as  it  could  have 
been  by  rail,  with  the  imperfect  organization  of  the  railroad,  as  it  then  existed. 

The  movement  from  Nashville,  southeast  by  way  of  Murfreesboro, 
to  a  certain  extent  beguiled  the  Federal  generals  into  the  belief  that 
General  Johnston  intended  to  retreat  on  Chattanooga,  and  masked  the 
concentration  of  his  troops  to  the  west.  A  direct  retrograde  would 
have  betrayed  his  purpose.  Had  they  understood  his  design,  with 
larger  forces,  shorter  lines,  and  better  routes,  they  might  have  antici 
pated  him  at  Corinth,  or  even  intercepted  him  at  Decatur. 

When  the  condition  of  the  troops,  the  season  of  the  year,  the  un 
precedented  rains  and  floods,  and  the  consequent  state  of  the  roads,  are 
taken  into  consideration,  this  retreat  may  well  be  accounted  an  extraor 
dinary  triumph  over  the  greatest  difficulties.  The  following  narrative 
will  show  some  of  the  embarrassments  which  had  naturally  caused  the 


508  FROM  MURFREESBORO   TO   CORINTH. 

staff  to  distrust  the  feasibility  of  this  circuitous  route,  or,  indeed,  of 
any  concentration  with  Beauregard. 

At  Murfreesboro  were  now  concentrated  all  the  troops  east  of  the 
Tennessee  River  and  west  of  the  mountains.  It  was  here  that  Gen 
eral  Johnston  assumed  command,  of  the  army  on  the  23d  of  February, 
thus  relieving  Hardee,  who  had  thus  far  been  holding  the  immediate 
command.  As  has  been  seen,  there  were  fifteen  regiments  in  East 
Tennessee,  besides  Floyd's  force  of  2,500  men  sent  back  by  General 
Johnston  to  Chattanooga.  General  Johnston  reorganized  his  own 
army  (now  numbering  about  17,000  men)  at  Murfreesboro.  The  nu 
cleus  was  the  force  that  had  been  posted  near  Bowling  Green,  to  which 
was  added  Crittenden's  command  and  the  debris  of  Donelson.  The 
army  was  reorganized  in  three  divisions  under  Hardee,  Crittenden,  and 
Pillow  respectively  ;  with  a  reserve  brigade  under  Breckinridge,  and 
the  Texas  Rangers  and  Forrest's  cavalry  unattached.  The  brigade- 
commanders  were  Hindman,  Cleburne,  Carroll,  Statham,  "Wood,  Bowen, 
and  Breckinridge.  There  were  represented  in  the  army  thirty-five 
regiments  and  five  battalions  of  infantry,  seven  regiments  and  five  bat 
talions  of  cavalry,  and  twelve  batteries  of  artillery.  The  number  of 
organizations,  as  compared  with  the  effective  total,  evinces  that  they 
were  but  skeletons. 

The  strictest  regulations  were  adopted  for  the  restoration  of  disci 
pline  and  the  morale  of  the  army.  Orders  for  the  repression  of  strag 
gling  and  of  marauding  under  the  pretext  of  impressment  or  purchase 
were  rigid  and  thorough.  General  Johnston,  always  keenly  alive  to 
the  rights  of  citizens  and  of  their  helplessness  in  presence  of  an  army, 
warned  commanders  against  stripping  them  of  the  "  means  of  support 
even  for  the  necessities  of  the  army,"  and  ordered  safeguards  to  be 
granted  where  the  means  of  the  citizen  were  reduced  "  to  the  wants 
of  his  family." 

The  line  of  march  from  Murfreesboro  through  Shelby ville  and  Fay- 
etteville  to  Decatur  was  a  middle  route  between  the  railroad  to  Chatta 
nooga  and  the  turnpike  from  Nashville  through  Columbia  and  Pulaski. 
It  was  adopted  so  as  to  enable  the  Confederate  army  to  intercept  and 
give  battle  to  Buell,  in  case  he  should  advance  by  any  of  these  three 
roads.  The  movement  was  covered  by  a  cloud  of  cavalry,  Helm's  First 
Kentucky,  Scott's  Louisiana,  Wirt  Adams's  Mississippi,  and  by  For 
rest's  and  Morgan's  commands,  who  were  bold  and  energetic  in  harass 
ing  the  enemy.  The  incessant  rains,  varying  from  a  drizzle  to  a  tor 
rent,  flooded  the  roads,  washed  away  bridges,  and  made  encampment 
almost  intolerable  and  marching  nearly  impossible.  General  Hodge, 
in  his  sketch,  says  of  the  road  taken  : 

Lying,  for  the  most  part,  through  cultivated  and  deep  bottoms,  on  the  edge 
of  Northern  Alabama  it  rises  abruptly  to  cross  the  great  plateau  thrown  out 


MORGAN'S  FIRST  RAIDS.  509 

from  the  Cumberland  Mountains,  here  nearly  a  thousand  feet  above  the  sur 
rounding  country  and  full  forty  miles  in  width,  covered  with  dense  forests  of 
timber,  yet  barren  and  sterile  in  soil,  and.  wholly  destitute  of  supplies  for  either 
man  or  beast.  Two  weeks  of  unintermitting  rain  had  softened  the  earth  until 
the  surface  resembled  a  vast  swamp.  .  .  . 

During  his  retreat,  General  Johnston's  movements  were  well  covered 
by  his  cavalry,  who  also  brought  him  full  information  of  the  enemy. 
Scott's  gallant  action  has  already  been  mentioned.  Captain  John  H. 
Morgan  here  first  began  to  win  his  reputation  as  a  raider.  "  The  raid  " 
— a  wild  dash  at  the  enemy's  communications — is,  of  course,  as  old  as 
warfare.  But  Morgan,  and  after  him,  Stuart,  Forrest,  and  others,  made 
it  historic  and  heroic.  For  the  raid,  the  torpedo,  and  the  ram — a  modi 
fied  revival  of  the  old  Roman  beaked  vessel — legitimate  modern  war 
fare  is  indebted  to  the  Confederates. 

Morgan's  first  raid  was  begun  on  the  afternoon  of  March  7th.  With 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Wood,  ten  rangers,  and  fifteen  of  his  own  squadron, 
he  advanced  along  by-roads  eighteen  miles  from  Murfreesboro  toward 
Nashville  that  day,  and  on  the  next  morning  marched  until  he  came 
opposite  the  lunatic  asylum,  near  Nashville.  Here  he  commenced  over 
hauling  the  trains  as  they  came  along,  capturing  and  disarming  the 
men,  until  he  had  ninety-eight  prisoners,  including  several  officers. 
Returning  in  three  parties,  one  was  pursued  by  the  Fourth  Ohio  Cav 
alry,  and  obliged  to  abandon  sixty  of  the  prisoners.  They  brought  in 
thirty-eight  prisoners,  however,  with  a  large  number  of  horses,  mules, 
sabres,  pistols,  saddles,  etc. 

Encouraged  by  this  essay,  he  and  Colonel  Wood,  with  forty  men, 
again  set  out  from  Murfreesboro,  secretly  and  in  separate  parties,  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  15th.  They  made  a  rapid  march,  reaching  Galla- 
tin,  on  the  Louisville  &  Nashville  Railroad,  twenty-six  miles  north  of 
Nashville,  at  4  p.  M.  next  day.  Here  he  seized  the  telegraph-office, 
with  several  of  Buell's  dispatches,  and  burned  all  the  rolling-stock  and 
water-tank  of  the  railroad  at  that  place.  He  returned  with  five  prison 
ers,  through  the  enemy's  lines,  to  Shelbyville. 

On  the  28th  of  February,  the  army  took  up  the  line  of  march, 
Hindman's  brigade  in  advance,  and  Hardee  covering  the  rear  with  all 
the  cavalry.  Orders  prescribed  twelve  to  fifteen  miles  a  day  as  the 
march.  The  hardships  endured  have  perhaps  been  sufficiently  outlined. 
A  soldier  present  in  the  campaign  says  1  of  this  retreat : 

The  difficulties  attending  it  were  great,  but  a  more  orderly  and  more  success 
ful  one,  under  all  the  circumstances,  was  perhaps  never  accomplished.  Popular 
indignation,  even  rage,  blind  but  full  of  confidence  and  of  such  force  as  would 
have  goaded  common  minds  into  desperation,  was  poured  out  upon  the  head  of 

1  Thompson's  "  History  of  the  First  Kentucky  Brigade,"  p.  79. 


510  FROM   MURFREE3BORO   TO   CORINTH. 

the  commander.  The  wintry  season,  inclement,  unpropitious  beyond  measure 
for  such  an  undertaking,  was  calculated  both  to  tax  the  skill  of  the  general  and 
destroy  the  martial  ardor,  even  the  ordinary  morale,  of  the  troops.  Dangers 
menaced  the  retreating  array  as  much  as  hardships  crowded  upon  its  course.  .  .  . 
Demoralization,  almost  unavoidably  consequent  upon  the  state  of  the  public 
mind  and  the  nature  of  a  retreat,  threatened  to  destroy  the  efficiency  of  bodies 
of  troops  who  could  not  have  been  spared  in  case  of  an  attack.  And  the  state 
of  the  weather — heavy  rains  having  set  in  before  the  command  had  quitted  the 
vicinity  of  Nashville — foreboded  evil,  in  retarding  if  not  arresting  the  prorress 
of  the  army,  by  swollen  streams  and  impassable  mud.  But  everything  went  on 
with  a  regularity  and  a  degree  of  order  that  seemed  to  have  been  the  result  of 
circumstances  working  in  entire  harmony  with  the  plans  of  a  great  general, 
instead  of  having  been  adverse  at  every  step  ;  and  he  reached  Corinth  with  so 
little  loss  of  men  or  munition  as  to  mark  him  one  of  the  first  administrative 
minds  of  his  age  and  country. 

Duke  says  ("Life  of  Morgan,"  page  118)  : 

When  the  line  of  march  was  taken  up,  and  the  heads  of  the  columns  were 
still  turned  southward,  the  dissatisfaction  of  the  troops  broke  out  into  fresh  and 
frequent  murmurs.  Discipline,  somewhat  restored  at  Murfreesboro,  had  been 
too  much  relaxed  by  the  scenes  witnessed  at  Nashville,  to  impose  much  restraint 
upon  them.  Unjust  as  it  was,  officers  and  men.  concurred  in  laying  the  whole 
burden  of  blame  upon  General  Johnston.  Many  a  voice  was  then  raised  to 
denounce  him,  which  has  since  been  enthusiastic  in  his  praise,  and  many  joined 
in  the  clamor,  then  almost  universal  against  him,  who,  a  few  weeks  later,  when 
he  lay  dead  upon  the  field  he  had  so  gallantly  fcught,  would  have  given  their 
own  lives  to  recall  him. 

The  extracts  from  narratives  and  letters,  which  will  be  quoted,  give 
an  idea  of  the  p'anic  and  rage  stirred  up  by  the  evacuation  of  Nashville, 
and  the  evident  intention  to  retreat  from  the  State.  The  wrath  and 
terror,  so  strikingly  exhibited  in  Nashville,  spread  with  incredible 
rapidity  over  the  whole  State.  Bounds  could  scarcely  be  set  to  the 
fury  and  despair  of  the  people.  Every  hamlet  resounded  with  denun 
ciation,  and  every  breast  was  filled  with  indignation  at  the  author  of 
such  calamities.  Those  who  had  refused  to  listen  to  his  warning  voice, 
when  it  called  them  to  arms,  were  loudest  in  their  passionate  outcry  at 
what  they  considered  a  base  desertion  of  them  to  the  mercies  of  the 
invader.  General  Johnston  was,  of  course,  the  special  target  of  every 
accusation,  including  imbecility,  cowardice,  and  treason.  These  rash 
charges  were  not  confined  to  the  ignorant,  the  malicious,  or  the  dis 
affected.  It  is  true  that  men  with  supposed  grievances  against  the 
Government,  the  cause,  or  the  commander,  seized  the  occasion  to  vent 
their  spleen  ;  and  that  demagogues,  eager  for  aggrandizement  at  any 
price,  joined  in  and  directed  the  wild  hunt  for  a  victim.  But  every 
class  helped  to  augment  the  volume  of  protest  and  appeal  to  the  Presi- 


POPULAR  FURY.  511 

dent,  demanding  General  Johnston's  removal.  Indeed,  the  greater  the 
stake  and  the  more  violent  the  revulsion  of  patriotic  fervor,  the  bitterer 
•was  the  disappointment,  and  the  more  vindictive  the  feeling.  Every 
where,  above,  below,  with  louder  and  deeper  swell,  came  from  a  whole 
people — noble,  but  mistaken,  and  with  passions  strung  to  the  highest 
pitch — the  terrible  demand  for  vengeance.  And  the  victim  required  by 
them — the  man  most  ready,  most  willing  to  suffer  as  a  sacrifice,  if  it 
would  avail  aught ! 

The  press  leveled  its  shafts  at  President  Davis.  One  of  the  most 
rabid  of  the  fire-eating  journals  in  the  South  used  this  language,  which 
is  given  as  a  sample : 

Shall  the  cause  fail  because  Mr.  Davis  is  incompetent?  The  people  of  the 
Confederacy  must  answer  this  plain  question  at  once,  or  they  are  lost.  Tennes 
see,  under  Sidney  Johnston,  is  likely  to  be  lost.  Mr.  Davis  retains  him.  Van 
Dorn  writes  that  Missouri  must  ~be  abandoned  unless  the  claims  of  Price  are 
recognized.  Mr.  Davis  will  not  send  in  his  nomination.  A  change  in  the  cabi 
net  is  demanded  instantly,  to  restore  public  confidence.  Mr.  Davis  is  motion 
less  as  a  clod.  Buell's  proclamation  to  the  people  of  Nashville  has  disposed  the 
young  men,  already  dissatisfied  with  Johnston,  to  lay  down  their  arms,  and 
paved  the  way  to  the  campaign  of  invasion  in  the  Mississippi  Valley.  Mr.  Davis 
remains  as  cold  as  ice.  The  people  must  know,  and  feel,  and.be  felt.  The 
Government  must  be  made  to  move. 

A  writer  in  one  of  the  public  prints  at  the  time,  evidently  with  good 
will,  confidence,  and  respect,  toward  General  Johnston,  but  somewhat 
timidly,  as  if  overawed  by  public  opinion,  called  for  "  charity  "  to  his 
conduct.  Among  other  statements  he  says: 

Special  correspondents,  not  satisfied  with  charges  of  stupidity,  must  de 
nounce  him  as  corrupt.  So  complete  is  the  revulsion  of  public  sentiment,  that 
soldiers,  when  enlisting,  make  it  a  condition  that  they  shall  not  be  placed  under 
General  Johnston.  This  precipitate  and  unmeasured  condemnation  must  neces 
sarily  cripple  him.  Whatever  ability  he  possesses  will  be  rendered  ineffectual 
through  a  want  of  confidence  which  will  withhold  from  him  the  means  of  mak 
ing  his  skill  available. 

Some  of  the  telegrams  addressed  to  the  President  are  here  given,  as 
illustrations  of  the  universal  feeling.  But  it  would  be  unjust  to  the 
writers  to  give  their  names,  and  thus  perpetuate  their  mistake,  for 
which  most  of  them  afterward  felt  and  expressed  a  sincere  regret.  An 
ex-member  of  the  United  States  Congress,  in  whose  house  General  John 
ston  made  his  headquarters,  telegraphed  President  Davis : 

Nothing  but  your  presence  here  can  save  Tennessee.     General  Johnston's 
army  is  demoralized.     Your  presence  will  reassure  it,  and  will  save  Tennessee. 
Nothing  else  can.    For  God's  sake,  come  ! 
34 


512  FROM  MURFREESBORO  TO  CORINTH. 

An  officer  who  overheard  its  transmission  reported  the  fact  to  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  who  replied :  "  I  was  aware  of  his  distrust.  Take  no 
notice  of  it." 

An  officer,  high  in  the  staff  of  the  army,  and  influential — a  Missis- 
sippian — telegraphed  thus : 

MEMPHIS,  March  1, 1862. 

If  Johnston  and  Hardee  are  not  removed,  the  army  is  demoralized.  Presi 
dent  Davis  must  come  here  and  take  the  field. 

A  member  of  the  Confederate  Congress  telegraphed  as  follows  : 

ATLANTA,  March  11, 1S62. 

I  have  been  with  and  near  General  Johnston's  army  ever  since  he  was  as 
signed  command — have  been  his  admirer  and  defender — still  admire  him  as  a 
man;  but,  in  my  judgment,  his  errors  of  omission,  commission,  and  delay,  have 
been  greater  than  any  general's  who  ever  preceded  him,  in  any  country.  [He 
has]  inexcusably  and  culpably  lost  us  12,000  men,  the  Mississippi  Valley,  and 
comparatively  all  provisions  stored,  by  one  dash  of  the  enemy.  This  is  the 
almost  unanimous  judgment  of  officers,  soldiers,  and  citizens.  Neither  is  it  mere 
opinion,  but  is  demonstrable  by  dates,  facts,  figures,  and  disastrous  results.  He 
never  can  reorganize  and  reenforce  his  army,  with  any  confidence. 

The  people  now  look  to  you  as  their  deliverer,  and  imploringly  call  upon  you 
to  come  to  the  field  of  our  late  disasters  and  assume  command,  as  you  promised 
in  a  speech  to  take  the  field  whenever  it  should  become  necessary.  That  neces 
sity  is  now  upon  us.  Such  a  step  would  be  worth  a  hundred  thousand  soldiers 
throughout  the  Confederacy.  Can  you,  then,  hesitate  ?  We  cannot  survive  the 
permanent  loss  of  Tennessee  and  Kentucky  for  the  war.  They  must  be  imme 
diately  retaken,  at  all  hazards,  or  great  suffering  for  provisions  and  forage  is  the 
inevitable  and  immediate  consequence.  If  your  presence  is  impossible,  for  God's 
sake  give  immediate  command  to  Beauregard,  Bragg,  or  Breckinridge,  or  all  will 
be  irretrievably  lost.  Save  us  while  it  is  yet  time.  I  will  be  in  Richmond  next 
week. 

Such  was  the  reversal  of  opinion  afterward  in  this  matter  that,  soon 
after  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  this  gentleman  voluntarily,  and  with  tears, 
expressed  to  the  writer  his  "remorse  for  this  telegram,  which  could 
only  be  accounted  for  by  the  panic  that  had  unhinged  everybody."  It 
is  due  to  him  to  say  that  he  but  expressed  the  popular  verdict — the 
public  opinion  with  which  he  came  in  contact. 

It  will  be  seen  that  every  one  of  these  telegrams  contains  a  most 
subtile  appeal  to  the  powerful  instinct  of  self-love ;  and  it  is  creditable 
to  the  calmness  of  President  Davis's  judgment,  as  well  as  to  the  con 
stancy  of  his  friendship,  that  he  took  them  at  their  true  value.  He, 
almost  alone,  remained  unmoved  ;  and  that  intrepidity  of  intellectual 
conviction,  characteristic  of  him,  so  often  and  so  mistakenly  called  his 
obstinacy,  saved  the  Confederacy,  not  only  from  a  great  injustice,  but 
from  a  great  mistake.  He  not  only  lent  his  moral  support  to  General 


THE  PRESIDENT  AND   CONGRESS. 


513 


Johnston,  the  weight  of  his  great  name — then  a  tower  of  strength  with 
the  Southern  people — but  he  ordered,  to  reenforce  him  at  Corinth,  from 
the  Gulf  coast,  Bragg's  fresh,  disciplined,  splendid  army,  10,000  strong. 

All  President  Davis's  power  was  needed  to  retain  General  John 
ston  in  his  position.  Congress  took  the  matter  in  hand ;  and,  though 
the  feeling  there  resulted  merely  in  a  committee  of  inquiry,  it  was 
evident  that  the  case  was  prejudged. 

The  resolutions  passed  by  the  Confederate  House  of  Representa 
tives  created  a  special  committee  "  to  inquire  into  the  military  disasters 
at  Fort  Henry  and  Fort  Donelson,  and  the  surrender  of  Nashville  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy,"  and  as  to  the  conduct,  number,  and  disposition, 
of  the  troops  under  General  Johnston.  Great  feeling  was  shown  in  the 
debates. 


j     I!    K'EXTUCKY       L.Wponelson 

•T^fer- — 


Boyd's  Landing       AT          5  Vrj-'Uv  <-*K>ra 


In  response  to  the  attempt  of  Mr.  Moore,  of  Kentucky,  to  put  in  a 
plea  for  General  Johnston,  Mr.  Foote,  of  Tennessee,  asked  "  if  the  gen 
tleman  would  advocate  the  continuance  of  any  man  in  command  when 
the  soldiers  under  him  had  lost  confidence  in  him." 

The  writer  believes  he  may  now  safely  say,  without  fear  of  contra 
diction  among  the  Southern  people,  that  General  Johnston  was  too 
calm,  too  just,  and  too  magnanimous,  to  misapprehend  or  resent  so 
natural  a  manifestation.  His  whole  life  had  been  a  training  for  this 
occasion.  To  encounter  suddenly  and  endure  calmly  the  obloquy  of  a 
whole  nation  is,  to  any  man,  a  great  burden.  To  do  this  with  a  seren- 


514  FROM  MURFREESBORO  TO  CORIXTH. 

ity  that  shall  not  only  not  falter  in  duty,  but  restore  confidence,  obtain 
the  best  possible  results,  and  organize  victory,  is  conclusive  proof  of  a 
greatness  of  soul  rarely  equaled. 

But,  while  the  storm  of  execration  raged  around  him,  the  men 
who  came  into  immediate  contact  with  General  Johnston  never  for  a 
moment  doubted  his  ability  to  perform  all  that  was  possible  to  man. 
Among  these,  the  Kentuckians,  who  felt  that  his  camp  was  their  only 
ark  in  the  revolutionary  deluge,  as  a  rule  gave  him  their  confidence. 
This  was  possibly  due  to  State  pride  in  his  nativity  ;  but  probably  still 
more  to  the  presence  on  his  staff  of  several  able  and  popular  citizens 
of  that  State.  The  Texans,  too,  never  faltered  in  their  trust  in  him, 
approved  by  so  many  years  of  trial. 

John  A.  Wharton,  then  colonel,  afterward  major-general,  a  man 
sagacious,  able,  and  eloquent,  wrote  to  him,  from  a  sick-bed,  March  14th : 

I  trust  the  Rangers  will  be  kept  as  near  you  as  the  good  of  the  service  will 
permit;  and  that  they  will  not  be  deprived,  under  any  circumstances,  from  par 
ticipating  in  the  first  battle.  The  esteem  and  admiration  of  every  honest  man 
must  be  desirable  to  any  man,  no  matter  how  exalted  his  position  ;  and,  under 
present  circumstances,  I  feel  it  is  not  inappropriate  in  me  to  say  that  I  regard 
you  as  the  best  soldier  in  America,  and  that  I  desire  to  fight  under  no  other 
leadership,  and  that  such  is  the  feeling  of  the  Texas  Eangers. 

This  was  not  according  to  regulations — a  subordinate  commending 
his  superior ;  but  it  -was  no  time  for  conventionalities,  as  Wharton's 
vigorous  sense  clearly  saw.  R.  Scurry,  well  known  in  the  early  annals 
of  Texas,  wrote  from  Hempstead,  Texas,  March  15th : 

I  fully  approve  of  your  movements.  I  have  all  the  enthusiasm  and  feelings 
of  '36  upon  me.  I  hope  for  the  best.  "With  an  ear  deaf  to  popular  clamor,  pur 
sue  your  course  and  follow  the  dictates  of  your  own  reason,  and  fame  will  be 
your  reward. 

Love  and  others  also  wrote  to  him  in  the  same  spirit. 

Quotations  have  already  been  made  from  an  able  article  from  the 
incisive  pen  of  Woolley  ;  other  Kentuckians  took  the  same  view  ;  but 
one  of  the  most  gratifying  testimonials  was  a  letter,  quoted  hereafter, 
from  the  provisional  Governor,  George  W.  Johnson,  which  might  prop 
erly  be  added  as  a  companion-piece  to  his  energetic  protest  against  the 
evacuation  of  Bowling  Green. 

A  correspondent  of  the  Mobile  Register  said : 

I  remember  well  being  with  him  one  evening  at  Murfreesboro,  after  the  re 
treat  from  Nashville,  when,  in  the  course  of  conversation,  I  urged  that  he  should, 
in  justice  to  himself,  make  an  explanation  to  the  people.  "Ah  !  my  dear  friend," 
he  replied,  "  I  cannot  correspond  with  the  people.  What  the  people  want  is  a 
battle  and  a  victory.  That  is  the  best  explanation  I  can  make.  I  require  no 
vindication.  I  trust  that  to  the  future."  Noble,  glorious,  self-sacrificing  heart ! 


MORAL  POWER.  515 

He  required  no  newspaper  vindication,  because  he  was  conscious  that  he  had 
taken  the  only  course  to  save  his  little  army.  If  there  was  censure  deserved, 
the  people  would  find  out  in  the  future  where  it  should  rest.  Thus  the  great, 
magnanimous  and  chivalric  Johnston  bared  his  head  to  the  storm  of  anathema 
and  denunciation,  without  a  murmur  of  complaint  or  any  attempt  to  shield  him 
self  from  its  fury. 

The  respect  due  these  men  is  that  which  was  paid  the  consul  who, 
after  Cannae,  did  not  despair  of  the  republic. 

Colonel  Munford  says  in  his  address  at  Memphis,  heretofore  quoted: 

When  we  left  Nashville  for  Murfreesboro  the  trip  was  made  in  the  night, 
because  the  army,  with  their  wagons  and  artillery,  would  then  be  encamped, 
and  the  road  clear.  About  ten  o'clock  that  night  a  very  heavy  rain  commenced 
falling,  and  General  Johnston  called  for  me  to  exchange  my  horse  for  his  driver's 
seat  beside  him,  and  get  into  a  little  carriage  in  which  he  was.  We  were  alone, 
and  the  conversation  soon  became  free  and  full  about  recent  events.  I  told  him 
he  had  begun  to  see  and  hear  something  of  the  clamor  his  retreat  was  causing. 
"Oh,  yes,"  he  said,  "but  you  know  I  anticipated  this.  It  will  last  no  longer 
than  is  necessary  for  me  to  be  in  condition  to  fight  a  battle.  As  soon  as  I  get 
men  enough,  I  have  no  fear  but  that  this  clamor  will  become  praise." 

Thus  looking  for  it  to  come,  as  well  as  facing  it  when  in  its  midst,  he  viewed 
and  treated  it  with  the  same  philosophic  calmness  and  just  appreciation.  That, 
as  a  good  man,  General  Johnston  felt  the  censures  of  his  countrymen  is  abso 
lutely  certain  ;  but  that,  as  a  wise  man,  he  estimated  them  at  their  true  value, 
and,  as  a  manly  man,  deviated  neither  to  the  right  hand  nor  to  the  left  from  the 
path  of  duty  on  account  of  them,  is  equally  certain. 

General  Preston  also  states  to  the  writer  that  General  Johnston 
felt  complete  confidence  in  his  ability  to  reorganize  his  army,  and  to 
strike  such  a  blow  as  would  not  only  restore  the  confidence  of  his  com 
patriots,  but  would  turn  the  tide  of  defeat  into  a  career  of  victory. 
Whoever  spoke  to  him,  whoever  saw  him,  went  away,  not  so  much 
touched  with  the  pathos  and  the  difficulties  of  his  great  ordeal,  as  san 
guine  of  success  and  eager  for  a  trial  of  arms  with  the  foe.  As  the  re 
treat  was  converted  into  an  evident  march  against  the  enemy,  the  spirit 
of  the  army  rose  from  the  depths  into  a  passionate  and  exultant  thirst 
for  the  combat.  Munford  says  : 

He  had  no  self-seeking.  He  honestly  believed  that  the  South  was  right, 
and  the  cause  of  constitutional  liberty  in  America  bound  up  in  her  fate.  In 
joining  her  standard,  therefore,  he  was  actuated  by  such  convictions  of  duty 
that  he  had  no  trouble  in  keeping  his  eye  fixed  singly  upon  her  success.  As  il 
lustrative  of  this,  of  his  magnanimity  and  absolute  justice,  I  will  notice  his  treat 
ment  of  Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow,  in  the  very  midst  of  the  denunciations 
poured  out  upon  him  for  losing  the  army  at  Donelson.  He  received  them  both 
with  the  utmost  kindness,  and  made  Floyd  at  once  commandant  of  the  post  at 
Nashville.  After  we  had  reached  Murfreesboro,  I  asked  him  what  he  thought 
of  their  conduct.  He  replied :  "  The  official  reports  are  not  yet  before  me.  I 


516  FROM   MURFREESBORO   TO   CORINTH. 

do  not  think  it  would  be  just  to  those  gentlemen  to  permit  myself  to  form  an 
opinion  till  they  have  stated  the  facts  in  an  authentic  form."  At  Decatur,  he 
voluntarily  said  to  me,  "  I  intend  to  sustain  Floyd  and  Pillow.  Their  conduct 
was  irregular,  but  its  repetition  may  be  avoided  by  a  simple  order.  They  are 
both  men  of  tried  courage,  and  have  had  experience  in  the  field.  TVe  have  too 
few  officers  possessed  of  these  advantages,  and  the  country  needs  them.  I  think 
it  my  duty  to  sustain  them,  and  shall  do  so."  How  rare  the  man,  thus  goaded 
by  abuse,  who,  unheeding  self,  would  do  alone  as  duty  bid ! 

On  the  16th  of  March,  however,  he  received  a  letter  from  the  Secre 
tary  of  War,  dated  March  llth,  which  closed  that  question.  Mr.  Ben 
jamin  says : 

The  reports  of  Brigadier-Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow  are  unsatisfactory,  and 
the  President  directs  that  both  these  generals  be  relieved  from  command  until 
further  orders.  In  the  mean  time  you  will  request  them  to  add  to  their  reports 
such  statements  as  they  may  deem  proper  on  the  following  points. 

The  Secretary  then  propounded  a  number  of  interrogatories,  relating 
to  matters  which  have  been  already  fully  discussed.  He  concludes  : 

You  are  further  requested  to  make  up  a  report  from  all  the  sources  of  in 
formation  accessible  to  you,  of  all  the  particulars  connected  with  the  unfortunate 
affair  which  can  contribute  to  enlighten  the  judgment  of  the  Executive  and  of 
Congress,  and  to  fix  the  blame,  if  blame  there  be,  on  those  who  were  delinquent 
in  duty. 

Out  of  this  matter  and  the  general  situation  in  the  West  arose  an 
unofficial  correspondence,  which  has  been  published  in  part.  General 
Johnston's  letter  of  March  18th  has  been  much  admired,  and  comment 
upon  it  by  the  present  writer  is  not  called  for.  President  Davis's  let 
ters  are  also  given  in  full,  and  will  be  found  to  reflect  equal  credit  on 
his  head  and  heart. 

[Telegram.] 

HUNTSVTLLE,  March  1 — 11  A.  JL 

YOUE  dispatch  is  just  received.  I  sent  Colonel  Liddell  to  Richmond  on  the 
28th  ult.,  with  the  official  reports  of  Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow  of  the  events  at 
Donelson,  and  suppose  that  he  must  have  arrived  by  this  time.  I  also  sent  by 
him  a  dispatch,  containing  my  purposes  for  the  defense  of  the  valley  of  the 
Mississippi,  and  for  cooperating  or  uniting  with  General  Beauregard,  who  has 
been  urging  me  to  come  on. 

The  stores  accumulated  at  Murfreesboro,  the  pork  and  provisions  at  Shelby- 
ville  and  other  points,  and  their  necessary  protection  and  removal,  with  the  bad 
roads  and  inclement  weather,  have  made  the  march  slow  and  laborious,  and 
delayed  my  movements.  The  general  condition  of  the  troops  is  good  and  effec 
tive,  though  their  health  is  impaired  by  the  usual  camp  disasters  and  a  winter 
campaign. 

The  fall  of  Donelson  disheartened  some  of  the  Tennessee  troops,  and  caused 
many  desertions  from  some  of  the  new  regiments,  so  that  great  care  was  re- 


DAVIS'S  GEXEROUS  LETTER.  517 

quired  to  inspire  confidence.  I  now  consider  the  tone  of  the  troops  restored, 
and  that  they  are  in  good  order.  The  enemy  are  about  25,000  strong  at  Nash 
ville,  with  reinforcements  arriving.  My  rear-guard,  under  General  Hardee,  is 
protecting  the  removal  of  provisions  from  Shelbyville.  Last  evening  his  pickets 
were  near  Murfreesboro,  but  gave  no  information  of  an  advance  by  the  enemy. 
There  are  no  indications  of  an  immediate  movement  by  the  enemy  from  Nash 
ville.  I  have  no  fears  of  a  movement  through  Tennessee  on  Chattanooga.  West 
Tennessee  is  menaced  by  heavy  forces.  My  advance  will  be  opposite  Decatur 
on  Sunday. 

(Signed)  A.  S.  JOHNSTOX,  General  0.  S.  A. 

To  President  DAVIS,  Richmond. 


EICHMOND,  VIRGINIA,  March  12, 1862. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL:  The  departure  of  Captain  Wickliffe  offers  an  oppor 
tunity,  of  which  I  avail  myself,  to  write  you  an  unofficial  letter.  We  have  suf 
fered  great  anxiety  because  of  recent  events  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee ;  and  I 
have  been  not  a  little  disturbed  by  the  repetitions  of  reflections  upon  yourself. 
I  expected  you  to  have  made  a  full  report  of  events  precedent  and  consequent  to 
the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson.  In  the  mean  time  I  made  for  you  such  defense  as 
friendship  prompted,  and  many  years  of  acquaintance  justified ;  but  I  needed 
facts  to  rebut  the  wholesale  assertions  made  against  you  to  cover  others  and  to 
condemn  my  administration.  The  public,  as  you  are  aware,  have  no  correct 
measure  for  military  operations ;  and  the  journals  are  very  reckless  in  their 
statements. 

Your  force  has  been  magnified,  and  the  movements  of  an  army  have  been 
measured  by  the  capacity  for  locomotion  of  an  individual. 

The  readiness  of  the  people  among  whom  you  are  operating  to  aid  you  in 
every  method  has  been  constantly  asserted ;  the  purpose  of  your  army  at  Bowl 
ing  Green  wholly  misunderstood ;  and  the  absence  of  an  effective  force  at  Nash 
ville  ignored.  You  have  been  held  responsible  for  the  fall  of  Donelson  and  the 
capture  of  Nashville.  It  is  'charged  that  no  effort  was  made  to  save  the  stores 
at  Nashville,  and  that  the  panic  of  the  people  was  caused  by  the  army. 

Such  representations,  with  the  sad  forebodings  naturally  belonging  to  them, 
have  been  painful  to  me,  and  injurious  to  us  both;  but,  worse  than  this,  they 
have  undermined  public  confidence,  and  damaged  our  cause.  A  full  develop 
ment  of  the  truth  is  necessary  for  future  success. 

I  respect  the  generosity  which  has  kept  you  silent,  but  would  impress  upon 
you  that  the  question  is  not  personal  but  public  in  its  nature ;  that  you  and  I 
might  be  content  to  suffer,  but  neither  of  us  can  willingly  permit  detriment  to 
the  country.  As  soon  as  circumstances  will  permit,  it  is  my  purpose  to  visit 
the  field  of  your  present  operations;  not  that  I  should  expect  to  give  you  any 
aid  in  the  discharge  of  your  duties  as  a  commander,  but  with  the  hope  that  my 
position  would  enable  me  to  effect  something  in  bringing  men  to  your  standard. 
With  a  sufficient  force,  the  audacity  which  the  enemy  exhibits  would  no  doubt 
give  you  the  opportunity  to  cut  some  of  his  lines  of  communication,  to  break 
up  his  plan  of  campaign ;  and,  defeating  some  of  his  columns,  to  drive  him  from 
the  soil  as  well  of  Kentucky  as  of  Tennessee. 

We  are  deficient  in  arms,  wanting  in  discipline,  and  inferior  in  numbers. 
Private  arms  must  supply  the  first  want ;  time  and  the  presence  of  an  enemy, 


518  FROM  MURFREESBORO  TO   CORINTH. 

with  diligence  on  the  part  of  commanders,  will  remove  the  second ;  and  public 
confidence  will  overcome  the  third.  General  Bragg  brings  you  disciplined 
troops,  and  you  will  find  in  him  the  highest  administrative  capacity.  General 
E.  K.  Smith  will  soon  have  in  East  Tennessee  a  sufficient  force  to  create  a  strong 
diversion  in  your  favor ;  or,  if  his  strength  cannot  be  made  available  in  that 
way,  you  will  best  know  how  to  employ  it  otherwise.  I  suppose  the  Tennessee 
or  Mississippi  River  will  be  the  object  of  the  enemy's  next  campaign,  and  I 
trust  you  will  be  able  to  concentrate  a  force  which  will  defeat  either  attempt. 
The  fleet  which  you  will  soon  have  on  the  Mississippi  River,  if  the  enemy's  gun 
boats  ascend  the  Tennessee,  may  enable  you  to  strike  an  effective  blow  at  Cairo ; 
but,  to  one  so  well  informed  and  vigilant,  I  will  not  assume  to  offer  suggestions 
as  to  when  and  how  the  ends  you  seek  may  be  attained.  With  the  confidence 
and  regard  of  many  years,  I  am  very  truly  your  friend, 

JEFFERSON  DAVIS. 


DECATUR,  ALABAMA,  March  18, 1862. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL:  I  received  the  dispatches  from  Richmond,  with  your 
private  letter  by  Captain  Wickliffe,  three  days  since ;  but  the  pressure  of  affairs 
and  the  necessity  of  getting  my  command  across  the  Tennessee  prevented  me 
from  sending  you  an  earlier  reply. 

I  anticipated  all  that  you  tell  as  to  the  censures  which  the  fall  of  Fort  Donel- 
son  drew  upon  me,  and  the  attacks  to  which  you  might  be  subjected ;  but  it  was 
impossible  for  me  to  gather  the  facts  for  a  detailed  report,  or  spare  time  which 
was  required  to  extricate  the  remainder  of  my  troops  and  save  the  large  accumu 
lation  of  stores  and  provisions,  after  that  disheartening  disaster. 

I  transmitted  the  reports  of  Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow  without  examining  or 
analyzing  the  facts,  and  scarcely  with  time  to  read  them. 

"When  about  to  assume  command  of  this  department,  the  Government  charged 
me  with  the  duty  of  deciding  the  question  of  occupying  Bowling  Green,  which 
involved  not  only  military  but  political  considerations.  At  the  time  of  my  arrival 
at  Nashville,  the  action  of  the  Legislature  of  Kentucky  had  put  an  end  to  the 
latter  by  sanctioning  the  formation  of  camps  menacing  Tennessee,  by  assuming 
the  cause  of  the  Government  at  Washington,  and  by  abandoning  the  neutrality 
it  professed  ;  and  in  consequence  of  their  action  the  occupation  of  Bowling  Green 
became  necessary  as  an  act  of  self-defense,  at  least  in  the  first  step. 

About  the  middle  of  September  General  Buckner  advanced  with  a  small  force 
of  about  4, 000  men,  which  was  increased  by  the  15th  of  October  to  12,000  ;  and, 
though  accessions  of  force  were  received,  continued  at  about  the  same  strength 
till  the  end  of  the  month  of  November,  measles,  etc.,  keeping  down  the  effective 
force.  The  enemy's  force  then  was,  as  reported  to  the  War  Department,  50,000, 
and  an  advance  impossible.  No  enthusiasm,  as  we  imagined  and  hoped,  but 
hostility,  was  manifested  in  Kentucky.  Believing  it  to  be  of  the  greatest  moment 
to  protract  the  campaign,  as  the  dearth  of  cotton  might  bring  strength  from 
abroad  and  discourage  the  North,  and  to  gain  time  to  strengthen  myself  by  new 
troops  from  Tennessee  and  other  States,  I  magnified  my  forces  to  the  enemy, 
bat  made  known  my  true  strength  to  the  department  and  the  Governors  of 
States.  The  aid  given  was  small.  At  length,  when  General  Beauregard  came 
out  in  February,  he  expressed  his  surprise  at  the  smallness  of  my  force,  and  was 
impressed  with  the  danger  of  my  position.  I  admitted  what  was  so  manifest, 


GENERAL  JOHNSTON'S  ANSWER.  519 

and  laid  before  him  my  views  for  the  future,  in  which  he  entirely  concurred, 
and  sent  me  a  memorandum  of  our  conference,  a  copy  of  which  I  send  to  you. 
I  determined  to  fight  for  Nashville  at  Donelson,  and  gave  the  best  part  of  my 
army  to  do  it,  retaining  only  14,000  men  to  cover  my  front,  and  giving  16,000 
to  defend  Donelson.  The  force  at  Donelson  is  stated  in  General  Pillow's  report 
at  much  less,  and  I  do  not  doubt  the  correctness  of  his  statement ;  for  the  force 
at  Bowling  Green,  which  I  supposed  14,000  effective  men  (the  medical  report 
showing  only  a  "little  over  500  sick  in  hospitals"),  was  diminished  more  than 
5,000  by  those  who  were  unable  to  stand  the  fatigue  of  a  march,  and  made  my 
force  on  reaching  Nashville  less  than  10,000  men.  I  inclose  medical  director's 
report.  Had  I  wholly  uncovered  my  front  to  defend  Donelson,  Buell  would 
have  known  it  and  marched  directly  on  Nashville.  There  were  only  ten  small 
steamers  in  the  Cumberland  in  imperfect  condition,  only  three  of  which  were 
available  at  Nashville,  while  the  transportation  of  the  enemy  was  great.  The 
evacuation  of  Bowling  Green  was  imperatively  necessary,  and  was  ordered  before 
and  executed  while  the  battle  was  being  fought  at  Donelson.  I  had  made  every 
disposition  for  the  defense  of  the  fort  my  means  allowed ;  and  the  troops  were 
among  the  best  of  my  forces,  and  the  generals,  Floyd,  Pillow,  and  Buckner,  were 
high  in  the  opinion  of  officers  and  men  for  skill  and  courage,  and  among  the  best 
officers  of  my  command  ;  they  were  popular  with  the  volunteers,  and  all  had 
seen  much  service.  No  reinforcements  were  asked.  I  wait'ed  the  event  oppo 
site  Nashville.  The  result  of  the  conflict  each  day  was  favorable.  At  midnight 
on  the  loth  I  received  the  news  of  a  glorious  victory;  at  dawn,  of  a  defeat. 
My  column  was  during  the  day  and  night  (of  the  16th)  thrown  over  the  river. 
A  battery  had  been  established  below  the  city  to  secure  the  passage.  Nashville 
was  incapable  of  defense  from  its  position,  and  from  the  forces  advancing  from 
Bowling  Green  and  up  the  Cumberland.  A  rear-guard  was  left,  under  General 
Floyd,  to  secure  the  stores  and  provisions,  but  did  not  completely  effect  the  ob 
ject.  The  people  were  terrified  and  some  of  the  troops  were  disheartened.  The 
discouragement  was  spreading,  and  I  ordered  the  command  to  Murfreesboro, 
where  I  managed,  by  assembling  Crittenden's  division,  and  the  fugitives  from 
Donelson,  to  collect  an  army  able  to  offer  battle.  The  weather  was  inclement, 
the  floods  excessive,  and  the  bridges  were  washed  away ;  but  most  of  the  stores 
and  provisions  were  saved,  and  conveyed  to  new  depots.  This  having  been  ac 
complished,  though  with  serious  loss,  in  conformity  with  my  original  design  I 
marched  southward  and  crossed  the  Tennessee  at  this  point,  so  as  to  cooperate 
or  unite  with  Beauregard  for  the  defense  of  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi.  The 
passage  is  almost  completed,  and  the  head  of  my  column  is  already  with  General 
Bragg  at  Corinth.  The  movement  was  deemed  too  hazardous  by  the  most  ex 
perienced  members  of  my  staff,  but  the  object  warranted  the  risk.  The  diffi 
culty  of  effecting  a  junction  is  not  wholly  overcome,  but  it  approaches  completion. 
Day  after  to-morrow  (22d),  unless  the  enemy  intercepts  me,  my  force  will  be 
with  Bragg — and  my  army  nearly  50,000  strong.  This  must  be  destroyed  before 
the  enemy  can  attain  his  object. 

I  have  given  you  this  sketch,  so  that  you  may  appreciate  the  embarrassments 
which  surrounded  me  in  my  attempts  to  avert  or  remedy  the  disaster  of  Donel 
son,  before  alluding  to  the  conduct  of  the  generals. 

When  the  force  was  detached,  I  was  in  hopes  that  such  dispositions  would 
have  been  made  as  would  have  enabled  the  forces  to  defend  the  fort  or  withdraw 


520  FROM  MURFREESBORO  TO  CORINTH. 

without  sacrificing  the  army.  On  the  14th  I  ordered  General  Floyd,  by  tele 
gram,  "  if  he  lost  the  fort  to  get  his  troops  back  to  Nashville."  It  is  possible 
this  might  have  been  done ;  but  justice  requires  to  look  at  events  as  they  ap 
peared  at  the  time,  and  not  alone  by  the  light  of  subsequent  information.  All 
the  facts  in  relation  to  the  surrender  will  be  transmitted  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
as  soon  as  they  can  be  collected  in  obedience  to  his  order.  It  appears  from  the 
information  received,  that  General  Buckner,  being  the  junior  officer,  took  the 
lead  in  advising  the  surrender,  and  General  Floyd  acquiesced,  and  they  all  con 
curred  in  the  belief  that  their  force  could  not  maintain  the  position.  All  con 
curred  that  it  would  involve  a  great  sacrifice  of  life  to  extricate  the  command. 
Subsequent  events  show  that  the  investment  was  not  so  complete  as  their  in 
formation  from  their  scouts  led  them  to  believe.  The  conference  resulted  in 
the  surrender.  The  command  was  irregularly  transferred,  and  devolved  on  the 
junior  general ;  but  not  apparently  to  avoid  any  just  responsibility,  or  from  any 
want  of  personal  or  moral  intrepidity.  The  blow  was  most  disastrous,  and 
almost  without  remedy.  I  therefore  in  my  first  report  remained  silent.  This 
silence  you  were  kind  enough  to  attribute  to  my  generosity.  I  will  not  lay 
claim  to  the  motive  to  excuse  my  course. 

I  observed  silence,  as  it  seemed  to  me  to  be  the  best  way  to  serve  the  cause 
and  the  country.  The  facts  were  not  fully  known,  discontent  prevailed,  and 
criticism  or  condemnation  was  more  likely  to  augment  than  cure  the  evil.  I 
refrained,  well  knowing  that  heavy  censures  would  fall  upon  me,  but  convinced 
that  it  was  better  to  endure  them  for  the  present,  and  defer  to  a  more  propitious 
time  an  investigation  of  the  conduct  of  the  generals ;  fo'r,  in  the  mean  time,  their 
services  were  required,  and  their  influence  was  useful.  For  these  reasons,  Gen 
erals  Floyd  and  Pillow  were  assigned  to  duty,  for  I  still  felt  confidence  in  their 
gallantry,  their  energy,  and  their  devotion  to  the  Confederacy. 

I  have  thus  recurred  to  the  motives  by  which  I  have  been  governed,  from  a 
deep  personal  sense  of  the  friendship  and  confidence  you  have  always  shown  me, 
and  from  the  conviction  that  they  have  not  been  withdrawn  from  me  in  adver 
sity.  All  the  reports  requisite  for  a  full  official  investigation  have  been  ordered. 
Generals  Floyd  and  Pillow  have  been  suspended  from  command.1 

You  mention  that  you  intend  to  visit  the  field  of  operations  here.  I  hope 
soon  to  see  you,  for  your  presence  would  encourage  my  troops,  inspire  the  peo 
ple,  and  augment  the  array.  To  me  personally  it  would  give  the  greatest  grati 
fication.  Merely  a  soldier  myself,  and  having  no  acquaintance  with  the  states 
men  or  leaders  of  the  South,  I  cannot  touch  springs  familiar  to  you.  Were  you 
to  assume  command,  it  would  afford  me  the  most  unfeigned  pleasure,  and  every 
energy  would  be  exerted  to  help  you  to  victory,  and  the  country  to  indepen 
dence.  Were  you  to  decline,  still  your  presence  alone  would  be  of  inestimable 
advantage. 

The  enemy  are  now  at  Nashville,  about  50,000  strong,  advancing  in  this  di 
rection  by  Columbia.  He  has  also  forces,  according  to  the  report  of  General 
Bragg,  landing  at  Pittsburg,  from  25,000  to  50,000,  and  moving  in  the  direction 
of  Purdy. 

This  arfny  corps,  moving  to  join  Bragg,  is  about  20,000  strong.  Two  bri 
gades,  Hindman's  and  Wood's,  are,  I  suppose,  at  Corinth.  One  regiment  of  Har- 

1  This  was  in  obedience  to  orders  from  the  War  Department. 


THE   TEST  OF  MERIT.  521 

dee's  division  (Lieutenant-Colonel  Patton  commanding)  is  moving  by  cars  to-day 
(20th  March),  and  Statham's  brigade  (Crittenden's  division).  The  brigade  will 
halt  at  luka,  the  regiment  at  Burnsville ;  Cleburne's  brigade,  Hardee's  division, 
except  regiment,  at  Burnsville ;  and  Carroll's  brigade,  Crittenden's  division,  and 
Helm's  cavalry,  at  Tuscumbia;  Bowen's  brigade  at  Cortland;  Breckinridge's 
brigade,  here ;  the  regiments  of  cavalry  of  Adams  and  Wharton,  on  the  oppo 
site  bank  of  the  river ;  Scott's  Louisiana  regiment  at  Pulaski,  sending  forward 
supplies  ;  Morgan's  cavalry  at  Shelby ville,  ordered  on. 

To-morrow,  Breckinridge's  brigade  will  go  to  Corinth ;  then  Bowen's.  When 
these  pass  Tuscumbia  and  luka,  transportation  will  be  ready  there  for  the  other 
troops  to  follow  immediately  from  those  points,  and,  if  necessary,  from  Burns 
ville.  The  cavalry  will  cross  and  move  forward  as  soon  as  their  trains  can  be 
passed  over  the  railroad-bridge. 

I  have  troubled  you  with  these  details,  as  I  cannot  properly  communicate 
them  by  telegram. 

The  test  of  merit  in  my  profession  with  the  people  is  success.  It  is  a  hard 
rule,  but  I  think  it  right.  If  I  join  this  corps  to  the  forces  of  Beauregard  (I  con 
fess  a  hazardous  experiment),  then  those  who  are  now  declaiming  against  me 
will  be  without  an  argument.  Your  friend, 

A.  S.  JOHXSTOX. 

P.  S. — I  will  prepare  answers  to  the  questions  propounded  by  General  Foote, 
chairman  of  the  committee  to  investigate  the  causes  of  the  loss  of  the  forts,  as 
soon  as  practicable.  But,  engaged  as  I  am  in  a  most  hazardous  movement  of  a 
large  force,  every,  the  most  minute,  detail  requiring  my  attention  for  its  accom 
plishment,  I  cannot  say  when  it  will  be  forwarded  to  the  Secretary  of  War  to  be 
handed  to  him,  if  he  think  proper  to  do  so.1 

Colonel  T.  M.  Jack,  in  a  letter  addressed  to  the  present  writer  in 
1877,  gives  a  graphic  account  of  the  circumstances  under  which  Presi 
dent  Davis  received  this  letter : 

Just  before  the  battle  of  Shiloh  your  father  sent  me  to  Richmond,  as  bearer 
of  dispatches  to  President  Davis.  Among  these  dispatches  was  the  celebrated 
letter  in  which  success  is  recognized  as  the  test  of  merit  in  the  soldier.  My  du 
ties,  of  course,  were  merely  executive— to  deliver  the  dispatches  in  person,  and 
return  with  the  answers  quietly  and  promptly. 

Arriving  at  Richmond,  and  announcing  my  business  to  the  proper  officer,  I 
was  at  once  shown  into  the  office  of  Mr.  Davis  and  presented  to  him.  I  had 
never  before  met  the  President  of  the  Confederacy.  He  received  me  with  cour 
tesy — even  with  kindness — asking  me  at  once,  "How  is  your  general — my  friend 
General  Johnston?  "  There  was  an  earnestness  in  the  question  which  could  not 
be  misunderstood.  Replying  briefly,  I  handed  him  my  dispatches,  which  he  was 
in  the  act  of  opening,  when  an  officer  entered  the  room,  to  whom  the  President 
presented  me  as  General  Lee.  This  was  my  first  meeting  with  him  also — and 
the  last.  He  had  not  then  attained  the  full  measure  of  his  fame.  He  wa»  not 
as  yet  the  idol  of  the  Southern  people.  These  things  came  afterward,  with  the 
recognition  by  all  fair-minded  Christendom  of  the  greatness  of  the  Christian 
chieftain.  There  was  something  fascinating  in  his  presence.  His  manners 

1  This  letter  was  begun  on  March  17th,  and  finished  March  20th. 


522  FROM  MURFREESBORO  TO  CORINTH. 

struck  me  as  dignified,  graceful,  and  easy.  He  seated  himself  by  my  side  at  the 
window,  and  engaged  me  in  conversation  about  the  movements  of  our  "Western 
army,  while  the  President  read,  in  silence,  the  dispatches  of  your  father.  These 
two  historic  figures,  together  in  the  capital  of  the  Confederacy,  the  one  chatting 
pleasantly  with  a  young  and  unknown  officer,  the  other  engrossed  with  the  last 
formal  papers  of  the  ranking  general  in  the  field  of  the  Confederate  forces  after 
their  retreat,  and  on  the  eve  of  a  pitched  battle  on  chosen  ground,  fastened  them 
selves  on  the  canvass  of  my  memory  in  bright  and  lasting  colors.  Listening  to 
the  pleasing  tones  of  the  general's  voice,  I  watched,  at  the  same  time,  with  eager 
interest,  the  countenance  of  the  President,  as  he  read  the  clear,  strong,  and  frank 
expressions  of  his  old  friend  and  comrade,  full  of  facts,  and  breathing  senti 
ments  of  the  noblest  spirit.  There  was  softness  then  in  his  face ;  and,  as  his  eye 
was  raised  from  the  paper,  there  seemed  a  tenderness  in  its  expression,  border 
ing  on  tears,  surprising  and  pleasing  at  that  critical  juncture  in  the  civil  and 
military  leader  of  a  people  in  arms. 

Next  day  the  President  handed  me  his  dispatches,  which  were  delivered  to 
the  general  at  Corinth,  as  he  was  preparing  for  the  field. 

"How  did  the  President  receive  you?"  he  asked,  in  a  playful  way,  as  I 
handed  him.  the  dispatches.  "As  the  aide-de-camp  of  his  friend,"  was  my  re 
sponse,  in  the  same  spirit;  after  which  he  made  no  further  allusion  to  the 
mission. 

The  following  was  the  reply  borne  to  General  Johnston  by  Colonel 
Jack : 

KICHMOND,  VIEGINTA,  March  26, 1862. 

MY  DEAE  GENERAL  :  Yours  of  the  18th  inst.  was  this  day  delivered  to  me  by 
your  aide,  Mr.  Jack.  I  have  read  it  with  much  satisfaction.  So  far  as  the  past 
is  concerned,  it  but  confirms  the  conclusions  at  which  I  had  already  arrived. 
My  confidence  in  you  has  never  wavered,  and  I  hope  the  public  will  soon  give 
me  credit  for  judgment,  rather  than  continue  to  arraign  me  for  obstinacy. 

You  have  done  wonderfully  well,  and  now  I  breathe  easier  in  the  assurance 
that  you  will  be  able  to  make  a  junction  of  your  two  armies.  If  you  can  meet 
the  division  of  the  enemy  moving  from  the  Tennessee  before  it  can  make  a 
junction  with  that  advancing  from  Nashville,  the  future  will  be  brighter.  If 
this  cannot  be  done,  our  only  hope  is  that  the  people  of  the  Southwest  will  rally 
en  masse  with  their  private  arms,  and  thus  enable  you  to  oppose  the  vast  army 
which  will  threaten  the  destruction  of  our  country. 

I  have  hoped  to  be  able  to  leave  here  for  a  short  time,  and  would  be  much 
gratified  to  confer  with  you,  and  share  your  responsibilities.  I  might  aid  you  in 
obtaining  troops  ;  no  one  could  hope  to  do  more  unless  he  underrated  your  mili 
tary  capacity.  I  write  in  great  haste,  and  feel  that  it  would  be  worse  than  use 
less  to  point  out  to  you  how  much  depends  upon  you. 

May  God  bless  you  is  the  sincere  prayer  of  your  friend, 

JEFFEESON  DAVIS.* 

On  the  25th  of  March  General  Johnston  completed  the  concentra 
tion  of  his  troops.  On  that  day  he  wrote  to  the  President  from  Cor 
inth,  "  My  force  is  now  united,  holding  Burnsville,  luka,  and  Tuscum- 
bia,  with  one  division  here." 

1  It  will  be  observed  that  General  Lee's  letter  (on  page  551)  was  written  the  same  day. 


THE  WAR  IN  MISSOURI.  523 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

PITTSBUKG      LANDING. 

WHILE  these  movements  of  General  Johnston  were  in  progress,  a 
stirring  campaign  occurred  in  Missouri,  and  great  preparations  were 
made  in  the  Mississippi  Valley,  and  on  the  Tennessee  River,  to  over 
whelm  him  on  that  flank.  The  storm  was  gathering.  It  has  been  seen 
that  General  Johnston's  efforts  to  raise  men  for  the  contest  west  of  the 
Mississippi  were  as  earnest  and  as  unavailing  as  in  Mississippi  and  Ten 
nessee.  Though  vested  with  the  direction  of  affairs  both  east  and  west 
of  the  river,  so  distant  and  distinct  was  the  scene  of  operations  in  Mis 
souri  that  he  was  only  able  to  maintain  a  general  control  there. 

While  the  armies  in  Kentucky,  like  wary  swordsmen,  watched  every 
opposing  movement,  with  only  an  occasional  thrust  and  parry,  until  the 
final  rush  and  death-grapple,  the  struggle  in  Missouri  resembled  those 
stage-combats  in  which  many  and  often  aimless  blows  are  given,  the 
antagonists  exchange  weapons  and  positions,  and  the  situations  shift 
with  startling  rapidity,  until  an  interposing  hand  strikes  up  the  weap 
ons  and  leaves  the  contest  undecided. 

After  the  return  of  Price's  army  from  the  expedition  to  Lexington, 
it  moved  about  in  Southwestern  Missouri  until  Christmas,  when  it 
advanced  to  Springfield,  where  it  remained  until  the  middle  of  Feb 
ruary.  McCulloch  wrote  to  General  Johnston,  October  llth,  that  he 
had  been  able  to  recruit  about  1,000  infantry,  which  did  not  supply  his 
losses  from  sickness.  McCulloch  was  convinced  that  nothing  could  be 
done  until  spring,  except  in  the  way  of  organization  and  preparation. 
Many  motives  impelled  Price  to  resume  the  aggressive.  He  was  flat 
tered  with  the  general  and  growing  sympathy  of  his  fellow-citizens ; 
but  he  was  not  sustained  by  a  corresponding  accession  of  force,  and 
for  a  long  time  his  army  remained  a  shifting  and  tumultuous  throng 
of  from  5,000  to  15,000  men.  Eventually,  disciplined  by  competent 
hands,  sifted  by  hardship,  and  tempered  in  the  fire  of  battle,  it  be 
came  as  true,  tried,  and  faultless,  as  the  blade  of  Damascus.  Dissen 
sions  arose  between  McCulloch  and  Price,  which  were  eventually  set 
tled  to  the  satisfaction  of  both  parties  by  the  assignment  of  Major- 
General  Earl  Van  Dorn  to  the  command  west  of  the  Mississippi  River. 

Van  Dorn  had  been  a  captain  in  General  Johnston's  own  regiment, 
the  Second  Cavalry,  and  was  distinguished  for  courage,  energy,  and 
decision.  On  taking  command,  he  adopted  bold  plans,  in  accordance 
with  the  views  of  Generals  Johnston  and  Price.  But  these  the  enemy 


524  PITTSBURG  LANDING. 

did  not  allow  him  to  carry  out.  Van  Dorn  assumed  command  January 
29,  1862,  and  was  engaged  in  organizing  the  force  in  Northeastern 
Arkansas  until  February  22d,  when,  learning  the  Federal  advance,  he 
hastened,  with  only  his  staff,  to  Fayetteville,  where  McCulloch's  army 
had  its  headquarters,  and  toward  which  Price  was  falling  back  from 
Springfield. 

General  Curtis,  the  Federal  commander,  had  at  Holla,  according  to 
his  report,  a  force  of  12,095  men,  and  fifty  pieces  of  artillery.  He 
advanced  February  llth,  and  Price  retreated.  He  overtook  Price's 
rear-guard  at  Cassville,  and  harassed  it  for  four  days  on  the  retreat. 
Curtis  pursued  Price  to  Fayetteville,  Arkansas,  and  then  retired  to 
Sugar  Creek,  where  he  proposed  to  establish  himself.  Leaving  the 
main  body  here  to  fortify,  he  sent  out  heavy  detachments  to  live  upon 
the  country  and  collect  provisions. 

As  soon  as  Van  Dorn  arrived  at  the  Confederate  camps,  on  Boston 
Mountain,  he  made  speedy  preparations  to  attack  Curtis  or  some  one  of 
his  detachments.  Learning  that  Sigel  was  at  Bentonville  with  7,000 
men,  he  attempted  to  intercept  him  with  his  army,  then  about  16,000 
strong.  The  lack  of  discipline  and  perfect  methods  in  the  Confederate 
army  allowed  Sigel  to  effect  his  escape,  which  he  did  with  considerable 
skill.  Curtis  was  enabled  to  concentrate  at  Sugar  Creek ;  and,  instead 
of  taking  him  in  detail,  Van  Dorn  was  obliged  to  assail  his  entire  army. 

Nevertheless,  while  Curtis  was  preparing  for  a  front  attack,  Van 
Dorn,  by  a  wide  detour,  led  Price's  army  to  the  Federal  rear,  moving 
McCulloch  against  Curtis's  right  flank.  Here,  again,  the  want  of  order 
among  the  Confederate  troops  produced  disastrous  results,  and  so  slow 
and  embarrassed  was  their  march  that  the  enemy  got  notice  of  it  in  time 
to  make  his  dispositions  accordingly.  Van  Dorn  had  avoided  his  in- 
trenchments,  however,  and  fought  him  on  fairer  terms,  though  Curtis, 
posted  on  rugged  and  wooded  hills,  still  held  the  stronger  ground. 

The  battle  of  "  Elkhorn,"  or  "  Pea  Ridge,"  as  the  Federals  call  it, 
began  early  on  the  morning  of  March  5,  1862.  The  opposing  armies 
were  nearly  equal  in  strength.  Van  Dora  says  he  had  14,000  men 
engaged,  and  Curtis  puts  his  force  at  about  10,000  men  and  forty-nine 
guns.  The  two  corps  of  the  Confederate  army  were  widely  separated  ; 
Curtis's  divisions  fought  back  to  back,  and  readily  ree'nforced  each 
other.  Van  Dorn,  with  Price's  corps,  encountered  Carr's  division, 
which  advanced  to  meet  it,  but  was  driven  back  steadily  and  with 
heavy  loss.  • 

In  the  mean  time,  McCulloch's  corps  met  a  division  under  Oster- 
haus,  and,  after  a  sharp,  quick  struggle,  swept  it  away.  Pushing  for 
ward  through  the  scrub-oak,  his  wide-extended  line  met  Sigel's,  As- 
both's,  and  Davis's  divisions.  Here  on  the  rugged  spurs  of  the  hills 
ensued  one  of  those  fearful  combats  in  which  the  most  determined 


BATTLE  OF  ELKHORN.  525 

valor  is  resisted  by  the  most  stubborn  tenacity.  In  the  crisis  of  the 
struggle  McCulloch,  dashing  forward  to  reconnoitre,  fell  a  victim  to  a 
lurking  sharp-shooter.  Almost  at  the  same  moment  Mclntosh,  his  sec 
ond  in  command,  fell  while  charging  a  Federal  battery  with  a  regiment 
of  Texas  cavalry.  Without  direction  or  head,  the  shattered  lines  of  the 
Confederates  left  the  field,  to  rally,  after  a  wide  circuit,  on  Price's  corps. 

When  Van  Dorn  learned  this  sad  intelligence,  he  urged  his  attack, 
pressing  back  the  Federals  until  night  closed  the  bloody  scene.  The 
Confederate  headquarters  were  then  at  Elkhorn  Tavern,  where  the 
Federal  headquarters  had  been  in  the  morning.  Each  army  was  now 
on  its  opponent's  line  of  communications.  Van  Dorn  found  his  troops 
much  disorganized  and  exhausted,  short  of  ammunition,  and  without 
food.  He  made  his  arrangements  to  retreat.  The  wagon-trains  and 
all  men  not  effective  for  the  coming  battle  were  started  by  a  circui 
tous  route  to  Van  Buren.  The  effectives  remained  to  cover  the  re 
treat.  The  gallant  General  Henry  Little  had  the  front  line  of  battle 
with  his  own  and  Rives's  stanch  Missouri  Brigades.  The  battle  was 
renewed  at  7  A.  M.  next  day,  and  raged  until  10  A.  M.  ,  this  stout  rear 
guard  holding  off  the  whole  Federal  army.  The  trains,  artillery,  and 
most  of  the  army,  were  by  this  time  well  on  the  road.  The  order  was 
then  given  to  the  Missourians  to  withdraw.  "  The  gallant  fellows 
faced  about  with  cheers,"  and  retired  steadily.  They  encamped  ten 
miles  from  the  battle-field,  at  three  o'clock.  There  was  no  real  pur 
suit.  The  attack  had  failed. 

Van  Dorn  puts  his  losses  at  600  killed  and  wounded,  and  200  pris 
oners.  Curtis  reports  his  losses  at  203  killed,  972  wounded,  and  176 
missing — total,  1,351.  But  the  casualties  did  not  measure  the  Confed 
erate  loss.  McCulloch's  corps  was  for  the  moment  broken  to  pieces, 
though  it  rapidly  recovered.  Worse  than  all,  a  great  chance  was  gone, 
and,  though  the  Federals  were  badly  crippled  and  soon  left  that  region, 
Missouri  was  not  regained,  nor  was  the  diversion  effected  in  General 
Johnston's  behalf  which  both  he  and  Van  Dorn  had  hoped. 

Van  Dorn  was  now  called  to  meet  General  Johnston  at  Corinth, 
and  was  ordered  to  hasten  his  army  by  the  quickest  route  to  that  point. 
Through  unavoidable  causes,  only  one  of  his  regiments  arrived  in  time 
to  participate  in  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  Soon  after,  however,  his  army 
reenforced  Beauregard. 

Beauregard  left  Nashville  sick,  February  14th,  to  take  charge  in 
West  Tennessee,  and  made  his  headquarters  at  Jackson,  Tennessee, 
February  17th.  He  was  still  prostrated  by  disease,  which  partially  dis 
abled  him  throughout  that  entire  campaign.  He  was,  however,  ably 
seconded  by  Bragg  and  Polk,  who  commanded  his  two  grand  divisions 
or  army  corps.  Writing  to  General  Johnston  March  2d,  he  says  : 
"  General  Bragg  is  with  me.  We  are  trying  to  organize  every  thing 


528  PITTSBURG  LANDING. 

as  rapidly  as  possible  ;"  and,  again,  on  the  6th:  "I  am  still  unwell, 
but  am  doing  the  best  I  can.  I  nominally  assumed  the  command  yes 
terday."  He  directed  the  military  operations  from  his  sick-room,  and 
sometimes  from  his  sick-bed,  as  he  informs  the  writer.  On  March  23d 
he  went  to  Corinth  to  confer  with  General  Johnston  there,  and  on 
March  26th  removed  thither  permanently. 

Whether  Columbus  should  be  evacuated  entirely  or  stand  a  siege 
with  a  small  garrison,  when  the  rest  of  the  army  retired  southward,  was 
a  question  which  had  been  left  by  General  Johnston  to  General  Beau- 
regard  to  determine  on  the  spot,  according  to  the  exigencies  of  the 
case.  On  the  20th  of  February  General  Johnston  telegraphed  to  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  : 

If  not  well  enough  to  assume  command,  I  hope  that  you,  now  having  had 
time  to  study  the  field,  will  advise  General  Polk  of  your  judgment  as  to  the 
proper  disposition  of  his  army,  in  accordance  with  the  views  you  entertained 
in  our  memoranda,  unless  you  have  changed  your  views.  I  cannot  order  him, 
not  knowing  but  that  you  have  assumed  command,  and  our  orders  conflict. 

Guided  by  these  instructions  from  General  Johnston,  Beauregard 
directed  the  evacuation  of  Columbus,  and  the  establishment  of  a  new 
line  resting  on  New  Madrid,  Island  No.  10,  and  Humboldt.  Polk  is 
sued  the  preliminary  orders  February  25th,  for  the  evacuation,  which 
was  completed  on  March  2d. 

General  Beauregard  selected  Brigadier-General  J.  P.  McCown,  an  old 
army-officer,  for  the  command  of  Island  No.  10,  forty  miles  below  Co 
lumbus,  whither  he  removed  his  division  February  27th.  A.  P.  Stew 
art's  brigade  was  also  sent  to  New  Madrid.  Some  7,500  troops  were 
assembled  at  these  points.  The  remainder  of  the  forces  marched  by 
land,  under  General  Cheatham,  to  Union  City.  The  quarters  and  build 
ings  were  committed  to  the  flames  ;  and  at  3  P.  M.,  March  2d,  General 
Polk  followed  the  retiring  column  from  the  abandoned  stronghold. 

Polk  says  in  his  report : 

The  enemy's  cavalry— the  first  of  his  forces  to  arrive  after  the  evacuation- 
reached  Columbus  in  the  afternoon  next  day,  twenty-four  hours  after  the  last  of 
our  troops  had  left.  In  five  days  we  moved  the  accumulations  of  six  months,  tak 
ing  with  us  all  our  commissary  and  quartermaster's  stores — an  amount  sufficient 
to  supply  my  whole  command  for  eight  months — all  our  powder  and  other  ammu 
nition  and  ordnance  stores,  excepting  a  few  shot  and  gun-carriages,  and  every 
heavy  gun  in  the  fort.  Two  thirty-two-pounders  in  a  remote  outwork  were 
the  only  valuable  guns  left,  and  these,  with  three  or  four  small  and  indifferent 
carronades  similarly  situated,  were  spiked  and  rendered  useless.  The  whole 
number  of  pieces  of  artillery  composing  our  armament  was  140. 

After  the  surrender  of  Fort  Donelson  and  the  first  flush  of  satisfac 
tion  resulting  in  Grant's  promotion,  he  fell  under  the  censures  of  his 


ISLAND   NO.    10.  527 

immediate  superior,  Halleck,  on  account  of  the  marauding  and  demoral 
ization  of  his  troops,  and  his  own  alleged  neglect  of  duty.  Grant  was 
superseded,  March  4th,  but  was  soon  after  (March  13th)  restored  to 
command.  It  is  evident,  however,  from  Halleck's  correspondence,  that 
his  own  cautious  and  hesitating  temper  had  as  much  to  do  with  the 
tardy  movements  of  the  Federals  as  any  of  Grant's  shortcomings. 
Halleck  was  now  put  in  command  of  the  whole  West  ;  Buell,  Grant, 
and  Pope,  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Mississippi,  and  Curtis  in  Southwest 
Missouri,  all  moving  under  his  supreme  control. 

While  the  Confederate  and  Federal  armies  were  gathering,  front  to 
front,  at  Corinth  and  Pittsburg  Landing,  important  operations  were 
occurring  around  New  Madrid  and  Island  No.  10.  On  the  18th  of 
February  General  Halleck  sent  Major-General  John  Pope,  whom  he 
had  recalled  from  Central  Missouri,  to  organize  an  expedition  against 
New  Madrid. 

His  force  consisted  of  eight  divisions,  made  up  of  thirty  regiments 
and  nine  batteries,  in  all  probably  25,000  men,  besides  Foote's  flotilla 
and  troops  with  it.  McCown  had  at  first  probably  7,500  men,  after 
ward  reduced  to  some  four  or  five  thousand  by  the  removal  of  troops. 
General  Beauregard  informed  him  from  the  first  that  under  no  circum 
stances  would  his  force  be  increased,  as  it  was  intended  as  a  forlorn 
hope  to  hold  this  position  until  Fort  Pillow  was  fortified.  The  defense 
at  Island  No.  10  was  not  adequate  to  the  preparations  there  ;  but,  as 
its  bearing  on  General  Johnston's  operations  was  simply  to  withhold 
from  his  army  its  garrison,  which  did  not  surrender  until  the  day  after 
the  battle  of  Shiloh,  an  account  of  the  transactions  there  may  be 
omitted  as  not  essential  to  this  narrative. 

While  Pope  was  thus  directed  against  New  Madrid,  a  combined 
movement  up  the  Tennessee  by  Grant's  column  was  also  projected.  In 
orders  issued  March  1st,  to  Grant,  Halleck  says : 

The  main  object  of  this  expedition  will  be  to  destroy  the  railroad-bridge  over 
Bear  Creek,  near  Eastport,  Mississippi,  and  also  the  connections  at  Corinth, 
Jackson,  and  Humboldt.  It  is  thought  best  that  these  objects  be  attempted  in 
the  order  named.  Strong  detachments  of  cavalry  and  light  artillery,  supported 
by  infantry,  may  by  rapid  movements  reach  these  points  from  the  river  without 
very  serious  opposition.  Avoid  any  general  engagement  with  strong  forces.  It 
will  be  better  to  retreat  than  to  risk  a  general  battle.  This  should  be  strongly 
impressed  upon  the  officers  sent  with  the  expedition  from  the  river.  General 
C.  F.  Smith,  or  some  very  discreet  officer,  should  be  selected  for  such  commands. 
Having  accomplished  these  objects,  or  such  of  them  as  may  be  practicable,  you 
will  return  to  Danville  and  move  on  Paris.1 

Halleck's  ultimate  objective  point  was  Memphis,  which  he  expected 
to  reach  by  forcing  a  column  down  the  Mississippi ;  and  the  movement 

1  Badeau's  "  Life  of  Grant,"  vol.  i.,  p.  596. 
35 


528  PITTSBURG  LANDING. 

up  the  Tennessee  was,  at  first,  only  subsidiary.  It  was  meant  to  cut  the 
communications  from  Memphis  east,  and  prevent  reinforcements  to  the 
Confederates  on  the  Mississippi.  Afterward,  when  the  concentration 
of  troops  at  Corinth  was  reported  to  him,  with  wonderful  exaggerations 
of  the  Confederate  strength — 100,000,  200,000  men— he  determined  to 
mass  Buell  and  Grant  against  the  army  at  that  point;  and  Buell  was 
ordered,  March  15th,  to  unite  his  forces  with  Grant's,  a  movement  pre 
viously  suggested  by  him. 

Meanwhile,  the  expedition  up  the  Tennessee  was  begun  by  C.  F. 
Smith,  on  the  10th  of  March,  with  a  new  division  under  Sherman  in  ad 
vance.  On  the  13th  of  March,  Smith  assembled  four  divisions — Sher 
man's,  Hurlbut's,  Lew  Wallace's,  and  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's,  at  Savannah, 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Tennessee,  at  its  Great  Bend.  Smith  at  once 
sent  Sherman  with  his  division,  escorted  by  two  gunboats,  to  land  be 
low  Eastport  and  make  a  break  in  the  Memphis  &  Charleston  Rail 
road  between  Tuscumbia  and  Corinth.  Sherman,  finding  a  Confederate 
battery  at  Eastport,  disembarked  below  at  the  mouth  of  the  Yellow 
River,  and  started  for  Burnsville ;  but,  becoming  discouraged  at  the 
continued  rains,  the  swollen  streams,  the  bad  roads,  and  the  resistance 
he  met  with  from  the  troops  posted  there,  under  G.  B.  Crittenden,  he 
retired.  After  consultation  with  Smith,  he  again  disembarked,  on  the 
16th,  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  on  the  left  bank,  seven  miles  above  Savan 
nah,  and  made  a  reconnaissance  as  far  as  Monterey,  some  ten  miles, 
nearly  half-way  to  Corinth.  On  the  17th  General  Grant  took  command, 
relieving  Smith,  who  was  lying  ill  at  Savannah  on  his  death-bed. 
Smith  died  April  25th — a  very  gallant  and  able  officer. 

Two  more  divisions,  Prentiss's  and  McClernand's,  had  joined  in  the 
mean  time,  and  Grant  assembled  the  Federal  army  near  Pittsburg  Land 
ing,  which  was  the  most  advantageous  base  for  a  movement  against 
Corinth.  Here  it  lay  motionless  until  the  battle  of  Shiloh. 

The  Federal  army  was  at  Shiloh,  near  Pittsburg  Landing,  in  a  posi 
tion  naturally  very  strong.  Its  selection  has  been  censured  for  rashness, 
on  the  erroneous  presumption  that  the  army  there  was  outnumbered, 
inferior  in  discipline  to  its  opponents,  and  peculiarly  exposed  to  attack. 
The  criticism  is  unjust,  because  the  supposition  is  altogether  untrue.  It 
cannot  be  denied  that  General  Grant  reported  the  Confederate  army  at 
Corinth,  at  60,000—80,000—100,000,  and  as  rumored  to  be  200,000 
strong ;  but  we  are  not  to  suppose  that  his  sagacity  was  so  much  at 
fault  as  to  be  misled  by  these  "  old  women's  stories,"  as  Sherman  calls 
them,  especially  when  Buell  was  conveying  to  Halleck  pretty  accurate 
information  of  the  numbers  there. 

Grant  felt  safe  at  Shiloh,  because  he  knew  he  was  numerically 
stronger  than  his  adversary.  His  numbers  and  his  equipment  were 
superior  to  those  of  his  antagonist,  and  the  discipline  and  morale  of 


TOPOGRAPHY  AROUND   SHILOH. 


529 


TOPOGRAPHICAL  SKETCH 

Of  the 

EEN'E  OT  OPERATIONS 
of  the 

AKMY  OF  THE  OHIO 

UNDER  THE  COMMAND  OF 
MAJOR  GE]S*ERAC  D.  C.  BUELL 

TT.  S.  VOI/CNTEERS. 

"Evacuation,  of  Corinth  l>y  the  Enemy.May  30th.  1862 
Surveyed  from  the  8th.of  April  to  the  Cth.of.Juae 

BY 

X.M1CIELER 

Capt.Topogl  Engrs.U.'S.  A. 

Assisted  \>y 
JOHN  E.WEYS.S.  MAJ..  Kr.  VOLS. 


Gen.Buell'sTI.Qs 

I 
MONTEREY 

PEA  BDDGE  !/   Bmnt  House 


his  army  ought  to  have  been  so.  The  only  infantry  of  the  Confederate 
army  which  had  ever  seen  a  combat  were  some  of  Folk's  men,  who  were 
at  Belmont;  Hind  man's  brigade,  which  was  ia  the  skirmish  at  Wood- 
sonville ;  and  the  fugitives  of  Mill  Spring.  In  the  Federal  army  were 
the  soldiers  who  had  fought  at  Belmont,  Fort  Henry,  and  Donelson — 


530  PITTSBURG  LANDING. 

30,000  of  the  last.     There  were  many  raw  troops  on  both  sides.     Some 
of  the  Confederates  received  their  arms  for  the  first  time  that  week. 

Unless  these  things  were  so,  and  unless  Grant's  army  was,  in  whole 
or  in  part,  an  army  of  invasion,  intended  for  the  offensive,  of  course  it 
was  out  of  place  on  that  south  bank.  But  Sherman  has  distinctly  as 
serted  that  it  was  in  prosecution  of  an  offensive  movement,  and  hence 
this  occupation  of  the  south  bank  was  a  necessary  preliminary  to  the 
advance  projected  against  Corinth.  There  was  much  to  foster  a  spirit 
of  self-complacent  security  in  the  bosoms  of  the  Federal  generals.  Not 
only  were  they  the  stronger,  but  their  gunboats  gave  them  command 
of  the  river  for  reenforcement  or  retreat ;  Buell  was  drawing  near  with 
his  large  army  ;  and  the  character  of  the  ground  at  Shiloh  made  it  a 
natural  stronghold.  The  peril  to  Grant's  army  was  not  in  the  topog 
raphy,  but  in  the  want  of  proper  precautions. 

The  overweening  confidence  that  received  at  Shiloh  so  just  and 
terrible  a  rebuke  is  inexplicable,  except  as  the  result  of  a  natural  temer 
ity,  increased  by  success,  inexperience,  and  a  perfect  reliance  on  superior 
strength  and  position.  Had  it  been  otherwise,  Grant  would  have  for 
tified  strongly,  and  urged  to  the  utmost  the  advance  and  junction  of 
Buell's  army  with  his  own,  or  asked  for  other  reenforcement.  We  shall 
see  he  did  neither.  The  truth  is,  he  undervalued  his  adversary's  celerity 
and  daring. 

The  water-shed  between  the  Mississippi  and  Tennessee  Rivers,  near 
the  Great  Bend,  follows  the  general  course  of  the  latter  stream,  at  the 
distance  of  some  twelve  or  fourteen  miles.  The  railroad  system  lies  on 
its  western  and  southern  slope,  and,  as  far  east  as  Burnsville,  passes 
through  a  poor,  flat,  and  swampy  country,  covered  with  the  primeval 
forest.  There  are  twenty  bridges  between  Corinth  and  Bethel,  a  space 
of  some  twenty-three  miles.  The  slope  toward  the  Tennessee  is  steep 
er,  broken  by  short  creeks,  which,  as  they  approach  the  river,  become 
deep,  or  spread  out  in  tangled  marshes.  The  ridges  between  these 
creeks  are  considerably  elevated  above  the  river-level. 

The  Tennessee  flows  northwest  for  some  distance,  until  a  little  west 
of  Hamburg,  a  point  nineteen  miles  from  Corinth,  it  takes  its  final  bend 
to  the  north.  Here,  two  affluents,  Owl  and  Lick  Creeks,  flowing  nearly 
parallel,  somewhat  north  of  east,  from  three  to  five  miles  apart,  empty 
into  the  Tennessee.  Owl  Creek,  uniting  with  Snake  Creek,  takes  that 
name  below  their  junction.  It  forms  the  northern  limit  of  the  ridge, 
which  Lick  Creek  bounds  on  the  south.  These  streams,  rising  some 
ten  or  twelve  miles  back,  toward  Corinth,  were  bordered  near  their 
mouths  by  swamps  filled  with  back-water,  and  impassable  except  where 
the  roads  crossed. 

The  inclosed  space,  a  rude  parallelogram,  is  a  rolling  table-land, 
about  one  hundred  feet  above  the  river-level,  with  its  water-shed  lying 


STRENGTH  OF  THE  POSITION.  531 

near  Lick  Creek,  and  either  slope  broken  by  deep  and  frequent  ravines 
draining  into  the  two  creeks  ;  the  side  toward  Lick  Creek  being  pre 
cipitous,  while  that  toward  Owl  Creek,  though  broken,  is  a  gradual 
declivity.  This  plateau  ends  in  abrupt  hills,  overlooking  the  narrow 
strip  of  river-bank ;  and,  the  gorges  near  the  river  passing  toward  it, 
the  tangle  of  ravines  results  in  very  broken  ground.  In  the  troughs  of 
the  ravines,  brooks  were  running,  the  drainage  of  the  recent  heavy 
rains  ;  and  there  were  boggy  places  hazardous  for  the  passage  of  artil 
lery,  and  difficult  even  for  infantry.  The  acclivities  were  covered  with 
forests,  and  often  thick-set  with  copses  and  undergrowth.  Indeed,  the 
whole  country  was  heavily  timbered,  except  where  an  occasional  small 
farm  dotted  the  wilderness  with  a  cultivated  or  abandoned  field. 

Pittsburg  Landing,  a  mere  hamlet  of  three  or  four  log-cabins,  was 
situated  about  midway  between  the  mouths  of  Owl  and  Lick  Creeks,  in 
the  narrow  and  swampy  bottom  that  here  fringes  the  Tennessee.  It 
was  three  or  four  miles  below  Hamburg,  six  or  seven  above  Savannah, 
the  Federal  depot  on  the  right  bank,  and  twenty-two  miles  from  Cor 
inth  by  the  direct  road.  Shiloh  Church,  from  which  the  battle  took  its 
name,  lay  two  and  a  half  miles  in  advance  of  the  landing.  The  coun 
try  between  the  river  and  Monterey,  a  village  on  the  road  to  Corinth, 
is  intersected  by  a  network  of  roads,  up  to  which  neighborhood  lead 
three  or  four  roads  from  Corinth,  cut  through  the  forests  and  across  the 
sloughs.  These  roads  were  badly  made,  soft  -with  the  continued  rains, 
and  not  perfectly  known  to  the  Confederate  leaders. 

It  will  be  perceived  that  the  Federal  position  was,  in  fact,  a  formi 
dable  natural  fortification.  With  few  and  difficult  approaches,  guarded 
on  either  flank  by  impassable  streams  and  morasses,  protected  by  a  suc 
cession  of  ravines  and  acclivities,  each  commanded  by  eminences  to  the 
rear,  this  quadrilateral  seemed  a  safe  fastness  against  attack — hard  to 
assail,  easy  to  defend.  Its  selection  was  the  dying  gift  of  the  soldierly 
C.  F.  Smith  to  his  cause. 

That  the  strength  of  Shiloh  has  not  been  overstated  is  evinced  by 
the  evidence  of  General  Sherman,  given  then  and  afterward.  He  says, 
in  his  "Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  page  229  : 

The  position  was  naturally  strong.  ...  At  a  later  period  of  the  war,  we 
could  have  rendered  this  position  impregnable  in  one  night,  but  at  this  time  we 
did  not  do  it,  and  it  may  be  it  is  well  we  did  not. 

He  says  of  it  in  a  letter  to  Grant's  adjutant-general,  Rawlins,  March 
18, 1862  (page  232) :  "  Magnificent  plain  for  camping  and  drilling,  and 
a  military  point  of.  great  strength."  On  the  next  day  (page  233),  he 
expresses  himself — 

Strongly  impressed  with  the  importance  of  this  position,  both  for  its  land 
advantages  and  its  strategic  position.  The  ground  itself  admits  of  easy  defense 


532  PITTSBURG  LANDING. 

by  a  small  command,  and  yet  affords  admirable  camping-ground  for  100,000 
men. 

On  the  trial  of  Colonel  Thomas  Worthington,  Forty-sixth  Ohio  Vol 
unteers,  who  had  severely  criticised  General  Sherman,  the  latter  testi 
fies  : 1 

I  will  not  insult  General  Smith's  memory  by  criticising  his  selection  of  afield. 
It  was  not  looked  to  so  much  for  defense  as  for  ground  on  which  an  army  could 
be  organized  for  offense.  We  did  not  occupy  too  much  ground.  .  .  .  But  even 
as  we  were,  on  the  6th  of  April,  you  might  search  the  world  over  and  not  find  a 
more  advantageous  field  of  battle,  flanks  well  protected  and  never  threatened, 
troops  in  easy  support;  timber  and  broken  ground  giving  good  points  to  rally: 
and  the  proof  is  that  forty-three  thousand  men,  of  whom  at  least  ten  thousand 
ran  away,  held  their  ground  against  sixty  thousand  chosen  troops  of  the  South, 
with  their  best  leaders. 

In  a  letter  to  the  editor  of  the  United  States  Service  Magazine^ 
published  January,  1865,  General  Sherman  says  :  "  It  was  General 
Smith  who  selected  that  field  of  battle,  and  it  was  well  chosen.  On 
any  other  we  should  surely  have  been  overwhelmed." 

It  cannot  be  said  that  the  Federal  generals  availed  themselves  of 
the  superior  advantages  of  their  position.  Flushed  with  the  victory 
at  Donelson,  they  indulged  the  delusion  of  marching  to  an  easy  triumph 
whenever  they  might  choose  to  advance  and  give  battle.  Sherman 
says  ("Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  page  229)  : 

I  always  acted  on  the  supposition  that  we  were  an  invading  army ;  that  our 
purpose  was  to  move  forward  in  force,  make  a  lodgment  on  the  Memphis  & 
Charleston  road,  and  thus  repeat  the  grand  tactics  of  Fort  Donelson,  by  sepa 
rating  the  rebels  in  the  interior  from  those  at  Memphis  and  on  the  Mississippi 
Eiver.  We  did  not  fortify  our  camps  against  an  attack,  because  we  had  no 
orders  to  do  so,  and  because  such  a  course  would  have  made  our  raw  men  timid. 

Again,  General  Sherman  says  ("  Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  page  247)  : 

We  had  no  intrenchments  of  any  sort,  on  the  theory  that  as  soon  as  Buell 
arrived  we  would  march  to  Corinth  to  attack  the  enemy. 

While  the  criticism,  so  often  made,  may  be  just,  that  comfortable 
camping-grounds  for  the  divisions  were  one  controlling  consideration 
in  the  arrangement  of  the  Federal  army,  still  it  would  have  been  diffi 
cult  on  that  ground  to  have  selected  any  other  than  strong  defensible 
positions. 

On  Colonel  Worthington's  trial  (vide  Boynton's  volume,  already 
quoted,  page  28),  Sherman  testifies,  under  oath,  thus  : 

1  Vide  "  Sherman's  Historical  Raid,"  by  Boynton,  p.  29 ;  also  "  Shiloh,"  p.  22,  by 
Colonel  Worthington. 


FALSE   SECURITY.  533 

He  (Colonel  Worthington)  says,  "  A  slight  abattis  might  have  prevented  an 
attack."  What  business  was  it  of  his  whether  his  superior  officer  invited  an 
attack  or  not?  The  Army  Regulations  will  show  him  that  no  fortification  can 
be  made,  except  under  order  of  the  commanding  general.  To  have  erected  forti 
fications  would  have  leen  an  evidence  of  weakness,  and  would  have  invited  an 
attack. 

Boynton  says  (page  31) : 

Immediately  after  the  battle,  General  Sherman  seems  to  have  been  won  over 
to  the  idea  that  an  abattis  might  be  valuable  as  a  protection  to  his  camp ;  for,  in 
a  compilation  of  his  orders,  made  under  his  own  direction,  the  very  first  of  them 
which  appears  after  the  engagement  contains  the  following  paragraph:  "Each 
brigade  commander  will  examine  carefully  his  immediate  front;  fell  trees  to 
afford  his  men  barricade,  and  clear  away  all  underbrush  for  two  hundred  yards 
in  front,  so  as  to  uncover  an  approaching  enemy ;  with  these  precautions,  we 
can  hold  our  camp  against  any  amount  of  force  that  can  be  brought  against  us." 
There  is  no  indication  that  General  Sherman  considered  this  order  either  an 
evidence  of  weakness,  or  an  invitation  to  attack,  or  as  calculated  to  make  his 
44  raw  men  timid." 

Sherman,  in  his  letter  to  the  editor  of  the  United  States  Service 
Magazine,  already  quoted,  which  might  by  courtesy  be  styled  his  "  Af 
ter-thoughts,"  wrote  as  follows : 

It  was  necessary  that  a  combat,  fierce  and  bitter,  to  test  the  manhood  of  the 
two  armies  should  come  off,  and  that  was  as  good  a  place  as  any.  It  was  not, 
theo,  a  question  of  military  skill  and  strategy,  but  of  courage  and  pluck ;  and  I 
am  convinced  that  every  life  lost  that  day  to  us  was  necessary;  for  otherwise, 
at  Corinth,  at  Memphis,  at  Vicksburg,  we  would  have  found  harder  resistance, 
had  we  not  shown  our  enemies  that,  rude  and  untutored  as  we  then  were,  we 
could  fight  as  well  as  they. 

All  these  excuses  do  not  hang  well  together.  What  was  the  result 
of  that  test  of  manhood  which  General  Sherman  applies,  if  he  did  not 
need  fortifications  before  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  and  did  need  them  after 
it  ?  Surely,  that  his  troops  were  bold  before  and  timid  after  the  fight 
—that  they  could  not  stand  the  test.  The  suggestion  does  injury  to 
the  brave  men  he  commanded.  It  is  not  just. 

It  is  perfectly  evident  that,  if  the  slightest  idea  of  an  attack  by  Gen 
eral  Johnston  had  been  foreseen,  not  only  would  defensive  works  have 
been  put  up,  but  a  very  different  line  of  battle  would  have  been  estab 
lished.  All  the  controversy  on  the  Federal  side  about  the  battle  of 
Shiloh  has  arisen  out  of  the  theory  that  it  is  necessary  to  show  that 
Generals  Grant  and  Sherman  are,  and  always  have  been,  incapable  of 
mistake  or  failure.  A  better  theory,  and  more  easily  maintained,  would 
be  that  they  were  capable  of  learning  something,  and  at  Shiloh  re 
ceived  a  lesson  which  rebuked  their  insolent  contempt  of  an  able  adver- 


534  PITTSBURG  LANDING. 

sary,  and  the  perilous  carelessness  of  their  false  security.  These  dis 
tinguished  generals  have  since  become  famous ;  and  it  is  not  necessary 
to  their  reputations  to  show  that  they  were  infallible — especially,  so 
early  in  their  careers.  If  the  testimony  proves  them  somewhat  at  fault 
in  wariness  and  sagacity,  yet  it  shows  them  derelict  only  so  far  ;  and 
they  certainly  exhibited  on  the  field  a  gallantry  and  persistence  worthy 
of  commendation. 

Buell  seems  to  have  advised  General  Halleck  with  very  considerable 
accuracy  and  promptness  of  General  Johnston's  movements  after  he  left 
Shelbyville,  showing  that  he  had  greatly  improved  his  means  of  infor 
mation,  and  that  the  retreating  army  could  not  so  effectually  mask  its 
movements  as  in  Kentucky. 

In  forming  a  plan  of  campaign,  there  was  some  diversity  of  opinion 
between  Halleck  and  Buell  as  to  details  ;  but  the  main  idea  of  dividing 
the  Confederacy,  by  cutting  the  Memphis  &  Charleston  Railroad  near 
the  Great  Bend  of  the  Tennessee,  was  essentially  the  same. 

There  has  been  controversy  as  to  the  origin  of  this  plan  of  cam 
paign.  McClellan  and  Buell  were  in  conference  about  it  ;  and  Halleck 
adopted  it  as  soon  as  he  saw  his  way  clear  to  the  possession  of  the 
Tennessee  River. 

The  original  design  of  Halleck,  as  communicated  to  his  subordinates, 
was  a  dash  at  the  Confederate  lines  of  communication.  It  had  become 
apparent  to  them,  however,  and  to  his  adversary,  that  he  purposed  to 
split  the  South,  and  that  from  Shiloh  to  Corinth  was  where  he  expected 
to  drive  his  wedge. 

Buell  says  that  he  and  Halleck,  as  independent  commanders,  con 
certed  the  campaign  against  Corinth.  Halleck's  troops  moved  by 
water  up  the  Tennessee — that  being  their  only  practicable  route.  Buell 
was  evidently  very  solicitous  to  occupy  and  secure  the  rich  region  of 
Middle  Tennessee,  and  for  that  reason  preferred  to  move  by  land,  and 
make  Florence,  Alabama,  instead  of  Pittsburg  or  Savannah,  the  base 
of  a  combined  movement.  But  Halleck,  having  been  put  in  supreme 
command,  his  opinion  prevailed,  and  the  joint  movement  concerted 
against  Corinth  between  the  two  commanders  was  set  on  foot. 

Halleck  telegraphed  Buell,  March  26th  : 

I  am  inclined  to  believe  the  enemy  will  make  his  stand  at  or  near  Corinth. 

On  the  28th  : 

It  seems  from  all  accounts  the  enemy  is  massing  his  forces  in  the  vicinity  of 
Corinth.  You  will  concentrate  all  your  available  troops  at  Savannah,  or  Pitts- 
burg,  twelve  miles  above.  Large  reinforcements  being  sent  to  General  Grant. 
We  must  be  ready  to  attack  the  enemy  as  soon  as  the  roads  are  passable. 

On  April  5th  Halleck  telegraphed  from  St.  Louis  : 


BUELL'S  MOVEMENTS.  535 

You  are  right  about  concentrating  at  Waynesboro.  Future  movements  must 
depend  on  those  of  the  enemy.  I  shall  not  be  able  to  leave  here  until  the  first 
of  next  week,  ma  Fort  Henry  and  Savannah.1 

General  Buell  gives  the  following  summary  of  his  share  in  the  cam 
paign  before  Shiloh,  in  a  letter  published  in  the  United  States  Service 
Magazine,  to  the  statements  of  which  his  high  character  must  secure 
entire  credit :  # 

I  deemed  it  best  that  mine  [ray  army]  should  march  through  by  land,  because 
such  a  movement  would  clear  Middle  Tennessee  of  the  enemy  and  facilitate  the 
occupation  of  the  Memphis  &  Charleston  Railroad  through  North  Alabama,  to 
which  I  had  assigned  General  Mitchell.  I  believed,  also,  that  I  could  effect  the 
movement  almost  as  promptly  that  way  as  by  water,  and  I  knew  that  it  would 
bring  my  army  upon  the  field  of  future  operations  in  better  condition.  I  com 
menced  my  march  from  Nashville  on  the  15th  of  March,  with  a  rapid  movement 
of  cavalry,  followed  by  McCook's  division,  to  seize  the  bridges  which  were  yet 
in  possession  of  the  enemy.  The  latter,  however,  succeeded  in  destroying  the 
bridge  over  Duck  River,  at  Columbia,  forty  miles  distant,  and  another  a  few 
miles  farther  north.  At  that  time  our  armies  were  not  provided  with  pontoon- 
trains,  and  rivers  had  to  be  crossed  with  such  means  as  we  could  make.  The 
streams  were  out  of  their  banks.  Duck  River  was  a  formidable  barrier,  and  it 
was  not  until  the  31st  that  the  army  was  able  to  cross. 

He  says  this  work  was  prosecuted  with  intelligence,  energy,  and 
diligence. 

In  the  mean  time  I  had  been  placed  by  the  War  Department  under  the  orders 
of  General  Halleck,  and  he  designated  Savannah,  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Ten 
nessee,  as  the  place  for  our  junction.  The  distance  from  Columbia  is  ninety 
miles,  and  was  marched  at  the  rate  of  fifteen  miles  a  day,  without  a  halt.  The 
distance  from  Nashville  is  130  miles,  and  was  marched  in  nine  marcHing  days, 
and  twelve  days,  were  occupied  in  bridging  streams.  The  rear  divisions,  in  con 
sequence  of  the  battle,  made  forced  marches.  .  .  . 

The  assertion  that  I  knew  that  General  Grant  was  in  jeopardy  has  no  foun 
dation  in  truth,  and  I  shall  show  that  General  Halleck  and  General  Grant  them 
selves  could  not  have  believed  that  such  was  the  case. 

He  says  he  only  casually  learned,  a  few  days  before  his  arrival  at 
Savannah,  that  General  Grant  was  not  there,  but  on  the  west  bank, 
adding,  "  And  then  I  was  told  it"  (the  force)  "was  secure  in  the  natu 
ral  strength  of  the  position."  On  the  18th  he  telegraphed  General 
Halleck: 

"  I  understand  General  Grant  is  on  the  east  side  of  the  river.  Is  it  not  so  ?  " 
And  the  reply  did  not  inform  me  to  the  contrary.  ...  At  no  time  did  either  of 
these  officers  inform  me  of  Grant's  actual  position,  or  that  he  was  thought  to  be 
in  danger. 

1  BuelPs  letter  to  Grant,  New  York  World,  April  6,  1866. 


536  PITTSBUKG  LANDING. 

On  the  3d  of  April  Buell  suggested  that  he  had  better  cross  the 
Tennessee  at  Hamburg,  and  Halleck  replied,  directing  him  to  halt  at 
Waynesboro,  thirty  miles  from  Savannah — 

Saying  he  could  not  leave  St.  Louis  until  the  7th  to  join  us ;  but,  as  his  dis 
patch  did  not  reach  me  before  I  arrived  at  Waynesboro,  I  made  no  halt,  but 
continued  my  march  to  Savannah.  And  further  yet,  the  day  before  his  arrival 
at  Savannah,  General  Nelson,  who  commanded  my  leading  division,  advised 
General  Grant  by  courier  of  his  approach,  and  was  informed  in  reply  that  it  was 
unnecessary  for  him  to  hasten  his  march,  as  he  could  not  at  any  rate  cross  the 
river  before  the  following  Tuesday.  Nevertheless,  that  division  and  myself 
arrived  at  Savannah  Saturday,  as  I  had  directed.  The  next  morning  General 
Grant  was  attacked  at  Pittsburg  Landing. 

General  Buell  says  further  that  all  the  facts  prove  that  Sherman 
shared  the  feeling  of  security. 

A  careful  reading  of  the  dispatches  and  communications  of  com 
manders  sustains  every  statement  in  the  foregoing  summary. 

General  G.  Ammen,  in  a  letter  dated  April  5,  1871,  published  in 
the  Cincinnati  Commercial,  strongly  corroborates  General  Buell's  state 
ment  that  Grant  delayed  Nelson's  march.  He  says  Nelson  told  him, 
at  Columbia,  that  he  was  not  wanted  at  Savannah  before  Monday, 
April  7th,  but,  everything  favoring  him,  he  arrived  there  on  the  5th,  at% 
noon.  Thus,  he  anticipated  in  time  not  only  the  calculations  of  the 
Confederate  commanders,  but  Buell's  orders,  by  two  days. 

There  is  no  reason  for  believing  that  General  Buell  disappointed 
any  just  expectation  of  his  colleagues,  or  moved  with  less  diligence  and 
expedition  than  the  proposed  plan  of  campaign  demanded,  or  the  diffi 
culties  of  the  march  permitted.  If  there  was  the  error  of  delay,  it 
occurred  in  stopping  at  Nashville,  and  arose  almost  inevitably  from  the 
division  of  the  command  between  Halleck  and  Buell,  and  the  time  taken 
up  in  concerting  a  combined  movement.  It  was  the  advance  of  Buell 
that  now  hastened  General  Johnston's  resolution  to  attack. 

The  First,  Second,  Fourth,  Fifth,  and  Sixth  Divisions,  commanded  respec 
tively  by  Brigadier-Generals  Thomas,  McCook,  Nelson,  Crittenden,  and  Wood, 
with  a  contingent  force  of  cavalry,  in  all  37,000  effective  men,  constituted  the 
main  army,  which,  under  the  personal  command  of  General  Buell,  was  to  join 
General  Halleck  in  the  projected  movement  against  the  enemy  at  Corinth,  Mis- 


Mitchell's  corps,  moving  against  Florence,  was  18,000  strong. 
The  writer  has  used  every  effort  to  ascertain  with  entire  accuracy 
the  forces  engaged  in  the  battle  of  Shiloh.     He  lays  before  the  reader 

1  "  Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  vol.  i.,  p.  99. 


FEDERAL   STRENGTH.  537 

all  the  information  he  can  obtain.  The  Hon.  Mr.  McCrary,  Secre 
tary  of  War,  kindly  put  at  his  disposal  all  the  data  in  possession  of 
the  War  Department.  These  are  given  in  the  Appendix  to  the  battle 
of  Shiloh,  showing  for  the  first  time  the  organization,  strength,  and 
casualties,  of  the  Federal  army,  in  a  form  which  it  is  hoped  will  prove 
a  valuable  contribution  to  history. 

The  tables  appended  to  Chapter  XXXIV.  (see  summary)  show  that 
General  Grant  had  at  Pittsburg  Landing — total  present,  58,052  men,  of 
whom  49,314  were  present  for  duty.  General  Buell,  on  the  information 
of  General  C.  F.  Smith,  estimated  it  at  60,000  men.  His  aggregate  on 
April  1st,  according  to  a  memorandum  furnished  the  writer  by  Secretary 
Belknap,  December  17,  1875,  was  68,175 ;  and  Buell's  aggregate  was 
101,051.  Buell,  on  March  20th,  reported  to  the  adjutant-general  that 
he  had  73,472  present  for  duty.  Thus  we  have  present  for  duty  in  the 
armies  of  invasion  opposed  to  General  Johnston,  and  excluding  the 
troops  in  garrison  or  reserve  of  Grant's  and  Halleck's  commands  : 

Buell's  troops 73,472 

Grant's     " 49,314 

Pope's      " (about)     27,000 


Total .  149,786 

Their  aggregate  force  reached  about  200,000  men.  To  meet  these 
great  armies,  General  Johnston  had  about  20,000  men  of  his  own  army, 
25,000  or  30,000  under  Beauregard,  and  9,000  or  10,000  at  Island  No. 
10,  Fort  Pillow,  and  other  garrisons ;  not  more  than  60,000  in  all,  of 
whom  not  more  than  50,000  were  effectives.  The  forces  immediately 
to  be  encountered,  exclusive  of  Pope's,  were  : 

Grant _",         .         ...         .     50,000 

Buell "...         .     37,000 

Mitchell .        .     18,000 


Total 105,000 

To  engage  these  it  will  be  seen  that  he  was  able  to  get  together 
about  40,000  available  troops -at  Shiloh. 


APPENDIX    A. 

(62T6  A.  G.  O.  75. 

WAR  DEPART] 

WASHINGTON,  December  17,  1875 

MEMORANDUM. 


WAR  DEPARTMENT,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE,  I 

i,  ) 


Statement  showing  the  number  of  troops,  present  and  absent,  in  the  com 
mands  of  Generals  Sherman,  Grant,  and  Buell,  at  the  dates  hereinafter  specified. 


538 


CONCENTRATION  AT  CORINTH. 


GENERAL    SHERMAN'S    COMMAND,    NOVEMBER    10,    1861. 

In  commands  that  furnished  returns  to  department  headquarters 
"  "  not  furnishing  returns  (about)  .... 
Regiments  in  process  of  formation  (estimated)  .... 


•Total      . 49,617 


General  Grant's  command,  February  1,  1862 
"        Buell's          "  "      20,  1862 

"         Grant's          "          April  1,  1862      . 
"        Buell's          "  "  30,  1862      . 


.     27,113 

.  103,864 
.  68,175 
.  101,051 


NOTE. — Owing  to  the  absence  of  returns  of  a  uniform  date,  the  above  figures  have 
been  taken  from  such  returns  as  are  on  file  bearing  date  nearest  to  the  time  desired. 


DISTANCES. 


From 


By  Land. 
Corinth  to  luka 
"  Burnsville 

Chewalla 
"  Bethel 

Purdy      . 
"  Eastport 

"  Wynn's  Landing 

"  Farmington 

"  Hamburg 

"  Monterey 

"  Pittsburg 

"  Savannah 

luka  to  Eastport 
Burnsville  to  Wynn's 
Bethel  to  Purdy        .    ,    . 

Savannah 
Monterey  to  Purdy   . 

"  Farmington  . 


Miles. 
23 
10 
Hi 
23 
22 
30 
21 

5 

19 
11 
23 
30 

8 
15 

4 
23 
15 


On  Tennessee  Elver  going  down. 
From  Chickasaw  to  Bear  Creek 


Miles. 


Bear  Creek  to  Eastport  . 

Eastport  to  Cook's  Landing  . 
Cook's  Landing  to  Indian  Creek 
Indian  Creek  to  Cook's  Landing  . 
Cook's  Landing  to  Yellow  Creek 
Yellow  Creek  to  "Wynn's  Landing 
Wynn's  Landing  to  Wood's  . 
Wood's  to  North  Bend  Landing  . 
North  Bend  Landing  to  Cham- 
bers's  Creek  .... 
Chambers's  Creek  to  Hamburg  . 
Hamburg  to  Lick  Creek  . 

Lick  Creek  to  Pittsburg  .  . 
Pittsburg  to  Crump's  Landing  . 
Crump's  Landing  to  Coffee  . 
Coflfee  to  Chalk-Bluff  Landing  . 
Chalk-Bluff  Landing  to  Saltillo  . 
Saltillo  to  Decatur  Furnace  .  . 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

CONCENTRATION    AT    CORINTH. 


GENERAL  JOHNSTON  had  now  effected  the  concentration  of  his  troops 
at  Corinth,  with  the  intent  of  striking  Grant  before  the  arrival  of  Buell. 
The  strategic  importance  of  this  point  can  scarcely  be  over-estimated. 
At  Corinth,  two  great  railway  lines  crossed — that  running  north  and 
south  from  Mobile,  on  the  Gulf,  to  Columbus,  near  the  mouth  of  the 


ARMY  AT   CORINTH.  539 

Ohio  ;  and  that  from  Memphis  to  Chattanooga,  running  east  and  west, 
and  connecting  the  Mississippi  River  with  the  railroad  system  of  Georgia 
and  East  Tennessee.  The  Mississippi  Central  Railroad  from  New  Or 
leans  runs  west  of  and  nearly  parallel  with  the  Mobile  &  Ohio  Railroad, 
gradually  approaching  it,  and  forming  a  junction  with  it  at  Jackson, 
Tennessee.  Still  farther  west,  the  Memphis  Railroad  to  Bowling  Green 
runs  northeast,  crossing  the  Mobile  &  Ohio  at  Humboldt.  With  the 
Tennessee  River  as  the  Federal  base,  its  Great  Bend  from  Florence  to 
Savannah  formed  a  salient,  to  which  the  railway  system  conformed. 
Corinth  was  the  central  point  and  key  of  this  system  and  its  defense. 
Pittsburg  Landing,  twenty-two  miles  distant,  was  the  strongest  point 
near  it  on  the  river  for  a  base.  There  was  no  mistake  in  its  selection, 
if  it  had  been  judiciously  intrenched,  as  has  been  shown. 

To  concentrate  at  Corinth,  and  fight  the  Federal  armies  in  detail — 
Grant  first,  Buell  afterward — this  had  been  the  cherished  object  to  which, 
during  so  many  weeks,  General  Johnston  had  bent  every  energy.  That 
concentration  was  at  last  accomplished.  Arriving  at  Corinth  in  person 
on  the  24th  of  March,  with  his  troops  nearly  all  on  the  ground  or  at 
hand,  he  spent  a  week  in  the  reorganization,  armament,  and  array  of 
the  forces  collected  there  from  so  many  quarters. 

It  has  already  been  seen  how  Folk's  command  was  drawn  back 
from  Columbus,  in  accordance  with  the  plan  settled  upon  at  Bowling 
Green,  February  7th.  It  has  been  seen,  too,  that  the  War  Department, 
as  soon  as  it  realized  the  fact  of  General  Johnston's  retreat  from  Bowling 
Green,  ordered  Bragg  from  Pensacola,  with  his  well-disciplined  army, 
to  aid  in  resisting  the  weight  of  the  attack.  Polk  had  been  negotiating 
with  Lovell,  in  January,  to  spare  him  some  troops  ;  and  in  compliance 
with  a  telegraphic  request  made  by  General  Johnston  from  Bowling 
Green,  February  2d,  Lovell  sent  him  Ruggles's  brigade.  General  John 
ston  telegraphed,  February  12th,  for  these  troops  to  report,  by  the  short 
est  possible  route  to  Corinth,  for  orders  from  General  Beauregard. 
Generals  Chalmers  and  L.  Pope  Walker  were  already  on  the  line  of  the 
Memphis  &  Charleston  Railroad,  with  considerable  commands. 

These  pages  have  evinced  how  many  and  how  strenuous  efforts  had 
been  made  to  raise  troops  in  the  South  during  that  autumn  and  winter. 
Many  regiments,  long  organized,  were  lying  in  rendezvous  waiting  for 
arms.  The  fall  of  Donelson  hurried  up  volunteering,  and  these  new 
levies  were  added  to  the  others.  At  this  juncture — at  the  critical  mo 
ment,  it  may  be  said  indeed,  at  the  last  moment — some  cargoes  of  arms 
ran  the  blockade,  and  the  troops  were  pressed  to  the  front  to  receive 
these  precious  weapons,  arriving,  some  in  time,  some  too  late,  to  share  in 
the  glories  of  Shiloh.  General  Beauregard  issued  an  eloquent  appeal 
for  volunteers,  and  several  regiments  responded — a  high  compliment  to 
his  prestige  won  at  Manassas. 


540  CONCENTRATION  AT   CORINTH. 

The  Comte  de  Paris  mentions  (vol.  i.,  page  525),  on  what  authority 
does  not  appear,  that  Beauregard  "  left  Manassas  with  15,000  men,"  and 
that  "  he  had  with  him  well-trained  troops,  who  took  with  them  the 
prestige  of  the  Bull-Run  victory,  and  were  to  inspire  new  ardor  in  the 
Army  of  the  Mississippi,  of  which  they  were  destined  to  form  the  nu 
cleus." 

This  is  an  error.  General  Beauregard  came  to  the  Army  of  the  West 
with  his  staff  only.  The  troops  collected  under  his  command  at  Corinth 
were  composed  of  Folk's  corps,  Bragg's  corps,  Ruggles's,  Walker's,  and 
Chalmers's  brigades,  and  the  new  troops  sent  forward  by  the  Governors. 
Careless  writers  have  assumed  that  this  considerable  army  was  sum 
moned  into  being,  or  concentrated  at  Corinth,  by  other  than  regular 
military  methods ;  but  they  are  mistaken.  They  were  recruited,  armed, 
disciplined,  and  assembled  at  Corinth,  by  the  conjoint  efforts  of  the  State 
and  Confederate  governments,  extending  through  many  months,  and  by 
the  slow  and  laborious  processes  already  detailed  in  these  pages. 

The  army  now  collected  at  Corinth  consisted  of  Folk's  corps,  whom 
we  have  seen  holding  Columbus,  and  baffling  Grant  at  Belmont ; 
Bragg's  well-disciplined  troops,  who  had  been  all  the  fall  in  training 
at  Pensacola ;  Ruggles's  reenforcement,  detached  from  Lovell  at  New 
Orleans  ;  and  Chalmers's  and  Walker's  commands,  as  stated.  To  these 
were  added  such  new  levies  as  the  Governors  had  in  rendezvous,  who  in 
this  emergency  were  sent  to  the  front,  even  without  arms,  and  a  few 
regiments  which  were  raised  in  response  to  General  Beauregard's  call. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  General  Johnston's  plan  of  concentration 
at  Corinth,  long  contemplated,  had  taken  shape  as  soon  as  Donelson  fell. 

On  February  21st  Mackall,  adjutant-general,  telegraphed  to  Gen 
eral  Pillow,  who  was  at  Columbia,  that  General  Johnston's  "  retreat 
will  be  toward  Shelbyville."  On  the  same  day  orders  were  given  to 
send  Cleburne's  regiment  to  Decatur.  On  February  24th  General 
Johnston  telegraphed  President  Davis  : 

My  movement  has  been  delayed  by  a  storm  on  the  22th,  washing  away  pike 
and  railroad-bridge  at  this  place.  Floyd,  2,500  strong,  will  march  for  Chatta 
nooga  to-morrow,  to  defend.  This  army  will  move  on  the  26th,  by  Decatur,  for 
the  valley  of  the  Mississippi.  Is  in  good  condition  and  increasing  in  numbers. 

When  his  arrangements  at  Murfreesboro  were  complete,  he  wrote  to 
Mr.  Benjamin,  February  27th,  that  he  was  about  to  move  to  the  defense 
of  the  Mississippi  Valley,  "  crossing  the  (Tennessee)  River  near  Deca 
tur,  in  order  to  enable  him  to  cooperate  or  unite  with  General  Beaure 
gard"  Next  day  he  moved.  This  was  before  Halleck's  orders  for 
the  movement  up  the  Tennessee,  and  ten  days  before  it  began,  and 
General  Johnston  was  already  three  days  on  his  march  before  Colum 
bus  was  evacuated. 


JOHNSTON'S   OBJECTIVE  POINT.  541 

On  the  26th  of  February  General  Beauregard  asked  for  a  brigade  to 
assist  in  the  defense  of  New  Madrid,  in  the  following  terms  : 

Appearance  of  an  early  attack  on  New  Madrid,  in  force.  Position  of  abso 
lute  necessity  to  us.  Cannot  you  send  a  brigade  at  once,  by  rail,  to  assist 
defense  as  fast  as  possible  ? 

In  his  report  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  he  says  : 

General  Johnston  being  at  Murfreesboro,  on  the  march  to  form  junction  of 
his  forces  with  mine,  was  called  on  to  send  at  least  a  brigade  by  railroad,  so  we 
might  fall  upon  and  crush  the  enemy  should  he  attempt  an  advance  from  under 
his  gunboats. 

There  was,  in  fact,  no  enemy  there  until  some  two  weeks  later,  and 
the  brigade  called  for  was  intended,  as  is  seen  above,  for  a  different 
purpose — "  to  assist  defense,"  not  "  to  fall  upon  and  crush  the  enemy." 
The  correspondence  between  General  Beauregard  and  General  John 
ston  shows  that  the  former  was  advised  of  all  of  General  Johnston's 
movements. 

General  Beauregard  wrote  from  Jackson,  Tennessee,  March  2d,  to 
General  Johnston: 

I  think  you  ought  to  hurry  up  your  troops  to  Corinth  by  railroad,  as  soon  as 
practicable,  for  here  or  thereabouts  will  soon  be  fought  the  great  battle  of  this 
controversy. 

Adjutant-General  Mackall  telegraphed  for  General  Johnston  to  Gen 
eral  Beauregard,  March  7th  : 

The  general  understands  that  detachments  for  this  army  are  coming  east. 
Will  you  order  none  to  pass  the  line  of  road  running  to  Corinth  ? 

This,  with  the  other  circumstances  already  given,  is  conclusive  that 
Corinth  was  the  objective  point  of  General  Johnston's  march.  While 
engaged  in  these  efforts  at  concentration,  General  Johnston  fully  per 
ceived  the  necessity  of  haste  in  their  execution,  and  it  has  been  seen 
that  all  possible  speed  was  made. 

Immediately  after  Sherman  effected  his  first  lodgement  at  Pitts- 
burg,  Bragg  conceived  the  project  of  striking  him  a  blow  at  once, 
which,  if  it  had  been  executed  promptly,  would  very  probably  have 
proved  successful,  and  might  have  changed  the  whole  course  of  subse 
quent  events.  This  bold  stroke  was,  however,  prevented  by  the  follow 
ing  orders  from  General  Beauregard,  who  determined  to  await  General 
Johnston's  arrival: 


54:2  CONCENTRATION  AT   CORINTH. 

JACKSON,  TENNESSEE,  March  17, 1862. 

DEAR  GENERAL:  I  telegraphed  you  yesterday,  via  Corinth,  my  views  relative 
to  the  two  strategic  points,  Chamberlain  and  Corinth  (according  to  the  map). 
Having  brigades  of  observation  at  Purdy  and  luka,  the  two  points  threatened  by 
the  enemy  from  the  Tennessee  River,  I  also  addressed  you  a  letter  on  the  same 
subject  through  my  adjutant-general,  Colonel  Jordan. 

Yesterday  evening,  however,  Captain  Jordan  submitted  to  me  your  inten 
tions,  formed,  no  doubt,  before  having  received  my  communications,  above 
referred  to,  relative  to  a  proposed  movement  on  your  part,  in  two  columns  from 
Corinth  and  Bethel,  to  meet  at  Adamsville.  This  movement,  with  such  troops 
as  we  have,  in  the  presence  of  a  determined  enemy,  might  be  dangerous,  for  the 
point  of  junction  is  too  near  his  positions  at  Crump's  Landing  and  Pittsburg. 
I  would  prefer  uniting  farther  back,  at  or  near  Purdy,  if  the  roads  permit  it. 
But  what  I  wish  to  call  your  attention  particularly  to  is,  the  nature  of  our  opera 
tions.  I  do  not  think,  owing  to  the  quality  of  our  troops,  the  nature  of  the 
country  we  would  have  to  operate  in  (cut  up  with  small  streams,  woods,  etc.), 
not  knowing  exactly  where  the  enemy  intends  to  strike,  and  in  what  force,  that 
our  operations  ought  to  be  purely  offensive ;  I  would  prefer  the  defensive-offen 
sive — that  is,  to  take  up  such  a  position  as  would  compel  the  enemy  to  develop 
his  intentions,  and  to  attack  us,  before  he  could  penetrate  any  distance  from  his 
base ;  then,  when  within  striking  distance  of  us,  to  take  the  offensive,  and  crush 
him  wherever  we  may  happen  to  strike  him,  cutting  him  off,  if  possible,  from 
his  base  of  operations,  or  the  river ;  in  that  way,  we  would  be  certain  not  to 
march  on  Crump's  Landing  or  Pittsburg,  when,  perhaps,  we  ought  to  move  on 
or  toward  luka  or  Eastport.  The  great  desideratum  is  to  be  thoroughly  pre 
pared  wheresoever  and  whenever  required,  on  positive  information  only  of  the 
enemy's  movements,  and  for  which  purpose  you  must  have  strong  advanced  posts 
in  every  direction  toward  him,  protected  by  a  strong  body  of  cavalry,  thrown 
well  forward,  to  watch  the  enemy  and  give  timely  notice  of  his  approach.  .  .  . 

(Here  follow  directions  for  the  disposition  of  the  troops,  not  spe 
cially  pertinent  to  this  memoir.) 

My  health  not  permitting  me  yet  to  be  with  you,  I  have  thought  it  advisable 
to  give  you  these  general  ideas,  which  may  be  of  service  to  you.  I  hope,  how 
ever,  to  be  well  enough  to  join  you  when  the  fighting  shall  have  commenced, 
not,  however,  to  interfere  with  your  arrangement,  but  merely  to  assist  you,  if  I 
can,  and  prevent  misunderstandings,  complications,  etc. 

My  physician  tells  me  that  I  must  stop  talking  altogether,  and  avoid  any  un 
due  excitement.  How  in  the  world  can  that  be  done,  at  this  critical  moment  ? 
They  might  as  well  tell  a  drowning  man  that  he  must  not  catch  at  a  straw. 

Still  hopeful,  however,  I  remain,  yours  truly, 

(Signed)  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  General  commanding. 

P.  S. — While  I  have  guarded  you  against  an  uncertain  offensive,  I  am  de 
cidedly  of  the  opinion  that  we  should  endeavor  to  entice  the  enemy  into  an 
engagement  as  soon  as  possible,  and  before  he  shall  have  further  increased  his 
numbers  by  the  large  numbers  which  he  must  still  have  in  reserve  and  available 
— that  is,  beat  him  in  detail. 
To  Major-General  B.  BRAGG. 

(For  the  information  of  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON.) 


BEAUREGARD'S  REPORT  OF  SHILOH.  543 

General  Beauregard's  report  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh  is  given  in  full  in 
the  appendix  to  Chapter  XXXV.  Its  statements  have  led  to  many  erro 
neous  inferences  and  much  of  the  prevalent  misapprehension  as  to  the 
circumstances  preceding  and  attending  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  It  is  not 
the  province  of  the  present  writer  to  deal  with  it  controversially.  It 
is  given  to  the  reader,  not  as  a  just  or  accurate  view  of  these  events, 
but  because  so  important  a  document  belongs  to  history.  It  has 
seemed  to  the  writer,  however,  that  this  report  ought  to  be  looked  at 
in  the  light  of  its  intent  and  of  the  circumstances  under  which  it  was 
composed.  It  was  written  in  the  first  hours  of  the  great  and  sudden 
disappointment  and  reversal  of  the  splendid  dream  of  complete  tri 
umph  opened  to  the  Southern  arms  at  Shiloh,  and  closed  again  by 
General  Johnston's  death.  It  was  written,  too,  amid  the  wreck  of  an 
unavailing  contest,  and,  unconsciously  perhaps,  to  reconcile  the  results 
with  the  fair  promise  of  its  opening.  Hence  its  standpoint  is  simply 
personal. 

Its  strictly  personal  character  is  readily  seen,  when  it  is  observed 
that  it  contains  no  record  of  all  the  service  of  General  Johnston  in  his 
last  campaign  and  his  last  battle.  These  are  attributed  to  an  imper 
sonal  "  It."  The  report  says,  "  It  was  expected,"  "  It  was  decided," 
"  It  was  determined,"  where  strong  men  thought  the  experience  of  a 
veteran  and  the  energies  of  a  great  soldier  were  incorporate,  vivid,  and 
strenuous,  in  the  person  of  their  leader. 

That  the  aspect  of  General  Beauregard's  report  is  simply  personal 
to  himself  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  General  Johnston's  name 
appears  in  it  but  four  times,  and  then  in  the  following  connections  :  1. 
That  he  reenforced  General  Beauregard  ;  2.  That  General  Johnston 
was  advised  that  his  attack  conformed  to  the  expectations  of  the 
President  ;  3.  That  he  died  bravely  at  Shiloh  ;  4.  That  he  had  a  staff 
worthy  of  commendation.  Surely,  if  this  is  a  record  of  General  John 
ston's  part  in  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  this  memoir  would  not  be  worth  the 
writing.  Hence,  it  seems  to  the  writer  that  General  Beauregard's  re 
port  must  be  taken  merely  as  the  record  of  General  Beauregard's  own 
services  from  his  own  point  of  view. 

Immediately  on  his  arrival  at  Corinth,  March  24th,  General  Johnston 
held  a  conference  with  Generals  Beauregard,  Polk,  and  Bragg,  after 
which  General  Beauregard  went  back  to  Jackson ;  but  returned  on  the 
26th,  and  lent  zealous  and  valuable  aid  in  spite  of  his  malady.  About 
the  same  time  General  Johnston  had  the  conference  with  Van  Dorn,  in 
which  it  was  determined  to  bring  his  army  also  to  Corinth.  The  enemy 
was  at  this  time  reported  in  front  of  Monterey,  almost  half-way  between 
Pittsburg  and  Corinth,  advancing.  But  this  was  a  mistake.  Grant 
made  no  move  of  note  previous  to  the  battle.  It  was  known  that  Buell 
was  advancing,  and  the  time  taken  for  reorganization  and  armament 
36 


544  CONCENTRATION  AT  CORINTH. 

had  to  be  measured  by  his  movements.  If  these  would  permit  it,  a  lit 
tle  time  would  make  the  Confederate  army,  reenforced  by  Van  Dorn, 
compact  and  terrible.  If,  however,  he  pressed  on,  the  blow  must  be 
struck  without  waiting  for  Van  Dorn.  The  Comte  de  Paris,  in  his  his 
tory  of  the  war,  vol.  i.,  page  557,  attributes  this  delay  to  hesitation  ; 
but  there  was  no  hesitation.  The  work  of  organization  and  armament 
was  unavoidable  and  imperious.  The  attack  was  ordered  within  two 
hours  after  Buell's  advance  was  reported. 

This  work  of  reorganization  and  armament  first  engaged  General 
Johnston's  attention.  His  personal  staff  was  now  constituted  as  fol 
lows  : 

Colonel  H.  P.  Brewster,  assistant  adjutant-general. 

Captain  N".  Wickliffe,  assistant  adjutant-general. 

Captain  Theodore  O'Hara,  assistant  inspector-general. 

Lieutenant  George  "W.  Baylor,  aide-de-camp. 

Lieutenant  Thomas  M.  Jack,  " 

Major  Albert  J.  Smith,  assistant  quartermaster-general. 

Captain  Wickham,  "  "  " 

Colonel  "William  Preston,  volunteer  aide-de-camp. 

Major  D.  M.  Hayden,  "  " 

Major  Edward  W.  Munford,  " 

Major  Calhoun  Benham,  " 

For  the  important  work  of  reorganization  before  him,  General 
Johnston  called  to  his  aid  General  Bragg,  who  had  special  qualifica 
tions  for  the  task.  At  General  Johnston's  earnest  request,  General 
Bragg  consented  to  act  temporarily  as  chief  of  staff,  with  the  under 
standing  that  he  was  to  have  command  of  his  corps  on  the  approach  of 
a  battle. 

General  Bragg  played  so  conspicuous  a  part  in  the  civil  war  that 
this  work  affords  neither  scope  nor  occasion  for  an  account  of  his  life, 
or  an  estimate  of  his  character.  Indeed,  there  is  scarcely  any  other 
career  that  has  come  under  the  writer's  personal  view  where  there  were 
so  many  questions  difficult  to  settle  fairly.  In  Bragg  there  was  so 
much  that  was  strong  marred  by  most  evident  weaknesses,  so  many  vir 
tues  blemished  by  excess  or  defect  in  temper  and  education,  so  near 
an  approach  to  greatness  and  so  manifest  a  failure  to  attain  it,  that  his 
worst  enemy  ought  to  find  something  to  admire  in  him,  and  his  best 
friend  something  painful  in  the  attempt  to  portray  him  truly.  The 
writer  saw  him  from  many  points  of  view  and  under  divers  lights  and 
shadows,  and  as  he  has  passed  into  history,  gives  here  a  brief  mention 
of  him  that  may  serve  till  some  abler  hand  performs  the  task  of  recount 
ing  his  services. 

Braxton  Bragg  was  born  in  Warren  County,  North  Carolina,  in  1815. 
Members  of  his  family  attained  eminence  in  politics  and  at  the  bar. 


BRAXTON    BRAGG.  545 

He  was  graduated  at  West  Point,  and  entered  the  Third  Artillery 
in  1837.  He  saw  service  in  the  Seminole  War  in  Florida,  and  was  pro 
moted  to  first-lieutenant  in  1838.  Bragg  served  under  General  Taylor 
in  the  Mexican  War,  and  was  brevetted  captain  in  1846,  "  for  gallant 
and  distinguished  conduct  in  the  defense  of  Fort  Brown,  Texas."  He 
was  brevetted  major  for  gallant  conduct  at  Monterey,  and  lieutenant- 
colonel  for  his  services  at  Buena  Vista.  The  mythical  order  of  General 
Taylor  to  him  on  that  field,  "  A  little  more  grape,  Captain  Bragg,"  made 
a  popular  catch-word,  which  gave  him  great  notoriety.  An  attempt 
was  made  to  assassinate  him  in  camp  in  1847,  by  the  explosion  of  a 
twelve-pound  shell  at  the  foot  of  his  bed. 

After  the  Mexican  War,  he  became  a  sugar-planter  in  Terre  Bonne 
Parish,  Louisiana,  and  his  methodical  habits,  industry,  and  skillful  man 
agement,  gave  him  great  success.  At  the  opening  of  the  war,  the  State 
of  Louisiana  made  him  commander-in-chief  of  her  volunteer  forces. 
When  the  Confederate  Government  was  established,  President  Davis 
made  him  a  brigadier-general,  and  put  him  in  command  at  Pensacola. 
Here  the  people  and  the  troops  expected  a  great  contest,  and,  though 
it  did  not  occur,  it  afforded  a  favorable  field  for  Bragg's  excellent  tal 
ents  for  organization,  administration,  and  discipline.  It  has  been  seen 
how  he  was  transferred  with  his  forces  to  Corinth. 

It  is  not  the  province  of  the  present  writer  to  recount  his  further 
services,  but  the  following  brief  abstract  from  the  pen  of  Colonel  J. 
Stoddard  Johnston,  who  served  on  his  staff,  will  here  suffice  : 

His  first  service  was  at  Pensaoola,  where  he  distinguished  himself  as  a  disci 
plinarian,  and  whence  he  was  transferred  to  Corinth  shortly  before  the  battle  of 
Shiloh,  having  the  rank  of  a  major-general.  He  served  with  distinction  at 
Shiloh,  having  been  made  by  General  Johnston  his  chief  of  staff,  and,  shortly 
after,  being  promoted  to  a  full  generalship,  succeeded  to  the  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Mississippi.  In  the  succeeding  summer,  1862,  he  transferred  the 
main  body  of  his  command  to  Chattanooga,  and  planned  and  executed  the  Ken 
tucky  campaign  of  that  year,  being  at  the  same  time  in  command  of  the  depart 
ment  embracing  the  territory  between  the  Mississippi  River  and  the  Alleghany 
range.  Notwithstanding  the  unpopularity  which  assailed  him  after  the  evacua 
tion  of  Kentucky,  he  was  continued  in  command,  and  transferred  his  army  in 
November,  1862,  to  Middle  Tennessee,  and  December  31st  of  that  year  fought 
with  31,000  infantry  the  battle  of  Murfreesboro  or  Stone  River.  Notwithstand 
ing  the  superior  numbers  by  which  he  was  opposed  under  Rosecrans,  the  victory 
for  a  time  was  his.  A  bloody  repulse  of  Hardee  at  the  moment  when  the  latter 
was  thought  to  be  giving  the  finishing  stroke  to  the  day,  and  the  slaughter  which 
befell  Breckinridge's  command  two  days  after,  compelled  him  to  retreat  and 
yield  the  ground  to  his  opponent.  He,  however,  continued  to  occupy  a  great 
part  of  Tennessee  until  the  following  September,  when  on  the  19th  and  20th  he 
again  fought  Rosecrans  at  Chickamauga.  Here  his  victory  was  decisive,  as  at 
the  close  of  the  second  day's  fight  he  occupied  the  battle-field,  and  Rosecrans  re 
treated  to  Chattanooga.  Failure  to  pursue  and  follow  up  his  victory  gave  Rose- 


546  CONCENTRATION  AT  CORINTH. 

crans  time  to  fortify  and  restore  the  morale  of  his  shattered  command,  and  re 
sulted  ultimately  in  Bragg's  defeat  at  Missionary  Ridge,  November  25th,  his 
retreat  into  Georgia,  and  his  relinquishment  of  the  command  of  the  army  to 
Joseph  E.  Johnston.  His  active  military  career  may  be  said  to  have  closed  here, 
as  he  was  assigned  to  staff-duty  at  Richmond,  where  he  remained  until  shortly 
before  the  close  of  the  war  in  confidential  relations  with  President  Davis,  as  chief 
of  staff  of  the  armies  of  the  Confederacy.  Not  long  before  the  surrender,  he 
was  placed  in  command  at  Wilmington,  North  Carolina,  and  was  engaged  in 
several  actions. 

The  close  of  the  war  found  him  ruined  in  fortune,  but  he  went  to  work 
cheerfully,  following  the  pursuit  of  a  civil  engineer  in  New  Orleans  and  Mobile, 
until  within  the  past  few  years  he  removed  to  Galveston,  where  death  closed 
his  career  in  his  sixty -first  year. 

General  Bragg  met  his  death  at  Galveston,  Texas,  September  27, 
1876,  by  heart-disease.  He  was  struck,  while  crossing  a  street,  and 
died  as  suddenly  as  if  he  had  met  his  fate  on  the  battle-field. 

Colonel  Johnston  continues  : 

The  brief  sketch  which  I  have  given  shows  that  his  service  in  the  late  war 
was  large,  varied,  and  active,  and  the  time  during  which  he  was  in  command, 
from  Shiloh  to  Dalton,  comprises  the  most  eventful  period  of  the  war  in  the 
"West.  Soldiers  with  whom  he  left  Pensacola  marched  northward  till  they  came 
in  sight  of  Cincinnati,  and  fought  under  him  at  Shiloh,  Perryville,  Murfreesboro, 
Chickamauga,  and  Missionary  Ridge;  and  the  historian  who  attempts  impartially 
to  give  the  details  of  his  marches  and  his  battles  will  find,  though  the  net  re 
sults  of  his  efforts  were  not  summed  up  in  victory,  what  triumphs  over  obstacles 
he  achieved  through  the  valor  of  his  men,  his  skill  as  an  organizer  and  disciplin 
arian,  and  his  fertility  of  resource  in  matters  pertaining  to  the  quartermaster, 
commissary,  and  ordnance  departments.  .  .  . 

I  am  not  his  eulogist;  but,  having  been  personally  associated  with  him 
at  the  most  critical  periods  of  his  active  service,  I  feel  that  I  owe  it  to 
him  to  bear  attestation  to  the  unselfish  and  untiring  devotion  he  always  gave  to 
the  service  in  which  he  was  enlisted.  He  was  not  a  soldier  of  the  first  rank  like 
Lee,  lacking  some  of  those  essential  grander  elements  which  give  success  to  a 
commander  in  the  field ;  but  he  possessed  qualifications  such  as,  rightly  directed, 
would  have  made  him  great  in  the  Confederate»army  as  Moltke  in  the  Prussian. 
Sidney  Johnston  weighed  him  aright  when  he  assigned  him  a  position  hitherto 
unknown  in  American  warfare,  but  essential  to  the  proper  organization  of  a 
great  army,  and  so  recognized  by  the  European  powers.  As  a  commander  in 
the  field,  Bragg  was  too  much  engrossed  with  the  details  of  moving,  disciplining, 
organizing,  and  feeding  his  men,  to  master  the  broader  and  more  comprehensive 
duties  of  a  great  captain  in  time  of  battle.  His  plans  of  battles,  and  orders  pro 
mulgated,  as  at  Murfreesboro  and  Chickamauga,  will  be  found  to  evince  more 
ability,  and  to  comprehend  remarkable  accuracy  of  detail  as  well  as  clearness 
and  precision. 

In  both  the  engagements  named,  he  attacked  boldly  on  the  flank ;  at  the  for 
mer  on  the  left,  and  the  latter  on  the  right ;  but,  in  the  supreme  moment,  when 
Lee  or  Jackson  would  have  made  his  victory  complete,  he  failed  in  the  power  to 


BRAGG'S   CHARACTER.  547 

modify  his  original  plan,  and  lost  from  his  tendency  to  adhere  inflexibly  to  his 
predetermined  line  of  action.  .  .  . 

But  in  the  matter  in  which  General  Bragg  has  been  most  criticised  and 
held  up  to  reproach  I  think  injustice  has  been  done  him.  That  he  was  strict 
is  true,  and  that  he  incited  fear  and  alarm,  by  his  avowed  purpose  to  enforce 
discipline  at  all  hazards,  is  also  true,  and  that  he  may  have  used  in  some  in 
stances  extreme  measures  we  may  admit ;  but  that  his  action  was  inspired  more 
by  a  sense  of  the  necessity  of  his  situation  as  an  officer  charged  with  the  safety 
of  a  great  army,  than  by  a  cruel  disposition,  is  my  firm  conviction.  He  had 
been  bred  in  a  strict  school  as  a  West-Pointer,  and  as  captain  of  an  artillery- 
company  in  actual  war  knew  the  details  as  well  as  the  necessity  of  discipline. 
He  was  no  holiday  soldier,  and  had  none  of  the  ulterior  aspirations  of  a  volun 
teer  to  lead  him  to  curry  favor  with  any  one.  He  therefore  exacted  of  all  a 
rigid  performance  of  duty,  a  neglect  of  which  fell  heavily  upon  any  one, 
whether  high  or  low ;  but  I  was  too  frequently  cognizant  of  his  good  deeds 
of  mercy  to  the  delinquents,  for  light  offenses,  and  commutations,  reprieves,  and 
pardon  for  capital  ones,  to  let  him  rest  under  the  imputation  of  a  heartless  man, 
or  one  who  wielded  his  great  powers  cruelly.  In  his  personal  habits  and  con 
duct  he  was  thoroughly  temperate,  in  both  meat  and  drink,  discarding  the  use 
of  liquor  in  any  form,  and  waging  ruthless  war  upon  all  who  made  it  or  sought 
to  supply  his  men  with  it.  He  was  untiring  in  his  labors,  methodical  and  sys 
tematic  in  the  discharge  of  business,  an  early  riser,  and  devout  in  his  attention  to 
his  religious  duties,  being  a  communicant  of  the  Episcopal  Church.  In  person 
he  was  tall  and  spare,  but  of  a  lithe  and  sinewy  frame,  and  capable  of  enduring 
any  amount  of  fatigue.  Though  in  social  converse  he  was  peculiarly  mild  and 
agreeable  in  manner,  a  peculiar  conformation  of  eyebrows,  which  extended  con 
tinuously  from  eye  to  eye,  and  a  cold,  steel-gray  eye,  which  exhibited  much  of 
the  white  when  animated,  gave  him  in  his  sterner  moods,  or  when  roused,  a 
very  ferocious  aspect,  which  made  him  a  terror  to  all  who  incurred  his  dis 
pleasure. 

I  recall  with  gratitude  and  pleasure  many  acts  of  personal  kindness  and 
friendship  of  which  I  was  the  recipient  at  his  hands,  and  for  which,  despite  the 
occurrence  of  the  circumstances  which  led  to  severance  of  association,  I  shall 
ever  hold  him  in  grateful  memory. 

Colonel  Johnston  also  mentions  his  lack  of  that  power  of  concilia 
tion  so  necessary  to  the  commander  of  volunteer  troops. 

Circumstances  give  to  Colonel  J.  S.  Johnston's  estimate  of  General 
Bragg  a  more  than  ordinary  judicial  character.  They  are  inserted  with 
such  fullness,  because  they  conform  very  nearly  to  the  well-settled 
opinions  of  the  present  writer.  While  Bragg  was  an  able  man,  he  was 
too  rigid  and  narrow  to  be  a  great  one.  He  was  very  harsh  and  intol 
erant  where  he  once  imbibed  a  prejudice,  and  he  was  not  slow,  nor 
always  just,  in  assuming  his  conclusions.  He  was  always  a  partisan, 
and  merciless  toward  those  who  resisted  him,  even  when  his  acts  were 
clearly  arbitrary.  He  did  not  inspire  love  or  reverence,  but  he  com 
manded  respect  and  fear.  He  trusted  too  much  those  who  agreed  with 
him,  and  was  apt  to  undervalue  those  who  held  aloof  from  or  offended 


548  CONCENTRATION  AT   CORINTH. 

him.  But  if  this  rugged  outline  seems  too  much  the  likeness  of  a  mili 
tary  despot,  it  should  be  added  that  his  purposes  were  great,  pure,  and 
unselfish,  and  his  aspirations  high. 

But,  whatever  may  have  been  General  Bragg's  defects,  he  was  con 
spicuous  for  one  trait  that  marks  him  as  the  worthy  citizen  of  a  repub 
lic — a  profound  sense  of  public  duty.  Whether  wise  or  unwise  in  the 
means  adopted,  the  ultimate  object  of  his  endeavors  was  the  public 
good.  He  was  a  patriot,  and  in  the  poverty  and  trials  of  his  latter 
days  no  temptation  shook  his  stoical  fortitude  in  bearing  the  ills  of  his 
own  lot,  and  in  maintaining  the  righteousness  and  dignity  of  the  cause 
for  which  he  had  suffered.  Physical  studies,  culture  from  books,  and 
the  enlarging  and  mellowing  influences  of  religion  and  domestic  hap 
piness,  gilded  his  latter  days.  It  is  right  to  give  such  a  man  his  exact 
place  in  history. 

Before  his  death,  General  Bragg  prepared  for  the  present  writer  a 
sketch  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  the  opening  of  which  succinctly  explains 
the  preliminaries  of  that  event.  It  is  as  follows  : 

The  memory  of  a  fallen  commander,  however  much  honored  and  revered  by 
his  countrymen,  rarely  receives  full  justice  during  the  excitement  of  war,  and 
especially  when  he  meets  his  fate  in  an  active  campaign,  or  on  a  hotly-contested 
and  unfortunate  field.  Few  can  know  the  motives  which  influenced,  the  acts 
which  distinguished,  or  the  opposition  which  met  him.  And  rules  of  military 
etiquette  frequently  impose  silence  on  these  few. 

After  the  disasters  incident  to  their  dispersed  condition,  which  naturally 
befell  the  Confederate  arms,  in  the  winter  of  1861  and  1862,  and  which  culmi 
nated  in  the  surrender  at  Fort  Donelson,  General  A.  Sidney  Johnston,  then  com 
manding  all  the  Confederate  forces  in  the  Western  Department,  acting  against 
the  advice  of  some  of  his  best  and  ablest  commanders,  wisely  determined  to 
concentrate  in  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi,  and  there  risk  his  own  fate  and  that 
of  the  cause  he  sustained.1  This  movement,  directed  upon  Corinth — commenced 
early  in  the  month  of  March — was  not  fully  consummated  when  information  of 
the  enemy's  dispositions  determined  Johnston  to  attack  -with  the  forces  then 
available.  In  a  period  of  four  weeks,  fragments  of  commands  from  Bowling 
Green,  Kentucky,  under  Hardee ;  Columbus,  Kentucky,  under  Polk;  and  Pen- 
sacola,  Mobile,  and  New  Orleans,  under  Bragg ;  with  such  new  levies  as  could 
be  hastily  raised,  all  badly  armed  and  equipped,  were  united  at  and  near  Corinth, 
and  for  the  first  time  organized  as  an  army.  It  was  an  heterogeneous  mass,  in 
which  there  was  more  enthusiasm  than  discipline,  more  capacity  than  knowl 
edge,  and  more  valor  than  instruction.  Eifles,  rifled  and  smooth-bore  muskets 
— some  of  them  originally  percussion,  others  hastily  altered  from  flint-locks  by 
Yankee  contractors,  many  still  with  the  old  flint  and  steel — and  shot-guns  of  all 
sizes  and  patterns,  held  place  in  the  same  regiments.  The  task  of  organizing 
such  a  command  in  four  weeks,  and  supplying  it,  especially  with  ammunition 
suitable  for  action,  was  simply  appalling.  It  "was  undertaken,  however,  with  a 

1  He  so  stated  to  me  at  Corinth,  when,  as  chief  of  staff,  I  advised  and  he  ordered  the 
troops  from  the  Trans-Mississippi  to  that  place,  before  the  battle  of  Shiloh. 


JOHNSTON'S   OFFER   TO   BEAUREGARD.  549 

cool,  quiet  self-control,  by  calling  to  his  aid  the  best  knowledge  and  talent  at  his 
command,  which  not  only  inspired  confidence,  but  soon  yielded  the  natural 
fruits  of  system,  order,  and  discipline. 

This  force,  about  40,000  of  all  arms,  was  divided  into  four  corps,  commanded 
respectively  by  Major- Generals  Polk,  Bragg,  and  Hardee,  and  Brigadier-General 
Breckinridge,  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  in  chief  command;  and  General 
Beauregard,  who,  having  recently  come  out  from  the  army  in  Virginia,  and 
being  in  feeble  health,  was  assigned  no  special  command,  but  was  designated 
in  orders  as  "  second  in  command,"  and  as  such  aided  the  commander-in-chief 
with  his  counsel  and  advice. 

The  difficulties  mentioned  by  General  Bragg  of  arming  the  troops 
were  increased  by  the  process  of  exchange  in  many  instances  for  new 
weapons,  some  of  which  were  put  into  the  hands  of  the  troops  only 
the  day  before  they  marched  against  the  enemy.  General  Beauregard 
likewise  mentions  that 

want  of  general  officers  needful  for  the  proper  organization  of  divisions  and 
brigades  of  an  army  brought  thus  suddenly  together,  and  other  difficulties  in 
the  way  of  an  effective  organization,  delayed  the  movements  until  the  night  of 
the  2d  inst.  (April). 

At  this  time  occurred  a  remarkable  episode,  which  General  Beaure 
gard  gives,  in  the  following  words,  in  a  letter  to  the  writer  : 

When  General  Johnston  first  met  me  at  Corinth,  he  proposed,  after  our 
staff  officers  had  retired,  to  turn  over  the  command  of  the  united  forces  to  me; 
but  I  positively  declined,  on  his  account  and  that  of  the  "  cause,"  telling  him 
that  I  had  come  to  assist,  but  not  to  supersede  him,  and  offering  to  give  him  all 
the  assistance  in  my  power.  He  then  concluded  to  remain  in  command.  It 
was  one  of  the  most  affecting  scenes  of  my  life. 

Colonel  William  Preston,  in  his  letter  of  April  18,  1862,  to  the 
writer,  says  : 

General  Beauregard  was  offered  the  immediate  command  of  the  whole  force, 
but  he  declined  it,  as  his  health  was  bad,  and  General  Johnston  assumed  it  in 
person. 

When  General  Johnston  told  his  purpose  to  Colonel  Munford, 
that  officer  remonstrated  with  him,  saying  that  he  appeared  to  have 
lost  Tennessee  and  Kentucky.  "This  battle  may  regain  them,  and 
reestablish  your  jeoparded  fame ;  yet  you,  on  such  an  occasion, 
would  invite  another  to  win  the  glory  of  redeeming  what  you  had  lost." 
He  smiled,  and  said,  "  I  think  it  but  right  to  make  the  offer."  Colonel 
Munford  pressed  upon  him  other  considerations  as  to  the  importance 
of  his  services  to  the  country,  to  which  General  Johnston  replied,  "  I 
will  be  present  at  the  battle,  and  will  see  that  nothing  goes  wrong." 

General  Johnston  felt  constrained  to  make  this  offer,  because  he  had 


550  CONCENTRATION  AT   CORINTH. 

brought  with  him  the  smaller  fraction  of  the  united  forces,  and  he  was 
on  a  field  that  he  had  set  apart  for  Beauregard's  control.  That  officer 
had  been  for  some  time  on  the  ground,  and  he  was  unwilling  that  a 
subordinate  should  suffer  by  his  arrival.  He  would  make  any  sacrifice 
himself  rather  than  take  one  laurel  from  the  brow  of  a  fellow-soldier. 

It  was  his  wish  to  give  General  Beauregard  the  command  of  the 
troops  in  the  field,  which  would  have  secured  to  that  officer  whatever 
of  glory  might  be  won  at  Shiloh  ;  but  it  was  in  no  wise  his  inten 
tion  to  abdicate  the  supreme  command,  or  the  superintendence  of 
affairs  in  the  management  of  the  department  or  the  movements  of 
the  army.  His  offer  to  Beauregard  was  certainly  an  act  of  rare  mag 
nanimity.  A  somewhat  analogous  case  in  his  career  occurred  at  the 
battle  of  the  Neches,  in  1839.  While  Secretary  of  War  of  Texas,  he 
attended  his  subordinate  on  the  field,  gave  him  the  benefit  of  his  mili 
tary  experience,  and  then  received  from  his  hand  the  report  of  the 
combat.  General  Johnston  had  no  diffidence  as  to'his  fitness  for  com 
mand.  He  once  said  regretfully  to  the  writer,  during  the  Mexican 
War  :  "  There  is  one  thing  I  know  I  can  do  ;  I  am  competent  to  com 
mand  troops."  In  this  instance,  with  General  Beauregard,  his  idea  of 
unselfishness,  even  though  heroic,  seems  somewhat  overstrained ;  for  he 
would  chiefly  have  suffered  in  case  of  a  failure,  but  would  not  have 
shared  in  the  glories  of  a  victory. 

The  rumor  of  this  occurrence  also  gave  rise  to  the  following  vigor 
ous  protest  from  Governor  George  W.  Johnson: 

BUBNSVILLE,  MISSISSIPPI,  March  26, 1862. 

MY  DEAR  SIK  :  A  rumor  has  reached  me  that  has  filled  me  with  just  alarm  for 
our  cause,  and  which  induces  me  again  to  write  to  you,  relying  on  the  friendship 
which  I  feel  for  you  as  my  excuse.  It  is  rumored  here  that  you  intend  to  yield 
to  the  senseless  clamors  of  fools  and  pretenders,  and  to  give  up  the  command  of 
the  army  at  the  very  crisis  of  our  fate.  This,  if  done,  will  be  fatal  to  our  cause, 
or  others  will  reap  what  ought  to  be  the  just  reward  of  all  your  noble  self- 
sacrifice  for  your  country.  I  cannot  sit  by  silent  while  this  is  being  done.  You 
did  what  was  right ;  you  have  in  your  own  hands  ample  means  of  self-defense 
against  those  who  assail  you ;  and,  as  your  friend,  I  sincerely  rejoiced  when  I 
heard  that  Congress  had  asked  for  explanations — because  this,  I  knew,  would 
at  once  break  the  seal  of  silence  which  your  own  noble  sense  of  justice  and 
mercy  to  others  might  have  imposed  upon  you.  You  left  Bowling  Green  when 
they  would  give  you  no  reinforcements,  and  when  it  was  impossible  to  defend 
Fort  Donelson  except  by  yielding  that  position.  You  had  sent  all  to  that  point 
who  could  be  spared  from  your  army  in  the  presence  of  Buell's  army.  The  event 
showed  that  you  had  sent  enough  troops  to  that  point — for  we  had  whipped  the 
enemy ;  and  if  the  generals  there  commanding  chose  to  surrender,  and  did  so 
surrender,  after  victory  and  to  a  retreating  foe,  it  is  their  fault — not  yours. 

From  this  disastrous  surrender,  and  not  from  the  defense  of  Donelson,  have 
resulted  the  subsequent  retreat  and  concentration  of  your  army  here.  We  are 
in  the  right  place,  at  the  right  time,  and  the  proudest  victory  of  the  war  awaits 


TEE  RESOLVE  TO  ATTACK.  551 

you,  unless  you  commit  suicide,  by  yielding  up  the  command  of  your  army  when 
it  most  needs  energy  and  an  active  head.  You  must  not  do  this.  I  beg  that  you 
will  not  do  it,  both  for  your  own  fame  and  the  good  of  our  country.  If  I  hear 
that  you  are  resolved  upon  this  course,  I  will  despair  of  our  cause.  It  will  sink 
under  the  curse  of  Heaven,  upon  a  people,  who  joined  like  wolves,  and  with  a 
few  wolves  in  sheep's  clothing,  to  hunt  down  the  noblest  and  purest  man  it  has 
been  my  good-fortune  to  know.  Very  truly  and  respectfully  your  friend, 

GEORGE  TV.  JOHNSON. 

General  A.  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON,  headquarters,  Corinth,  Mississippi. 

It  is  proper  to  say  that  General  Beauregard  considers  himself  as 
having  inspired  General  Johnston  with  the  idea  of  attacking  Grant  at 
Shiloh.  But  he  must  be  mistaken.  This  was  the  purpose  for  which  he 
had  concentrated  his  army  at  Corinth.  What  he  said  to  Schaller, 
Whitthorne,  and  many  others,  has  already  been  stated.  It  was  known 
to  the  President,  to  his  own  staff  and  generals,  and  to  others,  that  his 
main  design,  in  the  tremendous  effort  by  which  he  had  transferred  his 
army  from  Nashville  to  Corinth,  was  to  fight  the  enemy  in  detail.  In 
view  of  Grant's  anticipated  movement,  and  to  be  able  to  strike  him 
before  Buell's  arrival,  he  had  made  that  race  of  life  and  death.  He  was 
now  within  arm's-length  of  his  enemy.  While  every  hour  of  delay  was 
important  to  him  to  augment,  organize,  arm,  and  rest  his  troops,  it  was 
never  his  intention  to  permit  a  junction  of  Buell  with  Grant.  Buell's 
advance  was  to  be  the  signal  for  action.  As  soon  as  the  intelligence  of 
it  was  received,  his  resolution  was  taken.  The  information  reached  him 
at  eleven  o'clock  at  night.  In  two  hours  the  orders  for  an  advance 
were  issued.  This  was  on  the  night  of  April  2d. 

President  Davis  has  assured  the  writer  that  he  concurred  in  all  of 
General  Johnston's  plans.  They  likewise  received,  about  this  time,  the 
sanction  of  a  name  then,  like  General  Johnston's,  under  the  shadow  of 
legislative  disfavor  and  popular  opposition,  and  supported  by  the  almost 
unaided  hand  of  the  President,  but  since  illustrious — that  of  General 
Robert  E.  Lee.  General  Lee  wrote  him  a  letter,  received  just  before  the 
battle  of  Shiloh,  the  text  of  which  is  here  given.  As  General  Lee  was 
at  that  time  in  Richmond,  acting  as  military  adviser  of  the  President, 
this  letter  may  be  held  to  convey  Mr.  Davis's  views  as  well  as  his  own. 

LETTEE  OF  GENERAL  LEE  TO  GENERAL  JOHNSTON. 

KICHMOND,  March  26, 1862. 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL  :  No  one  has  sympathized  with  you  in  the  troubles  with 
which  you  are  surrounded  more  sincerely  than  myself.  I  have  watched  your 
every  movement,  and  know  the  difficulties  with  which  you  have  had  to  contend. 
I  hope  your  cares  will  be  diminished,  if  not  removed,  when  your  junction  with 
the  other  lines  of  your  army  has  been  completed,  which  must  be  accomplished 
by  this  time.  I  need  not  urge  you,  when  your  army  is  united,  to  deal  a  blow  at 
the  enemy  in  your  front,  if  possible,  before  his  rear  gets  up  from  Nashville. 
You  have  him  divided,  and  keep  him  so,  if  you  can.  Wishing  you,  my  dear 


552  CONCENTRATION  AT   CORINTH. 

general,  every  success  and  happiness,  with  my  earnest  prayers  for  the  safety  of 
your  whole  army,  and  that  victory  may  attend  your  movements, 

I  remain,  truly  and  sincerely  your  friend,   . 
(Signed)  E.  E.  LEE. 

General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

Geheral  Johnston  was  not  insensible  to  the  perils  of  his  aggressive 
movement,  or  to  the  strength  of  the  enemy's  position  from  the  nature 
of  the  ground  and  the  proximity  of  his  gunboats,  affording  means  of 
retreat  or  reenforcement  ;  but  it  was  necessary  to  destroy  that  army 
without  delay.  To  effect  this,  immediate  battle  must  be  delivered. 
On  this  General  Johnston  at  once  resolved. 

The  following  is  from  Colonel  Munford's  address  at  Memphis  : 

When  General  Johnston  terminated  his  retreat  from  Kentucky,  at  Corinth, 
he  found  General  Beauregard  in  command  of  a  small  army,  to  which  he  united 
his  own.  All  available  troops  were  concentrated  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and, 
before  moving  on  the  enemy  at  Sliiloh,  upward  ©f  thirty-Jive  thousand  men  of 
all  arms  were  in  hand.  General  Beauregard's  health  was  feeble.  He  was  slowly 
recovering  from  a  severe  attack,  which  had  given  just  cause  for  serious  alarm  ; 
but,  sick  as  he  was,  he  was  indefatigable  in  duty.  Much,  however,  devolved  on 
the  general-in-chief .  Soon  after  his  headquarters  were  established,  General  John 
ston  requested  General  Bragg,  then  a  major-general  of  volunteers,  to  act  as  his  ad 
jutant-general,  especially  during  the  reorganization  of  the  army,  which  was  soon 
to  take  place.  In  a  day  or  two  he  told  me  Bragg  had  consented,  but  would  retain 
his  command  fas  corps  commander]  in  the  approaching  battle.  This  was  my  first 
knowledge  that  a  battle  was  imminent.  Questions  have  been  mooted  as  to  who 
projected  and  who  planned  the  battle  of  Shiloh.  I  do  not  know.  I  have  heard, 
however,  from  President  Davis's  own  lips,  that  the  concentration  of  troops  at 
Corinth,  for  this  purpose,  was  agreed  upon  between  him  and  General  Johnston 
beforehand ;  and  that,  two  days  before  the  battle  was  fought,  General  Johnston 
sent  him  a  despatch  in  cipher.  But  I  regard  these  questions  and  their  solution  as 
wholly  unimportant.  The  facts  hereafter  revealed,  which  took  place  on  the  field 
the  day  before  the  battle,  demonstrate  that,  but  for  Sidney  Johnston,  no  such  bat 
tle  would  have  been  fought.  As  far  as  this  question  of  honor  between  the  gen 
erals  Ts  concerned,  it  was  emphatically  Sidney  Johnston's  battle,  though  this  fact 
would  never  be  inferred  from  the  official  report  of  it  sent  to  the  Government. 

General  Johnston  was  most  active  in  his  attention  to  all  the  details  of  re 
organization  and  preparations  for  the  battle.  At  an  early  stage  in  these  pro 
ceedings,  he  said  he  could  add  a  full  brigade  to  his  strength,  if  he  could  substi 
tute  negroes  for  soldiers  detailed  as  cooks  and  teamsters,  and  asked  my  assist 
ance.  I  advised  sending  out  men  of  well-known  character  from  the  army  into 
the  counties  in  the  rear,  with  authority  to  hire,  for  sixty  or  ninety  days,  such 
negroes  as  he  wanted,  and  to  give  obligations  binding  the  Government  to  pay 
their  value  as  agreed  upon,  if,  on  any  account,  they  were  not  returned.  It  was 
adopted,  but  we  got  less  than  fifty  negroes,  the  men  sent  out  saying,  "  Those 
people  have  given  their  sons  freely  enough,  but  it  is  folly  to  talk  to  them  about 
a  negro  or  a  mule."  The  general  said :  "  I  regret  this  disappointment ;  a  single 
brigade  may  determine  the  fate  of  a  battle.  These  people  do  not  seem  to  be 


PLAN  OF  BATTLE.  553 

aware  how  valueless  would  be  their  negroes  were  we  beaten."  And  on  the 
morning  of  the  4th  of  April,  our  horses  already  waiting  under  saddle,  I  will  ever 
remember  his  pause  on  the  door-step,  lost  in  thought,  and  how,  looking  up,  he 
muttered,  half  aloud,  "  Yes,  I  believe  I  have  overlooked  nothing." 

General  Beauregard  informs  the  writer  : 

I  prepared  the  order  of  march  and  of  battle,  which  were  submitted  by  me  to 
Generals  Johnston  and  Bragg,  in  presence  of  Colonel  Jordan,  chief  of  staff  of 
the  whole  army,  and  they  were  accepted  without  one  word  of  alteration.  They 
were  then  put  in  proper  form  by  Colonel  Jordan,  and  furnished  to  the  corps 
commanders. 

These  orders  are  in  Appendix  C  to  this  chapter.  In  a  letter  from 
General  Bragg  to  the  writer  occur  the  following  comments  : 

GALVESTON,  TEXAS,  December  16, 1874. 

DEAR  COLONEL  :  Yours  of  the  8th  instant,  asking  for  any  facts  in  my  pos 
session  as  to  the  authorship  of  the  plan  for  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  is  received. 
The  details  of  that  plan,  arranged  after  General  A.  Sidney  Johnston  decided  on 
delivering  battle  and  had  given  his  instructions,  were  made  up  and  published  to 
the  army  in  full  from  the  adjutant-general's  office.  My  first  knowledge  of  them 
was  derived  from  this  general  order,  the  authorship  of  which  has  been  claimed 
by  General  Beauregard. 

Conceding  the  arrangement  of  the  details  to  Beauregard  or  Jordan, 
General  Bragg  continues  : 

In  this  case,  as  I  understood  then,  and  still  Believe,  Johnston  gave  general 
instructions  for  the  general  movement.  .  .  .  Over  his  (Jordan's)  signature  these 
elaborated  details  reached  the  army. 

General  Bragg  goes  on  to  say  that  Johnston's  general  plan  was 
admirable,  but  condemns  the  elaboration  of  the  details.  He  continues  : 

"When  the  time  arrived  for  execution,  you  know  well  what  occurred.  In 
spite  of  opposition  and  prediction  of  failure,  Johnston  firmly  and  decidedly 
ordered  and  led  the  attack  in  the  execution  of  his  general  plan,  and,  notwith 
standing  the  faulty  arrangement  of  troops,  was  eminently  successful  up  to  the 
moment  of  his  fall.  The  victory  was  won.  How  it  was  lost  the  official  reports 
will  show,  and  history  h&s  already  recorded. 

• 

Independent  of  General  Beauregard's  explicit  statement,  and  Gen 
eral  Bragg's  recollection,  nothing  could  be  more  natural  than  that  Gen 
eral  Johnston  should  confide  the  elaboration  of  the  plan  of  advance  and 
the  orders  for  the  movements  of  troops  to  General  Beauregard.  When 
that  officer  reported  to  him  he  was  assigned  to  command  at  Columbus, 
with  special  reference  to  his  distinction  as  a  soldier  and  an  engineer. 
He  had  now  been  five  or  six  weeks  in  the  neighborhood  of  Corinth 
studying  this  precise  problem.  What  were  the  best  arrangements  for 


554  CONCENTRATION  AT   CORINTH. 

an  advance  against  Grant  was  dependent  on  an  acquaintance  with  the 
roads  and  the  nature  of  the  ground  to  be  contested.  This  was  presuma 
bly  within  General  Beauregard's  knowledge,  though  his  adjutant-general 
says  he  had  no  topographical  information,  "  which  hitherto  the  Confed 
erate  generals  had  been  unable  to  acquire  of  that  region,  and  of  which 
indeed  they  could  learn  nothing  definite."  l  Governor  Harris  informs 
the  writer  that  General  Johnston  seemed  to  understand  the  topography 
of  the  battle-field  thoroughly,  principally  through  information  from  Ma 
jor  Waddell,  now  of  St.  Louis,  who  showed  peculiar  talents  as  a  scout. 

General  Johnston  has  also  been  censured  for  "  miscalculating  "  the 
time  it  would  take  his  troops  to  march  from  Corinth  to  the  battle-field. 
General  Beauregard  had  arranged  all  these  details  with  great  particu 
larity  ;  and  though  there  were  some  mistakes  and  inherent  defects  in 
the  order  of  march  which  led  to  confusion  and  delay,  the  great  obstacles 
to  the  rapid  movement  of  the  troops  were  their  own  rawness  and  the 
rain  and  mud — obstacles  which  neither  foresight  nor  skill  could  avert 
or  remedy. 

The  Comte  de  Paris  advances,  in  the  following  paragraph,  a  better- 
grounded  charge  : 

"We  are  also  of  the  opinion  that  they  committed  a  grave  mistake  in  deploying 
the  different  corps  in  successive  lines  along  the  whole  front  of  the  army,  instead 
of  intrusting  a  part  of  that  front  to  each  corps,  itself  formed  in  several  lines. 

It  will  be  seen  by  examining  the  orders  issued,  and  the  details  of 
the  advance  given  in  the  course  of  this  narrative,  that  the  Confederate 
army  attacked  the  Federal  position  in  three  lines  parallel  to  its  sup 
posed  front.  The  Comte  de  Paris  claims  substantially  that  the  three 
corps  should  have  attacked  by  lines  perpendicular,  instead  of  parallel,  to 
that  front.  There  is  force  in  the  objection  ;  and  that  such  was  General 
Johnston's  original  intention  is  clearly  evinced  by  the  following  telegram : 

CORINTII,  April  8,  1662. 

General  Buell  in  motion  30,000  strong,  rapidly  from  Columbia  by  Clifton  to 
Savannah.  Mitchell  behind  him  with  10,000.  Confederate  forces— 40,000— 
ordered  forward  to  offer  battle  near  Pittsburg.  Division  from  Bethel,  main 
body  from  Corinth,  reserve  from  Burnsville,  converging  to-morrow  near  Mon 
terey  on  Pittsburg.  Beauregard  second  in  command,  Polk  the  left,  Bragg  the 
centre,  Hardee  the  right  wing,  Breckinridge  the  reserve.  Hope  engagement  be 
fore  Buell  can  form  junction. 
To  the  President,  Eichmond. 

The  words  italicized  are  in  General  Johnston's  own  handwriting  in 
the  original  dispatch. 

Why  this  plan  was  changed  in  the  orders  issued  the  writer  cannot 
tell.  Doubtless  General  Johnston  assented  to  the  change  in  deference 
1  Jordan's  "  Life  of  Forrest,"  p.  110. 


ORDERS  AS   TO  MOVEMENTS.  555 

to  General  Beauregard's  opinions  in  the  matter,  and  for  reasons  which 
seemed  sufficient  at  the  time.  It  seems  apparent  now  that  much  of  the 
confusion,  entanglement,  and  delay,  that  occurred  on  the  march  between 
Monterey  and  Mickey's,  and  of  the  subsequent  intermingling  of  com 
mands,  might  have  been  avoided  by  adhering  to  the  original  plan.  At 
the  same  time  it  may  be  said  in  extenuation  that  the  entire  organiza 
tion  of  the  army  was  so  recent  and  temporary  in  its  character,  that  the 
breaking  up  of  the  corps  did  not  greatly  affect  either  the  morale  of  the 
troops  or  the  result. 

But  important  as  were  the  preliminaries — the  maps,  the  roads,  the 
methods  of  putting  his  army  face  to  face  with  the  enemy,  which  General 
Johnston  had  to  take  on  trust — he  knew  that  the  chief  strategy  of  the 
battle  was  in  the  decision  to  fight.  Once  in  the  presence  of  the  enemy, 
he  knew  that  the  result  would  depend  on  the  way  in  which  his  troops 
icere  handled.  This  was  his  part  of  the  work,  and  he  felt  full  confidence 
in  his  own  ability  to  carry  it  out  successfully. 


APPENDIX. 

AD< 

COEINTH,  MISSISSIPPI,  April  3, 1862. 


HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THB  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 


Special  Orders,  No.  8. 

I. — In  the  impending  movement  the  corps  of  this  army  will  march,  assemble, 
and  take  order  of  battle  in  the  following  manner,  it  being  assumed  that  the 
enemy  is  in  position  about  a  mile  in  advance  of  Shiloh  church,  with  its  right 
resting  on  Owl  Creek,  and  its  left  on  Lick  Creek  : 

1.  The  Third  Corps,  under  Major-General  Hardee,  will  advance  as  soon  as 
practicable  on  the  Ridge  road  from  Corinth  to  what  is  known  as  the  uBark" 
road,  passing  about  half  a  mile  northward  of  the  Workhouse.     The  head  of  the 
column  will  bivouac  if  possible  to-night,  at  Mickey's  house,  at  the  intersection  of 
the  road  from  Monterey  to  Savannah.     The  cavalry,  thrown  well  forward  dur 
ing  the  march  to  reconnoitre  and  prevent  surprise,  will  halt  in  front  of  the 
Mickey  house  on  the  Bark  road. 

2.  Major  Waddell,  aide-de-camp  to  General  Beauregard,  with  two  good  guides, 
will  report  for  service  to  Major-General  Hardee. 

3.  At  3  A.  M.  to-morrow  the  Third  Corps  with  the  left  in  front  will  continue 
to  advance  by  the  Bark  road,  until  within  sight  of  the  enemy's  outposts  or  ad 
vanced  positions,  when  it  will  be  deployed  in  line  of  battle  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  ground,  its  left  resting  on  Owl  Creek,  its  right  toward  Lick  Creek^ 
supported  on  that  flank  by  half  of  its  cavalry ;  the  left  flank  being  supported  by 
the  other  half.     The  interval  between  the  extreme  right  of  this  corps  and  Lick 
Creek  will  be  filled  by  a  brigade  or  division — according  to  the  extent  of  the 
ground— from  the  Second  Corps.     These  troops,  during  the  battle,  will  also  be 
under  the  command  of  Major-General  Hardee. 

He  will  make  the  proper  disposition  of  the  artillery  along  the  line  of  battle, 
remembering  that  the  rifled  guns  are  of  long  range,  and  should  be  placed  on  any 
commanding  positions  in  rear  of  his  infantry  to  fire  mainly  on  the  reserves  and 


556  CONCENTRATION  AT   CORINTH. 

second  line  of  the  enemy,  but  occasionally  will  be  directed  on  his  batteries  and 
heads  of  columns. 

II. — The  Second  Corps,  under  Major-General  Braxton  Bragg,  will  assemble 
on  Monterey,  and  move  thence  as  early  as  practicable;  the  right  wing  with 
left  in  front  by  the  road  from  Monterey  to  Savannah,  the  head  of  column  to 
reach  the  immediate  vicinity  of  Mickey's  house,  at  the  intersection  with  the  Bark 
road,  before  sunset. 

The  cavalry  with  this  wing  will  take  position  on  the  road  to  Savannah  be 
yond  Mickey's  as  far  as  Owl  Creek,  having  advanced  guards  and  pickets  well  to 
the  front.  The  left  wing  of  this  corps  will  advance  at  the  same  time,  also,  left 
in  front,  by  the  road  from  Monterey  to  Purdy— the  head  of  the  column  to  reach, 
by  "night,  the  intersection  of  that  road  with  the  Bark  road.  This  wing  will  con 
tinue  the  movement  in  the  morning  as  soon  as  the  rear  of  the  Third  Corps  shall 
have  passed  the  Purdy  road,  and  which  it  will  then  follow. 

The  Second  Corps  will  form  the  second  line  of  battle,  about  one  thousand 
yards  in  rear  of  the  first  line ;  it  will  be  formed,  if  practicable,  with  regiments  in 
double  columns  at  half  distance,  disposed  as  advantageously  as  the  nature  of  the 
ground  will  admit;  and,  with  a  view  to  facility  of  deployment,  the  artillery 
placed  as  may  seem  best  to  Major-General  Bragg. 

III. — The  First  Corps,  under  Major-General  Polk,  with  the  exception  of  the 
detached  division  at  Bethel,  will  take  up  its  line  of  march  by  the  Eidge  road, 
hence  to  Pittsburg,  half  an  hour  after  the  Third  Corps  shall  have  passed  Corinth, 
and  will  bivouac  to-night  in  rear  of  that  corps,  and  on  to-morrow  will  follow 
the  movements  of  said  corps,  with  the  same  interval  of  time  as  to-day.  AVhen 
its  head  of  column  shall  reach  the  vicinity  of  the  Mickey  house,  it  will  be  halted 
in  column  or  massed  on  the  line  of  the  Bark  road,  according  to  the  nature  of 
the  ground,  as  a  reserve.  Meanwhile,  one  regiment  of  its  cavalry  will  be  placed 
in  observation  on  the  road  from  Johnston's  house  to  Stantonville,  with  advanced 
guards  and  pickets  thrown  out  well  in  advance  toward  Stantonville.  Another 
regiment  or  battalion  of  cavalry  will  be  posted  in  the  same  manner  on  the  road 
from  Monterey  to  Purdy,  with  its  rear  resting  on  or  about  the  intersection  of 
that  road  with  the  Bark  road,  having  advanced  guards  and  pickets  in  the  direc 
tion  of  Purdy. 

The  forces  at  Bethel  and  Purdy  will  defend  their  positions  as  already  in 
structed,  if  attacked;  otherwise  they  will  assemble  on  Purdy,  and  thence  advance 
with  advanced  guards,  flankers,  and  all  other  prescribed  military  precautions, 
forming  a  junction  with  the  rest  of  the  First  Corps  at  the  intersection  of  that 
road  with  the  Bark  road,  leading  from  Corinth. 

IV. — The  Reserve  of  the  forces  will  be  concentrated  by  the  shortest  and  best 
route  at  Monterey,  as  soon  as  the  rear  of  the  Second  Corps  shall  have  moved  out 
of  that  place.  Its  commander  will  take  up  the  best  position,  whence  to  ad 
vance,  either  in  the  direction  of  Mickey's  or  Pratt's  house,  on  the  direct  road  to 
Pittsburg — if  that  road  is  found  practicable — or  in  the  direction  of  the  Eidge 
road  to  Hamburg,  throwing  all  its  cavalry  on  the  latter  road  as  far  as  its  inter 
section  with  the  one  to  Pittsburg,  passing  through  Grier's  Ford,  on  Lick  Creek. 

This  cavalry  will  throw  well  forward  advanced  guards  and  videttes  toward 
Grier's  Ford,  and  in  the  direction  of  Hamburg,  and,  during  the  impending  battle, 
when  called  to  the  field  of  combat,  will  move  by  the  Grier's  Ford  road. 

A  regiment  of  the  infantry  reserve  will  be  thrown  forward  to  the  intersec- 


ORDERS  AS  TO  MOVEMENTS.  557 

tion  of  the  Gravel  Hill  road  with  the  Kidge  road  to  Hamburg,  as  a  support  to 
the  cavalry. 

The  Reserve  will  be  formed  of  Breckinridge's,  Bowen's,  and  Statham's  bri 
gades,  as  now  organized,  the  whole  under  the  command  of  Brigadier-General 
Breckinridge. 

Y. — General  Bragg  will  detach  the  Fifty-first  and  Fifty-second  Regiments, 
Tennessee  Volunteers,  Blount's  Alabama,  and  Desha's  Arkansas  Battalions,  and 
Bain's  battery,  from  his  corps,  which,  with  two  of  Carroll's  regiments,  now  en 
route  for  these  headquarters,  will  form  a  garrison  for  the  post  and  depot  of  Cor 
inth. 

VI. — Strong  guards  will  be  left  at  the  railroad-bridges  between  luka  and 
Corinth,  to  be  furnished  in  due  proportions  from  the  commands  at  luka,  Burns- 
ville,  and  Corinth. 

VII. — Proper  guards  will  be  left  at  the  camps  of  the  several  regiments  of  the 
forces  in  the  field ;  corps  commanders  will  determine  the  strength  of  these  guards. 

VIII. — Wharton's  regiment  of  Texas  Cavalry  will  be  ordered  forward  at  once, 
to  scout  on  the  road  from  Monterey  to  Savannah,  between  Mickey's  and  its  in 
tersection  with  the  Pittsburg-Purdy  road.  It  will  annoy  and  harass  any  force 
of  the  enemy  moving  by  the  latter  way  to  assail  Cheatham's  division  at  Purdy. 

IX. — The  chief-engineer  of  the  forces  will  take  all  due  measures  and  pre 
cautions,  and  give  all  requisite  orders  for  the  repairs  of  the  bridges,  causeways, 
and  roads,  on  which  our  troops  may  move  in  the  execution  of  these  orders. 

X. — The  troops,  so  individually  intelligent,  and  with  such  great  interests  in 
volved  in  the  issue,  are  urgently  enjoined  to  be  observant  of  the  orders  of  their 
superiors  in  the  hour  of  battle.  Their  officers  must  constantly  endeavor  to  hold 
them  in  hand,  and  prevent  the  waste  of  ammunition  by  heedless,  aimless  firing 
— the  fire  should  be  slow — always  at  a  distinct  mark.  It  is  expected  that  much 
and  effective  work  will  be  done  by  the  bayonet. 

By  command  of  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON  : 

THOMAS  JOEDAN,  Assistant  Adjutant- General. 

For  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  commanding  Army  of  Mississippi. 


HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  )_ 
COBINTH,  April  3, 1862.         I 

Memorandum  for  the  Commanders  of  the  Corps  and  of  the  Reserve. 

I. — As  soon  as  the  reserve  shall  have  taken  position  at  Monterey,  a  strong 
working-party  will  be  sent  to  repair  the  bridges,  causeway,  and  road  across 
Lick  Creek,  on  the  direct  road  from  Monterey  to  Pittsburg,  so  that  it  may  be 
used  in  any  forward  movement  of  the  reserve. 

II.— In  the  approaching  battle  every  effort  should  be  made  to  turn  the  left 
flank  of  the  enemy  so  as  to  cut  off  his  line  of  retreat  to  the  Tennessee  River,  and 
throw  him  back  on  Owl  Creek,  where  he  will  be  obliged  to  surrender.  Every 
precaution  must  also  be  taken  on  our  part  to  prevent  unnecessary  exposure  of 
our  men  to  the  enemy's  gunboats. 

By  command  of  General  A.  S.  JOHNSTON  : 

THOMAS  JOEDAN,  Assistant  Adjutant- General. 

For  the  commander  of  the  forces,  Army  of  Mississippi,  Corinth,  Mississippi. 


558  BEFORE   THE   BATTLE. 

CHAPTER    XXXIII. 

BEFORE     THE     BATTLE. 

ON  Thursday  morning,  April  3d,  at  about  one  o'clock,  preliminary 
orders  were  issued  to  hold  the  troops  in  readiness  to  move  at  a  mo 
ment's  notice,  with  five  days'  provisions  and  100  rounds  of  ammunition. 
The  orders  for  the  march  and  battle  were  issued  later  in  the  day — in  the 
afternoon,  as  it  seems — after  they  had  been  elaborated  by  General 
Beauregard. 

When  it  became  apparent  that  the  orders  meant  an  advance  and 
an  attack  upon  the  enemy — meant  battle — the  soldiers,  full  of  ardor, 
were  aroused  to  the  utmost  enthusiasm.  With  somewhat  hasty  prepa 
ration — for  time  was  precious — the  movement  began.  Hardee  led  the 
advance,  the  Third  Corps,  that  afternoon.  He  marched  from  Corinth, 
by  the  northernmost  route,  known  as  the  Ridge  road,  which,  near  Shiloh, 
led  into  another,  known  as  the  Bark  road.  Bivouacking  that  night 
on  the  way,  he  arrived  next  morning  at  Mickey's,  a  house  seventeen 
or  eighteen  miles,  by  that  route,-  from  Corinth,  and  four  or  five  miles 
from  Pittsburg. 

The  Second  Corps,  under  Bragg,  marched  by  the  direct  road  to 
Pittsburg,  through  Monterey.  This  road  proved  so  narrow  and  bad 
that  the  head  of  Bragg's  column  did  not  reach  Monterey  until  11  A.  M. 
on  the  4th,  but  bivouacked  that  night  near  Mickey's,  in  rear  of  Hardee's 
corps,  with  a  proper  interval. 

The  First  Corps,  commanded  by  Polk,  consisted  of  two  divisions, 
under  Cheatham  and  Clark.  Clark's  division  was  ordered  to  follow 
Hardee  on  the  Ridge  road,  at  an  interval  of  half  an  hour,  and  to  halt 
near  Mickey's.  This  halt  was  to  allow  Bragg's  corps,  whose  route  from 
Monterey  crossed  the  Ridge  or  Bark  road  at  that  point,  to  fall  in  behind 
Hardee,  at  1,000  yards'  interval,  and  form  a  second  line  of  battle.  Polk's 
corps  was  to  form  the  left  wing  of  the  third  line  of  battle  ;  and  Breck- 
inridge's  reserve  the  right  wing. 

Polk's  other  division,  under  Cheatham,  was  on  outpost  duty,  at  and 
near  Bethel  on  the  Mobile  &  Ohio  Railroad,  and  was  about  as  far 
from  Mickey's,  the  point  of  concentration,  as  Corinth  was.  Cheatham's 
orders  were  to  defend  himself  if  attacked  ;  otherwise,  to  assemble  his 
forces  at  Purdy,  and  pursue  the  route  to  Monterey,  with  proper  mili 
tary  precautions.  Acting  on  these  instructions,  Cheatham  did  not 
advance  until  the  morning  of  the  5th  ;  but  he  effected  his  junction  at 
four  o'clock  that  afternoon,  and  took  position,  as  the  left  wing  of  Polk's 


RESERVE  CORPS. 


559 


MAP 

used  by  the 
CONFEDERATE  GENERALS 

AT  SIHLOH 

Scale  of  Miles 


corps,  as  early  as  some  other  divisions  whose  presence  was  necessary  to 
the  attack.  These  movements  were  construed*  by  General  Lew  Wal 
lace  as  a  reconnaissance  in  force  against  his  own  division  at  Crump's 
Landing,  and  held  him  in  check  during  the  5th  and  the  6th,  the  first 
day  of  the  battle. 

Breckinridge's  three  brigades — a  division,  in  fact,  but  by  courtesy  a 
reserve  corps — having  received  their  orders  on  the  afternoon  of  April 
3d,1  moved  from  Burnsville  on  April  4th,  at  3  A.  M.,  by  way  of  Farm- 
ington,  toward  Monterey,  fourteen  miles  distant.  "  Some  Enfield  rifles, 
with  accoutrements  and  ammunition,,  just  received,  were  distributed 
about  nightfall "  to  supply  deficiencies,  and  rations  were  prepared  dur 
ing  the  night.3 

The  road  was  even  worse  than  those  from  Corinth.  The  corps 
struggled  painfully  on,  with  poor  progress.  After  a  hard  day's  march, 
it  bivouacked  on  the  road.  Part  of  the  artillery  was  late  at  night  reach 
ing  its  position,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  the  road.  Breckinridge  had 
ridden  forward  to  Monterey,  and  had  met  Generals  Johnston  and  Bragg 
in  consultation.  He  hoped,  then,  to  be  up  in  time,  and  received  orders 
to  join  in  the  attack  next  morning. 


1  E.  P.  Thompson's  "  History  of  the  First  Kentucky  Brigade,"  p.  87.     2  Ibid. 
37 


560  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE. 

At  midnight  he  sent  a  dispatch,  saying  his  artillery  was  stuck  in 
the  mud,  and  had  stopped  his  train.  Major  Hayden  says  General 
Johnston  sent  him  word,  "  Cut  a  new  road  for  your  column."  It  did 
not,  however,  effect  its  junction  with  the  other  corps  until  late  Saturday 
afternoon,  the  5th,  owing  to  the  rains  on  Friday  and  Saturday,  the 
storm  of  Friday  night,  and  other  causes  that  delayed  all  the  corps. 

The  Confederate  cavalry,  thrown  well  to  the  front  and  flanks,  en 
countered  the  pickets  of  the  enemy.  In  some  sharp  skirmishes  they 
took  a  few  prisoners,  a  major,  two  lieutenants,  and  eight  privates,  and 
wounded  eight  more.  They  lost  some  men,  captured.  Sherman  says  he 
took  ten  prisoners.1  A  Federal  reconnaissance  had  been  sent  out  under 
Colonel  Buckland,  and  encountered  Cleburne's  brigade  of  Hardee's 
corps,  but  retired  without  ascertaining  anything  important,  or  surmising 
that  General  Johnston's  army  was  approaching. 

Bragg  says8  that,  where  this  duty  had  not  been  previously  per 
formed,  "  the  commanders  of  divisions  and  brigades  were  assembled 
that  night,  the  order  was  read  to  them,  and  the  topography  of  the 
enemy's  position  was  explained  as  far  as  understood  by  us,"  which  was 
imperfectly  enough.  They  knew  that  in  the  recesses  of  that  forest, 
between  those  creeks,  50,000  invaders  were  posted  ;  but  where,  or  how, 
and  with  what  preparation,  no  man  could  tell.  Many  of  these  soldiers, 
familiar  with  the  dangerous  sports  of  their  native  South,  must  have 
felt  as  when  hunting  in  the  dense  canebrake,  and,  following  the  trail, 
they  drew  near  the  den  of  some  great  bear,  hidden  in  the  thicket,  with 
whom  momently  they  expected  encounter  and  mortal  struggle. 

The  order  was  to  march  at  three  o'clock  in  the  morning,  so  as  to 
attack  the  enemy  early  on  the  5th.  So  far  as  human  knowledge  can 
reach,  if  this  order  could  have  been  carried  out,  Grant  and  his  army 
would  have  been  destroyed.  But  man  proposes,  and  God  disposes. 
The  same  elements  that  had  opened  watery  pathways  up  the  rivers  to 
the  Federal  fleet,  against  all  expectation,  by  unprecedented  floods,  were 
again  on  the  side  of  the  strongest  battalions.  It  may  not  be  amiss  here 
to  remark  that  those  people  who  think  that  "  whatever  is,  is  right,"  in 
human  affairs  as  well  as  in  the  order  of  Nature,  have  drawn  exceedingly 
strong  and  unwarrantable  inferences  from  these  and  other  providential 
dispensations  as  to  the  justice  of  the  Federal  cause. 

This  is  no  place  for  such  argument ;  but  the  wise  Preacher,  the  son 
of  David,  king  in  Jerusalem,  has  answered  this  superstition  when  he 
said  : 

There  is  a  vanity  which  is  done  upon  the  earth ;  that  there  be  just  men,  unto 
whom  it  happeneth  according  to  the  work  of  the  wicked ;  again,  there  be  wicked 
men,  to  whom  it  happeneth  according  to  the  work  of  the  righteous.3 

1  Sherman's  "  Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  p.  235.     2  Report  of  the  battle.     ?  Ecclesiastes  viii.  14. 


A  PROVIDENTIAL  STORM. 


Again  : 


All  things  come  alike  to  all :  -there  is  one  event  to  the  righteous,  and  to  the 
wicked. 

And  again : 

I  have  seen  servants  upon  horses,  and  princes  walking  as  servants  upon  the 
earth.2 

And  a  greater  Son  of  David  answered  the  painful  and  perplexing 
question  by  a  reply  that  reaches  beyond  the  judgments  of  this  world  : 

There  were  present  at  that  season  some  that  told  him  of  the  Galileans,  whose 
blood  Pilate  had  mingled  with  their  sacrifices.  And  Jesus  answering  said  unto 
them,  Suppose  ye  that  these  Galileans  were  sinners  above  all  the  Galileans, 
because  they  suffered  such  things?  I  tell  you,  Nay:  but,  except  ye  repent,  ye 
shall  all  likewise  perish.3 

The  clouds  had  been  sending  down  their  showers  on  the  4th,  to  the 
great  annoyance  and  detention  of  the  moving  columns.  But,  after 
midnight,  they  gathered  for  a  great  outburst  upon  the  unsheltered 
soldiers.  The  leafy  covert  of  the  forest  gave  slight  protection  to  the 
troops  in  bivouac.  The  storm  broke  upon  them  about  2  A.M.;  and 
the  drenching  rain  poured  in  torrents  as  they  lay,  without  tents,  ex 
posed  to  its  fury.  The  men  were  anxious  most  of  all,  but  often  in  vain, 
"  to  keep  their  powder  dry."  Nevertheless,  at  three  o'clock,  the  ap 
pointed  hour,  the  whole  army  was  put  under  arms,  to  be  ready  to  ad 
vance.  There  they  stood,  anxious  to  go  forward  ;  but  it  was  impossible 
to  move  in  the  pitch-darkness,  over  flooded  roads  and  swollen  streams, 
with  the  cold,  driving  rain  beating  upon  them. 

With  almost  criminal  recklessness,  many  of  the  soldiers  discharged 
their  small-arms,  to  find  out  the  condition  of  the  cartridges.  General 
Johnston,  as  he  rode  along  the  lines  on  the  5th,  tried  to  prevent  the 
recurrence  of  this.  Bragg  alludes  to  it  with  great  severity.  Colonel  E. 
L.  Drake,  of  Fayetteville,  Tennessee,  who  was  at  that  time  serving  in 
Bate's  Second  Tennessee  Regiment,  of  which  he  has  furnished  a  valu 
able  memoir  to  the  writer,  gives  the  following  statement.  His  regi 
ment  was  in  Cleburne's  brigade,  and  on  the  extreme  left  of  Hardee's 
line.  He  says : 

The  wishes  of  General  Johnston  to  move  quietly  were  not  generally  regarded ; 
and,  at  one  point  on  the  march,  the  presence  of  a  wild  deer,  which  ran  along 
the  lines,  evoked  a  yell  among  Hardee's  men  which  could  have  been  heard  for 
miles.  Hard  showers  fell.  There  was  great  uneasiness  among  the  men  lest 
their  guns  should  fail  fire ;  and  many  pieces  were  discharged  on  the  route,  and 
on  Sunday  morning  as  the  lines  were  forming  for  the  attack.  It  seems  to  be 

1  Ecclesiastes  ix.  2.  5  Ibid.,  x.  7.  3  Luke  xiii.  1. 


562  BEFORE  THE   BATTLE. 

certain  that  our  presence  was  disregarded  by  the  enemy  up  to  a  late  hour  Sat 
urday  night.  Their  bands  were  serenading  at  different  headquarters  until 
after  midnight.  This  I  have  since  learned  from  a  Federal  officer  who  was  pres 
ent.  At  the  time,  the  object  of  the  music  was  misunderstood  by  the  Confeder 
ates,  being  attributed  to  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  to  take  up  positions  for 
the  morrow's  battle.  This  idea  was  strengthened  by  an  occasional  cheer,  which 
rang  out  in  that  direction. 

It  was  supposed  at  the  time  that  the  fusillade  might  have  aroused 
the  enemy  to  a  sense  of  their  peril ;  and  it  convinced  General  Beaure- 
gard  that  a  surprise  was  impossible.  It  was  sufficiently  distinct  at  the 
Confederate  rear  to  keep  it  continually  on  the  alert  with  the  apprehen 
sion  of  an  attack  in  front.  But,  whether  from  the  direction  of  the  wind, 
the  noise  and  pelting  of  the  tempest,  the  neglect  and  drowsiness  of  the 
Federal  outpost,  or  their  disregard  of  the  firing  in  front — a  prevalent 
practice  among  the  pickets — no  heed  was  taken  of  these  hostile  warn 
ings  by  the  Northern  army.  If,  as  has  been  alleged,  the  enemy's  pickets 
were  only  half  a  mile  out,  Hardee's  line  was  still  perhaps  two  miles  off, 
which  might  account  for  the  failure  to  hear  their  random  shots. 

At  daylight,  on  Saturday,  the  5th  of  April,  Hardee  advanced,  and  by 
seven  o'clock  was  sufficiently  out  of  the  way  to  allow  Bragg  to  move  his 
command.  Before  ten  o'clock  Hardee's  corps  had  reached  the  outposts, 
and  developed  the  lines  of  the.  enemy.  The  Confederate  advance  imme 
diately  deployed  in  line  of  battle,  about  a  mile  and  a  half  west  of  Shiloh 
church,  where  Lick  Creek  and  Owl  Creek  approach  most  nearly,  a  space 
of  about  three  miles.  'Hardee's  corps  not  being  sufficiently  strong,  it 
had  been  provided  that  Gladden's  brigade,  of  Bragg's  corps,  should 
occupy  his  right.  This  line  extended  from  Owl  Creek  to  Lick  Creek. 
General  Johnston  had  reached  Bragg's  headquarters  early,  and  before 
seven  o'clock  his  column  was  also  put  in  motion ;  and  Gladden's  and 
Withers's  other  brigades  were  placed  in  line  of  battle,  in  due  time,  the 
latter  about  800  yards  in  rear  of  Hardee's  line.  Ruggles's  division  did 
not  come  up  promptly,  and  Folk's  corps  was  held  motionless  by  its 
delay. 

Having  recounted  thus  far  the  events  of  these  days,  let  us  recur 
briefly  to  General  Johnston's  personal  movements.  He  left  Corinth  on 
the  morning  of  the  4th,  and  arrived  at  Monterey  at  1  P.M.  Soon 
after,  Clanton's  Alabama  Cavalry  brought  in  some  Federal  prisoners ; 
and  it  was  manifest  from  their  surprise  and  their  conversation  with  the 
staff  thai?  the  Confederate  attack  was  wholly  unexpected. 

During  the  afternoon,  General  Johnston  conferred  with  Bragg, 
Breckinridge,  and  other  officers.  He  halted  that  night  at  Monterey. 
He  handed  to  Munford  and  some  others  of  his  staff  a  small  roll  of  pa 
pers,  containing  his  maps  and  the  plan  of  battle,  with  the  intended 
positions  of  the  different  commands,  and  requested  them  to  become 


DELAY.  563 

familiar  with  the  contents,  that  he  might  be  able  to  use  their  services 
to  the  best  advantage  on  the  day  of  battle.     Munford  says : 

We  were  to  attack  his  army  in  their  encampments  between  these  creeks  and 
that  river.  The  military  problem  was  so  to  distribute  an  army  of  a  little  over 
30,000  men  as  effectually  to  cover  our  front.  Its  solution,  involving  the  much- 
talked-of  plan,  was  exceedingly  simple.  It  was  assumed  as  a  postulate  that  no 
force  the  enemy  could  oppose  could  cut  through  three  lines  of  Confederates. 
The  army  was  therefore  deployed  into  three  lines. 

General  Johnston  slept  but  little  on  the  night  of  the  4th.  He  was 
too  old  a  soldier  not  to  know  that  the  storm  would  delay  the  movement 
of  his  army.  It  abated  about  five  o'clock  ;  and,  by  half-past  five,  he 
was  on  horseback,  on  his  way  to  the  front,  with  his  staff.  Being  joined 
by  General  Beauregard,  he  rode  to  Bragg's  position ;  and,  under  his 
orders,  by  seven  o'clock,  Withers's  division  was  put  in  motion,  as  has 
been  stated.  General  Johnston  meanwhile  rode  forward  to  Hardee's 
line,  where  some  slight  skirmishing  seemed  to  be  going  on,  which  was 
really,  however,  the  random  firing  already  mentioned. 

Munford  tells  as  follows  of  how  the  morning  passed: 

Everything  had  been  calculated  with  the  utmost  precision — the  hour  for 
breaking  camp,  the  order  and  stages  of  march,  and  the  exact  time  at  which  each 
separate  command  was  to  deploy  into  line  on  the  field.  All  this  was  to  be  done 
by  7  A.  M.  on  the  5th,  and  the  battle  to  begin  at  eight.  General  Johnston  and 
staff  arrived  on  the  field  a  little  after  six  o'clock.  Hardee's  line  was  already 
formed,  and  the  general-in-chief  took  position  a  little  way  in  its  rear.  In 
a  little  while  Bragg's  right  wing,  under  Withers,  deployed  into  line,  but  eight, 
nine  o'clock  came,  and  the  division  on  his  left  was  nowhere  to  be  seen.  About 
half -past  nine,  General  Johnston  sent  me  to  General  Bragg  to  know  "why 
the  column  on  his  left  was  not  in  position."  Bragg  replied:  "Tell  General 
Johnston  the  head  of  that  column  has  not  made  its  appearance.  I  have  sent 
to  the  rear  for  information,  and  as  soon  as  I  learn  the  cause  of  its  detention  he 
shall  be  informed."  Ten,  eleven,  half-past  eleven  o'clock  came,  and  General 
Johnston  began  to  show  signs  of  impatience.  I  was  again  sent  back  to  know  of 
Bragg  "why  the  column  on  his  left  was  not  yet  in  position."  I  received  iden 
tically  the  same  answer  he  had  given  earlier  in  the  morning.  At  last  half-past 
twelve  o'clock  came,  and  no  appearance  of  the  missing  column,  nor  any  report 
from  Bragg.  General  Johnston,  looking  first  at  his  watch,  then  glancing  at  the 
position  of  the  sun,  exclaimed,  "  This  is  perfectly  puerile !  This  is  not  war  /— 
Let  us  have  our  horses."  He,  Major  Albert  Smith,  Captain  Nathaniel  Wickliffe, 
and  myself,  rode  to  the  rear  until  we  found  the  missing  column  standing  stock- 
still,  with  its  head  some  distance  out  in  an  open  field.  General  Folk's  reserves 
were  ahead  of  it,  with  their  wagons  and  artillery  blocking  up  the  road.  General 
Johnston  ordered  them  to  clear  the  road,  and  the  missing  column  to  move  for 
ward.  There  was  much  chaffering  among  those  implicated  as  to  who  should 
bear  the  blame.  It  was  charged  on  General  Polk  ;  but  the  plucky  old  bishop 
unhorsed  his  accusers  right  on  the  spot.  I  believe  their  commander,  General 


564  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE. 

Buggies,  was  finally  blamed.  ...    It  was  about  four  o'clock  when  the  lines 
were  completely  formed ;  too  late,  of  course,  to  begin  the  battle  then. 

There  was  sharp  controversy  then  and  afterward  as  to  where  the 
fault  lay.  Folk's  answer  was  sufficient — that  Clark's  division  was  ready 
to  move  at  3  A.  M.  His  orders  were  to  wait  for  the  passage  of  Bragg's 
corps,  and  to  move  and  form  his  line  in  rear  of  Ruggles's  division, 
which  composed  Bragg's  left  wing.  He  could  not  advance  or  establish 
his  line  until  this  had  passed.  The  road  was  not  clear  until  2  P.  M.  ;  yet 
he  got  Clark's  division  into  line  of  battle  by  four  o'clock,  and  Cheatham, 
who  had  come  up  on  the  left,  soon  after.  Breckinridge's  line  was 
formed  on  Folk's  right  about  the  same  time.  Thus  was  the  army  ar 
rayed  in  three  lines  of  battle  late  Saturday  afternoon. 

The  detention  was  unexpected;  and,  perhaps,  will  never  be  fully  ex 
plained.  The  rain  and  storm,  the  mud,  the  passage  through  an  unknown 
forest  tract,  over  narrow  dirt-roads,  and  the  rawness  of  the  advancing 
army,  sufficiently  account  for  the  delay.  There  was,  doubtless,  some 
confusion  or  mistake  of  orders  in  Ruggles's  division ;  but  what  would 
have  been  gross  misconduct  at  a  later  period  was  very  pardonable  in  a 
militia  as  uninstructed  as  the  troops  who  marched  out  against  Shiloh. 
Field  and  staff  officers,  fresh  from  the  counting-house  or  plantation,  with 
unaccustomed  duties,  ignorant  of  the  country,  must  sometimes  have 
signally  failed  in  the  performance  of  the  most  obvious  duties.  It  is 
certain  that  one  of  Ruggles's  brigade  commanders,  who  was  on  out 
post  duty  at  Monterey,  received  no  orders  at  all,  and  was  left  to  surmise 
the  meaning  of  the  whole  movement,  as  regiment  after  regiment  filed 
by.  Under  the  circumstances  it  is  useless  to  attach  censure  to  particu 
lar  individuals  or  commands. 

One  real  source  of  the  entanglement  and  confusion  of  commands 
arose  from  the  order  of  march  and  the  routes  by  which  the  troops  were 
brought  upon  the  field.  One  ground  of  General  Bragg's  censure  of 
these  arrangements  was  probably  this  :  After  Hardee,  every  column 
was  so  conducted  to  the  field  that  it  was  compelled  to  halt  at  a  fork 
of  a  road  until  some  other  corps  had  passed  by  and  deployed,  before  it 
could  establish  its  own  line  of  battle.  A  trained  staff  and  better  topo 
graphical  information  would  have  prevented  this. 

There  is  a  letter  from  General  Bragg,  written  at  10  A.  M.,  April  4th, 
addressed  to  "  General  Johnston  or  General  Beauregard,"  from  Mon 
terey,  which  has  never  been  alluded  to,  and  which  may  also  throw  some 
light  on  the  subject  of  the  detention.  General  Bragg  says  : 

MY  DEAR  GENERAL  :  I  reached  here  at  half -past  eight  o'clock,  ahead  of  my 
rear  division.  Bad  roads,  inefficient  transportation  badly  managed,  and  the 
usual  delays  of  a  first  move  of  new  troops,  have  caused  the  delay.  My  first 
division  is  at  Mickey's ;  and  the  ignorance  of  the  guide  for  the  second,  as  well 


CHANGE   OF   ORDERS.  565 

as  the  reports  I  receive  from  people  here,  induces  me  to  order  my  second  division 
to  move  on  the  same  road  as  the  first.  I  am  also  influenced  to  do  this  from  the 
information  I  have  of  General  Hardee's  advance.  .  .  . 

I  will  send  a  courier  to  notify  G-eneral  Polk  of  my  change.  .  .  . 

By  the  first  division  General  Bragg  means  Withers's  ;  by  the  second, 
Ruggles's. 

The  "  special  orders  as  to  movement  of  troops  "  directed  Bragg  to 
move  from  Monterey  to  Mickey's  with  Withers's  division,  while  Rug 
gles's  division  was  to  move  from  Monterey  on  the  road  to  Purdy,  which 
crossed  the  Bark  road  more  than  two  miles  in  rear  of  Mickey's.  Had 
Ruggles  pursued  this  route,  he  could  have  passed  to  the  left  of  Mickey's, 
and  deployed  without  interference  or  obstruction  from  Hardee's  or 
Withers's  division.  But  Bragg's  order  changing  Ruggles's  line  of 
march,  and  bringing  him  in  rear  of  these  commands,  delayed  any  move 
ment  until  they  had  cleared  the  way.  To  this  cause  of  delay  was  added 
the  confusion  arising  from  any  change  of  orders  with  raw  troops  as  to 
routes  in  the  labyrinth  of  roads  in  that  vicinity. 

Hardee's  corps,  moving  on  the  Ridge  road  under  its  methodical 
commander,  assisted  by  the  ardor  and  energy  of  Hindman  and  Cleburne, 
moved  with  greater  celerity  than  the  other  troops.  But  something  of 
this  was  due  to  their  apprenticeship  in  war,  under  General  Johnston's 
own  eye  and  inspiration,  on  outpost  duty  in  Kentucky  and  in  the  long 
and  toilsome  march  from  Bowling  Green  to  Corinth,  which  had  inured 
them  to  the  hardships  and  difficulties  of  this  kind  of  service.  Folk's 
corps  was  at  this  time  superior  to  the  others  in  its  transportation  and 
in  its  experience  under  fire,  and  Bragg's  in  drill  and  order.  Each  had 
its  own  excellence  ;  but  all  were  soon  to  be  welded  to  a  common  tem 
per  in  the  white  heat  of  sectional  war.  But  at  this  time  the  whole 
army  was  new,  and  not  yet  moulded  into  a  consistent  whole. 

In  describing  his  own  corps,  Bragg  correctly  portrays  the  whole 
army.  He  says : 

But  few  regiments  of  my  command  had  ever  made  a  day's  march.  A  very 
large  proportion  of  the  rank  and  file  had  never  performed  a  day's  labor.  Our 
organization  had  been  most  hasty,  with  great  deficiency  in  commanders,  and 
was,  therefore,  very  imperfect.  The  equipment  was  lamentably  defective  for 
field-service ;  and  our  transportation,  hastily  impressed  in  the  country,  was  de 
ficient  in  quantity  and  very  inferior  in  quality.  With  all  these  drawbacks,  the 
troops  marched  late  on  the  afternoon  of  the  3d,  a  day  later  than  intended,  in 
high  spirits,  and  eager  for  the  combat. 

A  very  dear  friend,  who  commanded  a  brigade  in  the  battle,  wrote 
as  follows,  in  1872,  to  the  author : 

You  know  I  was  as  ignorant  of  the  military  art  at  that  time  as  it  was  pos 
sible  for  a  civilian  to  be.  I  had  never  seen  a  man  fire  a  musket.  I  had  never 


566  BEFORE   THE  BATTLE. 

heard  a  lecture  or  read  a  line  on  the  subject.  We  were  all  tyros — all,  the  raw 
est  and  greenest  recruits — generals,  colonels,  captains,  soldiers.  One  thing  I 
recollect,  and  that  was  the  majestic  presence  of  General  Johnston.  He  looked 
like  a  hero  of  the  antique  type,  and  his  very  appearance  on  the  field  was  a  tower 
of  more  than  kingly  strength.  I  saw  him  as  our  lines  were  forming,  and  talked 
and  shook  hands  with  him  for  the  last  time. 

While  waiting  for  the  appearance  of  the  various  commands,  detained 
by  the  storm,  the  mire,  and  the  other  causes  already  assigned — Breck- 
inridge's,  Ruggles's,  and  Cheatham's — General  Johnston,  followed  by 
his  staff,  passed  from  one  body  of  troops  to  another,  encouraging  the 
men  both  by  his  words  and  his  presence.  Major  Hayden,  his  volunteer 
aide,  says  : 

"When  they  began  to  cheer  his  approach,  he  checked  them,  because  it  would 
call  the  attention  of  the  enemy  to  their  position.  His  advice  to  the  men  was 
brief  and  characteristic.  He  told  them,  "Look  along  your  guns,  and  fire  low." 

During  the  intervals  of  the  march  on  the  4th  and  5th  of  April, 
while  the  men  stood  on  their  arms,  the  following  address  of  the  com 
manding  general  was  read  at  the  head  of  each  regiment.  It  was  re 
ceived  with  exhibitions  of  deep  feeling,  and  the  soldiers  were  stirred  to 
a  still  sterner  resolution,  which  proved  itself  in  the  succeeding  conflict. 

HEADQTTARTERS,  AKMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
CORINTH,  MISSISSIPPI,  April  3,  1S62.      $ 

SOLDIERS  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI  :  I  have  put  you  in  motion  to  offer 
battle  to  the  invaders  of  your  country.  With  the  resolution  and  discipline  and 
valor  becoming  men  fighting,  as  you  are,  for  all  worth  living  or  dying  for,  you 
can  but  march  to  a  decisive  victory  over  the  agrarian  mercenaries  sent  to  sub 
jugate  you  and  to  despoil  you  of  your  liberties,  your  property,  and  your  honor. 
Remember  the  precious  stake  involved ;  remember  the  dependence  of  your 
mothers,  your  wives,  your  sisters,  and  your  children,  on  the  result ;  remember 
the  fair,  broad,  abounding  land,  and  the  happy  homes  that  would  be  desolated 
by  your  defeat. 

The  eyes  and  hopes  of  eight  millions  of  people  rest  upon  you ;  you  are  ex 
pected  to  show  yourselves  worthy  of  your  lineage,  worthy  of  the  women  of  the 
South,  whose  noble  devotion  in  this  war  has  never  been  exceeded  in  any  time. 
"With  such  incentives  to  brave  deeds,  and  with  the  trust  that  God  is  with  us, 
your  generals  will  lead  you  confidently  to  the  combat— assured  of  success. 

A.  S.  JOHNSTON,  General  commanding. 

Between  four  and  five  o'clock  on  Saturday  afternoon  was  held  that 
famous  "  council  of  war,"  on  the  issue  of  which  turned  the  question 
whether  the  battle  of  Shiloh  should  be  fought  at  all.  It  has  been  de 
scribed,  with  more  or  less  picturesque  effect,  but  under  the  most  vari 
ous  forms.  Some  of  these  accounts  are  altogether  spurious,  the  coinage 
of  a  lively  fancy.  Dismissing  these  romances,  we  shall  find  that  the 
eve  and  ear  witnesses,  though  differing  in  details,  agree  in  all  essential 


THE  COUNCIL  OF  WAR.  567 

facts.  The  council  was  held  at  the  cross-roads,  a  few  hundred  yards 
from  the  headquarters  of  the  night  before.  Colonel  Jordan's  account  is 
as  follows,  and  is  presumably  to  be  received  as  General  Beauregard's 
own  statement  of  the  matter.1  Mentioning  in  a  note  that  it  occurred 
about  four  o'clock  in  the  open  air,  on  foot,  in  the  road,  between  the 
generals,  surrounded  at  a  short  distance  by  a  number  of  staff  officials, 
and  was  of  short  duration,  he  names  Generals  Johnston,  Beauregard, 
Polk,  Bragg,  Hardee  (Hardee  was  not  present,  but  Gilmer  was),  and 
Breckinridge,  as  taking  part  in  it,  and  then  furnishes  this  narrative  : 

At  least  one  division,  if  not  the  whole  of  Bragg's  corps,  was  likewise  inex 
plicably  tardy  in  movement  on  Saturday,  though  General  Johnston,  through  his 
staff,  had  made  every  effort  to  get  his  troops  in  position  for  an  attack  that  day. 
Supremely  chagrined  that  he  had  been  balked  in  his  just  expectation,  it  was 
evidently  now  too  late  for  a  decisive  engagement  that  afternoon ;  so  General 
Johnston  called  his  corps  and  reserve  commanders  together,  and  a  council  was 
held  within  less  than  two  miles  of  Shiloh  Chapel,  the  headquarters  of  the  Fed 
eral  General  Sherman. 

It  was  now  learned  that  many  of  the  troops  had  improvidently  thrown  away 
or  consumed  their  provisions,  and  at  the  end  of  three  days  were  out  of  subsist 
ence.  General  Bragg  promised,  however,  to  remedy  this  from  his  alleged  well- 
stocked  commissariat.  But  General  Beauregard  earnestly  advised  the  idea  of 
attacking  the  enemy  should  be  abandoned,  and  that  the  whole  force  should  re 
turn  to  Corinth,  inasmuch  as  it  was  scarcely  possible  they  would  be  able  to  take 
the  Federals  unawares,  after  such  delay  and  the  noisy  demonstrations  which  had 
been  made  meanwhile.  He  urged  the  enemy  would  be  now  found  formidably 
intrenched  and  ready  for  the  attack ;  that  success  had  depended  on  the  power 
to  assail  them  unexpectedly,  for  they  were  superior  in  number,  and  in  large 
part  had  been  under  fire.  On  the  other  hand,  few  comparatively  of  the  Con 
federates  had  that  advantage,  while  a  large  part  were  too  raw  and  recently  en 
rolled  to  make  it  proper  to  venture  them  in  an  assault  upon  breastworks  which 
would  now  be  thrown  up.  And  this  unquestionably  was  the  view  of  almost  all 
present. 

General  Johnston,  having  listened  with  grave  attention  to  the  views  and 
opinions  advanced,  then  remarked,  in  substance,  that  he  recognized  the  weight 
of  the  objections  to  an  attack  under  the  circumstances  involved  by  the  unfortu 
nate  loss  of  time  on  the  road.  But,  nevertheless,  he  still  hoped  the  enemy  was 
not  looking  for  offensive  operations,  and  that  he  would  yet  be  able  to  surprise 
them  ;  and  that,  having  put  his  army  in  motion  for  a  battle,  he  would  venture 
the  hazard. 

This  decision  being  announced,  the  officers  rapidly  dispersed  to  their  respec 
tive  posts  in  high  and  hopeful  spirits,  notwithstanding  the  probabilities  that  all 
previous  expectations  of  a  surprise  would  fail  of  accomplishment. 

General  Polk,  in  his  report  of  the  battle,  gives  the  following  ac 
count  of  the  occasion  and  circumstances  of  the  meeting,  which,  in  the 

1  "Life  of  Forrest,"  p.  113. 


5C8  BEFORE   THE  BATTLE. 

opinion  of  most  of  General  Johnston's  staff,  was  accidental  so  far  as  he 
was  concerned.     Polk  says  : 

I  had  not  advanced  far  before  I  came  upon  General  Ruggles,  who  commanded 
General  Bragg's  left,  deploying  his  troops.  Having  ascertained  the  direction  of 
the  line,  I  did  not  wait  for  him  to  complete  it,  but  returned  to  the  head  of  my 
column  to  give  the  necessary  orders.  By  this  time  it  was  near  four  o'clock,  and, 
on  arriving,  I  was  informed  that  General  Beauregard  desired  to  see  me  immedi 
ately.  I  rode  forward  to  his  headquarters  at  once,  where  I  found  General  Bragg 
and  himself  in  conversation.  He  said,  with  some  feeling,  "  I  am  very  much  dis 
appointed  at  the  delay  which  has  occurred  in  getting  the  troops  into  position." 
I  replied:  "  So  am  I,  sir ;  but,  so  far  as  I  am  concerned,  my  orders  are  to  form  on 
another  line,  and  that  line  must  first  be  established  before  I  can  form  upon  it." 
I  continued :  "  I  reached  Mickey's  at  nightfall  yesterday,  whence  I  could  not 
move,  because  of  the  troops  which  were  before  me,  until  2  p.  M.  to-day.  I  then 
promptly  followed  the  column  in  front  of  me,  and  have  been  in  position  to  form 
upon  it. so  soon  as  its  line  was  established."  He  said  he  regretted  the  delay 
exceedingly,  as  it  would  make  it  necessary  to  forego  the  attack  altogether  ;  that 
our  success  depended  upon  our  surprising  the  enemy ;  that  this  was  now  im 
possible,  and  we  must  fall  back  to  Corinth. 

Here  General  Johnston  came  up  and  asked  what  was  the  matter.  General 
Beauregard  repeated  what  he  had  said  to  me.  General  Johnston  remarked  that 
this  would  never  do,  and  proceeded  to  assign  reasons  for  that  opinion.  lie 
then  asked  what  I  thought  of  it.  I  replied  that  my  troops  were  in  as  good 
condition  as  they  had  ever  been ;  that  they  were  eager  for  battle ;  that  to  re 
tire  now  would  operate  injuriously  upon  them ;  and  I  thought  we  ought  to  at 
tack.  General  Breckinridge,  whose  troops  were  in  the  rear,  and  by  this  time  had 
arrived  upon  the  ground,  here  joined  us  ;  and,  after  some  discussion,  it  was  de 
cided  to  postpone  further  movement  until  the  following  day,  and  to  make  the 
attack  at  daybreak. 

General  Bragg,  in  a  monograph  on  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  prepared 
for  the  use  of  the  writer  of  this  memoir,  says  : 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  5th,  as  the  last  of  our  troops  were  taking  posi 
tion,  a  casual  and  partly-accidental  meeting  of  general  officers  occurred  just  in 
rear  of  our  second  line,  near  the  bivouac  of  General  Bragg.  The  commandcr- 
in-chief,  General  Beauregard,  General  Polk,  General  Bragg,  and  General  Breck 
inridge,  are  remembered  as  present,  and  General  Hardee  may  have  been.  In  a 
discussion  of  the  causes  of  the  delay  and  its  incidents,  it  was  mentioned  that 
some  of  the  troops,  now  in  their  third  day  only,  were  entirely  out  of  food, 
though  having  marched  with  five  days'  rations.  General  Beauregard,  confident 
our  movement  had  been  discovered  by  the  enemy,  urged  its  abandonment,  a 
return  to  our  camps  for  supplies,  and  a  general  change  of  programme.  In  this 
opinion  no  other  seemed  fully  to  concur ;  and  when  it  was  suggested  that  "  the 
enemy's  supplies  were  much  nearer,  and  could  be  had  for  the  taking,"  General 
Johnston  quietly  remarked,  "  Gentlemen,  we  shall  attack  at  daylight  to-morrow." 
The  meeting  then  dispersed  upon  an  invitation  of  the  commanding  general  to 
meet  at  his  tent  that  evening.  At  that  meeting  a  further  discussion  elicited  the 
same  views,  and  the  same  firm,  decided  determination. 


GENERAL  JOHNSTON'S  DECISION.  569 

The  next  morning,  about  dawn  of  day,  the  6th,  as  the  troops  were  being  put 
in  motion,  several  generals  again  met  at  the  camp-fire  of  the  general-in-chief. 
The  discussion  was  renewed,  General  Beauregard  again  expressing  his  dissent ; 
when,  rapid  firing  in  the  front  indicating  that  the  attack  had  commenced,  Gen 
eral  Johnston  closed  the  discussion  by  remarking :  "The  battle  has  opened,  gen 
tlemen  ;  it  is  too  late  to  change  our  dispositions."  He  proposed  to  move  to  the 
front,  and  his  subordinates  promptly  joined  their  respective  commands,  inspired 
by  his  coolness,  confidence,  and  determination.  Few  men  have  equaled  him  in 
the  possession  and  display  at  the  proper  time  of  these  great  qualities  of  the 
soldier. 

As  far  as  the  writer  can  ascertain,  the  meeting  was,  as  stated  by 
Bragg,  casual.  Beauregard  sent  for  Polk.  The  discussion  between 
them  was  conducted  with  some  warmth.  General  Johnston  joined  the 
group,  but  not  by  preconcert,  and  Breckinridge  came  up  afterward. 
General  Preston  says  in  his  letter  of  April  18,  1862  : 

General  Johnston  was  within  two  miles  of  the  chapel,  and  anxious  to  attack 
that  evening,  for  fear  the  enemy  would  discover  his  presence,  and  be  on  the 
alert  to  receive  him ;  but,  considering  the  condition  of  the  men,  determined  to 
rest  them  and  attack  in  the  morning.  It  was,  moreover,  discovered  that  some 
of  the  regiments  had  not  brought  provisions  sufficient  A  conference  was  held 
between  Generals  Johnston,  Beauregard,  Bragg,  and  Polk,  at  5  p.  M.  ;  Major 
Gilmer  being  near.  Some  thought  the  long  delay  in  the  movement,  of  thirty-six 
hours,  would  put  the  enemy  on  the  alert,  and  the  want  of  provisions  would  en 
danger  a  failure,  and  that  the  attack  was  too  late  to  be  successful.  I  was  or 
dered  to  go  for  General  Breckinridge,  to  see  the  state  of  his  command ;  but  he 
appearing  at  the  moment,  and  reporting  the  provisions  ample,  General  Johnston 
then  ordered  the  attack  for  next  morning,  and  we  bivouacked  in  silence  for  the 
night. 

General  Preston  informs  the  writer  that  General  Johnston  said  lit 
tle,  but  closed  the  discussion  with  great  decision  of  manner.  As  he 
moved  off,  he  said  to  Preston : 

I  would  fight  them  if  they  were  a  million.  They  can  present  no  greater  front 
between  these  two  creeks  than  we  can ;  and  the  more  men  they  crowd  in  there, 
the  worse  we  can  make  it  for  them.  .  .  .  Polk  is  a  true  soldier  and  a  friend. 

Governor  Harris  mentions  the  following  incident,  which  is  signifi 
cant  of  General  Johnston's  train  of  thought  during  that  day,  and  confirm 
atory  of  the  above : 

I  was  riding  with  him  along  the  line  of  battle,  which  was  being  formed  about 
12  M.1  on  Saturday,  when  one  of  our  scouts  intercepted  us,  and  made  a  report  to 
the  general  which  indicated  the  presence  of  a  much  larger  Federal  force  than 
previous  information  had  induced  us  to  expect.  For  a  moment  after  receiving 
this  report,  he  appeared  to  be  in  profound  thought,  when  he  turned  to  me,  say 
ing  :  u  I  will  fight  them  if  there  is  a  million  of  them !  I  have  as  many  men  as  can 

1  Colonel  Munford  thinks  the  hour  was  earlier. 


570  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE. 

be  well  handled  on  this  field,  and  I  can  handle  as  many  men  as  they  can."    He 
then  proceeded  with  the  inspection  of  his  line. 

The  Hon.  Jacob  Thompson,  Secretary  of  the  Interior  under  Mr. 
Buchanan,  who  was  present  on  the  staff  of  General  Beauregard,  fur 
nishes  the  writer  with  the  following  notes  of  an  interview  which  he 
held  with  General  Johnston  on  the  way  to  this  conference,  as  he  thinks, 
but  which  more  probably  occurred  soon  after  it : 

General  Johnston  took  my  arm,  and  remarked,  "I  perceive  that  General 
Beauregard  is  averse  to  bringing  on  the  attack  on  the  enemy  in  the  morning, 
on  the  ground  that  we  have  lost  an  opportunity  by  delay."  I  replied  that  I 
knew  that  such  was  the  feeling  of  General  Beauregard,  and  he  seemed  wonder 
fully  depressed  in  spirits.  "But."  says  General  Johnston,  "don't  you  think  it  is 
better  to  fight,  and  run  the  chances  of  defeat  rather  than  retreat?  Our  troops 
are  in  high  spirits,  eager  for  the  trial  of  arms,  and  confident  of  victory ;  and  the 
effect  of  an  order  to  retreat  will  not  only  disappoint  them  but  depress  their 
spirits,  and  I  fear  it  would  have  the  same  effect  as  a  defeat."  I  replied  that  if 
Buell  should  come  up  in  time  the  odds  would  be  greatly  against  us.  Then  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  as  if  wishing  to  draw  out  my  opinion,  said  :  "  Don't  you  think  we 
had  better  try  and  fight  the  two  armies  in  detail  ?  The  junction  is  not  yet  made, 
and  it  is  probable  will  not  be  made  to-morrow."  My  reply  to  that  was,  "  There 
are  great  difficulties  and  embarrassments,  take  either  horn  of  the  dilemma,  and 
those  who  have  the  responsibility  must  decide  it."  The  result  of  the  council 
was  an  order  to  attack  early,  and  General  Johnston  determined  to  lead  the 
attack  in  person,  and  leave  General  Beauregard  to  direct  the  movements  of 
troops  in  the  rear. 

General  Gilmer  says  that  Beauregard's  proposition  to  retire  with 
out  making  an  attack  was  not  opposed,  so  far  as  he  can  remember.  He 
adds  : 

General  Johnston  appeared  much  surprised  at  the  suggestion,  and  held  that 
a  failure  to  attack  would  demoralize  his  command,  which  had  come  on  the  field 
in  good  spirits,  expecting  to  give  battle.  I  ventured  to  suggest  that  a  withdrawal 
would  certainly  destroy  the  morale  of  the  troops.  General  Johnston  said,  "  We 
will  attack  the  enemy  in  the  morning."  All  dispositions  were  accordingly  made, 
and  special  instructions  given  to  the  corps  commanders  for  the  engagement  in 
the  morning. 

Colonel  Munford,  in  his  address  at  Memphis,  has  supplied  the  fol 
lowing  interesting  particulars  of  a  conversation  held  with  General  John 
ston  immediately  after  the  "  council  of  war."  He  says  : 

The  leading  general  officers  were  called  together,  and  a  short  colloquy  held, 
which  General  Johnston  seemed  to  terminate  a  little  abruptly.  He  turned,  saw 
me,  and,  pointing  to  a  large  oak,  motioned  me  to  meet  him  there.  It  was  his 
habit  not  to  betray  emotion.  Despite  this  exterior  calm,  I  saw  he  was  deeply 
moved.  His  first  words  were  :  "  I  want  to  tell  you  something  which  I  desire 
remembered.  I  shall  tell  nobody  but  you  and  Preston,  but  I  do  not  wish  what 


CONFIDENCE  IX  THE  KESULT.  571 

I  say  to  be  forgotten,  as  it  may  become  very  important  some  day."  I  told  him 
his  wishes  should  be  complied  with.  He  then  said:  "They  wish  me  to  with 
draw  the  army  without  a  battle;  what  is  your  opinion?"  My  surprised  reply 
was  :  "  General,  a  defeat  is  preferable.  This  army  cannot  be  withdrawn  with 
out  a  fight,  and  kept  together.  They  will  become  disheartened  and  melt  away. 
They  are  very  raw,  but  are  eager  to  meet  the  enemy.  I  have  been  around  their 
camp-fires,  mingled  freely  with  them,  and  know,  if  you  can  ever  do  anything 
with  such  a  number  of  undisciplined  men,  now  is  your  time.  They  are  ready 
for  the  fight."  The  general  said  with  a  glowing  countenance,  "  /  have  ordered 
a  battle  for  to-morrow  at  daylight,  and  I  intend  to  '  hammer  'em !  "  I  then  said 
to  him  :  "  There  is  a  matter  well  worthy  of  consideration.  We  have  lost  a  day. 
We  know  Buell  is  marching  an  army  as  large  as  your  own  to  this  point.  If  he 
has  not  been  inactive,  he  can  get  here  to-morrow,  and  may  be  here  to-night. 
The  army  you  propose  attacking  is  already  much  larger  than  your  own,  is  better 
armed,  and  in  all  respects  better  appointed.  Suppose,  in  the  morning,  instead 
of  sixty  or  seventy  thousand,  you  find  yourself  confronting  ninety  or  one  hun 
dred  thousand,  what  think  you  of  your  chances  for  success?"  He  replied: 
"  There  is  Lick  Creek  on  my  right,  and  Owl  Creek  on  my  left.  These  creeks 
effectually  protect  my  flanks.  I  have  men  enough  to  cover  the  front,  and  the 
more  men  they  crowd  into  this  small  space  between  me  and  the  river,  the  better 
for  me  and  the  worse  for  them.  I  think  we  will  hammer  them  beyond  doubt" 
I  have  transcribed  as  much  of  this  conversation  as  it  is  proper  should  now  be 
written  down — enough  to  shed  a  clear  light  upon  this  portion  of  the  history  of 
the  battle  of  Shiloh.  It  is  remarkable  both  for  the  facts  it  discloses  and  the 
peculiar  circumstances  under  which  it  took  place. 

These  varied  presentations,  in  the  words  of  the  witnesses  themselves, 
leave  on  the  mind  a  vivid  picture  of  this  striking  scene.  The  seeming 
disagreements  in  minor  circumstances  in  the  foregoing  statements  are 
easily  reconcilable.  They  arise  from  the  different  points  of  view  of 
the  narrators,  and  are  not  only  consistent  with  the  strictest  veracity, 
but  are  a  very  strong  attestation  of  the  principal  facts.  The  substantive 
facts  are  that,  on  Saturday  afternoon  late,  when  the  Confederate  army 
was  drawn  up  in  battle  array,  within  two  miles  of  Shiloh  Church,  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  earnestly  urged  the  necessity  of  a  retreat.  General 
Johnston,  against  his  emphatic  advice,  decided  to  fight  the  battle  of 
Shiloh.  General  Beauregard's  counsel  in  this  conference  freed  him 
from  responsibility  in  case  of  a  repulse,  and  compelled  General  John 
ston  to  take  the  hazard  of  a  doubtful  and  perilous  contest  weighted 
with  such  opposition.  Success  was  absolutely  necessary  to  the  vindi 
cation  of  his  military  character.  He  was  not  unwilling  to  accept  the 
test, 

As  to  the  soundness  of  General  Johnston's  judgment  in  deciding  to 
fight  contrary  to  the  auguries  of  his  distinguished  subordinate,  the 
writer  does  not  pretend  to  offer  an  unbiased  opinion.  He  rests  the 
wisdom  of  General  Johnston's  course  upon  the  results  of  the  battle  up 
to  the  time  of  his  death.  But,  whatever  may  have  been  the  weight  of 


572  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE. 

the  reasons  for  and  against  attacking,  those  assigned  for  retreating  by 
General  Beauregard  most  certainly  proved  invalid.  Contrary  to  his 
opinion  of  its  possibility,  the  Federals  were  surprised,  and  they  were 
not  intrenched ;  and  whatever  disparity  of  military  experience  in  the 
two  armies  existed  on  the  evening  of  the  5th  had  also  existed  on  the 
morning  of  the  3d,  before  they  left  Corinth.  Indeed,  it  was  a  mere  as 
sumption  that  the  enemy  were  on  their  guard  and  intrenched,  as  there 
was  not  the  slightest  evidence  to  that  effect,  and  all  the  indications  were 
to  the  contrary.  To  conclude  that  they  were  prepared  because  they 
ought  to  be,  was  a  reason  which  applied  with  greater  force  against  an 
advance  from  Corinth  than  against  an  attack  on  Sunday  morning.  The 
Confederate  army,  deployed  in  three  lines  of  battle  on  the  Federal  front, 
ready  and  eager  for  the  onset,  was  stronger  for  aggression  than  when 
it  lay  at  Corinth.  The  position  was  almost  more  than  its  generals  could 
have  hoped  for.  Though  the  attack  was  not  without  its  difficulties  and 
dangers,  every  omen  seemed  auspicious.  General  Johnston,  as  a  trained 
soldier,  put  discipline  at  its  fullest  value ;  but  he  knew  what  a  power 
enthusiasm  was  also,  and  that  his  army  was  wrought  up  to  the  highest 
pitch.  In  such  a  state  of  mind,  with  those  new  levies,  the  demoraliza 
tion  of  another  retreat  would  have  been  worse  than  defeat. 

Without  disparagement  to  General  Beauregard's  ability,  his  willing 
ness,  his  urgency,  to  retire  from  that  field,  when  in  the  face  of  the 
enemy,  evinces  conclusively  how  little  he  was  in  sympathy  with  the 
leading  idea  in  General  Johnston's  mind,  that  he  must  crush  Grant  be 
fore  Buell  joined  him.  This  was  the  purpose,  this  was  the  plan  of  the 
battle  of  Shiloh.  ; 

When  night  fell,  on  the  eve  of  battle,  the  following  was  the  Con 
federate  array :  The  front  line,  composed  of  the  Third  Corps  and  Glad- 
den's  brigade,  was  under  Hardee,  and  extended  from  Owl  Creek  to  Lick 
Creek,  a  distance  of  somewhat  over  three  miles.  Cleburne's  brigade 
was  on  the  left,  with  its  flank  resting  near  Owl  Creek.  Hindman  was 
intrusted  with  a  division,  composed  of.  Wood's  brigade,  and  his  own  un 
der  Colonel  Shaver.  These  occupied  the  centre.  The  interval,  on  his 
right,  to  Lick  Creek,  was  occupied  by  Gladden's  brigade,  detached  from 
Bragg,  and  put  under  Hardee's  command  for  the  battle.  Hardee's 
three  brigades  numbered  6,789  effectives,  and  Gladden  added  2,235 
more — an  effective  total  in  the  front  line  of  9,024. 

Bragg  commanded  the  second  line.  Withers's  division  formed  his 
right  wing.  Jackson's  brigade,  2,208  strong,  was  drawn  up  three 
hundred  yards  in  rear  of  Gladden,  its  left  on  the  Bark  road.  Chal 
mers's  brigade  was  on  Jackson's  right,  en  echelon  to  Gladden's  brigade, 
with  its  right  on  a  fork  of  Lick  Creek.  Clanton's  cavalry  was  in  rear 
of  Chalmers's,  with  pickets  to  the  right  and  front.  In  this  order  the 
division  bivouacked. 


THE   CONFEDERATE   ARRAY.  573 

General  Bragg's  left  wing  was  made  up  of  three  brigades,  under 
General  D.  Ruggles.  Colonel  B.  L.  Gibson  commanded  the  right  bri 
gade,  resting  with  his  right  on  the  Bark  road.  Colonel  Preston  Pond 
commanded  the  left  brigade,  near  Owl  Creek,  with  an  interval  between 
him  and  Gibson.  About  three  hundred  yards  in  the  rear  of  these  two 
brigades,  opposite  the  interval,  with  his  right  and  left  flanks  masked  by 
Gibson  and  Pond,  Patton  Anderson's  brigade,  1,634  strong,  was  posted. 
Bragg's  corps  was  10,731  strong,  and  was  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle, 
or  with  the  regiments  in  double  column  at  half  distance,  according  to 
the  nature  of  the  ground. 

The  third  line  or  reserve  was  composed  of  the  First  Corps,  under 
Polk,  and  three  brigades  under  Breckinridge.  Polk's  command  was 
massed  in  columns  of  brigades  on  the  Bark  road,  near  Mickey's ;  and 
Breckinridge's  on  the  road  from  Monterey  toward  the  same  point. 
Polk  was  to  advance  on  the  left  of  the  Bark  road,  at  an  interval  of 
about  eight  hundred  paces  from  Bragg's  line ;  and  Breckinridge,  to  the 
right  of  that  road,  was  to  give  support,  wherever  it  should  become 
necessary. 

Polk's  corps,  9,136  strong  in  infantry  and  artillery,  was  composed 
of  two  divisions,  Cheatham's  on  the  left,  made  up  of  B.  R.  Johnson's  and 
Stephens's  brigades,  and  Clark's  on  his  right,  formed  of  A.  P.  Stewart's 
and  Russell's  brigades.  It  followed  Bragg's  line  at  about  eight  hundred 
yards'  distance. 

Breckinridge's  reserve  was  composed  of  Trabue's,  Bowen's,  and 
Statham's  brigades,  with  a  total  infantry  and  artillery  of  6,439. 

The  cavalry,  about  4,300  strong,  guarded  the  flanks,  or  was  de 
tached  on  outpost  duty  ;  but,  both  from  the  newness  and  imperfec 
tions  of  their  organization,  equipment,  and  drill,  and  from  the  rough 
and  wooded  character  of  the  ground,  they  did  little  service  that  day. 
The  part  taken  by  Morgan's,  Forrest's,  and  Wharton's  (Eighth  Te$as), 
will  be  given  in  its  proper  place. 

The  army,  exclusive  of  its  cavalry,  was  between  35,000  and  36,000 
strong.  Jordan,  in  an  official  report,  made  in  July,  1862,  to  the  writer, 
then  on  inspection-duty,  gave  the  effective  total  of  all  arms  at  38,773, 
who  marched  April  3d.  In  his  "  Life  of  Forrest  "  he  makes  it  39,630. 
Hodge,  in  his  sketch  of  the  First  Kentucky  Brigade,  with  a  different 
distribution  of  troops,  puts  the  total  at  39,695,  which  he  says  he  made 
up  from  the  returns  at  the  time.  Beauregard's  report  of  the  battle 
gives  the  field  return  at  40,335,  of  which  4,382  was  cavalry.  This  last 
return  includes  Colonel  Hill's  Forty-seventh  Tennessee  Regiment,  which 
came  up  on  the  7th.  There  are  apparently  some  errors  in  the  return  of 
July,  1862.  The  writer  believes  that  the  figures  in  Jordan's  "  Life  of 
Forrest "  approach  the  truth  most  nearly. 

It  now  behooves  us  to  consider  the  employment  of  the  Federal 


574:  BEFORE  THE  BATTLE. 

army  during  those  fateful  first  days  of  April,  when  the  Confederates 
were  gathering  in  its  front.  Premising  that  General  Grant  kept  his 
headquarters  at  Savannah,  nine  miles  from  Pittsburg  by  water  and  six 
or  seven  by  land,  and  left  a  large  discretion  in  the  hands  of  General 
Sherman,  as  his  friend  and  most  experienced  officer,  we  must  turn  to 
the  " Memoirs"  of  General  Sherman  to  arrive  at  his  theory  of  the 
battle,  and  his  account  of  the  events  preceding  it.  He  is  entitled  to 
this  consideration,  since,  by  his  position  in  the  advance,  and  by  the 
special  confidence  reposed  in  him  by  Grant,  he  shared  with  his  chief 
the  responsibility  for  whatever  was  done  or  left  undone  at  Shiloh.  We 
have  already  seen  his  opinion  on  the  natural  strength  of  the  position, 
and  the  reasons  he  gives  for  not  adding  to  it.  The  following  is  his 
account  of  the  transactions  ushering  in  the  battle  ("Memoirs,"  vol. 
i.,  p.  229): 

From  about  the  1st  of  April  we  were  conscious  that  the  rebel  cavalry  in  our 
front  was  getting  bolder  and  more  saucy ;  and  on  Friday,  the  4th  of  April,  it 
dashed  down  and  carried  off  one  of  our  picket-guards,  composed  of  an  officer 
and  seven  men,  posted  a  couple  of  miles  out  on  the  Corinth  road.  Colonel 
Buckland  sent  a  company  to  its  relief,  then  followed  himself  with  a  regiment, 
and,  fearing  lest  he  might  be  worsted,  I  called  out  his  whole  brigade  and  fol 
lowed  some  four  or  jive  miles,  when  the  cavalry  in  advance  encountered  artil 
lery.  I  then,  after  dark,  drew  back  to  our  lines,  and  reported  the  fact  by  letter 
to  General  Grant,  at  Savannah  ;  but  thus  far  we  had  not  positively  detected  the 
presence  of  infantry,  for  cavalry  regiments  generally  had  a  couple  of  guns  along, 
and  I  supposed  the  guns  that  opened  on  us  on  the  evening  of  Friday,  April  4th, 
belonged  to  the  cavalry  that  was  hovering  along  our  whole  front.  Saturday 
passed  in  'our  camps  without  any  unusual  event,  the  weather  being  wet  and 
mild,  and  the  roads  back  to  the  steamboat-landing  being  heavy  with  mud. 

It  may  be  remarked  on  the  foregoing,  that  General  Sherman's  re 
connaissance  did  not  advance  so  far  as  he  thinks,  as  four  or  five  miles, 
the  distance  named  by  him,  did  not  intervene  between  Shiloh  Church 
and  Mickey's,  in  front  of  which  Hardee's  corps  was  deploying.  Indeed, 
Colonel  Buckland,  who  made  the  reconnaissance,  says  that  he  advanced 
three,  not  four  or  five  miles.1  Hardee  was,  in  fact,  within  two  miles. 
It  will  be  observed  that  Sherman  supposed  the  artillery  belonged  to 
the  Confederate  cavalry. 

In  his  letter  to  Grant,  dated  April  5th  (page  235),  Sherman  reports 
that  he  lost  eleven  men,  officers  and  privates,  taken  prisoners,  and  eight 
privates  wounded.  He  says  he  took  ten  prisoners.  He  continues : 

I  infer  that  the  enemy  is  in  some  considerable  force  at  Pea  Ridge  (Monterey), 
that  yesterday  morning  they  crossed  a  brigade  of  two  regiments  of  infantry, 
one  regiment  of  cavalry,  and  one  battery  of  field-artillery,  to  the  ridges  on  which 

1  "Sherman's  Historical  Raid,"  Boynton,  p.  31. 


SHERMAN'S   FALSE   SECURITY.  575 

the  Corinth  road  lies.  They  halted  the  infantry  at  a  point  about  five  miles  in 
my  front,  sent  a  detachment  to  the  lane  of  General  Meaks,  on  the  north  of 
Owl  Creek,  and  the  cavalry  down  toward  our  camp. 

Though  he  did  not  suspect  the  fact,  it  was  the  whole  Confederate 
army  which  was  unfolding  along  his  front. 

In  his  report  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh  ("  Memoirs,"  vol.  i.,  p.  235), 
Sherman  says  : 

On  Saturday  the  enemy's  cavalry  was  again  very  bold,  coming  well  down  to 
our  front ;  yet  I  did  not  believe  they  designed  anything  but  a  strong  demonstra 
tion. 

General  Sherman  seems  to  deny  with  derision  that  his  command 
was  surprised  on  the  morning  of  April  6th.  He  says  ("  Memoirs," 
vol.  i.,  p.  244)  : 

Probably  no  single  battle  of  the  war  gave  rise  to  such  wild  and  damaging 
reports.  It  was  publicly  asserted  at  the  North  that  our  army  was"  taken  com 
pletely  by  surprise,  etc. 

His  denial  is  not  categorical,  but  by  inference  ;  but  Moulton's  "  Criti 
cism  of  Boynton's  Review  of  Sherman"  (page  11),  which  is  virtually 
General  Sherman's  own  utterance,  denies  any  purpose  or  necessity  "  of 
contradicting  the  foolish  stories  about  our  forces  being  surprised  by 
the  enemy  at  its  beginning."  Moulton  continues : 

No  matter  what  were  the  reasons  for  starting  them  originally  in  the  news 
papers  or  elsewhere,  there  is  not  the  slightest  excuse  for  reiterating  them  at  this 
time. 

He  rests  his  defense  on  the  ground  that  Sherman's  whole  line  was 
not  overthrown  in  the  first  onset,  but  that  part  of  it  on  favorable  ground 
formed  a  line  of  battle  and  fought  well  ;  that  the  officers  on  picket — 

were  in  a  constant  state  of  watchfulness ;  that  the  pickets  were  not  less  than 
two  and  a  half  miles  out,  and  were  strengthened  as  occasion  required ;  that  re 
connaissances  in  force  were  made  from  time  to  time,  and  that  both  these  and  the 
pickets  reported  the  presence  of  cavalry  and  infantry  to  the  division  commanders, 
who  were  on  the  qui  vive  in  consequence,  and  that  their  troops  were  in  line  of 
battle  on  the  morning  of  the  attack. 

He  alleges  also  that  they  (the  Confederate  generals)  "  did  not  defi 
nitely  fix  the  date  of  the  attack  until  late  in  the  evening  of  the  5th" 
but  this  is  a  mere  quibble,  for  General  Johnston  marched  from  Corinth 
with  an  unalterable  resolution  to  attack,  which  nothing,  not  even  the 
remonstrances  of  his  second  in  command,  could  shake,  and  intended  to 
attack  on  the  morning  of  the  5th. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  consider  Moulton's  statements  seriatim  /  for, 

though  all  of  them  have  some  color  of  fact,  they  are  not  relevant  to  the 

38 


576  BEFORE   THE  BATTLE. 

issue.  A  narrative  of  the  facts  will  leave  a  clearer  impression  on  the 
reader's  mind  than  any  word-mongering  or  technical  disputations. 
Whether  Grant  and  Sherman  used  all  requisite  vigilance  or  not,  they 
believed  that  the  Confederate  army  was  at  Corinth,  twenty  miles  away, 
and  only  a  brigade  at  Mickey's,  when  that  army  was  unfolding  for  an 
assault  upon  them.  Whether  they  were  "  surprised  "  or  not,  the  at 
tack  upon  them  was  unexpected^  and  their  own  words  show  that  a 
thunderbolt  from  a  clear  sky  could  not  have  astonished  them  more  than 
the  boom  of  artillery  on  Sunday  morning. 

In  Badeau's  "Life  of  Grant"  (page  600)  occurs  the  following  cor 
respondence.  The  first  communication  is  a  telegram  from  General 
Grant  to  General  Halleck,  his  commanding  officer : 

SAVANNAH,  April  5, 1862. 

The  main  force  of  the  enemy  is  at  Corinth,  with  troops  at  different  points 
east.  Small  garrisons  are  also  at  Bethel,  Jackson,  and  Humboldt.  The  number 
at  these  places  seems  constantly  to  change.  The  number  of  the  enemy  at 
Corinth,  and  in  supporting  distance  of  it,  cannot  be  far  from  80,000  men.  In 
formation,  obtained  through  deserters,  places  their  force  west  at  200,000.  One 
division  of  Buell's  column  arrived  yesterday.  General  Buell  will  be  here  himself 
to-day.  Some  skirmishing  took  place  between  our  out-guards  and  the  enemy's 
yesterday  and  the  day  before. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Major- General. 

Major-General  H.  W.  HALLECK,  St.  Louis,  Missouri. 

In  a  subsequent  dispatch  to  Halleck,  on  the  same  day,  he  says  that 
he  had  received  notes,  stating  that — 

our  outposts  had  been  attacked  by  the  enemy,  apparently  in  considerable  force, 
I  immediately  went  up,  but  found  all  quiet.  .  .  .  They  had  with  them  three 
pieces  of  artillery,  and  cavalry  and  infantry.  How  much,  cannot  of  course  be 
estimated.  /  have  scarcely  the  faintest  idea  of  an  attaclc  {general  one)  heing 
made  upon  us,  but  will  be  prepared  should  such  a  thing  take  place. 

General  Sherman's  dispatch  to  Grant,  sent  with  the  above  to  Hal 
leck,  is  as  follows  : 

PITTSBURG  LANDING,  April  5, 1862. 

SIB:  All  is  quiet  along  my  lines  now.  We  are  in  the  act  of  exchanging 
cavalry,  according  to  your  orders.  The  enemy  has  cavalry  in  our  front,  and  I 
think  there  are  two  regiments  of  infantry  and  one  battery  of  artillery  about  six 
miles  out.  I  will  send  you  in  ten  prisoners  of  war  and  a  report  of  last  night's 
affair  in  a  few  minutes. 

W.  T.  SHEEMAN,  Brigadier- General. 

Your  note  is  just  received.  I  have  no  doubt  that  notbing  will  occur  to-day 
more  than  some  picket-firing.  The  enemy  is  saucy,  but  got  the  worst  of  it  yes 
terday,  and  will  not  press  our  pickets  far.  I  will  not  be  drawn  out  far,  unless 
with  certainty  of  advantage ;  and  I  do  not  apprehend  anything  like  an  attack 
upon  our  position.  SHEEMAN. 

To  General  GEANT. 


SPECIAL    PLEADING.  577 

In  view  of  these  quotations  from  Badeau's  book,  argument  would 
seem  entirely  unnecessary  in  order  to  show  that  there  was  "  scarcely 
the  faintest  idea  of  an  attack  being  made,"  or  that  there  was  any 
knowledge  of  the  Confederate  movement  in  force.  Grant  and  Sherman 
evidently  expected  some  skirmishing  on  outposts,  but  nothing  more. 
General  Badeau's  commentaries  on  his  own  text  are  really  amusing. 
He  dwells  on  Grant's  letters,  quoted  above,  which,  however,  speak  for 
themselves,  and  adds  (page  96) : 

It  has  been  repeatedly  asserted  that  Grant  was  surprised  at  Shiloh,  but  the 
evidence  to  the  contrary  is  incontrovertible.  The  preliminary  fighting  of  the 
3d  and  4th  of  April  necessarily  put  division  and  army  commanders  on  the  alert. 

The  evidence  he  cites  for  this  is  as  follows : 

Prentiss  had  doubled  his  pickets  the  day  before  (the  5th),  and  had  a  recon 
naissance  of  a  regiment  out  at  three  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  6th;  he  re 
ceived  the  earliest  assault  outside  of  his  camps.  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  also  break 
fasted  early,  and  had  his  horses  saddled,  "  to  be  ready  in  case  of  an  attack." 
These  are  not  the  indications  of  a  camp  that  is  surprised. 

Badeau  indulges  somewhat  oracularly  in  a  piece  of  special  pleading, 
very  wonderful  in  view  of  the  facts.  He  says: 

Private  soldiers  and  inferior  officers  very  probably  could  not  read  the  signs 
that  told  so  plainly  to  their  commanders  the  necessity  of  readiness  ;  such  may 
very  likely  have  been  surprised  at  what  occurred ;  but  Grant  and  his  division 
generals,  although  of  course  they  could  not  know  at  what  hour  or  place  the 
rebels  might  choose  to  assault,  nor  indeed  that  they  certainly  would  assault  at 
all,  although  they  did  not  really  expect  an  attack,  yet  knew  the  propinquity  of  a 
great  army,  and,  so  far  as  could  be,  were  prepared  to  receive  it — except  in  the 
matter  of  defensive  intrenchments. 

The  translation  of  which  into  English  is,  that  General  Grant  thought 
the  Confederates  were  at  Corinth — not  two,  but  twenty-two  miles  away. 
The  readiness  for  the  attack  consisted  in  what  ?  Some  colonels  strength 
ened  their  pickets,  one  general  sent  a  regiment  on  reconnaissance,  and 
another  had  his  horse  saddled  before  breakfast. 

Instead  of  the  commanders  having  a  peculiar  and  occult  insight  into 
the  situation,  unrevealed  to  their  less-gifted  subordinates,  the  exact  re 
verse  occurred.  In  the  reconnaissances  and  cavalry-skirmishes  of  out 
posts,  the  ready  apprehension  of  raw  troops  saw  the  shadow  of  coming 
danger.  Like  the  startled  stag  which  scents  afar  the  perilous  approach 
of  a  foe,  and  watches  for  the  rustle  of  the  leaves,  and  hearkens  for  the 
distant  bay  of  hounds,  these  undisciplined  men  were  touched  by  a 
vague  apprehension  of  coming  danger.  They  saw,  in  the  dash  of  the 
Southern  troopers  at  their  pickets,  the  cloud  no  bigger  than  a  man's 
hand  that  precedes  the  tempest.  Their  quick  imaginations  suggested 


578  BEFORE  THE   BATTLE. 

the  fear  that  it  was  the  vanguard  of  a  great  army  threading  the  swamps 
and  thickets  of  the  unknown  forest  in  their  front.  It  may  even  be  true, 
as  is  alleged,  that  the  experienced  eye  of  some  veteran  caught  here  or 
there  the  gleam  of  a  bayonet  in  the  background,  or  detected  by  other 
signs  the  massing  of  infantry.  It  is  certain  that  a  feeling  of  uneasiness 
and  mistrust  pervaded  the  whole  front  line,  and  gradually  spread  from 
soldiers  to  officers,  reaching  higher  and  higher.  Every  soldier  knows 
that  "  camp-rumor  "  has  a  certain  undefined  value,  that  there  is  some 
thing  in  the  Greek  idea  of  the  "  Pheme,"  the  voice  that  addresses  the 
general  consciousness,  the  voice  that  heralded  across  the  ^Egean  the 
victory  of  Plataea  to  the  combatants  of  Mycale.  Known  facts,  inference 
and  imagination,  often  construct  in  an  army  an  hypothesis  not  to  be 
neglected.  Possibly  upon  some  such  basis  General  Prentiss  acted  in 
throwing  to  the  front  ten  companies,  under  Colonel  Moore,  to  watch  the 
approaches  to  his  position. 

But  it  is  perfectly  evident  that  Grant  and  Sherman  considered  them 
selves  above  such  idle  fears.  The  vulgar  apprehension  did  not  touch 
the  victor  of  Donelson.  It  never  reached  either  Grant  or  Sherman. 
Indeed,  the  latter,  with  bitter  innuendo,  points  to  it  as  proof  of  coward 
ice  in  certain  officers  with  whom  he  was  at  variance.  He  swears  in  his 
evidence  on  Worthington's  trial.1 

Therefore,  on  Friday,  two  days  before  the  battle,  when  Colonel  "Worthington 
was  so  apprehensive,  /  knew  there  was  no  hostile  party  in  six  tniles?  though 
there  was  reason  to  expect  an  attack.  I  suppose  Colonel  McDowell  and  myself 
had  become  tired  of  his  constant  prognostications,  and  paid  no  attention  to  him, 
especially  when  we  were  positively  informed  by  men  like  Buckland,  Kilby  Smith, 
and  Major  Kicker,  who  went  to  the  front  to  look  for  enemies,  instead  of  going 
to  the  landing.  .  .  . 

On  Friday,  the  4th,  nor  officer,  nor  soldier,  looked  for  an  attack,  as  I  can 
prove.  .  .  .  For  weeks  and  months  we  had  heard  all  sorts  of  reports,  just  as  we 
do  now.  For  weeks  old  women  had  reported  that  Beauregard  was  coming, 
sometimes  with  100,000,  sometimes  with  .300,000,  when,  in  fact,  he  did  not  leave 
Corinth  until  after  even  Colonel  "Worthington  had  been  alarmed  for  safety. 

Sherman  says,  further  on,  that,  after  the  reconnaissance  on  Friday 
afternoon — 

We  knew  that  we  had  the  elements  of  an  army  in  our  front,  but  did  not 
know  its  strength  or  destination.  The  guard  was  strengthened,  and,  as  night 
came  on,  we  returned  to  camp,  and  not  a  .man  in  camp  but  knew  we  had  an 
enemy  to  the  front,  before  we  slept  that  night.  But  even  I  had  to  guess  its  pur 
pose. 

Colonel  Buckland,  who  made  the  reconnaissance,  states  that  he  dis 
covered  a  large  force  of  infantry  and  artillery,  and  that,  when  he  re- 

1  "  Sherman's  Historical  Raid,"  by  Boynton,  p.  29. 

2  Hardee  was  not  more  than  two  miles  distant. 


A  SURPRISE.  579 

ported  with  his  prisoners  to  Sherman,  his  manner  indicated  he  was  not 
pleased.  He  made  a  written  report  of  the  skirmish  that  night.  Buck- 
land  says  : 

The  next  day,  Saturday,  April  5th,  I  visited  the  picket-line  several  times,  and 
found  the  woods  were  swarming  with  rebel  cavalry  along  the  entire  front  of 
my  line,  and  the  pickets  claimed  to  have  discovered  infantry  and  artillery. 
Several  times  during  the  dc^y  I  reported  these  facts  to  General  Sherman.  Colonel 
Hildebrand,  of  the  Third  Brigade,  and  other  officers,  visited  the  picket-line  with 
me  during  the  day.  It  was  well  understood  all  that  day  and  night,  throughout 
Sherman's  division,  that  there  was  a  large  rebel  force  immediately  in  our  front. 

Buckland  strengthened  his  pickets,  and  adds,  "  Every  officer  in  my 
brigade  was  fully  aware  of  the  danger,  and  such  precautions  were  taken 
that  a  surprise  was  impossible."  1 

Concerning  the  same  reconnaissance,  Major  Ricker  wrote  as  follows: 2 

When  we  got  back  to  the  picket-lines  we  found  General  Sherman  there  with 
infantry  and  artillery,  caused  by  the  heavy  firing  of  the  enemy  on  us.  General 
Sherman  asked  me  what  was  up.  I  told  him  I  had  met  and  fought  the  advance 
of  Beauregard's  army,  that  he  was  advancing  on  us.  General  Sherman  said  it 
could  not  ~be  possible,  Beauregard  was  not  such  a  fool  as  to  leave  his  base  of 
operations  and  attack  us  in  ours — mere  reconnaissance  in  force. 

General  Buell  says  that,  "  so  far  as  preparation  for  battle  is  con 
cerned,  no  army  could  well  have  been  taken  more  by  surprise  than  was 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  on  the  6th  of  April."  3 

Van  Home's  "Army  of  the  Cumberland,"  to  which  General  Sher 
man's  special  advocate,  Mr.  Moulton,  refers  the  reader,  "  for  a  fair  and 
full  history  of  this  battle,"  has  the  following  (page  105) : 

While  the  national  army  was  unprepared  for  battle,  and  unexpectant  of  such 
an  event,  and  was  passing  the  night  of  the  5th  in  fancied  security,  Johnston's 
army  of  40,000  men  was  in  close  proximity,  and  ready  for  the  bloody  revelation 
of  its  presence  and  purpose  on  the  following  morning.  General  Johnston  was 
already  a  day  later  in  attaining  position  for  attack  than  he  had  anticipated,  and 
this  loss  of  a  day  had  brought  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  one  day's  march  nearer  to 
the  conjunction  with  General  Grant,  to  prevent  which  was  the  object  of  his  ad 
vance.  Usually,  the  indications  of  approaching  battle  are  so  palpable  that  the 
men  in  the  ranks,  as  well  as  the  officers  of  all  grades,  foresee  the  deadly  struggle, 
and  nerve  themselves  to  meet  it.  But  in  this  case  the  nearness  of  the  enemy  in 
force  was  not  known  in  the  national  army,  and  there  was  no  special  preparation 
for  the  conflict. 

In  "  Sherman  and  his  Campaigns,"  by  Colonels  Bowman  and  Irwin, 
it  is  stated  (page  50),  "  There  was  nothing  to  indicate  a  general  attack 

1  "  Sherman's  Historical  Raid,"  pp.  31,  32.  2  Ibid. 

3  Buell's  letter,  dated  January  19,  1865,  to  United  States  Service  Magazine,  republished 
in  the  New  York  World,  February  29,  1865. 


580  BEFORE   THE   BATTLE. 

until  seven  o'clock  on  Sunday  morning,  when  the  advance-guard  of 
Sherman's  front  was  forced  in  on  his  main  line." 

"Grant  and  his  Campaigns,"  a  book  compiled  by  Prof.  Coppee, 
avowedly  from  Grant's  "  Reports,"  and  very  prejudiced  in  its  conclu 
sions  in  favor  of  that  general,  says,  "  At  the  outset  our  troops  were 
shamefully  surprised  and  easily  overpowered." 

It  is  but  a  poor  compliment  to  the  generalship  of  either  Grant  or 
Sherman  to  believe  them  aware  of  the  presence  of  the  Confederate 
army  in  their  front  on  the  oth.  Else  why  was  General  Lew  Wallace 
with  7,500  men  kept  at  Crump's  Landing,  and  Nelson  and  Critten- 
den's  divisions — 14,000  men — left  at  Savannah  ?  Why  the  calm  of  Sat 
urday  and  the  confusion  of  Sunday  ?  For  the  events  of  the  battle,  let 
the  eulogists  of  Generals  Grant  and  Sherman  rather  plead,  than  deny, 
the  "  surprise  "  that  befell  them  on  Sunday  morning. 

Boynton  says  (page  34)  : 

The  officers  of  General  Thomas's  army,  -who  had  charge  of  the  pickets  a  few 
days  after  the  battle,  rode  over  the  line  from  which  the  rebels  moved  to  the 
attack.  Everywhere  were  signs  of  the  deliberation  with  which  the  enemy 
formed  his  forces.  The  routes,  by  which  each  corps  and  division  of  the  first 
line  was  to  march  to  its  position  in  the  woods,  were  blazed  upon  the  trees,  and 
the  entire  force  of  the  enemy  went  into  line  for  the  attack  wholly  undisturbed, 
and  with  as  much  order  and  precision  as  if  forming  tipon  markers  for  a  grand 
review.  And  the  time  that  the  enemy  was  thus  forming  his  lines,  scarcely  out 
of  rifled-cannon  range,  passed  in  our  camps,  says  General  Sherman,  without  any 
unusual  event." 

Such  is  a  fair  view  of  the  situation  and  transactions  of  the  Federal 
army  before  Shiloh,  as  taken  from  their  own  writers. 

According  to  the  general  tenor  of  their  official  reports,  the  Federal 
army  was  disposed  as  follows  on  the  night  of  April  5th  :  Sherman 
commanded  the  advance,  consisting  of  the  Fifth  Division,  and  had  his 
headquarters  at  Shiloh  Church,  a  little  wooden  meeting-house,  two 
miles  and  a  half  or  more  from  Pittsburg  Landing,  on  the  Corinth  road. 
The  road  to  Purdy  crosses  the  Corinth  road,  somewhat  in  rear  of  this 
chapel,  almost  at  right  angles,  and,  passing  to  the  right  and  front,  fol 
lows  a  ridge  to  Owl  Creek,  which  it  crosses  by  two  bridges.  This  ridge 
was  thickly  set  with  trees  and  undergrowth,  and  fell  away  by  a  sharp 
declivity  to  a  deep  ravine,  boggy  and  flooded  with  the  storms  of  the 
past  month.  Sherman's  First  Brigade,  under  Colonel  McDowell,  was  on 
his  right,  on  the  Purdy  road  as  a  guard  to  the  bridges  over  Owl  Creek. 
His  Fourth  Brigade,  under  Colonel  Buckland,  came  next  in  his  line,  with 
its  left  resting  on  the  Corinth  road  at  Sbiloh.  The  Third  Brigade,  under 
Colonel  Hildebrand,  stood  with  its  right  on  the  same  point.  His  Sec 
ond  Brigade,  under  Colonel  Stuart,  was  detached  in  position  on  the  ex 
treme  left,  guarding  the  ford  over  Lick  Creek.  Each  brigade  had  three 


FEDERAL   ARRAY.  581 

regiments  and  a  battery  ;  and  eight  companies  of  the  Fourth  Illinois 
Cavalry  were  posted  in  an  open  field  to  the  left  and  rear  of  Shiloh. 

Among  the  multitude  of  roads  and  cross-roads,  running  in  every 
direction  over  the  broken  surface  of  the  Shiloh  plateau,  one  principal 
road  diverged  to  the  left  in  rear  of  Shiloh  Church  from  the  direct  Pitts- 
burg  and  Corinth  road,  and  following  the  ridge  led  into  both  the  Bark 
road  and  the  Corinth  road  by  numerous  approaches.  Across  this  to 
Sherman's  left,  with  an  interval  between  them,  Prentiss's  division  (the 
Sixth)  was  posted.  Covering  this  interval,  but  some  distance  back,  lay 
McClernand's  division  (the  First),  with  its  right  partially  masked  by 
Sherman's  left.  Some  two  miles  in  rear  of  the  front  line,  and  about 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  in  advance  of  Pittsburg,  were  encamped  to 
the  left,  Hurlbut's  (the  Fourth),  and  to  the  right,  Smith's  (the  Second) 
division,  the  latter  under  General  W.  H.  L.  Wallace.  The  Federal 
front  was  an  arc  or  very  obtuse  angle  extending  from  where  the  Purdy 
road  crossed  Owl  Creek  to  the  ford  near  the  mouth  of  Lick  Creek, 
which  was  guarded  by  Stuart's  brigade.  General  Lew  Wallace's  divi 
sion  was  five  or  six  miles  distant,  with  one  brigade  at  Crump's  Land 
ing,  and  the  other  two  on  the  Adamsville  road,  with  intervals  of  some 
two  miles,  in  observation  of  Cheatham's  division,  which  he  believed  to 
be  still  at  Purdy.  The  advance  of  Buell's  army,  Nelson's  division,  had 
passed  through  Savannah  on  Saturday  morning,  April  5th,  and  was  dis 
tant  from  Pittsburg  about  five  miles  on  the  north  bank  of  the  river. 
Crittenden's  division  arrived  there  on  the  morning  of  the  6th,  and  the 
other  divisions  of  Buell's  army  followed  at  intervals  of  about  six  miles. 

The  arrangement  of  Grant's  army  at  Shiloh  has  been  subjected  to 
very  severe  and  probably  just  criticism,  by  Federal  writers,  because  he 
did  not  so  place  his  troops  as  to  make  the  most  of  his  position.  This 
may  be  true  ;  but  such  were  the  natural  advantages  of  the  ground  that 
the  attack  was  nevertheless  almost  equivalent  to  an  assault  on  a  strong 
ly  intrenched  place.  No  Confederate  who  fought  at  Shiloh  has  ever 
said  that  he  found  any  point  on  that  bloody  field  easy  to  assail. 

But  while  the  Federal  army,  strong  in  the  natural  advantages  of  its 
position,  its  prestige,  and  its  stubborn  and  self-reliant  courage,  lay  un 
aware  of  its  mighty  peril,  the  Confederate  army  had  set  itself  down 
opposite  to  the  Federal  camps,  in  battle  array,  with  its  flanks  protected 
by  natural  barriers,  ready  for  the  onset.  It  had  reached  its  positions, 
it  is  true,  more  slowly  than  could  have  been  foreseen,  but,  according 
to  all  testimony,  with  almost  the  regularity  of  a  drill  or  parade.  More 
could  not  have  been  expected;  More  could  not  have  been  achieved 
under  the  circumstances.  Thus  the  two  armies  lay  face  to  face  :  the 
Federal  host,  like  a  wild-boar  in  his  lair,  stirred  but  not  aroused  by 
monitions  of  an  unseen  danger ;  its  foe,  like  a  panther,  hidden  in  the 
jungle,  in  wait  to  spring,  tense  for  the  deadly  combat. 


582  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

BATTLE    OF   SHILOH. — SUNDAY. 
I.— MORNING. 

SATURDAY  afternoon,  April  5th,  the  sun,  breaking  through  the  mists 
which  drifted  away,  set  in  a  cloudless  sky.  The  night  was  clear,  calm, 
and  beautiful.  General  Johnston,  tired  out  with  the  vigils  of  the  night 
before,  slept  quietly  in  an  ambulance-wagon,  his  staff  bivouacking  by 
the  camp-fires  around  him.  Some  of  Hardee's  troops  having  wasted 
their  rations,  he  and  Bragg  spent  a  large  part  of  the  night  getting  up 
provisions  for  them.  Before  the  faintest  glimmer  of  dawn,  the  wide 
forest  was  alive  with  preparations  for  the  mighty  contest  of  the  coming 
day.  No  bugle-note  sounded,  and  no  drum  beat  the  reveille ;  but  men 
took  their  hasty  morning  meal,  and  looked  with  sharp  attention  to  the 
arms  that  were  to  decide  the  fortunes  of  the  fight.  The  cool,  gray 
dawn  found  them  in  motion.  Morning  opened  with  all  the  delicate 
fragrance  and  beauty  of  the  season,  enhanced  by  the  contrast  of  the 
day  before.  The  sky  was  serene,  the  air  was  bracing,  the  dew  lay 
heavy  on  the  tender  green  of  leaf  and  herb,  and  the  freshness  of  early 
spring  was  on  all  around.  When  the  sun  rose  it  was  with  unclouded 
brilliancy ;  and,  as  it  shed  its  glories  over  the  coverts  of  the  oak-woods, 
the  advancing  host,  stirred  by  the  splendor  of  the  scene  and  the  enthu 
siasm  of  the  hour,  passed  the  omen  from  lip  to  lip,  and  welcomed  its 
rising  as  another  "  sun  of  Austerlitz." 

The  native  buoyancy  of  General  Johnston's  self-repressed  temper 
broke  its  barriers  at  the  prospect  of  that  struggle  which  should  settle 
for  all  time  by  the  arbitrament  of  arms  the  dispute  as  to  his  own  mili 
tary  ability  and  skill  and  the  fate  of  the  Confederate  cause  in  the  West. 
He  knew  the  hazard  ;  but  he  knew,  too,  that  he  had  done  all  that  fore 
sight,  fortitude,  energy,  and  strategy,  could  accomplish  to  secure  a  vic 
tory,  and  he  welcomed  with  exultant  joy  the  day  that  was  about  to 
decide  not  only  these  great  questions,  but  for  him  all  questions,  solving 
the  mysteries  of  life  and  death.  Men  who  came  within  his  influence  on 
the  battle-field  felt  and  confessed  the  inspiration  of  his  presence,  his 
manner,  and  his  words.  As  he  gave  his  orders  in  terse  sentences,  every 
word  seemed  to  ring  with  a  presage  of  victory. 

Turning  to  his  staff,  as  he  mounted,  he  exclaimed,  "  To-night  we 
will  water  our  horses  in  the  Tennessee  River."  It  was  thus  that  he 
formulated  his  plan  of  battle.  It  must  not  stop  short  of  entire  victory. 


JOHNSTON    ON   THE   FIELD. 


583 


First  Position  of  Troops  (Morningr),  April  6. 


1st.  Position  (Morning)  Cth.April 
Confederate  — •  — 


BATTLE  OF 

SHILOH 

Part  I. 


As  he  rode  forward  he  encountered  Colonel  Randal  L.  Gibson,  who 
was  the  intimate  friend  of  his  son.  When  Gibson  ordered  his  brigade 
to  salute,  General  Johnston  took  him  warmly  by  the  hand  and  said  : 
"Randal, I  never  see  you  but  I  think  of  William.  I  hope  you  may  get 
through  safely  to-day,  but  we  must  win  a  victory."  Gibson  says  he 
felt  greatly  stirred  by  his  words. 

Sharp  skirmishing  had  begun  before  he  reached  the  front.  Here 
he  met  Colonel  John  S.  Marmaduke,  commanding  the  Third  Arkansas 


584:  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

Regiment.  This  officer,  in  reply  to  General  Johnston's  questions,  ex 
plained,  with  some  pride,  that  he  held  the  centre  of  the  front  line,  the 
other  regiments  forming  on  him.  Marmaduke  had  been  with  General 
Johnston  in  Utah,  at  Bowling  Green,  and  in  the  retreat  to  Corinth,  and 
regarded  him  with  the  entire  affection  and  veneration  of  a  young  soldier 
for  his  master  in  the  art  of  war.  General  Johnston  put  his  hand  on  Mar- 
maduke's  shoulder,  and  said  to  him  with  an  earnestness  that  went  to  his 
heart,  "  My  son,  we  must  this  day  conquer  or  perish !"  Marmaduke 
felt  himself  nerved  to  a  tenfold  resolution. 

General  Johnston  said  to  the  ambitious  Hindman,  who  had  been  in 
the  vanguard  from  the  beginning  :  "  You  have  earned  your  spurs  as 
major-general.  Let  this  day's  work  win  them." 

"  Men  of  Arkansas ! "  he  exclaimed  to  a  regiment  from  that  State, 
"  they  say  you  boast  of  your  prowess  with  the  bowie-knife.  To-day 
you  wield  a  nobler  weapon — the  bayonet.  Employ  it  well."  It  was 
with  such  words,  as  he  rode  from  point  to  point,  that  he  raised  a  spirit 
in  that  host  which  swept  away  the  serried  lines  of  the  conquerors  of 
Donelson. 

As  he  looked  around  on  his  soldiers  he  might  well  feel  more  like 
the  chieftain  who  leads  his  clansmen  to  battle  than  the  mere  general  of 
an  army.  Everywhere  he  beheld  men  bound  to  him  by  ties  of  ancient 
friendship  or  of  service  on  other  fields.  There  was  Polk,  his  life-long 
friend ;  Hardee,  for  the  last  six  years  his  major,  for  the  last  six  months 
his  right  arm  in  war  ;  Breckinridge,  bound  to  him  by  many  ties  and 
marked  out  by  him  for  the  highest  military  distinctions ;  and  Gilmer, 
his  trusted  engineer.  Around  him  was  a  staff  who  followed  him  with 
filial  reverence — Preston,  Brewster,  O'Hara,  Jack,  and  others.  Among 
the  younger  soldiers  were  many  who  had  been  his  pupils  in  war — Hard- 
castle,  Bowen,  Rich,  and  many  more.  From  the  walks  of  civil  life  had 
come  to  the  front  a  number  of  ardent  and  generous  young  men,  without 
experience,  but  strong  in  native  character  and  talent:  the  dashing  Duke, 
the  wily  Morgan,  Colonel  R.  A.  Johnson,  Colonel  Ben  Anderson,  all 
sons  of  his  early  friends ;  Gibson,  his  connection,  brave,  faithful,  and 
accomplished,  and  many  more  allied  by  blood  or  marriage ;  and  a  gal 
lant  band  of  Texans,  Wharton,  Ashbel  Smith,  and  others  ;  with  a  mul 
titude  besides,  known  to  him  personally  or  by  reputation  and  name  as 
the  inheritors  of  martial  virtues.  But  why  multiply  names  ?  Regulars 
were  there,  who  had  wintered  with  him  in  Utah ;  Texans  who  had  known 
him  on  the  border,  as  patriot  leader,  statesman,  citizen,  soldier;  the  men 
of  Monterey  and  the  Mexican  War,  and  the  brave  soldiers  who  had  wel 
comed  him  with  shouts  at  Columbus,  or  helped  him  to  guard  the  line  of 
the  Barren  River  all  winter.  He  regarded  all  these  not  as  strangers,  not 
as  factors  to  be  canceled  in  the  deadly  problem  of  successful  combat, 
but  as  of  his  own  belonging — his  kith  and  kin  by  ties  almost  as  strong 


CONFEDERATE   VALOR  AND   ENTHUSIASM.  585 

as  those  of  blood.  He  looked  upon  them  with  the  tenderness  of  a  patri 
archal  regard — of  an  Abraham  or  a  Jephthah.  In  the  dread  holocaust 
of  war,  in  which  perish  the  bravest  and  best,  he  was  ready  to  make  his 
offering,  as  a  sacrifice  for  his  people  and  for  constitutional  liberty.  In 
this  spirit  he  sent,  in  this  spirit  he  led,  the  sons  of  the  South  to  the 
field  of  death  and  victory,  on  which  he  himself  was  to  fall  a  victim. 

Every  one  who  witnessed  the  battle  of  Shiloh  testifies  to  the  splen 
did  valor  of  the  Confederate  army  there,  rarely  equaled,  never  sur 
passed,  on  any  field  of  any  war.  It  must  be  remembered,  even  by  the 
heroes  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  who  repulsed  the  multitudi 
nous  battalions  of  Grant  in  the  Wilderness,  and  struck  such  blows  at 
Chancellorsville  and  the  Second  Manassas,  that  these  were  the  men 
who  drove  Grant  and  Sherman  from  an  almost  impregnable  stronghold, 
and  crushed  one  of  the  best  armies  the  United  States  ever  put  in  the 
field  into  a  shapeless  mass. 

Duke,  in  his  "  Life  of  Morgan  "  (page  142),  says  : 

Every  one  who  witnessed  that  scene — the  marshaling  of  the  Confederate 
army  for  attack  upon  the  morning  of  the  6th  of  April — must  remember,  more 
distinctly  than  anything  else,  the  glowing  enthusiasm  of  the  men,  their  buoyancy 
and  spirited  impatience  to  close  with  the  enemy.  .  .  .  When  the  lines  began  to 
advance,  the  wild  cheers  which  arose  made  the  woods  stir  as  if  with  the  rush  of 
a  mighty  wind.  Nowhere  was  there  any  thought  of  fear — everywhere  were  the 
evidences  of  impetuous  and  determined  valor. 

Friend  and  foe  alike  testify  to  the  enthusiastic  courage  and  un 
quenchable  ardor  of  the  soldiers  that  day.  Bragg  and  many  others 
have  said  that  they  caught  their  martial  glow  from  the  spirit  of  their 
commander.  If  it  is  not  so,  let  it  be  denied  now,  while  soldiers  who 
fought  there  with  the  sword  or  musket  yet  live  to  tell  of  what  they 
know.  Would  to  God  that  every  one  of  these  might  have  spoken  out 
or  made  his  inarticulate  sign  of  what  he  saw  or  felt  that  day  !  It  would 
make  a  record  of  heroism  in  officers  and  men  for  the  ages  to  read  with 
admiration. 

Colonel  Munford  gives  the  following  animated  description  of  day 
break  at  headquarters ; 

Just  as  day  was  dawning  I  was  awakened  by  General  Johnston  asking  for 
me.  I  found  him  and  the  staff  taking  a  breakfast  of  coffee  and  cold  biscuit  at  a 
little  fire.  He  told  me  I  had  better  eat  something,  as  he  would  move  upon  the 
enemy  in  a  few  moments.  Just  as  I  was  draining  my  tin  cup  of  coffee,  bang — 
bang — bang  went  some  muskets  near  the  right  wing  of  Hardee's  line,  and  in  a 
moment  more  boom  went  a  cannon.  "  There,"  said  Preston,  "the  first  gun  of 
the  battle !  "  General  Johnston  turned  to  bim  and  me,  to  whom  he  had  before 
given  blank  books  to  note  the  incidents  of  the  battle,  and  said,  "Note  che  hour, 
if  you  please,  gentlemen."  It  was  precisely  fourteen  minutes  after  five  o'clock. 
We  mounted,  galloped  to  the  front,  found  the  enemy  in  retreat,  and  our  line 
just  starting  in  pursuit. 


586  BATTLE   OF   SEILOH. 

Haydon  says  that  General  Johnston  had  ordered  his  horse  at  five 
o'clock.  "  We  all  got  off  in  fine  spirits.  .  .  .  The  generals  separated, 
and  the  general  commanding  made  his  way  to  where  the  firing  was 
heaviest." 

General  Beauregard's  official  report  of  the  military  operations  on 
Sunday  is  so  brief  that  it  is  inserted  here  as  a  summary  of  the  battle 
on  that  day  : 

At  5  A.M.,  on  the  6th  instant,  a  reconnoitring  party  of  the  enemy  having 
become  engaged  with  our  advanced  pickets,  the  commander  of  the  forces  gave 
orders  to  begin  the  movement  and  attack  as  determined  upon,  except  that  Tra- 
bue's  brigade  of  Breckinridge's  division  was  detached  and  advanced  to  support 
the  left  of  Bragg's  corps  and  line  of  battle  when  menaced  by  the  enemy,  and 
the  other  two  brigades  were  directed  to  advance  by  the  road  to  Hamburg,  to 
support  Bragg's  right ;  and  at  the  same  time  Maney's  regiment,  of  Folk's  corps, 
was  advanced  by  the  same  road  to  reenforce  the  regiment  of  cavalry  and  bat 
tery  of  four  pieces,  already  thrown  forward  to  watch  and  guard  Grier's,  Tan 
ner's,  and  Borland's  Fords  of  Lick  Creek. 

Thirty  minutes  after  5  A.  M.,  our  lines  and  columns  were  in  motion,  all 
animated  evidently  by  a  promising  spirit.  The  front  line  was  engaged  at  once, 
but  advanced  steadily,  followed  in  due  order,  with  equal  resolution  and  steadi 
ness,  by  the  other  lines,  which  were  brought  successively  into  action  with  rare 
skill,  judgment,  and  gallantry,  by  the  several  corps  commanders  as  the  enemy 
made  a  stand,  with  his  masses  rallied  for  the  struggle  for  his  encampments. 
Like  an  Alpine  avalanche,  our  troops  moved  forward,  despite  the  determined 
resistance  of  the  enemy,  until  after  6  p.  M.,  when  we  were  in  possession  of  all 
his  encampments  between  Owl  and  Lick  Creeks  but  one.  Nearly  all  of  his 
field- artillery,  about  thirty  (30)  flags,  colors,  and  standards,  over  3,000  pris 
oners,  including  a  division  commander  (General  Prentiss),  and  several  brigade 
commanders,  thousands  of  small-arms,  an  immense  supply  of  subsistence,  forage, 
and  munitions  of  war,  and  a  large  amount  of  means  of  transportation — all  the 
substantial  fruits  of  a  complete  victory,  such,  indeed,  as  rarely  have  followed 
the  most  successful  battles,  for  never  was  an  army  so  well  provided  as  that  of 
our  enemy. 

The  remnant  of  his  army  had  been  driven  in  utter  disorder  to  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  Pittsburg,  under  the  shelter  of  the  heavy  guns  of  his  iron-clad  gun 
boats,  and  we  remained  undisputed  masters  of  his  well-selected,  admirably-pro 
vided  cantonments,  after  our  twelve  hours  of  obstinate  conflict  with  his  forces, 
who  had  been  beaten  from  them  and  the  contiguous  covert,  but  only  by  a  sus 
tained  onset  of  all  the  men  we  could  bring  into  action. 

How  all  this  was  done  may  now  be  told  with  more  detail.  But  it 
must  be  premised  that  the  writer,  in  spite  of  much  diligent  work  among 
a  confused  tangle  of  obscure  and  contradictory  reports,  does  not  claim 
that  his  account  is  absolutely  accurate  or  complete.  As  no  artist  can 
truly  paint  a  skirmish  even,  where  all  is  motion,  so  no  writer  can  re 
produce  all  the  varying  features  of  a  great  battle,  where  a  hundred 
thousand  combatants  strove  for  mastery.  It  must  be  remembered  that 


THE   FIRST  BLOOD.  587 

each  narrator  looks  from  a  narrow  point  of  view  upon  a  scene  which  he 
reads  in  the  light  of  every  terrible  passion  which  stirs  the  human 
breast.  He  has  small  chance  to  rectify  errors,  and  many  motives  to 
perpetuate  them.  The  easy,  but  unfortunate,  method  of  the  ordinary 
historian  is  to  strike  an  average,  irrespective  of  the  credibility  of  wit 
nesses  or  the  probabilities  of  the  conflicting  testimony.  But  what 
should  be  sought  is  the  absolute  truth,  and  this  he  must  tell  without 
fear  or  favor.  I  have  tried  to  tell  it  as  I  have  found  it. 

The  skirmishing  began  at  break  of  day.  General  Prentiss,  appre 
hensive  at  the  near  approach  to  his  front  of  what  he  believed  to  be  an 
audacious  cavalry  reconnaissance,  had  on  Saturday  evening  sent  ten 
companies  of  infantry,  under  Colonel  David  Moore,  of  the  Twenty-first 
Missouri  Regiment,  out  on  the  Corinth  road  for  observation  and  repri 
sal,  and  had  also  subsequently  doubled  and  extended  his  grand  guards. 
But  for  these  precautions  the  Federal  army  would  have  been  taken 
entirely  unawares.  Colonel  Moore  advanced  about  three  o'clock  on  the 
morning  of  the  6th,  and  cautiously  feeling  his  way  along  a  road  that  led 
obliquely  to  the  right,  toward  Sherman's  front,  at  early  dawn  encoun 
tered  Hardee's  skirmish-line  under  Major  Hardcastle.  The  Missourians 
assailed  it  vigorously;  and  thus,  unexpectedly  to  both  parties,  the 
battle  was  begun  by  the  Federals.  They  had  hoped  to  surprise  an  out 
post — they  found  an  army.  The  struggle  was  brief  but  spirited.  The 
Twenty-first  Missouri  made  a  bold  attack,  but  .was  held  in  check  by 
Hardcastle's  little  battalion  until  relieved  by  the  Eighth  and  Ninth 
Arkansas,  when,  after  a  sharp  contest,  Colonel  Moore  fell  severely 
wounded,  and  the  Federals  retreated.  Shaver's  brigade  pursued.  In 
the  horror  of  the  recoil  the  Federal  vanguard  was  swept  away  by  the 
rapid  onset  of  the  Confederate  skirmishers.  As  it  fled  surprised,  the 
men  caught  a  vision,  through  the  dusky  shadows  of  the  forest,  of  a  dark 
line  of  troops  moving  steadily  upon  them. 

Thus  it  happened  that,  though  the  first  collision  between  the  two 
armies  was  with  Prentiss's  outpost,  it  occurred  nearer  to.  Sherman's 
camp  than  his  own  ;  and,  as  his  line  was  more  retired  than  Sherman's, 
the  first  blow  fell  upon  the  left  brigade  of  the  latter,  under  Hildebrand. 
This  lay  in  the  pathway  of  the  impetuous  Hindman;  and  General 
Johnston  was  already  with  him  urging  him  to  the  assault.  The  swiftest 
of  the  fugitives,  scattering  through  the  Federal  camps,  gave  the  alarm ; 
and  the  rattle  of  musketry  also  gave  sharper  notice  that  it  was  no  com 
mon  peril  that  threatened. 

The  long  roll  was  beaten,  the  bugles  sounded,  and  brisk  volleys  gave 
still  sterner  warning.  There  was  rallying  in  hot  haste,  a  sudden  sum 
moning  to  arms,  and  Sherman's  division  woke  to  find  the  foe  pressing 
right  upon  them.  Hindman,  leading  Wood's  brigades  along  the  direct 
road  to  Shiloh,  had  the  advantage  of  a  ridge  and  of  the  most  favorable 


588  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 

ground  upon  the  field  for  an  advance.  The  ardor  of  his  troops  kept 
pace  with  his  own  ;  and,  under  the  immediate  eye  of  the  commander- 
in-chief,  they  rushed  through  the  woods,  driving  before  them  the  Fed 
eral  advance,  almost  without  a  halt,  until  they  reached  the  main  line 
where  Hildebrand  was  posted.  Sherman's  advance-guards  had  made 
what  resistance  they  could,  but  it  was  brief  and  fruitless. 

In  the  mean  time,  Sherman  and  Hildebrand  had  hurriedly  formed  a 
line  of  battle  in  front  of  the  camp.  It  was  good  ground  for  defense — 
a  low,  timbered  ridge,  with  an  open  valley  traversed  by  a  small  stream 
in  front.  But  there  was  cover  on  the  opposite  hill,  in  which  Hindman's 
skirmishers  swarmed  ;  and  soon  his  main  line  appeared.  Sherman  and 
Hildebrand  rode  to  and  fro  encouraging  the  men  who  were  firing  brisk 
volleys.  To  attack  them,  the  Southern  brigades  had  to  cross  the  stream 
and  open  field.  Just  then,  General  Johnston  rode  to  the  front.  At 
that  moment,  he  and  Sherman  were  confronted  almost  within  pistol- 
shot  ;  the  one  urging  the  attack,  the  other  trying  in  vain  to  hold  his 
line.  Hardee  says  briefly  in  his  report :  "  My  command  advanced. 
Hindman's  brigade  engaged  the  enemy  with  great  vigor  in  the  edge  of 
a  wood,  and  drove  him  rapidly  back  on  the  field  toward  Pittsburg." 

But  the  Confederate  line,  which  had  hung  for  a  few  minutes  only 
on  the  crest  of  the  hill,  like  a  storm-cloud  on  the  mountain's  brow, 
now  burst  with  a  sudden  impulse  upon  Hildebrand's  camps.  The 
"  rebel  yell,"  so  inspiring  to  friends,  so  terrific  to  foes,  rose  sharp  and 
shrill  from  the  rushing  line  of  Southern  soldiery.  Their  volleys  came 
pouring  in,  and  the  bayonet  even  was  used  on  some  whose  heavy  slum 
bers  were  broken  only  by  the  oncoming  of  their  foes.  Sherman's  order 
ly  was  shot  dead  by  his  side,  and  he  himself  rode  away  to  the  right,  out 
of  the  wreck.  Sherman  had  ordered  Colonel  Appier,  with  the  Fifty- 
third  Ohio,  to  hold  his  ground  at  all  hazards ;  but  it  could  not  stand 
the  charge,  and,  after  firing  two  rounds,  fled,  scattered,  and  was  seen 
no  more.  Hildebrand  says:  "This  regiment  became  separated  from 
my  command,  and  its  movements  throughout  the  day  were  general" 
The  Fifty-seventh  Ohio  soon  followed,  and,  a  little  later,  Hildebrand's 
own  regiment,  the  Seventy-seventh  Ohio.  Sherman,  though  in  error  as 
to  the  hour,  says,  "  Hildebrand's  brigade  had  substantially  disappeared 
from  the  field,  though  he  himself  bravely  remained."  It  is  due  to 
Hildebrand  to  say  that  his  discomfiture  does  not  seem  to  have  been  due 
to  his  personal  conduct  on  the  field,  which  commended  itself  to  his 
superiors. 

While  this  struggle  was  going  on,  Hindman's  right  brigade,  under 
Colonel  Shaver,  and  Gladden's  brigade,  burst  in  upon  Prentiss's  division. 
Peabody's  brigade,  which  lay  upon  the  Bark  road,  was  got  into  posi 
tion.  The  Twenty-fifth  Missouri,  the  Sixteenth  Wisconsin,  and  the 
Twelfth  Michigan,  were  hurriedly  pushed  forward  into  line  of  battle, 


HIXDMAN  AND   GLADDEN.  589 

and  the  remainder  of  the  division  formed  in  front  of  their  camps ;  but 
they  were  unprepared,  confused,  and  startled.  It  was  not  eight  o'clock 
when  Shaver's  and  Gladden's  strong  line  fell  fiercely  upon  them.  Here 
were  enacted,  though  in  less  measure,  the  same  scenes  that  had  oc 
curred  in  Hildebrand's  camps.  Nevertheless,  Peabody's  brigade  made 
a  determined  and  sanguinary  resistance,  driving  back  in  confusion  some 
of  the  advanced  regiments,  which  General  Johnston  assisted  in  rallying. 
General  Preston  says : 

Hindman's  brigade  was  suffering  under  a  heavy  fire.  Some  of  the  men  were 
breaking  ranks,  and  there  were  many  dead  and  wounded.  General  Johnston 
in  person  rallied  the  stragglers,  and  I  rode  forward,  where  I  found  General 
Hindman  animating  and  leading  on  his  men.  He  informed  me  that  he  desired 
support,  and,  having  reported  this  to  the  general,  I  was  requested  by  him  to 
order  General  Bragg  to  advance. 

Bragg  had  already  given  the  order.     Haydon  says  : 

Colonel  Preston  then  carried  the  order  to  Hindman's  brigade,  who  made  a 
splendid  and  victorious  charge.  ...  It  was  while  under  this  fire  that  Captain 
Brewster  expostulated  with  General  Johnston  against  his  exposing  his  person. 
I  was  not  near  enough  to  hear  his  reply,  but  it  had  no  effect,  for  he  smilingly 
rode  to  the  brow  of  the  hill  where  we  could  distinctly  see  the  enemy  retreating. 

There  was  a  gap  between  Hildebrand  and  Prentiss's  right,  and  into 
this  poured  Hindman's  men.  His  left,  too,  was  assailed  by  Chalmers's 
brigade,  which  was  on  Gladden's  right.  Here  the  Eighteenth  Wiscon 
sin,  1,000  strong,  was  attacked  by  the  Tenth  Mississippi,  360  strong, 
followed  by  the  Ninth  and  Seventh  Mississippi,  which  dashed  at  it 
with  the  bayonet,  and  drove  it  back  half  a  mile.  Chalmers  was  about 
to  charge  again,  when  General  Johnston,  coming  up,  ordered  him  still 
farther  to  the  right,  restoring  his  order  of  battle,  and  brought  up  Jack 
son's  brigade  into  the  interval.  The  conflict  was  severe,  but  not  pro 
tracted.  Crowded  in  front,  to  the  right,  to  the  left,  by  eager  antago 
nists,  Prentiss's  whole  division  gave  way,  and  fell  back  in  confusion  on 
its  supports.  It  was  not  routed,  but  broken  and  very  badly  hammered. 

In  the  first  assault  upon  Prentiss's  division,  General  Gladden,  who 
led  the  attacking  brigade,  fell  mortally  wounded.  He  was  a  New 
Orleans  merchant,  who  had  seen  service  in  the  war  with  Mexico,  and 
brought  valor,  experience,  and  enthusiasm,  to  the  cause.  He  was  a 
South  Carolinian  by  birth,  and  his  varied  talents  were  applied  to  trade, 
politics,  and  war.  His  common-sense  and  humor  were  both  evinced  in 
his  reply  to  an  inquirer,  who,  struck  by  their  costume,  asked  him  "  if 
he  did  not  prefer  Zouaves  as  soldiers."  "  It  is  very  easy  to  make 
one,"  he  replied  ;  "  you  only  want  an  Irishman  and  two  yards  of  red 
flannel."  Gladden's  death  was  a  serious  loss. 

It  has  been  claimed  that  there  was  no  "  surprise  "  at  Shiloh.     The 


590  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

subject  of  the  preparation  of  the  Federal  army  for  an  attack  has  already 
been  discussed.  The  following  is  General  Sherman's  own  account  of 
the  opening  of  the  battle.  After  mentioning  the  death  of  his  orderly 
in  front  of  Hildebrand's  line,  soon  after  seven  o'clock,  he  says  : 

About  8  A.  M.  I  saw  the  glistening  bayonets  of  heavy  masses  of  infantry  to 
our  left  front,  in  the  woods  beyond  the  small  stream  alluded  to,  and  became 
satisfied  for  the  first  time  that  the  enemy  designed,  a  determined  attack  on  our 
whole  camp.  All  the  regiments  of  my  division  were  then  in  line  of  battle,  at 
their  proper  posts. 

The  attack  was  made  before  sunrise,  and  by  eight  o'clock  Hilde- 
brand  had  been  driven  from  the  field.  Sherman's  right  brigades,  how 
ever,  did  succeed  in  forming  and  holding  their  ground  for  some  time. 
The  troops  he  saw  were  the  columns  moving  against  Prentiss.  It  is 
difficult  to  reconcile  his  admission  that  this  was  the  first  time  he  became 
satisfied  that  a  general  attack  was  intended,  with  his  constant  denial 
that  he  was  surprised. 

To  appreciate  the  suddenness  and  violence  of  the  blow  that  appalled 
and  overthrew  the  Federal  front,  one  must  read  the  testimony  of  eye 
witnesses.  General  Bragg  says,  in  a  sketch  of  "  Shiloh,"  made  for  the 
writer : 

Contrary  to  the  views  of  such  as  urged  an  abandonment  of  the  attack,  the 
enemy  was  found  utterly  unprepared,  many  being  surprised  and  captured  in 
their  tents,  and  others,  though  on  the  outside,  in  costumes  better  fitted  to  the 
bedchamber  than  to  the  battle-field. 

Jordan  says  : : 

Officers  and  men  were  killed  or  wounded  in  their  beds,  and  large  numbers 
had  not  time  to  clutch  up  arms  or  accoutrements.  Nevertheless,  few  prisoners 
were  taken,  nor  were  many  either  killed  or  wounded  in  the  first  stage  of  the 
battle. 

This  is  true,  comparatively  speaking  ;  but  the  loss  in  Hildebrand's 
brigade  shows  severe  suffering,  the  greater  part  of  it  in  this  single 
onslaught.  Three  hundred  killed  and  wounded,  and  ninety-four  missing, 
are  reported  in  that  command. 

General  Preston,  in  his  letter  heretofore  quoted,  says  : 

General  Johnston  then  went  to  the  camp  assailed,  which  was  carried  be 
tween  seven  and  eight  o'clock.  The  enemy  were  evidently  surprised.  The 
breakfasts  were  on  the  mess-tables;  the  baggage  unpacked;  the  knapsacks, 
arms,  stores,  colors,  and  ammunition,  abandoned.  I  took  one  stand  of  colors 
from  the  colonel's  tent,  which  was  sent  by  me,  next  morning,  through  Colonel 
Gilmer,  to  General  Beauregard. 

This,  however,  was  one  of  Prentiss's  camps. 

1  "Life  of  Forrest,"  p.  121. 


THE   SURPRISE.  591 

The  correspondent  of  the  Cincinnati  Gazette,  in  a  letter  of  April 
9,  1862,1  says : 

Almost  at  dawn,  Prentiss's  pickets  were  driven  in ;  a  very  little  later,  Hilde- 
brand's  (in  Sherman's  division)  were  ;  and  the  enemy  were  in  the  camps  almost 
as  soon  as  were  the  pickets  themselves. 

Here  began  scenes  which,  let  us  hope,  will  have  no  parallel  in  our  remaining 
annals  of  the  war.  Some,  particularly  among  our  officers,  were  not  yet  out  of 
bed ;  others  were  dressing,  others  washing,  others  cooking,  a  few  eating  their 
breakfasts.  Many  guns  were  unloaded,  accoutrements  lying  pell-mell,  ammu 
nition  was  ill-supplied — in  short,  the  camps  were  virtually  surprised — disgrace 
fully,  it  might  be  added,  unless  some  one  can  hereafter  give  some  yet  undiscov 
ered  reason  to  the  contrary — and  were  taken  at  almost  every  possible  disad 
vantage.  .  .  .* 

Into  the  just-aroused  camps  thronged  the  rebel  regiments,  firing  sharp  vol 
leys  as  they  came,  and  springing  toward  our  laggards  with  the  bayonet.  Some 
were  shot  down  as  they  were  running,  without  weapons,  hatless,  coatless, 
toward  the  river.  The  searching  bullets  found  other  poor  unfortunates  in  their 
tents,  and  there,  all  unheeding  now,  they  still  slumbered,  while  the  unseen  foe 
rushed  on. 

At  the  first  alarm,  Sherman  sent  back  to  McClernand,  Hurlbut,  and 
W.  H.  L.Wallace,  for  help.  McClernand  hurried  three  Illinois  regiments 
— the  Eleventh,  Twentieth,  and  another — to  the  front,  which,  arriving 
just  as  Hildebrand  was  routed,  were  unable  long  to  withstand  the  vig 
orous  attack  of  Hindman's  brigades,  as  they  pushed  on  in  their  vic 
torious  career,  part  of  Shaver's  brigade  coming  to  Wood's  assistance, 
breaking  in  on  the  left  flank  of  the  Illinois  regiments.  Assailed,  beset, 
shivered,  these  gallant  Northwestern  troops  too  gave  way.  In  their 
demolition,  Waterhouse's  battery  fell  into  the  hands  of  Wood's  brigade. 
It  was  charged  and  taken  by  the  Sixteenth  Alabama  and  Twenty-seventh 
Tennessee.  Colonel  Williams,  of  the  Twenty-seventh  Tennessee,  was 
killed,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Brown  severely  wounded.  Major  Love 
was  killed  next  day,  so  that  this  regiment  lost  all  its  field-officers.  The 
Eighth  and  Ninth  Arkansas,  supporting,  also  suffered  heavily,  and  were, 
moreover,  fired  on  by  the  second  line  of  advancing  Confederates.  What 
was  left  of  Hindman's  command  then  joined  in  the  general  assault  on 
Sherman's  heavy  lines,  as  will  be  narrated  hereafter.  Colonel  Ransom, 
of  the  Eleventh  Illinois,  in  his  report,  says  of  the  three  Illinois  regi 
ments: 

The  enemy  were  immediately  in  front  of  us,  in  greatly  superior  numbers, 
advancing,  in  four  ranks  and  in  three  columns,  steadily  upon  us.  When  in  good 
range  we  opened  our  fire  upon  them,  which  was  responded  to  by  a  terrific  fire 
from  their  lines.  This  fire  was  kept  up  on  both  sides,  and  told  with  fearful 
effect  upon  my  line.  My  loss  here  in  ten  minutes  was  very  heavy. 

1  "  Rebellion  Record,"  vol.  iv.,  p.  388. 
39 


592  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

Among  the  wounded  were  the  colonel,  major,  two  captains,  and  two 
lieutenants,  of  the  Eleventh  Illinois.  They  rallied  on  the  line  which 
McClernand  had  formed. 

In  the  mean  time,  Wallace  had  sent  McArthur's  brigade  to  support 
Colonel  Stuart  on  the  extreme  left,  and  Wright's  Thirteenth  Missouri, 
450  strong,  to  Sherman's  aid  ;  and  Hurlbut  had  sent  him  Veatch's 
brigade.  McClernand  had  also  brought  up  Hare's  brigade  on  his  left, 
with  Raith's  next  to  it  on  the  left  of  Sherman's  line.  All  this  time, 
Sherman  had  been  maintaining  well  his  strong  position  on  the  right. 
With  these  reinforcements  interlocked  with  arid  lapping  over  his  left, 
and  with  six  batteries  belching  thunders  upon  the  Confederates,  Sher 
man  made  a  good  defense  that  morning.  To  whatever  other  criticism 
this  officer  may  be  amenable,  his  quickness  and  resource  shone  out 
conspicuously  on  this  trying  occasion.  Rapid  and  undismayed,  he 
rode  from  point  to  point,  carrying  encouragement  to  his  volunteers,  and 
holding  hard  to  the  vantage-ground  he  was  on. 

When  Hardee's  first  line  of  battle  was  formed,  it  chanced  to  be  at 
the  narrowest  part  of  the  peninsula  between  Owl  and  Lick  Creeks.  As 
it  advanced,  gaps  were  left  on  the  flanks.  Chalmers  occupied  that  on 
the  right,  near  Lick  Creek.  Cleburne,  on  the  extreme  left,  leading  his 
brigade  against  Sherman's  right,  found  such  an  interval  between  his 
left  and  Owl  Creek.  Nevertheless,  he  went  at  his  work,  sending  back 
to  Bragg  for  reinforcements.  Sherman's  strong  position  has  already 
been  described.  The  ravine  that  fronted  it  descended  rapidly  to  Owl 
Creek,  spreading  into  a  marsh  filled  with  undergrowth  and  tangled 
vines.  The  assailants  had  to  cross  this,  under  fire,  and  charge  up  a 
steep  acclivity ;  though  more  to  the  right  the  ground  was  less  difficult. 
Cleburne's  gallant  brigade,  supported  by  the  Second  Tennessee  drawn 
from  the  third  line,  attempted  to  take  the  heights  by  assault.  As  these 
bold  soldiers  struggled  across  the  narrow,  boggy  valley,  and  in  the 
jungle,  and  climbed  the  hill-side,  they  were  exposed  to  the  withering 
fire  of  Sherman's  division  and  its  supports,  lying  under  cover  of  the 
crest,  and  of  logs  and  trees  and  some  extemporized  defenses.  Many  a 
brave  man  died  there  disputing  that  ground. 

Hardee  thus  describes  the  operations  under  Cleburne : 

At  the  same  time,  Cleburne's  brigade,  with  the  Fifteenth  Arkansas  de 
ployed  as  skirmishers,  and  the  Second  Tennessee, l  en  echelon,  on  the  left,  moved 
quickly  through  the  fields,  and,  though  far  outflanked  by  the  enemy  on  our  left, 
rushed  forward  under  a  terrific  fire  from  the  serried  ranks  drawn  up  in  front  of 
the  camp.  A  morass  covered  his  front,  and,  being  difficult  to  pass,  caused  a 
break  in  this  brigade.  Deadly  volleys  were  poured  upon  the  men  from  behind 
bales  of  hay  and  other  defenses,  as  they  advanced ;  and,  after  a  series  of  desper- 

1  Of  B.  R.  Johnson's  brigade,  Folk's  corps. 


CLEBURNE  AGAINST   SHERMAN.  593 

ate  charges,  they  were  compelled  to  fall  back.  In  this  charge,  the  Sixth  Mis 
sissippi,  under  Colonel  Thornton,  lost  more  than  300  killed  and  wounded  out 
of  an  effective  force  of  425  men.  It  was  at  this  point  that  Colonel  (now 
Brigadier-General)  Bate  fell,  severely  wounded,  while  bravely  leading  his  regi 
ment.1 

Supported  by  the  arrival  of  the  second  line,  Cleburne,  with  the  remainder 
of  his  troops,  again  advanced,  and  entered  the  enemy's  encampment,  which  had 
been  forced  on  the  centre  and  right  by  the  dashing  charges  of  Gladden's, 
Wood's,  and  Hindman's  brigades. 

The  centre  of  the  morass  was  impassable,  and  the  brigade  split  into 
two  parts:  the  Fifth  Tennessee,  under  Colonel  Hill,  the  Twenty-fourth 
Tennessee,  under  Colonel  Peebles,  and  the  Second  Tennessee,  under 
Colonel  Bate,  passing  to  the  left ;  and  the  Sixth  Mississippi,  Colonel 
Thornton,  and  the  Twenty-third  Tennessee,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Neil, 
attacking  on  the  right,  with  the  Fifteenth  Arkansas,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Patton,  which  was  deployed  as  skirmishers,  and  fell  back  on  its  sup 
ports.  Never  was  there  a  more  gallant  attack  or  a  more  stubborn 
resistance.  Cleburne's  horse  bogged  down  and  threw  him,  so  that  he 
got  out  with  great  difficulty.  He  was  on  the  right,  and  Trigg's  battery 
tried  in  vain  there  to  maintain  its  fire  against  several  Federal  batteries 
opposing.  Under  the  terrible  fire  from  Sherman's  impregnable  line, 
the  Sixth  Mississippi  and  Twenty-third  Tennessee  suffered  a  quick  and 
bloody  repulse,  though  the  Sixth  Mississippi  made  charge  after  charge. 
Its  two  field-officers,  Colonel  Thornton  and  Major  Lowry,  were  both 
wounded.  The  impetuous  courage  and  tenacity  of  this  magnificent 
regiment  deserved  a  better  fate.  The  fighting  had  been  murderous  on 
the  left  also.  The  Fifteenth  Arkansas  had  lost  its  major,  J.  T.  Harris, 
and  many  good  men.  The  Twenty-fourth  Tennessee  had  borne  itself 
with  steady  valor,  and  the  Second  Tennessee  had  been  terribly  cut  up 
by  the  iron  storm  from  the  hill-top. 

Just  as  Cleburne's  line  first  went  forward  with  loud  cheers,  General 
Johnston  came  up  from  where  he  had  been  urging  Hindman's  attack. 
General  Preston  says: 

General  Johnston  then  passed  to  the  left  at  a  point  in  front  of  the  camps, 
near  two  cabins,  subsequently  used  as  a  hospital.  A  field  of  a  hundred  acres 
fringed  with  forest  extended  to  the  northeast.  Through  this  General  Cleburne's 
brigade  moved  in  beautiful  order,  and  with  loud  and  inspiring  cheers  in  the 
direction  of  the  advanced  camp.  Heavy  firing  was  heard  as  they  neared  it. 

Finding  all  apparently  going  well  in  that  quarter,  General  Johnston 
again  pursued  the  track  of  Hindman's  advance,  and  from  there  still 
farther  to  the  right.  He  did  not  know  the  hot  work  Cleburne  was  to 
have,  but  he  nevertheless  sent  to  General  Beauregard  for  two  brigades 

1  The  Second  Tennessee. 


594  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

to  be  moved  to  his  aid.  Beauregard  hearing,  however,  that  Sherman 
was  giving  way,  after  beginning  the  movement,  countermanded  it,  and 
moved  the  brigades  to  the  right.  General  Johnston  naturally  felt  a 
greater  security  as  to  Cleburne,  because  General  Beauregard  was  in 
this  part  of  the  field. 

Colonel  Drake,  describing  the  charge  of  the  Second  Tennessee  on 
the  extreme  left  of  Cleburne  and  the  army,  says : 

With  loud  cheers  it  rose  the  hill  and  advanced  on  the  level  a  short  distance. 
.  .  .  The  tire  there  encountered  was  the  worst  the  regiment  suffered  during  the 
war,  except  at  Kichmond,  Kentucky,  where  over  two-thirds  of  its  numbers  fell 
killed  and  wounded  in  less  than  ten  minutes.  The  enemy,  hidden  behind  logs 
and  trees,  delivered  three  volleys ;  when  the  Second  Tennessee  broke  and  re 
treated.  They  were  rallied  on  Bragg's  line  on  the  opposite  hill. 

Drake  continues : 

The  mortification  of  a  repulse  in  our  first  regular  engagement  was  extreme : 
some  wept,  some  cursed,  and  others  lamented  the  death  of  some  of  our  bravest 
officers  and  men,  and  not 'a  few  drifted  to  the  rear. 

The  major,  W.  R.  Doak,  and  Captains  Tyree  and  Bate,  and  two 
lieutenants,  were  killed  in  the  assault,  besides  four  more  officers  and 
and  nearly  a  hundred  men  wounded  out  of  365  men  on  the  field.  But 
the  regiment  reformed,  and  the  gallant  Bate  led  them  again  to  the 
charge.  As  he  was  crossing  the  creek  at  the  bottom  of  the  valley,  a 
Minie*-ball  crushed  his  leg-bone  and  wounded  his  horse.  He  pressed 
on  until  he  became  too  weak,  when  he  retired.  The  regiment,  discour 
aged,  fell  back  under  a  heavy  fire.  Some  of  the  men  ran  forward  to  the 
right  and  joined  the  Twenty-fourth  Tennessee,  which,  on  more  favor 
able  ground,  clung  to  the  advanced  position  it  had  won.  It,  too,  suf 
fered  heavily,  losing  over  200  in  killed  and  wounded. 

Pond's  brigade,  of  Bragg's  corps,  came  up  in  support,  but  did  not 
attempt  to  cross  this  valley  of  death.  The  Confederate  artillery  was 
said  not  to  have  been  brought  to  bear  with  sufficient  effect  here  ;  and, 
though  the  musketry-fire  was  kept  up,  no  impression  was  made.  The 
Comte  de  Paris  thinks  this  ought  to  have  been  the  chief  point  assailed 
by  the  Confederate  army  en  masse  ;  but,  as  it  was  the  strongest  point 
on  the  line  and  virtually  impregnable  to  a  direct  attack,  the  course 
pursued  of  turning  it  on  the  right  seems  incomparably  more  judicious. 
At  all  events,  being  then  near  that  point,  General  Beauregard  ordered 
to  the  right  the  two  brigades  sent  by  General  Johnston  to  Cleburne's 
aid;  and  he  acted  with  all  the  lights  before  him.  Cleburne's  right 
aided  in  this,  though  with  heavy  loss.  When  that  was  accomplished, 
the  position  was  no  longer  tenable. 

While  Sherman  was  standing  up  so  stubbornly,  McClernand,  on  his 


ROUT  OF  FRONT  LINE.  595 

left,  had  to  meet  the  shock  of  Hindman's  victorious  troops,  with  Polk 
on  their  left,  and  Jackson's  fresh  brigade  on  their  right.  Gladden's 
brigade,  which  had  suffered  severely  in  its  attack  on  Prentiss,  paused 
after  the  death  of  its  leader  to  gather  itself  up  for  another  contest,  and 
these  brigades  passed  to  its  front.  General  Johnston,  coming  upon 
Gladden's  brigade  at  this  time,  ordered  it  to  charge  ;  but,  when  he 
learned  that  it  had  just  lost  its  leader,  he  countermanded  the  order. 

General  Johnston  in  person  directed  the  movement  of  Jackson's 
brigade,  which  belonged  to  the  second  line,  and  was  now  brought  up. 
He  gave  Colonel  Wheeler,  of  the  Nineteenth  Alabama,  afterward  dis 
tinguished  as  a  cavalry-general,  his  orders  to  charge.  He  also  found 
here  the  Second  Texas,  in  which  were  many  of  his  friends.  He  threw 
it  against  the  enemy,  and  it  executed  its  difficult  task  with  great  dash 
and  persistence,  under  his  eye. 

Major  Haydon  makes  this  note  : 

As  soon  as  General  Johnston  discovered  we  were  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy, 
he  ordered  a  Texas  regiment  to  charge  the  camp  on  the  opposite  side  of  the 
hollow.  In  descending  the  hollow  the  nature  of  the  ground  somewhat  disor 
dered  their  lines,  but  they  again  formed  at  the  base  of  the  hill,  and  routed  the 
camp  in  fine  style.  I  was  then  sent  for  General  Chalmers,  who  received  orders 
to  push  up  the  road  and  sweep  down  the  river,  to  where  we  heard  a  heavy  firing, 
supported  by  Wirt  Adams's  regiment. 

While  Jackson's  brigade  was  attacking  McClernand's  left  flank,  and 
Hindman  his  right,  Anderson's  brigade  had  got  in  on  Hindman's  left, 
and  Gibson's  brigade  was  trailing  at  his  heels,  adding  to  the  momentum 
of  the  column.  Indeed,  Bragg's  whole  corps  was  now  virtually  with 
the  front  line,  though  not  yet  all  actually  engaged.  The  contest  with 
McClernand  and  Sherman  now  grew  strenuous  and  deadly ;  but  so  im 
petuous  and  resolute  was  the  attack,  that  Hare's  and  Raith's  brigades, 
'sorely  pressed  in  front  and  oh  the  left  flank,  gave  way,  and  fell  back 
fighting  confusedly,  until  they  found  safety  in  Hurlbut's  and  Wallace's 
lines.  Captain  Behr  was  shot  from  his  horse,  and  his  battery  taken  at 
the  point  of  the  bayonet,  his  gunners  barely  escaping. 

Prentiss's  division  and  Sherman's  left  were  gone  ;  and  the  Confed 
erates  were  crowding  in  where  they  had  stood.  While  McClernand's 
command  was  caving  in  under  the  stunning  blows  delivered  against  it, 
Polk  led  Russell's  and  B.  R.  Johnson's  brigades  upon  Sherman's  flank. 
As  Folk's  corps  was  advancing,  Cheatham  was  detached,  and  now 
General  A.  S.  Johnston  himSelf  led  A.  P.  Stewart's  brigade  farther  to 
the  right,  and  put  it  into  the  fight.  Stewart,  then  acting  under  Bragg's 
orders,  advanced  the  Fourth  Tennessee  to  take  a  battery.  Stewart 
asked  the  gallant  Lieutenant-Colonel  Strahl  if  they  could  take  it.  "  We 
can  try,"  answered  Strahl,  and  led  the  Fourth  Tennessee  to  the  charge 


596  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

at  a  double-quick.  Giving  one  round  at  thirty  paces,  they  rushed  on 
with  a  yell,  and  took  the  battery,  driving  off  the  supports.  But  they 
lost  31  men  killed  and  160  wounded  in  this  charge.  The  Twelfth  Ten 
nessee,  Lieutenant-Colonel  T.  H.  Bell  commanding,  coming  up,  they 
were  able  to  repulse  a  resolute  counter-charge. 

In  the  mean  time  Clark,  who  was  with  Russell's  brigade,  received  an 
order  from  Bragg  to  take  an  enfilading  battery  to  his  left.  He  at  once 
led  forward  Marks's  Eleventh  Louisiana  at  a  double-quick.  The  assault 
was  gallantly  made,  but  was  repulsed  with  severe  loss  from  shot  and 
canister  and  the  musketry-fire  of  a  heavy  infantry  support.  Clark  and 
Russell  then  led  forward  the  whole  brigade,  which  charged  at  a  double- 
quick,  and  helped  to  drive  the  enemy  some  five  hundred  yards,  when 
pursuit  was  checked  by  the  supports,  and  Clark  fell,  severely  wounded 
in  the  shoulder.  This  was  part  of  the  simultaneous  advance  which 
drove  Sherman  from  his  first  position,  and  in  which  Cleburne's,  B.  R. 
Johnson's,  and  Stewart's  brigades  joined.  B.  R.  Johnson's  brigade 
moved  to  the  left  of  Russell's  on  the  main  road  ;  his  right  wing  aiding 
in  this  attack,  his  left  helping  Cleburne  to  get  in.  They  fought  well  ; 
Folk's  battery,  pushed  to  the  front,  was  nearly  disabled,  and  its  com 
mander  wounded;  Johnson  was  himself  finally  wounded.  Preston  Smith 
then  took  command  of  the  brigade.  His  regiment,  the  One  Hundred 
and  Fifty-fourth  Senior  Tennessee,  and  Blythe's  Mississippi,  had  already 
captured  six  guns. 

The  whole  Federal  front,  which  had  been  broken  here  and  there, 
and  was  getting  ragged,  gave  way  under  this  hammering  process  on 
front  and  flank,  and  fell  back  across  a  ravine  to  another  strong  position 
behind  the  Hamburg  and  Purdy  road  in  rear  of  Shiloh.  But  they  were 
not  allowed  to  get  away  -unmolested.  The  blood  of  their  assailants  was 
up,  and  they  were  pursued,  driven,  and  slaughtered,  as  they  fell  back. 
Sherman's  route  of  retreat  was  marked  by  the  thick-strewn  corpses  of 
his  soldiers. 

Sherman  was  not  allowed  to  remain  in  his  new  position.  Polk  at 
tacked  him  with  his  two  brigades,  which  were  soon  warmly  engaged. 
Polk,  summing  up  his  work,  says,  "The  resistance  at  this  point  was  as 
stubborn  as  at  any  other  point  on  the  field."  The  Federals  "  fought 
with  determined  courage,  and  contested  every  inch  of  ground."  The 
division  commander,  Brigadier-General  Clark,  and  Brigadier-General 
B.  R.  Johnson,  were  severely  wounded.  The  gallant  Colonel  Blythe,  of 
Mississippi,  was  shot  through  the  heart,  charging  a  battery.  The  loss 
was  severe.  But  the  enemy  was  dislodged*  and  two  batteries  captured. 

In  these  attacks  Anderson's  and  Pond's  brigades  joined  with  great 
vigor  and  severe  loss,  but  with  unequal  fortune.  The  former  blazoned 
its  blood-stained  record  with  one  success  after  another  ;  the  latter  suf 
fered  a  series  of  disasters.  The  blue  uniforms  of  some  of  the  regiments 


SHERMAN  DRIVEN  BACK.  597 

twice  caused  other  Confederates  to  fire  upon  them,  with  serious  effect ; 
and  the  commander  complained  that  one  of  Beauregard's  staff,  acting 
in  Hardee's  name,  put  the  brigade  into  action  in  such  a  way  as  to  sub 
ject  it  to  a  raking  fire  and  unnecessary  loss.  Doubtless,  however,  it 
contributed  its  full  share  to  the  general  result.  Sherman,  beaten  and 
driven,  had  to  go  back  again,  with  McDowell's  and  Veatch's  brigades 
crushed  to  pieces,  and  to  be  heard  of  no  more  in  the  battle.  But  Sher 
man  did  not  finally  give  way  until  General  Johnston's  movement  had 
crushed  in  and  routed  the  whole  front  line  on  the  Federal  left  and  was 
pressing  back  Hurlbut  and  Stuart. 

While  these  furious  combats,  succeeding  each  other  like  well-deliv 
ered  blows  from  the  iron  flail  of  war,  were  raging  along  the  whole  line, 
General  Johnston  was  carrying  forward  the  movement  by  which  his 
entire  right  wing  was  swung  around  on  the  centre,  Hindman's  brigade, 
as  a  pivot,  so  that  every  command  of  the  Federals  was  taken  succes 
sively,  in  front  and  flank,  and  a  crumbling  process  ensued  by  which  the 
whole  line  went  to  pieces. 

At  last,  pressed  back  toward  both  Owl  Creek  and  the  River,  these 
broken  commands  found  safety  by  the  interposition  on  their  left  flank 
of  W.  H.  L.  Wallace's  fresh  division,  ready  to  meet  the  thronging  bat 
talions  of  the  South. 

Colonel  Drake,  who  was  in  the  pursuit  over  this  hotly-contested 
field  with  one  of  Cleburne's  Tennessee  Regiments,  says  : 

The  enemy's  dead  began  to  appear  in  considerable  numbers  on  the  parade- 
ground,  in  rear  of  General  Sherman's  headquarters,  called  by  him  u  Shiloh 
Chapel."  .  .  .  From  this  point  on,  the  enemy's  dead  lay  thick,  and  numbers  seem 
to  have  fallen  in  retreat. 

He  picked  up  General  Sherman's  order-book,  which  he  afterward 
deposited  with  General  Cleburne.  He  says  it  contained  no  intimation 
of  the  Confederate  approach. 

General  Preston  gives  the  following  account  of  the  movements  on 
the  Confederate  right  : 

General  Hardee  reported  his  men  still  advancing  at  this  camp  about  nine 
o'clock,  and  conferred  with  General  Johnston,  who  was  reconnoitring  a  second 
line  of  camps  near  the  river,  where  the  enemy  were  posted  in  force.  They  then 
commenced  shelling  the  first  camp,  apparently  attracted  by  the  presence  of  the 
staff  and  escort,  the  distance  being,  I  should  think,  six  or  eight  hundred  yards, 
and  shells  from  the  gunboats  of  large  size  were  thrown.  General  Johnston  re 
ceived  a  report  and  rough  draft  at  this  time  from  Captain  Lockett,  stating  that 
the  enemy  were  strongly  posted  on  the  left  in  front  of  our  right.  Heavy  mus 
ketry-firing  and  cannonades  indicated  that  Bragg  and  Hardee  were  successfully 
advancing  on  our  left.  General  Johnston  rode  down  the  hill  to  escape  the  shell?, 
and  his  escort  back  toward  the  woods.  This  was  about  half -past  nine.  After 
pondering  a  little  while,  he  determined  to  bring  forward  Breckinridge's  reserve, 
and,  feeling  his  way  to  the  river,  to  turn  the  enemy's  left. 


598  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

The  Hon.  Jacob  Thompson  says,  in  a  letter  to  the  writer : 

Sunday,  6th  of  April,  between  eight  and  nine  o'clock,  General  Beauregard 
directed  me  to  seek  General  Johnston,  who  was  in  the  front,  learn  from  him  the 
condition  of  things  there,  and  know  of  him  what  order  he  had  to  give  as  to  the 
disposition  of  the  reserves  commanded  by  General  Breckinridge.  I  did  so,  and 
rode  with  speed  to  the  front,  where  I  found  General  Johnston  just  as  the  enemy 
was  making  his  last  stand  at  the  Gin -house1  before  retreating  beyond  their 
camps.  The  battle  was  then  raging  furiously.  General  Johnston  was  sitting  on 
his  horse  where  the  bullets  were  flying  like  hail-stones.  I  galloped  up  to  him 
amid  the  fire,  and  found  him  cool,  collected,  self-possessed,  but  still  animated 
and  in  fine  spirits. 

After  making  known  my  errand,  he  said  to  me :  "  Say  to  General  Beauregard, 
we  are  sweeping  the  field  before  us,  and  in  less  than  half  an  hour  we  shall  be  in 
possession  of  their  camps,  and  I  think  we  shall  press  them  to  the  river.  Say, 
also,  I  have  just  learned  from  a  scout,  or  messenger,  that  the  enemy  is  moving 
up  in  force  on  our  left,  and  that  General  Breckinridge  had  better  move  to  our 
left  to  meet  him."  I  turned  my  horse  to  leave,  but  he  called  me  back,  and  said : 
"  Do  not  say  to  General  Beauregard  that  this  is  an  order,  but  he  must  act  on 
what  additional  information  he  may  receive.  The  reports  to  him  are  more  to 
be  relied  on  than  to  me."  When  I  returned,  General  Breckinridge,  with  his 
troops,  was  started  to  our  left,  but  soon  it  was  seen  that  the  pressure  was  upon 
our  right,  and  his  direction  was  immediately  changed,  and  it  was  fortunate  that 
it  was  so  ordered. 

The  movement  to  which  Mr.  Thompson  refers  was  most  probably  that 
in  which  Trabue's  brigade  was  detached  to  the  left,  and  the  remainder 
of  the  brigade  was  finally  moved  to  the  support  of  the  extreme  right. 

General  Johnston  had  pushed  Chalmers  to  the  right  and  front,  with 
Clanton's  cavalry  on  his  right  flank,  and  thus  they  swept  down  the  left 
bank  of  Lick  Creek,  driving  in  pickets,  until  they  encountered  Stuart's 
brigade  on  the  Pittsburg  and  Hamburg  road,  supported  by  McArthur's 
brigade.  Stuart  was  strongly  posted  on  a  steep  hill  near  the  river,  cov 
ered  with  thick  undergrowth,  and  with  an  open  field  in  front.  Me  Arthur 
was  to  his  right  and  rear  in  the  woods.  Jackson  attacked  McArthur, 
who  fell  back ;  and  Chalmers  went  at  Stuart's  brigade.  This  command 
reserved  its  fire  until  Chalmers's  men  were  within  forty  yards,  and  then 
delivered  a  heavy  and  destructive  volley  ;  but,  after  a  hard  fight,  they 
were  driven  back  down  the  river.  Chalmers's  right  now  rested  on  the 
Tennessee  River  bottom-lands,  and  he  fought  down  the  bank  toward 
Pittsburg  Landing.  The  enemy's  left  was  completely  turned,  and  the 
Federal  army  was  now  crowded  on  a  shorter  line,  a  mile  or  more  to  the 
rear  of  its  first  position.  The  new  line  of  battle  was  established  before 
ten  o'clock.  Thus  far  all  had  been  successful ;  and,  although  there  was 
at  no  time  an  absolute  cessation  of  fighting  on  the  line,  it  may  be  con 
sidered  that  the  first  engagement  of  the  day  had  ended. 

1  A  cotton-gin  house. 


FEDERAL  RIGHT  TURNED.  599 

The  orders  of  the  3d  of  April  were  that  "  every  effort  should  be  made 
to  turn  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy,  so  as  to  cut  off  his  line  of  retreat  to 
the  Tennessee  River,  and  throw  him  back  on  Owl  Creek,  where  he  will 
be  obliged  to  surrender."  It  is  seen  that  from  the  first  they  were  car 
ried  out  in  letter  and  spirit,  and  as  long  as  General  Johnston  lived  the 
success  of  this  movement  was  complete. 

The  Comte  de  Paris,  following  American  writers,  both  Northern  and 
Southern,  and  their  incorrect  topographical  descriptions,  adopts  the 
view  that  General  Johnston  should  have  massed  his  army  on  the  Fed 
eral  right,  turned  that  flank,  and  driven  it  up  the  river  into  the  angle 
between  Lick  Creek  and  the  Tennessee.  Though  somewhat  deficient  in 
positive  topographical  knowledge  as  to  the  field,  since  he  had  no  sur 
veys,  yet  he  had  good  descriptions  from  Major  B.  B.  Waddell  and 
others  ;  and  he  formed  his  plan  of  battle  either  on  such  information, 
which  he  deemed  sufficient,  or  guided  by  those  correct  military  intu 
itions  which  are  the  surest  proofs  of  a  genius  for  war.  Yet  that  Gen 
eral  Johnston  was  able  to  modify  his  strongly-preconceived  ideas,  if 
necessary,  is  seen  in  the  discretion  accorded  to  Beauregard  as  to  the 
reserves  under  Breckinridge.  Nevertheless,  the  battle  was  fought  pre 
cisely  as  it  was  planned.  The  instructions  delivered  to  his  subordinates 
on  the  previous  day  were  found  sufficient  for  their  conduct  on  the  bat 
tle-field.  General  Chalmers  says  he  received  only  one  order  on  Sunday, 
and  that  was  from  General  Johnston,  and  that  he  acted  solely  on  his 
previous  orders.  General  Johnston  in  person  put  Stewart's,  Jackson's, 
Bowen's,  and  Statham's  brigades  into  the  fight,  leading  them  to  the 
right.  The  Federal  left  afforded  the  best  grounds  for  attack.  The  lav 
of  the  land  favored  both  the  celerity  and  the  success  of  the  movement 
by  the  Confederate  right.  It  pressed  its  advantage,  and  turned  the 
Federal  left  flank  with  comparative  ease,  while  it  is  by  no  means  certain 
that  the  right  next  Owl  Creek  could  have  been  carried  at  all  by  direct 
attack.  Sherman's  camp  was  a  stronghold,  yet  in  no  sense  was  it  the 
key  to  the  Federal  position.  But  it  was  easily  turned  on  its  left,  as 
was  proved.  The  point  of  least  resistance  proved,  as  anticipated,  to  be 
on  the  Federal  left ;  General  Johnston  pressed  it,  broke  in  on  that 
flank,  and  piled  his  reserves  there,  till  it  gave  way  everywhere.  It  was 
this  ability  to  see  the  vital  point  instantly,  and  at  the  exact  moment 
to  strike  it  a  mortal  blow,  that  so  impressed  his  officers  at  Shiloh. 


II.— MID-DAY. 

When  the  battle  first  began,  Hurlbut  and  W.  H.  L.  Wallace  had  been 
apprised,  and  had  sent  forward  reinforcements,  as  mentioned.  They 
advanced  about  eight  o'clock,  so  that  Prentiss,  when  he  was  driven 


600 


BATTLE  OF  SHILOII. 


Second  Position  (Noon),  April  6th. 


BATTLE  OF 

S  H  I L,  O  H' 

Part  IL 


2<1.  Position    (Noon)    6th.  April 
Con/edcrate  —  —  —  —  — 


back,  took  refuge  between  them.  McClernand's  defense,  arresting  the 
Confederate  advance  on  the  centre  for  some  time,  by  half-past  nine  or 
ten  o'clock  a  new  and  very  strong  line  of  battle  was  formed,  and  ready 
to  receive  the  approaching  Southerners.  Stuart's  brigade  held  the  left, 
resting  on  the  river.  Supporting  Stuart,  came  up  from  Wallace  the 
Ninth  and  Twelfth  Illinois,  of  McArthur's  brigade,  but  they  were 
routed  by  10J  A.  M.,  with  a  loss  of  250  killed  and  wounded.  Then  came 
Hurlbut,  with  Williams's  and  Lauman's  fresh  and  veteran  brigades  and 
three  batteries.  On  his  right,  Prentiss's  division  had  rallied,  reenforced 


THE  SECOND  ENGAGEMENT.  601 

by  the  Twenty-third  Missouri  Regiment,  just  landed,  and  the  Eighth 
Iowa.  The  remainder  of  McArthur's  brigade  was  also  in  this  part  of 
the  field — but  probably  farther  to  the  right.  Wallace  had  brought  up 
Tuttle's  brigade,  of  four  veteran  regiments,  on  his  left,  and  Sweeney's 
brigade  next,  of  three  regiments.  Then,  to  the  right  of  Wallace,  were 
McClernand's  and  Sherman's  confused  but  unsubdued  commands,  which 
rallied  and  reformed  as  they  reached  their  supports.  The  second  line 
formed  by  the  Federals  was  shorter,  stronger,  compacter,  and  more  con 
tinuous,  than  the  first.  It  had  seized  a  line  of  wooded  heights,  ap 
proached  only  across  ravines  and  difficult  ground,  and  in  this  formidable 
position  awaited  the  Confederate  attack.  Their  line  was  torn,  man 
gled,  and  in  parts  utterly  routed  ;  but,  among  the  fresh  troops  and  those 
who  stood  to  their  colors,  there  was  an  obdurate  spirit  of  defiance  that 
held  hard  to  every  point  of  timber  and  broken  ground. 

As  the  first  engagement  was  closing  on  the  Confederate  left,  about 
ten  o'clock,  in  desultory  combats  with  the  retreating  enemy,  a  second 
engagement  began  on  the  centre  and  right  with  extreme  violence.  All 
the  troops  of  both  armies,  except  two  of  Breckinridge's  brigades,  were 
now  in  the  front  line.  As  the  Southern  army  swung  round  to  the  left, 
by  the  more  rapid  advance  of  the  right  wing,  it  broke  into  gaps  between 
the  brigades,  which  were  promptly  occupied  by  the  troops  of  the  second 
and  third  lines. 

General  Polk  says  in  his  report : 

The  first  order  received  by  me  was  from  General  Johnston,  who  had  ridden 
to  the  front  to  watch  the  opening  operations,  and  who,  as  commander-in-chief, 
seemed  deeply  impressed  with  the  responsibilities  of  his  position.  It  was  ob 
served  that  he  entered  upon  his  work  with  the  ardor  and  energy  of  a  true  sol 
dier  ;  and  the  vigor  with  which  he  pressed  forward  his  troops  gave  assurance 
that  his  persistent  determination  would  close  the  day  with  a  glorious  victory. 

General  Johnston  asked  Polk  for  a  brigade,  and,  receiving  Stewart's, 
led  it  in  person  and  put  it  in  position  on  Hindman's  right.  Polk  sent 
General  Cheatham  with  his  second  brigade,  under  Colonel  William  H. 
Stephens,  to  the  left ;  but  it  was  soon  after  ordered  by  Beauregard  to 
the  right.  Polk  himself  advanced  with  Johnson's,  Russell's,  and 
Trabue's  brigades  down  the  main  road  toward  Pittsburg.  He  thus  had 
the  left  centre,  with  Pond's  and  Cleburne's  brigades  on  his  left,  and 
Stewart's  to  his  right,  acting  under  Bragg's  orders.  Patton  Anderson 
adjoined  Stewart  on  the  right,  and  Gibson  came  next,  fighting  in  con 
cert  with  Hindman's  two  brigades  ;  a  little  later  Cheatham  brought  in 
Stephens's  brigade  to  Gibson's  right;  the  next  was  Gladden's,  and  then 
Jackson's  brigade.  When  Breckinridge's  two  brigades  came  up,  under 
Bowen  and  Statham,  they  occupied  the  ground  between  Jackson's  and 
Chalmers's,  which  was  on  the  extreme  right.  But  in  the  rushing  for- 


602  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 

ward  of  regiments  to  fill  the  gaps  in  the  front  line  or  to  replace  others 
that  hesitated  or  came  limping  out  of  the  fight  crippled  and  disheart 
ened,  the  brigade  organization  was  much  broken,  and,  to  some  extent, 
lost.  Battles,  especially  of  raw  troops,  do  not  present  many  of  the 
features  of  a  parade.  At  Shiloh  there  was  much  dislocation  of  com 
mands,  but  there  was  little  loss  of  effective  force.  There  was  no  fancy- 
manoeuvring  ;  but  command  after  command  of  desperate  men  was  hurled 
with  overwhelming  power  and  success  against  strongholds  that  looked 
impregnable.  Everybody  seems  to  have  assumed  authority  to  command 
a  junior  officer,  whether  a  subordinate  or  not ;  and  as  the  order  was 
"  Help  me ! "  or  "Forward  ! "  it  was  almost  always  obeyed  with  alacrity. 
A  common  enthusiasm  fired  all  hearts ;  a  common  impulse  moved  officers 
and  men  alike.  There  was  not  much  etiquette,  but  there  was  terrible 
fighting  at  Shiloh. 

Grant  spent  Saturday  night  at  Savannah.  His  purpose  was  to  meet 
and  confer  with  Buell.  But  the  sound  of  hostile  cannon  hurried  his 
breakfast ;  and  he  went  on  board  a  transport,  leaving  a  note  for  Buell,1 
and  an  order  for  Nelson  to  march  to  the  river  opposite  Pittsburg. 
Grant  sent  this  order  to  Nelson.2 

Grant  stopped  at  Crump's  Landing,  to  order  Lew  Wallace  to  hold 
himself  in  readiness  to  march  on  Pittsburg  or  defend  himself,  according 
to  circumstances.  He  subsequently  condemned  Wallace  for  not  coming 
up  until  night,  but  it  does  not  appear  that  he  conveyed  him  any  orders 
to  that  effect.  Wallace  took  the  direct  road  to  Shiloh  ;  but,  learning 
that  Sherman  had  lost  the  Owl  Creek  crossing,  he  retraced  his  steps  to 
Crump's  Landing,  and  advanced  by  the  river  road  toward  the  Snake 
Creek  crossing. 

Grant  says  he  himself  got  to  Pittsburg  Landing  about  eight  o'clock, 
and  was  with  Sherman  about  ten  o'clock.  Sherman  was  then  in  the 
confusion  of  defeat.  Commending  his  stubborn  defense,  Grant  betook 
himself  to  rallying  the  fugitives  who  were  streaming  to  the  rear.  Grant 
seems  to  have  been  somewhat  stunned  by  the  shock ;  his  subordinates 
make  little  mention  of  his  presence  on  the  field,  and  Buell  found  him 
soon  after  mid-day  on  a  steamboat  with  his  staff.  But  he  seems  to 
have  retained  the  stolid  resolution  that  distinguishes  him.  If  he  showed 
little  activity,  it  is  certain  that  he  had  no  thought  of  yielding. 

During  the  morning  Grant  ordered  General  Wood,  one  of  Buell's 

1  Badeau,  in  his  "  Life  of  Grant,"  vol.  i.,  p.  75,  gives  this  note  thus :   "  Heavy  firing  is 
heard  up  the  river,  indicating  plainly  that  an  attack  has  been  made  upon  our  most  ad- 
vanced  positions.     I  have  been  looking  for  this,  but  did  not  believe  the  attack  would  be 
made  before  Monday  or  Tuesday.     This  necessitates  my  joining  my  forces  up  the  river, 
instead  of  meeting  you  to-day  as  I  had  contemplated.     I  have  directed  General  Nelson  to 
move  to  the  river  with  his  division.     He  can  march  to  opposite  Pittsburg." 

2  Badeau's  "  Life  of  Grant,"  vol.  i.,  p.  75. 


GRANT  AND  BUELL.  603 

division  commanders,  to  hasten  to  Pittsburg,  and  later  sent  the  follow 
ing  significant  dispatch : 

COMMANDING  OFFICER,  Advance  Forces,  Buell's  Army,  near  Pittsburg : 

The  attack  on  my  forces  has  been  very  spirited  from  early  this  morning. 
The  appearance  of  fresh  troops  in  the  field  now  would  have  a  powerful  effect, 
both  by  inspiring  our  men  and  disheartening  the  enemy.  If  you  will  get  upon 
the  field,  leaving  all  your  baggage  on  the  east  bank  of  the  river,  it  will  be  more 
to  our  advantage  and  possibly  save  the  day  to  us.  The  rebel  forces  are  estimated 
at  over  one  hundred  thousand  men.  My  headquarters  will  be  in  the  log-building 
on  the  top  of  the  hill,  where  you  will  be  furnished  with  a  staff  officer  to  conduct 
you  to  your  place  on  the  field. 

General  Buell  had  arrived  at  Savannah  on  Saturday  evening,  the 
5th,  having  telegraphed  General  Grant  to  meet  him  there.  This  Grant 
failed  to  do,  intending  to  see  him  next  day.  On  Sunday  morning,  no 
tified  by  the  cannonade  of  hot  work  in  front,  Buell  went  to  Grant's 
quarters  to  concert  measures  for  bringing  up  the  troops,  but  Grant  had 
just  gone.  Without  advices,  and  in  some  perplexity,  he  remained  until 
the  distant  din  of  arms  made  it  manifest  that  a  pitched  battle  was  in 
progress.  He  then  ordered  his  divisions  to  push  forward  by  forced 
marches,  while  he  himself  hastened  to  Pittsburg,  where  he  found  Grant 
between  noon  and  one  o'clock. 

While  these  generals  were  in  conference  on  the  boat,  the  division 
commanders  were  engaged  in  one  of  the  most  terrible  conflicts  of  the 
war.  It  is  difficult  to  give  clearly  the  details  of  this  gigantic  contest.  It 
commenced  about  the  middle  of  the  right  wing,  and  soon  raged  along 
the  whole  line,  lasting,  with  a  short  intermission,  for  six  hours.  It 
began  a  mile  from  Pittsburg.  When  it  ended,  the  landing  was  barely 
covered  by  one  flank  ;  the  other  was  crowded  about  the  crossing  of 
Snake  Creek. 

The  battle  was  renewed  by  Gladden's  gallant  brigade,  now  com 
manded  by  Colonel  Daniel  W.  Adams.  Adams  took  it  in  with  his 
usual  mettle.  There  was  a  fierce  wrestle ;  but  it  was  the  beating  of 
the  wave  against  the  rock.  The  Confederates  wilted  under  the  scath 
ing  sheet  of  flame,  faltered,  and  fell  back.  Jackson,  too,  was  hammer 
ing  upon  this  part  of  the  line  ;  and  Chalmers,  joining  in  the  onset, 
turned  their  flank.  At  this  critical  moment,  Adams  seized  the  colors 
of  the  First  Louisiana,  and  led  his  men  in  a  desperate  and  successful 
charge.  The  enemy,  whose  flank  had  been  turned  farther  to  their  left, 
fell  back,  but  in  good  order.  Adams,  according  to  his  wont,  was 
wounded ;  and  Colonel  Deas  took  command  of  the  brigade. 

And  now  both  armies  were  in  the  tumult  of  mortal  endeavor.  The 
Confederate  assaults  were  made  by  rapid  and  often  unconnected 
charges  along  the  line.  They  were  repeatedly  checked,  and  often  re 
pulsed,  by  the  stubborn  resistance  of  the  assailed.  Sometimes  counter- 


604:  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 

charges  drove  them  back  for  short  distances ;  but,  whether  in  assault  or 
recoil,  both  sides  saw  their  bravest  soldiers  fall  in  frightful  numbers. 
Over  the  blue-clad  lines  of  the  Federal  troops  floated  the  "  Stars  and 
Stripes,"  endeared  to  them  by  the  traditions  of  three-quarters  of  a  cen 
tury.  The  Confederates  came  on  in  motley  garb,  varying  from  the  fa 
vorite  gray  and  domestic  "  butternut "  to  the  blue  of  certain  Louisiana 
regiments,  which  paid  so  dearly  the  penalty  of  doubtful  colors.  Over 
them  were  flags  and  pennons  as  various  as  their  uniforms.  Each  Con 
federate  regiment  had  a  corps  battle-flag.  That  of  Folk's  corps  was  a 
white  cross  on  a  blue  field  ;  of  Bragg's,  a  blue  cross  on  a  red  field ;  of 
Hardee's,  a  white  medallion  on  a  blue  field.  Besides  these,  or  in  lieu 
of  them,  many  of  the  regiments  bore  their  State  flags ;  and  the  "  Lone 
Star  "  of  Texas  and  the  "  Pelican  flag  "  of  Louisiana  are  mentioned  as 
conspicuous  among  the  emblems  of  the  advancing  host.  On  they  came, 
their  banners  brightly  glinting  through  the  pale  green  of  the  foliage, 
but  soon  to  be  riddled,  and  torn,  and  stained  with  the  blood  of  the 
color-bearers.  At  each  charge  there  went  up  a  wild,  appalling  yell, 
heard  high  above  the  roar  of  artillery ;  only,  the  Kentuckians,  advan 
cing  with  measured  step,  poured  out  in  martial  chorus  the  deep,  full 
notes  of  their  war-song  :  "  Cheer,  boys,  cheer  ;  we'll  march  away  to 
battle." 

Polk  and  Bragg,  meeting  about  half -past  ten  o'clock,  agreed  that 
Polk  should  direct  the  left  centre,  where  part  of  his  corps  was  grouped, 
and  that  Bragg  should  take  command  to  his  right.  Bragg  says : 

Here  we  met  the  most  obstinate  resistance  of  the  day,  the  enemy  being 
strongly  posted  with  infantry  and  artillery  on  an  eminence  behind  a  dense 
thicket.  Hind  man's  command  was  gallantly  led  to  the  attack,  but  recoiled 
under  a  murderous  fire. 

Hindman  himself  was  severely  wounded  by  the  explosion  of  a  shell, 
and  borne  from  the  field.  A.  P.  Stewart  then  took  command  of  Hind- 
man's  brigade,  with  his  own. 

This  position  of  the  Federals  was  occupied  by  Wallace's  division, 
and  perhaps  by  the  remains  of  Prentiss's  and  other  commands.  Here, 
behind  a  dense  thicket  on  the  crest  of  a  hill,  was  posted  a  strong  force 
of  as  hardy  troops  as  ever  fought,  almost  perfectly  protected  by  the 
conformation  of  the  ground,  and  by  logs  and  other  rude  and  hastily- 
prepared  defenses.  To  assail  it  an  open  field  had  to  be  passed,  enfiladed 
by  the  fire  of  its  batteries.  It  was  nicknamed  by  the  Confederates,  by 
a  very  mild  metaphor,  "The  Hornets'  Nest."  No  figure  of  speech 
would  be  too  strong  to  express  the  deadly  peril  of  assault  upon  this 
natural  fortress,  whose  inaccessible  barriers  blazed  for  six  hours  with 
sheets  of  flame,  and  whose  infernal  gates  poured  forth  a  murderous 
storm  of  shot  and  shell  and  musket-fire  which  no  living  thing  could 


"THE  HORNETS'   XEST."  605 

quell  or  even  withstand.  Brigade  after  brigade  was  led  against  it.  But 
valor  was  of  no  avail.  Hindman's  brilliant  brigades,  which  had  swept 
everything  before  them  from  the  field,  were  shivered  into  fragments  in 
the  shock  of  the  assault,  and  paralyzed  for  the  remainder  of  the  day. 
A.  P.  Stewart's  regiments  made  fruitless  assaults,  but  only  to  retire 
mangled  and  disheartened. 

Bragg  now  ordered  up  Gibson's  splendid  brigade,  composed  of  the 
First  Arkansas,  Fourth,  Thirteenth,  and  Nineteenth  Louisiana,  which 
moved  forward  with  alacrity.  Gibson  himself,  a  knightly  soldier,  as 
gentle  and  courteous  as  he  was  unflinching,  was  aided  by  colonels 
three  of  whom  afterward  became  generals.  The  brigade  made  a  gallant 
charge,  but,  like  the  others,  recoiled  from  the  fire  it  encountered.  A 
blaze  of  musketry  swept  through  it  from  front  and  flank;  powerful 
batteries  also  opening  upon  its  left.  Under  this  cross-fire  it  at  last  fell 
back  with  very  heavy  loss.  Allen's  Fourth  Louisiana  was  dreadfully 
cut  up  in  this  charge,  and  suffered  some  confusion  from  a  misappre 
hension  that  it  was  fired  upon  by  friends.  Gibson  asked  for  artillery  to 
be  sent  him ;  but  it  was  not  at  hand,  and  Bragg  sent  orders  to  charge 
again.  The  colonels  thought  it  hopeless ;  but  Gibson  led  them  again 
to  the  attack,  and  they  again  suffered  a  bloody  repulse. 

Gibson,  who,  assisted  by  Allen  and  Avegno,  had  been  leading  the 
Fourth  and  Thirteenth  Louisiana  in  the  first  two  assaults,  learning  from 
the  adjutant  of  Fagan  that  the  regiments  on  the  right  had  suffered 
equal  disaster,  turned  over  the  command  of  his  left  wing  to  Colonel 
Allen,  with  directions  to  execute  the  orders  received  from  General 
Bragg.  He  then  proceeded  to  the  right,  and  helped  Fagan  to  lead  the 
magnificent  First  Arkansas  again  to  the  assault. 

"  Four  times  the  position  was  charged  ;  four  times  the  assault 
proved  unavailing."  The  brigade  was  repulsed;  but  maintained  its 
ground  steadily,  until  Wallace's  position  was  turned,  when,  again  re 
newing  its  forward  movement  in  conjunction  with  Cheatham's  com 
mand,  it  helped  to  drive  back  its  stout  opponents.  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Thompson,  of  the  First  Arkansas,  fell  pierced  with  seven  balls.  Two 
of  its  captains  were  killed;  the  major,  a  captain,  and  many  officers, 
wounded.  In  the  Fourth  Louisiana,  Colonel  Allen  was  wounded,  and 
three  captains  and  three  lieutenants  killed  or  wounded.  Gibson's  en 
tire  staff  was  disabled,  and  his  assistant  adjutant-general,  Lieutenant 
Ben  King,  killed.  When  Gibson  went  to  Fagan,  Allen,  a  very  fearless 
soldier,  wrung  at  his  unavailing  loss,  rode  back  to  General  Bragg  to 
repeat  the  need  of  artillery,  and  to  ask  him  if  he  must  charge  again. 
Bragg,  impatient  at  the  check,  hastily  replied,  "  Colonel  Allen,  I  want 
no  faltering  now."  Allen,  stung  by  the  reply,  said  not  a  word,  but, 
going  back  to  his  command,  and  waving  his  sword  for  his  men  to  fol 
low,  charged  once  more — but  again  in  vain.  He  never  forgave  Bragg, 


606  BATTLE  OF  SI1ILOH. 

and  the  brigade  thought  they  got  hard  measure  in  Bragg's  orders  and 
in  his  report. 

Patton  Anderson's  brigade,  with  the  Crescent  Regiment,  of  Pond's 
brigade,  and  aided  by  a  regiment,  two  battalions,  and  a  battery  from 
Trabue's  brigade,  was  eventually  more  successful  farther  to  the  left. 
His  ground  also  was  very  difficult,  but  he  caught  the  enemy  more  on 
the  flank,  and  clung  to  it,  rattling  them  with  musketry  and  artillery, 
until  the  movement  of  the  Confederate  right  broke  into  this  citadel, 
when  he  carried  his  point.  But  this  was  not  until  after  hours  of 
manoeuvring  and  heavy  skirmishing,  with  great  loss,  and  after  the 
enemy's  left  was  turned.  The  Twentieth  Louisiana  was  badly  cut  up 
in  the  underbrush,  and  in  other  regiments  many  companies  lost  all 
their  officers.  Anderson  probably  confronted  Prentiss.  The  loss  suf 
fered  by  Pond's  brigade  has  already  been  mentioned. 

General  Polk,  with  Russell's  brigade,  and  with  Johnson's  under 
Preston  Smith,  and  during  a  portion  of  the  time  with  Stewart's  bri 
gade,  was  engaged  in  the  same  sort  of  heavy  work,  driving  the  enemy, 
and,  in  turn,  losing  the  ground  he  had  won,  until  it  had  been  three 
times  fought  over.  This  was  with  McClernand's  troops,  and  Buck- 
land's  brigade  of  Sherman's  division. 

Cheatham's  division  had  been  formed  in  the  morning  on  either  side 
of  the  Pittsburg  road,  immediately  in  rear  of  Clark's  division.  He 
was  first  ordered  to  the  left,  with  his  Second  Brigade,  under  Colonel 
Stevens,  by  Polk,  to  support  Bragg,  and  was  ordered  thence  by  Beau- 
regard  to  the  extreme  right,  to  ascertain  the  point  where  the  firing  was 
heaviest,  and  there  engage  the  enemy  at  once. 

About  10  A.  M.  he  came  upon  the  enemy,  strongly  posted  on  the 
right,  and  engaged  him  in  an  artillery  duel  for  an  hour,  when  Breckin- 
ridge  came  up  and  formed  on  his  right.  At  eleven  o'clock,  Colonel 
Jordan  ordered  Cheatham  to  charge,  which  he  did  across  an  open  field. 
The  enemy  occupied  an  abandoned  road,  behind  a  fence,  a  strong  posi 
tion,  and  met  the  attack  with  a  heavy  fire.  When  Cheatham's  gallant 
division  reached  the  middle  of  the  field,  a  murderous  cross-fire  from 
the  left  arrested  their  progress.  The  command  fell  back  in  good  order. 
Cheatham,  with  the  Second  Brigade,  now  under  Colonel  Maney,  again, 
later  in  the  day,  attacked  on  Bre»ckinridge's  left  in  Prentiss's  front, 
when  that  Federal  general  was  captured. 

On  the  left  Hardee  was  in  charge.  Here,  Colonel  Trabue,  com 
manding  the  Kentucky  Brigade,  with  four  of  his  regiments,  assailed 
part  of  Sherman's  command,  which  they  identified  from  the  prisoners 
as  McDowell's  and  the  Thirteenth  Missouri.  Duke,  who  was  with 
Morgan's  cavalry,  marching  in  their  rear,  says  that  as  they  went  in, 
horse  and  foot,  they  struck  up  their  battle-song,  as  mentioned,  and 
that  "  the  effect  was  animating  beyond  description."  They  fought  for 


HARDEE   AND   SHERMAX.  607 

an  hour  and  a  quarter,  never  losing  ground,  and  several  times  forcing 
McDowell  back.  Finally,  bringing  up  the  Thirty -first  Alabama,  which 
had  been  held  in  reserve,  they  charged  at  a  double-quick,  routing  the 
enemy,  and  driving  them,  at  a  run,  from  the  field.  This  defeat  of  the 
enemv  was  shared  in  by  Folk's  corps  and  Patton  Anderson's  brigade. 
Morgan's  cavalry  and  Wharton's  Eighth  Texas  Cavalry  also  pursued 
the  routed  Federals,  but  were  checked,  with  loss,  in  the  thick  under 
growth.  Hardee  had  assisted  in  again  routing  Sherman,  by  leading 
four  regiments  up  a  ravine  on  the  extreme  left,  and  turning  the  posi 
tion.  He  also  put  the  cavalry  in  pursuit  of  him. 

After  the  rout  of  Sherman,  there  seems  to  have  been  not  much 
heavy  fighting  on  that  flank.  His  division  drifted  out  of  the  battle, 
clinging  to  the  banks  of  Owl  Creek,  keeping  up,  however,  a  desultory 
resistance  to  the  disconnected  and  indecisive  skirmishing  directed 
against  it.  Cleburne's  brigade  had  lost  so  heavily  in  the  morning 
that  only  a  part  of  it  remained  in  line.  One-third  of  his  men  were 
killed  or  wounded,  as  his  "  butcher's  bill "  in  the  Appendix  will  show. 
In  an  assault  this  is  one  of  the  surest  signs  of  honest,  hard  fighting. 
With  the  remnant,  however,  he  continued  to  press  on  Sherman's  right, 
which  it  kept  moving,  without  absolutely  crushing  it.  McClernand's 
line  still  maintained  itself,  and  the  force  of  the  Confederate  attack  at 
the  left  was  turned  against  it.  General  Beauregard's  headquarters 
were  about  this  time  at  Shiloh  Church.  The  situation  there  seems  hard 
to  understand.  An  extract  from  Colonel  Drake's  sketch  may  throw 
some  light  on  the  condition  of  things  on  the  left.  Drake  says  : 

It  was  at  this  juncture  that  the  lines  at  this  point  were  halted,  and  a  lull  in 
the  battle  ensued  for  a  considerable  length  of  time.  Many  supposed  the  fight 
ing  was  ended,  and  scattered  over  the  field  on  various  errands.  Entire  regi 
ments  were  seen  marching  to  the  rear,  and  then  began  on  a  large  scale  the 
pillage  of  the  captured  camps,  for  which  our  army  was  so  harshly  blamed ;  but 
the  object,  so  far  as  my  observation  went,  was  not  so  much  to  gather  the  booty 
as  to  gratify  curiosity,  and  pick  up  articles  as  mementos.  Greenbacks  were 
no  object  then,  and  the  pockets  of  the  dead  were  not  rifled.  Shoes,  boots, 
and  underclothes,  seemed  to  be  in  more  request  than  anything  else. 

Naming  many  other  articles — patriotic  envelopes,  cheap  pictures, 
caricatures,  song-books,  etc.,  he  adds  : 

And  yet  the  Confederate  soldiers,  who  sought  after  trash,  and  pillaged  sutler- 
stores,  were  not  so  much  to  blame  as  the  inexperience  of  the  times,  as  illustrated 
in  field  and  general  officers.  No  battle  of  the  war — no  event  in  Confederate 
history — has  such  a  long  list  of  "  ifs  "  and  "  might  have  beens  "  as  this  battle  of 
Shiloh ;  it  is  the  saddest  story  of  them  all. 

Colonel  Munford  gives  the  following  account,  which  is  a  very  good 
summary  of  the  situation  on  the  centre  and  right  : 
40 


608  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

General  Bragg  was  ordered  to  attack  them  at  once,  and  here  occurred  the 
most  obstinate  contest  of  the  whole  day.  It  was  full  four  hours  of  the  severest 
fighting  before  the  enemy  gave  way,  and  then  not  until  General  Johnston  with 
the  remainder  of  the  active  troops  had  driven  all  opposition  from  the  entire  right 
and  centre  of  the  field  far  back  toward  the  river.  Soon  after  our  left  had  become 
so  hotly  engaged,  other  scouts  brought  intelligence  that  large  bodies  of  the  enemy 
were  moving  in  the  direction  of  Pittsburg  Landing  on  the  river.  Others  reported 
heavy  masses  assembled  there ;  and,  lastly,  that  the  head  of  a  column  had  started 
from  that  point  up  the  road  which  turned  our  right  in  the  direction  of  Lick  Creek. 
When  this  information  was  received,  the  general  looked  at  his  watch,  and  con 
tinued  conversing  with  the  members  of  the  staff  for  twenty  or  thirty  minutes, 
when,  again  glancing  at  his  watch,  he  remarked,  "  It  is  now  time  to  move  for 
ward."  He  gave  orders  for  the  formations  he  desired.  The  troops  in  marching 
order  were  so  arranged  that,  while  all  were  compactly  in  hand,  every  man,  horse, 
and  gun-carriage,  had  necessary  room.  The  beauty  of  the  manoeuvre  did  not 
escape  attention  even  under  the  circumstances,  and  in  a  small  way  showed  how 
justly  the  general  had  been  celebrated  for  the  ease  with  which  he  handled  troops. 
Just  then  I  was  ordered  to  see  that  a  brigade  "went  promptly"  to  the  support 
of  Brigadier-General  Clark  in  Bragg's  fight,  and,  in  doing  so,  had  an  opportunity 
of  witnessing  a  portion  of  the  hardest  fighting  I  have  ever  seen.  "When  I  over 
took  General  Johnston,  he  had  taken  position  with  his  right  across  the  road,  up 
which  it  was  reported  the  enemy  had  begun  to  march,  on  the  very  verge  of  the 
ridges  overlooking  Pittsburg  Landing.  He  was  in  the  act  of  swinging  his  troops 
round  on  his  left  as  a  pivot.  A  brigade  under  Colonel  (afterward  Major-General) 
Chalmers,  flanked  by  a  battalion  of  Wirt  Adams's  cavalry,  constituted  the  ex 
treme  right.  We  sat  on  our  horses,  side  by  side,  watching  that  brigade  as  it 
swept  over  the  ridge ;  and,  as  the  colors  dipped  out  of  sight,  the  general  said  to 
me,  "  That  checkmates  them."  I  told  him  I  was  glad  to  hear  him  announce 
"checkmate,"  but  that  "he  must  excuse  so  poor  a  player  for  saying  he  could 
not  see  it."  He  laughed,  and  said,  "Yes,  sir,  that  mates  them."  The  comple 
tion  of  this  movement  faced  the  troops  at  an  angle  of  about  45°  toward  the 
left,  when  the  forward  movement  became  uniform.  We  had  advanced  but  a 
few  hundred  yards,  when  we  came  upon  a  line  of  the  enemy,  strongly  posted 
with  their  right  in  a  flat  covered  by  a  dense  growth  of  shrubs,  almost  a  chapar 
ral,  and  their  centre  and  left  along  the  hollow  through  which  this  flat  and  the 
hill-sides  were  drained.  Their  bodies  were  almost  entirely  protected,  but  their 
position  enabled  them  to  see  the  entire  persons  of  our  troops,  who,  when  they 
came  in  sight,  were  within  easy  musket-range  and  wholly  unprotected.  They 
opened  upon  us  a  murderous  fire.  General  Johnston  moved  forward  with  his 
staff  to  a  depression  about  thirty  yards  behind  our  front  line,  where  the  bullets 
passed  over  our  heads ;  but  he  could  see  more  than  half  of  his  line,  and,  if  an 
emergency  arose,  could  meet  it  promptly.  He  fought  that  entire  battle  on  the 
true  philosophic  principle  which  it  involved.  He  was  in  command  of  fresh 
Southern  volunteers.  He  therefore  let  them  stand  and  fire,  .only  till  what  is 
known  as  the  "shoulder-to-shoulder"  courage  was  developed,  leaving  the  im 
petuous  fire  of  Southern  pluck  unchilled.  His  charges  were  uniformly  success 
ful.  I  saw  our  line  beginning  to  stagger,  not  give  back,  but  waver  along  its 
whole  length  like  small  grain  when  struck  by  a  breeze.  The  general  passed  his 
eye  from  the  right  of  the  line  to  his  extreme  point  of  vision  in  the  direction  of 
the  left,  and  slowly  back  again,  when  he  remarked  to  Governor  Harris  who  was 


THE  FEDERAL  KEY.  609 

by  his  side :  "  Those  fellows  are  making  a  stubborn  stand  here.  I'll  have  to  put 
the  bayonet  to  them."  Just  then  a  shell  from  one  of  our  batteries  on  the  ex 
treme  right  came  flying  over  the  heads  of  the  men  in  line,  passed  just  in  front 
of  us,  struck  and  exploded  a  little  to  our  left  between  us  and  our  reserve  or 
second  line.  The  general  asked  me  to  correct  the  position  of  that  battery. 
When  I  returned  from  the  discharge  of  this  duty  a  charge  was  being  executed 
along  the  whole  line,  and  the  general  was  gone  from  the  place  where  I  had  left 
him. 

The  front  on  which  General  Johnston  was  now  moving  was  almost 
at  right  angles  to  his  original  lines  and  approaching  a  perpendicular  to 
the  river.  Chalmers's  brigade,  on  the  extreme  right,  next  the  river,  was 
somewhat  advanced,  so  that  it  continually  pressed  upon  and  turned  the 
enemy's  left  flank.  Eight  hundred  yards  to  his  left  and  rear,  Bowen's 
brigade  came  up  ;  and,  with  a  like  interval  to  the  left  and  rear  of  Bow- 
en's,  Statham's  strong  brigade.  These  troops  advanced  en  echelon  of 
brigades.  The  batteries  were  in  full  play  ;  the  resistance  was  vigor 
ous  ;  the  contest  fierce.  Chalmers  pushed  forward  with  considerable 
success  ;  General  Johnston  had  Bowen's  brigade  deployed,  and  it  ad 
vanced  with  energy.  Statham's  brigade  impinged  upon  what  was  an 
angle  in  the  Federal  line,  where  the  Northerners  were  collected  in 
heavy  masses.  The  locality  was  probably  that  held  by  Hurlbut's  bri 
gades,  and  they  opposed  a  desperate  defense  to  every  forward  move 
ment.  The  severe  pressure  on  their  left  had  called  the  Northern  troops 
to  this  point,  and  we  find  acting  Brigadier-General  Cruft,  after  having 
repulsed  four  assaults  farther  to  the  right,  strengthening  it.  Sweeney 
also  reenforced  Hurlbut  with  three  regiments. 

There  had  been  four  hours  of  heavy  fighting,  during  which  the  Fed 
eral  centre  had  not  been  moved.  The  right  had  been  broken  ;  its  left 
was  forced  back  and  doubled  up  on  itself ;  and  Hurlbut  had  more  than 
once  fallen  back,  retiring  his  left,  in  order  to  correct  his  alignment. 
But  there  his  command  stood,  dealing  slaughter  on  every  attempt  at 
advance.  His  position  was  evidently  the  key ;  and  it  was  necessary  to 
break  down,  the  stubborn  defense  that  maintained  it.  Jt  was  for  this 
that  Breckin ridge's  reserves,  the  only  brigades  which  had  not  been 
engaged,  were  brought  forward.  General  Johnston's  purpose  was  to 
destroy  Grant's  army  that  day.  The  afternoon  was  upon  him.  The 
final  blow  must  be  struck.  Statham's  brigade  was  sent  in  about  noon. 
It  was  made  up  of  six  fine  regiments :  two  of  them  were  raw,  four  of 
them  knew  nothing  of  war,  except  the  miserable  defeat  at  Mill  Spring. 
The  brigade  now  found  itself  welcomed  by  a  fearful  blaze  of  musketry 
and  artillery ;  and,  in  getting  into  line,  suffered  enough  to  fall  into 
some  confusion. 

The  Federals  were  posted  in  a  double  line  of  battle,  protected  by 
the  crest  of  a  wooded  hill,  and  the  men  seemed  to  be  lying  down  and 


610  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

firing.  Opposite  this  strong  position,  one  or  two  hundred  yards  distant, 
was  another  ridge,  swept  by  the  Federal  fire.  Behind  it,  Statham's 
troops  were  comparatively  secure  ;  but,  to  assail  the  enemy,  they  had 
to  cross  this  exposed  ridge,  descend  one  slope,  and  ascend  another,  com 
manded  and  raked  by  this  deadly  ambuscade.  They  stood,  therefore,  de 
livering  and  receiving  a  fire  which,  Governor  Harris  says,  was  as  heavy 
as  any  he  saw  in  the  war  ;  but  they  could  not  drive  the  enemy  from 
his  stronghold  by  their  fire,  nor  without  a  charge  that  meant  death  for 
many.  Statham's  brigade  and  even  particular  regiments  have  to  some 
extent  been  held  responsible  for  General  Johnston's  death.  It  has  been 
held  to  account,  as  if  it  were  the  only  command  which  on  that  day 
failed  to  carry  a  position  promptly  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  without 
first  measuring  its  strength  with  the  foe.  But  those  who  have  read 
this  narrative  must  have  seen  how  often  good  and  gallant  troops  re 
coiled  from  positions  which  they  could  not  take.  The  measure  of  resist 
ance  is  an  element  of  the  greatest  importance,  too  often  ignored,  in 
estimating  the  value  and  courage  of  an  attack. 

Major  (afterward  General)  Hodge,  who  was  Breckinridge's  adjutant- 
general,  and  on  the  spot,  gives  the  following  clear  description  of  the 
attack : 

The  long  slope  of  the  ridge  was  here  abruptly  broken  by  a  succession  of 
small  hills  or  undulations  of  about  fifty  feet  in  height,  dividing  the  rolling 
country  from  the  river-bottom,  and  behind  the  crest  of  the  last  of  these  the 
enemy  was  concealed ;  opposite  them,  at  the  distance  of  seventy-five  yards,  was 
another  long  swell  or  hillock,  the  summit  of  which  it  was  necessary  to  attain  in 
order  to  open  fire ;  and  to  this  elevation  the  reserve  moved,  in  order  of  battle, 
at  a  double-quick.  In  an  instant,  the  opposing  height  was  one  sheet  of  flame. 
Battle's  Tennessee  regiment,  on  the  extreme  right,  gallantly  maintained  itself, 
pushing  forward  under  a  withering  fire  and  establishing  itself  well  in  advance. 
Lytle's  Tennessee  regiment,  next  to  it,  delivered  its  fire  at  random  and  ineffi 
ciently,  became  disordered,  and  retired  in  confusion  down  the  slope.  Three 
times  it  was  rallied  by  its  lieutenant-colonel,  assisted  by  Colonel  T.  T.  Haw 
kins,  and  by  the  adjutant-general,  and  carried  up  the  slope,  only  to  be  as  often 
repulsed  and  driven  back — the  regiment  of  the  enemy  opposed  to  it,  in  the  inter 
vals,  directing  an  oblique  fire  upon  Battle's  regiment,  now  contending  against 
overwhelming  odds.  The  crisis  of  the  contest  had  come ;  there  were  no  more 
reserves,  and  General  Breckinridge  determined  to  charge. 

The  Forty-fifth  Tennessee  was  behind  the  crest  of  the  hill,  and 
thus  protected.  The  men  would  advance  to  a  rail-fence,  individually, 
or  in  squads,  deliver  an  irregular  fire,  and  fall  back ;  but  they  would 
not  come  up  to  their  alignment,  nor  exhibit  the  purpose  required  for  a 
desperate  charge.  They  were  not  stampeded,  but  irresolute,  and  their 
conduct  probably  did  not  fall  below  the  average  of  the  brigade,  or  be 
low  what  might  be  expected  from  raw  troops  under  like  circumstances. 
But  more  was  required  of  them  and  of  all. 


A  MEMORABLE   CHARGE. 

The  following  is  Governor  Harris's  account  of  the  circumstances  pre 
ceding  the  charge  : 

Just  as  day  was  dawning,  on  Sunday  morning,  he  (General  Johnston)  made 
the  attack.  For  some  time  our  advance  was  steady  and  without  any  serious  or 
obstinate  resistance.  About  one  o'clock,  p.  M.,  being  informed  that  our  extreme 
right  had  encountered  such  resistance  as  prevented  further  advance,  he  repaired 
to  it  at  once. 

We  found  our  right  wing  posted  upon  a  ridge,  while  upon  a  parallel  ridge  in 
easy  musket-range  the  enemy  was  in  great  force.  Here  the  firing  was  kept  up 
with  great  energy  by  both  armies  for,  perhaps,  an  hour,  during  the  whole  of 
which  time  the  general  remained  upon  the  line,  more  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the 
enemy  than  any  soldier  in  the  line. 

After  the  firing  had  been  thus  continued  for  near  an  hour,  the  general  said 
to  me:  "They  are  offering  stubborn  resistance  here.  I  shall  have  to  put  the 
bayonet  to  them." 

It  was  in  this  condition  of  things  that  Breckinridge  rode  up  to  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  and,  in  his  preoccupation,  not  observing  Governor  Harris, 
said,  "General,  I  have  a  Tennessee  regiment  that  won't  fight."  Har 
ris  broke  in  energetically,  "  General  Breckinridge,  show  me  that  regi 
ment!"  Breckinridge,  courteously  and  apologetically,  indicated  the 
command,  and  General  Johnston  said,  "  Let  the  Governor  go  to  them." 
Governor  Harris  went,  and  with  some  difficulty  put  the  regiment  in  line 
of  battle  on  the  hill,  whence  they  could  engage  in  the  combat  effectively. 

After  some  delay,  the  wavering  of  the  line  still  increasing,  General 
Johnston  directed  that  the  line  be  got  ready  for  a  charge.  Breckin 
ridge  soon  returned  and  said  he  feared  that  he  could  not  get  the  bri 
gade  to  make  the  charge.  General  Johnston  replied  to  him  cheerfully : 
"  Oh,  yes,  general  ;  I  think  you  can."  Breckinridge,  with  an  emotion 
unusual  to  his  controlled  and  equable  temper,  told  him  he  had  tried  and 
failed.  "  Then,  I  will  help  you,"  said  General  Johnston.  "  We  can  get 
them  to  make  the  charge."  Turning  to  Governor  Harris,  who  had 
come  back  to  report  that  the  Tennessee  regiment  was  in  line,  he  re 
quested  him  to  return  to  and  encourage  this  regiment,  then  some  dis 
tance  to  his  right,  but  under  his  eye,  and  to  aid  in  getting  them  to 
charge.  Harris  galloped  to  the  right,  and,  breaking  in  among  the  sol 
diers  with  a  sharp  harangue,  dismounted  and  led  them  on  foot,  pistol 
in  hand,  up  to  their  alignment,  and  in  the  charge  when  it  was  made. 

In  the  mean  time  Breckinridge,  with  his  fine  voice  and  manly  bear 
ing,  was  appealing  to  the  soldiers,  aided  by  his  son  Cabell  and  a  very 
gallant  staff*.  It  was  a  goodly  company ;  and,  in  the  charge,  Breckin 
ridge,  leading  and  towering  above  them  all,  was  the  only  one  who 
escaped  unscathed.  Major  Hodge  and  Cabell  Breckinridge  had  their 
horses  shot  under  them;  Major  Hawkins  was  wounded  in  the  face,  and 
Captain  Allen  had  his  leg  torn  by  a  shell.  Many  eye-witnesses  have 


612  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

remarked  to  the  writer  on  the  beautiful  composure  and  serene  fidelity 
with  which  Cabell  Breckinridge,  then  a  mere  boy,  rode  close  by  his 
father  during  all  this  stirring  scene. 

General  Johnston  rode  out  in  front,  and  slowly  down  the  line.  His 
hat  was  off.  His  sword  rested  in  its  scabbard.  In  his  right  hand  he 
held  a  little  tin  cup,  the  memorial  of  an  incident  that  had  occurred 
earlier  in  the  day.  As  they  were  passing  through  a  captured  camp,  an 
officer  had  brought  from  a  tent  a  number  of  valuable  articles,  calling 
General  Johnston's  attention  to  them.  He  answered,  with  some  stern 
ness  :  "None  of  that,  sir  ;  we  are  not  here  for  plunder!"  And  then,  as 
if  regretting  the  sharpness  of  the  rebuke,  for'the  anger  of  the  just  cuts 
deep,  he  added,  taking  this  little  tin  cup,  "  Let  this  be  my  share  of 
the  spoils  to-day."  It  was  this  plaything,  which,  holding  it  between 
two  fingers,  he  employed  more  effectively  in  his  natural  and  simple 
gesticulation  than  most  men  could  have  used  a  sword.  His  presence 
was  full  of  inspiration.  Many  men  of  rank  have  told  the  writer  that 
they  never  saw  General  Johnston's  equal  in  battle  in  this  respect.  He 
sat  his  beautiful  thorough-bred  bay,  "  Fire-eater,"  with  easy  command 
— like  a  statue  of  Victory.  His  voice  was  persuasive,  encouraging,  and 
compelling.  It  was  inviting  men  to  death,  but  they  obeyed  it.  But, 
most  of  all,  it  was  the  light  in  his  gray  eye,  and  his  splendid  presence, 
full  of  the  joy  of  combat,  that  wrought  upon  them.  His  words  were 
few.  He  touched  their  bayonets  with  significant  gesture.  "  These 
must  do  the  work,"  he  said.  "  Men  !  they  are  stubborn  ;  we  must  use 
the  bayonet."  When  he  reached  the  centre  of  the  line,  he  turned.  "I 
will  lead  you  ! "  he  cried,  and  moved  toward  the  enemy.  The  line  was 
already  thrilling  and  trembling  with  that  tremendous  and  irresistible 
ardor  which  in  battle  decides  the  day.  Those  nearest  to  him,  as  if 
drawn  to  him  by  some  overmastering  magnetic  force,  rushed  forward 
around  him  with  a  mighty  shout.  The  rest  of  the  line  took  it  up  and 
echoed  it  with  a  wild  yell  of  defiance  and  desperate  purpose,  and  moved 
forward  at  a  charge  with  rapid  and  resistless  step.  A  sheet  of  flame 
burst  from  the  Federal  stronghold,  and  blazed  along  the  crest  of  the 
ridge.  There  was  a  roar  of  cannon  and  musketry  ;  a  storm  of  leaden 
and  iron  hail.  The  Confederate  line  withered,  and  the  dead  and  dying 
strewed  the  dark  valley.  But  there  was  not  an  instant's  pause.  Right 
up  the  steep  they  went.  The  crest  was  gained.  The 'enemy  were  in 
flight — a  few  scattering  shots  replying  to  the  ringing  cheers  of  the  vic 
torious  Confederates. 

General  Johnston  had  passed  through  the  ordeal  seemingly  unhurt. 
His  noble  horse  was  shot  in  four  places  ;  his  clothes  were  pierced  by 
missiles,  his  boot-sole  was  cut  and  torn  by  a  Minie  ;  but  if  he  himself 
had  received  any  severe  wound  he  did  not  know  it.  At  this  moment 
Governor  Harris  rode  up  from  the  right,  elated  with  his  own  success 


DEATH   OF  GENERAL  JOIIXSTOX.  613 

and  with  the  vindication  of  his  Tennesseeans.  After  a  few  words, 
General  Johnston  sent  him  with  an  order  to  Colonel  Statham,  which, 
having  delivered,  he  speedily  returned.  In  the  mean  time  knots  and 
groups  of  Federal  soldiers  kept  up  an  angry  discharge  of  fire-arms  as 
they  retreated  upon  their  supports,  and  their  last  line,  now  yielding, 
delivered  volley  after  volley  as  they  sullenly  retired.  By  the  chance 
of  war,  a  Minie-ball  from  one  of  these  did  its  fatal  work.  As  General 
Johnston,  on  horseback,  sat  there,  knowing  that  he  had  crushed  in 
the  arch  which  had  so  long  resisted  the  pressure  of  his  forces,  and 
waiting  until  they  should  collect  sufficiently  to  give  the  final  stroke, 
he  received  a  mortal  wound.  It  came  in  the  moment  of  victory  and 
triumph  from  a  flying  foe.  It  smote  him  at  the  very  instant  when  he 
felt  the  full  conviction  that  the  day  was  won ;  that  his  own  conduct 
and  wisdom  were  justified  by  results,  and  that  he  held  in  his  hand  the 
fortunes  of  war  and  the  success  of  the  Confederate  cause.  If  this  was 
not  to  be,  he  fell  as  he  would  have  wished  to  fall,  and  with  a  happier 
fate  than  those  who  lived  to  witness  the  overthrow  and  ruin  of  their 
great  cause.  He  had  often  expressed  to  the  writer  a  preference  for 
this  death  of  the  soldier.  It  came  sudden  and  painless.  But  he  had 
so  lived  as  neither  to  fear  nor  shun  it.  It  came  to  him  like  an  incident 
of  an  immortal  life — its  necessary  part,  but  not  its  close. 

The  writer  will  be  pardoned  for  adding  the  narrative  of  Governor 
Harris,  the  faithful  comrade  who  was  with  him  at  the  last.  He  writes 
as  follows  : 

Soon  thereafter  our  line  slightly  wavered  with  a  backward  tendency,  when 
the  general  said,  "I  will  go  to  the  front,  order,  and  lead  the  charge."  Just  as 
he  was  in  the  act  of  passing  through  the  line  to  the  front,  he  said  to  me,  "  Go 
to  the  extreme  right,  and  lead  the  Tennessee  regiment  stationed  there."  I  gal 
loped  to  the  regiment  named ;  and  when  the  charge  was  ordered,  which  was 
only  a  few  moments  after,  I  repeated  the  order  on  the  extreme  right,  and  moved 
forward  with  it. 

The  charge  was  successful ;  the  Federal  line  gave  way,  and  we  advanced 
from  a  half  to  three-fourths  of  a  mile  without  opposition,  when  we  encountered 
the  reserve  line  of  the  enemy  strongly  posted  upon  a  ridge. 

The  general  immediately  established  his  line  upon  a  parallel  ridge  in  easy 
musket- range  of  the  line  of  the  enemy,  and  a  galling  fire  was  opened  upon  both 
sides. 

Just  as  the  line  of  our  extreme  right  (with  which  I  had  moved  forward)  was 
established,  casting  my  eye  up  the  line  to  the  left  I  saw  General  Johnston  sitting 
upon  his  horse  a  few  feet  in  rear,  and  about  the  centre  of  his  line.  He  was 
alone.  I  immediately  galloped  to  him,  to  ascertain  if,  in  his  new  position,  he 
wished  to  send  orders. 

I  had  never,  in  my  life,  seen  him  looking  more  bright,  joyous,  and  happy, 
than  he  looked  at  the  moment  that  I  approached  him. 

The  charge  he  had  led  was  heroic.  It  had  been  successful,  and  his  face 
expressed  a  soldier's  joy  and  a  patriot's  hope. 


614:  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

As  I  approached  him,  he  said  "  Governor,  they  came  very  near  putting  mo 
hors  de  combat  in  that  charge,"  holding  out  and  pointing  to  his  foot.  Looking 
at  it,  I  discovered  that  a  musket-ball  had  struck  the  edge  of  the  sole  of  his  boot, 
cutting  the  sole  clear  across,  and  ripping  it  off  to  the  toe.  I  asked  eagerly : 
"Are  you  wounded?  Did  the  ball  touch  your  foot?"  He  said,  "No;"  and 
was  proceeding  to  make  other  remarks,  when  a  Federal  battery  opened  fire  from 
a  position  which  enfiladed  our  line  just  established.  He  paused  in  the  middle 
of  a  sentence  to  say,  "  Order  Colonel  Statham  to  wheel  his  regiment  to  the  left, 
charge,  and  take  that  battery."  I  galloped  to  Colonel  Statham,  only  about  two 
hundred  yards  distant,  gave  the  order,  galloped  back  to  the  general  where  a 
moment  before  I  had  left  him,  rode  up  to  his  right  side,  and  said,  "  General, 
your  order  is  delivered,  and  Colonel  Statham  is  in  motion ; "  but,  as  I  was  utter 
ing  this  sentence,  the  general  reeled  from  me  in  a  manner  that  indicated  he  was 
falling  from  his  horse.  I  put  my  left  arm  around  his  neck,  grasping  the  collar 
of  his  coat,  and  righted  him  up  in  the  saddle,  bending  forward  as  I  did  so,  and, 
looking  him  in  the  face,  said,  "  General,  are  you  wounded  ? "  In  a  very  deliber 
ate  and  emphatic  tone  he  answered,  "  Yes,  and  I  fear  seriously."  At  that  mo 
ment  I  requested  Captain  Wickhain  to  go  with  all  possible  speed  for  a  surgeon, 
to  send  the  first  one  he  could  find,  but  to  proceed  until  he  could  find  Dr.  Yan- 
dell,  the  medical  director,  and  bring  him.  The  general's  hold  upon  his  rein  re 
laxed,  and  it  dropped  from  his  hand.  Supporting  him  with  my  left  hand,  I 
gathered  his  rein  with  my  right,  in  which  I  held  my  own,  and  guided  both 
horses  to  a  valley  about  150  yards  in  rear  of  our  line,  where  I  halted,  dropped 
myself  between  the  two  horses,  pulling  the  general  over  upon  me,  and  eased 
him  to  the  ground  as  gently  as  I  could.  "When  laid  upon  the  ground,  with  eager 
anxiety  I  asked  many  questions  about  his  wounds,  to  which  he  gave  no  answer, 
not  even  a  look  of  intelligence. 

Supporting  his  head  with  one  hand,  I  untied  his  cravat,  unbuttoned  his  col 
lar  and  vest,  and  tore  his  shirts  open  with  the  other,  for  the  purpose  of  finding 
the  wound,  feeling  confident  from  his  condition  that  he  had  a  more  serious 
wound  than  the  one  which  I  knew  was  bleeding  profusely  in  the  right  leg ;  but  I 
found  no  other,  and,  as  I  afterward  ascertained,  he  had  no  other.  Raising  his 
head,  I  poured  a  little  brandy  into  his  mouth,  which  he  swallowed,  and  in  a  few 
moments  I  repeated  the  brandy,  but  he  made  no  effort  to  swallow ;  it  gurgled 
in  his  throat  in  his  effort  to  breathe,  and  I  turned  his  head  so  as  to  relieve  him. 

In  a  few  moments  he  ceased  to  breathe.  I  did  not  consult  my  watch,  but 
my  impression  is  that  he  did  not  live  more  than  thirty  or  forty  minutes  from 
the  time  he  received  the  wound. 

He  died  calmly,  and,  to  all  appearances,  free  from  pain — indeed,  so  calmly, 
that  the  only  evidence  I  had  that  he  had  passed  from  life  was  the  fact  that  he 
ceased  to  breathe,  and  the  heart  ceased  to  throb.  There  was  not  the  slightest 
struggle,  nor  the  contortion  of  a  muscle ;  his  features  were  as  calm  and  as  natural 
as  at  any  time  in  life  and  health. 

Just  as  he  expired,  General  William  Preston  arrived,  and  it  was  agreed  that 
he  should  remain  with  and  accompany  the  remains  of  General  Johnston  to 
headquarters,  and  that  I  should  proceed  at  once  to  report  the  fact  of  General 
Johnston's  death  to  General  Beauregard. 

My  own  horse  having  run  off  when  I  dismounted,  I  mounted  "  Fire-eater," 
General  Johnston's  horse,  but  found  him  so  badly  crippled  that  I  dismounted 


INCIDENTS  OF  HIS  DEATH.  615 

and  examined  him,  and  found  upon  examination  that  he  was  wounded  in  three 
legs  by  musket-balls.  I  rode  him  to  the  rear,  where  we  had  left  General  John 
ston's  orderly  with  two  fresh  horses ;  left  Fire-eater  with  the  orderly,  and 
mounted  one  of  the  fresh  horses  and  proceeded  to  report  to  General  Beauregard. 

Other  members  of  the  staff  confirm  all  this,  with  the  following 
slight  variations : 

Captain  Wickham  assisted  Governor  Harris  in  lifting  General  John 
ston  from  his  horse,  and  then  went  for  a  surgeon.  General  Preston 
came  up  before  General  Johnston's  death.  Kneeling  by  him,  he  cried 
passionately,  "  Johnston,  do  you  know  me  ?  "  General  Johnston  smiled 
faintly,  but  gave  no  other  sign  of  recognition.  They  then  tried  to  ad 
minister  the  brandy,  but  he  could  not  swallow  it.  General  Johnston 
soon  became  utterly  unconscious,  and  quietly  passed  away.  Colonel 
O'Hara,  Major  Haydon,  and  others  of  the  staff,  joined  the  group  soon 
after. 

Wrapping  his  body  in  a  mantle  to  conceal  his  death  from  the  army, 
some  of  the  staff  took  charge  of  it  and  left  the  field.  The  others 
separated  to  inform  General  Beauregard  and  the  corps  commanders. 
Colonel  Munford  says  : 

Besides  the  wound  which  killed  him,  he  was  hit  three  other  times :  once  by 
a  spent  ball  on  the  outside  and  about  midway  of  the  right  thigh ;  once  by  a 
fragment  of  shell  just  above  and  to  the  rear  of  the  right  hip ;  and  once  by  a 
Minie-ball  cutting  the  left  boot-sole  entirely  in  two,  at  which  he  kicked  up  his 
foot,  and  said,  gayly,  "  They  didn't  trip  me  up  that  time."  But  one  bullet  broke 
the  skin — and  that,  alas !  was  fatal. 

The  mortal  wound  was  from  a  Minie-ball,  which  tore  the  popliteal 
artery  of  the  right  leg,  where  it  divides  into  the  tibial  arteries,  as  Dr. 
Yandell  informs  the  writer.  He  did  not  live  more  than  ten  or  fifteen 
minutes  after  receiving  it.  It  was  not  necessarily  fatal.  General 
Johnston's  own  knowledge  of  military  surgery  was  adequate  for  its 
control  by  an  extemporized  tourniquet,  had  he  been  aware  or  regardful 
of  its  nature. 

Dr.  D.  W.  Yandell,  his  surgeon,  had  attended  his  person  during 
most  of  the  morning ;  but,  finding  a  large  number  of  wounded  men, 
including  many  Federals,  at  one  point,  General  Johnston  ordered  Yan 
dell  to  stop  there,  establish  a  hospital,  and  give  them  his  services. 
He  said  to  Yandell :  "  These  men  were  our  enemies  a  moment  ago,  they 
are  prisoners  now  ;  take  care  of  them."  Yandell  remonstrated  against 
leaving  him,  but  he  was  peremptory,  and  the  doctor  began  his  work. 
He  saw  General  Johnston  no  more.  Had  Yandell  remained  with  him, 
he  would  have  had  little  difficulty  with  the  wound.  It  was  this  act  of 
unselfish  charity  which  cost  him  his  life. 

General  Beauregard  had  told  General  Johnston  that  morning  as  he 


616  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 

rode  off,  that,  if  it  should  be  necessary  to  communicate  with  him  or  for 
him  to  do  anything,  he  would  be  found  in  his  ambulance  in  bed.  Gov 
ernor  Harris,  knowing  this,  and  how  feeble  General  Beauregard's 
health  was,  went  first  to  his  headquarters — just  in  the  rear  of  where 
the  army  had  deployed  into  line  the  evening  before.  Beauregard  and 
his  staff  were  gone  on  horseback  in  the  direction  of  Shiloh  Church. 
He  found  them  there.  The  Governor  told  General  Beauregard  that 
General  Johnston  had  been  killed.  Beauregard  expressed  regret,  and 
then  remarked,  "  Everything  else  seems  to  be  going  on  well  on  the 
right."  Governor  Harris  assented.  "  Then,"  said  Beauregard,  "  the 
battle  may  as  well  go  on."  The  Governor  replied  that  he  certainly 
thought  it  ought.  He  offered  his  services  to  Beauregard,  and  they 
were  courteously  accepted.  General  Beauregard  then  remained  where 
he  was,  waiting  the  issue  of  events. 


III.-AFTERNOON. 

Up  to  the  moment  of  the  death  of  the  commander-in-chief,  the  bat 
tle  presented  two  features,  at  first  sight  incongruous  and  almost  incom 
patible.  The  first  of  these  was  the  dislocation  of  commands  by  the 
pushing  forward  of  the  second  and  third  lines  into  the  intervals  of  the 
first,  and,  by  the  shifting  fortunes  of  the  field,  resulting  in  an  effect 
like  the  shuffling  of  cards.  The  other  was  the  most  perfect  regularity 
in  the  development  of  the  plan  of  battle.  In  all  the  seeming  confusion, 
there  was  the  predominance  of  intelligent  design  ;  a  master-mind, 
keeping  in  clear  view  its  purpose,  sought  the  weak  point  in  the  de 
fense,  and,  finding  it  on  the  enemy's  left,  kept  turning  that  flank. 
With  the  disadvantage  of  inferior  numbers,  General  Johnston  brought 
to  bear  a  superior  force  on  each  particular  point,  and,  by  a  series  of 
consecutive  blows,  repeated  with  great  rapidity  and  strength,  broke 
the  Federal  army  to  pieces. 

General  Duke  makes  the  following  intelligent  comments  on  the  bat 
tle.  He  says  : 

The  corps  of  Hardee,  Bragg,  and  Polk,  were  now  striving  abreast,  or  mingled 
with  each  other.  In  reading  the  reports  of  the  Confederate  generals,  frequent 
allusion  will  be  found  to  regiments  and  brigades  fighting  without  "head  or 
orders."  One  commander  would  sometimes  direct  the  movements  of  troops 
belonging  to  another.  At  this  phase  of  the  struggle,  the  narrative  should  dwell 
more  upon  "  the  biographies  of  the  regiments  than  the  history  of  the  battle." 
But  the  wise  arrangement  of  the  lines  and  the  instructions  given  subordinate 
commanders  insured  harmonious  action  and  the  desired  result. 

Each  brigade  commander  was  ordered,  when  he  became  disengaged,  to  seek 
and  attack  the  nearest  enemy ;  to  pass  the  flank  of  every  stubborn  hostile  force 


THE  METHOD  OF  THE  ATTACK. 


617 


Third  Position  (Sunday),  April  6th. 


BATTLE  OF, 

1 S  H I L  O  H 

Part  III. 


3rd.  Position  (Sunset)  Cth.  April 
Federal      


Confederate  • 


which  his  neighbors  could  not  move,  and,  at  all  hazards,  to  press  forward. 
General  Johnston  seemed  to  have  adopted  the  spirit  of  the  motto,  "  When  fight 
ing  in  the  dark,  strike  out  straight."  He  more  than  once  assumed  command  of 
brigades  which  knew  not  what  to  do,  and  led  them  to  where  they  could  fight 
with  effect. 

The  same  remark  might  be  made  of  all  the  higher  officers. 

Duke  also  notes  as  follows  the  systematic  manner  in  which  the 
troops  were  rapidly  massed  on  successive  points  : 


618  BATTLE   OF   SIIILOH. 

This  disposition  of  the  forces  and  the  energetic  conduct  of  the  Confederate 
commanders  explain  the  striking  features  of  the  battle,  which  have  been  so 
often  remarked — the  methodical  success  of  the  Confederates  upon  the  first  day, 
the  certainty  with  which  they  won  their  way  forward  against  the  most  deter 
mined  resistance,  the  "  clock-like  "  regularity  of  their  advance,  the  desperate 
struggle,  the  Federal  retreat,  repeated  again  and  again  through  the  day.  Tak 
ing  into  consideration  the  circumstances  under  which  the  collision  occurred, 
military  savants  will  some  day  demonstrate  that  success  ought,  with  mathema 
tical  certainty,  to  have  resulted  from  the  tactics  of  General  Johnston.  An 
army  moving  to  attack  an  enemy  surprised  and  unprepared,  in  three  lines  sup 
ported  by  a  reserve,  and  with  its  flanks  perfectly  protected,  ought  to  have 
delivered  crushing  and  continuous  blows.  Such  a  formation,  directed  by  con 
summate  skill  and  the  finest  nerve  in  a  commander  of  troops  who  believed  that 
to  fight  would  be  to  win,  promised  an  onset  wellnigh  irresistible. 


Speaking  elsewhere  of  the  repeated  successful  assaults  of  the  Con 
federates,  Duke  says  : 

Those  who  were  in  that  battle  will  remember  these  successive  contests,  fol 
lowed  by  short  periods  of  apparent  inaction,  going  on  all  day.  To  use  the  illus 
tration  of  one  well  acquainted  with  its  plans  and  incidents,  "  It  went  on  like 
the  regular  stroke  of  some  tremendous  machine."  There  would  be  a  rapid 
charge  and  fierce  fight — the  wild  yell  would  announce  a  Confederate  success — 
then  would  ensue  a  comparative  lull,  broken  again  in  a  few  minutes,  and  the 
charge,  struggle,  and  horrible  din  would  recommence. 

Just  when  General  Johnston  was  stricken  down,  the  victory  seemed 
complete.  The  enemy  was  not  merely  broken,  but,  so  close  were  the 
quarters  and  so  rapid  was  the  charge,  that  they  suffered  more  than  the 
usual  slaughter  in  a  defeat. 

Captain  Allison,  who  commanded  the  Forty-fifth  Tennessee  in  this 
charge,  makes  the  following  statement  to  the  writer : 

The  impulse  given  the  Confederate  line  by  General  Johnston's  presence  was 
irresistible.  The  Federals  were  ensconced  in  a  deep  ravine,  and  when  their 
assailants  closed  down  on  them  for  the  death-struggle,  they  crowded  for  escape 
into  a  ravine  which  ran  perpendicularly  to  the  rear,  hoping  thus  to  avoid  the 
line  of  fire,  which  swept  the  level  above  them.  The  steepness  of  the  sides  held 
them  in  a  mass,  into  which  the  Forty-fifth  Tennessee  fired  at  close  range  with 
murderous  effect. 

Captain  Allison  adds  that  he  never  saw  such  slaughter  during  the 
whole  war  as  took  place  here.  He  further  says  that,  when  he  got 
orders  to  fall  back  in  the  afternoon,  his  regiment  was  within  two 
hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's  batteries,  in  fine  spirits  and  organization. 
He  adds  some  striking  incidents,  of  which  want  of  space  prevents  the 


A  LULL  AND   CRUSHING  ASSAULT.  619 

insertion.  The  Federal  reports  show  that,  among  the  troops  who  fought 
here,  the  Twenty -fifth  Kentucky  (Federal),  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bristow, 
had  but  sixty-five  men  left,  and  Colonel  McHenry  reported  that  his  regi 
ment  (the  Seventeenth  Kentucky)  was  reduced  to  one-half  its  numbers. 

Now  was  the  time  for  the  Confederates  to  push  their  advantage, 
and,  closing  in  on  the  rear  of  Prentiss  and  Wallace,  to  finish  the  bat 
tle.  But,  on  the  contrary,  there  came  a  lull  in  the  conflict  on  the  right, 
lasting  more  than  an  hour  from  half-past  two,  the  time  at  which  General 
Johnston  fell.  It  is  true  that  the  Federals  fell,  back  and  left  the  field, 
and  the  Confederates  went  forward  deliberately,  occupying  their  posi 
tions,  and  thus  helping  to  envelop  the  Federal  centre.  But  there  was 
no  further  general  direction  nor  concerted  movements.  The  spring  and 
alertness  of  the  onset  nagged;  the . determinate  purpose  to  capture 
Grant  that  day  was  lost  sight  of ;  the  strong  arm  was  withdrawn,  and 
the  bow  remained  unbent.  The  troops  who  had  fought  under  General 
Johnston's  eye  were  carried  forward  by  the  impulse  imparted  to  them, 
and  the  momentum  of  their  own  success ;  but  with  no  visible  or  defi 
nite  object.  Elsewhere,  there  were  bloody  desultory  combats,  but  tend 
ing  to  nothing.  Indeed,  it  may  be  truly  said  that  General  Johnston's 
death  ended  the  second  engagement  of  the  day. 

About  half-past  three  o'clock,  the  struggle  at  the  centre,  which  had 
been  going  on  for  five  hours  with  fitful  violence,  was  renewed  with  the 
utmost  fury.  Folk's  and  Bragg's  corps,  intermingled,  were  engaged  in 
a  death-grapple  with  the  sturdy  commands  of  Wallace  and  Prentiss. 
The  Federal  generals  had  consulted,  and  had  resolved  to  stand  and 
hold  their  ground  at  all  hazards,  hoping  thus  to  save  the  rest  of  the 
army  from  destruction  ;  and  there  is  little  doubt  that  their  manful  re 
sistance,  which  cost  one  his  life  and  the  other  his  liberty,  so  checked  the 
Southern  troops  as  to  gain  time,  and  prevent  the  capture  of  Grant's  army. 

While  an  ineffectual  struggle  was  going  on  at  the  centre,  General 
Ruggles  judiciously  collected  all  the  artillery  he  could  find,  some  eleven 
batteries  in  all,  which  he  massed  against  Prentiss's  right  flank,  the  cen 
tre  of  what  remained.  The  opening  of  so  heavy  a  fire,  and  the  simul 
taneous  though  unconcerted  advance  of  the  whole  Confederate  line,  re 
sulted  at  first  in  the  confusion  of  the  enemy  and  then  in  the  defeat  of 
Wallace  and  the  surrender  of  Prentiss.  Patton  Anderson's  brigade  and 
Marshall  J.  Smith's  Crescent  Regiment  were  especially  conspicuous  in 
these  closing  scenes,  the  latter  being  so  fortunate  as  to  receive  the  sur 
render  of  a  large  number  of  prisoners.  But,  while  the  artillery  massed 
by  Ruggles,  and  his  division,  were  so  effectual  in  achieving  this  result, 
by  hammering  down  the  Federal  front,  they  were  not  alone  in  the  crush 
ing  coil  which  caught  Prentiss  in  its  folds.  Polk  and  Hardee  burst 
through  and  destroyed  the  troops  occupying  the  right  of  Wallace's  po 
sition,  who  were  thoroughly  beaten  and  driven  from  the  field  or  capt- 


620  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

ured,  with  the  commander  killed  in  the  rout.  They  thus  got  in  on 
Prentiss's  right  flank.  Bragg,  who  had  gone  to  the  Confederate  right, 
with  Breckinridge,  pushed  in  on  Prentiss's  left  flank ;  and  Chalmers  on 
his  rear — and  thus  intercepted  his  retreat. 

While  these  movements  were  being  executed,  Prentiss  determined 
on  a  bold  course,  afterward  condemned  by  his  more  fortunate  superiors, 
because  it  failed  ;  but,  in  the  writer's  opinion,  it  saved  both  Grant  and 
Sherman  from  capture.  He  formed  his  men  to  make  an  attack  ;  but 
the  Confederates  closed  in  around  him,  and  he  found  himself,  after  a 
struggle,  cut  off,  encompassed,  and  at  the  mercy  of  his  adversaries. 
With  Hurlbut  gone  and  Wallace  gone,  Prentiss  was  left  isolated. 
Struck  in  front,  in  rear,  and  on  either  flank,  cut  off  in  every  attempt  to 
escape,  about  half-past  four  o'clock  what  was  left  of  Prentiss's  division 
surrendered  with  the  Eighth,  Twelfth,  and  Fourteenth  Iowa,  and  the 
Fifty-eighth  Illinois  Regiments,  of  Wallace's  division.  More  than  3,000 
prisoners  were  taken,  Prentiss  and  many  officers  among  them.  This 
division  had  received  the  first  blow  in  the  morning,  and  made  the  last 
organized  resistance  in  the  afternoon. 

Each  Confederate  commander — division,  brigade,  and  regimental — 
as  his  command  pounced  upon  the  prey^  believed  it  entitled  to  the  credit 
of  the  capture.  Breckinridge's,  Withers's,  Ruggles's,  Cheatham's,  and 
other  divisions,  which  helped  to  encircle  and  subdue  these  stubborn 
fighters,  each  imagined  its  own  the  hardest  part  of  the  work — possibly 
the  whole  of  it.  The  capture  was,  in  truth,.due  almost  as  much  to  one  as 
to  another,  as  it  was  the  result  of  the  annihilation  of  Grant's  whole  line. 

A  similar  instance  of  self-deception  occurs  in  many — indeed,  most — 
of  the  Federal  reports  of  this  battle.  According  to  these,  no  com 
mand  ever  gives  way  until  its  neighbors,  on  both  flanks,  have  left  the 
field.  This,  of  course,  is  in  the  nature  of  things  impossible.  It  was,  as 
a  rule,  true  of  one  flank  ;  and  the  gaps  made  in  the  line  by  casualties 
and  flight  left  it  so  ragged  on  the  other  flank  as  to  favor,  if  not  to 
create,  the  illusion.  So  many  human  motives  concur  to  fortify  these 
prejudices  that  we  have  no  occasion  to  be  astonished  at  them. 

The  following  particulars  of  this  momentous  contest  will  not  be 
thought  out  of  place.  In  describing  his  share  in  the  combat,  General 
Polk  says : 

The  enemy  in  our  front  was  gradually  and  successively  driven  from  his 
positions,  and  forced  from  the  field  back  on  the  river-bank.  About  5  p.  M.  my 
line  attacked  the  enemy's  troops — the  last  that  were  left  upon  the  field — in  an 
encampment  on  ray  right.  The  attack  was  made  in  front  and  flank.  The  resist 
ance  was  sharp  but  short.  The  enemy,  perceiving  he  was  flanked  and  his  posi 
tion  completely  turned,  hoisted  the  white  flag  and  surrendered. 

Commending  the  conduct  of  Bragg's  troops  cooperating  with  him, 
and  especially  of  the  Crescent  Regiment,  General  Polk  says  : 


PREXTISS'S   SURRENDER.  621 

General  Prentiss  delivered  his  sword  with  his  command  to  Colonel  Russell, 
one  of  my  brigade  commanders,  who  turned  him  over  to  me.  The  prisoners 
turned  over  were  about  2,000.  They  were  placed  in  charge  of  Lieutenant  Rich- 
mond,  my  aide-de-camp,  and,  with  a  detachment  of  cavalry,  sent  to  the  rear. 

Immediately  after  the  surrender,  General  Polk  ordered  such  cavalry 
as  he  had  in  hand  to  charge  the  fleeing  enemy.  A  detachment  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Miller  "  dashed  forward  and  intercepted  a  battery, 
within  150  yards  of  the  river,  the  Second  Michigan,  and  captured  it 
before  it  could  unlimber  and  open  fire.  It  was  a  six-gun  battery,  com 
plete  in  all  its  equipments,  and  was  captured,  men,  horses,  and  guns. 
A  portion  of  this  cavalry  rode  to  the  river  and  watered  their  horses." 

In  this  final  struggle,  Trabue's  brigade,  which  was  now  on  the  left 
next  to  Cleburne's,  supported  by  Stewart's  brigade,  and  some  fragments 
of  Anderson's,  was  opposed  to  the  remains  of  Sherman's  and  McCler- 
nand's  commands,  including  McDowell's  brigade.  Hardee  was  giving 
direction  to  this  part  of  the  line.  Trabue  ordered  his  command  to  fix 
bayonets  and  charge  at  a  double-quick,  which  they  did  in  the  hand 
somest  manner,  and  with  complete  success.  He  says  : 

The  enemy,  unwilling  and  unable  to  stand  this  charge,  ran  through  their 
camps  into  the  woods  in  their  rear,  whither  we  followed  them.  They  were, 
however,  too  badly  routed  to  make  a  stand,  and  for  several  hundred  yards  I 
moved  forward  without  opposition. 

Embarrassed  by  the  broken  ground  and  thick  undergrowth,  by  an 
enfilading  fire  from  a  Confederate  battery  on  the  right,  and  the  appear 
ance  of  a  Louisiana  regiment  dressed  in  blue  on  the  left,  Trabue's 
movement  was  made  cautiously  and  with  some  delay.  Nevertheless, 
feeling  their  way  with  much  hard  fighting,  and  gradually  drawing  the 
lines  closer,  these  troops  from  the  left  by  a  slight  change  of  front  inter 
cepted,  with  volleys  of  musketry,  the  Federals  flying  from  the  impet 
uous  charge  of  Breckinridge's  brigades  on  the  right.  A  portion  of 
Prentiss's  command  which  surrendered  was  turned  over  to  them  by 
Hardee,  and  sent  to  the  rear  in  charge  of  Crews's  battalion.  Colonel 
Shorter,  of  Bragg's  corps,  was  detached  with  another  lot  of  prisoners. 

Breckinridge's  other  brigades,  advancing,  soon  passed  to  their  front; 
and  the  Sixth  and  Ninth  Kentucky  Regiments  availed  themselves  of 
the  opportunity  "  hastily  to  exchange  their  guns'  for  Enfield  rifles,  which 
the  enemy  had  surrendered."  Trabue  adds : 

I  then  moved  up  and  rejoined  General  Breckinridge,  who,  with  Statham's  and 
Bowen's  brigades,  was  occupying  the  front  line,  being  on  the  crest  of  the  hill 
(or  high  land)  overlooking  the  narrow  valley  of  the  Tennessee  River,  on  which, 
and  near  by,  was  Pittsburg  Landing. 

Having  been  halted  here  for  more  than  an  hour,  we  endured  a  most  terrific 
cannonade  and  shelling  from  the  enemy's  gunboats. 


622  BATTLE   OF  SIIILOH. 

A  few  of  the  troops  were  demoralized  by  this,  and  fell  back  ;  but 
there  was  little  loss. 

Bragg,  having  found  the  Federal  position,  called  "The  Hornets' 
Nest,"  in  front  of  the  Confederate  right  centre  impregnable,  had  ordered 
that  the  troops  there,  who  had  suffered  greatly,  should  hold  their 
position.  When  he  learned  the  fall  of  the  commander-in-ehief,  he 
rode  rapidly  to  the  extreme  right.  Bragg  says  in  his  report : 

Here  I  found  a  strong  force,  consisting  of  three  parts,  without  a  common 
head :  Brigadier-General  Breckinridge,  with  his  reserve  division,  pressing  the 
enemy ;  Brigadier-General  Withers,  with  his  splendid  division,  greatly  exhausted 
and  taking  a  temporary  rest;  and  Major-General  Gheatham,  with  his  division  of 
General  Folk's  command,  to  their  left  and  rear.  These  troops  were  soon  put  in 
motion,  responding  with  great  alacrity  to  the  command,  "Forward — let  every 
order  be  forward !  "  It  was  now  probably  past  four  o'clock,  the  descending  sun 
warning  us  to  press  our  advantage,  and  finish  the  work  before  night  should 
compel  us  to  desist. 

Fairly  in  motion,  these  commands  again,  with  a  common  head  and  a  common 
purpose,  swept  all  before  them.  Neither  battery  nor  battalion  could  withstand 
their  onslaught.  Passing  through  camp  after  camp,  rich  in  military  spoils  of 
every  kind,  the  enemy  was  driven  headlong  from  every  position,  and  thrown 
in  confused  masses  upon  the  river-bank,  behind  his  heavy  artillery,  and  under 
cover  of  his  gunboats  at  the  landing.  He  had  left  nearly  the  whole  of  his  light 
artillery  in  our  hands,  and  some  3,000  or  more  prisoners,  who  were  cut  off  from 
their  retreat  by  the  closing  in  of  our  troops  on  the  left  under  Major-General 
Polk,  with  a  portion  of  his  reserve  corps,  and  Brigadier-General  Ruggles,  with 
Anderson's  and  Pond's  brigades  of  his  division.  The  prisoners  were  dispatched 
to  the  rear  under  a  proper  guard,  all  else  being  left  on  the  field  that  we  might 
press  our  advantage.  The  enemy  had  fallen  back  in  much  confusion,  and  was 
crowded  in  unorganized  masses  on  the  river-bank,  vainly  striving  to  cross.  They 
were  covered  by  a  battery  of  heavy  guns,  well  served,  and  their  two  gunboats, 
which  now  poured  heavy  fire  upon  our  supposed  positions,  for  we  were  entirely 
hid  by  the  forests.  Their  fire,  though  terrific  in  sound,  and  producing  some 
consternation  at  first,  did  us  no  damage,  as  the  shells  all  passed  over,  and  ex 
ploded  far  beyond  our  positions. 

Hardee  gives  the  following  brief  but  spirited  summary  of  the  battle 
in  his  report : 

Nothing  could  be  more  brilliant  than  the  attack.  The  fierce  volleys  of  a 
hundred  thousand  muskets  and  the  boom  of  two  hundred  cannon  receding 
steadily  toward  the  river,  marked,  hour  by  hour  from  dawn  till  night,  our  slow 
but  ceaseless  advance.  The  captured  camps,  rich  in  the  spoils  of  war,  in  arms, 
horses,  stores,  munitions,  and  baggage,  with  throngs  of  prisoners  moving  to  the 
rear,  showed  the  headlong  fury  with  which  our  men  had  crushed  the  heavy 
columns  of  the  foe." 

No  Federal  division  any  longer  preserved  even  a  show  of  organiza 
tion.  Parts  of  regiments,  the  bravest  and  coolest  of  the  men,  stuck  to 


THE   LAST   ASSAULT.  023 

their  colors  and  strove  to  rally  and  form  a  line  of  battle  wherever  they 
could  find  a  nucleus.  There  were  many  such  heroic  spirits  in  the  crushed 
and  mangled  mass  which  was  huddling  back  into  the  angle  between 
Snake  Creek  and  the  Tennessee  River.  Sherman  in  his  report  says : 
"  My  command  had  become  decidedly  of  a  mixed  character.  Buckland's 
brigade  was  the  only  one  that  retained  its  organization."  Buckland's 
own  report,  however,  does  not  sustain  this  view.  He  mentions  that, 
in  the  combat  on  the  Purdy  road — 

The  fleeing  mass  from  the  left  broke  through  our  lines,  and  many  of  our  men 
caught  the  infection  and  fled  with  the  crowd.  Colonel  Cockerill  became  sepa 
rated  from  Colonel  Sullivan  and  myself,  and  was  afterward  engaged  with  part  of 
his  command  at  McClernand's  camp.  Colonel  Sullivan  and  myself  kept  together, 
and  made  every  effort  to  rally  our  men,  with  but  poor  success.  They  had  be 
come  scattered  in  every  direction. 

They  afterward  formed  a  line  of  battle — what  sort  of  a  one  may  be 
imagined  after  reading  the  foregoing.  Colonel  Sullivan  then  marched 
to  the  landing  for  ammunition,  and  did  not  join  Buckland  till  next  day. 
This  tells  the  story.  It  is  difficult  to  see  where  "the  organization" 
was. 

Of  the  two  armies,  one  was  now  an  advancing,  triumphant  host,  with 
arm  uplifted  to  give  the  mortal  blow  ;  the  other,  a  broken,  mangled, 
demoralized  mob,  paralyzed  and  waiting  for  the  stroke.  While  the 
other  Confederate  brigades,  which  had  shared  most  actively  in  Prentiss's 
capture,  were  sending  back  the  prisoners  and  forming  again  for  a  final 
attack,  two  brigades,  under  Chalmers  and  Jackson,  on  the  extreme  right, 
had  cleared  away  all  in  front  of  them,  and,  moving  down  the  river- 
bank,  now  came  upon  the  last  point  where  even  a  show  of  resistance 
was  made.  Two  very  bold  and  active  brigadiers,  they  at  «once  closed 
with  the  enemy  in  their  front,  crossing  a  deep  ravine  and  difficult  ground 
to  get  at  him.  Here  Colonel  Webster,  of  Grant's  staff,  had  gathered 
all  the  guns  he  could  find  from  batteries,  whether  abandoned  or  still 
coherent,  and  with  stout-hearted  men,  picked  up  at  random,  had  pre 
pared  a  resistance.  Some  infantry,  similarly  constituted,  had  been  got 
together  ;  and  Ammen's  brigade,  the  van  of  Nelson's  division,  had 
landed,  and  was  pushing  its  way  through  the  throng  of  pallid  fugitives 
at  the  landing  to  take  up  the  battle  where  it  had  fallen  from  the  hands 
of  Grant  and  Sherman.  It  got  into  position  in  time  to  do  its  part  in 
checking  the  unsupported  assaults  of  Chalmers  and  Jackson. 

In  describing  this  final  attack,  General  Chalmers  says  in  his  report: 

It  was  then  about  four  o'clock  in  the  evening,  and,  after  distributing  ammu 
nition,  we  received  orders  from  General  Bragg  to  drive  the  enemy  into  the 
river.     My  brigade,  together  with  that  of  Brigadier-General  Jackson,  filed  to 
the  right,  and  formed  facing  the  river,  and  endeavored  to  press  forward  to  the 
41 


BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

water's  edge ;  but  in  attempting  to  mount  the  last  ridge  we  were  met  by  a  fire 
from  a  whole  line  of  batteries,  protected  by  infantry  and  assisted  by  shells  from 
the  gunboats.  Our  men  struggled  vainly  to  ascend  the  hill,  which  was  very 
steep,  making  charge  after  charge  without  success,  but  continued  the  fight  until 
night  closed  the  hostilities  on  both  sides. 

During  this  engagement,  Gage's  battery  was  brought  up  to  our  assistance, 
but  suffered  so  severely  that  it  was  soon  compelled  to  retire.  This  was  the 
sixth  fight  in  which  we  had  been  engaged  during  the  day,  and  my  men  were  too 
much  exhausted  to  storm  the  batteries  on  the  hill ;  but  they  were  brought  off 
in  good  order,  formed  in  line  of  battle,  and  slept  on  the  battle-field,  where  I 
remained  with  them. 

Brigadier-General  Jackson  gives  this  account : 

My  brigade  was  ordered  to  change  direction  again,  face  toward  Pittsburg, 
where  the  enemy  appeared  to  have  made  his  last  stand,  and  to  advance  upon 
him,  General  Chalmers's  brigade  being  again  on  my  right,  and  extending  to  the 
swamp  of  the  Tennessee  River.  "Without  ammunition,  and  with  only  their 
bayonets  to  rely  on,  steadily  my  men  advanced,  under  a  heavy  fire  from  light 
batteries,  siege-pieces,  and  gunboats.  Passing  through  the  ravine,  they  arrived 
near  the  crest  of  the  opposite  hill,  upon  which  the  enemy's  batteries  were,  but 
could  not  be  urged  further  without  support.  Sheltering  themselves  against  the 
precipitous  sides  of  the  ravine,  they  remained  under  this  fire  for  some  time. 
Finding  an  advance  without  support  impracticable,  remaining  there  under  fire 
useless,  and  believing  that  any  further  forward  movement  should  be  made 
simultaneously  along  our  whole  line,  I  proceeded  to  obtain  orders  from  General 
Withers ;  but,  before  seeing  him,  was  ordered  by  a  staff  officer  to  retire.  This 
order  was  announced  to  mo  as  coming  from  General  Beauregard,  and  was 
promptly  communicated  to  my  command. 

General  Buell  had  reached  Pittsburg  Landing  about  one  o'clock  ; 
or,  as  Badeau  states  (page  82),  "  midway  in  the  afternoon."  He  says  : 

I  found  Grant  on  his  boat,  with  two  or  more  of  his  staff,  in  the  ladies'  cabin. 
I  proposed  we  should  go  ashore,  and  his  horses  were  accordingly  taken  ashore. 

Buell  also  arranged  with  Grant  to  send  steamers  to  Savannah,  to 
bring  up  Crittenden's  division. 

General  Buell,  in  his  official  report  of  April  15,  1862,  gives  the  fol 
lowing  account  of  the  condition  of  things  at  Pittsburg,  and  of  the  part 
taken  by  himself  and  his  command  in  the  battle  of  the  6th  : 

The  impression  existed  at  Savannah  that  the  firing  was  only  an  affair  of  out 
posts,  the  same  thing  having  occurred  for  the  two  or  three  previous  days  ;  but, 
as  it  continued,  I  determined  to  go  to  the  scene  of  action,  and  accordingly  started 
with  my  chief  of  staff,  Colonel  Fry,  on  a  steamer  which  I  had  ordered  to  get 
under  steam.  As  we  proceeded  up  the  river,  groups  of  soldiers  were  seen  upon 
the  west  bank,  and  it  soon  became  evident  that  they  were  stragglers  from  the 
army  that  was  engaged.  The  groups  increased  in  size  and  frequency  until,  as 


A  ROUTED   ARMY.  625 

we  approached  the  landing,  they  amounted  to  whole  companies,  and  almost 
regiments  ;  and  at  the  landing  the  bank  swarmed  with  a  confused  mass  of  men 
of  various  regiments.  The  number  could  not  have  been  less  than  four  or  five 
thousand,  and  later  in  the  day  it  became  much  greater.  Finding  General  Grant 
at  the  landing,  I  requested  him  to  send  steamers  to  Savannah  to  bring  up  Gen 
eral  Crittenden's  division,  which  had  arrived  during  the  morning,  and  then  went 
ashore  with  him.  The  throng  of  disorganized  and  demoralized  troops  increased 
continually  by  fresh  fugitives  from  the  battle,  which  steadily  drew  nearer  the 
landing ;  and  with  these  were  mingled  great  numbers  of  teams,  all  striving  to 
get  as  near  as  possible  to  the  river.  With  few  exceptions,  all  efforts  to  form 
the  troops  and  move  them  forward  to  the  fight  utterly  failed. 

In  the  mean  time  the  enemy  had  made  such  progress  against  our  troops  that 
his  artillery  and  musketry  began  to  play  into  the  vital  spot  of  the  position,  and 
some  persons  were  killed  on  the  bank  at  the  very  landing.  General  Nelson 
arrived  with  Colonel  Ammen's  brigade  at  this  opportune  moment.  It  was 
immediately  posted  to  meet  the  attack  at  that  point,  and  with  a  battery  of 
artillery  which  happened  to  be  on  the  ground,  .and  was  brought  into  action, 
opened  fire  on  the  enemy,  and  repulsed  him.  The  action  of  the  gunboats  also 
contributed  very  much  to  that  result.  The  attack  at  that  point  was  not 
renewed,  night  having  come  on,  and  the  firing  ceased  on  both  sides.  In  the 
mean  time  the  remainder  of  General  Nelson's  division  crossed,  and  General  Grit- 
tenden's  arrived  from  Savannah  by  steamers. 

Badeau  says  (page  84) : 

A  battery  of  artillery,  well  posted  by  Colonel  Webster,  of  Grant's  staff,  did 
good  service  at  this  juncture,  and  the  gunboats  were  also  of  importance,  as  they 
had  been  for  some  time  previous,  in  checking  the  advance  of  the  enemy  on  the 
extreme  left.  Both  sides  were  now  crippled  and  both  fatigued,  the  extraordi 
nary  efforts  of  the  day  telling  hard  on  either  army.  ...  It  was  nearly  five 
o'clock  when  the  head  of  Nelson's  column  crossed  the  river ;  but,  after  once 
starting  his  troops,  this  commander  was  prompt  in  marching  them,  and  the  men 
themselves  were  eager  to  get  into  battle  and  assist  their  hard-pushed  comrades. 
Two  of  Nelson's  regiments  were  put  in  position,  on  the  extreme  left;  and,  as  a 
final  spasmodic  attack  was  made  by  the  rebels,  these  regiments  fired  two  or 
three  volleys  and  lost  three  men ;  but  it  was  too  late  then  to  affect  the  fortunes 
of  the  day.  The  exhaustion  consequent  upon  their  earlier  efforts  told  upon  the 
rebels  as  well  as  upon  the  national  troops. 

General  Hurlbut,  in  a  letter  to  the  writer,  says  that  he  had  "  at 
least  four  thousand  steady  infantry  in  line  "  to  the  right  of  the  artillery 
massed  under  Colonel  Webster.  He  also  thinks  they  could  have  re 
pelled  an  attack  upon  them.  But  the  contemporaneous  reports  of  his 
subordinates  lead  to  different  conclusions. 

General  Nelson  says  in  his  report  that,  in  obedience  to  orders .  from 
General  Grant,  reiterated  by  General  Buell,  he  left  Savannah  at  half- 
past  one  o'clock,  and  marched  up  the  bank  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  with 
the  head  of  his  column,  at  five  o'clock.  He  continues  : 


626  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

The  Sixth  Ohio  and  Thirty-sixth  Indiana  had  hardly  deployed,  when  the  left 
of  our  artillery  was  completely  turned  by  the  enemy,  and  the  gunners  fled  from 
their  pieces.  The  gallantry  of  the  Thirty-sixth  Indiana,  supported  by  the  Sixth 
Ohio,  under  the  able  conduct  of  Colonel  G.  Ammen,  commanding  the  Tenth 
Brigade,  drove  back  the  enemy  and  restored  the  line  of  battle.  This  was  at 
half-past  six  o'clock,  and  soon  after  the  enemy  withdrew,  owing,  I  suppose,  to 
the  darkness. 

This  repulse  undoubtedly  refers  to  some  of  Chalmers's  later  unsup 
ported  assaults. 

The  following,  from  Nelson's  report,  also  illustrates  the  demoraliza 
tion  of  the  Federal  army.  Nelson  says : 

I  found  cowering  under  the  river-bank  when  I  crossed  from  7,000  to  10,000 
men,  frantic  with  fright  and  utterly  demoralized,  who  received  my  gallant 
division  with  cries  that  "  we  are  whipped !  "  "  cut  to  pieces !  "  etc.  They  were 
insensible  to  shame  and  sarcasm,  for  I  tried  both  on  them ;  and,  indignant  at 
such  poltroonery,  I  asked  permission  to  open  fire  upon  the  knaves. 

The  scene  at  Pittsburg  is  well  pictured  in  the  following  extracts 
from  the  correspondence  of  the  Cincinnati  Gazette : 

Our  whole  army  is  crowded  in  the  region  of  "Wallace's  camps,  and  to  a  cir 
cuit  of  one-half  to  two-thirds  of  a  mile  around  the  landing.  We  have  been 
falling  back  all  day.  "We  can  do  it  no  more.  The  next  repulse  puts  us  into  the 
river ;  and  there  are  not  transports  enough  to  cross  a  single  division  till  the 
enemy  would  be  upon  us.  ...  We  have  lost  nearly  all  our  camps  and  camp- 
equipage.  We  have  lost  nearly  half  our  field-artillery.  We  have  lost  a  division 
general,  and  two  or  three  regiments  of  our  soldiers  as  prisoners.  We  have  lost 
— how  dreadfully  we  are  afraid  to  think — in  killed  and  wounded.  The  hospitals 
are  full  to  overflowing.  A  long  ridge-bluff  is  set  apart  for  surgical  uses.  It  is 
covered  with  the  maimed,  the  dead,  and  the  dying.  And  our  men  are  discour 
aged  by  prolonged  defeat.  .  .  .  Meanwhile,  there  is  a  lull  in  the  firing.  For 
the  first  time  since  sunrise  you  fail  to  catch  the  angry  rattle  of  musketry  or 
the  heavy  booming  of  the  field-guns.  ...  On  the  bluffs  above  the  river  is  a 
sight  that  may  well  make  our  cheeks  tingle.  There  are  not  less  than  5,000 
skulkers  lining  the  banks ! 

The  correspondent  goes  on  to  state  that  Colonel  Webster  placed 
twenty-two  guns  in  all  in  position,  which  were  served  by  improvised 
artillerists.  He  continues  : 

Remember  the  situation.  It  was  half-past  four  o'clock — perhaps  a  quarter 
later  still.  Every  division  of  our  army  on  the  field  had  been  repulsed.  The 
enemy  were  in  the  camps  of  four  out  of  five  of  them.  We  were  driven  to  within 
little  over  half  a  mile  of  the  landing.  Behind  us  was  a  deep,  rapid  river.  Before 
us  was  a  victorious  enemy.  And  still  there  was  an  hour  for  fighting.  "Oh, 
that  night  or  Blucher  would  come!  "  "Oh,  that  night  or  Lew  Wallace  would 
come !  "  Nelson's  division  of  General  Buell's  army  evidently  couldn't  cross  in 
time  to  do  us  much  good.  We  didn't  yet  know  why  Lew  Wallace  wasn't  on  the 


BEAUREGARD'S  THEORY   OF  SHILOH.  627 

ground.     In  the  justice  of  our  cause,  and  in  that  semicircle  of  twenty-two  guns 
in  position,  lay  all  the  hope  we  could  see. 

He  attributes  the  final  repulse  to  the  fire  of  these  batteries,  the 
shelling  of  the  gunboats,  and  the  assistance  of  Nelson's  advance.  That 
these  combined  means  of  resistance  repulsed  the  assaults  actually  made 
is  true.  But  they  do  not  account  for  the  failure  of  the  Confederates  to 
capture  this  position  and  consummate  their  victory,  -which  was  due  to 
General  Beauregard's  premature  recall  of  his  troops  at  the  moment  of 
fate. 


IV.— A  VICTORY  L03T. 

General  Beauregard's  theory  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh  is  so  different 
from  the  writer's  that  it  is  due  to  him  to  give  his  version  of  its  close, 
as  set  forth  in  his  report  and  in  the  writings  of  his  chief  of  staff,  who 
is  indorsed  by  him. 

The  following  is  General  Beauregard's  telegram  to  the  adjutant- 
general  : 

The  battle  commenced  on  the  6th  of  April.  We  attacked  the  enemy  in  a 
strong  position  in  front  of  Pittsburg ;  and,  after  a  severe  battle  of  ten  hours' 
duration,  thanks  be  to  the  Almighty,  we  gained  a  complete  victory,  driving  the 
enemy  from  every  position.  The  loss  on  both  sides  is  heavy,  including  the 
commander-in-chief,  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  who  fell  gallantly  leading  his 
troops  into  the  thickest  of  the  fight. 

G.  T.  BEAUBEGAED,  General  commanding. 

To  General  S.  COOPEK,  Adjutant- General. 

General  Beauregard's  brief  report  of  the  conclusion  of  Sunday's 
battle  is  as  follows  : 

The  chief  command  then  devolved  upon  me,  though  at  the  time  I  was  greatly 
prostrated  and  suffering  from  the  prolonged  sickness  with  which  I  had  been 
afflicted  since  early  in  February.  The  responsibility  was  one  which,  in  my 
physical  condition,  I  would  have  gladly  avoided,  though  cast  upon  me  when  our 
forces  were  successfully  pushing  the  enemy  back  upon  the  Tennessee  River,  and 
though  supported  on  the  immediate  field  by  such  corps  commanders  as  Major- 
Generals  Polk,  Bragg,  and  Hardee,  and  Brigadier- General  Breckinridge  com 
manding  the  reserve. 

It  was  after  six  o'clock,  p.  M.,  as  before  said,  when  the  enemy's  last  position 
was  carried,  and  his  force  finally  broke  and  sought  refuge  behind  a  commanding 
eminence,  covering  the  Pittsburg  Landing,  not  more  than  half  a  mile  distant,  and 
under  the  guns  of  the  gunboats,  which  opened  on  our  eager  columns  a  fierce 
and  annoying  fire  with  shot  and  shell  of  the  heaviest  description.  Darkness  was 
close  at  hand.  Officers  and  men  were  exhausted  by  a  combat  of  over  twelve 
hours,  without  food,  and  jaded  by  the  march  of  the  preceding  day  through  mud 
and  water;  it  was,  therefore,  impossible  to  collect  the  rich  and  opportune  spoils 


628  BATTLE   OF  SHILOE. 

of  war  scattered  broadcast  on  the  field  left  in  our  possession,  and  impracticable 
to  make  any  effective  dispositions  for  their  removal  to  the  rear. 

In  accounting  for  the  frustration  of  an  alleged  attempt  of  General 
Beauregard  to  consummate  the  victory,  Colonel  Jordan,  General  Beau- 
regard's  chief  of  staff,  says  : 

Unfortunately,  however,  the  Federal  encampments  were  plethoric  with  food 
most  tempting  to  hungry  men,  as  well  as  with  clothing  and  other  alluring  spoil ; 
the  thick  woods,  too,  had  greatly  disintegrated  almost  every  regiment,  so  that 
none  of  the  divisions  confronted  in  an  embodied  form  the  last  position  that  re 
mained  between  them  and  the  deep,  broad  waters  of  the  Tennessee.  The  supe 
rior  officers  present,  howbeit,  collected  the  men  immediately  around  them  of 
whatsoever  corps.  Tired,  hungry,  and  exhausted,  as  were  the  Confederates, 
nevertheless  a  number  of  determined  separate  efforts  were  made  by  them, 
during  the  remaining  hour  of  daylight,  to  wrench  their  last  foothold  from  their 
elsewhere-beaten  adversary. 

He  thus  describes  the  order  of  withdrawal  : 

General  Beauregard,  in  the  mean  time,  observing  the  exhausted,  widely-scat 
tered  condition  of  his  army,  directed  it  to  be  brought  out  of  battle,  collected  and 
restored  to  order  as  far  as  practicable,  and  to  occupy  for  the  night  the  captured 
encampments  of  the  enemy.  This,  however,  had  been  done  in  chief  part  by  the 
officers  in  immediate  command  of  the  troops  before  the  order  was  generally  dis 
tributed. 

For  this  last  allegation  there  is  not  the  slightest  warrant. 

And  if  General  Beauregard,  as  Jordan  also  states,  after  Prentiss's 
surrender,  "urged  the  forward  propulsion  of  the  whole  force  upon  the 
shattered  fragments  of  the  enemy,"  these  orders  must  have  miscarried, 
as  a  diligent  search  has  failed  to  discover  that  any  such  were  received 
by  his  subordinates.  The  only  orders  that  reached  them  were  to  retire. 
The  operations  of  the  afternoon  evince  this,  as  can  be  seen  by  the  field 
reports.  There  was  no  failure  by  officers  or  troops  in  their  duty  in  this 
respect. 

Furthermore,  the  final  rout  and  surrender  of  Prentiss  occurred  much 
earlier  than  six  o'clock.  This  is  made  evident  in  the  Confederate 
reports ;  while  the  correspondent  of  the  Cincinnati  Gazette  places 
the  rout  of  the  Federals  earlier  than  half -past  four.  As  to  the 
order  of  withdrawal,  it  was  received  and  in  part  executed  before  six 
o'clock. 

Colonel  Jordan  also  says  that  the  gunboats  "  were  used  with  an 
effect  on  our  troops  to  which  all  will  testify  who  were  in  the  advance 
and  witnessed  it."  The  testimony  of  these  very  people,  when  adduced, 
will  show  the  exact  reverse  of  this :  that  the  roar  and  bursting  of  the 
shells,  however  terrific  in  the  rear,  at  Beauregard's  headquarters,  were 


ERRORS   CORRECTED.  629 

almost  harmless  to  the  troops  near  the  river.  This  was  one  of  the  la 
mentable  features  of  the  day :  that  what  General  Beauregard  saw  at 
Shiloh  Church  should  be  mistaken  for  the  situation  at  the  front ;  that 
the  trains  of  wounded  and  the  tide  of  fugitives  should  supplant  in  his 
eyes  those  heroic  warriors  who  were  still  marching  onward. 

The  substance  of  the  statements  made  by  Colonel  Jordan  is,  that  the 
order  of  withdrawal  was  issued  because  the  last  position  of  the  Federals 
was  impregnable,  because  it  was  too  late  to  effect  anything  decisive, 
and  because  the  Confederate  army  was  dispersed,  disorganized,  demor 
alized,  exhausted,  and  incoherently  managed  by  its  superior  officers. 
Further,  he  maintains  that  the  battle  ended  by  a  sort  of  subsidence 
of  the  fight  from  inanition  before  the  order  of  withdrawal  was  received 
by  the  brigades. 

There  is  just  enough  of  truth  in  all  this  to  mislead.  Among  the 
new  recruits  at  Shiloh  there  were,  of  course,  many  skulkers.  There 
are  in  all  armies.  But  there  is  a  marked  distinction  between  these 
and  the  reckless  soldiers  who,  careless  of  the  restraints  of  discipline 
and  prompted  by  an  idle  and  barbaric  curiosity,  left  their  ranks  to 
gather  trophies  or  for  other  purposes  as  vain.  Big-eyed  wonder,  more 
than  booty,  was  their  motive  ;  and,  at  each  charge,  they  rallied  round 
the  nearest  standard  with  the  zest  of  a  hunt  for  human  game.  The 
only  effective  use  to  be  made  of  such  men  is  to  keep  hurling  them  at 
the  foe.  But  they  are  not  to  be  confounded  with  those  streams  of 
fugitives  which,  like  rivulets  from  the  base  of  a  glacier,  trickle  or  pour 
to  the  rear  with  the  refuse  and  debris  of  the  army. 

The  troops  were  tired  and  hungry,  it  is  true,  and  greatly  weakened 
by  casualties  and  straggling.  But  to  say  that  they  were  "  exhausted  " 
in  the  sense  that  they  could  fight  no  more  is  abundantly  disproved.  It 
is  refuted  by  numerous  positive  statements  of  their  officers,  and  by  the 
vigorous  attacks  by  Chalmers  late  that  evening  and  early  next  morn 
ing,  after  five  combats  and  more  than  average  marching.  The  troops 
were  moving  forward  with  enthusiasm  when  recalled  by  General  Beau- 
regard's  order.  To  confound  such  men  with  the  multitude  of  stragglers 
is  to  do  a  great  act  of  injustice. 

To  illustrate  the  desultory  nature  of  the  "  separate  "  attacks  made 
by  the  Confederates,  "  abortive  assaults "  with  "  fruitless  results,"  as 
he  styles  them,  Colonel  Jordan  cites  an  unsuccessful  attempt  of  Colonel 
Mouton,  of  the  Eighteenth  Louisiana,  "  to  charge  a  battery  on  a  hill " 
about  four  o'clock;  when,  advancing  "unsupported,"  he  was  beaten 
back  with  the  loss  of  207  of  his  men.  With  some  eighty  regiments 
and  battalions  on  the  field,  many  such  attacks  must  have  occurred  that 
day  ;  but  the  particular  case  mentioned  has  no  relevancy,  as  the  time 
at  which  it  was  made  indicates  that  it  was  one  of  that  series  of  attacks 
by  which  the  lines  of  Wallace  and  Prentiss  were  crushed,  and  hence, 


630  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

though  "  unsupported"  and  baffled,  not  "separate,"  but  part  of  a  gen 
eral  system  of  assault  which  was  successful.  Besides,  no  argument  can 
be  drawn  as  to  the  situation  after  the  destruction  of  those  divisions 
from  a  combat  before  that  event.  ' 

Jordan  also  cites,  as  an  illustration  of  the  unconcerted  movements 
at  the  front,  the  last  assaults  by  Chalmers  and  Jackson.  But  these 
were,  in  fact,  only  parts  of  a  well-concerted  general  movement,  which 
was  disconcerted,  paralyzed,  and  brought  to  naught,  by  General  Beau- 
regard's  staff  officers  at  a  critical  moment  withdrawing  the  cooperat 
ing  force  piecemeal.  It  came  near  being  successful  as  it  was.  Had  it 
been  sustained,  it  would  almost  certainly  have  made  the  victory  com 
plete.  To  use  it  as  a  reason  or  justification  for  the  order  of  withdrawal 
is  most  extraordinary. 

Colonel  Jordan  says  that  "  none  of  the  divisions  confronted  in  an 
embodied  form  the  last  position."  This  is  true.  It  would  have  been 
an  unparalleled  case  if,  after  ten  hours  of  continual  assault,  in  a  broken 
and  wooded  country,  divisions  had  been  found  entire.  But  it  proves 
nothing.  The  severance  of  commands  resulted,  as  already  indicated, 
from  the  plan  of  battle,  corps  moving  in  successive  parallel  lines,  and 
from  the  nature  of  the  ground.  But  they  had  fought  in  this  wise  all 
day  ;  every  combat  on  the  field  had  been  thus  won  ;  and  all  the  corps, 
except  Hardee's,  were  more  "embodied"  after  Prentiss's  surrender 
than  they  had  been  since  10  A.  M.  Trabue  was  reunited  to  Breckin- 
ridge,  and  Cheatham  to  Polk,  and  Bragg  had  his  men  more  in  hand 
than  when  charging  positions  miles  apart.  The  army  was  not  demor 
alized,  as  suggested.  Weakened  but  resolute  bands  of  men,  animated 
by  duty,  discipline,  intelligent  patriotism,  and  "the  stern  joy  that  war 
riors  feel,"  still  stood  coherent,  eager,  and  fired  with  the  ardor  of  com 
bat  and  the  exultation  of  a  marvelous  success.  Nothing  remained 
except  to  give  the  finishing  stroke. 

The  real  strength  and  character  of  the  attack  made  by  Chalmers 
and  Jackson,  and  the  measure  of  the  resistance  possible  under  the  cir 
cumstances  by  the  Federal  remnant,  may  be  safely  left  to  the  intelli 
gence  of  the  reader  who  has  carefully  considered  what  has  been  herein 
recorded  from  the  pens  of  both  Federals  and  Confederates.  According 
to  the  writer's  view,  the  actual  contest  was  between  the  fragments  of 
two  Confederate  brigades  and  Webster's  guns,  supported  by  Ammen's 
brigade  and  a  few  infantry.  What  would  have  been  achieved  but  for 
General  Beauregard's  order  of  withdrawal  can  only  be  surmised.  But 
it  will  be  made  clear,  from  contemporary  reports  and  other  sources,  that 
the  state  of  facts  did  not  exist  on  which  the  order  was  based  ;  and  that, 
through  a  total  misconception  of  General  Johnston's  purposes,  and  a 
failure  to  carry  them  out,  a  mighty  victory  was  allowed  to  glide  from 
the  hand  of  the  conqueror.  This  might  have  been  permitted  to  pass  as 


HARDEE  AND  POLK.  631 

a  pardonable  error  of  judgment,  as  indeed  it  seems  to  the  writer  to  be, 
considering  the  ill-health  of  General  Peauregard,  his  position  upon  the 
field,  and  the  part  he  took  in  the  battle  of  Sunday ;  but  it  would  be 
unjust  to  allow  to  pass  into  history  the  claim  set  up  that  his  order  of 
withdrawal  was  an  act  of  consummate  wisdom,  or  anything  else,  in 
deed,  than  a  fatal  blow  to  the  Confederate  cause. 

Let  us  see  whether  General  Beauregard's  theory,  as  expounded  by 
himself  and  his  chief  of  staff,  or  the  writer's  view,  is  verified  by  the 
evidence  in  the  case. 

Governor  Harris  writes  as  follows  in  a  recent  letter  : 

General  Johnston's  plans  had  been  carried  out  with  signal  success  up  to  the 
moment  of  his  death  ;  and  I  believed  tl>en,  as  I  do  now,  that  the  momentum  of 
success  already  achieved  rendered  certain  a  great  and  decisive  victory. 

Hardee,  in  his  report,  says : 

At  this  moment  of  supreme  interest  it  was  our  misfortune  to  lose  the  com 
manding  general.  .  .  .  This  disaster  caused  a  lull  in  the  attack  on  the  right,  and 
precious  hours  were  wasted.  It  is,  in  my  opinion,  the  candid  belief  of  intelli 
gent  men  that  but  for  this  calamity  we  would  have  achieved  before  sunset  a 
triumph,  signal  not  only  in  the  annals  of  this  war,  but  memorable  in  future  his 
tory.  .  .  . 

Upon  the  death  of  General  Johnstonj  the  command  having  devolved  upon 
General  Beauregard,  the  conflict  was  continued  until  near  sunset,  and  the  ad 
vance  divisions  were  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  Pittsburg,  where  the  enemy 
were  huddled  in  confusion,  when  the  order  to  withdraw  was  received.  The 
troops  were  ordered  to  bivouac  upon  the  field  of  battle. 

Speaking  elsewhere  of  Wood's  brigade,  he  incidentally  remarks : 

This  brigade  was  by  my  order  moved  forward  later  in  the  afternoon  in  the 
direction  of  the  heavy  cannonade  in  front,  but  about  sunset  was  ordered  to 
withdraw  by  a  staff  officer  from  General  Beauregard. 

Cleburne,  in  his  report,  says : 

I  again  advanced  until  halted  by  an  aide  of  General  Beauregard,  who  informed 
me  we  were  not  to  approach  nearer  to  the  river. 

General  Folk's  report  says : 

By  this  time  the  troops  under  my  command  were  joined  by  those  of  Gen 
erals  Bragg  and  Breckinridge,  and  my  fourth  brigade,  under  General  Cheatham, 
from  the  right.  The  field  was  clear ;  the  rest  of  the  forces  of  the  enemy  were 
driven  to  the  river  and  under  its  bank.  TVe  had  one  hour  or  more  of  daylight 
still  left,  were  within  one  hundred  and  fifty  to  four  hundred  yards  of  the  en 
emy's  position,  and  nothing  seemed  wanting  to  complete  the  most  brilliant  vic 
tory  of  the  \var  but  to  press  forward  and  make  a  vigorous  assault  on  the  demor 
alized  remnant  of  his  forces. 


BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 

At  this  juncture,  his  gunhoats  dropped  down  the  river  near  the  landing, 
where  his  troops  were  collected,  and  opened  a  tremendous  cannonade  of  shot 
and  shell  over  the  bank  in  the  direction  whence  our  forces  were  approach 
ing.  The  height  of  the  plain  on  which  we  were,  above  the  level  of  the  water, 
was  about  one  hundred  feet,  so  that  it  was  necessary  to  give  great  elevation  to 
his  guns  to  enable  him  to  fire  over  the  bank.  The  consequence  was,  that  shot 
could  take  effect  only  at  points  remote  from  the  river's  edge.  They  were  com 
paratively  harmless  to  our  troops  nearest  the  bank,  and  became  increasingly  so 
as  we  drew  near  the  enemy,  and  placed  him  between  us  and  his  boats.  Here 
the  impression  arose  that  our  forces  were  waging  an  unequal  contest;  that  they 
were  exhausted  and  suffering  from  a  murderous  fire;  arid,  by  an  order  from  the 
commanding  general,  they  were  withdrawn  from  the  field. 

The  following  is  an  extract  from  General  Bragg's  official  report  of 
the  battle  of  Shiloh  : 

It  may  not  be  amiss  to  refer  briefly  to  the  causes  it  is  believed  operated  to 
prevent  the  complete  overthrow  of  the  enemy,  which  we  were  so  near  accom 
plishing,  and  which  would  have  changed  the  entire  complexion  of  the  war.  The 
want  of  proper  organization  and  discipline,  and  the  inferiority  in  many  cases  of 
our  officers  to  the  men  they  were  expected  to  command,  left  us  often  without 
system  or  order,  and  the  large  proportion  of  stragglers  resulting  weakened  our 
forces,  and  kept  the  superior  and  staff  officers  constantly  engaged  in  the  duties 
of  file-closers.  Especially  was  this  the  case  after  the  occupation  of  the  enemy's 
camps,  the  spoils  of  which  served  to  delay  and  greatly  to  demoralize  our  men. 
But  no  one  cause  probably  contributed  so  greatly  to  our  loss  of  time,  which  was 
the  loss  of  success,  as  the  fall  of  the  commanding  general.  At  the  moment  of 
this  irreparable  disaster,  the  plan  of  battle  was  being  rapidly  and  successfully 
executed  under  his  immediate  eye  and  lead  on  the  right.  For  want  of  a  common 
superior  to  the  different  commands  on  that  part  of  the  field,  great  delay  oc 
curred  after  this  misfortune,  and  that  delay  prevented  the  consummation  of  the 
work  so  gallantly  and  successfully  begun  and  carried  on,  until  the  approach  of 
night  induced  our  new  commander  to  recall  the  exhausted  troops  for  rest  and 
recuperation  before  a  crowning  effort  on  the  next  morning. 

As  soon  as  our  troops  could  be  again  formed  and  put  in  motion,  the  order 
was  given  to  move  forward  at  all  points  and  sweep  the  enemy  from  the  field. 
The  sun  was  about  disappearing,  so  that  little  time  was  left  us  to  finish  the 
glorious  work  of  the  day — a  day  unsurpassed  in  the  history  of  warfare  for  its 
daring  deeds,  brilliant  achievements,  and  heavy  sacrifices. 

Our  troops,  greatly  exhausted  by  twelve  hours'  incessant  fighting,  without 
food,  mostly  responded  to  the  order  with  alacrity,  and  the  movement  com 
menced  with  every  prospect  of  success,  though  a  heavy  battery  in  our  front,  and 
the  gunboats  on  our  right,  seemed  determined  to  dispute  every  inch  of  ground. 
Just  at  this  time  an  order  was  received  from  the  commanding  general  to  with 
draw  the  forces  beyond  the  enemy's  fire.  As  this  was  communicated  in  many 
instances  direct  to  brigade  commanders,  the  troops  were  soon  in  motion  and  the 
action  ceased.  The  different  commands,  mixed  and  scattered,  bivouacked  at 
points  most  convenient  to  their  positions  and  beyond  the  range  of  the  enemy's 
guns.  All  firing,  except  a  half-hour's  shot  from  the  gunboats,  ceased,  and  the 
whole  night  was  passed  by  our  exhausted  men  in  quiet.  Such  as  had  not 


BRAGG'S   OPINION.  633 

sought  shelter  in  the  camps  of  the  enemy  were  again  drenched  before  morn 
ing  by  one  of  those  heavy  rain-storms  which  seemed  to  be  our  portion  for  this 
expedition. 

But  General  Bragg  is  still  more  explicit  in  his  sketch  of  "  Shiloh," 
communicated  to  the  writer.  After  discussing  the  events  up  to  the 
time  of  General  Johnston's  death,  which,  he  says,  "sealed  the  fate  of 
the  South,  and  destroyed  the  'liberties  of  this  country,"  Bragg  says  : 

The  command  devolved,  of  course,  on  General  Beauregard,  the  next  in  rank, 
who,  in  feeble  health,  as  previously  stated,  was  with  his  carriage,  where  the 
commanding  general  had  assigned  him,  far  in  the  rear  of  the  strife,  directing  the 
movements  of  the  reserves.  The  fall  of  Johnston  produced  a  sort  of  temporary 
paralysis  with  the  troops  under  his  immediate  command  on  our  right.  But, 
after  a  short  respite,  which  they  improved  to  replenish  their  haversacks  and 
cartridge-boxes  from  the  enemy's  rich  stores,  they  resumed  their  victorious 
march  under  the  direction  of  General  Bragg,  who  had  promptly  repaired  to  this 
part  of  his  command  on  receiving  notice  of  General  Johnston's  death. 

The  troops  promptly  and  enthusiastically  responded  to  the  command  "For 
ward  !  Let  every  order  be  forward ! "  The  rapid  and  near  approach,  at  this 
time,  of  all  our  troops  to  the  enemy's  last  stronghold,  immediately  on  the  bank 
of  the  river,  where  we  had  completely  enveloped  all  that  was  left  to  him  from 
five  of  his  six  divisions,  indicated  that  the  end  was  inevitable  and  near  at  hand. 
Concurring  testimony,  especially  that  of  the  prisoners  on  both  sides — our  capt 
ured  being  present  and  witnesses  to  the  demoralization  of  the  enemy,  and  their 
eagerness  to  escape  or  avoid  further  slaughter  by  surrender — left  no  doubt  but 
that  a  persistent,  energetic  assault  would  soon  have  been  crowned  by  a  general 
yielding  of  his  whole  force.  About  one  hour  of  daylight  was  left  to  us.  The 
enemy's  gunboats,  his  last  hope,  took  position  opposite  us,  in  the  river,  and 
commenced  a  furious  cannonade  at  our  supposed  position.  From  the  elevation 
necessary  to  reach  the  high  bluff,  on  which  we  were  operating,  this  proved  "  all 
sound  and  fury  signifying  nothing,"  and  did  not  in  the  slightest  degree  mar  our 
prospects  or  our  progress.  Not  so,  however,  in  our  rear,  where  these  heavy 
shells  fell  among  the  reserves  and  stragglers;  and,  to  the  utter  dismay  of  the 
commanders  on  the  field,  the  troops  were  seen  to  abandon  their  inspiring  work, 
and  to  retire  sullenly  from  the  contest  when  danger  was  almost  past,  and  vic 
tory,  so  dearly  purchased,  was  almost  certain.  .  .  . 

What  followed  is  a  part  of  the  sad  history  of  the  country,  and  need  not  be 
recapitulated.  Had  the  first  shot  of  the  5th,  on  the  skirmish-line,  killed  Sidney 
Johnston,  the  battle  of  Shiloh  would  not  have  been  fought  and  won  by  the 
Confederates.  Had  the  fatal  shot  which  struck  him  down  on  the  6th  not  been 
fired,  Grant  and  his  forces  would  have  been  destroyed  or  captured  before  sun 
down,  and  Buell  would  never  have  crossed  the  Tennessee. 

A  few  days  after  our  great  disaster,  the  Secretary  of  War  telegraphed  Gen 
eral  Bragg  that  the  President  had  nominated,  and  the  Senate  had  confirmed 
him,  as  general  in  the  Confederate  States  Army,  to  fill  the  vacancy  caused  by 
Sidney  Johnston's  death.  To  that  dispatch  the  following  reply  was  sent :  "  I 
feel  greatly  honored  at  my  selection  by  the  President  to  succeed  Sidney  John 
ston — no  one  can  fill  the  vacancy." 


634  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 

Colonel  Jordan,  after  saying  that  the  officers  in  immediate  command 
of  the  troops  were  withdrawing  before  General  Beauregard's  order  to 
retire  was  generally  distributed,  adds  in  a  note  ("  Life  of  Forrest," 
page  134)  : 

This  was  especially  the  case  with  Bragg's  corps.  Yet,  oddly  enough,  Gen 
eral  Bragg,  in  his  own  official  report,  ventures  to  state  that  his  men,  though 
greatly  exhausted,  were  about  to  charge  with  great  alacrity  upon  the  last  posi 
tion,  and  most  probably  would  have  carried  it,  when  Beauregard's  order  was 
received  recalling  them. 

He  says  further  (page  150)  : 

His  order  really  was  not  distributed  before  the  greater  part  of  the  Confed 
erate  troops  had  already  given  up  the  attempt  for  that  day  to  carry  the  ridge  at 
the  landing. 

As  it  might  appear  from  these  dicta  that  Bragg's  report  was  base 
less,  the  following  extracts  are  given  from  the  reports  of  his  subordi 
nates. 

Major-General  Withers,  in  his  official  report  of  June  20,  1862,  says  : 

This  division  was  then  advanced  to  the  Pittsburg  edge  of  the  field,  in  which 
the  enemy  had  stacked  their  arms,  and  halted  for  a  supply  of  ammunition.  Most 
of  the  regiments  were  supplied  from  the  camps  of  the  enemy.  The  order  was 
now  given  by  General  Bragg,  who  was  present  on  the  right  during  the  fierce 
fight  which  ended  in  the  capture  of  Prentiss,  to  "  sweep  everything  forward !  " 
This  division  was  moved  promptly  forward,  although  some  regiments  had  not 
succeeded  in  getting  a  supply  of  ammunition,  and  had  just  entered  a  steep  and 
precipitous  ravine,  when  the  enemy  opened  a  terrific  fire  upon  it.  Staff  officers 
were  immediately  dispatched  to  bring  up  all  the  reinforcements  to  be  found,  and 
the  order  was  given  to  brigade  commanders  to  charge  the  batteries.  These 
orders  were  being  obeyed,  when,  to  my  astonishment,  a  large  portion  of  the 
command  was  observed  to  move  rapidly  by  the  left  flank  from  under  the  fire  of 
the  enemy.  Orders  were  immediately  sent  to  arrest  the  commanding  officers, 
and  for  the  troops  to  be  promptly  placed  in  position  for  charging  the  batteries. 
Information  was  soon  brought,  however,  that  it  was  by  General  Beauregard's 
orders,  delivered  thus  directly  to  brigade  commanders,  that  the  troops  were 
being  rapidly  led  from  under  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  gunboats.  Thus  ended  the 
fight  on  Sunday,  and  thus  was  this  command  disorganized,  an  evil  sorely  felt 
during  the  next  day. 

Major-General  Ruggles,  Bragg's  other  division  commander,  makes 
the  following  statement  in  his  report : 

Subsequently,  while  advancing  toward  the  river,  I  received  instructions  from 
General  Bragg  to  carry  forward  all  the  troops  I  could  find,  and,  while  assembling 
a  considerable  force  ready  for  immediate  action,  I  received  from  Colonel  Au- 
gustin  notice  of  General  Beauregard's  orders  to  withdraw  from  the  further  pur 
suit  ;  and,  finding  soon  afterward  that  the  forces  were  falling  back,  I  retired 
with  them,  just  as  night  set  in,  to  the  open  field  in  the  rear;  and,  as  I  received 


GIBSON   AND    GILMER.  635 

no  further  orders,  I  directed  General  Anderson  and  Colonel  Gibson  to  hold 
their  troops  in  readiness,  with  their  arms  cleaned  and  cartridges  supplied,  for 
service  the  next  morning. 

By  reference  to  Jackson's  report  of  his  last  charge  (page  624),  it 
will  be  seen  that  he  was  thus  withdrawn.  General  R.  L.  Gibson,  com 
manding  one  of  Ruggles's  brigades,  commenting  in  an  unofficial  letter, 
writes  as  follows : 

From  all  I  have  heen  able  to  gather,  the  conception,  or  plan  of  battle,  was 
excellent.  It  was  a  complete  surprise ;  and,  at  the  moment  of  General  John 
ston's  fall,  so  far  as  I  could  learn,  we  were  successful  all  along  the  lines.  The 
enemy  was  broken  and  routed,  and  in  full  retreat.  I  was  riding  with  General 
Cheatham,  when  the  news  of  his  death  was  confirmed.  We  were  moving  our 
commands  toward  the  river,  with  nothing  in  sight  to  oppose  our  easy  march. 
"When  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  the  river,  the  gunboats  opened  an  aimless 
fire  in  the  direction  we  were  moving.  We  halted  and  formed  line  of  battle,  and 
sent  forward  scouts  and  skirmishers,  preparatory  to  attacking  or  resuming  the 
march  toward  the  river.  While  at  this,  I  met  my  general  of  division,  General 
Ruggles,  and  he  told  me  the  order  was  to  halt.  It  was  yet  light.  I  am  not  sure 
the  sun  was  down.  You  could  see  as  well  as  at  mid-day.  It  was  before  twi 
light.  I  think  we  had  at  least  one  good  battle-hour  remaining. 

My  conviction  is  that,  had  General  Johnston  survived,  the  victory  would 
have  been  complete,  and  his  army  would  have  planted  the  standard  of  the  Con 
federacy  on  the  banks  of  the  Ohio. 

General  Johnston's  death  was  a  tremendous  catastrophe.  There  are  no  words 
adequate  to  express  my  own  conception  of  the  immensity  of  the  loss  to  our 
country.  Sometimes  the  hopes  of  millions  of  people  depend  upon  one  head  and 
one  arm.  The  West  perished  with  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  and  the  Southern 
country  followed. 

General  Gilmer,  in  a  letter  to  the  writer,  dated  September  17,  1872, 
gives  the  following  statement  in  regard  to  the  battle  : 

It  is  my  well-considered  opinion  that,  if  your  father  had  survived  the  day, 
he  would  have  crushed  and  captured  General  Grant's  army  before  the  setting 
of  the  sun  on  the  6th.  In  fact,  at  the  time  your  father  received  the  mortal 
wound  advancing  with  General  Breckinridge's  command,  the  day  was  ours. 
The  enemy  having  lost  all  the  stormed  positions  on  that  memorable  field,  his 
troops  fell  back  in  great  disorder  on  the  banks  of  the  Tennessee.  .  To  cover  the 
confusion,  rapid  fires  were  opened  from  the  gunboats  the  enemy  had  placed  in 
the  river;  but  the  shots  passed  entirely  over  our  devoted  men,  who  were  exult 
ant  and  eager  to  be  led  forward  to  the  final  assault,  which  must  have  resulted  in 
a  complete  victory,  owing  to  the  confusion  and  general  disorganization  of  the 
Federal  troops.  I  know  the  condition  of  General  Grant's  army  at  the  moment, 
as  I  had  reached  a  high,  projecting  point  on  the  bank  of  the  river  about  a  mile 
above  Pittsburg  Landing,  and  could  see  the  hurried  movements  to  get  the  dis 
ordered  troops  across  to  the  right  bank.  Several  thousand  had  already  passed, 
and  a  confused  mass  of  men  crowded  to  the  landing  to  get  on  the  boats  that 
were  employed  in  crossing.  I  rode  rapidly  to  General  Bragg's  position  to  re- 


636  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

port  what  I  had  seen,  and  suggested  that  if  he  would  suspend  the  fire  of  his 
artillery,  and  marshal  his  infantry  for  a  general  advance,  the  enemy  must  sur 
render.  General  Bragg  decided  to  make  the  advance,  and  authorized  me  and 
other  officers  to  direct  the  commanders  of  the  batteries  to  cease  firing. 

In  the  midst  of  these  preparations,  orders  reached  General  Bragg  from  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  directing  the  troops  to  be  withdrawn  and  placed  in  camp  for 
the  night  —  the  intention  being  to  resume  the  contest  in  the  morning.  This  was 
fatal,  as  it  enabled  General  Buell  and  General  Wallace  to  arrive  on  the  scene 
of  action  ;  that  is,  they  came  up  in  the  course  of  the  night.  Had  General  Beau- 
regard  known  the  condition  of  the  enemy,  as  your  father  knew  it,  when  he  re 
ceived  the  fatal  shot,  the  order  for  withdrawal  would  certainly  not  have  been 
given,  and,  without  such  order,  I  know  the  enemy  would  have  been  crushed. 

General  Duke,  in  his  "  Life  of  Morgan,"  takes  the  following  view 
of  these  events  (page  154)  : 

It  is  a  point  conceded  now  on  all  sides  that,  had  the  Confederate  army  pur 
sued  its  success  on  the  evening  of  the  first  day,  the  army  under  General  Grant 
would  have  been  annihilated,  and  Buell  never  could  have  crossed  the  river. 
Had  General  Johnston  survived,  the  battle  would  have  been  pressed  vigorously 
to  that  consummation.  Then,  what  would  have  been  the  situation?  The  army, 
remaining  upon  the  banks  of  the  Tennessee  for  a  few  days,  would  have  been 
reorganized  and  recovered  from  the  exhausting  effects  of  the  battle.  The 
slightly  wounded,  returning  to  the  ranks,  would  have  made  the  muster-roll  full 
thirty  thousand  effectives.  Price  and  Van  Dorn,  coming  with  about  fifteen 
thousand,  and  the  levies  from  all  quarters  which  were  hastening  to  Corinth, 
would  have  given  General  Johnston  nearly  sixty  thousand  men. 

Duke  then  goes  on  to  consider  the  results,  which  he  concludes  must 
have  transferred  the  seat  of  war  to  Kentucky,  perhaps  to  the  North 
western  States. 

Finally,  I  shall  take  the  liberty  of  quoting  Colonel  Jordan  in  reply 
to  himself  ("Life  of  Forrest,"  page  134).  In  giving  the  deeds  of  For 
rest  and  his  men  in  the  fray,  he  says  : 

They  assisted  in  the  capture  of  General  Prentiss's  men,  and,  being  mounted, 
as  well  as  comparatively  fresh,  led  the  advance  upon  the  ridge,  where  the  bat 
tery  was  established.  Despite  the  efforts  of  the  Federal  officers,  such  was  the 
confusion  prevalent  as  Forrest  began  to  skirmish  vigorously,  that  he  sent  a 
staff  officer  to  report  to  General  Polk  (from  whom  he  had  last  received  orders), 
that  by  a  strong,  rapid,  forward  movement,  the  enemy  might  be  driven  into  the 
river. 


Jordan  also  says  in  a  note  (page  135),  that  A\rillie  Forrest,  a  boy  of 
fifteen— 

with  two  other  comrades  of  the  same  age,  happening  to  get  detached,  made 
their  way  to  the  river,  near  which  they  came  upon  fifteen  or  twenty  Federal 
soldiers.  Firing  upon  the  group  with  their  shot-guns,  these  boys  then  charged, 
and  captured  and  led  away  seme  fifteen  prisoners,  whom  they  delivered  to  the 
provost-marshal. 


CHALMERS'S  ACCOUXT.  637 

Could  a  more  striking  illustration  be  given  of  the  demoralization  of 
the  Federal  army ;  and  this,  too,  under  "  a  raking  fire  from  the  gun 
boats,  and  the  artillery  of  both  sides  playing  over  their  heads  ! " 

Another  incident  of  the  battle,  in  connection  with  General  Forrest 
and  his  son,  deserves  to  be  remembered  as  illustrative  of  the  condition  of 
our  undisciplined  troops  after  the  fight,  and  as  showing  how  much  was 
lost  by  a  failure  to  press  forward  while  our  men  were  together,  and  be 
fore  night  and  the  demoralization  of  victory,  with  its  rich  spoils,  had 
scattered  them  ;  and  it  is  thus  told  by  General  Chalmers  : 

When  night  put  a  stop  to  my  efforts  to  take  the  last  hill  above  Pittsburg 
Landing,  I  fell  back,  and  found  to  my  great  surprise  that  our  whole  army  had 
fallen  back.  I  bivouacked  my  men  in  line  on  the  ground  where  Prentiss  surren 
dered,  and  about  midnight  was  awakened  by  Colonel  (afterward  General)  For 
rest,  who  was  searching  for  his  son,  whom  he  supposed  to  have  been  killed. 

He  asked  me  first  for  the  headquarters  of  General  Beauregard,  then  of 
Bragg,  Polk,  and  Ilardee;  and  I  told  him  I  did  not  know  where  any  of  them 
were.  He  asked  then  where  my  command  was;  and  I  answered,  "  Sleeping  in 
line  before  me  with  their  guns  by  their  sides."  He  replied,  "  You  are  the  first 
general  I  have  found  to-night  who  knows  where  his  men  are,  and  if  the  enemy 
attack  us  in  the  morning  they  will  whip  us  like  hell!  "  He  said,  " I  will  put  out 
a  picket  in  front  of  you."  And  he  did,  and  gave  me  timely  notice,  before  day, 
that  the  enemy  was  preparing  to  advance. 

It  is  thus  seen  that,  so  far  from  General  Bragg's  corps  withdraw 
ing  before  the  distribution  of  the  order,  both  Jackson  and  Withers 
concur  that  this  order  came  direct  from  General  Beauregard ;  while 
Chalmers,  who  did  not  receive  any  order  to  retire,  continued  the  fight 
alone  until  dark. 

Chalmers  says,  in  a  memorandum  to  the  writer : 

One  more  resolute  movement  forward  would  have  captured  Grant  and  his 
whole  army,  and  fulfilled  to  the  letter  the  battle-plan  of  the  great  Confederate 
general,  who  died  in  the  belief  that  victory  was  ours,  and  that  his  own  reputa 
tion  was  fully  redeemed. 

General  Beauregard  sums  up  his  theory  of  the  plan  of  battle  in  his 
report  in  the  following  language  : 

By  a  rapid  and  vigorous  attack  on  General  Grant,  it  was  expected  he  would 
be  beaten  back  into  his  transports  and  the  river,  or  captured  in  time  to  enable 
us  to  profit  by  the  victory,  and  remove  to  the  rear  all  the  stores  and  munitions 
that  would  fall  into  our  hands  in  such  an  event  before  the  arrival  of  General 
Buell's  army  on  the  scene.  It  was  never  contemplated,  however,  to  retain  the 
position  thus  gained  and  abandon  Corinth,  the  strategic  point  of  the  campaign. 

Why,  then,  did  he  stop  short  in  his  career  ?  Sunday  evening,  it  was 
not  a  question  of  retaining,  but  of  gaining  Pittsburg  Landing.  On 
that  day  there  was  no  strategic  point  for  Confederates  under  all  the 


(538  BATTLE   OF   SIIILOII. 

heavens  except  the  heart  and  vitals  of  Grant's  army,  which  crouched 
throbbing,  pierced,  mangled,  and  bleeding,  under  the  bluffs  at  Pitts- 
burg  Landing. 

That  General  Beauregard's  view  of  General  Johnston's  plans  is 
fallacious,  must  be  apparent  to  the  reader  of  these  pages.  It  is  un 
happily  only  too  plain  that  he  misinterpreted  the  vast  purpose  of  his 
commander.  What  were  the  consequences  of  that  mistake  ? 

The  last  attack  of  the  day  was  about  to  be  made,  and  in  sufficient 
force  to  insure  its  success.  Most  of  the  Confederate  brigades  were 
swarming  to  the  front,  converging  their  lines  upon  the  sole  point  of  de 
fense.  Their  ability  to  take  it  seems  scarcely  to  admit  a  doubt.  That 
little  screen  thrown  down,  the  Federal  army  lay  at  the  absolute  mercy 
of  its  antagonist.  The  Confederates,  in  possession  of  the  heights,  could 
have  poured  concentrated  destruction  and  slaughter  into  the  confused 
mass  below,  and  compelled  instant  surrender.  All  the  fruits  of  victory 
seemed  within  the  grasp  of  the  Confederate  army,  when  the  prize  so 
dearly  bought  was  suddenly  snatched  away.  It  was  as  in  those  dreams 
where  visions  of  untold  riches,  and  power,  and  splendor,  loom  before 
the  sleeper,  when  a  word  rudely  awakens  him  to  the  hard  realities,  it 
may  be  even  to  the  cruel  afflictions,  of  actual  life.  The  Confederates 
saw  Grant  crushed,  annihilated  ;  Buell  checked,  retreating  ;  the  tide  of 
war  rolled  back  and  pouring  across  the  border  ;  Kentucky,  Missouri, 
aroused,  instinct  with  martial  fervor,  and  springing  into  the  ranks  with 
their  sisters  of  the  South;  renewed  prestige,  restored  confidence,  in 
creased  credit,  strength,  and  means  of  warfare  ;  peace,  prosperity,  and 
independence  ;  and  a  young  and  strong  Confederacy,  a  martial  virgin 
— a  helmeted  Minerva — among  the  nations,  entering  on  a  long  and 
splendid  career,  in  which  liberty  and  order,  justice  and  tradition,  power 
and  peace,  should  uphold  the  fabric  of  the  state.  The  omen  of  the 
name  was  to  be  fulfilled.  At  "  Shiloh,"  "  he  whose  right  it  is  "  was 
about  to  prevail.  But,  in  the  sad  significance  of  the  result,  the  fulfill 
ment  remained  as  obscure  as  the  oracle  was  ambiguous.  After  all,  it 
was  only  a  dream,  in  which  bearded  men  and  red-handed  warriors  saw, 
through  the  smoke  of  the  battle-field,  and  the  mists  of  blood-reeking 
forest-lands,  an  idea  grow  into  life.  But  the  spell  was  broken,  the 
scene  dissolved  ;  all  these  fair  promises  of  the  future  "  are  melted  into 
air,  thin  air  " — 

"  And,  like  the  baseless  fabric  of  this  vision, 
....  this  insubstantial  pageant  faded, 
Leave  not  a  rack  behind." 

All  was  shattered  by  one  word.  "  On  !  "  would  have  made  it  his 
tory;  but  the  commanding  general  said,  "Retire."  Oh,  the  power  of 
a  general-in-chief !  It  was  all  over.  That  bloody  field  was  to  mean 


DARKXESS.  639 

nothing  in  all  time  but  a  slain  hero,  and  25,000  dauntless  soldiers 
stretched  upon  a  bloody  field — and  another  day  of  purposeless  slaugh 
ter,  with  broken  bands  of  desperate  men  mangling  and  slaying  to 
no  visible  end  in  all  God's  plan  of  setting  up  the  right.  The  great 
forest  tract  was  sinking  into  darkness,  stained,  trampled,  and  echoing 
with  groans.  But  the  victory — its  very  hope — was  gone.  "  They  had 
watered  their  horses  in  the  Tennessee  River ; "  but,  when  he  fell  who 
spoke  the  word,  the  prediction  had  lost  its  meaning. 


CHAPTER  XXXV. 
I. 

THE   NIGHT    OF    THE    6TH. 

NIGHTFALL  found  the  victorious  Confederates  retiring  from  the 
front,  and  abandoning  the  vantage-ground  on  the  bluffs,  won  at  such  a 
cost  of  blood.  This  gave  the  Federals  room  and  opportunity  to  come 
out  from  their  corner,  and  to  advance  and  reoccupy  the  strong  positions 
from  which  they  had  been  driven,  and  dispose  their  troops  on  much 
more  favorable  ground  than  the  crowded  landing  permitted.  Called 
off  from  the  pursuit  by  staff  officers,  who  gave  no  specific  instructions, 
the  brigades,  according  to  circumstances,  bivouacked  on  the  battle-field, 
inarched  to  the  rear,  or  made  themselves  comfortable  on  the  profuse 
spoils  of  the  enemy's  encampments.  Some  were  painfully  threading 
the  dark  paths  of  the  forest,  finding  or  losing  their  way,  in  search  of 
vaguely-designated  positions.  Others  sought  the  sleep  of  exhaustion 
in  dread  of  some  sudden  sally,  not  knowing  how  they  lay  toward  friend 
or  foe. 

Jordan  estimates  the  losses  of  the  6th  ("Life  of  Forrest,"  page  138) 
at  6,500.  There  were,  of  course,  many  stragglers.  He  estimates  the 
Confederate  infantry,  ready  for  battle  on  the  morning  of  the  7th,  at 
20,000  men.  Jordan  also  says  that  Polk  led  his  troops  a  mile  and  a 
half  to  the  rear  of  Shiloh.  This  is  a  mistake.  Clark's  division,  now 
under  A.  P.  Stewart,  bivouacked  on  the  ground.  Cheatham,  having 
become  detached  with  one  brigade,  thought  best  to  retire  to  his  en 
campments  of  the  night  before  ;  but  he  held  his  men  well  in  hand, 
and  had  them  ready  for  engagement  early  next  morning.  Their 
withdrawal  and  position  were  reported  that  night  by  General  Polk  to 
General  Beauregard,  who  gave  no  orders  for  their  return.  Polk  joined 
them,  in  order  to  be  sure  of  their  early  presence  on  the  field,  and  led 
42 


640  THE  NIGHT  OF  THE   6TH. 

them  back  at  an  early  hour;  and  their  conduct  was  uncommonly  spir 
ited  on  Monday. 

At  regular  intervals  of  ten  minutes  the  gunboats  threw  a  shell; 
and  the  boom  and  roar  of  these  heavy  missiles,  bursting  among  the 
tired  Confederates,  broke  their  repose  and  added  to  the  demoralization. 
At  midnight,  too,  another  heavy  storm  broke  upon  them,  drenching 
those  who  had  not  been  so  fortunate  as  to  secure  shelter  in  the  Federal 
encampments.  There  was  no  lack  of  provisions,  however,  and  the  men 
reveled  without  stint  in  the  unwonted  luxuries  of  the  Federal  sutlers5 
stores. 

At  headquarters,  credence  was  given  to  a  misleading  dispatch  from 
Decatur  (or  Florence). 

Colonel  Jordan,  in  a  letter  to  the  Savannah  Republican,  says  of 
General  Beauregard : 

Animated  by  the  plain  dictates  of  prudence  and  foresight,  lie  sought  to  be 
ready  for  the  coming  storm,  which  he  had  anticipated  and  predicted  as  early  as 
the  afternoon  of  the  5th. 

By  this  he  means  the  arrival  of  Buell's  reinforcements.  And  he 
says  in  the  same  letter  : 

General  Beauregard  had  the  current  [concurrent  ?]  evidence  of  prisoners  and 
scouts,  that  Buell's  arrival  was  confidently  expected.  ...  It  was,  however, 
after  General  Beauregard  had  given  his  orders,  and  made  his  arrangements  as 
far  as  practicable  to  meet  any  exigency,  that  I  joined  him  and  communicated 
the  substance  of  a  dispatch,  addressed  to  General  Johnston,  that  Lad  been 
handed  me  on  the  battle-field,  which  encouraged  the  hope  that  the  main  part  of 
Buell's  forces  had  marched  in  the  direction  of  Decatur. 

He  says  (in  his  "  Life  of  Forrest,"  page  136)  that  this  emanated 
from  a  reliable  officer,  placed  near  Florence  for  observation,  and  adds : 

Buell's  timely  junction  with  General  Grant  was  accordingly  deemed  impos 
sible.  Therefore  the  capture  of  the  latter  was  regarded  at  Confederate  head 
quarters  as  inevitable  the  next  day,  as  soon  as  all  the  scattered  Confederate 
reserves  could  be  brought  to  bear  for  a  concentrated  effort. 

Colonel  Preston  telegraphed  to  the  President  from  Corinth,  April 
7th. 

General  Johnston  fell  yesterday  while  leading  a  successful  charge,  turning 
the  enemy's  right,  and  gaining  a  brilliant  victory.  (Here  follow  some  details 
already  given.)  Last  night  Colonel  Gilmer  informed  me  he  saw  the  enemy  em 
barking  under  cover  of  their  gunboats — and  no  commencement  of  the  conflict 
was  expected  by  General  Beauregard. 

In  spite  of  the  somewhat  imprudent  boasts  of  General  Prentiss  that 
Buell's  reinforcements  would  turn  the  tide  of  battle  in  the  morning,  it 


FEDERAL  REEXFORCEMENT8.  641 

was  expected,  therefore,  that  the  next  day's  work  would  be  merely  to 
pick  up  the  spoils  of  victory.  During  the  night,  Forrest  reported  that 
reenforcements  were  arriving  ;  but  no  other  steps  were  taken  than  the 
usual  precautions  against  surprise  by  an  army  in  the  face  of  the  enemy. 

Lew  "Wallace's  division,  8,000  strong,  came  marching  up  from 
Crump's  Landing,  a  little  after  nightfall,  and,  filing  over  the  Snake 
Creek  crossing,  was  placed  soon  after  midnight  on  the  Federal  right, 
covering  the  fragments  of  Sherman's  and  McClernand's  divisions. 
During  the  night  the  entire  divisions  of  Nelson  and  Crittenden  were 
got  across  the  river,  and,  by  daylight,  that  of  McCook  began  to  arrive. 
Nelson  took  position  on  the  left  ;  Crittenden,  next  to  him ;  and  then 
McCook.  The  interval  between  McCook  and  Wallace  was  occupied 
by  such  commands  of  Grant's  army  as  the  officers  had  been  able  to  get 
into  shape. 

Badeau  ("  Life  of  Grant,"  page  86)  says  : 

All  the  camps  originally  occupied  by  the  national  troops  were  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy,  but  the  rebel  advance  had  been  checked  at  every  point.  The 
division  organization  was,  however,  greatly  broken  up.  Sherman  had  lost 
thousands  by  desertion  and  straggling;  Prentiss  had  been  captured,  with  2,200 
men ;  while  TV.  H.  L.  Wallace's  command  was  nearly  destroyed,  by  casualties 
and  the  loss  of  its  chief.  The  line,  as  constituted  on  Sunday  night,  was  simply 
a  mass  of  brave  men,  determined  to  hold  their  own  against  the  enemy,  wherever 
they  found  a  commander. 

General  Sherman  says  that  as  early  as  5  P.  Jr.,  on  the  6th,  General 
Grant  thought  the  battle  could  be  retrieved  next  day,  and  ordered  him 
to  resume  offensive  operations.  The  inference  from  his  letters  and 
<:  Memoirs  "  is  that  these  offensive  movements  were  determined  on  irre 
spective  of  Buell's  reenforcements  ;  but  it  is  impossible  to  believe  Gen 
eral  Grant  ignorant  of  Buell's  movements,  especially  after  recent  con 
ference  with  him.  It  is  not  hard  to  understand  that,  if  he  could  escape 
capture  that  night,  he  would  expect,  with  nearly  30,000  fresh  troops 
coming  to  his  reinforcement,  to  recover  his  lost  ground  next  day.  But 
it  is  evident,  from  the  comparative  sluggishness  and  feebleness  of  their 
next  morning's  operations,  that  Grant's  troops  were  in  no  condition  to 
attack  unaided.  His  routed  and  panic-stricken  army  rapidly  regained 
its  courage,  however,  as  division  after  division  came  up  on  its  flanks, 
unshaken  by  the  horrors  of  the  day,  and  eager  to  renew  the  contest. 
The  respite  given  by  the  early  cessation  of  the  combat  was  ably  im 
proved  before  night  came  on ;  and  the  narrow  space  into  which  the 
troops  had  been  crowded,  for  lack  of  avenues  of  escape,  now  aided  in 
their  reorganization.  The  night  was  spent  in  this  work. 

Sherman  estimates  that  18,000  men  remained,  Sunday  evening,  fit 
for  battle.  These,  with  the  reenforcements,  would  give  some  46,000 
Federals  for  the  fight  on  Monday.  But  if  only  18,000  remained,  what 


C42  THE  NIGHT   OF  THE   6TH. 

a  story  it  tells  of  the  havoc  and  rout  of  Sunday  !  Two-thirds  of  the 
army  dead,  wounded,  or  missing  !  These  statements  of  Grant's  strength 
have  been  met  by  the  flat  contradiction  of  General  Buell  and  his 
friends,  as  being  absolutely  inconsistent  with  the  situation  of  affairs. 
In  an  interview  with  Major  J.  M.  Wright,  of  his  staff,  authoritatively 
published  in  the  Louisville  Courier- Journal,  General  Buell  speaks  in 
reference  to  these  matters  as  follows  : 

My  own  recollection  has  always  been  that  General  Sherman's  explanations 
on  that  occasion  were  briefer  than  would  ordinarily  be  expected  from  him,  and 
that  if  there  was  much  conversation  it  consisted  mainly  in  my  unequivocal  state 
ment  to  him  that  I  should  attack  the  enemy  the  next  morning  at  daylight,  and 
in  my  endeavor  to  get  such  information  from  him  as  might  be  useful  in  the  exe 
cution  of  that  design.  I  should  not  have  paid  much  attention  to  his  opinion 
with  reference  to  what  was  left  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  for  I  probably 
knew  more  about  that  than  he  did.  I  had  seen  its  disorganized  fragments  about 
the  landing  and  along  the  bank  of  the  river,  and  walked  pretty  much  the  whole 
extent  of  its  organized  front.  I  have  stated,  on  a  previous  occasion,  that  the 
number  of  troops  that  retained  theiifcranks  at  the  close  of  the  first  day  did  not 
probably  exceed  10,000  men.  A  measurement  of  the  ground  which  they  occu 
pied  will  show  that  the  number  could  not  have  been  more  than  5,000,  exclusive 
of  Lew  Wallace's  division.  That  number  may  have  been  slightly  increased  the 
next  morning  from  stragglers,  under  the  encouraging  effect  of  a  large  and  fresh 
body  of  troops,  but  my  belief  is  it  did  not  exceed  that  number. 

Indeed,  it  seems  improbable  that  such  orders  were  issued  to  Sher 
man  that  night,  as  the  other  division  commanders  mention  the  next 
morning  as  the  time  when  they  received  them.  Evidently,  all  depend 
ed  on  what  Buell  could  do. 

General  Buell  says,  speaking  of  Sherman's  sketch-map  of  the  battle 
field  sent  to  the  writer : 

Sherman's  sketch  is  also  an  interesting  one,  as  showing  the  positions  from 
which  they  were  driven,  and  the  dwindled  front  to  which  they  were  reduced. 
It  will  help  to  show,  in  connection  with  other  circumstantial  evidence,  that,  of 
the  army  of  not  less  than  50,000  effective  men  which  Grant  had  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  Tennessee  River,  not  more  than  5,000  were  in  ranks  and  available 
on  the  battle-field  at  nightfall  on  the  6th,  exclusive  of  Lew  Wallace's  division, 
say  8,500  men,  that  only  came  up  during  the  night.  The  rest  were  either  killed, 
wounded,  captured,  or  scattered  in  inextricable  and  hopeless  confusion  for  miles 
along  the  banks  of  the  river. 


RENEWAL   OF  BATTLE. 


II. 


THE    BATTLE    OF   MONDAY. 

Buell  says  in  his  report : 

Soon  after  five  o'clock,  on  the  morning  of  the  Vth,  General  Nelson's  and 
General  Crittenden's  divisions,  the  only  ones  yet  arrived  on  the  ground,  moved 
promptly  forward  to  meet  the  enemy.  Nelson's  division,  marching  in  line  of 
battle,  soon  came  upon  his  pickets,  drove  them  in,  and  at  about  six  o'clock  re 
ceived  the  fire  of  his  artillery. 

Buell  then  pushed  forward  his  artillery,  which  engaged  the  Confed 
erates,  while  Crittenden  aligned  his  division  on  Nelson's  right ;  and 
McCookj  whose  division  was  beginning  to  arrive,  took  position  on  the 
right  of  Crittenden.  The  line,  when  formed,  had  a  front  of  one  mile 
and  a  half.  Buell  had  with  him,  also,  two  fragments  of  Grant's  army 
that  he  had  picked  up,  each  about  1,0€0  strong. 

The  forces  on  the  Confederate  right,  which  encountered  Nelson, 
were  extremely  fragmentary.  Chalmers's  brigade,  and  the  remains  of 
Jackson's,  which  had  fallen  to  pieces  in  the  night,  were  there.  The  regi 
ments  of  Gladden's  brigade  were  represented  by  small  bands  of  one  or 
two  hundred  men,  under  various  commanders.  Colonel  Deas,  with  224 
men  of  Gladden's  brigade,  was  aided  by  the  Fourth  Kentucky,  which 
had  become  detached  from  Trabue's  brigade.  In  a  charge  he  lost  half 
of  them.  The  First  Tennessee  from  Stephens's  brigade,  the  One  Hun 
dred  and  Fifty -fourth  Tennessee  from  Johnson's,  and  the  "Crescent" 
Regiment  from  Pond's,  which  had  so  distinguished  itself  on  the  left 
centre  the  previous  afternoon,  were  found  mingled  in  the  confused  and 
bloody  conflict  on  the  right.  Chalmers  was  at  one  time  detached  from 
the  command  of  his  own  brigade  by  General  Withers,  in  order  to.  lead 
one  of  these  conglomerate  commands ;  and  Colonel  Wheeler  had  charge 
of  two  or  three  regiments  thrown  together.  General  Withers  strove, 
with  great  gallantry  and  skill,  to  bring  order  out  of  all  this  confusion  ; 
but  in  vain.  Nelson's  division  encountered  this  line  about  seven  o'clock, 
and  after  a  contest  of  half  an  hour  was  driven  back.  The  elation  of 
yesterday  would  not  yet  permit  these  men  to  think  themselves  other 
wise  than  invincible. 

The  battle,  not  only  here  but  all  along  the  line,  consisted  all  the  morn 
ing  of  a  series  of  charges  and  counter-charges,  in  which  the  assailants 
were  always  beaten  back  with  loss.  The  Federals  suffered  heavily,  and 
the  ragged  front  of  the  Southern  regiments  wasted  away.  Once  or 
twice,  during  lulls  in  the  battle,  the  Confederates  retired,  taking  new 
and  strong  positions.  General  Chalmers  tells  how,  after  having  re- 


SECOND  BATTLE   OF   SIIILOH. 

pulsed  a  charge  of  Nelson's  line  in  force,  with  a  double  command  of  his 
own  and  his  temporary  brigade,  the  Confederates  were  driven  back  some 
300  yards.  Then,  having  been  rallied,  they  boldly  met  and  drove  back 
their  pursuers  in  turn,  and  reoccupied  the  lost  ground.  Nelson  came 
on  again  with  still  heavier  battalions,  the  fight  was  renewed,  and  the 
Confederates  were  again  driven  down  the  hill.  The  One  Hundred  and 
Fifty-fourth  Tennessee  and  the  remnant  of  Blythe's  Mississippi  coming 
up,  they  were  again  rallied.  Chalmers  tried  once  more  to  rouse  them  to 
a  charge  ;  but  his  appeals  were  unheeded  by  the  exhausted  men,  till  he 
seized  the  colors  of  the  Ninth  Mississippi  Regiment,  and  called  on  them 
to  follow.  With  a  wild  shout,  the  whole  brigade  rushed  in  and  drove 
the  enemy  back,  until  it  reoccupied  its  first  position  of  the  morning. 
In  this  charge  Wheeler  led  a  regiment  on  foot,  carrying  its  colors  him 
self.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Rankin,  commanding  the  Ninth  Mississippi, 
fell  mortally  wounded  ;  and  the  major,  J.  E.  Whitfield,  who  had  on 
Sunday  led  the  skirmishers,  was  also  there  wounded.  The  Second 
Texas  and  Twenty-first  Alabama,  under  Colonel  Moore,  while  advan 
cing,  having  been  falsely  told  that  the  troops  on  their  front  were  Breck- 
inridge's,  fell  into  an  ambuscade  and  lost  so  heavily  that  they  fell  back 
in  confusion. 

Equally  sanguinary  struggles  occurred  on  the  centre  and  left.  Rug- 
gles's  division  was  very  fully  engaged,  both  Gibson's  and  Anderson's 
brigades  charging  repeatedly,  and  capturing  batteries,  which  they  could 
not,  however,  bring  off.  There  had  been  an  intermingling  of  commands 
on  Sunday,  but  on  Monday  all  order  was  lost.  The  positions  of  regi 
ments  nearly  resembled  a  shuffled  pack  of  cards,  in  which  none  adjoins 
its  next  in  suit  except  by  chance.  It  is  not  possible  so  to  unravel  the 
tangled  skein  of  narratives  as  correctly  to  assign  the  alignment  of  the 
Confederate  front.  Indeed,  in  every  combat  it  shifted  in  agonized  con 
tortions,  as  the  heavy  blows  fell  upon  it  from  an  army  of  double  its 
numbers,  and  largely  made  up  of  fresh  troops.  It  no  longer  fought 
with  the  enthusiasm  of  the  day  previous,  when  the  stake  seemed  empire  ; 
but  it  had  been  sifted  of  all  who  were  physically  or  morally  incapable 
of  enduring  the  sternest  ordeals.  Its  charges  were  made  with  a  des 
perate  fury  from  which  the  strongest  columns  recoiled.  A  broken  band 
of  heroic  spirits,  united  by  no  tie  but  their  common  cause,  would  gather 
itself  for  an  assault,  which  looked  impossible  of  achievement  and  fruit 
less  of  results.  As  it  waited  the  signal,  looking  to  the  right  or  left  for 
succor  that  would  not  come,  it  might  shiver  a  little  at  the  bloody  jaws 
of  death  that  yawned  to  receive  it,  but  it  did  not  quail.  The  word 
would  be  given,  and  some  martial  spirit — general,  colonel,  or  daring 
subordinate  impatient  for  glory — would  seize  the  riddled  flag,  and  rush 
with  reckless  valor  against  the  foe.  The  "  rebel  yell " — that  penetrat 
ing  scream  of  menace  and  resolve — went  up,  and  the  line  would  hurl 


UNAVAILING   HEROISM.  64:5 

itself  headlong,  sometimes  to  success,  sometimes  to  meet  a  storm  of  lead 
and  iron,  which  strewed  the  field  with  the  wounded  and  the  dead.     And 
this  went  on  all  the  morning,  until  noon,  until  one,  two  o'clock. 
This  picture  is  not  a  fancy  sketch.     Patton  Anderson  says  : 

When  one  of  General  Cheathain's  regiments  had  been  appealed  to  in  vain  to 
make  a  charge  on  the  advancing  foe,  Lieutenant  Sandidge,  seizing  its  colors  and 
holding  them  high  overhead,  calling  upon  the  regiment  to  follow  him,  spurred 
his  horse  to  the  front,  and  charged  over  the  brow  of  the  hill  amid  a  shower  of 
leaden  hail  from  the  enemy.  The  effect  was  electrical.  The  regiment  moved 
gallantly  to  the  support  of  its  colors,  but  superior  numbers  soon  pressed  it  back 
to  its  original  position.  Colonel  Stanley,  of  the  Ninth  Texas,  did  the  same  thing 
with  the  same  result. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Jones,  of  the  Seventeenth  Louisiana,  says  that, 
just  before  the  retreat,  having  collected  some  two  hundred  stragglers 
into  line,  General  Ruggles  ordered  them  to  advance,  and  adds  : 

The  general  at  this  instant  rode  in  front  of  the  lines,  and,  seizing  the  flag 
from  the  hands  of  the  color-bearer,  gallantly  led  them  to  the  charge.  In  this 
charge  he  was  assisted  by  Colonel  S.  S.  Heard. 

Colonel  Looney,  Thirty-eighth  Tennessee,  says  of  Captain  John  C. 
Carter  : 

At  one  time  he  took  the  flag,  and,  urging  his  men  forward,  rendered  me  great 
assistance  in  moving  forward  the  entire  regiment. 

Major  Caldwell,  of  the  Twelfth  Tennessee,  says  in  his  report  : 

Private  Fielder  took  charge  of  Companies  B  and  G,  which  were  left  without 
a  commissioned  officer.  lie  led  these  two  companies  all  day  in  the  thickest  part 
of  the  battle. 

Colonel  Mouton,  of  the  Eighteenth  Louisiana,  says  in  his  report : 

From  8  A,  M.  until  half-past  1  p.  M.  we  were  constantly  marching  and  counter 
marching — the  "  Orleans  Guards,"  in  the  mean  time,  having  been  attached  to  my 
command.  About  2  p.  M.  we  were  ordered  to  move  on  the  enemy — which  was 
done  without  energy  or  life  by  the  troops  twice  in  succession,  notwithstanding 
the  noble  and  daring  efforts  of  Generals  Beauregard  and  Bragg  to  lead  them  on 
in  the  face  of  the  enemy.  The  fact  is,  the  men  were  completely  exhausted  from 
inanition  and  physical  fatigue,  many  dropping  in  the  attempt  to  move  forward. 
Here  I  was  wounded  in  the  face. 

These  are  but  a  few  instances  of  the  many  acts,  recorded  and  unre 
corded,  of  individual  heroism  by  which  the  wearied  soldiers  were  ani 
mated  and  inspired.  They  were  of  no  avail. 

One  of  the  most  painful  features  resulting  from  the  confusion  was 
the  waste  of  time  and  strength  resulting  from  contradictory  orders  and 


646  SECOND  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

purposeless  manoeuvres.  Nearly  every  report  mentions  some  fact  illus 
trating  this.  Colonel  Pond,  whose  brigade  had  encamped  on  the  left, 
within  four  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy,  was  left  some  three-quarters 
of  a  mile  in  advance  of  the  general  line.  He  was  attacked  early  in 
the  morning  by  Lew  Wallace's  brigade,  and,  after  a  sharp  engage 
ment,  fell  back  under  cover  of  the  artillery-fire  of  Captain  Ketchum's 
battery,  which  was  fighting  within  infantry-range.  The  artillery  was 
managed  in  the  most  skillful  and  intrepid  manner,  and  finally  withdrew, 
covered  by  the  Texas  Rangers.  Pond  says  of  Ketchum,  "  The  safety 
of  my  command  was  due  to  him."  He  continues : 

Upon  reaching  the  main  line,  the  left  of  •which  was  at  the  enemy's  first  camp 
on  the  Savannah  road,  I  was  ordered  by  General  Euggles  to  form  on  the  extreme 
left,  and  rest  my  left  on  Owl  Creek.  While  proceeding  to  execute  this  order,  I 
was  ordered  to  move  by  the  rear  of  the  main  line  to  support  the  extreme  right 
of  General  Hardee's  line.  I  was  again  ordered  by  General  Beauregard  to  ad 
vance  and  occupy  the  crest  of  a  ridge  in  the  edge  of  an  old  field.  My  line  was 
just  formed  in  this  position,  when  General  Polk  ordered  me  forward  to  support 
his  line.  "While  moving  to  the  support  of  General  Polk,  an  order  reached  me 
from  General  Beauregard  to  report  to  him,  with  my  command,  at  his  headquar 
ters.  This  was  on  the  extreme  left ;  where  my  brigade  became  engaged  in  the 
fight,  which  continued  until  the  contest  between  the  armies  ceased. 

The  attack  of  the  Federal  army  was  well  conducted,  systematic,  and 
spirited.  Ammen's  brigade  was  opposed  to  Chalmers,  next  the  river  ; 
and  Hazen's  brigade,  on  Nelson's  right,  charged  with  great  dash  and 
success,  until  it  was  cut  up  by  cross-fires  from  Breckinridge's  command. 
Hazeri  and  Am  men  were  driven  back,  but  were  rallied  on  Terrell's  artil 
lery,  and  on  Crittenden's  left  brigade  under  Smith,  and  their  own  re 
serve  under  Bruce.  The  regiments  in  reserve  of  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee  were  also  brought  up.  Nelson  must  have  displayed  conspicuous 
gallantry  in  this  conflict.  He  is  said  to  have  been  recognized  animat 
ing  his  men  by  Kentuckians  on  the  Confederate  side. 

Crittenden's  division  moved  simultaneously  with  Nelson's,  and  with 
well-delivered  blows  ;  but,  as  has  been  seen,  they  were  unavailing  to 
break  down  the  wall  of  living  men  opposed  to  it,  in  the  main  under  the 
direction  of  Hardee.  General  Crittenden  said  to  the  writer  that  this 
was  the  hardest  fighting  he  saw  in  the  war,  and  was  over  a  very  narrow 
space. 

Between  eight  and  nine  o'clock,  McCook's  leading  brigade,  under 
Rousseau,  went  in  on  the  centre,  soon  followed  by  Gibson's,  and  eventu 
ally  by  Kirk's  brigade. 

General  Hardee's  report  contains  this  account  of  Monday's  battle  : 

On  Monday,  about  six  o'clock,  portions  of  my  command  were  formed  upon  an 
alignment  with  other  troops  on  the  left  to  resist  the  enemy,  who  soon  opened  a 


AT    THE   CENTRE.  647 

hot  fire  on  our  advanced  lines.  The  battle  reanimated  our  men,  and  the  strong 
columns  of  the  enemy  were  repulsed,  again  and  again,  by  our  tired  and  disor 
dered  but  bravo  and  steadfast  troops.  The  enemy  brought  up  fresh  reenforce- 
ments,  pouring  them  continually  upon  us.  At  times  our  lines  recoiled,  as  it 
were,  before  the  overwhelming  physical  weight  of  the  enemy's  forces ;  but  the 
men  rallied  readily,  and  fought  with  unconquerable  spirit.  Many  of  our  best 
regiments,  signalized  in  the  battle  of  Sunday  by  their  steady  valor,  reeled  un 
der  the  sanguinary  struggle  on  the  succeeding  day. 

McCook's  line  of  advance  was  along  the  road  from  Pittsburg  to 
Shiloh,  and  through  the  adjacent  country  to  the  southeast.  Here 
Breckinridge's  two  brigades,  under  Bowen  and  Statham,  and  what 
was  left  of  Hindman's  and  Cleburne's  commands,  under  Hardee's  own 
eye,  formed  the  nucleus  of  the  defense.  Cleburne,  who  had  gone  in  on 
Sunday  2,750  strong,  had  but  800  men  left.  Half  the  remainder  were 
dead  or  wounded  ;  half  were  scattered  or  had  fled.  He  advanced  on 
Breckinridge's  left,  under  fires  and  cross-fires,  gallantly  supported  by 
the  Washington  Artillery.  In  a  charge  of  the  whole  line,  his  men  were 
mowed  down  and  the  brigade  repulsed.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Neil,  of 
the  Twenty-third  Tennessee,  was  shot  through  the  body,  and  Acting-Ma 
jor  Cowley,  of  the  Fifteenth  Arkansas,  killed.  But,  when  the  enemy  at 
tempted  to  advance,  Cleburne  led  fifty -eight  men  of  the  Fifteenth  Ar 
kansas  in  a  counter-charge,  and  repulsed  them.  Here  fell  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Patton,  its  sole  surviving  field  officer.  Hindman's  troops  fought 
near  by,  with  almost  identical  results. 

The  Southern  troops  held  the  Federal  army  at  bay  with  obstinate 
courage,  giving  back  blow  for  blow,  till  the  assailant  reeled  and  called 
to  the  front  all  his  reserves.  The  account  already  given  sufficiently 
describes  the  character  of  the  contest :  stubborn  combats  in  the  woods, 
charges,  repulses,  counter-charges,  surges  of  slaughter  and  fury,  with 
lulls  and  pauses  in  the  heat  and  motion  of  the  fray.  The  Federal  officers 
rivaled  their  adversaries  in  the  display  of  personal  bravery.  Rousseau 
behaved  with  great  gallantry.  Colonel  Kirk,  commanding  the  Fifth 
Brigade,  McCook's  division,  came  upon  the  Thirty-fourth  Illinois  as  it 
wavered,  appalled,  before  a  burst  of  battle-flame  which  had  killed  its 
commander,  Major  Levenway.  It  was  Kirk's  own  regiment.  He  seized 
a  flag,  rushed  forward,  and  steadied  the  line  again  ;  while  doing  this 
he  was  severely  wounded  in  the  shoulder. 

McCook's  troops  deserve  the  more  credit  for  their  persistent  attacks, 
as  they  had  marched  twenty-two  miles  the  day  before,  and  a  portion 
of  them  had  stood  all  night  in  the  streets  of  Savannah  without  sleep. 
McCook  says : 

At  Pittsburg  Landing  the  head  of  my  column  had  to  force  its  way  through 
thousands  of  panic-stricken  and  wounded  men,  before  it  could  engage  the  enemy. 


648  SECOND  BATTLE   OF  SIIILOH. 

Sherman,  in  his  advance  toward  the  close  of  the  battle,  saw,  from 
his  position  on  McCook's  right,  the  latter  part  of  his  contest  in  front 
of  Shiloh  Church.  He  says  : 

Here  I  saw  for  the  first  time  the  well-ordered  and  compact  Kentucky  forces 
of  General  Buell,  whose  soldierly  movement  gave  confidence  to  our  newer  and 
less-disciplined  forces.  Here  I  saw  Willich's  regiment  advance  upon  a  point  of 
water-oaks  and  thicket,  hehind  which  I  knew  the  enemy  was  in  great  strength, 
and  enter  it  in  heautiful  style.  Then  arose  the  severest  musketry -fire  I  ever 
heard,  and  lasted  twenty  minutes,  when  this  splendid  regiment  had  to  fall  back. 

Willich's  regiment  had  received  its  "baptism  of  fire"  from  the 
Texan  Rangers  at  Green  River  crossing,  as  narrated  in  these  pages. 
It  now  accepted  immersion  in  flame  at  the  hands  of  troops  under 
Cheatham  and  Gibson. 

General  Polk  led  Cheatham's  division,  which  had  probably  suffered 
the  least  disorganization  of  any  command  on  the  field,  to  its  position, 
in  support  of  Breckinridge's  left,  as  Cheatham  says.  This  was,  as  near 
as  can  be  ascertained,  the  left  centre  of  the  Confederate  line — some 
what  to  the  front  and  left  of  Shiloh  Church.  His  other  division,  Clark's, 
now  under  A.  P.  Stewart,  had  bivouacked  near  the  front,  and  got  early 
into  action.  It  was  probably  fully  ten  o'clock,  when  Cheatham,  hav 
ing  formed  his  division,  with  Gibson's  brigade,  and  the  Thirty-third 
Tennessee  (of  Stewart's  brigade),  and  the  Twenty-seventh  Tennessee 
(of  Wood's  brigade),  was  called  on  to  resist  the  onset  of  Grant's  re 
organized  forces,  which  were  now  led  to  the  attack  by  Sherman.  The 
defense  was  made  with  unblenching  courage. 

Sherman  seems  to  have  had  a  general  supervision  of  Grant's  troops. 
Wallace's,  Prentiss's,  and  Hurlbut's  divisions,  had  almost  disappeared 
from  the  contest ;  but  as  their  residuary  legatee,  and  with  part  of  his 
own  and  McClernand's  men,  after  seventeen  hours  of  respite,  he  was 
able  to  muster  a  formidable  force.  Awe  of  the  terrible  foe  in  front  of 
them  strove  for  mastery  with  mortification,  emulation  of  Buell's  prog 
ress,  and  the  generous  emotions  of  soldiers  striving  to  recover  their 
lost  prestige.  McClernand  aided  in  leading  the  men,  and  Hurlbut  was 
active  in  reorganizing  the  troops,  and  bringing  them  up  at  critical 
moments.1 

This  large  force  and  Lew  Wallace's  division  were  led  simultaneous 
ly  against  the  lines  held  by  Polk,  and  farther  to  the  left  by  Bragg, 
who  had  here  Anderson's,  Pond's,  and  Trabue's  brigades,  and  some 
remnants  of  Cleburne's  and  other  commands.  The  odds  were  tremen- 

1  General  Hurlbut  informs  the  writer  that  his  division  was  "  complete  in  organization, 
every  regiment  in  place  in  line  of  battle,"  both  Sunday  evening  and  Monday  morning. 
The  writer  feels  that  it  is  due  to  General  Hurlbut  to  give  this  statement,  though  his 
own  inference  from  the  Federal  reports  is  different. 


COMBAT   BETWEEN7  POLK   AND   SHERMAN.  049 

dous.  It  is  hard  to  conceive  how  they  maintained  themselves.  Eight 
or  ten  thousand  jaded  men  had  here  to  cope  with  twenty  to  twenty-five 
thousand  of  the  enemy.  General  Beauregard  was  present  in  person 
directing  the  battle.  But  that  gray  line  stood  like  a  rock-bound  coast 
against  which  the  blue  and  silver  surges  beat  in  vain.  Again  and  again 
they  rushed  on  ;  but  fell  back,  scattered  in  spray,  as  the  breaker  that  has 
spent  its  force.  Wave  after  wave  of  Northern  soldiery  came  pouring 
with  deadly  purpose  against  the  Confederate  front  and  recoiled,  shat 
tered  and  in  dismay.  It  was  only  when  the  right  was  withdrawn,  and 
McCook  was  thus  allowed  to  press  their  flank,  that  this  stout  line  slowly 
fell  back  in  sullen  defiance.  Polk  says  : 

They  engaged  the  enemy  so  soon  as  they  were  formed,  and  fought  him  for 
four  hours  one  of  the  most  desperately  contested  conflicts  of  the  battle.  The 
enemy  was  driven  gradually  from  his  position ;  and,  though  reenforced  several 
times  during  the  engagement,  he  could  make  no  impression  on  that  part  of 
the  line. 

Major  Love,  commanding  the  Twenty-seventh  Tennessee,  was  mor 
tally  wounded  ;  and  Colonel  Preston  Smith,  commanding  Johnson's 
brigade,  was  severely  wounded,  but  retained  his  command. 

This  force  maintained  the  position  it  had  held  for  so  many  hours  up  to  half- 
past  two  o'clock,  the  time  at  which  orders  were  received  from  the  general 
commanding  to  withdraw  the  troops  from  the  field. 

Cheatham's  command  was  formed  immediately  in  front  of  a  large 
force  of  the  enemy,  then  pressing  forward  vigorousl}T.  He  gives  the 
following  report  of  this  hard-fought  field  : 

My  engagement  here  commenced  almost  the  instant  I  had  formed,  and  was 
for  four  hours  the  most  hotly  contested  I  have  witnessed.  My  own  command 
fought  with  great  gallantry  and  desperation,  and  for  two  hours  I  gradually 
drove  the  enemy  from  his  position,  and  he,  though  constantly  reenforced  during 
the  conflict,  and  with  heavy  odds  in  his  favor  at  the  beginning,  failed  utterly  in 
accomplishing  anything.  .  .  .  During  the  engagement  here  I  was  reenforced  by 
Colonel  Gibson  with  a  Louisiana  brigade,  and  by  Colonel  Campbell  with  his 
gallant  Thirty-third  Tennessee,  all  of  whom  deserve  particular  mention.  .  .  . 
At  half-past  one  o'clock  I  occupied  about  the  same  position  at  which  I  first  came 
in  collision  with  the  enemy. 

Major  A.  P.  Avegno,  commanding  the  Thirteenth  Louisiana,  of 
Gibson's  brigade,  was  mortally  wounded  here,  and  many  officers  and 
men  fell  resisting  the  Federal  onsets. 

Being  now  reenforced  with  artillery,  in  which  he  had  been  deficient, 
Cheatham  continues  : 

Thus  strengthened,  I  would  have  had  no  difficulty  in  maintaining  my  posi 
tion  during  the  remainder  of  the  day ;  but  at  half -past  two  o'clock,  p.  M.,  by 


050  SECOND   BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

orders  from  Major-General  Polk,  I  withdrew  my  command  slowly,  and  in  order, 
in  the  direction  of  my  camp,  the  enemy  making  no  advance  whatever. 

The  movement  on  the  Federal  right  conducted  by  Lew  Wallace,  in 
conjunction  with  Sherman's  division,  was  comparatively  slow,  as  has 
been  stated  already.  Wallace  began  skirmishing  at  daylight,  simul 
taneously  with  Nelson.  But  outlying  bands  of  Southerners  promptly 
took  up  the  battle,  where  they  had  left  it  off  the  night  before.  His 
skirmishers  pushed  these  back,  though  not  vigorously,  until  the  Con 
federates  on  that  flank,  roused  to  the  fact,  rushed  forward  and  drove 
his  advance  back  for  nearly  a  mile,  thus  securing  a  strong  position 
"on  an  eminence  in  an  open  field,  near  Owl  Creek,  which  we  held  until 
near  the  close  of  the  conflict,  against  every  effort  the  enemy  could 
make." ' 

Wallace,  making  no  headway  in  front,  contented  himself  with  trying 
to  edge  cautiously  up  along  Owl  Creek  so  as  to  turn  the  Confederate 
flank.  He  found  this  a  perilous  game,  and  at  ten  o'clock  had  made  no 
real  progress.  It  is  evident  that  he  was  not  able  or  willing  to  venture 
his  entire  strength  against  the  Confederate  left,  because  he  did  not  feel 
secure  of  support  from  Sherman's  and  McClernand's  beaten  troops.  It 
was  ten  o'clock  before  the  combined  attack  was  made  in  force.  The 
strength  of  the  Confederates  who  met  it  was  not  commensurate  with 
the  task  required  of  them,  but  they  made  up  in  desperate  valor  for 
their  weakness  in  numbers.  Bragg  had  the  chief  direction  here,  and 
his  force  was  made  up,  as  already  mentioned,  of  the  remnants  of  Cle- 
burne's  brigade  and  other  organizations  and  Trabue's  brigade.  Later 
in  the  day,  part  of  Ruggles's  division  came  up  here  and  took  part  in  the 
defense.  About  noon,  this  force  fell  back  to  the  neighborhood  of  Shi- 
loh,  which  it  held  till  ordered  to  retreat. 

On  Sunday  night,  Trabue's  Kentucky  Brigade  had  occupied  Mc 
Dowell's  camps  between  Shiloh  and  Owl  Creek,  feasting  and  making 
themselves  comfortable  with  the  spoils  of  war.  On  the  other  hand, 
Patton  Anderson,  for  fear  of  demoralization,  had  bivouacked  with  his 
brigade  in  the  open,  resting  himself  under  an  apple-tree  with  a 
blanket  over  his  head,  while  the  pitiless  storm  once  again  beat  upon 
himself  and  his  men.  Yet  it  would  be  hard  to  say  that  either  brigade 
excelled  the  other  in  valor  or  in  the  fortitude  with  which  it  endured 
ten  hours  more  of  slaughter  and  reverse.  It  would  seem  from  this — 
and  other  instances  might  be  adduced — that  the  effect  of  the  "  spoils  " 
upon  the  demoralization  of  the  army  has  been  greatly  overrated,  though 
of  course  they  were  not  without  their  influence  on  the  more  ignorant 
and  rapacious.  The  Kentucky  Brigade,  with  Byrne's  battery,  got  a 
strong  position,  to  the  left  of  the  road  from  Shiloh  to  Pittsburg.  It 

1  Bragg's  "  Report." 


THE   KENTUCKIANS.  651 

held  this  four  hours.  As  the  gradual  pressure  upon  the  right  after  a 
while  brought  the  Federal  troops  upon  its  flank,  Bragg  ordered  a  charge 
by  the  Fourth  Kentucky  Regiment  and  the  Fourth  Alabama  Battalion. 
After  a  contest  of  twenty  minutes  they  drove  back  the  enemy  on  their 
reserves  ;  but  were  in  turn  driven  back  four  or  five  hundred  yards. 
Patton  Anderson's  brigade  coming  to  their  aid,  "  they  again  drove  back 
the  enemy ;  and  thus,  forward  and  backward,  was  the  ground  crossed 
and  recrossed  four  times."  It  was  a  terrific  combat.  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Hines,  commanding  the  Fourth  Kentucky,  was  wounded  ;  the 
heroic  Major  Thomas  B.  Monroe,  was  mortally  wounded;  Captain 
Nuckols,  acting  major,  was  badly  wounded  ;  Captains  Ben  Monroe, 
Thompson,  and  Fitzhenry,  and  four  lieutenants,  were  wounded.  Monroe 
died  on  the  battle-field,  bequeathing  his  sword  to  his  infant  son,  and 
requesting  that  he  might  be  told  that  "  his  father  died  in  defense  of 
his  honor  and  of  the  rights  of  his  country." 

Governor  George  W.  Johnson  had  gone  into  the  battle  on  horseback, 
acting  as  a  volunteer  aide  to  the  commander  of  the  Kentucky  Brigade. 
His  horse  was  killed  under  him  on  Sunday,  when  he  took  a  musket, 
and  fought  on  foot  in  the  ranks  of  the  Fourth  Kentuck}'.  In  the  last 
repulse  of  that  regiment  he  was  shot  through  the  body,  and  was  left 
upon  the  field.  He  was  not  found  until  the  next  day,  when  he  was 
taken  into  the  Federal  camp  still  alive,  but  soon  died.  He  was  a  brave 
and  patriotic  citizen,  who  sealed  his  convictions  with  his  blood. 

The  Sixth  and  Ninth  Kentucky  held  their  ground  farther  to  the  left 
until  the  close  of  the  fight.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Cofer  and  Lieutenant 
Colonel  R.  A.  Johnson  and  Major  John  W.  Caldwell  were  wounded,  and 
many  brave  men  fell.  In  the  Ninth  Kentucky,  four  color-corporals 
were  killed,  and  three  color-corporals  and  the  color-sergeant  were 
wounded.  The  career  of  victory  had,  on  Sunday  afternoon,  reunited 
Breckinridge's  divided  command  with  his  old  brigade  in  front  of  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  at  the  close  of  the  battle.  Separated  again  on  Monday, 
they  fought  in  opposite  wings,  until  these  were  bent  back,  when  they 
met  again  in  front  of  Shiloh  Church. 

By  one  o'clock,  it  was  apparent  to  General  Beauregard  that  the 
contest  was  hopeless.  The  movement  of  the  Federal  army  was  that  of 
the  tide  as  it  crawls  up  the  beach.  Each  living  ripple  wras  rolled  back 
at  the  musket's  mouth  ;  and  yet,  after  seven  hours  of  struggle,  the 
Confederates  had  lost  ground,  and  were  evidently  maintaining  a  hope 
less  conflict.  There  was  no  object  in  remaining  there  without  a  chance 
of  victory. 

Beauregard  at  last  determined  to  retreat,  and  made  his  dispositions 
judiciously  to  that  end.  In  the  lull  of  a  temporary  success,  he  retired 
liis  right  wing  first,  in  good  order,  but  in  readiness  to  renew  the  conflict 
if  assailed,  and  with  such  deliberation  that  the  skirmishers  were  able  to 


652  SECOND  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

contest  aud  check  the  Federal  advance.  The  retreat  was  by  alternate 
lines,  and  was  skillfully  conducted  by  General  Beauregard.  The  press 
ure  on  that  wing,  moreover,  was  relieved  by  the  direction  given  to 
Nelson's  column,  which  was  moved  toward  Hamburg.  General  Beau- 
regard  says  : 

About  2  P.  M.  the  lines  in  advance,  which  had  repulsed  the  enemy  in  their 
last  fierce  assault  on  our  left  and  centre,  received  the  orders  to  retire.  This  was 
done  with  uncommon  steadiness,  and  the  enemy  made  no  attempt  to  follow. 

Before  they  fell  back,  the  Kentucky  Brigade,  with  Marmaduke's 
Arkansas  Regiment,  and  Tappan's  Arkansas  Regiment,  had  a  final  com 
bat  with  the  enemy,  in  which  Colonel  Hunt  led  the  Ninth  Kentucky  in 
a  gallant  but  unavailing  charge.  Trabue,  in  his  report,  puts  the  fact 
very  well  when  he  says  : 

The  fragmentary  forces  of  hoth  armies  had  concentrated  at  this  time  around 
Shiloh  Church,  and,  worn  out  as  were  our  troops,  the  field  was  here  successfully 
contested  for  two  hours  (i.  e.,  from  one  until  three  o'clock)  ;  when,  as  if  by 
mutual  consent,  both  sides  desisted  from  the  struggle. 

Just  as  the  fighting  ceased,  the  Federals  were  reeiiforced  by  two 
fresh  brigades  of  Wood's  division  which  came  up. 

In  the  mean  time,  under  Beauregard's  direction,  Breckinridge  had 
formed  Statham's  brigade  at  the  junction  of  the  roads  to  Monterey 
from  Hamburg  and  from  Pittsburg,  about  a  mile  and  a  half  in  the  rear 
of  Shiloh  Church,  and  this  brigade,  with  the  Kentucky  Brigade  and  the 
cavalry,  formed  the  rear-guard  of  the  retiring  army.  The  movement 
backward  had  been  slow  and  well  guarded.  Some  of  the  Federal  ac 
counts  describe  desperate  charges,  routing  the  Southerners,  about  this 
time ;  but  they  are  the  vainglorious  boasts  of  those  who  had  done  the 
least  real  hard  fighting  that  day.  The  Confederate  army  retired  like  a 
lion,  wounded  but  dauntless,  that  turns  and  checks  pursuit  by  the  grim 
defiance  in  his  face.  The  Federal  army  was  well  content  to  recover 
its  lost  ground,  and  win  back  that  field  from  which  it  had  shrunk  cower 
ing  and  beaten  the  day  before. 

General  Beauregard  says : 

Our  artillery  played  upon  the  woods  beyond  for  a  while,  but  upon  no  visible 
enemy,  and  without  a  reply.  Soon  satisfied  that  no  serious  pursuit  was,  or 
would  be,  attempted,  this  last  line  was  withdrawn,  and  never  did  troops  leave 
battle-field  in  better  order. 

About  an  hour  after  the  Confederate  troops  retired,  the  Federal 
army  reoccupied  its  front  line  of  April  5th.  In  this  day's  contest  the 
troops  of  McCook's  division  had  especially  signalized  themselves.  They 
had  entered  the  field,  last  of  all,  at  a  reentrant  angle,  and  closed  the 


ABORTIVE  PURSUIT.  653 

day  as  the  salient — the  point  of  a  wedge  at  Shiloh,  struggling  with  the 
heaviest  masses  of  the  Southern  troops. 

Another  rain-storm  swept  over  the  exhausted  armies,  the  plentiful 
tears  of  Heaven  shed  upon  a  field  of  remorseless  carnage.  It  brought 
solace  to  the  fevered  wounds  of  many  left  unheeded  upon  the  ground 
by  friends  too  eager  or  too  hard  pressed  to  indulge  in  pity.  But  it 
added  to  the  hardships  and  sufferings  of  the  Confederates  as  they  fell 
back  over  roads  thus  rendered  intolerably  bad.  The  rear-guard  biv 
ouacked  in  the  mud  and  rain,  and  next  morning  moved  back  slowly  to 
Mickey's,  about  three  miles,  carrying  off  the  wounded  and  many  spoils. 
It  remained  at  Mickey's,  where  there  was  a  large  hospital,  three  days, 
burying  the  dead,  removing  the  wounded,  and  sending  back  to  Corinth 
its  captures.  On  Friday,  Breckinridge  marched  the  rear-guard  into 
Corinth. 

The  only  attempt  to  follow  up  the  victory  was  on  Tuesday.  The 
rear-guard  was  covered  by  about  350  cavalry.  Colonel  Forrest  was  the 
senior  officer.  He  had  150  men  of  his  own ;  a  company  of  Wirt 
Adams's  regiment,  under  Captain  Isaac  F.  Harrison  ;  a  squadron  of 
Wharton's  Texas  Rangers ;  and  John  Morgan,  with  some  of  his  men. 

Sherman  advanced  with  two  brigades  and  the  Fourth  Illinois  Cav 
alry,  and,  receiving  the  support  of  a  column  from  General  Wood,  pro 
ceeded  cautiously  on  a  reconnaissance.  Marching  with  Hildebrand's 
unfortunate  Third  Brigade  in  front,  he  came  upon  Forrest's  cavalry  com 
mand.  He  at  once  threw  out  the  Seventy-seventh  Ohio  Regiment, 
supported  by  the  Fourth  Illinois  Cavalry,  when  Forrest,  perceiving  the 
Federal  infantry  somewhat  disordered  in  crossing  a  stream,  with  his 
quick  and  bold  intuition  took  the  initiative,  and  led  a  charge  upon 
them.  The  ground  was  not  favorable  to  him,  as  it  was  miry  and  cov 
ered  with  fallen  timber ;  but,  so  sudden  and  fierce  was  the  onslaught, 
that  a  panic  seized  the  Federal  infantry,  and  it  broke  and  fled.  The 
Confederate  horsemen  rode  through  it,  shooting  down  the  flying  men  ; 
and,  without  drawing  rein,  rushed  headlong  upon  the  cavalry.  Neither 
did  this  stand  to  meet  the  shock.  As  it  broke  in  disorder,  Forrest  and 
his  men  burst  upon  the  startled  troopers,  driving  them  in  tumultuous 
rout  and  slaying  them,  until  they  came  upon  the  main  line  of  Sher 
man's  and  Wood's  brigades.  Forrest,  carried  away  by  the  ardor  of  the 
combat,  outstripped  his  own  men  and  many  of  the  enemy,  and  came 
within  fifty  yards  of  the  Federal  line.  A  volley  greeted  him,  inflicting 
a  severe  wound  in  his  side,  and  mortally  wounding  his  horse.  Never 
theless,  in  spite  of  special  efforts  to  kill  him,  he  got  back  to  his  men, 
and  away.  Sherman  reports  fifteen  of  Hildebrand's  men  killed  and 
twenty-five  wounded,  which  does  not  seem  to  include  the  cavalry,  and 
he  makes  no  mention  of  seventy-five  prisoners,  said  by  Colonel  Jordan 
to  have  been  captured  and  carried  off.  No  steps  were  taken  in  pursuit. 


054  SECOND   BATTLE  OF  SIIILOH. 

There  is  one  branch  of  the  service  to  which  the  writer  feels  that  his 
description  of  the  battle  has  done  scant  justice — the  artillery.  In  both 
armies  it  played  a  conspicuous  part,  and  challenged  the  admiration  of 
leaders  and  soldiers  alike  by  its  skill  and  the  splendid  gallantry  with 
which  it  plunged  into  the  foremost  of  the  fight.  The  men  died  at  their 
guns,  and  whole  batteries  were  supplied  by  volunteers  from  the  infan 
try,  w?ho,  ignorant  but  ardent,  made  shift  to  hurl  destruction  upon  their 
foes  in  this  unaccustomed  way.  Ketchum's  invaluable  services  have 
already  been  alluded  to.  Byrne's  battery  rendered  not  less  useful  ser 
vice  on  Sunday,  and  again  on  Monday,  to  the  Kentucky  Brigade.  When 
Byrne  called  on  the  Sixth  Kentucky  Regiment  for  a  detail,  "  No  de 
tail,"  cried  John  Spurrier,  springing  from  the  ranks,  "  but  all  the  volun 
teers  you  wrant  ! "  and  thus  he  was  supplied. 

Captain  Polk  lost  a  leg,  fighting  his  guns  well ;  Hodgson  and 
Slocomb,  with  the  Washington  Artillery,  are  highly  commended ;  and 
Bankhead's,  Gage's,  and  Girardey's  batteries ;  and,  indeed,  the  record  of 
gallant  and  effective  service,  commemorated  in  the  battle  reports,  covers 
the  entire  list  of  batteries,  so  that  almost  any  distinction  seems  invid 
ious.  The  brigadiers  and  infantry  commanders  appear  anxious  to  tes 
tify  with  generous  gratitude  to  the  obligations  they  were  under  to  the 
artillery.  A  gallant  soldier,  Major  Caldwell  of  the  Ninth  Kentucky, 
who  afterward  commanded  a  brigade,  informed  the  writer  that  he  never 
saw  the  artillery  fight  so  audaciously  on  any  other  field  as  at  Shiloh. 

It  is  the  same  on  the  Federal  side ;  and  both  Grant  and  Buell  men 
tion  the  good  service  done  them  by  the  artillery.  The  guns  under 
Colonel  Webster  that  arrested  Chalmers's  last  charge  on  Sunday  even 
ing  made  a  crisis  in  the  day.  Major  Taylor  is  commended  by  Sher 
man,  and  Lieutenant  Brotzman  by  Hurlbut  ;  and  Buell  speaks  in  high 
terms  of  the  services  of  MendenhalPs,  Terrell's,  and  Bartlett's  bat 
teries. 

The  Rev.  Robert  Collyer,  who  went  up  to  Pittsburg  Landing  with 
one  of  the  first  boats  sent  with  comforts  for  those  wounded  in  the  bat 
tle,  contributed  to  the  Chicago  Tribune  some  interesting  details  of 
what  he  saw  and  learned  there.  With  regard  to  the  bringing  on  of 
the  first  day's  battle,  he  said  : 

Among  these  285  (wounded)  men,  many  of  them  officers  of  intelligence,  I 
gathered  the  only  clear  ideas  and  conclusions  I  was  able  to  come  to,  concerning 
the  battle.  I  will  give  them  as  I  got  them.  They  were  so  evidently  the  true 
convictions  of  the  men  that  I  listened  to  them  with  the  deepest  interest,  not  so 
much  because  they  must  be  true  (though  I  think  that  is  of  great  value),  but, 
above  all,  because  that  is  the  way  the  fighters  think,  not  individually,  but  in 
masses. 

1.  All  who  said  anything  about  it  said  that  the  fatal  surprise  of  Sunday  morn 
ing  was  the  result  of  unpardonable  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  commanders. 


ROBERT  COLLYER'S   CRITICISM.  655 

The  men  themselves  knew  that  the  woods  all  about  them  were  swarming  with 
the  enemy  (I  quote  the  exact  phrases) ;  hut  there  was  no  effort  made  to  get  a 
clear  knowledge  of  the  real  condition  of  things,  and  not  even  a  picket-guard 
sent  out  until  perhaps  Saturday  ;  and  that  this  knowledge  that  a  certain  danger 
was  near  them,  for  which  their  officers  made  no  provision,  made  the  men  feel 
unsteady  and  unstrung.  If  they  could  have  known  exactly  what  was  hidden 
among  the  trees  and  ravines,  they  would  have  had  hetter  courage  to  grapple 
with  it  when  it  sprung  upon  them.  So  when  the  enemy  came,  storming  down 
with  a  fierce,  determined  onslaught,  almost  without  parallel  in  battles,  they  were 
taken  at  a  double  disadvantage.  They  were  outnumbered  and  dispirited  at  the 
same  time. 

2.  The  battle  on  Sunday  was  badly  managed.     The  men  said  to  me :  "  We 
would  have  fought ;  we  meant  to  fight ;  we  wanted  to  fight ;  we  will  fight ;  but 
we  were  outflanked  every  time.    Just  as  sure  as  we  made  a  stand,  we  had  to 
fight  superior  numbers,  put  where  they  could  do  as  they  liked,  and  we  could 
only  do  as  we  could.     We  did  run  away,  we  don't  deny  it;  we  got  under  the 
bank,  and  staid  there ;  we  could  not  come  out.     Why  ?    Because  it  was  no  use. 
If  a  man  gives  his  life,  he  wants  to  get  the  worth  of  it." 

3.  The  Tennessee  River,  the  gunboats,  and  Colonel  Webster,  saved  Grant's 
division  on  Sunday  afternoon  from  a  second  Bull  Run,  or  annihilation.     The 
river  held  the  troops  in,  and  the  gunboats,  with  the  batteries  skillfully  placed  by 
Colonel  Webster,  protected  them  until  Buell  came  up.     Not  a  man  or  a  steam 
boat,  probably,  would  have  been  left  but  for  these  cannon. 

4.  These  same  men  who  had  run  on  Sunday  went  in  with  BuelFs  men  on 
Monday.     Fragments  of  regiments,  patched  together  in  the  haste  of  the  morn 
ing,  gathered  new  spirit  when  they  knew  what  they  had  to  do ;  and  the  uni 
versal  testimony  is  that  they  fought  well — never  men  fought  better  than  those 
that  went  back  to  fight  again. 

5.  The  battle  on  Monday  was  a  lattle  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  in  which  he 
apparently  did  his  utmost  before  he  began  to  retreat.     He  did  not  mean  to  re 
treat,  but  he  had  to  do  so  because  we  beat  him  back.     Still,  while  on  the  Sun 
day  we  were  routed,  on  the  Monday  Tie  retreated  and  was  not  routed.     His 
retreat  was  well  done.     Such  is  the  universal  testimony. 

The  cavalry  made  very  little  impression  on  him  in  the  retreat,  for  three 
reasons :  First,  his  forces  were  well  ordered ;  second,  the  roads  were  bad  for 
cavalry ;  and,  third,  they  could  not  tell  what  sort  of  a  trap  might  be  set  for 
them  in  the  woods.  I  inquired  diligently  after  the  idea  of  the  men  as  to  the 
final  result,  and  it  was  that  we  are  about  where  we  were  a  week  before  the  battle, 
with  a  loss  of  8,000  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing  ;  yet  that,  with  every  desire 
to  see  fair,  the  prestige  of  the  battle  remains  finally  with  our  forces.  As  soon 
as  we  fought  at  all  on  equal  terms,  our  men  beat  them  without  the  shadow  of  a 
doubt.  The  men  everywhere,  wounded  and  well,  are  in  good  heart,  I  saw  no 
sign  of  depression  anywhere  beyond  what  comes  out  of  pain  and  loss  of  blood. 
The  men  look  serious,  as  if  they  had  grown  older;  but  I  did  not  speak  to  a  man 
who  did  not  say  we  can  beat  the  enemy  every  time,  if  we  get  fair  play. 

Two  battles  had  been  fought ;  and  each  army  occupied  the  ground 
which  it  had  held  before  they  began.     A  woful  list  of  more  than  20,000 
killed  and  wounded,  and  3,000  or  4,000  prisoners — many  valiant  dead 
43 


656 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 


— many  great  souls  blotted  from  the  roll  of  the  living — this  was  all 
there  was  left  to  tell  of  those  two  days  of  havoc. 

It  is  true  a  stunning  blow  had  been  delivered  to  the  Federal  army, 
which  arrested  its  progress,  shattered  its  morale,  and  changed  its  tac 
tics.  But  all  this  was  as  nothing,  for  it  secured  delay  only.  General 
Johnston  did  not  mean  to  delay  it — he  meant  to  destroy  it.  This  only 
could  have  secured  the  independence  of  the  South. 

General  Beauregard  reports  the  loss  of  the  Confederate  army  : 

Killed - 1,728 

Wounded 8,012 

Missing 959 


Total 


10,699 


After  a  close  examination  of  all  accessible  sources  of  information, 
covering  about  two  thirds  of  the  army,  the  writer  finds  a  possible  varia 
tion  of  218  more  casualties,  principally  in  missing,  that  might  be  added 
to  General  Beauregard's  report,  based  upon  the  returns  first  sent  in. 
The  Confederate  casualties  may  therefore  be  safely  estimated  at  be 
tween  10,700  and  11,000,  in  killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  The  miss 
ing  men  were  the  wounded  left  on  and  near  the  field  in  Monday's 
battle.  Jordan  speaks  of  the  loss  on  the  first  day  at  about  6,500, 
which  would  leave  over  4,000  for  Monday's  battle.  His  data  are  not 
known  to  the  writer. 

The  loss  of  the  Federal  army  was,  according  to  official  reports,  as 
follows  : 


Killed. 

Wounded. 

Captured. 

Total. 

Grant's  army 

1,437 

5,679 

2,934 

10,050 

BuelPs  army  

263 

1,816 

88 

2,167 

Total 

1  700 

7,495 

3,022 

12,2  1  7 

A  reference  to  the  Appendix  will  show  that  General  Grant's  aggre 
gate  loss  was  11,220  instead  of  10,050,  giving  a  total  loss,  including 
BuelPs,  of  13,387.  Buell's  less  has  not  been  verified,  and  was  also 
probably  larger  than  the  official  report.  Swinton,  in  his  "Decisive 
Battles,"  and  Prof.  Coppee,  in  his  "  Life  of  Grant "  (page  96),  put  the 
Federal  loss  at  15,000. 

Jt  is  probable  that  Grant's  army  did  not  lose  much  more  than  a 
thousand  men  on  Monday.  If  this  be  so,  it  is  apparent  that  his  losses 
on  Sunday  were  some  10,000,  besides  thousands  of  fugitives,  at  a  cost 
of  about  6,500  Confederates.  On  Monday  the  Federal  loss  was  only 
some  3,000  or  4,000,  with  an  equal  or  greater  loss  inflicted  on  the 
Southern  army.  In  both  cases,  the  assailant  suffered  less  than  the 


COUNTING  THE  COST.  657 

defensive  lines.  General  Wallace  was  killed.  General  Grant  is  said 
to  have  been  wounded,  and  Sherman  was  wounded  in  the  hand,  besides 
having  three  horses  killed.  A  good  many  Federal  officers  were  also 
killed  and  wounded.  But  among  the  Confederates  the  proportion  of 
officers  killed  and  wounded  was  much  greater.  Besides  the  commander- 
in-chief,  and  Brigadier-General  Gladden,  there  was  a  great  number  of 
regimental  officers  killed.  Bragg  had  two  horses  shot  under  him  ; 
Hardee  was  slightly  wounded,  his  coat  cut  and  his  horse  disabled  by  a 
shell;  Breckinridge  was  twice  slightly  struck;  Cheatham  was  also 
slightly  wounded,  and  had  three  horses  shot  under  him.  Brigadier- 
Generals  Clark,  Bowen,  and  Johnson,  were  severely  wounded,  and 
Hindman  was  injured  by  a  shell  exploding  under  his  horse  and  killing 
it.  Colonel  Smith,  who  succeeded  Bushrod  Johnson  in  command  of  his 
brigade,  was  wounded  ;  and  Colonel  Dan  Adams,  and  Colonel  Deas, 
who  in  turn  succeeded  Gladden,  were  also  wounded.  The  long  list  of 
field  and  company  officers,  and  of  brave  soldiers,  would  swell  too  much 
the  bulk  of  this  volume. 

The  Comte  de  Paris  says  (volume  i.,  page  542)  that  Sherman  told 
him  that  Sunday's  battle  was  "  the  most  terrible  that  he  had  witnessed 
during  his  whole  career."  Badeau  remarks  (volume  i.,  page  78)  in  re 
gard  to  the  assault  on  Sherman  Sunday  morning,  that  it  was  success 
ful,  "  after  several  hours  of  as  desperate  fighting  as  was  ever  seen  on 
the  American  Continent."  He  says  (page  89),  "  With  the  exception  of 
one  or  two  severe  struggles,  the  fighting  of  April  7th  was  light  when 
compared  with  that  of  Sunday."  Again  (page  93)  :  "It  was  the 
fiercest  fight  of  the  war  west  of  the  Alleghanies,  and,  in  proportion  to 
the  numbers  engaged,  equaled  any  contest  during  the  rebellion.  I 
have  heard  Sherman  say  that  he  never  saw  such  terrible  fighting  after 
ward,  and  Grant  compared  Shiloh  only  with  the  Wilderness."  He 
adds  truly :  "  In  the  battle,  each  party  was  forced  to  respect  the  fight 
ing  qualities  of  the  other  ;  the  Northerners  recognized  the  impetuous 
vigor  and  splendid  enthusiasm  of  the  rebels,  and  the  latter  found  all 
the  tenacity  and  determination  of  the  North  in  those  who  opposed 
them." 

The  Federal  writers  have  claimed  that,  the  battles  having  ended  in 
the  retreat  of  the  assailant,  the  moral  advantages  remained  with  them. 
It  is  true  they  held  the  field  of  battle,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that 
it  had  been  for  them  a  canvas  city  where,  in  the  security  of  overpower 
ing  strength,  they  had  discussed  great  schemes  of  invasion  and  con 
quest.  Suddenly  the  bolt  of  war  had  burst  over  their  own  heads. 
They  had  seen  their  city  taken  by  storm,  wrapped  in  flames  and 
sacked,  and  had  been  snatched  from  the  brink  of  destruction  only  by 
the  premature  arrival  of  a  second  army  and  the  mysterious  arrest  of  the 
impending  and  final  blow.  They  looked  around  them,  and  everywhere 


658  SECOXD  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

were  the  lamentable  signs  and  ravages  of  horrid  war,  breathing  fire 
and  slaughter  ;  the  desolated  camps,  broken  artillery  and  scattered 
arms ;  the  trodden,  blood-stained  mire  ;  the  dead  and  dying ;  and 
pale,  trembling  fugitives  creeping  back  to  their  places  in  the  ranks. 
There  was  neither  glory  nor  gain  of  any  sort  apparent  to  their  eyes. 
There  was  no  room  for  exultation  anywhere.  Indeed,  the  last  combat 
of  the  field,  Forrest's  charge  with  350  men,  routing  a  regiment  of  in 
fantry  and  a  regiment  of  cavalry  in  the  face  of  three  brigades,  which 
turned  back  from  that  road  as  if  it  were  beset  by  some  occult  danger, 
is  a  sufficient  comment  on  the  text  of  the  bulletins.  At  the  close  of 
the  apologue  comes  the  moral.  The  epic  is  ended  with  an  epigram 
in  cold  steel,  leaving  no  doubt  as  to  the  meaning  of  what  had  gone 
before. 

The  best  proof  of  what  conclusions  were  drawn  from  the  conduct 
and  issue  of  the  battle  is  found  in  the  entire  change  of  Federal  tac 
tics  from  that  day.  The  bayonet  was  exchanged  for  the  spade  ;  and 
the  grand  march  was  turned  into  a  siege  of  the  South.  Halleck  took 
chief  command  on  the  9th,  and  Grant,  though  left  nominally  second  in 
command,  was,  as  his  biographer,  Badeau,  admits,  under  a  cloud,  un- 
consulted,  unemployed,  and  in  disgrace.  If  he  had  not  possessed  ex 
cellent  qualities  for  war,  not  to  be  disregarded  in  perilous  times,  he 
would  have  been  irretrievably  ruined.  Sherman's  family  influence, 
with  his  personal  conduct  on  the  field,  condoned  any  mistakes  he  had 
made,  and  he  was  recommended  for  promotion.  Buell,  unfortunately 
for  himself,  had  done  not  enough  to  dictate  his  own  terms,  and  too 
much  to  be  forgiven ;  so  that  his  rescue  of  Grant's  army  was  treated 
almost  as  a  failure  then,  and  altogether  as  a  crime  afterward.  He  cer 
tainly  had  eventually  to  pay  the  penalty  of  it  ;  and  it  is  difficult  to 
decide  from  the  tone  of  the  court-annalists,  while  Grant  and  Sherman 
were  wielding  the  sword  and  purse  of  the  country,  whether  Buell's 
delay  was  the  cause  of  all  the  trouble,  or  his  arrival  an  impertinent 
intrusion. 

But,  though  the  Federal  plans  were  disarranged,  their  generals 
shocked,  and  their  troops  demoralized  by  the  battles  of  Shiloh,  the 
only  satisfaction  it  brought  to  the  camps  of  the  South  was  pride  in  the 
prowess  of  her  soldiers,  and  in  the  proofs  she  had  given  of  power  to 
strike  a  great  and  terrible  blow.  Her  generals  said  to  one  another 
that  the  best,  and,  as  it  proved,  the  only  chance  to  convert  the  wasting 
war  of  defense  into  one  of  aggression,  had  escaped  them.  This  was 
whispered  in  the  camps,  and  is  yet  a  tradition  among  her  people,  in 
spite  of  all  the  glosses  that  factitious  history  has  put  into  print.  Presi 
dent  Davis  said,  not  once,  but  many  times  :  "  When  Sidney  Johnston 
fell,  it  was  the  turning-point  of  our  fate ;  for  we  had  no  other  hand  to 
take  up  his  work  in  the  West." 


AMENITIES  IX  WAR.  659 

The  armies  of  the  West  had  found  in  every  encounter  foemen 
worthy  of  their  steel.  But  the  magnitude  of  the  contest  at  Shiloh, 
and  the  tremendous  issues  at  stake,  the  impetuous  valor  and  stubborn 
resolution  of  the  combatants,  inspired  a  mutual  respect — a  respect 
which  it  is  to  be  hoped  may  do  much  to  remove  ancient  prejudices  and 
form  the  basis  of  an  equal  and  permanent  friendship. 

One  pleasing  feature,  which  casts  a  mellow  light  over  the  dreadful 
carnage  of  the  field  of  Shiloh,  is  the  humanity  and  mutual  courtesy 
that  marked  the  conduct  of  the  antagonists.  It  is  true  that  General 
Grant  refused  General  Beauregard's  request,  on  April  9th,  to  bury  the 
dead  under  a  flag  of  truce ;  but  he  stated  that  he  had  already  performed 
that  duty.  There  were  no  complaints  of  "outrages" — killing  of  cap 
tives,  mutilation  of  the  dead,  cruelty  to  the  wounded — which  made  so 
large  a  part  of  the  war  news  of  certain  correspondents.  The  conflict 
had  been  too  serious  and  too  grand  to  require  or  admit  any  merely 
sensational  stuff  in  its  recital. 

"  A  participant,"  writing  to  the  Cincinnati  Commercial*  says: 

While  preparing  our  meal,  a  flag  of  truce,  consisting  of  a  yellow  handker 
chief  tied  to  a  sapling-pole,  emerged  from  the  woods  beyond  us.  It  was  car 
ried  by  a  tall  Alabamian,  who  brought  with  it  the  wounded  lieutenant-colonel 
of  the  Fiftieth  Illinois,  borne  on  a  litter.  The  bearers  all  had  tied  on  their  arms 
a  piece  of  white  rag,  which,  by  questioning  the  wearers,  I  learned  designated  a 
detail  for  hospital  duty.  I  am  glad  to  be  able  to  say  something  good  of  an  army 
of  traitors ;  "  we  will  give  the  devil  his  due."  No  instance  came  to  my  knowl 
edge  in  which  our  dead  were  treated  in  so  diabolical  a  manner  as  they  were 
reported  to  be  at  Manassas  and  Pea  Ridge.  They  were  invariably,  wherever 
practicable,  kindly  cared  for.  A.  Hickenlooper  tells  me  that  one  of  his  corpo 
rals,  who  was  wounded,  received  many  attentions  from  them.  An  officer  handed 
him  a  rubber  blanket,  saying  that  he  himself  needed  it  bad  enough,  but  the 
wounded  man  needed  it  worse.  Others  brought  him  food  and  water,  and 
wrapped  him  up  in  woolen  blankets.  Such  instances  were  common;  and, 
among  the  hundreds  of  dead  and  wounded  I  have  looked  upon,  not  one  showed 
signs  of  the  barbarities  which  the  rebels  are  commonly  supposed  to  practise  on 
the  patriots. 

General  Buell,  in  a  letter  to  the  present  writer,  says  : 

A  circumstance  occurred  after  the  battle,  which  excited  a  good  deal  of  in 
terest  for  the  moment,  particularly  among  those  who  had  known  your  father. 
We  had  heard  of  his  death,  but  not  the  particulars  of  it,  from  prisoners  taken 
in  the  course  of  the  battle  of  the  7th ;  and,  in  collecting  and  burying  the  dead 
on  the  morning  of  the  8th,  a  body  was  found  which  several  persons  supposed 
to  be  that  of  your  father.  It  was  carried  to  the  headquarters  of  General  Nel 
son  and  laid  out  in  a  tent,  where  a  number  of  persons  came  to  see  it.  Several 
of  them,  acquaintances  of  your  father,  were  quite  confident  of  the  identity.  I 

1  "Rebellion  Record,"  vol.  iii.,  p.  416. 


660  SECOND   BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

was  not  one  of  those  who  entertained  that  opinion,  though  the  expression  of 
the  face  was  so  changed  by  the  wound  which  it  had  received  as  to  make  it  dif 
ficult  to  be  very  confident  about  the  identity.  There  was  the  same  manly  form, 
certainly  ;  but  that  was  all  that  I  could  see  alike.  However,  the  question  was 
determined  early  in  the  day  by  the  information  which  we  received  from  the 
Confederate  army,  that  your  father  was  killed  on  the  6th,  and  that  his  body  was 
removed  from  the  field  at  the  time  of  his  death. 

It  was  ascertained,  as  the  writer  has  been  informed,  that  the  body 
was  that  of  Colonel  Thomas  Preston,  of  Memphis,  a  connection  by  mar 
riage  of  General  Johnston.  The  writer  does  not  know  the  origin  of  the 
mistake.  It  is  needless  to  say  that  all  the  respect  due  to  his  supposed 
rank  and  personality  was  paid  by  those  who  had  the  body  in  charge. 
It  is  curious  to  note  the  contrast  in  the  conduct  of  these  honorable 
warriors,  still  hot  from  the  fray,  with  that  of  Sheridan,  Heintzelman, 
and  Griffin,  which  will  be  related  in  the  next  chapter. 

But  little  remains  to  be  said  of  what  occurred  after  General  John 
ston's  death.  It  is  not  the  purpose  of  the  writer  to  give  a  history  of 
the  war,  but  only  to  tell  the  story  of  General  Johnston's  life,  what  he 
did,  and  the  great  events  in  which  he  played  a  part.  All  this  ended 
absolutely  on  Sunday  afternoon,  April  6,  1862.  Not  often  is  there  an 
Elisha  to  catch  up  the  mantle  of  the  translated  Elijah.  When  a  man 
dies,  others  take  up  his  work  to  mend  or  mar  it,  and  he  is  soon  forgot 
ten.  A  puff  of  wind,  or  a  little  pewter  extinguisher,  puts  out  the  light 
that  shines  over  many  a  league  of  land  and  sea.  No  man  has  any 
tenure  of  the  things  of  this  world  in  the  grave.  His  power,  his  author 
ity,  most  of  his  influence,  die  with  him.  There  come  others  in  his  place, 
and  all  his  plans,  his  methods,  and  his  informing  spirit,  are  changed. 
It  was  so  in  this  case. 

General  Beauregard  retired  to  Corinth,  where  Van  Dorn  reenforced 
him  almost  immediately  with  17,000  men,  the  strong  fighters  of  Wil 
son's  Creek  and  Elkhorn.  These  troops,  added  to  the  effective  total 
reported  by  Jordan  after  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  32,212,  give  an  army  of 
nearly  50,000  men  fit  for  duty.  Re  enforcements  were  poured  in  from 
every  quarter.  But,  with  an  aggregate  on  the  rolls  of  112,092,  the 
effective  total  could  not  be  gotten  above  a  reported  effective  force  of 
52,706  men.  The  sick  and  absent  numbered  more  than  one-half  the 
army.  No  sudden  epidemic  had  smitten  the  camp ;  the  sickness  was 
the  effect  of  causes  evident  from  the  hour  of  retreat.  Halleck  had  taken 
position  at  Farmington,  and  was  advancing  spade  in  hand  ;  and  Beau- 
regard  intrenched  to  resist  him.  Digging  in  the  trenches  among  those 
marshes,  with  consequent  malaria ;  bad  food ;  neglect  of  police  duty  ; 
impure  and  insufficient  water,  the  drainage  of  swamps  and  heavily 
charged  with  magnesia  and  rotten  limestone  ;  these  causes,  acting  in 
conjunction  with  certain  moral  influences,  the  depression  of  retreat  and 


END   OF   CAMPAIGN.  GG1 

inaction,  produced  obstinate  types  of  diarrhoea  and  typhoid  fever.    The 
attempt  to  bore  artesian  wells  failed.     No  sound  men  were  left. 

Beauregard  twice  offered  Halleck  battle.  But  he  preferred  regular 
approaches,  in  the  mean  time  seizing  the  railroad  east  of  Corinth,  and 
cutting  off  communication  with  the  seaboard.  There  was  nothing  to 
be  done  except  to  retreat,  which  Beauregard  did,  May  30th,  falling 
back  to  Tupelo,  on  the  Ohio  &  Mississippi  Railroad.  The  retreat  was 
made  in  good  order,  and  with  no  very  considerable  loss  in  men  or  ma 
terial  of  war.  But  the  abandonment  of  Corinth,  which  was  a  point 
of  the  first  strategic  importance,  involved  the  surrender  of  Memphis 
and  the  Mississippi  Valley,  and  the  loss  of  the  campaign.  General 
Beauregard,  whose  health  continued  bad,  devolved  the  command  of  the 
army  on  General  Bragg,  and  retired  to  Mobile  for  rest  and  recuperation. 
The  President  made  Bragg's  temporary  command  a  permanent  one. 


APPENDIX. 

GENERAL  BEAUEEGAED's    OFFICIAL   REPORT. 

HEADQUARTERS,  ARMY  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
CORINTH,  MISSISSIPPI,  April  11, 1S62.       ) 

GENERAL  :  On  the  2d  ultimo,  having  ascertained  conclusively  from  the 
movements  of  the  enemy  on  the  Tennessee  River,  and  from  reliable  sources 
of  information,  that  his  aim  would  be  to  cut  off  my  communication  — in 
West  Tennessee  with  the  Eastern  and  Southern  States,  by  operating  from 
the  Tennessee  Elver  between  Crump's  Landing  and  Eastport  as  a  base — I  deter 
mined  to  foil  his  designs  by  concentrating  all  my  available  forces  at  and  around 
Corinth. 

Meanwhile,  having  called  on  the  Governors  of  the  States^of  Tennessee,  Mis 
sissippi,  Alabama,  and  Louisiana,  to  furnish  additional  troops,  some  of  them 
(chiefly  regiments  from  Louisiana)  soon  reached  this  vicinity,  and,  with  two  di 
visions  of  General  Folk's  command  from  Columbus,  and  a  fine  corps  of  troops 
from  Mobile  and  Pensacola,  under  Major-General  Bragg,  constituted  the  Army 
of  the  Mississippi.  At  the  same  time  General  Johnston,  being  at  Murfreesboro, 
on  the  inarch  to  form  a  junction  of  his  forces  with  mine,  was  called  on  to  send 
at  least  a  brigade  by  railroad,  so  that  we  might  fall  on  and  crush  the  enemy 
should  he  attempt  to  advance  from  under  his  gunboats.  The  call  on  General 
Johnston  was  promptly  complied  with.  His  entire  force  was  also  hastened  in 
this  direction;  and  by  the  first  of  April  our  united  forces  were  concentrated 
along  the  Mobile  &  Ohio  Railroad  from  Bethel  to  Corinth,  and  on  the  Memphis 
&  Charleston  Railroad  from  Corinth  to  luka. 

It  was  then  determined  to  assume  the  offensive,  and  strike  a  sudden  blow  at 
the  enemy  in  position,  under  General  Grant,  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Tennessee, 
at  Pittsburg,  and  in  the  direction  of  Savannah,  before  he  was  reenforced  by  the 
army  under  Gene/al  Buell,  then  known  to  be  advancing  for  that  purpose  by 
rapid  marches  from  Nashville  via  Columbia.  About  the  same  time  General 
Johnston  was  advised  that  such  an  operation  conformed  to  the  expectations  of 
the  President. 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  SIIILOH. 

By  a  rapid  and  vigorous  attack  on  General  Grant,  it  was  expected  he  would 
be  beaten  back  into  Ms  transports  and  the  river,  or  captured,  in  time  to  enable 
us  to  profit  by  the  victory  and  remove  to  the  rear  all  the  stores  and  munitions 
that  would  fall  into  our  hands,  in  such  an  event,  before  the  arrival  of  General 
Buell's  army  on  the  scene.  It  was  never  contemplated,  however,  to  retain  the 
position  thus  gained  and  abandon  Corinth,  the  strategic  point  of  the  campaign! 

Want  of  general  officers  needful  for  the  proper  organization  of  divisions  and 
brigades  of  an  army  brought  thus  suddenly  together,  and  other  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  an  effective  organization,  delayed  the  movement  until  the  night  of  the 
2d  instant,  when  it  was  heard  from  a  reliable  quarter  that  the  junction  of  the 
enemy's  armies  was  near  at  hand.  It  was  then,  at  a  late  hour,  determined  that 
the  attack  should  be  attempted  at  once,  incomplete  and  imperfect  as  were  our 
preparations  for  such  a  grave  and  momentous  adventure.  Accordingly,  that 
night,  at  1  A.  M.,  the  preliminary  orders  to  the  commanders  of  corps  were  issued 
for  the  movement. 

On  the  following  morning  the  detailed  orders  of  movement,  a  copy  of  which 
is  herewith,  marked  "A,"  were  issued,  and  the  movement,  after  some  delay,  com 
menced,  the  troops  being  in  admirable  spirits.  It  was  expected  we  should  be 
able  to  reach  the  enemy's  lines  in  time  to  attack  him  early  on  the  5th  instant. 
The  men,  however,  for  the  most  part,  were  unused  to  marching ;  the  roads,  nar 
row  and  traversing  a  densely-wooded  country,  became  almost  impassable  after 
a  severe  rain-storm  on  the  night  of  the  4th,  which  drenched  the  troops  in 
bivouac;  hence  our  forces  did  not  reach  the  intersection  of  the  roads  from  Pitts- 
burg  and  Hamburg,  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  enemy,  until  late  Saturday 
afternoon. 

It  was  then  decided  that  the  attack  should  be  made  on  the  next  morning,  at 
the  earliest  hour  practicable,  in  accordance  with  the  orders  of  movement ;  that 
is,  in  three  lines  of  battle,  the  first  and  second  extending  from  Owl  Creek  on 
the  left  to  Lick  Creek  on  the  right,  a  distance  of  about  three  miles,  supported 
by  the  third  and  the  reserve.  The  first  line,  under  Major-General  Hardee,  was 
constituted  of  his  corps,  augmented  on  his  right  by  Gladden's  brigade,  of  Major- 
General  Bragg's  corps,  deployed  in  line  of  battle,  with  their  respective  artillery 
following  immediately  by  the  main  road  to  Pittsburg,  and  the  cavalry  in  rear  of 
the  wings.  The  second  line,  composed  of  the  other  troops  of  Bragg's  corps, 
followed  the  first  at  a  distance  of  five  hundred  yards  in  the  same  order  as  the 
first.  The  army  corps,  under  General  Polk,  followed  the  second  line,  at  the 
distance  of  about  eight  hundred  yards,  in  lines  of  brigades,  deployed  with  their 
batteries  in  rear  of  each  brigade,  moving  by  the  Pittsburg  road,  the  left  wing 
supported  by  cavalry!  The  reserve,  under  Brigadier-General  Breckinridge,  fol 
lowed  closely  the  third  line,  in  the  same  order,  its  right  wing  supported  by 
cavalry. 

These  two  corps  constituted  the  reserve,  and  were  to  support  the  front  lines 
of  battle,  by  being  deployed  when  required  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  Pitts 
burg  road,  or  otherwise  act  according  to  the  exigencies  of  the  battle. 

At  5  A.  M.,  on  the  6th  instant,  a  reconnoitring  party  of  the  enemy,  having 
become  engaged,  with  our  advanced  pickets,  the  commander  of  the  forces  gave 
orders  to  begin  the  movement  and  attack  as  determined  upon,  except  that 
Trabue's  brigade  of  Breckinridge's  division  was  detached  and  advanced  to  sup 
port  the  left  of  Bragg's  corps  and  line  of  battle  when  menaced  by  the  enemy, 
and  the  other  two  brigades  were  directed  to  advance  by  the  road  to  Hamburg, 


BEAUREGARD'S   REPORT.  663 

to  support  Bragg' s  right;  and,  at  the  same  time,  Maney's  regiment,  of  Folk's 
corps,  was  advanced  by  the  same  road  to  reenforce  the  regiment  of  cavalry  and 
battery  of  four  pieces  already  thrown  forward  to  watch  and  guard  Grier's,  Tan 
ner's,  and  Borland's  Fords  of  Lick  Creek. 

Thirty  minutes  after  5  A.  M.,  our  lines  and  columns  were  in  motion,  all  ani 
mated,  evidently,  by  a  promising  spirit.  The  front  line  was  engaged  at  once, 
but  advanced  steadily,  followed  in  due  order,  with  equal  resolution  and  steadi-r 
ness,  by  the  other  lines,  which  were  brought  successively  into  action  with  rare 
skill,  judgment,  and  gallantry,  by  the  several  corps  commanders,  as  the  enemy 
made  a  stand,  with  his  masses  rallied  for  the  struggle  for  his  encampments. 
Like  an  Alpine  avalanche  our  troops  moved  forward,  despite  the  determined 
resistance  of  the  enemy,  until  after  6  P.  M.,  when  we  were  in  possession  of  all  his 
encampments  between  Owl  and  Lick  Creeks  but  one.  Nearly  all  of  his  field 
artillery,  about  thirty  (30)  flags,  colors,  and  standards,  over  3,000  prisoners,  in 
cluding  a  division  commander  (General  Prentiss)  and  several  brigade  command 
ers,  thousands  of  small-arms,  an  immense  supply  of  subsistence,  forage,  and  mu 
nitions  of  war,  and  a  large  amount  of  means  of  transportation — all  the  substan 
tial  fruits  of  a  complete  victory,  such,  indeed,  as  rarely  have  followed  the  most 
successful  battles,  for  never  was  an  army  so  well  provided  as  that  of  our  enemy. 

The  remnant  of  his  army  had  been  driven  in  utter  disorder  to  the  imme 
diate  vicinity  of  Pittsburg,  under  the  shelter  of  the  heavy  guns  of  his  iron-clad 
gunboats,  and  we  remained  undisputed  masters  of  his  well-selected,  admirably- 
provided  cantonments,  after  over  twelve  hours  of  obstinate  conflict  with  his 
forces,  who  had  been  beaten  from  them  and  the  contiguous  covert,  but  only  by 
a  sustained  onset  of  all  the  men  we  could  bring  into  action. 

Our  loss  was  heavy,  as  will  appear  from  the  accompanying  return  marked 
"  B."  Our  cornmander-in-chief,  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  fell  mortally  wounded, 
and  died  on  the  field  at  2.30  p.  M.,  after  having  shown  the  highest  qualities  of 
the  commander,  and  a  personal  intrepidity  that  inspired  all  around  him,  and 
gave  resistless  impulsion  to  his  columns  at  critical  moments. 

The  chief  command  then  devolved  upon  me,  though  at  the  time  I  was  great 
ly  prostrated,  and  suffering  from  the  prolonged  sickness  with  which  I  had  been 
afflicted  since  early  in  February.  The  responsibility  was  one  which,  in  my 
physical  condition,  I  would  have  gladly  avoided,  though  cast  upon  me  when  our 
forces  were  successfully  pushing  the  enemy  back  upon  the  Tennessee  River,  and, 
though  supported  on  the  immediate  field  by  such  corps  commanders  as  Major- 
Generals  Polk,  Bragg,  and  Hardee,  and  Brigadier-General  Breckinridge,  com 
manding  the  reserve. 

It  was  after  6  p.  M.,  as  before  said,  when  the  enemy's  last  position  was  car 
ried,  and  his  forces  finally  broke  and  sought  refuge  behind  a  commanding  emi 
nence,  covering  the  Pittsburg  Landing,  not  more  than  half  a  mile  distant,  and 
under  the  guns  of  the  gunboats,  which  opened  on  our  eager  columns  a  fierce 
and  annoying  fire  with  shot  and  shell  of  the  heaviest  description.  Darkness 
was  close  at  hand.  Officers  and  men  were  exhausted  by  a  combat  of  over 
twelve  hours  without  food,  and  jaded  by  the  march  of  the  preceding  day 
through  mud  and  water.  It  was,  therefore,  impossible  to  collect  the  rich  and 
opportune  spoils  of  war  scattered  broadcast  on  the  field  left  in  our  possession, 
and  impracticable  to  make  any  effective  dispositions  for  their  removal  to  the 
rear. 

I  accordingly  established  my  headquarters  at  the  church  of  Shiloh,  in  the 


664:  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  SHILOII. 

enemy's  encampment,  with  Major-General  Bragg,  and  directed  our  troops  to 
sleep  on  their  arms  in  such  positions  in  advance  and  rear  as  corps  commanders 
should  determine,  hoping,  from  news  received  by  a  special  dispatch,  that  delays 
had  been  encountered  by  General  Buell  in  his  march  from  Columbia,  and  that 
his  main  force,  therefore,  could  not  reach  the  field  of  battle  in  time  to  save 
General  Grant's  shattered  fugitive  forces  from  capture  or  destruction  on  the  fol 
lowing  day. 

During  the  night  the  rain  fell  in  torrents,  adding  to  the  discomfort  and  har 
assed  condition  of  the  men ;  the  enemy,  moreover,  had  broken  their  rest  by  a 
discharge,  at  measured  intervals,  of  heavy  shells  thrown  from  the  gunboats ; 
therefore,  on  the  following  morning,  the  troops  under  my  command  were  not  in 
a  condition  to  cope  with  an  equal  force  of  fresh  troops,  armed  and  equipped 
like  our  adversary,  in  the  immediate  possession  of  his  depots,  and  sheltered  by 
such  an  auxiliary  as  the  enemy's  gunboats. 

About  six  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  7th  of  April,  however,  a  hot  fire 
of  musketry  and  artillery,  opened  from  the  enemy's  quarter  on  our  advanced 
line,  assured  me  of  the  junction  of  his  forces;  and  soon  the  battle  raged  with  a 
fury  which  satisfied  me  I  was  attacked  by  a  largely  superior  force.  But,  from 
the  outset,  our  troops,  notwithstanding  their  fatigue  and  losses  from  the  battle 
of  the  day  before,  exhibited  the  most  cheering,  veteran-like  steadiness.  On  the 
right  and  centre  the  enemy  was  repulsed  in  every  attempt  he  made  with  his 
heavy  columns  in  that  quarter  of  the  field  ;  on  the  left,  however,  and  nearest  to 
the  point  of  arrival  of  his  reinforcements,  he  drove  forward  line  after  line  of 
his  fresh  troops,  which  were  met  with  a  resolution  and  courage  of  which  our 
country  may  be  proudly  hopeful.  Again  and  again  our  troops  were  brought  to 
the  charge,  invariably  to  win  the  position  at  issue,  invariably  to  drive  back  their 
foe.  But  hour  by  hour,  thus  opposed  to  an  enemy  constantly  reenforced,  our 
ranks  were  perceptibly  thinned  under  the  unceasing,  withering  fire  of  the  en 
emy,  and  by  12  M.  eighteen  hours  of  hard  fighting  had  sensibly  exhausted  a 
large  number.  My  last  reserves  had  necessarily  been  disposed  of,  and  the  enemy 
was  evidently  receiving  fresh  reinforcements  after  each  repulse.  Accordingly, 
about  1  P.  M.,  I  determined  to  withdraw  from  so  unequal  a  conflict,  securing 
such  of  the  results  of  the  victory  of  the  day  before  as  were  then  practicable. 

Officers  of  my  staff  were  immediately  dispatched  with  the  necessary  orders 
to  make  the  best  dispositions  for  a  deliberate,  orderly  withdrawal  from  the  field, 
and  to  collect  and  post  a  reserve  to  meet  the  enemy  should  he  attempt  to  push 
after  us.  In  this  connection  I  will  mention  particularly  my  adjutant-general. 
Colonel  Jordan,  who  was  of  much  assistance  to  me  on  this  occasion,  as  he  had 
already  been  on  the  field  of  battle  on  that  and  the  preceding  day. 

About  2  p.  M.,  the  lines  in  advance,  which  had  repulsed  the  enemy  in  their 
last  fierce  assault  on  our  left  and  centre,  received  the  orders  to  retire.  This  was 
done  with  uncommon  steadiness,  and  the  enemy  made  no  attempt  to  follow. 

The  line  of  troops  established  to  cover  this  movement  had  been  disposed  on 
a  favorable  ridge,  commanding  the  ground  of  Shiloh  Church.  From  this  position 
our  artillery  played  upon  the  woods  beyond  for  a  while,  but  upon  no  visible 
enemy,  and  without  reply.  Soon-,  satisfied  that  no  serious  pursuit  would  be  at 
tempted,  this  last  line  was  withdrawn,  and  never  did  troops  leave  a  battle-field 
in  better  order;  even  the  stragglers  fell  into  the  ranks,  and  marched  off  with 
those  who  had  stood  more  steadily  by  their  colors.  A  second  strong  position 
was  taken  up  about  a  mile  in  rear,  where  the  approach  of  the  enemy  was  awaited 


BEAUREGARD'S   REPORT.  665 

for  nearly  an  hour,  but  no  effort  to  follow  was  made,  and  only  a  small  detach 
ment  of  horsemen  could  be  seen  at  a  distance  from  this  last  position,  warily 
observing  our  movements. 

Arranging,  through  my  staff  officers,  for  the  completion  of  the  movements 
thus  begun,  Brigadier-General  Breckinridge  was  left  with  his  command  as  a 
rear-guard  to  hold  the  ground  we  had  occupied  the  night  preceding  the  first  bat 
tle,  just  in  front  of  the  intersection  of  the  Pittsburg  and  Hamburg  roads,  about 
four  miles  from  the  former  place,  while  the  rest  of  the  army  passed  to  the  rear 
in  excellent  order. 

On  the  following  day  General  Breckinridge  fell  back  about  three  miles  to 
Mickey's,  which  position  we  continued  to  hold,  with  our  cavalry  thrown  con 
siderably  forward  in  immediate  proximity  to  the  battle-field. 

Unfortunately,  toward  night  of  the  7th  instant,  it  began  to  rain  heavily ;  this 
continued  throughout  the  nigbt ;  the  roads  became  almost  impassable  in  many 
places,  and  much  hardship  and  suffering  now  ensued  before  all  the  regiments 
reached  their  encampments;  but,  despite  the  heavy  casualties  of  the  two  event 
ful  days  of  the  6th  and  7th  of  April,  this  army  is  more  confident  of  ultimate 
success  than  before  its  encounter  with  the  enemy. 

To  Major- Generals  Polk,  Bragg,  and  Hardee,  commanding  corps,  arid  to 
Brigadier-General  Breckinridge,  commanding  the  reserve,  the  country  is  greatly 
indebted  for  the  zeal,  intelligence,  and  energy,  with  which  all  orders  were  exe 
cuted  ;  for  the  foresight  and  military  ability  they  displayed  in  the  absence  of 
instructions  in  the  many  exigencies  of  the  battle  on  a  field  so  densely  wooded 
and  broken,  and  for  their  fearless  deportment  as  they  repeatedly  led  their  com 
mands  personally  to  the  onset  upon  their  powerful  adversary.  It  was  under 
these  circumstances  that  General  Bragg  had  two  horses  shot  under  him  ;  that 
Major-General  Hardee  was  slightly  wounded,  his  coat  rent  by  balls,  and  his 
horse  disabled ;  and  that  Brigadier-General  Breckinridge  was  twice  struck  by 
spent  balls. 

For  the  services  of  their  gallant  subordinate  commanders  and  of  other  of 
ficers,  as  well  as  for  the  details  of  the  battle-field,  I  must  refer  to  the  reports  of 
corps,  division,  and  brigade  commanders,  which  shall  be  forwarded  as  soon  as 
received. 

To  give  more  in  detail  the  operations  of  the  two  battles  resulting  from  the 
movement  on  Pittsburg  than  now  attempted  must  have  delayed  this  report  for 
weeks,  and  interfered  materially  with  the  important  duties  of  my  position.  But 
I  may  be  permitted  to  say  that  not  only  did  the  obstinate  conflict  for  twelve 
hours  on  Sunday  leave  the  Confederate  army  masters  of  the  battle-field  and 
our  adversary  beaten,  but  we  left  that  field  on  the  next  day  only  after  eight 
hours1  incessant  battle  with  a  superior  army  of  fresh  troops,  whom  we  had  re 
pulsed  in  every  attack  on  our  lines — so  repulsed  and  crippled,  indeed,  as  to  leave 
it  unable  to  take  the  field  for  the  campaign  for  which  it  was  collected  and 
equipped  at  such  enormous  expense,  and  with  such  profusion  of  all  the  appli 
ances  of  war.  These  successful  results  were  not  achieved,  however,  as  before 
said,  without  severe  loss — a  loss  not  to  be  measured  by  the  number  of  the  slain 
and  wounded,  but  by  the  high  social  and  personal  worth  of  so  large  a  number 
of  those  who  were  killed  or  disabled,  including  the  commander  of  the  forces, 
whose  high  qualities  will  be  greatly  missed  in  the  momentous  campaign  im 
pending. 


666  SECOND  BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 

I  deeply  regret  to  record  also  the  death  of  the  Hon.  George  M.  Johnson, 
Provisional  Governor  of  Kentucky,  who  went  into  action  with  the  Kentucky 
troops,  and  continually  inspired  them  by  his  words  and  example.  Having  his 
horse  shot  under  him  on  Sunday,  he  entered  the  ranks  of  a  Kentucky  regiment 
on  Monday,  and  fell  mortally  wounded  toward  the  close  of  the  day.  Not  his 
State  alone,  but  the  whole  Confederacy,  has  sustained  a  great  loss  in  the  death 
of  this  brave,  upright,  and  able  man. 

Another  gallant  and  able  soldier  and  captain  was  lost  to  the  service  of  the 
country,  when  Brigadier-General  Gladden,  commanding  First  Brigade,  Withers' s 
division,  Second  Army  Corps,  died  from  a  severe  wound  received  on  the  6th  in 
stant,  after  having  been  conspicuous  to  his  whole  corps  and  the  army  for  courage 
and  capacity. 

Major-General  Cheatham,  commanding  First  Division,  First  Corps,  was  slight 
ly  wounded,  and  had  three  horses  shot  under  him. 

Brigadier-General  Clark,  commanding  Second  Division  of  the  First  Corps,  re 
ceived  a  severe  wound  also  on  the  first  day,  which  will  deprive  the  army  of  his 
valuable  services  for  some  time. 

Brigadier-General  Hindman,  engaged  in  the  outset  of  the  battle,  was  con 
spicuous  for  a  cool  courage  efficiently  employed  in  leading  his  men  ever  into  the 
thickest  of  the  fray,  until  his  horse  was  shot  under  him,  and  he  was  unfortu 
nately  so  severely  injured  by  the  fall  that  the  army  was  deprived,  on  the  follow 
ing  day,  of  his  chivalrous  example. 

Brigadier- Generals  B.  R.  Johnson  and  Bowen,  most  meritorious  officers, 
were  also  severely  wounded  in  the  first  combat,  but  it  is  hoped  will  soon  be  able 
to  return  to  duty  with  their  brigades. 

To  mention  the  many  field-officers  who  died  or  were  wounded  while  gallant 
ly  leading  their  commands  into  action,  and  the  many  brilliant  instances  of  indi 
vidual  courage  displayed  by  officers  and  men  in  the  twenty  hours  of  battle,  is 
impossible  at  this  time ;  but  their  names  will  be  duly  made  known  to  their  coun 
trymen. 

The  immediate  staff  of  the  lamented  commander-in-chief,  who  accompanied 
him  to  the  field,  rendered  efficient  service,  and,  either  by  his  side,  or  in  carrying 
his  orders,  shared  his  exposures  to  the  casualties  of  a  well-contested  battle-field. 
I  beg  to  commend  their  names  to  the  notice  of  the  War  Department,  namely : 
of  Captains  H.  P.  Brewster  and  N.  Wickliffe,  of  the  Adjutant  and  Inspector- 
General's  Department. 

Captain  Theodore  O'Hara,  acting  inspector-general. 

Lieutenants  George  Baylor  and  Thomas  M.  Jack,  aides-de-camp. 

Volunteer  Aides-de-Camp  Colonel  William  Preston,  Major  D.  M.  Hayden, 
E.  W.  Munford,  and  Calhoun  Benham. 

Major  Albert  J.  Smith  and  Captain  Wickham,  Quartermaster's  Department. 

To  these  gentlemen  was  assigned  the  last  sad  duty  of  accompanying  the  re 
mains  of  their  lamented  chief  from  the  field,  except  Captains  Brewster  and 
Wickliffe,  who  remained,  and  rendered  valuable  services  as  staff  officers  on  the 
7th  of  April. 

Governor  Isham  G.  Harris,  of  Tennessee,  went  upon  the  field  with  General 
Johnston,  was  by  his  side  when  he  was  shot,  aided  him  from  his  horse,  and  re 
ceived  him  in  his  arms  when  he  died.  Subsequently  the  Governor  joined  my  staff, 
and  remained  with  me  throughout  the  next  day,  except  when  carrying  orders 


BEAUREGARD'S   REPORT.  667 

or  engaged  in  encouraging  the  troops  of  his  own  State,  to  whom  he  gave  a  con 
spicuous  example  of  coolness,  zeal,  and  intrepidity. 

I  am  also  under  many  obligations  to  my  own  general,  personal,  and  volun 
teer  staff,  many  of  whom  have  been  so  long  associated  with  me.  I  append  a  list 
of  those  present  on  the  field  on  both  days,  and  whose  duties  carried  them  con 
stantly  under  fire,  namely :  Colonel  Thomas  Jordan,  Captain  Clifton  H.  Smith, 
and  Lieutenant  John  M.  Otey,  Adjutant-General's  Department. 

Major  George  TV.  Brent,  acting  inspector-general ;  Colonel  R.  B.  Lee,  chief 
of  subsistence,  whose  horse  was  wounded ;  Lieutenant-Colonel  S.  \V.  Ferguson, 
and  Lieutenant  A.  R.  Chisholm,  aides-de-camp. 

Volunteer  Aides-de-Camp  Colonel  Jacob  Thompson,  Major  Numa  Augustin, 
Major  H.  E.  Peyton,  Captain  Albert  Ferry,  Captain  B.  B.  TVaddell. 

Captain  TV.  TV.  Porter,  of  Major-General  Crittenden's  staff,  also  reported  for 
duty,  and  shared  the  duties  of  my  volunteer  staff  on  Monday. 

Brigadier-General  Trudeau,  of  Louisiana  Volunteers,  also,  for  a  part  of  the 
first  day's  conflict,  was  with  me  as  a  volunteer  aide. 

Captain  E.  H.  Cummins,  signal-officer,  also,  was  actively  employed  as  a  staff 
officer  on  both  days. 

Nor  must  I  fail  to  mention  that  Private  TV.  E.  Goolsby,  Eleventh  Regiment 
Virginia  Volunteers,  orderly  to  my  headquarters  since  last  June,  repeatedly  em 
ployed  to  carry  my  verbal  orders  to  the  field,  discharged  the  duty  with  great  zeal 
and  intelligence. 

Other  members  of  my  staff  were  necessarily  absent  from  the  immediate  field 
of  battle,  intrusted  with  responsible  duties  at  these  headquarters,  namely : 
Captain  F.  H.  Jordan,  assistant  adjutant-general,  in  charge  of  general  headquar 
ters  ;  Major  Eugene  E.  McLean,  chief  quartermaster ;  Captain  E.  Deslonde,  Quar 
termaster's  Department. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Ferguson,  aide-de-camp,  early  on  Monday,  was  assigned 
to  command  and  direct  the  movements  of  a  brigade  of  the  Second  Corps. 

Lieutenant- Colonel  Gilmer,  chief-engineer,  after  having  performed  the  im 
portant  and  various  duties  of  his  place  with  distinction  to  himself  and  material 
benefit  to  his  country,  was  wounded  late  on  Monday.  I  trust,  however,  I  shall 
not  long  be  deprived  of  his  essential  services. 

Captain  Lockett,  Engineer  Corps,  chief  assistant  to  Colonel  Gilmer,  after 
having  been  employed  in  the  duties  of  his  corps  on  Sunday,  was  placed  by  me 
on  Monday  in  command  of  a  battalion  without  field-officers.  Captain  Fremeaux, 
provisional  engineers,  and  Lieutenants  Steel  and  Helm,  also  rendered  material 
and  ever-dangerous  service  in  the  line  of  their  duty. 

Major-General  (now  General)  Braxton  Bragg,  in  addition  to  his  duties  of 
chief  of  staff,  as  has  been  before  stated,  commanded  his  corps — much  the  largest 
in  the  field — on  both  days  with  signal  capacity  and  soldiership. 

Surgeon  Foard,  medical  director;  Surgeons  R.  L.  Brodie  and  S.  Chopin, 
medical  inspectors;  and  Surgeon  D.  TV.  Yandell,  medical  director  of  the  West 
ern  Department,  with  General  Johnston,  were  present  in  the  discharge  of  their 
arduous  and  high  duties,  which  they  performed  with  honor  to  their  profession. 

Captain  Tom  Saunders,  Messrs.  Scales  and  Metcalf,  and  Mr.  Tully,  of  New 
Orleans,  were  of  material  aid  on  both  days ;  ready  to  give  news  of  the  enemy's 
positions  and  movements,  regardless  of  exposure. 

"While  thus  partially  making  mention  of  some  of  those  who  rendered  brill- 


668  SECOND  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 

iant,  gallant,  or  meritorious  service  in  the  field,  I  have  aimed  merely  to  notice 
those  whose  positions  would  most  probably  exclude  the  record  of  their  services 
from  the  reports  of  corps  or  subordinate  commanders. 

From  this  agreeable  duty  I  turn  to  one  in  the  highest  degree  unpleasant — one 
due,  however,  to  the  brave  men  under  me — as  a  contrast  to  the  behavior  of  most 
of  the  army  who  fought  so  heroically.  I  allude  to  the  fact  that  some  officers, 
non-commissioned  officers,  and  men,  abandoned  their  colors  early  on  the  first  day 
to  pillage  the  captured  encampments;  others  retired  shamefully  from  the  field  on 
both  days,  while  the  thunder  of  cannon,  and  the  roar  and  rattle  of  musketry, 
told  them  that  their  brothers  were  being  slaughtered  by  the  fresh  legions  of  the 
enemy.  I  have  ordered  the  names  of  the  most  conspicuous  on  this  roll  of  lag 
gards  and  cowards  to  be  published  on  orders. 

It  remains  to  state  that  our  loss  in  the  two  days  in  killed  outright  was  1,728 ; 
wounded,  8,012;  missing,  959 — making  an  aggregate  of  casualties  of  10,699. 

This  sad  list  tells  in  simple  language  of  the  stout  fight  made  by  our  country 
men  in  front  of  the  rude  log  chapel  of  Shiloh,  especially  when  it  is  known  that 
on  Monday,  from  exhaustion  and  other  causes,  not  20,000  men  on  our  side  could 
be  brought  into  action. 

Of  the  loss  of  the  enemy  I  have  no  exact  knowledge.  Their  newspapers 
report  it  as  very  heavy.  Unquestionably  it  was  greater,  even  in  proportion, 
than  our  own  on  both  days,  for  it  was  apparent  to  all  that  their  dead  left  on  the 
field  outnumbered  ours  two  to  one. 

Their  casualties,  therefore,  cannot  have  fallen  many  short  of  20,000  in  killed, 
wounded,  prisoners,  and  missing. 

Through  information  derived  from  many  sources,  including  the  newspapers 
of  the  enemy,  we  engaged  on  Sunday  the  divisions  of  Generals  Prentiss,  Sher 
man,  Hurlbut,  McClernand,  and  Smith,  of  9,000  men  each,  or  at  least  45,000 
men.  This  force  was  reenforced  on  Sunday  night  by  the  divisions  of  Generals 
kelson,  McCook,  Crittenden,  and  Thomas,  of  Major-General  Buell's  army,  some 
25,000  strong,  including  all  arms.  Also  General  L.  Wallace's  division  of  General 
Grant's  army,  making  at  least  33,000  fresh  troops,  which,  added  to  the  remnant 
of  General  Grant's  forces,  on  Monday  morning  amounting  to  over  20,000,  made 
an  aggregate  force  of  some  53,000  men,  at  least,  arrayed  against  us  on  that  day. 

In  connection  with  the  results  of  the  battle  I  should  state  that  the  most  of 
our  men  who  had  inferior  arms  exchanged  them  for  the  improved  arms  of  the 
enemy.  Also,  that  most  of  the  property,  public  and  personal,  in  the  camp  from 
which  the  enemy  was  driven  on  Sunday,  was  rendered  useless  or  greatly  dam 
aged,  except  some  of  the  tents. 

With  this  are  transmitted  certain  papers,  to  wit : 

Order  of  movements,  marked  "  A." 

A  list  of  the  killed  and  wounded,  marked  "B." 

A  list  of  captured  flags,  marked  u  C ;  "  and  a  map  of  the  field  of  battle,  marked 
"D." 

All  of  which  is  respectfully  submitted  through  rny  volunteer  aide-de-camp, 
Colonel  Jacob  Thompson,  of  Mississippi,  who  has  in  charge  the  flags,  standards, 
and  colors,  captured  from  the  enemy. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  general,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  T.  BEAUEEGAED,  General  commanding. 

To  General  S.  COOPEE,  Adjutant  and  Inspector-General  Confederate  States  Army,  Richmond,  Vs. 


CONFEDERATE  FIELD  RETURNS. 


669 


APPENDIX  I. 

KILLED,  WOUNDED,  AND  MISSING. 
BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 


COMMAND. 

Commander. 

Corps. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Misf- 
ing. 

92 
28 
45 

Remarks. 

1st  Brigade  

Colonel  Trabue  
Brig.-General  Bowen  
Colonel  Statham 

Reserve  

151 

98 
137 

557 
498 
627 

3d          u 

Total 

Brig.-Gen.  Breckinridge  . 

Reserve 

886 

1,682 

165 

1st  Brigade 

Brig.-General  Hindman.  . 
Cleburno  .  . 
Wood  

Third  Corps... 

109 

188 
107 

546 
790 
600 

88 
65 
88 

8d         "       

Total  

Major-General  Hardee.  .  . 

Third  Corps  .  . 

404 

1,936 

141 

1st  Brigade,  1st  Div.... 
2d        "          "     "  
1st       "         2d 
2d        "          "".... 

Total 

Colonel  Russell 

First  Corps... 

97 
93 
120 
75 

512 
421 
607 
413 

'3 
13 
8 

Brig.-Gen.  Clark  & 
Major-Gen.  Cheat- 
ham    commanding 
div'ns  in  1st  Corps. 

Brig.-General  Stewart... 
"              Johnson.  .  . 
Colonel  Stephens  

Major-General  Polk  

First  Corps... 

885 

1,958 

19 

1st  Brigade.  1st  Div      . 
2d        u          "     " 
8d        "          *'     " 
1st       "         2d    " 
2d        "          "     " 
3d       "         "     " 

Total 

Colonel  Gibson        .... 

Second  Corps. 

97 
69 
89 
129 
83 
86 

488 
313 
836 
597 
343 
864 

97 
52 
169 
103 
19 
194 

Brig.-Gens.   With 
ers    and     Ruggles 
commanding  divis 
ions  Second  Corps. 

Brig.-General  Anderson.. 
Colonel  Pond.  
Brig.-General  Gladden.  .  . 
Chalmers.. 
Jackson  .  .  . 

Major-General  Bragg  

Second  Corps. 

553 

2,441 

684 

Grand  total  

General  Beauregard  

Army  Miss  .  .  . 

1,728 

8,012 

959 

RECAPITULATION. 

Killed 1,728 

Wounded 8,012 

Missing 959 


Total. 


Respectfully  submitted, 

JOHN  M.  OTET, 

Assistant  Adjutant- General. 


670 


SECOND  BATTLE  OF  SHILOH. 


lx 


CONFEDERATE   FIELD   RETURNS. 


GT1 


•s 


It 

s  a 


:^~  1^  liSS 


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;  TH       .  T*      I    00 


I       g' 


f2 
«o   II 


it 


i  P?r 
S"  i  i 


S  l§ 

^ 


i!!l|g! 


fa          -SJMUJO 


1181  1  *-*« 


of  First  Corps 
"  Second  " 
"  Third  " 
"  Eesorvc 


*il8 

Ells 
S-^H^ 
'o^  s  i 
>, 


H      < 


Cavalry 
Grand 


BRAGG, 
General  co 


ward 
BIIA 


l±  ^ 


ral. 


Respectfully  submit 
JOHN  M 


OTEY, 
Assistant  Adj 


44 


672 


SECOND   BATTLE   OF  SHILOIL 


APPENDIX   III.' 


FIELD  RETURN  OF  THE  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI  BEFORE  AND  AFTER  THE  BATTLE  OF 

SHILOH. 


COMMAND. 

Commanders. 

Effective 
Tutal  before 
Battle. 

Effective 
Total  after 
Battle. 

REMARKS. 

1st  Army  Corps 

Major-General  L  Polk 

9136 

6TT9 

Casualties   in    battle    of 

2d      " 
3d      "           " 
Keserve  

General  Braxton  Bragg  

Major-General  W.  J.  Hardee  
Brigadier-General  J.  C.  Breckinridge. 

13.589 
6,789 
6.439 

9.961 

4.609 
4,206 

Shiloh:  killed,    1.728; 
wounded,  S,012  ;  miss 
ing,  959. 

Total  Infantry  | 

85,953 

25,555 

and  Artillery  f 

Brigadier-General  F   Gardner 

4,382 

40S1 

The  battle-field   was    so 

40,335 

29,630 

the   cavalry  was  use 
less  and  could  not  op 

10,699 

erate  at  all. 

Respectfully  submitted, 


THOMAS  JORDAN, 

Assistant  Adjutant  General. 


Respectfully  submitted  and  forwarded, 

G.  T.  BEAUREGARD, 

General  commanding  Army  of  the  Mississippi. 


HEADQUARTERS  ARMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI, 
COEINTH.  MISSISSIPPI,  April  21,  1862. 


1  Forwarded  with  official  report. 


CONFEDERATE   ORGANIZATION   AND   CASUALTIES. 


673 


APPENDIX  IV. 

ORGANIZATION  AND  CASUALTIES  OP  THE  ARMY  OP  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  APRIL  6  AND  7,  1862, 
COMPILED  FROM  THE  BATTLE  REPORTS  BY  THE  AUTHOR. 

K.,  killed ;  m.  w.,  mortally  wounded  ;  w.,  wounded. 

General  ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHXSTOX,  Commander-in-  Chief. 

General  G.  T.  BEAUKEGAKD,  Second  in  Command. 

First  Corps. — Major-General  LEOXIDAS  POLK. 

First  Division. — Brigadier-General  CHARLES  CLARK  (w.). 

First  Brigade. — Colonel  R.  M.  RUSSELL. 


REGIMENTS. 

Commanders. 

Effec 
tive. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Miss 
ing- 

Total. 

Twelfth  Tennessee  

Lieutenant-Colonel  T  II  Bell.         

Thirteenth      " 

23 

134 

Twenty-second  Tenn  

j  <  1)  Colonel  T.  J.  Freeman  (w.)  
\  (2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  Stewart  (w.)  
J  (1)  Colonel  3.  F.  Marks  (w.)  

550 

Batterv  

j  (-2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  K.  H.  Barrow    .  .  . 
Captain  S.  P.  Bankhead  

93 

2 

18 

Second  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  ALEXANDER  P.  STEWART. 


REGIMENTS. 

Commanders. 

Effec 
tives. 

Killed. 

Wound- 

Miss 
ing- 

Total. 

(  (1)  Colonel  Neelv  

Fifth               "            

l  (2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  O.  P.  Strahl  
Lieutenant-Colonel  C  D  Venable 

36 

1S3 

.  .   . 

Thirty-third  Tennessee 

Colonel  A  W   Campbell 

20 

ios 

17 

Thirteenth  Arkansas  

{(1)  Lieutenant-Colonel  A.  D.  Grayson  (k.) 
(2)  Major  J  A.  McXeely  (w  ) 

25 

7° 

3 

(3)  Colonel  J.  C.  Tappan  

Batterv  

Captain  T.  J.  Stanford 

131 

4 

14 

2 

Second  Division. — Major-General  B.  F.  CHEATHAM. 

First  Briaadc  — -S  W  Brigadier-General  B.  R.  JOHNSON  (w.). 
$r  Jfnffaae-      \  (2)  Colonel  PRESTON  SMITH  (w.). 


REGIMENTS. 

Commanders. 

Effec 
tives. 

Killed. 

Wound- 

Miss 
ing. 

Total. 

One  Hundred  and  Fifty- 

(  (1)  Colonel  Preston  Smith  (w  ) 

fourth  Sr.  Tennessee.. 
Second                 " 

|  (2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  Marcus  J.  Wright 
Colonel  J.  Knox  Walker 

650 

25 

1P3 

11 

199 

Fifteenth 

j  (1)  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  C.  Tyler  (w.).  . 

1  (%}  Miinr  TTparn 

(  (1)  Colonel  A  K  Blythe  (k  ) 

Blythe's  Mississippi  

•<  (2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  D   Herron  (k  ) 

(  (3)  Major  Moore  

Batterv.  .  . 

Captain  M.  T.  Polk  (w.).  .  . 

102 

4 

18 

2 

24 

674 


SECOND   BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 


B^  *^,- j  <1>  Sjone,  Wjj*™,  H.  SlEPnra, 


REGIMENTS. 

Commanders. 

Effec 
tives. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Miss 
ing. 

Total. 

First  Tennessee  
Sixth         "         
^intb        "         

Colonel  George  Maney  

1,213 

Lieutenant-Colonel  T.  P.  Jones  

... 

Colonel  H.  L  Douglass  

Seventh  Kentucky 

"       Charles  Wickliffe  (m.  w  ) 

Battery 

(lantain  \\    Smith 

120 

1 

13 

Cheatham's  report  for 

division. 

3,801 

/Second  Corps. — Major-General  BKAXTON  BEAGG. 

First  Division. — Brigadier-General  DANIEL  RUGGLES. 

First  Brigade. — Colonel  RANDAL  L.  GIBSON. 


REGIMENTS. 

Commanders 

Effec 
tives. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Miss 
ing. 

Total. 

Fourth  Louisiana  

Colonel  H.  W.  Allen  (w.)  

575 

24 

1C3 

22 

203 

Thirteenth     "      

j  (1)  Major  A.  P.  Avegno  (m.  w.)  I 

Nineteenth    "      

Colonel  B.  L.  Hodae 

First  Arkansas 

Battery  

Captain  Bain  

Second  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  PATTON  ANDERSON. 


REGIMENTS. 

Commanders. 

Effec 
tives. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Misi- 

Total. 

82(5 

Twentieth             u 

Colonel  August  Eeichard        

507 

"        W.  A  Stanley 

226 

14 

42 

11 

dl 

(  (1)  Major  T.  A.  McDonell  (w.)  
4  (2)  Captain  W  G.  Poole. 

250 

((8)        "       W.  C.  Bird  

Two  Cos.  Confederate  I 

Major  F  H  Clack 

169 

10 

35 

1 

46 

Guards  Response  —  j 
Battery 

Captain  W  I.  Hodgson  

155 

Anderson's  report  .  .  . 

1,634 

434 

Third  Brigade.— Colonel  PRESTON  POND. 


REGIMENTS. 

Commanders. 

Effec-  ' 
tives. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Miss 
ing. 

Total. 

Sixteenth  Louisiana 

Major  D  Gober                  

830 

19 

46 

27 

92 

Eighteenth       " 

13 

80 

1181 

211 

Thirty-eighth  Tennessee 

"        K  F  Loonoy 

43 

15 

65 

Crescent  (Louisiana) 

"        M.  J.  Smith                 

23 

84 

20 

127 

17 

55 

18 

<ii) 

Battery  

Captain  William  H.  Ketchum  

1 

12 

1 

14 

Total 

80 

820 

199 

599 

1  Mostly  killed  and  wounded. 


CONFEDERATE   ORGANIZATION   AXD   CASUALTIES. 


675 


Second  Division. — Brigadier  JOXES  M.  WITHERS. 


First  Brigade. — 


(1)  Brigadier-General  A.  H.  GLADDEN  (k.). 

(2)  Colonel  D.  W.  ADAMS  (w.). 

(3)  Colonel  Z.  C.  DBAS  (w.). 

(4)  Colonel  J.  Q.  LOOMIS. 


! 

REGIMENTS.                                                   Commander*. 

Effec 
tives. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Miss 
ing- 

Total. 

(  (1)  Colonel  D.  W.  Adams  (w.)  \ 

\  (2)  Major  F.  II.  Farrar  f 

198 

(  (1)  Colonel  Z.  C.  Deas  (w.)  \ 
'•  '  \  (2>  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  Q.  Marrast..  f 

T«™tv  fifth             "                      f  (1)    Col°nel  Q-  LoomiS  j 

435 
305 

440 

"•   1  (2)  Major  J.  D.  Johnston  f 
(  (1  )  Colonel  Coltart  (w.)  j 
"  •  ,  1  (2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  W.  D.  Chadick.  f 
Battery                               '     Captain  Robertson                  ...         

TVithers's  report.  .  . 

120        597 

~103 

829 

Second  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  JAMES  R.  CHALMERS. 


REGIMENTS. 

Commanders. 

Effec 
tives. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Miss 
ing. 

Total. 

Fifth  Mississippi 

Colonel  A  E.  Fant  

"         H  Mayson.   .       .             . 

Xinth          " 

"       "W  A.  Rankin  (k  ) 

Tenth         " 

"        R.  A.  Smith  

"        B  J    Lea 

Battery 

Captain  Gage  

Chalmers's  report  . 

2,039 

82 

343 



425 

TJdrd  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  JOHN  K.  JACKSON. 


Jackson's  report 


REGIMENTS. 

Commanders. 

Effec 
tives. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Miss 
ing. 

Total. 

Colonel  R   C  Favis 

Kitrhteenth          ** 

"        E.  3   Shorter  .      ..     .           

"        Joseph  Wheeler 

Battery... 

Captain  J.  P.  Girardy.  .  . 

2.203 


Second  Division — (Summary). 


BRIGADES. 

Commanders. 

Effec 
tives, 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

j  Miss- 

Total. 

I 

Gladden                                                        1 

129 

82 
91 

293 

597 
843 
364 

1.334 

!     103 
i       2!) 
194 

253 

829 
454 
640 

1.1M8 
1.8SO 

II.. 

Chalmers 

2.039 
2,208 

Ill 

Withers's  report.  .  . 
Bragg'  s 

6.4S2 
6.4S2 

Beauregard's  report. 


302 


676 


SECOND  BATTLE   OF  SHILOII. 


Third  Corps. — Major-General  WILLIAM  J.  HAEDEE. 

First  Division. — Brigadier-General  THOMAS  C.  HINDMAN. 

first  Brigade. — Colonel  R.  G.  SHAVER. 


REGIMENTS. 

Commanders. 

Effec 
tives. 

Killed.  W™nd- 

Miss- 
ing. 

Total. 

Third  Confederate  

Colonel  J.  8.  Marmaduke  

(  (1)  Colonel  Govan  } 

Second  Arkansas  

<  (2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  Patterson  (w.)..  V 
(  (3)  Major  K.  T.  Harvey  \ 

.... 

Sixth           "               

Colonel  A.  T.  Hawthorne 

Seventh      "        

j  (1)  Lieut.  -Colonel  John  M.  Dean  (k.)..  } 

Battery 

Captain  Swett 

Third  Brigade. — Brigadier-General  S.  A.  M.  WOOD. 


REGIMENTS. 

Commanders. 

Effec 
tives. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Miss 
ing. 

Tutal. 

Sixteenth  Alabama  

Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  W.  Harris  

825 

IVlith  Arkansas 

Colonel  W  K  Patterson  

305 

Major  John  H  Kelley 

155 

8 

49 

2 

5') 

Twenty-seventh  Tenn.  .  . 

(  (1)  Colonel  Williams  (k.)  ) 
<  (2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  Brown  (w.)  v 
(  (3)  Major  Love  (k.)  ) 

380 

27 

115 

43 

190 

Colonel  C.  A.  McDaniel  (w  )  

270 

Fifty-fifth                 " 

"        McKoin 

805 

Third  Mississippi  Battal'n 

Major  A.  M.  Hardcastle  

800 

Battery 

Captain  Harper  (four  guns)               .   . 

Infantry  .  .  . 

2,040 





—  



Second  Brigade  (unattached). — Brigadier-General  P.  R.  CLEBURNE. 


REGIMENTS. 

Cornmanders. 

Effec 
tives. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Miss 
ing. 

Total. 

Second  Tennessee  
Fifth           " 

i  (1)  Colonel  William  Bate  (w.)  ) 

365 
369 
573 

/  (2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  D.  L.  Goodall...  f 
Colonel  Ben  J.  Hill                       

Twenty-third  Tennessee. 
Twenty-fourth        " 
Sixth  Mississippi  

j  (1)  Colonel  J   F   Neil  (w)                          ) 

j  (2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  Cantrell  j 
"                 "        Peebles 

j  (1)  Colonel  J.  J.  Thornton  (w.)  \ 

.... 

Fifteenth  Arkansas  
Battery 

(  (1)  Lieutenant-Colonel  Patton  (k.)  } 
j  (2)  Major  J.  T.  Harris  (k  )  f 

Captain  Tri^g 

"        Calvert  

32 

Brigade                                      Cleburne's  report  

2.750 

1,000 

1,032 

Corps  

Hardee's  report  

6,789 

404 
404 

1,936 

141 

2,481 

Corps.  .  .  . 

Beaurepard's  report  

6,789 

1,936 

141  :  2.431 

CONFEDERATE   ORGANIZATION  AND   CASUALTIES. 


677 


Iteserve  Corps. — Brigadier-General  JOHN  C.  BKECKINRIDGE. 
First  Brigade. — Colonel  ROBERT  P.  TRABUE. 


REGIMENTS.                                                Commanders. 

Effec 
tives. 

Killed. 

Casual 
ties. 

Miss 
ing. 

Total. 

Third  Kentucky         Lieutenant-Colonel  Ben  Anderson  

174 

u     '                    j  (1)  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hynes  (w.)  

431 

213 

|  (2)  Major  Thomas  B.  Monroe  (k.)  

108 

\inth          "                        i           "       Thomas  H.  Hunt  

184 

Thirtv-first  \Iabama             Lieutenant-Colonel  Galbraith. 

79 

30 

Crews"  s       "             u        >     Lieutenant-Colonel  Crews  

55 

37 

Battery                                       'k       E.  P  Byrne  

14 

Trabue's  renort..  . 

2.400 

844 

c,        T  T>  •      7        (  0)  Brigadier-General  JOHN  S.  BOWEN  (w.). 
Second  Brigade.-  \      '  ^^  JQHN  R  ^^ 


REGIMENTS. 

Commanders. 

Effec 
tives. 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Miss- 
lug. 

Total. 

First  Missouri 

Colonel  Rich  (k  )  

(  (1)  Colonel  John  D   Martin 

Second  Confederate  

~\  (2)  Major  Mangum  

Colonel  Dunlap  .  .  . 

Hudson's  Battery  — 

Third  Brigade. — Colonel  STATHAM. 


REGIMENTS. 

Commandew. 

Effec 
tive). 

Killed. 

Wound 
ed. 

Miss 
ing. 

Total. 

Nineteenth  Tennessee.  .  . 

Colonel  CummLngs  

Twentieth            " 



Twenty-eighth    " 

Forty-fifth           " 

Fifteenth  Mississippi  

.     ... 

Rutledge's  Battery  

Cavalry. 


COMMANDS. 

Commanderi. 

Attached 
to  Corps. 

None. 
Polk. 

Effec 
tives. 

Kill'd. 

Wound 
ed. 

Miss- 

Total. 

Regiment  

Colonel  N".  B.  Forrest  (w.)  .  .  , 
"       A.  J.  Lindsay  

"        Mississippi  
il        Alabama  
"        Texas 

"       Clanton  

Bragg,  i 

"       John  A.  Wharton  (w.)  
Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  II.  Brewer..  .  . 
Major  John  H.  Morgan  
Captain  Phil  Thompson  

None. 
Polk. 
Breck. 
Breck. 

200 

7 
2 

56 
10 

4 
1 

67 
18 

Squadron  

"        Ky.  (3  comp's). 
Kentucky  Company.  .... 

Four  companies  

Captains  Jenkins,  Tomlinson,  Cox,  | 
and  Robins  .  .  . 

Bragg. 

236 

2 

6 

1 

9 

Notes. 

Any  official  or  other  trustworthy  information  that  will  help  to  complete  these  tables  will  be  "rate- 
fully  received. 

1  Two  regiments  were  known  as  the  Second  Tennessee— Bate's  and  J.  Knox  Walker's. 

2  An  Alabama  battalion  and  an  Arkansas  battalion  had  been  assigned  to  Jackson's  brigade,  but  were 
not  in  the  battle. 

3  The  Seventh  Alabama  Regiment  was  assigned  to  Wood's  brigade,  but  does  not  appear  in  the  battle; 
probably  detached. 

4  The  Forty-seventh  Tennessee,  Colonel  Hill,  arrived  on  the  field  on  the  7th. 
6  Some  of  the  batteries  appear  under  different  names. 


678 


SECOND   BATTLE   OF  SHILOH. 


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j  (1)  Colonel  A.  M.  Hare,  Eleve 
(  (2)  "  M.  M.  Crocker,  Thirt 

j  (1)  Captain  J.  M.  Ashmore.  .  . 
1(2)  "  R.  II.  Sturgess.... 
j  (1)  Major  Samuel  Eaton  
j  (2)  Captain  A.  J.  Anderson.  .  . 
Lieutenant-  Colonel  William  Ha 
J  (1)  Colonel  M.  M.  Crocker.  .  .  . 
|  (2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  M.  M. 

^ 

Colonel  C.  C.  Marsh,  Twcntietl 

j  (1")  Colonel  T.  E.  G.  Ransom. 
\  (2)  Major  S.  Nevins  
Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  Richards 
Colonel  John  E.  Smith  
"  J.  N.  Haynie  

Total  

J  (1)  Colonel  Julius  Raith.  Fort 
j  (2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  A.  Eng 

1 
|-  -  -      1 

3 

Captain  Stewart  

1  Including  352  artillery  a 

:      :    : 

COMMANDS. 

FIRST  DIVISION  

first  Brigade  

Eighth  Illinois  

Eighteenth  Illinois. 
Eleventh  Iowa  
Thirteentk  Iowa  

Second  Brigade  .  .  . 

Eleventh  Illinois  .  .  . 

Twentieth  " 
Forty-fifth  " 
Forty-eighth  Illinois 

1 
Ex 

Seventeenth  Illinois. 
Twenty-ninth  "  . 
Forty-third  "  . 
Forty-ninth  "  . 

Cavalry  Battalion... 
Artillery  

GRANT'S   ORGANIZATION,  STRENGTH,  AND   CASUALTIES.  679 


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A.  J.  Babcock. 
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Lieutenant  -Colonel  Johi 
Colonel  S.  D.  Baldwin.. 
W.  F.  Lynch.. 

Total  

Major  Cavender  
Lieutenant  P.  P.  Wood. 

Total  

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Seventh  "  . 
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Ninth  Illinois... 

Twelfth  "  ... 

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Eighty  -first  Ohio 

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Companies  D,  II, 
First  Missouri  i 
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tillery  (Willard1 

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SECOND  BATTLE   OF  SIIILOH. 


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Colonel  Morgan  L.  Smil 
Colonel  OeorgcTPrMcGi 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Jam 
Colonel  Alvin  P.  llovey 

Total  

Colonel  John  M.  Thayei 

Lieutenant-Colonel  W. 
Colonel  W.  E.  Sanderso 
"  V.  Bausenwcin 
"  S.  II.  Steednaar 

Total  

Colonel  Charles  Whittle 
Lieutenant-Colonel  M. 
Colonel  Charles  R.  Woe 
"  M.  D.  Leggett 
"  T.  Kinney.... 

Total  

Lieutenant  C.  H.  Tliurl 
Captain  N.  S.  Thompso 
Major  C.  S.  Hayes  
"  James  F.  Johnso 

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GRANT'S  ORGANIZATION,  STRENGTH,  AND   CASUALTIES. 


C81 


HEMAEK9. 

General  Hurlbut's  report  of  battle. 

1  Eegimcntal  report  of  battle. 

2  Colonel  Read's  report. 
3  Colonel  Mcllenry's  report. 

Casualties  reported  in  McClei  nand's  report. 

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/  ('2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  A 
Colonel  A.  K.  Johnson... 
44  John  A.  Logan  .  .  . 

i 

Colonel  J.  C.  Veatch  

Lieutenant-Colonel  W.  11. 
Colonel  Cyrus  Hall  
Lieutenant-Colonel  E.  F.  " 
Colonel  J.  A.  Davis  

Total  

Brigadier-General  J.  G.  L 

Colonel  Charles  Cruft.  .  .  . 
44  II.  B.  Read  
44  J.  II.  Mcllenry  .  . 
Lieutenant-Colonel  B.  11.  E 

Total  

Captain  J.  B.  Burrows.  .  .  . 
Lieutenant  Brotzmann  

1 

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—«__*_ 

COMMANDS. 

FOURTH  DIVISION  

^ir«^  Brigade  

Third  Iowa  

Forty-first  Illinois  

Twenty-eighth  Illinois. 
Thirty-second  " 

Second  Brigade  

Twenty-fifth  Indiana.. 
Fourteenth  Illinois.  .  .  . 
Fifteenth  "  
Forty-sixth  44  

Third  Brigade  

Thirty-first  Indiana..  .  . 
Forty-fourth  "  
Seventeenth  Kentucky 
Twenty-fifth  " 

Fourteenth  Ohio  Batter 
Mann's  Battery  

Third  Battalion  Fourth 
Illinois  Cavalry  
Thielmann'8  Battalion 
Cavalry  

G82 


SECOND  BATTLE   OF  SIIILOIL 


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COMMANDS. 

FIFTH  DIVISION  

First  Brigade  

Sixth  Iowa  

Forty-sixth  Ohio... 
Fortieth  Illinois  

Second  Brigade.  .  . 

Fifty-fifth  Illinois.. 
Fifty-fourth  Ohio.. 
Seventy-first  Ohio. 

Third  Brigade.  .  . 

Seventy-seventh  Oh 
Fifty-seventh  l 
Fifty-third  • 

Fourth  Brigade.  . 

Seventieth  Ohio... 
Forty-eighth  Oliio. 
Seventy-second  Oh 

Fifth  Ohio  Cavalry 
Sixth  Indiana  Bat't* 
B,  First  Illinois  Art 
E,  "  " 

GRANT'S  ORGANIZATION,  STRENGTH,  AND   CASUALTIES. 


683 


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Commanders. 

General  B.  M.  Prentiss  

Colonel  Everett  Peabody  (k.)  . 

"Lieutenant-Colonel  It.  TrVan 
Colonel  B.  Allen  
"  F.  Quinn  

J  (1)  Colonel  D.  Moore  (w.)  .  .  .  . 
\  (2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  11.  M. 

Total  

Colonel  Madison  Miller  

Colonel  Madison  Miller  
"  Jacob  Fry  

"  Alexander  Chambers.  . 

Total  

Colonel  E.  G.  Ingersoll  

Captain  A.  Hickenlooper  
"  E.  Munch  

Total  

Colonel  James  8.  Alban  
"  D.  E.  Wood  
j  (1)  Colonel  J.  T.  Tindall  
j  (2)  Lieutenant-Colonel  Q.  Mar 
Colonel  H.  T.  Eeid  

Total  

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Eighteenth  Missour 
Sixty-first  Illinois. 
Sixteenth  Iowa.  .  .  . 

Eleventh  Illinois  Ci 

F  i  fth'Oliio"  Battery 
First  Minnesota.  .  . 

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FEDERAL  SUMMARY. 


685 


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SECOXD   BATTLE   OF  SIIILOIL 


APPENDIX  VI. 

UNITED  STATES  TROOPS  ENGAGED  AT  SHILOH. 


REGIMENTS,  ETC. 


Brigade. 


Division. 


Army. 


Seventy-seventh  Pennsylvania 5  2  Buell. 

First                Kentucky  Infantry 22  4  Buell. 

Second                                    "        22  4  Buell. 

Fifth                                        "        4  2        !  Buell. 

Sixth                       "               "        19  4        !  Buell. 

Ninth                      "               "        11  5        j  Buell. 

Eleventh                                "        14  5  Buell. 

Thirteenth            "              " 11  5  Buell. 

Seventeenth           "               "        j  3  4  Grant. 

Twentieth                               "         >  22  4  Buell. 

Twenty-fourth      "               " 21  6  Buell. 

Twenty-fifth          "               "        8  4  Grant. 

Twenty-sixth         "               " 14  5  Buell. 

Fifth  Ohio  Cavalry 3  and  5  Grant. 

G,  First  Ohio  Light  Artillery 5  Buell. 

Fifth          Ohio  Battery 6  Grant. 

Eighth           "  u       3  Grant. 

Thirteenth    "  "      ..  Grant. 

Fourteenth    "  "      1  Grant. 

First                     Ohio  Infantry 4  2  Buell. 

Sixth                         "           "       10  4  Buell. 

Thirteenth               "           "       14  5  Buell. 

Nineteenth              "          "       11  5  Buell. 

Twentieth               "           "       3  3  Grant. 

Twenty-fourth        "           "       10  4  Buell. 

Forty-first                            "       19  4  Buell. 

Forty-sixth              "           "       1  5  Grant. 

Forty-eighth            "           "       4  5  Grant. 

Forty-ninth             "           "       6  2  Buell. 

Fifty-third               "           "       3  5  Grant. 

Fifty-fourth             "           "       2  5  Grant. 

Fifty-seventh           "           "       3  5  Grant. 

Fifty-eighth            "           "       2  3  Grant. 

Fifty-ninth              "           "         11  5  Buell. 

Sixty-fourth             "           "       20  6  Buell. 

Sixty-fifth                 "           "       20  6  Buell. 

Seventieth                "           "       4  5  Grant. 

Seventy-first            "           " 2  5  Grant. 

Seventy-second       "  "       5  Grant 

Seventy-sixth          "  "       3  Grant. 

Seventy-seventh     "  "       5  Grant. 

Seventy-eighth       "  "       3  Grant. 

Eighty-first              "           "       2  2  Grant. 

Second  Michigan  Battery . .  . .  Grant. 

Twelfth      "         Infantry 6  Grant. 

Thirteenth"                "       15  6  Buell. 

Fifteenth    "               "       2  6  Grant. 

Detachment  Second  Indiana  Cavalry Buell. 

Sixth  Indiana  Battery 5  Grant. 

Ninth       "  "       3  Grant. 

Sixth                Indiana  Infantry 4  2  Buell. 

Ninth  "             "  19  4  Buell. 

Eleventh               "             "       1  3  Grant. 

Fifteenth              "             "       21  6  Buell. 

Twenty-third        "              " 2  3  Grant. 

Twenty-fourth      "             "       1  3  Grant. 

Twentv-fifth         "             u       2  4  Grant. 

Twenty-ninth  "             "  52  Buell. 

Thirtieth               «              "       5  2  Buell. 

Thirty-first            "             "       3  4  Grant. 

Thirty-second       "              "       6  2  Buell. 

Thirty-sixth          "             "       10  4  Buell. 

Thirty-ninth          "             "       6  2  Buell. 

Fortieth                                " 21  6  Buell. 

Forty-fourth          "             "       3  4  Grant. 

Fifty-seventh        «             " 21  6  Buell. 

A,  Second  Illinois  Cavalry . .  3  Grant. 

B,  "                           '•       . .  3  Grant. 

Fourth  "      land  4  Grant. 

Eleventh        "  "  6  Grant. 


FEDERAL   TROOPS  ENGAGED. 


68T 


APPENDIX  VI.  (continued). 


REGIMENTS,  ETC. 


Brigade. 


Army. 


Stewart's  battalion  Illinois  Cavalry . .  1 

A,  First  Illinois  Light  Artillery 3 

U,     "           "          "            "        5 

1),     "           "          "            "        1 

K,     «            '          "            "        6 

II,     "            '          "            "    '    5 

I,  "            '          "            "        •. ..  5 

15,  Second     '          "  "        

1),       "  "        

E,  "         "          "           "        . .  1 

F,  "         "           "            "        6 

Seventh             Illinois  Infantry 3  2 

Eighth                    "            "        1  1 

Ninth                                    "        2  2 

Eleventh                              "        2  1 

Twelfth                                " 2  2 

Fourteenth                         "        2  4 

Fifteenth                             "        2  4 

Seventeenth           "             "        3  1 

Eighteenth            "             "        1  1 

Twentieth                                    2  1 

Twenty-eighth      "              '        1  4 

Twenty-ninth       "              '        3  1 

Thirty-second        "              '        1  4 

Thirty-fourth         "             '        5  2 

Fortieth                 "             '        1  5 

Forty-first                             "        1  4 

Forty -third             u             ';        3  1 

Forty-fifth             "            "        2  1 

Forty-sixth                           " 2  4 

Forty-eighth          "             "        2  1 

Forty-ninth           "            "        3  1 

Fiftieth                                "        3  2 

Fifty-second          "             "        3  2 

Fifty-fifth               "             "        2  5 

Fifty-seventh        u            "        3  2 

Fifty-eighth          "             "        3  2 

Sixty-first              "             "        2  C 

Earn  Monarch 

C,  First  Missouri  Light  Artillery 4 

D,  "  "  

II,  "  "  

I.                                                       3 

K,  "  "  

Eighth             Missouri  Infantry 1  3 

Thirteenth              "               "       2  2 

Fourteenth             "              "       2  2 

Eighteenth             "              "      2  6 

Twenty-first          "              "       1  6 

Twenty-third          "               "       . .  6 

Tsventy-fifth           "               "       1  6 

Fourteenth  Wisconsin  Infantry  . .  6 

Sixteenth                                "       1  6 

Eighteenth          "                 "       ..  6 

Second        Iowa  Infantry 1  2 

Third              "                    1  4 

Sixth               "           "       " .  1  5 

Seventh          "                    1  2 

Eighth            "                    3  2 

Eleventh        "                   1  1 

Twelfth           "                    1  2 

Thirteenth      "                    1  1 

Fourteenth    "".....  12 

Fifteenth        "           "       '  6 

Sixteenth        "           "       2  6 

First  Minnesota  Battery 6 

First  Nebraska  Infantry ^..  2  3 

C,  Second  United  States  Cavalry. ...  2 

I,  Fourth               "               "        \\  .,  2 

H,  Fourth  United  States  Artillery. . 

M,    "         "        "    :::::  2 

H,  Fifth                  "                 "        2 

Battalion  Fifteenth  United  States  Infantry. .\ ..........................  4  2 

"         Sixteenth           "                   "  42 

"        Nineteenth        MM  42 


Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 

Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Buell. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 

Grant. 


Grant. 

Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Grant. 
Buell. 
Buell. 
Buell. 
Buell. 
Buell. 
Buell. 


45 


GENERAL  JOHNSTON  IN   THE   GRAVE. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

JOHXSTON  IN  THE  GEAVE. 


WHEX  it  was  found  that  General  Johnston  was  dead,  General  Pres 
ton  conveyed  his  body  from  the  field  to  the  headquarters  of  the  night 
before,  and  left  it  in  charge  of  Captain  Wickham  and  Major  John  W. 
Throckmorton.  He  then  reported,  with  Majors  Benham  and  Hayden, 
and  Lieutenant  Jack,  to  General  Beauregard,  who  courteously  offered 
them  places  on  his  staff,  which  were  accepted,  for  that  battle.  After 
consultation  with  General  Beauregard,  and  learning  at  headquarters 
that  the  victory  was  as  complete  as  it  probably  would  be,  and  that  no 
attack  was  apprehended,  the  staff  determined  to  accompany  General 
Johnston's  remains  to  New  Orleans.  Preston,  Munford,  O'Hara,  Ben- 
ham,  Hayden,  Jack,  and  Wickliffe,  composed  this  escort.  There  was 
no  cannonade,  and  no  idea  of  a  general  engagement,  when  they  left 
headquarters  at  6  A.  M.  on  Monday  morning.  But  at  eight  o'clock,  be 
tween  Mickey's  and  Monterey,  they  were  embarrassed  by  a  stampede 
occasioned  by  five  horsemen  —  one,  of  considerable  rank.  At  Corinth 
they  found  the  soldiers  straggling  through  the  woods,  shooting  squir 
rels.  They  learned,  before  they  left  that  night,  that  Beauregard  had 
retired. 

On  arriving  in  New  Orleans,  General  Johnston's  body  was  escorted 
to  the  City  Hall  by  the  Governor  and  staff,  General  Lovell  and  staff, 
and  many  prominent  citizens.  Colonel  Jack,  in  a  letter  describing  the 
scene,  says  : 

The  streets  were  thronged  with  citizens,  and,  as  the  procession  moved  slowly 
along,  I  saw  tears  silently  flowing  from  the  eyes  of  young,  middle-aged,  and  old. 

The  body  was  laid  in  state  in  one  of  the  public  halls,  and  throngs 
of  people  of  all  classes,  rich  and  poor,  the  lofty  and  the  lowly,  came  in 
mournful  silence  to  pay  the  last  tokens  of  respect  to  the  dead  leader. 
Ladies  wreathed  the  coffin  with  magnolias  and  other  flowers. 

The  remains  were  laid  in  a  tomb  belonging  to  Mayor  Monroe,  in  St. 
Louis  Cemetery.  Each  year  while  it  rested  there,  the  writer  received 
assurances  that  on  All-saints'-day,  there  dedicated  to  the  remembrance 
of  the  dead,  friendly  or  admiring  hands  decorated  his  burial-place  with 
wreaths  and  garlands.  A  visitor  to  the  spot  sent  the  following  to  the 
writer  : 


SEPULTURE  AND   PUBLIC  SOPvROW.  689 

Here  is  the  inscription,  written  in  pencil :  "  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  C.  S.  A., 
Shiloh,  April  6,  1862."  On  one  corner  some  hand  had  written  this:  "Texas 
weeps  over  her  noblest  son.  A  Texas  soldier."  The  tomb  was  decorated  with 
flowers,  some  of  them  yet  fresh.  My  fair  companion  informed  me  that  scarcely 
a  day  had  passed  since  his  burial  without  fresh  flowers  being  laid  upon  his 
grave.  I  have  in  my  portfolio  some  of  the  roses  that  I  took  from  the  grave 
with  no  sacrilegious  hand,  and,  if  they  were  bedewed  with  tears,  no  true  man  or 
good  woman  will  call  it  a  weakness  or  a  crime  to  weep  at  the  tomb  of  such  a 
man  as  Albert  Sidney  Johnston. 

This  constant  memorial  is  understood  to  have  been  kept  up. 

When  the  news  of  General  Johnston's  death  was  spread  abroad,  tire 
public  heart,  with  that  noble  contrition  which  marks  a  brave  and  gen 
erous  people,  sought  in  self-reproach  to  make  atonement  for  the  wrong 
and  injustice  he  had  suffered.  The  evidences  of  grief  were  general 
and  sincere.  Not  only  was  every  official  recognition  given  of  the  ex 
tent  of  the  calamity,  but  the  tokens  of  sorrow  were  multiplied  in  many 
a  Southern  household,  and  a  great  lamentation  went  up  as  if  the  loss  of 
this  leader  was  private  and  personal  to  every  citizen. 


GENERAL  ORDER  OX  THE  DEATH"  OF  GENERAL  A.  9.  JOHNSTON. 

The  following  general  order  was  issued  from  headquarters  at  Corinth 
by  General  Beauregard  : 

HEADQUARTERS,  AHMY  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  j 
COKLNTH,  MISSISSIPPI,  April  10,  1862.       > 

SOLDIERS  :  Your  late  commander-in-chief,  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  is  dead ; 
a  fearless  soldier,  a  sagacious  captain,  a  reproachless  man,  has  fallen — one 
who,  in  his  devotion  to  our  cause,  shrank  from  no  sacrifice ;  one  who,  animated 
by  a  sense  of  duty,  and  sustained  by  a  sublime  courage,  challenged  danger,  and 
perished  gallantly  for  his  country  while  leading  forward  his  brave  columns  to 
victory.  His  signal  example  of  heroism  and  patriotism,  if  imitated,  would  make 
his  army  invincible. 

A  grateful  country  will  mourn  his  loss,  revere  his  name,  and  cherish  his 
many  virtues.  G.  T.  BEAUREGARD,  General  commanding. 

President  Davis  sent  the  following  message  to  Congress  : 

To  the  Senate  and  House  of  Representatives  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America. 

The  great  importance  of  the  news  just  received  from  Tennessee  induces  me 
to  depart  from  the  established  usages,  and  to  make  to  you  this  communication 
in  advance  of  official  reports.  From  official  telegraphic  dispatches,  received 
from  official  sources,  I  am  able  to  announce  to  you,  with  entire  confidence,  that 
it  has  pleased  Almighty  God  to  crown  the  Confederate  arms  with  a  glorious  and 
decisive  victory  over  our  invaders. 

On  the  morning  of  the  6th,  the  converging  columns  of  our  army  were 


690  GENERAL  JOHNSTON  IN   THE    GRAVE. 

combined  by  its  commander-in-chief,  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  in  an 
assault  on  the  Federal  army,  then  encamped  near  Pittsburg,  on  the  Tennessee 
River. 

After  a  hard-fought  battle  of  ten  hours,  the  enemy  was  driven  in  disorder 
from  his  position,  and  pursued  to  the  Tennessee  River,  where,  under  the  cover 
of  the  gunboats,  he  was  at  the  last  accounts  endeavoring  to  effect  his  retreat  by 
aid  of  his  transports.  The  details  of  this  great  battle  are  yet  too  few  and  in 
complete  to  enable  me  to  distinguish  with  merited  praise  all  of  those  who  may 
have  conspicuously  earned  the  right  to  such  distinction,  and  I  prefer  to  delay 
our  own  gratification  in  recommending  them  to  your  special  notice,  rather  than 
incur  the  risk  of  wounding  the  feelings  of  any  by  failing  to  include  them  in  the 
list.  When  such  a  victory  has  been  won  over  troops  as  numerous,  well  dis 
ciplined,  armed,  and  appointed,  as  those  which  have  been  so  signally  routed,  we 
may  well  conclude  that  one  common  spirit  of  unflinching  bravery  and  devotion 
to  our  country's  cause  must  have  animated  every  breast,  from  that  of  the  com 
manding  general  to  that  of  the  humblest  patriot  who  served  in  the  ranks. 
There  is  enough  in  the  continued  presence  of  invaders  on  our  soil  to  chasten  our 
exultation  over  this  brilliant  success,  and  to  remind  us  of  the  grave  duty  of  con 
tinued  exertion  until  we  shall  extort  from  a  proud  and  vainglorious  enemy  the 
reluctant  acknowledgment  of  our  right  to  self-government. 

But  an  All-wise  Creator  has  been  pleased,  while  vouchsafing  to  us  his 
countenance  in  battle,  to  afflict  us  with  a  severe  dispensation,  to  which  we 
must  bow  in  humble  submission.  The  last,  long,  lingering  hope  has  disappeared, 
and  it  is  but  too  true  that  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  is  no  more !  The  tale 
of  his  death  is  simply  narrated  in  a  dispatch  from  Colonel  William  Preston,  in  the 
following  words f. 

"  General  Johnston  fell  yesterday,  at  half-past  two  o'clock,  while  leading  a 
successful  charge,  turning  the  enemy's  right,  and  gaining  a  brilliant  victory.  A 
Minie-ball  cut  the  artery  of  his  leg,  but  he  rode  on  until,  from  loss  of  blood,  he 
fell  exhausted,  and  died  without  pain  in  a  few  moments.  His  body  has  been  in 
trusted  to  me  by  General  Beauregard,  to  be  taken  to  New  Orleans,  and  remain 
until  instructions  are  received  from  his  family." 

My  long  and  close  friendship  with  this  departed  chieftain  and  patriot  forbid 
me  to  trust  myself  in  giving  vent  to  the  feelings  which  this  intelligence  has 
evoked.  Without  doing  injustice  to  the  living,  it  may  safely  be  said  that  our 
loss  is  irreparable.  Among  the  shining  hosts  of  the  great  and  good  who  now 
cluster  around  the  banner  of  our  country,  there  exists  no  purer  spirit,  no  more 
heroic  soul,  than  that  of  the  illustrious  man  whose  death  I  join  you  in  lament 
ing. 

In  his  death  he  has  illustrated  the  character  for  which  through  life  he  was 
conspicuous — that  of  singleness  of  purpose  and  devotion  to  duty  with  his  whole 
energies.  Bent  on  obtaining  the  victory,  which  he  deemed  essential  to  his 
country's  cause,  he  rode  on  to  the  accomplishment  of  his  object,  forgetful  of 
self,  while  his  very  life-blood  was  ebbing  away  fast.  His  last  breath  cheered 
his  comrades  on  to  victory.  The  last  sound  he  heard  was  their  shout  of  victory. 
His  last  thought  was  his  country,  and  long  and  deeply  will  his  country  mourn 
his  loss.  JEFFEKSON  DAVIS. 

The  message  was  laid  on  the  table,  and  ordered  to  be  printed. 

Mr.  Barksdale  moved  to  have  500  extra  copies  printed.     Agreed  to. 


CONFEDERATE   COXGRESS.  691 

The  following  were  the  proceedings  in  the  Confederate  House  of 
Representatives  : 

HOUSE    OF   REPEESENTATIVES. 

MONDAY,  April  7, 1562. 

The  House  met  at  twelve  o'clock,  and  was  opened  with  prayer  by  Rev.  Mr. 
Crumley.  Journal  of  Saturday  read. 

Mr.  Wilcox,  of  Texas,  introduced  the  following  joint  resolution : 

"Resolved,  That  Congress  has  learned  with  feelings  of  deep  joy  and  grati 
tude  to  the  Divine  Ruler  of  nations  the  news  of  the  recent  glorious  victory  of 
our  arms  in  Tennessee. 

"Resolved,  That  the  death  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  the  com 
mander  of  our  forces,  while  leading  his  troops  to  victory,  cannot  but  temper  our 
exultation  with  a  shade  of  sadness  at  the  loss  of  so  able,  skillful,  and  gallant  an 
officer. 

"  Resolved,  That,  in  respect  to  the  memory  of  General  Johnston,  the  Senate 
concurring,  Congress  do  now  adjourn  until  twelve  o'clock  to-morrow." 

Mr.  Perkins,  of  Louisiana,  thought  that  we  could  best  evince  our  regret  for 
the  fall  of  our  heroes  by  imitating  their  examples  in  discharging  the  duties 
which  devolve  upon  us.  He  had  no  disposition  to  oppose  the  appropriate  reso 
lutions  introduced  by  the  gentleman  from  Texas,  but  there  were  many  important 
matters  demanding  the  attention  of  the  House. 

Mr.  Foote :  "  I  would  ask  the  gentleman  from  Louisiana  to  withdraw  his  ob 
jection  to  the  consideration  of  these  resolutions. 

"  While  I  agree  with  the  gentleman  as  to  the  necessity  of  speedy  action  upon 
the  subject  to  which  he  refers,  it  seems  to  me  that  such  a  mark  of  respect  to  the 
gallant  dead  is  peculiarly  appropriate,  and  should  be  offered  regardless  of  the 
consideration  which  the  gentleman  presents.  Notwithstanding  that  we  all  feel 
rejoiced  over  the  glorious  victory  which  has  been  achieved,  we  cannot  but  feel 
deeply  saddened  at  the  fate  of  the  gallant  Johnston. 

"  It  seems  to  me,  sir,  that  we  cannot  be  to-day  sufficiently  composed  to  per 
form  our  duties  here,  and  it  would,  in  my  opinion,  best  comport  with  the  feel 
ings  of  respect  and  gratitude  which  we  all  entertain  for  the  distinguished  and 
patriotic  chieftain,  as  well  as  the  officers  and  soldiers  who  participated  with 
Lira  in  this  conflict,  to  adopt  these  resolutions,  and  adjourn  over  until  to-mor 
row. 

"  I  am  as  anxious  as  any  man  to  perform  the  duties  devolving  upon  us  here ; 
but  I  am  satisfied  that  we  cannot  do  so  to-day  with  that  degree  of  composure 
which  is  necessary  to  give  force  and  efficiency  to  our  action. 

"I  trust  the  gentleman  will  withdraw  his  objection,  and  allow  the  resolution 
to  pass." 

Mr.  Perkins:  "  I  withdraw  my  objection." 

Mr.  McQueen,  of  South  Carolina :  "  I  desire  to  suggest  to  the  gentleman  from 
Texas  (Mr.  Wilcox)  that  this  battle  may  have  been  fought  in  Mississippi.  If  so, 
it  would  be  proper  for  him  to  change  that  part  of  his  resolutions  which  locates 
the  fight  in  Tennessee." 

Mr.  Davis,  of  Mississippi :  "  That  battle  was  fought  in  Tennessee,  very  near 
the  Mississippi  line." 

Mr.  Moore,  of  Kentucky:  "Mr.  Speaker,  I  do  not  arise  for  the  purpose  of 


692  GENERAL  JOHNSTON  IN  THE  GRAVE. 

detaining  the  House  by  any  protracted  remarks  in  support  of  the  resolutions 
offered  by  the  gentleman  from  Texas,  but  rather  to  express  my  gratitude  to  that 
gentleman  for  presenting  those  resolutions.  I  trust,  however,  that  I  may  be  in 
dulged  in  the  request  that  this  House  will  unanimously  adopt  the  resolutions, 
and  bear  their  testimony  of  regard  to  the  memory  of  that  great  and  good  man. 
Until  our  recent  reverses  at  Forts  Donelson  and  Henry,  no  cloud  of  darkness 
had  rested  on  his  fair  name,  no  shadow  had  passed  along  to  obscure  the  bright 
sunshine  of  his  matchless  military  fame.  But  I  must  not  call  up  the  memory 
of  the  past.  I  do  not  wish  to  refer  to  any  reflections  which  may  have  been  in 
dulged  either  here  or  elsewhere  toward  General  Johnston  in  reference  to  those 
reverses ;  but  it  only  remains  now  for  me  to  ask  this  tribute  to  his  memory, 
since  he  has  given  the  highest  evidence  of  devotion  to  his  country  which  the 
soldier  can  offer.  He  has  fallen  at  the  head  of  his  army,  in  the  midst  of  the 
conflict,  in  the  full  tide  of  a  glorious  and  brilliant  victory  over  his  country's  foe. 
"  This  crowning  act  of  devotion  to  that  country  which  he  had  so  long  loved 
and  served  has  dissipated  every  cloud  which  momentarily  marred  the  splendor 
of  his  glorious  name,  and  his  memory  passes  into  history,  undimmed  by  any 
word  of  condemnation,  unclouded  by  any  shadow  of  reproach.  Xor,  indeed, 
Mr.  Speaker,  would  any  cloud  of  suspicion  ever  have  rested  upon  his  name  had 
the  circumstances  with  which  he  was  surrounded  at  Bowling  Green  been  known 
by  the  country.  No  man  can  know  the  facts  save  those  of  us  who  were  person 
ally  cognizant  of  his  condition  at  that  place.  I  have  seen  and  witnessed  the  ter 
rible  responsibility  pressing  upon  his  great  heart,  as,  reposing  on  his  couch  of 
straw,  he  contemplated  the  unmeasured  degree  of  hope  and  expectation  with 
which  the  country  looked  to  him,  while  he  had  an  army  too  small  to  advance, 
and  almost  too  small  to  hazard  a  retreat.  But,  Mr.  Speaker,  I  am  happy  to 
witness  already  demonstrations  in  this  House  which  mark  the  unanimity  with 
which  the  resolutions  will  be  adopted — the  unanimity  with  which  this  House, 
here  in  the  Capitol,  will  offer  a  nation's  gratitude  as  a  tribute  of  respect  to  the 
memory  of  the  illustrious  dead. 

"  While  I  have  felt  justified,  under  all  the  circumstances,  in  alluding  particu 
larly  to  General  Johnston,  I  would  by  no  means  have  it  understood  that  I  feel 
less  grateful  to  the  memory  of  all  the  officers  and  soldiers  who  may  have  fallen 
in  the  same  conflict.  God  forbid  that  the  humblest  soldier  who  fell  on  that 
glorious  field  where  victory  so  signally  crowned  our  arms  should  fail  to  be  re 
membered  with  the  warmest  affection  and  gratitude  of  our  people.  In  this,  as 
in  all  revolutions,  the  officers  and  soldiers  constitute  our  tower  of  strength. 
Upon  their  strong  arms  and  brave  hearts  do  we  lean  with  all  our  hopes  and  ex 
pectations  for  ourselves  and  our  country.  And  now,  as  they  have  in  the  dread 
hour  of  sanguinary  conflict  laid  down  their  lives,  and  thus  borne  the  highest 
evidences  of  devotion  to  their  country,  I  hope  this  House  will  unanimously 
adopt  the  resolutions,  and  pay  that  high  mark  of  respect  to  those  gallant  soldiers 
who  so  nobly  fell  in  defense  of  their  country." 

After  the  conclusion  of  Mr.  Moore's  remarks  the  resolutions  were  adopted 
unanimously. 

They  were  immediately  reported  to  the  Senate ;  but,  that  body  having  ad 
journed,  Mr.  Jones  moved  for  a  reconsideration  of  the  vote  by  which  they  were 
adopted,  with  a  view  to  passing  resolutions  expressive  of  the  sorrow  of  this 
House  at  the  intelligence  of  the  loss  of  one  of  our  distinguished  chieftains. 


CONFEDERATE  CONGRESS.  693 

In  the  course  of  the  debate  in  Congress  on  the  resolutions  relative  to  the 
death  of  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  Mr.  Barksdale,  of  Mississippi,  said : 

"I  hold  in  my  hand  an  unofficial  Jetter,  probably  the  last  written  by  the 
lamented  deceased  to  the  Chief  Executive  of  the  Confederacy,  to  whom  he  had 
long  been  united  by  the  ties  of  friendship,  and  with  whom  he  had  enlisted  at  an 
early  day  under  the  flag  of  a  Government  which  together  they  abandoned  when 
it  became  the  symbol  of  a  monstrous  despotism.  This  letter  has  been  given  me 
to  be  used  as  I  might  think  proper  for  the  vindication  of  the  recent  acts  of  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  not  fully  understood  by  the  public.  I  will,  therefore,  by  the  in 
dulgence  of  the  House,  read  this  letter,  that  they  may  see  the  facts  in  the  light 
by  which  his  course  was  shaped  previous  and  subsequent  to  the  fall  of  Donel- 
son.  These  facts  triumphantly  vindicate  his  fame  as  a  true  patriot  and  an  able 
and  skillful  military  leader.  This  letter,  written  under  most  trying  circum 
stances,  shows  that  no  trace  of  passion  was  visible  in  the  awful  serenity  of  the 
pure,  brave,  and  undaunted  spirit  in  which  it  originated.  It  is  a  simple  recital 
of  facts  in  justification  of  his  actions,  before  which  the  calumnies  of  the  ignorant 
or  the  wicked  will  flee  like  mist  before  the  brow  of  day.  He  has  left  a  noble 
example  of  magnanimity  in  the  midst  of  unjust  complaint,  and  of  courage  and 
fortitude  amid  disaster.  His  fame  rises  brighter  from  the  severe  ordeal  through 
which  he  has  passed,  and  his  name  will  live  green  and  fresh  forever  in  the  hearts 
of  a  grateful  people.  Mr.  Speaker,  I  will  close  by  reading  the  letter  to  which  I 
have  referred." 

Mr.  Barksdale  then  read  General  Johnston's  letter  of  March  18th,  heretofore 
inserted  (page  518). 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  speech  of  Mr.  Barksdale  and  the  reading  of  the  letter 
from  General  Johnston — 

Mr.  Smith,  of  Virginia,  offered  the  following  resolution : 

"  Resolved,  That  this  House,  from  respect  to  the  memory  of  General  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston,  and  the  officers  and  men  who  have  fallen  in  the  defense  of 
their  country  in  the  hour  of  a  great  and  glorious  victory  over  our  ruthless  enemy, 
do  now  adjourn. " 

This  resolution  was  adopted  without  opposition,  and  the  House  adjourned. 

TUESDAY,  April  8, 1862. 

The  Senate  met  at  eleven  o'clock.  Prayer  by  the  Rev.  Mr.  Kepler,  of  the 
Episcopal  Church. 

Mr.  Haynes,  of  Tennessee,  moved  that  the  resolution  touching  the  victory 
near  Corinth,  and  lamenting  the  death  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  be  taken  up, 
so  that  he  could  offer  resolutions  in  lieu.  Resolutions  were  then  presented  by 
the  Senator,  expressive  of  the  joy  of  Congress  on  hearing  of  the  great  victory 
of  our  army  in  Tennessee,  paying  a  glowing  tribute  of  respect  to  the  memory  of 
the  commander-in-chief,  and  conveying  the  thanks  of  Congress  to  General  Beau- 
regard  and  the  officers  under  his  command,  for  their  services  in  that  memorable 
battle. 

Mr.  Haynes  stated  that  he  was  one  of  the  Tennessee  delegation  who  requested 
the  President  to  transfer  General  Johnston's  command  to  some  other  officer, 
after  the  retreat  from  Nashville.  Subsequently,  information  had  caused  him  to 
alter  his  opinion,  and  he  therefore  felt  it  his  duty  to  offer  the  resolutions  named. 

Mr.  Yancey,  of  Alabama,  moved  that  the  resolutions  be  so  amended  as  to 


GENERAL  JOHNSTON  IN  THE   GRAVE. 

designate  the  place  of  the  battle  as  indicated  by  General  Beauregard — viz.,  the 
battle-field  of  SMloJi.  He  moved,  also,  that  the  resolutions  be  so  amended  as  to 
tender  the  thanks  of  Congress  to  General  Beauregard  and  the  surviving  officers 
and  soldiers  for  their  gallantry  and  skill  on  that  memorable  field. 

On  October  1,  1866,  the  Legislature  of  Texas  by  joint  resolution  of 
both  Houses,  unanimously  adopted,  appointed  a  select  committee  to 
proceed  to  New  Orleans,  after  the  adjournment,  and  arrange  for  the 
removal  of  the  remains  of  General  Johnston  to  Austin,  the  seat  of 
government  of  the  State.  The  Hon.  R.  V.  Cook,  of  the  Senate,  and 
Colonel  Ashbel  Smith  and  Colonel  Jones,  of  Titus  County,  were  ap 
pointed  as  the  committee.  Feeling  tributes  were  paid  to  General 
Johnston's  memory  by  Messrs.  Cook,  Smith,  and  F.  C.  Hume,  of  Walker 
County. 

The  following  is  the  joint  resolution  concerning  the  removal  of  the 
remains  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  from  the  State  of  Louisi 
ana,  and  their  interment  in  the  State  Cemetery : 

Whereas,  The  remains  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  who  fell  at  Shiloh, 
were  stopped  in  New  Orleans,  on  their  way  to  Texas,  by  the  capture  of  that 
city,  and  have  never  been  removed  thence ;  and,  whereas,  it  was  the  desire  of 
the  deceased  that  he  should  be  buried  in  the  State  of  Texas;  and,  whereas,  it  is 
believed  to  be  the  wish  of  the  people  of  the  State  that  the  dying  request  of  one 
whom  Texas  was  proud  to  acknowledge  as  one  of  the  most  illustrious  of  her  citi 
zens  should  be  complied  with :  therefore — 

Be  it  resolved  by  the  Legislature  of  the  State  of  Texas,  That  the  sum  of 
$2,000,  or  so  much  thereof  as  may  be  necessary,  be  appropriated,  out  of  any 
money  in  the  Treasury  not  otherwise  appropriated  by  law,  to  defray  the  ex 
penses  of  the  removal  and  burial  of  the  remains  of  General  Albert  Sidney  John 
ston,  in  the  State  Cemetery,  in  the  city  of  Austin ;  and  that  a  joint  committee 
of  the  Legislature,  consisting  of  one  from  the  Senate,  and  two  from  the  House 
of  Representatives,  be  appointed,  who  shall  proceed,  in  vacation,  to  the  city  of 
New  Orleans,  and  carry  this  resolution  into  effect,  in  an  appropriate  manner. 
Approved  October  3,  1866. 

(Signed)  J.  W.  THEOCKMOKTOX. 

The  question  being  upon  the  motion  to  amend  the  joint  resolution  by  pro 
viding  that  a  committee  of  the  two  Houses  be  charged,  after  the  adjournment  of 
the  Legislature,  with  carrying  the  object  of  the  resolution  into  effect,  Senator 
Cook  said : 

"Mr.  President,  in  moving  this  amendment  to  the  resolution  offered  by  the 
honorable  Senator  from  Travis,  I  do  so  from  the  feeling  that  it  is  but  a  fitting 
tribute  to  the  worth  and  greatness  of  the  illustrious  deceased.  Instead  of  allow 
ing  the  sacred  duty  of  his  reinterment  to  be  devolved  upon  some  irresponsible 
person,  let  it  be  done  by  the  Legislature  itself.  Let  the  body  of  the  admirable 
soldier  be  borne  to  its  final  grave  by  a  joint  committee  of  the  representatives  of 
the  people  of  Texas.  General  Johnston  always  claimed  the  State  of  Texas  as 
his  home,  and  was  looked  upon  by  the  people  as  one  of  her  citizens ;  and,  as  it 


SPEECH   OF  R.  V.   COOK.  695 

was  originally  intended  that  he  should  be  buried  in  our  midst,  and  as  it  was  only 
by  the  fall  of  New  Orleans  that  his  remains  were  stopped  in  that  city,  on  their 
way  to  Texas,  it  is  now  but  a  just  tribute  to  his  memory  that  the  objects  of  these 
resolutions  be  carried  into  effect. 

"Mr.  President,  when  the  conflict  became  inevitable,  and  when  all  hope  of 
accommodation  had  fled,  and  when  the  earthquake-throes  of  civil  war  began  to 
shake  the  foundation  of  the  republic,  General  Johnston,  at  that  time  afar  oil 
upon  the  shores  of  the  Pacific,  hearing  the  din  of  the  approaching  struggle, 
immediately  began  his  journey  across  the  howling  wilderness  and  trackless 
desert  that  separated  him  from  Texas,  resolving  to  offer  his  sword  to  a  cause 
which  already  had  the  sanction  of  his  affections.  I  will  not  weary  the  Senate, 
sir,  with  a  recital  of  his  journey  to  the  seat  of  government,  and  his  final  as 
sumption  of  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  ISTor  will  I  attempt 
to  follow,  step  by  step,  the  disastrous  events  over  which  he  had  no  control,  and 
which  resulted  in  the  final  retreat  of  the  Confederate  army  from  Bowling  Green. 
Nor  shall  I  advert  to  the  detailed  events  which  marked  the  progress  of  that 
army,  as  it  swung  slowly  over  the  hills  of  Kentucky,  and  through  the  forests  of 
Tennessee,  amid  the  inclemency  of  wintry  weather,  to  the  memorable  encamp 
ment  at  Corinth.  But,  sir,  during  those  weeks  of  gloom,  a  burden  of  obloquy 
was  heaped  upon  the  gallant  leader  of  the  retreating  army,  which  must  have 
stung  his  proud  spirit  nigh  unto  death.  ISTo  words  of  reproval  were  thought  too 
vile  with  which  to  bring  him  into  odium.  The  newspapers  and  the  orators 
everywhere  throughout  the  South  denounced  him  as  a  failure,  and  a  military  em 
piric — a  s worded  and  belted  quack,  whose  movements  were  bringing  our  cause 
to  ruin.  Miserable  newspaper  scribblers,  who  never  saw  a  '  squadron  set  in  the 
field,'  dared  to  brand  the  greatest  soldier  in  the  West  with  incompetency,  if  not 
with  cowardice.  "Without  comprehending  or  dreaming  of  the  greatness  of  his 
plans,  which  only  his  death  prevented  from  culminating  in  the  magnificence  of 
a  crowning  victory,  ignorant  critics  imputed  the  retreat  of  our  army,  and  all  the 
disasters  which  preceded  it,  to  his  want  of  courage  and  capacity — an  unjust  ver 
dict,  which  will  excite  posterity  with  surprise,  and  which  an  indignant  sense  of 
returning  justice  has  already  reversed. 

"No  marvel,  sir,  when  our  army  halted  amid  the  historic  hills  of  Corinth,  that 
the  proud  spirit  of  our  hero  chafed  within  him,  and  that  he  eagerly  turned  the 
heads  of  his  columns  toward  the  memorable  field  of  Shiloh.  I  will  not  repeat 
the  details  of  that  glorious  battle :  how  that,  hour  after  hour,  amid  the  shouts 
of  advancing  thousands,  the  eagle  of  the  Confederacy  soared  to  victory;  how 
that  banner  after  banner  fluttered  through  smoke  and  storm  as  the  foe  receded ; 
how  that,  while  the  hurrahs  of  victory  were  still  ringing  in  his  ears,  Johnston 
died  a  soldier's  death.  Yes,  sir,  in  the  saddle,  with  the  harness  of  a  warrior  on, 
the  chieftain  met  the  inevitable  messenger  of  Fate.  The  pitiless  musket-ball  that 
pierced  him  spilled  the  noblest  blood  of  the  South.  When  he  fell,  all  was  from 
that  moment  lost !  Victory  no  longer  perched  upon  our  flag.  Less  competent 
hands  guided  the  strife,  and  a  genius  of  lesser  might  ruled  in  his  stead.  What 
was  assured  success  when  the  sun  was  wheeling  to  his  zenith,  became  a  fruitless 
and  barren  struggle  ere  the  evening  shades  descended ;  and  the  shadows  of  night 
but  covered  the  disposition  for  the  morrow's  retrograde  movement.  Then,  sirs, 
was  for  the  first  time  felt  the  priceless  and  inestimable  loss  we  had  sustained. 
Then,  for  the  first  time,  men  began  to  see,  when  the  fruits  of  victory  were  so 
near  being  seized,  the  vast,  gigantic,  comprehensive  strategy,  which  might  have 


696  GENERAL  JOHXSTOX  IX   THE   GRAVE. 

resulted  in  the  complete  overthrow  of  the  Federal  army,  and  the  recovery  of 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  I  will  not  say  that  it  would  have  changed  the  result ; 
I  will  not  say  that,  had  our  admirable  soldier  heen  spared,  the  Confederacy  would 
now  be  numbered  with  the  nations  of  the  earth.  Into  the  counsels  of  Heaven 
let  no  mortal  presumptuously  seek  to  enter.  But  what  I  do  say,  sir,  is,  that 
from  the  fatal  hour  when  the  life-blood  of  the  gallant  Johnston  moistened  the 
earth — from  that  hour,  sir,  may  be  dated  that  long  series  of  disasters,  relieved, 
it  is  true,  by  heroic  effort,  and  brightened  from  time  to  time  by  brilliant  but 
barren  victories — but  reaching,  nevertheless,  through  the  darkness  of  successive 
campaigns,  until  the  Southern  Cross  descended  forever  amid  the  wail  of  a  peo 
ple's  agony  behind  the  clouds  upon  the  banks  of  the  Appomattox. 

"Fearless,  honest,  and  loyal  to  principles,  our  hero  died  for  what  he  thought 
was  right.  We  know  his  resting-place,  and  we  can  recover  his  ashes.  But,  alas ! 
thousands  of  his  soldiers,  the  children  of  Texas,  will  never  sleep  in  her  soil. 
Their  graves  are  upon  the  heights  of  Gettysburg,  upon  the  hills  of  the  Sus- 
quehanna,  by  the  banks  of  the  Potomac,  and  by  the  side  of  the  Cumberland. 
They  sleep  in  glory  upon  the  fields  of  Manassas  and  of  Sharpsburg,  of  Gaines's 
Mill,  and  in  the  trenches  of  Richmond,  and  upon  the  shores  of  Vicksburg,  and 
upon  a  hundred  other  historic  fields,  afar  from  the  land  of  their  love.  Ay,  but 
let  them  sleep  on  in  their  glory.  Posterity  will  do  them  justice.  In  the  ages 
that  are  to  come,  when  all  the  passions  that  now  animate  the  bosom  and  sway 
the  heart  shall  have  passed  away  with  the  present  generation  of  men,  and  when 
the  teeming  millions  from  the  North  and  South  who  are  to  inhabit,  in  future 
centuries,  the  vast  and  fertile  regions  of  the  Mississippi  Valley,  shall  recount,  in 
song  and  story,  the  glorious  achievements  of  their  ancestry,  and  when  they  shall 
dwell,  with  just  pride,  upon  the  renown  of  their  deeds,  and  when  hoary  age 
shall  tell  to  kindling  youth  the  marvelous  story  of  a  revolution,  the  like  of 
which  the  sun  has  never  yet  gazed  upon  in  his  six  thousand  years  of  created 
splendor — then,  sir,  it  will  be,  that  our  gallant  dead  shall  live  in  the  remem 
brance  of  mankind ;  then,  sir,  will  posterity  raise  and  build  a  fitting  monument 
to  perpetuate  their  memory. 

"  Perhaps  the  field  of  Shiloh  will  be  chosen  as  the  spot  for  its  erection.  Broad 
will  be  laid  its  foundation,  deep  down  in  the  rock-ribbed  earth.  Vast  will  be  its 
proportions — even  vaster  than  the  hoary  Pyramids  of  Egypt.  Upon  its  ascend 
ing  sides,  as  they  slowly  aspire  to  the  clouds,  will  be  engraven  the  names  of  the 
great  multitudes  who  sleep  in  soldiers'  graves.  Upon  its  angles,  and  around  its 
broad  pedestal,  will  be  erected  the  bronze  statues  of  illustrious  chieftains  who 
led  the  opposing  hosts — while,  sir,  upon  its  lofty  summit,  as  the  crowning  glory 
of  the  whole  structure,  a  gigantic  figure  will  be  reared,  girt  about  with  a  war 
rior's  sword,  while  upon  its  head  shall  be  wreathed  a  chaplet  of  immortal  glory. 
The  fleecy  clouds  will  love  to  linger  about  it,  and  the  earliest  sunlight  shall 
brighten  its  features.  Upon  the  pedestal,  where  stands  this  statue,  let  the 
Muse  of  History  inscribe  in  letters  of  everlasting  fire  the  name  of  Albert  Sidney 
Johnston ! 

"Sir,  gentlemen  who  are  insensible  to  the  worth  of  departed  greatness  may 
declare  such  utterances  treasonable.  But  I  have  yet  to  learn  that  admiration  of 
true  heroism  and  laudation  of  moral  worth  and  intellectual  greatness  were  ever 
regarded  by  an  intelligent  people  as  badges  of  treason.  For  my  own  part  I  see 
nothing  inconsistent  in  honoring  the  worth  of  our  departed  dead,  and  at  the  same 
time  giving  our  cordial  support  in  maintaining,  upholding,  and  defending  the 


SPEECHES  OF  R.  V.   COOK  AND   ASHBEL  SMITH.  697 

Government  of  the  United  States.  Sir,  I  love  the  Constitution  of  our  fathers, 
and  the  great  principles  of  republican  government,  and  shall  ever  feel  it  a  sacred 
duty  to  defend  the  same  against  all  foes,  foreign  and  domestic.  If  loyalty 
to  the  Government  implies  that  we  are  to  forget  and  execrate  our  dead,  and 
are  to  declare  by  our  words  and  acts  that  the  glorious  army  of  the  Confederacy 
was  only  a  band  of  outlaws  and  felons,  and  that  its  leaders  deserved  the  gibbet 
or  the  dungeon — I  repeat,  sir,  if  these  things  must  be  included  in  the  definition 
of  '  loyalty ' — then,  indeed,  are  we  all  disloyal,  and  such  will  be  the  condition 
of  the  Southern  people  for  generations  unborn.  For  sooner  might  the  stars  be 
swept  from  the  heavens,  or  the  faculty  of  memory  be  eradicated  from  the  hu 
man  mind,  than  the  recollections  of  the  heroic  and  remarkable  achievements 
of  the  Confederate  army  be  forgotten  by  the  American  people.  Ay,  sir,  while 
the  hills  exist  and  the  mountains  survive ;  while  the  Potomac  continues  to  pour 
his  bright  waters  to  the  broad  Atlantic ;  while  the  Mississippi  continues  to  roll 
his  turbid  flood  to  the  delta  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  the  remembrance  of  the 
'lost  cause '  shall  survive,  and  the  names  of  Johnston,  and  Jackson,  and  Lee, 
and  a  host  of  other  heroes,  shall  live,  and  the  glory  of  their  endurance  and  their 
illustrious  deeds  shall  stir  the  souls  of  future  freemen,  and  stimulate  the  blood 
of  generations  yet  unborn. 

"  Mr.  President,  the  great  Napoleon,  dying  on  the  rock-prison  of  St.  Helena, 
left  as  his  last  heritage  the  wish  that  he  might  be  buried  on  the  banks  of  the 
Seine,  among  the  French  people  that  he  had  loved  so  well.  For  twenty  years 
he  slept  beneath  the  rocks  of  the  isle  upon  which  he  had  died.  But  when  at 
last  the  rage  of  animosity  had  ceased,  and  when  human  passions  had  subsided 
with  the  settlement  of  the  great  questions  that  had  roused  them,  the  voice  of  the 
great  popular  heart  of  France  reached  the  king  upon  his  throne,  demanding 
that  the  body  of  the  emperor  should  be  removed  and  buried  in  the  land  of  his 
love.  The  king  heeded  the  voice,  and  sent  his  proud  ships  and  the  chivalry 
that  surrounded  his  throne,  to  bring  the  illustrious  sleeper  to  France. 

"  With  a  magnificence  unprecedented  even  in  that  remarkable  country,  the 
remains  of  the  chieftain  were  received.  Millions  went  forth  to  meet  the  great 
conqueror  stretched,  in  imperial  pomp,  upon  his  funeral-chariot.  Amid  tears  and 
sobs,  and  the  waving  of  banners,  and  the  roar  of  cannon,  and  the  imposing  cere 
monies  of  religion,  they  laid  their  idol  to  rest  beneath  the  dome  of  the  Invalides. 
We  know  that  our  hero  cannot  be  thus  received.  Neither  banners  nor  cannon 
can  welcome  his  ashes  to  a  grave  in  our  midst.  But,  sir,  he  will  be  received 
with  none  the  less  heart-felt  respect;  and  his  sleep  will  be  none  the  less  sweet 
beside  the  ashes  of  Burleson  and  McCulloch,  in  the  land  of  his  love.  And  if  we 
can  lower  him  to  his  last  resting-place,  while  the  bosoms  of  brave  men  heave 
around  him,  and  the  tears  of  fair  women  bedew  the  sod  that  shall  cover  him,  a 
sacred  duty  will  be  performed  to  the  memory  of  a  great,  a  noble,  and  an  illus 
trious  man : 

'  He  is  Freedom's  now  and  Fame's, 
One  of  the  few,  the  immortal  names 
That  were  not  born  to  die  ! ' 

"  Sir,  I  have  done.  I  have  said  more  than  I  expected  to  say  when  I  arose  to 
speak.  I  thank  the  Senate  for  its  attention,  and  I  trust  the  resolution  and 
amendment  may  both  be  adopted." 


698  GENERAL  JOHNSTON  IN  THE   GRAVE. 

Remarks  of  Ashbel  Smith  on  moving  the  adoption  of  the  resolution 
proposing  to  have  the  remains  of  General  A.  Sidney  Johnston  removed 
from  New  Orleans  to  the  capital  of  Texas  : 

"Mr.  Speaker,  I  rise  to  move  that  the  joint  resolution  from  the  Senate  which 
has  just  been  read  be  now  adopted  by  this  House.  It  is  fitting  that  the  mortal 
remains  of  the  great  soldier  therein  named  should  repose  in  the  bosom  of  this 
State,  brought  hither  under  the  orders  and  auspices  of  the  representatives  of 
the  people  whom  he  loved  so  well.  In  moving  the  adoption  of  this  resolution  I 
perform  a  sad  and  yet  not  altogether  unpleasant  duty.  To -render  honor  and 
homage  to  worth,  so  great  and  so  pure,  is,  sir,  a  pleasure.  Albert  Sidney  John 
ston  was  my  friend — and  who  that  ever  knew  him  is  there  that  was  not  his 
friend  ?  We  were  fellow-soldiers,  too ;  I  served  under  him  in  the  old  Republic 
of  Texas  twenty-five  years  ago  ;  a  quarter  of  a  century  afterward  I  fought  under 
his  command  on  the  great  battle-field  of  Shiloh — his  last  battle-field,  where  he 
sealed  his  devotion  to  the  cause  with  his  life's  blood.  I  ask  the  privilege  from 
the  House  to  say  a  few  words  on  this  occasion.  I  shall  not  attempt  any  sketch  of 
General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston — an  outline  of  his  life,  a  recital  of  his  service?, 
a  portrayal  of  his  character,  even  were  I  adequate  to  this  work,  are  too  ample 
material  to  be  compressed  into  the  time  allotted  us  on  this  occasion.  The  brief 
est  notice  must  suffice."  (Colonel  Smith  here  gave  a  brief  outline  of  his  career.) 

"It  is  fitting,  it  is  profitable,  to  render  honor  and  homage  to  great  worth  and 
great  public  services.  We  are  ourselves  better  for  this  homage.  Like  mercy, 
it  blesses  him  that  gives — it  makes  the  man,  the  people  who  render  this  homage, 
a  better  man,  a  better  people.  It  is  no  superstition,  it  is  truth,  that  the  spirits 
of  the  mighty  dead  shed  an  influence  for  good  over  the  land  in  which  their 
mortal  bodies  repose.  For,  though  their  bodies  rest  in  the  earth,  their  true 
sepulchre  is  in  the  hearts  of  their  countrymen.  The  worth  of  Albert  Sidney 
Johnston  is  to  the  people  of  Texas,  to  their  children  and  their  children's  chil 
dren,  a  possession  and  an  inheritance  forever.  It  is  fitting  and  due  that  his 
mortal  remains  be  laid  in  this  land.  I  move  the  adoption  by  the  House  of  the 
Senate's  joint  resolution." 

Remarks  of  F.  Charles  Hume  on  the  joint  resolution  of  the  Senate 
relative  to  the  removal  of  the  remains  of  General  A.  Sidney  Johnston 
to  Texas : 

"Mr.  Speaker,  I  have  only  a  few  words  to  say  in  addition  to  the  eloquent 
remarks  of  the  gentleman  from  Harris,  and  I  am  done. 

"  "We  all  know  it  was  the  dying  wish  of  General  Johnston  to  be  buried  in  the 
bosom  of  his  adopted  State,  to  whose  services  he  had  given  the  labor  of  his  best 
years,  and  the  devotion  of  his  great  heart. 

The  unfortunate  condition  of  our  country  has  hitherto  prevented  the  State 
from  granting  this  last  request ;  but  now  that  the  dread  scenes  of  war  have 
ended,  and  the  people  enjoy  an  opportunity  of  expressing  the  tenderness  of 
their  memory  for  the  irreproachable  patriot  who  defended  them  aud  theirs 
*  even  unto  death,'  it  is  as  little  as  their  representatives  can  do,  in  justice  to 
the  living  and  the  dead,  to  ask  of  Louisiana  the  mouldering  body  of  their  war 
rior,  that  he  may  be  buried  by  the  waters  of  the  Colorado,  and  mingle  his  dust 


REMARKS  OF  MR.   HUME.  699 

with  the  heroes  and  statesmen  whose  names  are  living  in  the  charmed  numbers 
of  undying  song. 

"  Few  names  stand  more  prominently  in  our  history  than  that  of  General 
Johnston ;  few  memories  wind  around  our  hearts  in  more  clinging  embraces. 

"  Coming  to  Texas  at  an  early  day,  and  assuming  at  once  his  proper  place 
among  our  wise,  great,  and  good  men,  he  has  led  our  armies  to  battle,  and  iden 
tified  himself  in  every  respect  with  her  eventful  history. 

"When  the  battle  for  Southern  independence  broke  with  its  thunders  and  its 
threatenings  upon  the  ears  of  our  people,  he  did  not  hesitate  to  pledge  to  Texas 
and  her  confederated  sisters  the  strength  of  his  arm,  and  the  fidelity  of  his 
heart.  He  did  not  pause  before  the  careering  waves  of  that  Rubicon  which 
held  mirrored  in  its  fearful  depths  the  evils  that  were  to  come ;  he  did  not  mur 
mur  in  the  wilderness,  and  curse  the  Moses  who  tried  to  lead  his  people  from 
the  savory  flesh-pots  and  the  galling  bondage  of  Egypt ;  but  in  all,  and  through 
all,  his  manly  heart  defied  the  storm,  and  he  fell  'mid  its  wrathful  fury,  still 
true  to  all  the  instincts  of  Southern  manhood,  and  blameless  in  his  unspotted 
glory. 

"  When  the  nations  of  Europe  combined  to  crush  the  arms  and  the  heart  of 
the  peerless  Xapoleon,  and  sent  him  to  the  barren  rocks  of  St.  Helena  to  sor 
row,  and  sicken,  and  die,  they  did  not  dream  that  a  day  would  come  when 
France  would  seek  the  very  ashes  of  her  illustrious  emperor,  and  bow  with 
bleeding  heart  before  his  coffined  form ;  but  so  it  was,  and,  after  the  lapse  of 
twenty  years,  Paris  was  illuminated  by  a  thousand  fires,  and  the  whole  nation 
bowed  its  head  and  wept  as  his  sacred  dust  was  laid  close  to  the  music  of  his 
own  '  sunny  Seine.' 

"Let  us  do  this  righteous  act;  and,  though  we  cannot  bestrew  the  grave  of 
our  fallen  chieftain  with  the  green  emblems  of  victory;  though  the  floral  offer 
ings  we  cast  upon  his  shrouded  form  are  woven  of  the  funereal  cypress  and  the 
weeping-willow  ;  though  we  feel  and  know  he  was  the  champion  of  a  cause 
now  lost  forever — still  in  the  deepness  of  our  grief  we  may  say  how  much  we 
love  his  memory ;  and,  while  we  weep  for  his  and  our  country's  misfortunes, 
whisper  a  prayer  that  God  will  bless  his  widowed  wife  and  orphaned  children." 

It  was  known  to  have  been  the  wish  of  General  Johnston  that  his 
ashes  should  repose  in  the  soil  of  Texas.  He  had  so  expressed  him 
self  in  the  presence  of  his  staff.  He  had  also  said  to  Preston,  "  When 
I  die,  I  want  a  handful  of  Texas  earth  on  my  breast." 

The  people  of  New  Orleans,  therefore,  surrendered  to  the  committee 
from  Texas  the  body  of  General  Johnston,  which  was  by  them  escorted 
to  Austin  in  January,  1867.  It  was  the  wish  of  the  committee  not  to 
arouse  the  jealousy  of  the  authorities.  The  chairman,  in  a  letter  to 
the  present  writer,  dated  January  8th,  says : 

In  view  of  the  strange  passions  which  govern  some  persons  in  the  United 
States,  including  some  individuals  in  high  office,  the  committee  have  deemed  it 
in  good  taste  and  fitting  the  solemnity  of  the  duty  devolved  on  u-s  to  attract  no 
premature  and  hostile  attention. 

This,  however,  they  were  unable  to  avoid,  as  events  proved. 


700  GENERAL  JOHNSTON  IN  THE   GRAVE. 

The  following  extract  from  the  New  Orleans  Picayune  of  January 
24, 1867,  gives  other  interesting  details  of  the  occasion  : 

At  the  hour  of  three  o'clock  yesterday  afternoon  the  St.  Louis  Cemetery  was 
the  scene  of  an  assemblage  such  as  never  before  had  been  witnessed  within 
those  ancient  walls,  which  inclose  the  mortal  remains  of  so  many  who,  in  their 
time,  had  been  loved  and  revered  by  the  population  of  Louisiana. 

It  was  the  occasion  of  the  disinterment  and  removal  of  the  remains  of  one 
who,  though  neither  a  native  nor  a  resident  of  New  Orleans,  was  perhaps  dearer 
than  either  native  or  resident  in  the  hearts  of  its  people — General  Albert  Sid 
ney  Johnston,  the  hero  chieftain  of  the  Confederate  army,  the  victor  and  victim 
of  the  bloody  field  of  Shiloh. 

The  State  of  Texas  had  sent  a  committee  for  the  purpose  of  superintending 
this  duty,  and  yesterday  was  appointed  for  the  exhumation.  ...  It  was  gen 
erally  known  throughout  the  city  that  the  disinterment  and  removal  were  to 
take  place  yesterday  at  three  o'clock,  but  no  formal  invitation  had  been  issued 
to  the  public  to  attend  the  ceremony. 

And  yet,  when  it  was  announced  that  the  friends  of  the  deceased  and  of  his 
family  were  expected  to  be  present,  this  simple  phrase  was  sufficiently  compre 
hensive  to  embrace  a  whole  population,  to  whom  the  memory  of  the  departed 
is  even  dearer  than  that  of  friend  or  relative.  It  was,  therefore,  not  surprising 
that  so  great  a  number  of  our  people  assisted  at  the  ceremony ;  nor  that  a  ma 
jority  should  have  belonged  to  that  gentler  sex  who  first  strewed  flowers  upon 
the  hero's  coffin,  and  who  ever  since  have  tended  his  tomb  with  pious  cares  more 
precious  than  odorous  garlands.  Although  the  event  was  one  which  appealed 
directly  to  the  sensibilities  and  emotions  of  the  people  of  New  Orleans,  the 
ceremonies  were  conducted  without  any  of  the  pageantry  or  pomp  which  usu 
ally  characterizes  such  occasions.  No  blazonry  of  military  rank  marked  the 
simple  procession  which  accompanied  the  remains  from  the  tomb  to  the  steamer. 
No  note  of  martial  music  measured  the  solemn  tread  of  the  long  line  of  mourn 
ers.  But  grief  was  not  less  sincere  because  its  expression  in  the  accustomed 
mode  was  not  permitted  ;  nor  was  it  the  less  intense  that  there  was  added  to 
sorrow  for  the  loss  of  one  so  loved  sorrow  for  the  loss  of  the  cause  for  which 
he  fought. 

No  stranger  could  have  supposed  that  the  plainly-attired  pall-bearers  who 
walked  beside  the  hearse  were  generals  high  in  rank  and  in  reputation — men 
who  had  led  armies  to  battle  and  to  victory;  who  had  defended  cities,  and  who 
had  organized  campaigns.  Among  them  were  several  who  had  been  the  friends 
and  associates  of  the  deceased  in  the  old  army  of  the  United  States,  and  some 
who  had  been  his  lieutenants  in  the  recent  war,  and  who  stood  beside  him  on 
that  fatal  but  glorious  day  which  deprived  the  Confederacy  of  his  services. 
There  was  Beauregard,  the  favorite  son  of  Louisiana,  who  immediately  suc 
ceeded  him  in  command  of  the  army ;  there  was  Bragg,  his  energetic  and  inde 
fatigable  chief  of  staff;  there  was-Buckner,  who  so  gallantly  fulfilled  the  chief 
tain's  orders  by  the  heroic  but  fruitless  defense  at  Donelson. 

It  is  remarkable,  too,  that,  among  this  distinguished  assemblage,  there  were 
three  men — Beauregard,  Bragg,  and  Hood — who  had  each  in  turn  succeeded  to 
the  command  of  the  army  upon  which  the  life  and  the  death  of  its  first  leader 
seemed  to  impress  a  peculiar  character  and  a  strange  fatality — an  army  whose 


REMOVAL  OF  THE  REMAINS.  701 

history  was  illustrated  by  so  many  heroic  deeds  and  so  many  signal  misfortunes 
— an  army  which  seemed  to  have  inherited  its  heroism  from  his  life,  and  its  mis 
fortunes  from  his  death.  .  .  . 

This  ceremony  concluded,  the  coffin  was  lifted  by  the  pall-bearers  from  the 
ground,  and  deposited  in  a  hearse  at  the  gate  of  the  cemetery.  Here  a  spon 
taneous  procession  was  formed.  The  hearse  moved  slowly  down  the  street,  ac 
companied  by  the  pall-bearers,  and  followed  by  a  long  cortege  composed  of  a 
great  number  of  the  ladies  and  gentlemen  of  the  city.  Very  many  ladies  fol 
lowed  immediately  after  the  hearse,  thus  imparting  a  peculiar  and  touching 
character  to  the  spectacle. 

The  line  of  pedestrians  was  many  squares  in  length,  and  after  these  came  a 
number  of  mourners  in  carriages.  The  route  taken  was  down  Conti  Street  to 
Eampart,  up  Rampart  to  Canal,  up  Canal  to  Chartres,  down  Chartres  to  St.  Pe 
ter,  and  thence  to  the  ferry-boat,  upon  which  the  remains  were  to  be  placed. 
The  utmost  decorum  pervaded  the  masses  of  the  people  who  were  assembled  on 
the  sidewalks  to  witness  the  procession ;  and  the  feeling  was  manifested  to  such 
an  extent  that  the  transit  of  the  street-cars  and  other  vehicles  was  stayed  along 
the  whole  route.  When  the  coffin  was  transferred  to  the  ferry-boat  many  per 
sons  embarked  with  it,  and  numbers  of  others  were  only  prevented  from  doing 
so  in  consequence  of  the  incapacity  of  the  boat  to  accommodate  them. 

Upon  the  arrival  of  the  remains  at  Algiers  they  were  placed  by  the  pall 
bearers  in  the  ladies'  parlor  of  the  depot-building  of  the  Opelousas  Railroad, 
where  they  were  left  in  charge  of  Lieutenant  John  Crowley,  who  lost  a  hand  at 
Bclmont  and  an  arm  at  Shiloh,  and  others  who  were  maimed  while  serving 
under  the  deceased  in  his  last  great  battle. 

Among  the  pall-bearers,  besides  Beauregard,  Bragg,  Buckner,  and 
Hood,  were  Generals  Richard  Taylor,  Longstreet,  Gibson,  and  Harry 
Hays. 

All  the  papers  were  full  of  testimonials  to  the  goodness  and  great 
ness  of  the  deceased. 

On  the  morning  of  January  24th  the  Texas  committee,  consisting 
of  Colonel  Ashbel  Smith,  Hon.  D.  W.  Jones,  Hon.  M.  G.  Shelley,  and 
Major  Ochiltree,  took  charge  of  the  remains  of  General  Johnston,  and 
conveyed  them  by  the  Opelousas  Railroad  to  Brashear  City.  At  Terre- 
bonne,  some  fifty  ladies,  headed  by  Mrs.  Bragg,  strewed  the  coffin  with 
fresh  flowers  and  wreaths,  and  decorated  it  with  floral  emblems ;  and  at 
Brashear  City  it  was  received  by  a  large  body  of  citizens.  It  was  car 
ried  thence  to  Galveston  by  steamer. 

Galveston  had  been  the  home  of  General  Johnston  at  one  time,  and 
many  of  its  citizens  had  been  his  personal  friends — some  of  them 
among  the  best  he  had.  It  was  proposed,  therefore,  and  so  announced, 
that  the  public  honor  of  a  solemn  funeral  procession  should  be  accorded 
his  body.  When  the  programme  was  published,  the  United  States 
general,  commanding  the  district,  issued  an  order  prohibiting  it.  The 
programme  is  published,  as  the  best  evidence  that  it  concealed  neither 
treason  nor  sedition. 


702  GENERAL  JOHNSTON  IN  THE   GRAVE. 

PEOGEAMME   FOB   THE    RECEPTION   OF   THE   EEMAINS    OF    GENERAL   JOHNSTON. 

The  following  is  the  programme  agreed  upon  this  morning  by  the  committee 
for  receiving  the  remains  of  General  Johnston : 

Band. 
Legislative  Committee. 

Remains. 

Pall-bearers.  Pall-bearers. 

Hon.  James  Love,  Hon.  F.  H.  Merriman, 

Dr.  Levi  Jones,  Dr.  N.  D.  Labadie, 

Oscar  Farish,  Esq.,  Henry  Journey,  Esq., 

James  P.  Nash,  Esq.,  Stephen  Southwick, 

Colonel  Andrew  Neil,  Colonel  John  D.  Waters. 

Clergy  and  Orator. 

Mayor  and  Aldermen. 

Eeception  Committee. 

City  and  County  Officers. 

Judges  and  Officers  of  the  Supreme  Court. 

Members  of  the  Bar. 
Civil,  Military,  and  Naval  officers  of  the  General  Government. 

Press. 

Howard  Association. 

German  Benevolent  Association. 

Hibernian  Benevolent  Association. 

St.  Andrew's  Society. 
Galveston  Literary  Association. 

Turners'  Association. 
Draymen's  Benevolent  Association. 

Stevedores. 

Fire  Department. 

Citizens. 

The  procession  will  form  on  Twentieth  Street,  head  of  column  resting  on 
Strand.  To  close  up  so  soon  as  the  reception  committee  reach  the  Strand  from 
the  wharf. 

LINE    OF    MAECH. 

Up  Strand  to  Bath  Avenue. 

Bath  Avenue  to  Broadway. 

Broadway  to  Tremont. 

Tremont  to  Church. 
Church  to  Presbyterian  Church. 

"Where  appropriate  religious  services  will  be  celebrated  under  the  direction 
of  Rev.  Dr.  McNair.  During  the  time  the  City-Hall  bell  will  be  tolled,  and  it  is 
requested  that  the  church-bells  will  also  be  tolled. 

During  the  progress  of  the  ceremonies  it  is  requested  that  all  stores  be  closed 
and  that  all  business  be  suspended. 

The  remains  will  arrive  on  Friday  morning  by  the  steamer  Matagorda. — 
Galveston  Bulletin. 


OFFICIAL  BRUTALITY.  703 

This  is  General  Griffin's  order : 

HEADQUARTERS  DISTRICT  OP  TEXAS,  ) 
GALVESTON,  January  24,  1S66.     ) 

SIR  :  My  attention  has  been  called  to  the  programme  published  in  the  morn 
ing  papers,  for  the  reception  of  the  remains  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston, 
now  en  route  from  ISTew  Orleans  to  Austin. 

Although  there  is  a  sacredness  surrounding  the  remains  of  all  deceased  per 
sons  which  makes  it  exceedingly  delicate  to  interfere  with  their  funeral  cele 
brations,  it  becomes  my  duty,  owing  to  the  position  that  General  Johnston  oc 
cupied  toward  the  United  States  Government,  during  the  latter  period  of  his 
life,  to  forbid  the  funeral  procession. 

If  the  body  can  be  taken  quietly,  without  any  ringing  of  bells,  public  or 
popular  demonstration,  from  the  point  of  its  arrival,  direct  to  the  point  of  its 
departure  from  the  city,  no  objections  will  be  made. 

I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

CHARLES  GRIFFIN,  Brevet  Major-  General  commanding. 

Hon.  C.  II.  LEONARD,  Mayor  of  Galveston,  Texas. 

This  order  was  without  warrant  of  law.  It  was  represented  to  Gen 
eral  Griffin  that  no  military  or  political  significance  was  intended  in  the 
honors  proposed;  that  the  ashes  of  a  great  man,  a  soldier,  a  Texan,  were 
on  the  way  to  their  last  resting-place,  and  that  it  was  unrighteous  to 
forbid  the  people  to  lament  for  their  dead.  It  was  pointed  out  to  him 
that  a  soldier,  who  fell  under  his  flag,  was  entitled  to  the  honors  of  war. 
Federal  officers  had  received  them  at  the  hands  of  the  Confederates 
while  the  flames  of  civil  war  burned  fiercest.  Wainwright  and  Lea 
were  so  buried  in  Galveston.  Colonel  Baylor  stated  that  he  buried 
Colonel  Mudd  and  Colonel  Bassett  with  the  honors  of  war.  It  was 
argued  that  a  decent  respect  for  chivalric  usages  could  do  no  harm. 
General  Thomas  Green,  an  heroic  soldier  of  the  South,  had  been  interred 
with  these  tokens  of  respect  at  Austin,  without  derogation  to  the  Fed 
eral  authority.  Such  arguments  were  in  vain.  General  Griffin  was 
inexorable.  He  affected  to  mistrust  the  statements  that  only  a  per 
sonal  significance  should  be  given  to  the  demonstration.  His  sole  con 
cession  was,  that  the  body  might  remain  at  the  wharf  until  next  day. 
An  appeal  was  made  to  General  Heintzelman,  who  went  beyond  Griffin, 
and  whose  conduct  is  said  to  have  been  very  coarse  and  cynical. 

The  mayor  then  appealed  by  telegraph  to  General  Sheridan.  The 
following  is  the  correspondence  : 

GALVESTON,  TEXAS,  January  24, 186T. 

The  citizens  of  Galveston  wish  to  give  a  civil  escort,  from  steamer  to  care, 
to  the  remains  of  General  Johnston.  General  Griffin,  commanding,  has  issued 
a  prohibitory  order.  Will  you  give  authority  to  the  citizens  here  to  give  civil 
escort  to  his  remains  ? 

(Signed)  CHAELES  H.  LEONARD,  Mayor. 

Major-General  P.  H.  SHERIDAN,  commanding  Department  of  the  Gulf,  New  Orleans,  Louisiana. 

46 


704  GENERAL  JOHNSTON  IN  THE   GRAVE. 

SIR  :  I  respectfully  decline  to  grant  your  request. 

I  have  too  much  regard  for  the  memory  of  the  brave  men  who  died  to  pre 
serve  our  Government,  to  authorize  Confederate  demonstrations  over  the  re 
mains  of  any  one  who  attempted  to  destroy  it. 

(Signed)  P.  II.  SHEKIDAN,  Major-  General  U.  S.  A. 

Mr.  CHARLES  H.  LEONARD,  Mayor  of  Galveston,  Texas. 

The  Southern  people  were  learning  that  they  who  have  laid  down 
their  arms  have  no  rights,  and  that  grief  may  become  a  crime  in  the 
eyes  of  jealous  tyranny. 

In  the  following  proclamation  the  Mayor  of  Galveston  made  known 
to  the  people  the  edict  of  their  military  master.  It  is  well  that  it 
should  be  read  by  those  who  talk  of  beneficent  despotisms  : 

MAYOR'S  OFFICE,  GALVESTON,  January  24, 186T. 

I  am  in  receipt  of  a  communication  from  brevet  Major-General  Charles 
Griffin,  dated  headquarters,  District  of  Texas,  Galveston,  January  24,  1867,  for 
bidding  the  contemplated  funeral  procession  in  honor  of  the  late  General  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston,  and  directing  that  the  remains  be  transported  through  this 
city  without  any  public  or  popular  demonstration. 

I  therefore  hereby  give  notice  that  the  proposed  ceremonies  will  not  take 
place.  CHAELES  H.  LEONARD,  Mayor. 

When  the  vessel  arrived,  and  the  order  of  the  military  commandant 
was  communicated  to  Colonel  Ashbel  Smith,  he  directed  the  body  to  be 
placed  upon  the  wharf,  and,  with  the  committee  and  the  mayor,  called 
on  the  military  authorities.  The  result  of  this  conference  was  the 
presentation  of  the  following  request,  to  which  General  Griffin  gave  a 
verbal  assent  : 

MAYOR'S  OFFICE,  GALVESTON,  January  13, 1867. 

GENEBAL  :  While  on  the  part  of  the  citizens  of  Galveston  I  would  state  that 
they  did  not  intend,  by  the  published  programme  for  the  reception  of  the  re 
mains  of  General  Johnston,  any  political  or  party  demonstration,  I  pledge  that 
there  shall  be  no  music  by  bands,  ringing  or  tolling  of  bells,  public  or  private 
demonstrations,  of  any  organized  associations  in  the  procession  should  the  body 
be  conveyed  to  the  church  in  this  city,  and  thence  to  the  point  of  its  departure. 
All  persons  appearing  in  the  procession  shall  be  invited  and  appear  as  members 
of  the  deceased's  family  or  friends.  Respectfully,  etc., 

(Signed)  CHAELES  H.  LEONAED,  Mayor. 

General  GBIFFIN,  commanding  District  of  Texas,  Galveston,  Texas. 

MAYOR'S  OFFICE,  GALVESTON,  January  25, 1S67. 

The  citizens  of  Galveston  are  hereby  respectfully  requested  to  implicitly  con 
form  to  the  terms  of  the  above  request.  CHAELES  H.  LEONARD,  Mayor. 

Subsequent  to  the  above,  a  meeting  was  called  at  the  office  of  Mr.  James 
Sorley,  Mayor  Leonard  in  the  chair,  when  Colonel  Smith  moved  as  follows : 


PUBLIC  RESPECT  AT  GALVESTOX.  705 

Out  of  deference  to  the  wishes  of  his  old  personal  friends,  the  remains  of 
General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  will  lie  in  state  on  the  Central  Wharf,  where 
they  may  be  visited.  They  will  be  moved  by  the  pall-bearers  and  committee  to 
morrow  morning,  Saturday,  26th  instant,  at  ten  o'clock  A.  M.,  from  their  present 
resting-place  on  Central  Wharf  to  the  depot,  thence  to  be  conveyed  by  special 
train  to  Houston.  The  friends  of  the  family  are  invited  to  attend  their  removal. 

This  was  carried  unanimously. 

While  these  conferences  were  going  on,  Major  McKnight  says,  in  his 
letter  to  the  New  Orleans  Times  : 

During  the  conference  up-town,  thousands  of  ladies  and  gentlemen  went 
down  to  the  wharf  and  exhibited  the  most  unequivocal  evidence  of  their 
respect  for  the  memory  of  the  deceased.  I  saw  some  thirty  or  thirty-five 
negroes,  with  mourning  streamers  upon  their  hats  and  arms,  walk  slowly  and 
solemnly  around  the  coffin,  and  several  of  them,  standing  near  the  head  of  the 
bier,  freely  dropped  tears  for  the  hero  whose  remains  were  before  them. 

The  following  is  the  account  given  by  the  Galveston  News  of  the 
transfer  of  the  body  from  the  wharf  to  the  depot,  with  editorial  com 
ments  which  reflected  the  sentiments  of  the  community  : 

OBSEQUIES    OF    GENEEAL   ALBEET    SIDNEY   JOHNSTON. 

The  remains  of  the  distinguished  chieftain  remained  in  state  on  the  Central 
Wharf  during  all  of  Friday,  where  it  was  visited  by  thousands,  and  at  night  it 
was  removed  into  an  adjoining  warehouse,  where  it  was  guarded  by  the  follow 
ing-named  gentlemen :  Major  E.  S.  Boiling,  Major  J.  W.  Mangum,  Messrs.  S.  B. 
Noble,  J.  F.  Crane,  Cyrus  Thompson,  Charles  J.  Jankes,  M.  Stoddart,  A.  W. 
Hughes,  Paul  Edmonds,  R.  W.  Belo,  John  Adriand,  Jr.,  A.  D.  McArthur,  Wil 
liam  C.  Carnes,  R.  J.  Johns,  William  H.  Shields,  P.  C.  Baker,  A.  F.  French, 
Charles  Spann,  A.  B.  Block,  J.  K.  Spires,  William  Warren,  John  Spann,  Joseph 
Turner,  Sidney  Smith,  J.  P.  Davis,  A.  P.  Root,  E.  S.  Alley,  and  P.  P.  Brotherson. 

The  Assembling . 

Early  yesterday  morning,  long  before  the  time  announced  for  the  removal 
of  the  remains,  thousands  of  our  people  could  be  seen  wending  their  way,  in 
the  face  of  a  stiff  norther,  toward  the  Central  Wharf,  while  every  few  minutes 
the  throng  increased  in  numbers.  About  half -past  nine  o'clock  the  hearse,  deco 
rated  with  black  plumes,  and  having  its  sides  appropriately  draped  with  mourn 
ing,  pulled  by  four  black  horses,  made  its  appearance.  This  was  the  signal  for 
the  crowd  to  close  up  together,  and  the  coffin  was  removed  from  its  resting- 
place  to  the  hearse  by  the  legislative  committee  and  the  pall-bearers,  composed 
of  our  citizens. 

The  Start. 

The  hearse  slowly  commenced  to  move  off,  and,  without  any  one  directing, 
the  multitude  formed  a  column  by  twos,  and  marched  behind.  Along  the 
Strand  and  Centre  Street  hundreds  of  ladies  and  children  were  waiting  to  take 
their  places  in  the  procession,  and  for  a  while  we  thought  they  were  doomed  to 


706  GENERAL  JOHNSTON  IN   THE   GRAVE. 

disappointment,  so  manj  males  were  moving  in  the  line  of  march,  and  there  did 
not  appear  to  be  any  one  willing  to  make  room  for  them.  They,  however, 
moved  on  the  sidewalk,  parallel  with  those  in  the  street.  On  every  corner  hun 
dreds  were  standing,  and  as  they  saw  the  opportunity  would  take  their  places 
in  the  procession.  The  route  of  the  cortege  was  up  Centre  Street,  then  along 
Market  Street  to  the  depot  of  the  Galveston  &  Houston  Kailroad. 

The  Halt. 

When  the  procession  reached  Tremont  Street,  it  halted,  and  the  ladies  had  a 
place  assigned  them  directly  behind  the  legislative  committee,  who  were  fol 
lowing  the  hearse.  It  requires  no  little  effort  to  walk  in  the  middle  of  our  sandy 
streets.  On  plodded  our  fair  and  noble  women,  slowly  but  happily,  never  seeming 
to  have  a  care  about  the  fierce,  cold  wind  blowing  at  the  time,  or  the  sand  through 
which  they  were  wading  ankle-deep.  Never  before  did  Galveston  witness  such 
a  scene.  Ladies  and  children,  who  would  not  have  dared  to  venture  out  in  the 
cold  on  any  other  occasion,  turned  out  en  masse  to  pay  respect  and  do  homage 
to  the  illustrious  dead.  And  it  was  a  befitting  tribute  to  departed  worth.  Dis 
heartened,  crushed,  oppressed^  as  we  are,  and  as  we  felt  on  this  particular  occa 
sion,  such  a  sight  served  to  encourage  every  one,  inasmuch  as  it  plainly  declared 
that,  while  laws  and  the  bayonet  might  restrict  a  demonstration  that  would  have 
been,  these  forces  were  utterly  powerless  (as  they  always  will  be)  to  restrain 
the  natural  feelings  of  the  human  heart,  and  a  proper  display  of  self-respect, 
always  admissible  on  such  occasions,  and  which  will  continue  to  be  seen,  in 
proportion  to  the  opposition  made  against  the  wishes  and  rights  of  the  people 
enacted  by  a  detested  military  despotism. 

Scenes  at  the  Depot. 

When  the  head  of  the  column  reached  the  depot,  the  rear  of  it  was  just  turn 
ing  Centre  Street,  and  the  whole  width  of  the  street,  for  that  distance,  was 
packed  with  the  seething  mass  of  human  beings.  We  could  not  form  an  esti 
mate  of  the  number  of  persons  engaged  in  this  ovation,  but  we  are  sure  we  are 
not  exaggerating  when  we  declare  that  thousands  participated  in  the  sad  funeral 
rites.  The  cars  and  engine  were  beautifully  draped  in  mourning,  and,  as  soon  as 
the  pall-bearers  had  placed  the  remains  in  the  car,  the  ladies  filed  to  the  left  and 
occupied  the  platform,  while  many  passed  into  the  car  to  catch  a  last  glimpse  of 
the  remains  of  him  who  had  nobly  fought,  sadly  lied,  gloriously  and  gladly  died, 
for  a  cause  dear  to  him  and  us.  A  car  had  been  prepared  especially  for  the 
ladies,  and  many  of  them  accompanied  the  remains  to  Houston,  also  a  number 
of  prominent  citizens  not  composing  the  committees.  The  whistle  blew,  and 
off  started  the  train  with  its  precious  dust,  while  every  head  was  uncovered. 
So  ended  the  honors  paid  by  the  people  of  Galveston  to  the  remains  of  General 
Albert  Sidney  Johnston. 

A  deep  sense  of  both  humiliation  and  indignation  was  aroused  by 
General  Griffin's  arbitrary  action.  Insults  cannot  be  offered  with  im 
punity  to  a  free  people.  The  excitement  increased  ;  and  when  the  re 
mains  of  General  Johnston  arrived  at  Houston,  another  city  where  he 
was  well  known  and  much  beloved,  bitter  wrath  was  mingled  with  the 


CEREMONIES  AT  HOUSTON.  707 

public  sorrow.     The  body  arrived  at  Houston  January  26th,  and  re 
mained  there  until  the  28th. 

The  following  account  of  the  funeral  at  Houston  is  taken  from  the 
correspondence  of  the  New  Orleans  Times,  and  was  written  by  Major 
McKnight,  better  known  as  "Asa  Hartz:  " 

The  train  arrived  at  the  latter  place  at  about  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon, 
when  it  was  met  by  a  similar  committee  of  the  city  of  Houston.  The  remains 
were  placed  in  a  hearse  drawn  by  four  white  horses,  and,  followed  by  an  immense 
procession  of  ladies  and  gentlemen,  carried  to  the  Houston  Academy,  where 
they  were  placed  in  state,  and  remained  until  ten  o'clock  on  Monday  morning, 
the  28th. 

Immediately  after  the  coffin  was  deposited  upon  the  stand,  Miss  Moore,  a 
poetess  of  no  ordinary  rank,  and  a  native  of  the  Lone-Star  State,  placed  upon 
the  bier  a  manuscript,  of  which  the  following  is  a  copy: 

ALBERT    SIDNEY    JOHNSTON. 

Texas,  like  Mary,  a  worshiper 

Comes  sorrowing ! 
Ila  !  who  keeps  her  away  from  the  sepulchre 

Of  her  shrouded  king  ? 
They  strike,  like  cowards,  her  galling  chains, 

And  sneer  that  her  lips  are  so  strangely  dumb ! 
Christ !  Will  the  blood  keep  calm  in  our  veins 

Till  the  end  is  come  ? 

Alas,  my  brothers,  whose  brave  forms  moved 

In  the  battle-flame ! 
Alas,  my  sisters,  whose  hearts  were  proved 

When  the  midnight  came  ! 
He  comes,  whose  arm  was  so  firmly  steeled ! — 

0  warrior,  what  of  the  hidden  past  ? 
Are  you  come  as  a  messenger  from  the  field 

Where  thy  sword  shone  last  ? 

Oh,  silent  and  royal,  that  mad  day  died 

In  a  sudden  night ! 
But  the  valley  was  grand  in  the  glow  of  thy  pride ! 

Is  it  not  our  right — 
The  laurels,  thy  name  and  thy  sword  have  won  us, 

The  trust  our  fetterless  soil  will  keep  ? 
But  the  eyes  of  our  masters  are  upon  us, 

And  we  may  not  weep  ! 

No  "  glorious  pomp  "  in  the  guarded  street — 

No  roll  of  drums — 
Naught  save  the  echo  of  mournful  feet 

Where  our  hero  comes — 
Silent  bells  in  each  guarded  steeple ! 

Met  like  a  prisoner  hanged  for  crime ! 
But  a  vengeance  cometh,  0  my  people — 

Let  us  bide  our  time  ! 


708  GENERAL  JOHNSTON  IN  THE  GRAVE. 

The  same  order  issued  at  Galveston  was  sent  to  Major  Pease,  commanding 
at  Houston,  but  it  was  not  strictly  enforced ;  and  the  demonstration,  though  fer 
vent,  was  entirely  of  a  civil  character,  and  totally  devoid  of  political  mean 
ing.  The  sons  and  daughters  of  Texas  wanted  to  honor  the  memory  of  their 
great  citizen,  and  they  did  it. 

The  following  extract,  from  a  private  letter  from  a  gentleman  in 
Houston,  dated  January  28,  1867,  but  published  by  the  recipient,  shows 
the  feeling  in  that  city : 

It  is  my  sad  and  mournful  pleasure  to  relate  to  you  the  funeral  obsequies  paid 
to  all  that  is  left  of  the  earthly  remains  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  that  great 
and  good  Southron,  by  the  citizens  of  Houston,  Texas.  Excitement  ran  to  a 
terrible  pitch,  owing  to  the  edict  issued  per  order  of  Phil  Sheridan,  through  a 
"  Griffin  "  of  Galveston,  that  there  should  be  no  "lying  in  state,  tolling  of  bells, 
or  parading  of  societies,"  which  order  was  not  very  quietly  submitted  to  by  the 
citizens  of  Galveston ;  but,  when  the  remains  reached  the  territory  occupied  by 
the  pure,  unadulterated  Texans,  the  people  had  run  mad  in  their  sorrow,  and 
no  power  could  restrain  them.  Such  a  universal  outburst  of  feeling.  I  never  saw. 
Early  Saturday  morning  every  house  was  draped  in  mourning  from  turret  to 
foundation,  with  long  streamers  of  crape  and  illusion ;  each  store  waved  its  dark 
plumage;  no  business  was  done,  and  the  city  presented  the  appearance  of  a  vast 
sepulchre.  On  the  arrival  of  the  train  from  Galveston,  the  citizens  rushed  to 
the  depot  and  the  remains  were  carried  to  the  Academy,  while  placards  were  on 
the  street,  "  Our  honored  dead  must  and  shall  be  respected."  The  remains  lay 
in  state  until  to-day  on  the  rostrum  in  the  Academy.  From  tall,  silver  candle 
sticks  at  the  head  and  foot  burned  tapers  night  and  day.  The  coffin  was  covered 
with  flowers  of  the  richest  kind,  and  directly  behind  it  on  the  wall  hung  the 
portraits  of  Jefferson  Davis  at  the  head,  Robert  E.  Lee  on  the  right,  and  Stone 
wall  Jackson  on  the  left,  draped  in  mourning,  all ;  and  in  the  centre,  a  master 
piece — "  The  Weeping  Confederacy ;  "  while  the  coffin  among  the  flowers  was 
literally  studded  with  photographs  of  Confederate  generals  of  lesser  grades.  At 
ten  o'clock  to-day  the  remains  were  escorted  by  five  hundred  ladies  on  foot,  and 
the  gentlemen's  procession  a  mile  in  length ;  then  came  carriages,  carrying  the 
decrepit  and  infirm.  The  hearse  was  of  the  most  gorgeous  manufacture  and 
material,  with  six  long,  black  plumes,  arranged  systematically  at  equal  distances ; 
six  milk-white  horses — the  finest  in  Texas — draped  in  mourning,  walked  off  as 
if  conscious  of  the  noble  burden  they  bore.  Bells  were  rung,  and  if  Texas  were 
an  independent  power  they  could  not  have  carried  matters  to  a  greater  extent. 

A  press  telegram,  among  other  points  in  regard  to  the  funeral,  says  : 

The  bells  are  tolling.  The  solemn  cortege  is  one  mile  in  length.  Five  hun 
dred  ladies  and  little  girls  are  on  foot  in  the  procession.  No  MILITARY  OFFICIALS 

ABE  SEEN  OX  THE  8TKEETS. 

It  would  do  no  good  to  reproduce  the  fiery  denunciations  of  the 
press  which  were  leveled  at  Sheridan  and  Griffin.  The  following 
extracts  from  the  journals  of  the  day  are  given  to  show  the  earnest- 


CEREMONIES  AT   HOUSTON.  709 

ness  and  universality  of  the  people's  grief.     The  Merchants'   Tran 
script  said  : 

He  was  received — received  in  Houston  by  the  outpouring  of  the  entire  peo 
ple.  All  joined  in — mother  and  daughter,  father  and  son — to  swell  the  great 
anthem  of  grief  that  breaks  from  the  popular  heart  when  an  idol  is  overthrown. 
Xo  one  cared  for  precedence.  All  were  content  to  solemnly  fall  into  the  mourn 
ful  line,  and  all  foolish  preeminences,  or  ideas  of  such,  were  dismissed  in  the 
presence  of  the  solemn  dead.  Petty  jealousies,  animosities,  foolish  pride,  dis 
appeared,  and  one  by  one  the  solemn  cortege  increased  its  numbers  at  every 
step  it  took. 

The  bells  rang  from  their  different  turrets,  the  houses  along  the  road  were 
enshrouded  in  mourning  emblems;  the  young  and  the  old  participated,  and  the 
ovation  of  the  people  attested  a  nation's  love,  as  well  as  the  folly  of  those  who 
would,  by  a  military  order,  attempt  to  control  the  reverence  and  affection  of  a 
people  that  illuminate  the  sable  plumes  that  wave. solemnly  over  the  hearse  that 
conveys  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  to  his  last  resting-place. 


The  following  is  from  the  Telegraph : 

In  the  large  Academy  Hall  of  this  city  the  honored  soldier,  taking  his  last 
sleep,  remained  Saturday  evening,  through  Sunday,  and  until  yesterday  morning. 

Thousands  of  those  who  admired  his  wisdom,  his  goodness,  and  his  courage, 
thronged  around  his  bier,  and  gazed  upon  the  coffin,  bendin'g  under  the  weight 
of  the  floral  offerings  of  Texas  women  and  maidens.  Fit  shroud,  these  flowers, 
for  so  grand  a  form,  for  flowers  are  love's  truest  language — and  it  was  the  hand 
of  undying  love  for  the  heroic  soldier  that  placed  them  there. 

On  yesterday  morning  the  streets  leading  to  the  Academy  were  thronged  by 
gathering  thousands  of  every  age  and  condition.  All  thronged  around  the  build 
ing  where  the  cherished  dead  hero  lay  in  his  peaceful  state  of  blessed  repose. 
Soon  the  building  was  thronged  to  its  utmost  capacity,  and  the  adjacent  grounds 
and  streets  were  also  filled  by  those  unable  to  obtain  admission.  A  deep  silence 
seemed  to  pervade  all  hearts,  and  every  one  was  impressed  with  the  historical 
sacredness  and  solemnity  of  the  occasion.  We  noticed  that  tears  were  in  the 
eyes  of  many — of  the  aged  especially. 

The  bearers  were  composed  of  our  best  citizens.  Immediately  following 
were  the  delegations,  etc.,  and  after  them  a  long  array  of  hundreds  of  women  and 
children,  followed  by  thousands  of  citizens.  The  procession  passed  through  the 
principal  streets,  and  everywhere  deep  solemnity  prevailed.  All  of  the  princi 
pal  public  and  business  houses  were  tastefully  decorated  with  the  insignias  of 
mourning.  All  stores  were  closed,  and  business  generally  suspended.  It  was 
the  grand  ovation  of  the  whole  people  to  the  "honored  dead."  The  body  was 
conveyed  to  the  Central  Depot,  placed  upon  a  car  prepared  for  the  purpose,  and 
all  that  is  mortal  of  this  immortal  man  is  now  speeding  onward,  amid  the  grief 
of  Texas,  to  its  last  resting-place. 

The  following  article,  from  the  New  Orleans  Crescent  of  January 
27,  1867,  exhibits  very  well  the  feeling  of  both  the  press  and  the  peo- 


710  GENERAL  JOHNSTON  IN  THE  GRAVE. 

pie  in  relation  to  General  Griffin's  order.     It  is  from  the  pen  of  General 
S.  B.  Buckner: 

THE  BEMAINS  OF  GENERAL  JOHNSTON. 

The  name  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  is  consecrated  in  the  memory  and  in 
the  hearts  of  the  Southern  people.  His  virtues  have  provoked  unwilling  admi 
ration  even  from  his  foes,  and  the  civilized  world  is  filled  with  his  fame.  Few 
men,  in  any  age,  can  claim  a  reputation  so  fair  as  his,  and  there  was  a  serenity  in 
the  greatness  of  his  character  which  placed  him  above  the  petty  passions  of 
ordinary  men.  He  was  conscientious  in  all  his  actions ;  and,  having  determined 
for  himself  what  was  right,  he  pursued  the  just  path,  regardless  alike  of  the 
unjust  criticisms  of  friends  and  the  denunciations  of  his  enemies.  His  hand 
some  and  imposing  presence,  the  dignity  and  the  greatness  of  his  character,  his 
fine  intellect  and  his  lofty  virtues,  displayed 

"  A  combination  and  a  form  indeed, 
Where  every  god  did  seem  to  set  his  seal, 
To  give  the  world  assurance  of  a  man." 

It  might  be  supposed  that  a  character  so  pure  would  be  held  up,  even  by  his 
former  enemies,  as  a  true  type  of  manly  virtues.  And,  if,  during  his  life,  ani 
mosities  may  have  existed  against  him  in  any  ingenuous  mind,  we  had  supposed 
they  would  have  been  buried  in  his  honored  grave. 

In  some  savage  tribes,  it  is  true,  there  once  prevailed  a  belief  that  he  who 
succeeded  in  slaying  a  great  and  a  noble  man  became  at  once  the  inheritor  of  the 
virtues  of  the  slain.  If  such  a  belief  were  entertained  in  the  present  age,  we 
might  conceive  of  persons  who,  possessed  of  small  merit  themselves,  might  seek 
to  acquire  some  nobility  of  soul  by  thus  falling  heir  to  the  high  virtues  of  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston.  It  would  seem,  from  recent  events,  that  some  remnant  of  this 
faith  still  lingers  upon  earth,  and  that  men  who  would  have  quailed  before  the 
fixed  gaze  of  Sidney  Johnston  when  living,  now  seek  to  acquire  an  ignoble  fame 
by  attempting  an  indignity  to  the  dust  of  the  illustrious  dead. 

....  Now,  in  a  time  of  profound  peace,  when  it  has  been  promulgated 
by  the  highest  authority  in  the  land  that  civil  law  prevails  throughout  its 
length  and  breadth,  a  mandate  has  gone  forth  at  Galveston,  from  a  subordi 
nate  military  commander,  that  the  house  of  God  shall  be  closed  against  the 
bones  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  and  that  no  processions  of  his  countrymen, 
whom  he  served  so  long  and  so  faithfully,  shall  follow  his  remains  to  their  last  , 
resting-place. 

"We  say  nothing  now  of  the  lawlessness  of  this  usurpation  of  authority.  "We 
do  not  ask  on  what  pretense  the  officer  assumes  the  power  of  closing  the  churches 
against  religious  ceremonies,  and  of  attempting  to  stifle  the  sighs  of  sorrowing 
friends,  and  to  suppress  demonstrations  of  admiration,  of  love,  and  of  esteem, 
for  one  so  gifted  with  every  quality  that  makes  man  illustrious.  The  generous 
and  the  brave  among  all  nations  love  to  honor  these  qualities  wherever  they  are 
found.  The  envious  and  the  ignoble  alone,  among  men,  would  seek  to  detract 
from  the  just  fame  of  the  departed,  as  the  wolf  and  the  hyena,  among  animals, 
prey  upon  the  dead. 


PUBLIC   OPINION.  711 

But  even  if  the  military  officer  at  Galveston  were  vested  with  authority  to 
do  as  he  has  done,  how  impolitic,  absurd,  and  impotent,  has  been  his  action !  He 
may  close  the  doors  of  the  churches,  he  may  disperse  the  assemblage  of  those 
who  delight  to  honor  the  nobler  virtues  that  dignify  human  nature,  he  may  ex 
cite  in  ingenuous  minds  pity  for  his  own  weakness  and  scorn  for  his  inhumanity, 
but  he  cannot  detract  from  the  fame  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  nor  diminish  in 
the  minds  of  just  and  good  men  the  esteem  in  which  the  memory  of  the  illus 
trious  hero  is  held.  The  more  he  seeks  to  suppress  that  feeling  of  reverence  for 
so  honored  a  name,  "  the  bigger  bulk  it  shows ;  "  and,  the  more  nearly  he  comes 
in  contact  with  the  name  of  the  illustrious  dead,  the  more  rapidly  does  he  dwin 
dle  into  insignificance. 

Despite  the  littlenesses  that  disfigure  human  nature,  it  is  men  like  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston  who  make  us  proud  of  our  kind. 

"  His  nature  was  too  noble  for  the  world : 
He  would  not  flatter  Neptune  for  his  trident, 
Or  Jove  for  his  power  to  thunder." 

In  life  he  possessed  a  serenity  of  soul  which  could  have  viewed  with  com 
posure  the  dissolution  of  the  world  and  a  revolution  in  the  universe.  With 
what  indifference,  then,  must  his  calm  spirit  view  the  futile  attempts  of  petty 
power  to  disturb  the  remains  that  once  held  so  great  a  soul ! 

At  Houston  there  was  fortunately  no  interference  and  no  disturb 
ance.  In  looking  back  at  those  days,  good  men  in  the  North  will 
regret  that  the  interests  and  public  peace  of  one  section,  and  the  honor 
of  the  other,  were  committed  to  such  keeping.  A  year  later,  General 
Griffin  fell  a  victim  to  the  yellow  fever  at  Galveston.  No  mark  of  dis 
respect  was  shown ;  but  a  strong  public  sentiment  studiously  withheld 
everything  that  might  be  construed  into  mourning,  or  the  customary 
h.onors  to  public  characters.  The  people  refused  to  show  an  esteem 
which  they  did  not  feel. 

The  State  Gazette  gave  a  full  account  of  the  arrival  of  the  commit 
tee  in  Austin,  on  the  2d  instant,  with  the  remains  of  General  Johnston, 
and  the  ceremonies  which  were  observed  in  honor  of  his  memory.  The 
remains  were  received  in  the  hall  of  the  House  of  Representatives  by 
the  Governor,  his  Excellency  J.  W.  Throckmorton.  On  presenting 
the  remains,  Colonel  Ashbel  Smith,  on  the  behalf  of  the  committee, 
said  : 

GOVEKXOE  :  The  committee  who  were  honored  by  the  Legislature  of  Texas, 
>  on  behalf  of  the  citizens,  to  perform  the  pious  duty  of  superintending  the  re 
moval  of  the  remains  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  from  their  temporary 
resting-place  in  the  city  of  New  Orleans,  to  be  interred  in  the  bosom  of  Texas, 
the  land  of  the  people  whom  in  life  he  loved  and  served  so  well,  and  who  so  loved 
and  honored  him  in  death  as  in  life,  have  to  announce  to  your  Excellency  that 
they  have  performed  this  duty.  The  committee  have  the  honor  here  to  present 


712  GENERAL  JOHNSTON  IN  THE  GRAVE. 

to  your  Excellency  the  remains  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston.  The  com 
mittee  will,  at  an  early  time,  make  to  your  Excellency  a  written  report  in  detail 
of  their  action  under  their  appointment. 

The  duty  of  the  committee,  under  their  legislative  appointment,  is  finished. 

To  this  the  Governor  responded  in  the  following  beautiful  and  impressive 
address : 

THE  GOVERNOR'S  ADDRESS. 

GENTLEMEN  OF  THE  COMMITTEE:  The  solemn  duty  imposed  upon  you  by 
the  representatives  of  the  people  of  Texas,  that  you  should  repair  to  a  neigh 
boring  State,  and,  in  the  name  of  Texas,  receive  and  convey  to  the  early 
home  of  his  adoption  the  mortal  remains  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  has  been 
accomplished. 

As  loving  friends,  and  as  honoring  countrymen,  without  the  splendor  and 
pageantry  of  public  or  official  ceremonies,  we  receive  his  honored  dust. 

All  that  is  left  to  us  of  his  once  manly  form,  wrapped  in  the  habiliments  of 
death — a  death  made  glorious  by  lofty  conduct  in  life — now  lies  lowly  in  the 
midst  of  mourning  countrymen,  who  knew  his  worth,  and  who  honor  his  memory, 
not  alone  for  his  achievements  as  a  warrior,  who  led  mighty  hosts  to  battle,  but 
also  for  the  many  and  rare  virtues  that  adorned  his  character  as  a  citizen,  and 
made  him  preeminent  among  the  noblest  of  men. 

His  reputation  as  a  public  man  belongs  to  history  and  to  his  country — with 
it  to-day  we  have  no  concern. 

However  desirable  it  might  be  to  commemorate  his  distinguished  and  useful 
public  career,  through  a  total  misconception  of  the  honor  and  fidelity  of  the 
people  of  Texas,  wo  are  denied  the  sacred  and  blessed  privilege  of  testifying  that 
homage  in  the  manner  which  the  people  of  every  clime  and  nation,  Christian  or 
barbarian,  civilized  or  savage,  whether  free  or  in  bondage,  have  been  wont  to 
exhibit  when  consigning  to  the  tomb  the  ashes  of  their  illustrious  and  great 
men. 

With  truth  may  it  be  said  that  General  Johnston  lives  in  the  hearts  of  the 
people  of  Texas.  He  is  enshrined  in  the  holiest  of  their  affections.  The  show 
ering  tears,  shed  by  thousands  of  our  noble  women  and  brave  men,  and  the 
countless  testimonials  that  have  everywhere  greeted  the  funeral  procession  on 
its  melancholy  way,  attest  the  affectionate  regard  entertained  for  him  by  our 
people.  But  our  tears  do  not  alone  moisten  the  memories  that  cling  around  the 
departed  hero.  The  tears  of  the  lovely  and  noble  ones  of  other  lands  mingle 
with  ours  in  paying  holy  tribute  to  the  worth  of  one  so  pure  in  all  tlie  private 
walks  of  life,  and  so  exalted  in  every  attribute  of  noble  manhood. 

When  the  pen  of  history  shall  record  the  deeds  of  the  fathers  who  made 
Texas  a  nation,  the  name  of  him  whom  we  mourn  will  occupy  one  of  the  most 
prominent  niches  in  that  distinguished  array. 

When  generations  have  passed  away,  and  the  memories  of  the  present  hour 
have  been  softened  and  purified  by  time,  and  the  student  of  history  lingers  with 
admiration  over  the  characters  of  the  great  men  brought  upon  the  stage  of  ac 
tion  by  the  recent  war,  no  one  name  will  command  greater  respect  than  that  of 
Albert  Sidney  Johnston. 

May  the  purity  of  his  private  life  be  an  exemplar  for  our  young  men  in  all 
time  to  come !  May  the  spotless  integrity  of  his  conduct  as  a  public  man  be 


GOVERNOR  THROCKMORTON'S  ADDRESS.          713 

emulated  by  all  in  authority !  And  may  his  unsullied  fame,  as  an  American 
citizen  and  soldier,  teach  us  that  we  cannot,  and  should  not,  share  it  alone ! 
His  fame,  with  that  of  his  many  distinguished  contemporaries,  whether  won 
under  the  Stars  and  Stripes,  or  under  the  Stars  and  Bars,  is  the  common  heritage 
of  the  American  people.  It  is  the  proud  representative  of  American  character, 
and  is  alike  honorable  to  the  North  and  to  the  South. 

Many  of  the  heroes  of  the  late  civil  war  grew  up  in  arms  together,  and  shared 
glories  mutually  won  upon  other  fields;  and,  notwithstanding  the  follies  of  their 
fellow-citizens  caused  them  to  lead  contending  armies  of  countrymen  against 
each  other  to  carnage  and  death,  yet  in  their  hearts  they  were  brothers  in 
affection.  Their  deeds — the  deeds  of  other  heroes — the  gallantry  and  endurance 
of  the  soldiers  from  every  section,  and  the  glories  won  by  the  armies  of  the 
North  and  the  South — all,  should  teach  us  that  we  cannot  be  two  people,  that 
we  should  remain,  as  our  fathers  desired — one  nation. 

I  trust  in  God  that  the  afflictions  we  have  suffered  may  purify  us,  and  that 
the  hearts  of  the  American  people  may  once  more  beat  in  perfect  unison  and 
accord  over  the  prosperity  and  harmony  of  ,a  reunited  and  happy  people,  and 
thrill  with  pride  at  the  mention  of  the  virtues  and  achievements  of  every  Ameri 
can  name,  regardless  of  the  section  that  may  give  it  birth  or  prestige. 

Gentlemen  of  the  committee,  you  are  entitled  to  and  will  receive  the  thanks 
of  the  people  of  Texas,  for  the  very  acceptable  and  praiseworthy  manner  with 
which  you  have  discharged  the  delicate  mission  confided  to  your  care. 

In  the  next  number  of  the  Gazette  the  following  account  is  given 
of  the  final  burial  of  General  Johnston  : 

The  final  funeral  rites  over  the  remains  of  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston 
were  performed  on  last  Saturday  at  the  Capitol.  All  that  was  mortal  of  him 
now  rests  in  the  State  Cemetery.  There  his  honored  dust  must  remain  in  a 
humble  tomb,  without  monument  or  inscription,  until  the  time  shall  come  when 
it  will  be  no  crime  to  erect  memorials,  or  to  speak  well  of  the  illustrious  dead. 
That  it  cannot  now  be  safely  done,  we  know,  nor  is  it  worth  while,  perhaps,  to 
speak  of  these  things.  The  orders  of  General  Sheridan  or  General  Griffin  are 
not  without  precedent,  and  the  Telegraph  is  mistaken  in  supposing  them  so. 
Burial-rites  were  refused  to  the  remains  of  the  mighty  Montrose,  and  his  body 
was  drawn  and  quartered.  A  British  king  had  the  remains  of  Oliver  Cromwell, 
the  mightiest  ruler  who  ever  pressed  the  English  throne,  exhumed  from  their 
tomb  in  Westminster  Abbey,  and  disgracefully  and  ignominiously  buried.  But 
history  has  preserved  the  memory  of  these  deeds  for  no  other  purpose  than  to 
heap  its  curses  on  their  authors,  and  hand  down  their  names  to  the  scorn  of  all 
the  coming  ages. 

But  now  it  may  not  be  entirely  safe  to  treat  further  of  this  subject ;  these 
things  must  be  left  for  posterity.  Under  the  present  condition  of  things,  we  are 
forcibly  reminded  of  the  celebrated  and  terrible  passage  of  Chateaubriand,  when 
commenting  on  a  similar  state  of  affairs  in  France.  He  says :  "  In  times  like 
these  the  historian  appears  to  be  charged  by  Fate  with  the  vengeance  of  the  na 
tions.  It  is  in  vain  that  Nero  triumphs.  Tacitus  has  been  born  into  the  em 
pire,  and  already  an  uncompromising  Providence  has  handed  over  to  an  obscure 
child  of  Genius  the  glory  of  the  master  of  the  world."  To  time,  the  great 


714  GENERAL  JOHNSTON  IN  THE   GRAVE. 

avenger ;  to  history,  the  appointed  agent  of  that  vengeance ;  and  to  the  future,  in 
whose  presence  the  righteous  retribution  will  take  place,  we  commit  the  case  of 
Sidney  Johnston,  as  against  Sheridan  and  Griffin.  He  will  fare  no  worse  with 
posterity  than  has  that  glorious  old  rebel  Montrose,  whose  bones  were  refused 
a  Christian  burial;  or  that  stout  old  traitor  Oliver  Cromwell,  whose  remains 
were  thrown  upon  a  dung-hill. 

After  the  beautiful  and  appropriate  remarks  of  Governor  Throckmorton, 
published  in  our  last  issue,  the  body  was  taken  charge  of  by  him,  and  lay  in 
state  in  the  Representative  Hall  of  the  Capitol,  until  Saturday,  at  twelve  o'clock, 
under  the  charge  of  a  guard  of  honor,  appointed  by  his  Excellency,  and  com 
posed  of  the  young  men  of  Austin — soldiers  who  had  battled  bravely  for  the 
"lost  cause."  The  bier  was  visited  by  many  ladies  and  gentlemen,  and  wreaths 
of  cedar,  laurel,  and  fresh  flowers,  were  strewed  above  it.  Among  the  number 
of  inscriptions  placed  upon  the  coffin,  all  indicative  of  the  deep  affection  and 
even  veneration  in  which  the  deceased  was  held  by  those  who  knew  him,  none 
was  more  expressive  or  appropriate  than  the  following : 

"  On  fame's  eternal  camping-ground 

Their  silent  tents  are  spread, 
And  glory  guards,  with  solemn  round, 
The  bivouac  of  the  dead."  1 

The  pall-bearers  were  selected  from  among  the  oldest  and  most  honored  of 
our  fellow-citizens.  The  Governor  and  State  officers  were  the  chief  mourners. 

The  Episcopal  burial-service  was  read  by  Rev.  J.  W.  Phillips,  Chaplain  of 
the  Senate. 

The  choir  of  ladies  and  gentlemen,  who  kindly  volunteered  for  the  occasion, 
sang  with  fine  effect  two  sacred  anthems. 

Nearly  all  the  ladies  of  the  city  were  present,  and  the  hall  of  the  Capitol 
was  crowded. 

The  procession  was  at  least  a  half-mile  in  length,  and  composed  of  children, 
of  ladies  and  gentlemen  on  foot,  and  also  many  others  in  carriages  and  on  horse 
back.  It  proceeded  from  the  Capitol  down  Congress  Avenue,  and  then  by 
Pecan  Street  to  the  State  Cemetery,  where  the  grave  awaited  its  honored  tenant. 
There  was  no  sound  of  bells  or  of  music  heard  during  the  moving  of  the  pro 
cession,  though  the  unheard  voices  of  many  hearts  chanted  the  virtues  end  the 
valor  of  the  dead.  Dr.  Robertson,  Captain  William  Walsh,  and  Mr.  Thornton, 
and  other  gentlemen,  kindly  assisted  in  forming  the  procession.  Upon  the  whole, 
the  ceremonies  were  exceedingly  impressive,  and  as  well  calculated  to  paint  the 
scene  on  the  memory  of  the  beholders  as  if  there  had  been  a  parade,  a  pro 
gramme,  the  tolling  of  bells,  the  sound  of  martial  music,  and  a  well-pronounced 
eulogy.  Silence  is  sometimes  more  eloquent  than  words. 

His  restless  life,  as  has  been  seen,  was  not  succeeded  by  quiet 
sepulture.  Borne  from  the  field  of  victory  and  death  to  a  distant 
though  friendly  city,  when  his  mourning  State  came  to  ask  for  his 
ashes,  her  pious  task  was  interrupted  and  the  sacred  rites  broken 

1  From  verses  written  on  another  occasion  by  Colonel  Theodore  O'Hara,  one  of  Gen 
eral  Johnston's  staff. 


MONUMENT  AT  NEW  ORLEANS.  715 

in   upon   by   an   unjust   and   unlawful    military   order.      Yet,  for  all 
this— 

"  After  life's  fitful  fever  he  sleeps  well." 

The  people  of  New  Orleans  have  continued  to  do  honor  to  the 
memory  of  General  Johnston.  On  the  10th  of  April,  1874,  the  Con 
federate  Tomb,  completed  by  the  Ladies'  Benevolent  Association  of 
New  Orleans  in  Greenwood  Cemetery,  was  unveiled.  It  is  a  mauso 
leum  of  masonry,  fifteen  feet  square  and  six  feet  high,  with  sloping 
sides,  turfed.  It  is  surmounted  by  a  granite  gallery,  eight  feet  square, 
in  the  centre  of  which  stands  a  marble  pedestal  nine  feet  high. 
On  this  stands  the  statue  of  a  Confederate  soldier,  fully  armed,  in  the 
attitude  of  an  outpost  sentinel.  It  is  of  Carrara  marble,  and  is  seven 
feet  in  height.  It  is  said  to  be  a  work  of  rare  excellence.  On  the  four 
sides  of  the  monument  are  placed  busts :  General  Polk  on  the  east  side, 
General  Lee  on  the  south,  General  Jackson  on  the  west,  and  General 
Johnston  on  the  north.  After  solemn  prayer  by  Dr.  Palmer,  and  an  elo 
quent  oration  from  Mr.  H.  N.  Ogden,  the  monument  was  unveiled.  It 
is  a  great  honor  to  be  cherished  in  the  hearts  and  memories  of  the 
people  who  erected  this  monument. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

THE    END. 

IT  has  been  the  writer's  aim  in  this  biography  to  let  a  truthful  nar 
rative  of  facts  reveal  the  character  of  its  subject.  He  has  not  been 
prepossessed  with  any  especial  ideal  to  which  he  has  striven  to  conform 
General  Johnston's  acts  or  motives.  Whatsoever  of  error  or  incon 
sistency  these  facts  may  exhibit  in  a  character  very  simple  and  noble 
— let  it  stand.  Although  the  writer  has  made  a  study  of  General 
Johnston's  life,  in  a  spirit  and  temper  which  he  hopes  has  been  as 
nearly  judicial  as  was  possible  under  the  circumstances,  yet  he  is  aware 
that  his  relations  were  too  close,  and  his  attachment  too  strong,  to  offer 
an  impartial  portrait  of  the  man.  Hence,  he  has  chosen,  often  at  the 
cost  of  brevity  and  with  the  sacrifice  of  artistic  effect,  to  speak,  where 
it  was  possible,  in  the  words  of  others.  Delicacy,  or  rather  fairness, 
seemed  to  require  that  the  evidence  for  his  opinions,  instead  of  merely 
his  conclusions,  should  be  laid  before  the  reader.  This  has  been  done  ; 
and  he  who  has  read  these  pages  has  a  better  conception  of  what  Gen 
eral  Johnston  really  was  than  the  most  labored  characterization  could 


716  THE  END. 

give.  Nevertheless,  it  may  not  be  deemed  amiss  that  he  should  now 
supplement  this  memoir  with  some  incidents  and  anecdotes  which  have 
not  fallen  into  place  in  the  course  of  the  narrative,  and  with  some  esti 
mates  of  its  subject  which  have  not  been  included  in  the  body  of  the 
work. 

Immediately  after  General  Johnston's  death  the  opinion  prevailed 
that  the  unjust  censures  of  the  press  and  people  had  driven  him  to  des 
peration,  and  that  he  had  lost  his  life  through  reckless  exposure.  The 
idea,  originally  suggested  by  popular  regret,  could  only  be  held  by 
those  unacquainted  with  the  facts  and  with  the  serene  strength  of  his 
character.  It  is  believed  that  it  has  effected  no  lodgment  in  the  public 
mind,  though  it  has  been  repeatedly  published.  His  staff,  and  many  of 
his  officers,  indignantly  contradicted  it  at  the  time,  and  since.  General 
Johnston  was  moved  solely  by  a  sense  of  duty  and  the  requirements  of 
the  situation.  He  held  his  own  life  at  no  higher  value  than  that  of  the 
humblest  private  in  the  ranks,  where  duty  called.  And  his  notion  of 
duty  was  that  of  a  soldier — that  general,  as  well  as  private,  ought  in 
battle  to  be  and  to  go  where  most  effective,  and  that  the  question  of 
danger  was  not  to  be  considered. 

Colonel  Munford,  in  his  address,  spoke  as  follows : 

The  impression  is  almost  universal  at  the  South  that  General  Johnston, 
stung  to  madness  by  the  bitterness  with  which  he  had  been  denounced,  reck 
lessly  exposed  bis  life.  Nothing  could  be  further  from  the  truth.  If  the  narra 
tive  of  simple  facts  already  given  is  not  sufficient,  other  proofs  are  abundant, 
and  in  justice  to  his  memory  shall  be  given. 

After  narrating  an  anecdote  already  given  (page  515),  illustrating 
General  Johnston's  perfect  confidence  in  the  result  of  the  campaign, 
Colonel  Munford  continues  : 

Another  reason  why  /  know  he  was  not  "affected  to  recklessness"  by  all 
this  clamor  is,  the  unflinching  firmness  with  which  the  President  stood  by  him 
from  its  outbreak,  and  General  Johnston's  perfect  knowledge  of  that  fact.  At 
Decatur,  Alabama,  the  day  before  we  left  for  Corinth,  the  general  handed  me 
for  perusal  two  private  letters  to  him  from  President  Davis,  assuring  him  of  bis 
continued  confidence  in  his  ultimate  triumphant  success,  and  of  the  resolute  pur 
pose  of  the  Government  to  sustain  him.  He  therefore  had  nothing  to  fear.  It 
was  in  reply  to  one  of  these  letters  from  the  President  that  he  used  those  noble 
words :  "  With  the  people  there  is  but  one  test  of  merit  in  my  profession,  tbat 
of  success.  It  is  a  hard  rule,  ~but  I  think  it  right."  Surely  the  man  who  thus 
felt,  and  thus  wrote  under  the  circumstances,  was  not  capable  of  being  made 
"  reckless."  It  will  be  noted,  too,  that  when  be  fell  a  most  brilliant  victory  was 
already  his,  and  every  motive  would  have  prompted  him  to  live.  He  did  not 
secure  himself  from  aoy  legitimate  danger,  but  at  no  moment  was  he  reckless, 
or  even  imprudent  in  unnecessarily  exposing  himself  to  injury.  The  pressure 
upon  Sidney  Johnston  was  from  no  selfish  thought  or  narrow  feeling,  but  from 


WAS  HE  RECKLESS?  717 

the  circumstances  under  ichicJi  he  had  "  ordered  the  battle  for  to-morrow  morn 
ing  at  daylight,"  and  the  disparity  of  his  forces  compared  with  those  of  the 
enemy.  If  with  a  thoroughly-trained  army,  under  skillful  leaders,  devotedly 
attached  to  their  chieftain,  and  accustomed  to  victory,  the  first  Napoleon  at 
Jena  excused  himself  for  taking  personal  risks,  by  saying,  "I  must  needs  see 
how  things  are  going,"  surely  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  at  Shiloh  will  not  be 
misinterpreted.  Surely,  there,  he  "  must  needs  see  how  things  icere  going"  !N"o, 
no,  he  fell  in  the  path  of  duty,  thinking  not  of  self. 

General  Preston  wrote  : 

I  felt  at  Shiloh,  when  your  father  fell,  that  our  last  hope  of  victory  perished, 
and  that  his  place  would  never  be  supplied. 

Major  Haydon,  in  his  "  Rough  Notes  on  Shiloh,"  says: 

Thus  fell  one  of  the  greatest  generals  of  the  age.  He  fell  where  heroes  like 
to  fall — in  the  arms  of  victory  upon  the  battle-field.  It  is  a  mistake  to  suppose 
that  the  censure  of  ignorant  men  about  his  recent  manoeuvres  drove  him  to  a 
rash  exposure  of  person.  In  this  battle  he  was  elated  from  the  very  beginning ; 
he  knew  that  victory  was  certain,  and  his  countenance  gleamed  with  the  en 
thusiasm  of  a  great  man  who  was  conscious  that  he  was  achieving  a  great  suc 
cess,  that  was  carrying  his  name  down  to  the  "latest  syllable  of  recorded  time." 

His  aide-de-camp,  Lieutenant  (afterward  Colonel)  T.  M.  Jack,  writ 
ing  to  Judge  Ballinger,  from  New  Orleans,  soon  after  the  battle,  thus 
closes  an  account  of  General  Johnston's  death  : 

How  much  of  manliness,  and  virtue,  and  patriotism,  and  heroism,  and  high 
resolve,  were  cut  down  by  that  random  ball !  There  was  no  rashness  or  des 
peration  in  his  conduct. 

He  regretted  certain  censures  against  him,  but  they  did  not  actuate  his 
motives,  or  affect  his  plans.  He  was  sustained  by  the  President.  He  had  the 
approval  of  his  military  brethren.  He  looked  with  confidence  to  the  final 
approbation  of  all  his  countrymen. 

On  the  field  of  battle,  and  in  the  hour  of  trial,  he  seemed  not  forgetful  that 
he  was  a  Texan,  remarking  that  Moore's  regiment  must  have  a  chance  at  the 
enemy,  and  specially  ordering  it  forward  to  the  attack. 

His  remains  lie  here  in  state,  to  be  placed  in  the  vault  to-morrow.  He  will 
no  doubt  be  buried  in  Texas.  He  once  remarked,  in  the  presence  of  his  military 
family,  that  he  desired  of  his  country  six  feet  of  Texas  soil.  Surely  that  noble 
State  will  be  all  the  nobler  with  such  bones  resting  in  its  bosom  ! 

Colonel  Jack,  in  a  letter  addressed  to  the  writer  in  1877,  says  : 

The  only  orders,  now  remembered,  which  I  carried  for  your  father  on  the 
field,  were  to  direct  Breckinridge  through  the  woods  and  to  place  him  in  line ; 
to  order  forward  a  Texas  regiment  to  an  effective  position ;  and  to  move  a  bat 
tery,  on  the  left,  so  as  to  play  on  a  point  where  the  enemy  offered  stubborn 
resistance.  Up  to  this  time  I  had  been  almost  constantly  with  him  on  all  parts 


718  THE  END. 

of  the  field.  In  the  execution  of  this  last  order,  I  was  separated  from  him ; 
and,  changing  his  position  with  the  changes  of  the  battle,  when  I  rejoined  him, 
he  had  already  received  the  fatal  ball,  and  his  life-blood  was  rapidly  flowing. 
Before  this  he  had  remarked  to  me,  slapping  his  thigh  and  smiling,  upon  a  spent 
ball  which  had  struck  and  stung  him. 

No  special  incident  of  the  battle  of  Shiloh  survives  in  my  memory  having  an 
important  bearing  on  the  general  result.  The  entire  scene  is,  of  course,  as  vivid 
as  of  yesterday;  the  advance;  the  forward  movement  of  troops,  quick  and 
eager  ;  the  line  of  battle  ;  the  shock  of  arms  ;  the  thundering  of  the  gunboats : 
the  retreating  lines  of  the  enemy ;  and  the  victorious  shouts  of  the  Confederate 
troops.  But  these  are  all  familiar  to  you  ;  and  so  are  the  conduct,  bearing,  ac 
tion,  and  appearance,  of  your  father  on  the  field — composed,  self -poised,  cheer 
ful,  and  confident  of  the  devotion  and  courage  of  his  men.  He  appears  to  me 
now,  as  he  did  then,  like  an  inspired  genius  of  battle  and  victory,  lit  up  and 
glowing  along  his  lines;  a  matchless  example  of  a  great  man  on  a  great  occa 
sion,  and  rising  loftily  and  steadily  to  all  the  duties  of  that  day  when  the  fate  of 
his  flag  and  the  cause  of  his  country  seemed  to  rest  upon  his  sword. 

The  following  extracts  are  taken  from  Colonel  Munford's  "  Histori 
cal  Address  before  the  Confederate  Association  of  Memphis,"  delivered 
November  21,  1871.  Though  an  account  has  been  elsewhere  given  of 
General  Johnston's  personal  appearance,  Colonel  Munford's  quick  ob 
servation  and  graphic  force  entitle  his  remarks  to  reproduction.  The 
writer  thinks  the  description  of  General  Johnston's  eyes  inaccurate. 
They  were  deep  set,  but  not  small  or  dull.  Heavily  shadowed  by  his 
brows,  they  were  wonderfully  calm  and  steady,  and  by  some  considered 
searching,  in  repose ;  but  under  excitement  they  flashed  with  an  elec 
tric  light,  which  changed  their  color  from  blue  to  gray : 

In  person  General  Johnston  was  tall,  square-shouldered,  full-chested,  and 
muscular.  He  was  neither  lean  nor  fat,  but  healthily  full,  without  grossness, 
indicating  great  bodily  strength.  His  bust  was  superb,  the  neck  and  head 
mounting  upward  from  the  shoulders  with  majestic  grace.  His  compact  jaws 
terminated  in  a  chin  somewhat  prominent  and  but  slightly  square,  above  which 
one  of  the  very  few  really  ornamental  mustaches  ever  worn  by  man  partly  con 
cealed,  but.  could  not  render  ferocious,  the  sweet  and  genial  expression  of  his 
mouth.  Over  this  stood  somewhat  boldly  forth  the  clear-cut  and  expanded 
nostrils  of  a  broad-based  nose  which,  slightly  inclining  upward,  grew  out  from 
beneath  his  prominently  developed  brow  where  thought  sat  as  upon  a  throne, 
His  full  and  angular  though  rounded  forehead  rose  upward  till  its  high  "wind 
ow's  peaks  "  were  lost  under  dark -brown  hair  a  little  mixed  with  gray,  extremely 
fine  and  wavy  almost  to  curls.  His  deep-set,  blue-gray 'eyes,  small,  and,  when 
unexcited,  somewhat  dull,  were  of  that  sort  which  Campbell  describes  as  ''melt 
ing  in  love  and  kindling  in  war."  Over  these  features  a  skin  naturally  soft, 
white,  and  clear,  though  now  slightly  bronzed  from  exposure,  completed  a  pict 
ure  of  more  than  ordinary  manly  beauty.  Courage  and  modesty,  intellect  and 
goodness,  cheerfully  divided  the  empire  over  his  expressive  face. 

When  absorbed  in  thought  his  head  leaned  forward  and  his  body  slightly 


MUNFOBD'S  EEMIXISCEXCES.  719 

bent.  At  all  other  times  he  was  strikingly  erect.  His  soldierly  port,  devoid 
of  stiffness,  was  characterized  by  a  dignified  and  benevolent  repose,  at  once 
calm,  self-poised,  simple,  and  unostentatious.  I  do  not  remember  a  man  filling 
high  position  so  utterly  uncontaminated  by  that  vulgar  "  divinity  which  doth 
hedge  a  king."  There  was,  in  both  his  appearance  and  bearing,  that  nameless 
something  which,  while  it  chastened  impertinence,  invited  confidence,  and  ren 
dered  even  the  humblest  at  perfect  ease  in  his  presence.  He  was  eminently 
approachable  to  everybody  of  every  rank  and  condition  in  life.  Neither  his 
movement  while  walking,  nor  his  manner  in  repose,  could  justly  be  called  awk 
ward,  yet  neither  was  light  and  airy ;  in  fact,  there  was  in  both  something  too 
ponderous  for  grace.  On  horseback  his  appearance  excited  universal  admira 
tion.  A  cavalier  by  instinct  and  training,  he  sat  upon  a  horse  as  if,  centaur- 
like,  he  had  grown  up  part  of  him.  Whenever  his  soldiers  caught  sight  of  him 
in  the  saddle  their  shouts  were  irrepressible. 

Ordinarily  his  conversation  was  grave,  the  style  being  simple,  vigorous,  and 
rigidly  concise.  His  manner  of  talking  was  slow,  measured,  and  thoughtful, 
evincing  an  anxious  care  to  choose  the  very  words  which  would  express  only 
his  exact  meaning.  From  this  care  to  say  just  the  thing  he  meant  he  never 
departed.  Still,  socially,  he  was  one  of  the  most  interesting  of  men.  His 
scholarship  was  ripe — his  knowledge  of  books,  of  men,  and  of  things,  was  ex 
tensive  and  varied.  His  views,  always  comprehensive  and  clear,  never  failed  in 
their  expression  to  rivet  attention  and  confer  pleasure.  To  his  cheerful  temper 
was  superadded  a  fund  of  the  richest  humor,  which  not  unfrequently  sparkled 
into  diamond-pointed  wit.  The  prominent  and  distinguishing  features  of  his  in 
tellect,  however,  were  an  intense  perception  and  realization  of  surrounding  cir 
cumstances  ;  a  power  of  analysis  which  no  complication  of  facts  could  baffle ;  a 
logical  accuracy  of  thought  which  could  follow  the  most  delicate  clew  through 
the  mazes  of  any  labyrinth ;  and  a  solid  judgment  which  correctly  estimated 
forces  and  values.  Of  the  use  of  these  faculties  he  was  perfect  master.  They 
were  thoroughly  disciplined — enlightened  by  extensive  knowledge,  and  per 
fected  by  a  larger  experience.  His  sound  sense,  therefore,  was  of  that  perfect 
kind  which  constitutes  wisdom. 

To  strangers,  his  intellectual  action  seemed  to  be  slow.  This  was  a  misap 
prehension,  requiring  for  its  correction  only  a  better  knowledge  of  the  man. 
In  communicating  his  thoughts  to  the  outer  world,  in  the  use  of  the  mere 
machinery  of  words,  he  was  simply  unready.  "Where  words  were  not  to  be 
used,  but  things  were  to  be  done ;  where  his  thoughts  were  to  be  translated 
directly  into  acts,  they  moved  with  all  the  quickness  and  force  of  the  electric 
ilash.  Of  oratorical  power  he  had  none.  Like  Moses,  he  was  "  slow  of  speech," 
and  could  write  better  than  he  spoke.  Some  men  can  both  speak  and  write 
greatly  above  their  true  intellectual  worth.  In  neither  could  Sidney  Johnston 
approach  the  very  high  mark  of  his  own,  and  he  was  fully  conscious  of  the  de 
fect.  In  counsel  he  was  always  great — in  action,  greater  still ;  as  at  Shiloh, 
where  in  penetrating  the  designs  of  the  enemy,  and  thwarting  them — in  seizing 
at  a  glance  the  decisive  points  of  the  battle-field,  and  concentrating  upon  them 
more  troops  than  could  be  opposed  to  him — in  grasping  his  army,  hurling  it  like 
a  thunderbolt  upon  the  foes  and  scattering  all  opposition  from  before  him — his 
genius  blazed  forth  in  all  its  full-orbed  splendor  and  glory.  In  his  short  career 
as  a  Confederate  general,  that  victory  is  his  greatest  monument.  Alas !  that 
the  "proud  temple  he  builded  there"  should  have  crumbled  into  dust  at  his 
47 


720  THE  EXD. 

death.  But  its  memory  and  his  will  live  in  the  bosoms  of  his  countrymen  as 
long  as  there  is  left  on  earth  one  true  Confederate  heart-beat.  To  these  high 
intellectual  gifts  was  united  a  large-hearted  goodness  of  which  he  was  "  full  as 
the  dew-drop  of  the  morning  beam."  Together  they  shed  upon  his  name  a  lus 
tre  belonging  of  right  only  to  the  immortals.  Such  was  Sidney  Johnston — the 
model  soldier,  gentleman,  and  patriot.  I  close  this  sketch  with  a  few  illustra 
tive  anecdotes.  * 

While  we  were  at  Bowling  Green,  a  man  claiming  to  hail  from  Nashville 
presented  himself  at  headquarters  and  inquired  for  me.  Being  shown  in,  he 
said  a  certain  friend  of  mine  had  directed  him  to  make  my  acquaintance,  as  he 
had  something  important  to  communicate.  I  soon  saw  he  only  desired  to  get 
into  communication  with  the  general,  and  presented  him.  He  was  a  glib 
talker,  but  had  a  countenance  at  once  acute,  sinister,  and  malignant.  I  saw 
the  general  fix  his  gaze  upon  him  as  the  fellow  went  on  to  tell  how  "  above  all 
earthly  things  he  had  the  Southern  cause  at  heart ;  that  he  believed  Andrew 
Johnson  was  the  most  dangerous  enemy  we  had  in  Tennessee,  if  not  in  the 
whole  South,  and  that  his  death  would  be  a  public  benefaction ;  that  he  knew 
just  where  he  was  in  Southeastern  Kentucky,  and  that  he  could  be  easily  dis 
posed  of  at  a  trifling  cost  of  money."  The  general  rose  up  and  said  :  "  Sir,  the 
Government  which  I  serve  meets  its  enemies  in  open  and  honorable  warfare. 
It  scorns  alike  the  assassin's  knife  and  the  debased  scoundrel  who  would  suggest 
its  use ! "  It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  add  that  there  was  a  vacant  seat  instanta 
neously  in  that  room.  The  general  turned  to  me  and  said,  "That  scoundrel 
wanted  me  to  bribe  him  to  assassinate  Andrew  Johnson." 

On  another  day,  while  riding,  we  came  unexpectedly  upon  a  colonel  who 
was  a  West-Pointer,  and  had  made  a  most  favorable  impression  at  headquarters. 

He  was  in  the  midst  of  a  portion  of  his  regiment,  cursing  and  d ning  the  men 

at  a  furious  rate.  After  we  had  passed,  the  general  remarked :  "  That  man  has 
not  as  much  sense  as  I  had  believed ;  he  does  not  know  how  to  command  men. 
It  is  an  error  to  suppose  it  can  be  done  by  fear.  The  true  secret  of  command 
lies  in  the  exercise  of  moderation,  united  with  superior  sense  and  justice.  No 
man  can  command  others  with  permanent  success  unless  he  has  learned  to  com 
mand  himself.  N"or  is  this  a  regular  army ;  these  are  people  who  have  left 
their  homes  to  fight  for  their  independence.  All  they  require  is  a  little  patient 
instruction."  And  few  officers  know  this. 

General  Johnston's  piety  was  a  principle.  I  shall  not  discuss,  with  those 
who  see  nothing  but  impiety  in  others  who  do  not  adopt  their  cherished  dog 
mas,  whether  or  not  his  views  were  orthodox.  I  know,  however,  that  his  piety 
was  deep  and  sincere,  and,  as  illustrative  of  this  trait,  state  that  he  and  myself 
had  been  at  work  till  long  after  midnight,  when  he  proposed  to  me  to  "adjourn 
to  his  bedroom,  take  a  drink,  say  our  prayers,  and  go  to  sleep."  I  told  him  I 
would  take  that  night  a  glass  of  water,  and  feared  he  would  find  me  no  better 
at  praying  than  drinking.  He  bent  on  me  a  look  of  almost  paternal  tenderness, 
and  said  solemnly, '"  I  never  lay  my  head  upon  my  pillow  at  night  without  re 
turning  thanks  to  God  for  his  protecting  care,  and  invoking  his  guidance  in 
future." 

The  following  reminiscences  of  General  A.  S.  Johnston  were  fur 
nished  by  Rev.  R.  M.  Chapman  : 


REMINISCENCES   OF  REV.  R.   M.   CHAPMAN.  721 

I  spent  the  first  half  of  the  year  1839  at  Houston,  Texas,  where  I  boarded  at 
the  house  of  Colonel  Gray,  in  company  with  President  Lamar,  General  A.  S. 
Johnston,  Secretary  of  "War  in  Lamar's  cabinet,  and  several  other  distinguished 
gentlemen.  The  opportunity  thus  afforded  me  of  seeing  much  of  General  John 
ston  was  enhanced  by  his  kindness  in  conversing  with  ine  often  in  a  manner  less 
public  than  at  a  large  table.  Of  that  kindness  I  have  ever  retained  a  most  grate 
ful  remembrance,  in  connection  with  a  profound  admiration  of  the  nobleness  of 
his  character.  Especially  do  I  cherish  in  my  memory  his  last  words  to  me. 

When  the  time  came  for  me  to  go  away,  I  was  undetermined  whether  or  not 
I  should  return  to  make  my  permanent  residence  in  Texas.  In  taking  leave  of 
me,  General  Johnston  pressed  my  hand  and  said  :  "  Come  back  ;  and,  if  I  have 
only  a  blanket,  you  shall  have  half  of  it." 

It  was  in  the  spring  of  that  year  that  Bishop  Polk,  then  missionary  Bishop 
of  the  Southwest,  made  his  first  visitation  in  Texas.  During  his  stay  in  Houston 
he  was  entertained  at  Colonel  Gray's.  His  meeting  there  with  General  John 
ston  was  particularly  gratifying  to  them  both,  as  they  had  been  contemporaries 
at  West  Point,  and  for  a  part  of  the  time  room-mates. 

Of  course,  at  such  an  interview  (and  I  believe  it  was  the  first  they  had  had 
since  leaving  the  Academy),  no  topic  of  conversation  would  so  readily  present 
itself  as  recollections  of  their  student-life.  I  remember  one  exceedingly  inter 
esting  conversation  of  that  kind  which  they  had  one  day,  as  we  sat  on  the  porch 
after  dinner.  They  had  been  recalling  one  and  another  of  their  old  comrades, 
and  telling  what  each  knew  of  their  later  lives  and  fortunes,  when  the  bishop 
said,  in  an  impulsive  manner,  "  It  is  remarkable,  general,  that  out  of  the  three 
composing  our  staff  at  the  Point  two  are  in  the  ministry  and  you  are  left  alone." 
General  Johnston  was  affected  by  the  words,  and  replied,  with  evident  sensibil 
ity :  "  It  is  true,  bishop,  and  I  cannot  say  that  it  is  not  my  fault.  But  I  assure 
you  it  is  not  pride  or  any  such  thing  that  keeps  me  from  confessing  the  same 
faith.  If  I  could  be  convinced,  I  would  preach  from  the  house-tops."  To  this 
the  bishop  replied,  warmly,  "  I  know  you  would,  general — I  know  you  would." 

Shortly  after,  General  Johnston  left  us  to  go  to  his  office ;  and  then  Bishop 
Polk,  by  way  of  apology  for  his  confidence,  so  feelingly  expressed,  in  his  friend's 
sincerity  even  of  unbelief,  related  to  me  the  history  of  his  own  conversion. 

While  he  was  in  the  Academy  a  very  considerable  religious  awakening  oc 
curred  among  the  cadets  under  the  ministry,  as  chaplain,  of  the  Rev.  C.  P. 
Mcllvaine,  afterward  Bishop  of  Ohio.  Polk  was  one  of  the  first  to  feel  this  new 
concern,  and,  being  entirely  ignorant  of  the  first  principles  of  Christian  belief, 
he  set  to  work  to  inform  himself  on  the  subject,  beginning  with  the  study  of 
"Christian  Evidences." 

Johnston  had  no  feeling  in  the  matter,  but,  seeing  his  room-mate  so  deeply 
interested,  he  read  with  him  such  books  as  the  chaplain  put  into  their  hands. 

The  event  was  P  oik's  entire  satisfaction,  followed  by  his  joining  the  church, 
and  determination  to  leave  the  army  for  the  ministry,  which  he  did. 

Though  General  Johnston  paid  small  attention  to  dogmatic  theology, 
it  has  been  seen  that  he  was  deeply  impressed  with  certain  fundamental 
religious  truths,  and  that  his  religious  aspirations  were  simple,  as  they 
were  fervent  and  direct. 

During  General  Johnston's  residence  at  Austin,  the  Rev.  Edward 


722  THE  EXD. 

Fontaine  was  the  Episcopal  minister  at  that  place.  He  was  a  gentle 
man  of  culture,  of  military  education  (I  believe),  and  of  great  zeal  and 
enthusiasm.  He  saw  a  good  deal  of  General  Johnston,  and,  after  his 
death,  published  some  reminiscences  of  him  in  the  Jackson  Mississip- 
pian,  from  which  the  following  has  been  clipped : 

If  I  were  selected  by  the  South  to  award  the  palm  of  merit  to  the  most 
worthy  of  all  the  illustrious  dead  who  compose  "  the  noble  army  of  martyrs  " 
who  died  in  defense  of  our  constitutional  liberty,  I  would  lay  the  sacred  symbol 
of  peerless  excellence  upon  the  tomb  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston.  If  he  were 
living,  and  in  arms,  with  Stonewall  Jackson,  Robert  E.  Lee,  Joseph  E.  Johnston, 
and  Beauregard,  ready  to  take  the  field  again,  and  I  had  to  appoint  one  of  these 
illustrious  heroes  the  generalissimo  of  our  army,  I  would  not  hesitate  a  moment 
to  give  him  the  command  of  the  whole,  with  a  feeling  of  confidence  that  each 
one  of  them  would  obey  his  orders  willingly,  and  that  no  master  of  the  art  of 
war  could  improve  the  orders  he  would  give.  In  all  the  virtues  which  constitute 
the  true  patriot  and  chivalrous  hero,  these  idols  of  the  Southern  States  were 
endowed  by  Nature  with  equal  measures ;  and  whether  it  be  attributable  to 
blood  or  education,  or  both,  although  differing  widely  in  personal  appearance, 
they  will  be  exhibited  to  future  ages  by  history  as  much  alike  in  character.  Of 
all  his  living  compeers  among  our  country's  defenders,  General  A.  Sidney  John 
ston  resembled,  most  in  disposition  and  all  his  marked  characteristics,  his 
namesake,  General  Joseph  Eggleston  Johnston.  They  were  not  at  all  related  by 
blood  ;  but  two  men  were  never  more  alike  in  everything  except  perfonal  ap 
pearance.  General  Joseph  E.  Johnston  is  well  formed,  but  under  the  medium 
size.  His  head  is  unusually  large ;  and,  to  a  painter,  it  seems  a  little  out  of  pro 
portion  when  compared  with  his  body.  General  A.  Sidney  Johnston  was  a  very 
large  man — not  corpulent,  but  well  proportioned — and  weighed  at  least  two  hun 
dred  pounds.  He  would  have  been  observed  among  a  thousand  good-looking 
men,  as  one  formed  to  command  others.  His  was 

"  The  lofty  port,  the  distant  mien, 
Which  seems  to  shun  the  sight,  yet  awes  if  seen ; 
The  solemn  aspect  and  the  high-born  eye, 
That  checks  low  mirth,  yet  lacks  not  courtesy." 

The  eyes  of  our  living  hero,  I  believe,  are  dark  hazel.  Those  of  him  who 
fell  at  Shiloh,  while  lighting  his  hosts  to  victory,  were  like  those  of  Napoleon 
and  Washington — clear  gray.  They  were  deeply  set,  and  the  heavy  shadows  of 
the  projecting  brows  gave  them  a  dark-blue  shade.  Both  possessed  the  same 
temperament — full  of  fire,  but  so  smothered  by  perfect  self-control  that  few  of 
their  most  intimate  friends  have 'ever  witnessed  its  flashing  under  any  circum 
stances.  But  none  could  doubt  that  enough  of  it  was  embodied  to  make  its 
possessor  formidable  as  a  sleeping  lion  or  silent  volcano.  A  wife,  child,  or  ser 
vant,  or  intimate  associate  in  private  life,  might  be  with  General  Sidney  John 
ston  for  a  li-fetime  without  ever  discovering  the  slightest  manifestation  of  ill- 
temper.  It  has  been  said  that  "  no  man  appears  great  to  his  valet."  This  say 
ing,  which  might  have  been  true  when  applied  to  Charles  XII.,  Frederick  the 
Great,  or  the  Duke  of  Marlborough,  was  not  so  in  regard  to  him.  He  was  the 
same  great  man  in  private  and  public ;  and  it  was  his  unselfish,  generous  amia- 


REMINISCENCES  OF  REV.   E.   FONTAINE.  723 

bility,  liis  strict  regard  to  truth  and  justice,  his  warm  and  sympathetic  friend 
ship,  his  tender  regard  for  the  rights  and  sensibilities  of  others,  and  the  self- 
control  which  governed  his  words  and  actions,  which  made  his  companions  love 
him.  His  profound  learning,  his  strong  common-sense,  and  the  quickness,  clear 
ness,  and  the  originality  of  his  thoughts  upon  all  subjects,  excited  their  respect 
and  admiration. 

I  will  leave  to  the  historian  the  task  of  assigning  to  him  his  just  position 
among  men  as  a  public  servant  and  as  a  general ;  I  shall  speak  of  him  only  as  I 
saw  him  in  private  life,  and  mention  a  few  circumstances  which  will  perhaps 
illustrate  his  character. 

Soon  after  the  Mexican  War,  a  large  number  of  the  officers  of  the  United 
States  Army,  who  had  distinguished  themselves  and  received  promotion  for  their 
gallantry  during  that  struggle,  were  assembled  in  Austin,  where  General  John 
ston  was  then  stationed.  The  citizens  gave  these  heroes  a  splendid  ball.  But, 
when  the  company  met,  General  Johnston  was  absent,  and  his  presence  was 
considered  almost  indispensable  on  such  an  occasion.  The  committee  of  arrange 
ments  were  much  mortified  when  it  was  ascertained  that,  in  issuing  tickets  of  in 
vitation  to  the  officers  of  the  army,  they  had  forgotten  to  send  one  to  General 
Johnston.  They  were  greatly  embarrassed  to  know  how  to  apologize  to  him  for 
their  neglect.  The  truth  was,  that  he  had  lived  among  them  so  long,  and  there 
was  so  little  of  the  "pomp  and  circumstance"  of  the  officer  about  him,  that  he 
was  regarded  by  them  as  a  plain  citizen,  and  as  one  of  themselves ;  but  they  did 
not  know  how  he  would  be  pleased  with  such  an  excuse.  When  he  learned  the 
difficulty  he  was  evidently  much  gratified,  and  told  them  not  to  feel  in  the  least 
unpleasant  about  it,  as  they  had  paid  him,  without  intending  it,  a  high  compliment. 

Rev.  Mr.  Fontaine  also  relates  the  following  ancedotes  : 

I  never  heard  Sidney  Johnston  make  a  public  speech.  His  modesty  made 
him  averse  to  any  display  of  his  talents ;  but  he  was  highly  gifted  in  conversa 
tion  ;  and,  whether  his  companions  were  ladies  or  gentlemen,  he  never  failed  to 
amuse  and  to  instruct  them.  He  spoke  fluently  but  deliberately,  and  always 
used  the  most  correct  and  appropriate  words  to  express  his  ideas.  In  the  course 
of  many  years,  in  camp,  in  garrison,  in  his  own  parlor,  and  while  traveling  with 
him  through  the  wilds  of  Texas,  I  never  heard  him  say  a  rude  or  silly  thing,  or 
utter  an  expression  obnoxious  to  the  most  refined  Christian  lady.  Yet  his  con 
versation  abounded  with  anecdotes,  and  was  spiced  with  wit  and  humor.  His 
knowledge  of  ancient  and  modern  history,  and  especially  that  of  our  country, 
was  thorough  ;  and  his  acquaintance  with  every  department  of  natural  science 
was  very  extensive.  He  was  particularly  fond  of  discussing  the  merits  of  all 
the  recent  discoveries  in  geology,  and  the  various  branches  of  natural  history. 

I  recollect  an  incident  which  will  give  you  some  idea  of  his  humor :  A 
clerical  friend,  who  was  often  his  companion  in  his  angling-excursions  in  the 
Colorado  bottom,  brought  upon  himself  a  severe  attack  of  intermittent  fever  by 
indulging  too  freely  in  this  innocent  amusement  during  the  "dog-days."  Wad 
ing  in  the  cold  water  with  an  August  sun  burning  upon  his  head  at. noon,  and 
inhaling  the  miasmatic  vapor  from  the  decaying  moss  and  aquatic  plants  left 
dead  upon  the  sand-bars  of  the  river,  shrunk  within  its  narrowest  limits  in  the 
dry  season,  had  given  him  "the  chills."  The  general,  with  some  other  friends, 


724:  THE  END. 

called  to  see  him  during  his  illness.  One  of  them  asked  him  how  he  made  him 
self  sick.  He  replied  that  he  could  not  account  for  the  attack,  unless  it  had 
been  caused  by  getting  wet  in  Barton's  Creek  and  the  Colorado  River.  Gen 
eral  Johnston  then  said :  "  I  will  answer  your  question  for  my  friend.  I  know 
his  habits  well,  and  I  have  been  with  him  frequently  lately,  and  but  for  a  very 
strong  constitution  I  would  probably  be  now  in  his  condition;  but  he  is  a 
clergyman,  and  as  such  he  does  not  like  to  confess  that  he  has  made  himself  sick 
by  frequenting  too  much  low  places" 

He  was  a  regular  attendant  at  church;  but  I  never  knew  him  to  commune 
at  the  sacrament  of  the  Lord's  supper.  His  wife  was  a  very  pious  and  useful 
member  of  the  Episcopal  Church.  I  do  not  recollect  ever  to  have  heard  him 
express  his  opinion  upon  the  subject  of  religion  but  once.  I  dined  with  him 
Sunday  after  preaching  a  sermon  upon  "  The  Doctrine  of  a  Special  Providence," 
to  which  he  listened  with  profound  attention.  After  dinner,  and  while  con 
versing  with  him  and  Mrs.  Johnston,  he  remarked:  "Your  sermon  to-day  in 
terested  me  very  much.  I  believe  firmly  in  the  doctrine  of  a  particular  Provi 
dence  which  directs  or  controls  the  destiny  of  the  worlds  or  atoms;  and  I  will 
relate  an  incident  in  my  own  life,  which,  with  many  others  of  a  similar  char 
acter,  has  confirmed  me  in  my  belief,  and  which  I  think  will  serve  to  illustrate 
the  truth  of  your  sermon.  As  the  paymaster  of  this  department  of  our  army, 
I  have  for  the  last  four  years  visited  Fort  Croghan,  Fort  Worth,  and  other  gar- 
gisons  in  Texas,  regularly  once  in  three  months,  to  pay  our  troops.  I  have  gen 
erally  had  the  same  escort  of  soldiers  whom  I  can  trust.  1  have  had  the  same 
ambulance,  the  same  mules,  and  the  same  driver;  and,  during  each  quarterly 
trip  between  Fort  Croghan  and  Fort  Worth,  I  have  invariably  camped  about 
one  hour  before  sunset  under  a  certain  post-oak  tree,  near  a  fine  spring,  at  the 
end  of  my  first  day's  journey  from  Fort  Croghan.  The  mules  were  so  accus 
tomed  to  the  spot  that,  whenever  I  reached  it,  they  went  to  the  oak-tree,  and 
turned  the  wagon  around  in  a  position  suitable  for  unloading  and  pitching  the 
tent  under  it.  I  used  the  body  of  the  tree  as  a  support  for  the  tent,  one  end  of 
which  was  fastened  to  it.  In  order  to  reach  this  camping-place  in  proper  time, 
I  was  in  the  habit  of  starting  punctually  at  eight  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  I 
do  not  remember  to  have  deviated  five  minutes  from  that  hour  in  four  years 
except  on  one  occasion.  The  ambulance  and  escort  were  all  ready  and  willing 
for  the  order  to  march.  But  I  sat  conversing  with  the  officers  and  ladies  of  the 
post  one  hour  later  than  usual.  I  remember  thinking  several  times  that  I  had 
better  be  off ;  but  I  felt  an  aversion  to  starting,  for  which  I  could  give  no  good 
reason.  At  length  I  found  that  I  had  idled  an  entire  hour,  and  gave  the  order 
to  move.  One  hour  later  than  usual,  traveling  four  miles  an  hour,  I  was  at  a 
distance  of  four  miles  from  the  camping-place  when  I  met  a  furious  storm  from 
the  northwest.  The  wind,  rain,  and  hail,  accompanied  with  tremendous  thunder 
and  incessant  lightning,  beat  full  in  our  faces  with  such  violence  that  I  was 
compelled  to  halt  in  the  prairie,  turn  the  front  of  the  ambulance  and  the  heads 
of  the  mules  from  the  storm,  and  remain  where  we  were  until  it  was  over.  It 
continued  until  late  in  the  night ;  and  we  remained  upon  the  spot  in  a  very  un 
comfortable  situation  until  the  next  morning.  As  soon  as  it  was  light,  I  ordered 
a  move  to  our  usual  camping-place,  where  there  was  plenty  of  wood  and  water, 
and  where  I  intended  to  breakfast.  In  an  hour  we  reached  it.  But  the  post-oak 
was  gone.  A  flash  of  lightning  had  shivered  it  in  fragments,  and  torn  many  of 


ANECDOTES.  725 

the  roots  of  it  out  of  the  ground ;  and  from  the  effects  of  the  terrible  stroke  I 
am  confident  that  I  should  have  been  killed,  and  all  with  me  would  have  perished, 
if  I  had  reached  it  at  the  usual  time,  and  if  the  tent  had  been  pitched  where  it 
had  been  once  in  every  three  months  for  four  years.  I  felt  truly  thankful  for 
my  escape.  Now,  sir,  I  can  only  account  for  it  in  this  way :  I  suppose,  uncon 
sciously  to  myself,  the  Great  and  all-pervading  Spirit  influenced  my  own  spirit, 
and  kept  me  employed  or  amused  in  conversation  at  Fort  Croghan.  It  was  neces 
sary  that  the  particular  spot  of  earth  where  I  usually  camped  should  be  electri 
fied  ;  but  it  was  not  necessary  that  I  should  then  be  killed.  Hence  a  Divine 
Providence  interrupted  the  regularity  of  my  movements,  and  saved  my  life." 

General  Johnston's  deliberation  is  illustrated  by  his  remark  to  a 
precipitate  friend  who  was  about  to  run  across  a  street  in  front  of  a 
carriage  driving  rapidly :  "  There  is  more  room  behind  that  carriage 
than  in  front  of  it." 

Dr.  D.  W.  Yandell,  General  Johnston's  medical  director,  furnishes 
the  following  incident : 

While  at  Corinth,  the  owner  of  a  drug-store,  living  in  Tennessee,  near  to 
Donelson,  represented  to  the  general  that  his  entire  stock  of  drugs  had  been 
taken  by  a  Confederate  quartermaster  for  the  use  of  his  command,  and  paid  for 
in  Confederate  money,  which  was  useless  to  him.  He  had  come  to  ask  the 
general  if  he  might  not  be  paid  at  least  its  equivalent  in  Tennessee  funds,  the 
difference  between  the  two  being  then  ten  or  fifteen  to  one.  General  Johnston 
requested  me  to  look  over  the  druggist's  account,  and  see  if  the  prices,  etc., 
were  honestly  stated.  He  said,  "  Scrutinize  every  item."  I  had  at  the  time  an 
experienced  druggist  acting  as  clerk  in  my  office.  He  examined  the  accounts 
and  found  them  square.  I  so  reported  to  the  general.  He  directed  his  quarter 
master  to  take  back  the  Confederate  money,  and  give  instead  its  equivalent  in 
Tennessee  currency,  remarking  to  me  at  the  time,  "It  wouldn't  be  honest  to 
pay  a  man  in  the  enemy's  lines  in  money  which  had  no  value  to  him." 

After  he  had  written  at  Tuscumbia,  Alabama,  his  report  of  the  operations 
of  the  army  from  Bowling  Green,  he  read  it  to  General  Preston  and  myself.  I 
was  struck  with  the  expression,  "Success  is  the  test  of  merit,"  and  objected  to 
its  use.  He  said,  "  Well,  critically  perhaps  it  is  not  correct,  but,  as  the  world 
goes,  it  is  true,  and  I  am  going  to  let  it  stand." 

The  following  brief  and  discriminating  description  is  an  extract 
from  an  article  in  Harper's  Weekly,  published  at  the  time  of  the  Utah 
Expedition : 

Colonel  Johnston  is  now  in  the  matured  vigor  of  manhood.  He  is  above  six 
feet  in  height,  strongly  and  powerfully  formed,  with  a  grave,  dignified,  and 
commanding  presence.  His  features  are  strongly  marked,  showing  his  Scottish 
lineage,  and  denote  great  resolution  and  composure  of  character.  His  com 
plexion,  naturally  fair,  is,  from  exposure,  a  deep  brown.  His  habits  are  ab 
stemious  and  temperate,  and  no  excess  has  impaired  his  powerful  constitution. 
His  mind  is  clear,  strong,  and  well  cultivated.  His  manner  is  courteous,  but 
rather  grave  and  silent.  He  has  many  devoted  friends,  but  they  have  been  won 
and  secured  rather  by  the  native  dignity  and  nobility  of  his  character  than  by 


726  THE  END. 

his  powers  of  address.  He  is  a  man  of  strong  will  and  ardent  temper,  but  his 
whole  bearing  testifies  the  self-control  he  has  acquired.  As  a  soldier  he  stands 
very  high  in  the  opinion  of  the  army.  As  an  instance  of  this  it  may  be  men 
tioned  that,  in  a  large  assembly  of  officers  and  gentlemen,  the  gallant  and  im 
petuous  Worth,  when  asked  who  was  the  best  soldier  he  had  ever  known,  re 
plied,  "  I  consider  Sidney  Johnston  the  best  soldier  I  ever  knew." 

Colonel  Thomas  F.  McKinney,  the  Robert  Morris  of  the  Texan  Rev 
olution,  in  a  letter  from  Austin,  dated  December  28, 1872,  writes  thus  : 

General  Johnston's  life  will  be  a  difficult  one  to  write,  as  in  his  action  he- 
was  always  up  to  the  full  measure  of  purity,  excellence,  and  high  moral  tone. 
It  has  often  been  remarked  that  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  possessed  more- 
good  and  high  qualities,  in  an  eminent  degree,  than  any  man  we  have  ever 
known ;  and,  though  I  have  heard  it  repeatedly  said  where  many  were  present, 
no  one  was  ever  found  who  did  not  approve  the  assertion. 

General  Johnston's  ability  and  conduct  were  recognized  by  some 
persons  and  public  journals  at  the  North,  even  through  the  white  heat 
of  civil  war.  A  San  Francisco  paper  said  : 

THE  LATE  GENEKAL  A.  S.  JOHNSTON. 

Elsewhere  in  our  columns  will  be  found  the  message  from  Jeff  Davis  to 
the  Confederate  Congress,  notifying  that  body  of  "the  irreparable  loss"  sus 
tained  by  the  South,  in  the  death  of  the  above-named  distinguished  officer. 

Those  of  our  citizens  who  had  the  pleasure  of  his  acquaintance  during  his 
brief  sojourn  in  our  city  will  truly  grieve  for  his  untimely  end. 

From  an  able  and  dispassionate  article  in  the  New  York  Times,  re 
viewing  the  career  of  General  Johnston,  we  take  the  following  ex 
tracts  : 

He  was  the  man  who,  of  all  others,  had  been  until  lately  looked  upon  in  the 
South  as  a  commander  without  a  peer  for  active  field-work — combining  in  him 
self  science,  skill,  daring,  coolness,  resoluteness,  experience,  and  whatever  other 
characteristics  or  elements  of  success  are  supposed  to  belong  to  a  great  leader. 
This  was  the  fourth  war  in  which  he  had  seen  and  done  service ;  and  in  each  of 
the  previous  wars  he  had  gained  only  renown  and  achieved  always  success. 
...  He  perpetually  threatened  our  army  with  assault  and  annihilation,  kept 
Louisville,  and  even  Cincinnati,  for  a  time,  in  a  state  of  perturbation,  and  de 
layed  the  progress  of  our  arms  until  it  seemed  his  end  was  on  the  eve  of  accom 
plishment. 

Speaking  of  the  battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing,  the  New  York  Times 
also  said  : 

It  is  clear  that,  while  the  rebel  generalship  of  Sunday  was  the  best,  and  ours 
of  that  day  all  but  the  worst  ever  seen  on  this  continent,  the  steady  valor  of 
most  of  our  soldiers  and  the  gallant  bearing  of  their  officers,  converted  what 
would  naturally  have  been  a  terrible  Union  disaster  into  a  decided  Union  victory. 


DR.   GALLEHER'S  LETTER.  727 

And,  again,  the  Times  declared  that  "  the  rebels,  led  by  their  very 
ablest  General,  Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  were  pressing  30,000  disor 
ganized  Unionists  down  a  steep  bluff  to  a  deep  river,  in  which  the  great 
mass  of  them  must  have  been  drowned,  but  for  the  timely  arrival  of 
two  gunboats." 

The  writer  having  found  among  General  Johnston's  papers  a  very 
complimentary  testimonial  to  the  services  of  Colonel  John  N.  Galleher 
so  well  and  favorably  known  as  General  Buckner's  chief  of  staff,  sent 
it  to  him.  Colonel  Galleher,  who  has,  since  the  war,  entered  the  min 
istry  of  the  Protestant  Episcopal  Church,  replied  in  the  following  note : 

BALTIMORE,  December  12, 1572. 

MY  DEAR  COLONEL  :  Your  note,  with  the  inclosure,  reached  me  this  morn 
ing.  Please  accept  my  warm  acknowledgments  for  your  thoughtful  kindness. 
The  document  is  one  that  I  shall  treasure  always  as  a  testimony  of  your  honored 
father's  kind  interest  in  me.  He  was  the  commander  to  whom  I  first  presented 
myself  at  the  opening  of  the  war,  and  from  him  I  sought  advice  as  to  the  selec 
tion  of  duty  in  the  army.  I  recall  distinctly  the  circumstances  of  my  interview 
with  him.  He  was  then  at  Columbus,  Kentucky,  his  headquarters,  on  a  hill 
overlooking  the  town  and  the  river.  As  I  climbed  the  hill  and  approached  the 
house,  I  began  to  feel  some  tremors,  and  was  almost  ready  to  turn  back  for  very 
diffidence,  and  fear  lest  he  should  be  annoyed.  But  I  went  on,  and  found  him 
in  his  office,  apparently  at  leisure.  At  first,  I  thought  there  was  something 
stern  and  severe  in  his  manner ;  but  it  was  only  the  deep  calmness  and  gravity 
which  wrapped  him  round  as  it  had  been  the  mantle  left  to  him  by  some  grand 
old  viking  who  knew  how  to  rule  himself  and  others.  When  I  had  told  him  that 
I  was  from  Mason  County,  he  spoke  with  evident  interest  of  his  birthplace  and 
mine,  asked  after  the  people  there  whom  he  remembered,  and  said  that  the 
topography  of  the  county  was  strangely  fresh  in  his  memory,  although  he  had 
long  been  absent.  He  was  extremely  kind,  and  relieved  me  of  my  embarrass 
ment  by  his  manner.  He  advised  me  to  repair  to  Bowling  Green,  where  the 
Kentucky  troops  were,  intimating  his  anticipation  that  active  work  with  the 
enemy  would  ere  long  be  found  somewhere  in  that  direction,  and  adding  that  he 
would  soon  be  there  himself.  I  went  away,  feeling  that  I  had  met  a  man 
in  whose  inspiring  presence  it  would  be  a  glorious  joy  to  suffer  any  hardship. 
He  had  magnetized  me  ;  and  to  this  hour  his  splendid  person  stands  out  in  my 
thought  as  the  incarnation  of  that  "  Confederacy  "  to  which  my  heart  yielded 
its  utmost  love  and  loyalty.  He  was  and  is  to  me  as  royal  Arthur  to  Eng 
land's  brave  romance.  Thus  reverencing  him,  and  remembering  him,  the  writ 
ten  words  which  connect  me  with  his  approbation  and  confidence  are  precious 
in  my  sight.  I  thank  you  for  them  again  and  again. 

Respectfully  yours, 

Colonel  WILLIAM  P.  JOHNSTON,  Lexington,  Virginia.  J.   N.    GALLEHER. 

Some  extracts  from  an  editorial  article  of  Colonel  J.  W.  Avery 
will  be  pardoned,  as  they  disclose  in  part  the  secret  of  General  John 
ston's  wonderful  influence  over  his  soldiers,  which  stirred  every  man 
with  the  conviction  that  he  was  under  the  eye  of  his  commander. 
This  gentleman  says  : 


728  THE  END. 

The  records  of  no  war  show  a  knightlier  warrior  than  the  one  whose  name 
heads  this  sketch.  We  may  be  pardoned  for  laying  a  leaf  upon  his  bloody  yet 
most  honorable  grave. 

He  was  the  first  general  to  whom  we  reported,  as  the  youthful  leader  of  a 
cavalry  band  of  gallant  Georgians.  We  had  raised  this  company,  and  it  was 
unarmed,  and  we  went  to  him  for  munitions. 

Passing  by  some  eulogy  by  the  author  on  General  Johnson's  forti 
tude  in  the  retreat  from  Nashville,  and  compliments  to  the  affability  of 
his  staff,  we  come  to  his  description  of  General  Johnston : 

General  Johnston  reminded  us  of  the  pictures  of  Washington.  He  was  very 
large  and  massive  in  figure,  and  finely  proportioned.  He  measured  six  feet  two 
inches  in  height,  and  had  flesh  to  give  him  perfect  symmetry.  His  face  was 
large,  broad,  and  high,  and  beamed  with  a  look  of  striking  benignity.  His  feat 
ures  were  handsomely  moulded.  He  was  very  straight,  and  carried  himself  with 
grace  and  lofty  and  simple  dignity.  He  dressed  neatly,  but  always  in  full  Con 
federate-gray  general's  uniform,  that  suited  him  admirably.  His  whole  appear 
ance  indicated,  in  a  marked  degree,  power,  decision,  serenity,  thought,  benevo 
lence.  We  thought  him  then  at  first  flush,  and  thought  it  unvaryingly  afterward, 
and  think  now,  in  the  hallowing  memory  of  his  noble  manhood,  made  sacred 
by  the  consecration  of  his  thrilling  and  heroic  death  for  the  Southern  cause,  that 
he  was  one  of  the  sweetest  and  most  august  men  we  ever  met.  His  character 
was  entrancing  in  its  pure  nobility.  We  thought  him  an  object  for  deep  venera 
tion  ;  and,  whenever  we  look  at  the  familiar  and  majestic  features  of  the  great 
Pater  Patrice,  we  always  think  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston. 

We  stated  our  name,  and  presented  our  introductory  note  from  General  Har- 
dee,  when,  greeting  us  courteously  and  kindly,  General  Johnston  requested  us 
to  be  seated.  It  was  pretty  early  in  the  war  then — in  November,  1862.  Old 
army-officers  were  wont  to  assume  much  pretension  and  style,  to  the  great  awe 
of  civilian  officers,  upon  whom  they  generally  looked  with  very  unconcealed  dis 
dain.  To  have  been  a  West-Pointer  was  the  grandest  of  earthly  accidents ;  and 
to  have  grown  up  an  unmilitary  civilian  was  an  unspeakable  and  ignominious 
misfortune.  It  will  be  remembered  how  many  of  the  first  class  lorded  it  over 
the  latter.  But  in  Johnston  there  was  none  of  it.  Simple  as  a  child,  unassum 
ing  and  modest  as  a  pure  woman,  he  affected  nothing  for  his  high  rank. 

We  were  inexperienced  in  tactics,  and  apprehensive,  though  ardent  in  the 
cause  and  eager  for  service.  We  told  this  to  the  general,  and  asked  him  to  deal 
gently  with  our  military  ignorance  in  consideration  of  our  zeal.  There  was 
something  in  his  manner  that  emboldened  confidence,  and,  when  we  got  through, 
nothing  could  exceed  the  fatherly  manner  with  which  he  replied,  encouraging, 
instructing,  and  assuring  us  of  his  kindness.  He  offered  to  help  us  with  his 
counsel,  or  otherwise ;  invited  us  to  call  on  him  at  any  time,  and,  giving  us 
necessary  orders,  we  left. 

It  was  that  gentle  politeness  that  won  everybody  who  approached  him,  and 
endeared  him  to  his  people.  Often,  afterward,  we  met  him  at  his  headquarters, 
and  in  the  field,  and  he  always  was  the  same  affable,  considerate,  fatherly  gen 
tleman,  inspiring  the  gravest  reverence,  winning  the  fondest  regard,  and  exciting 
the  highest  admiration. 


COLONEL  J.  W.  AVERY'S  REMINISCENCES.  729 

We  have  not  time  to  tell  all  the  incidents  of  our  experience  of  this  rare 
gentleman  and  great  captain.  We  never  knew  of  any  one  being  refused  admis 
sion  and  a  kindly  hearing,  and  we  venture  that  no  distinguished  leader  ever  left 
a  tenderer  personal  memory  than  Johnston. 

But  we  must  hasten  on  to  our  last  interview  with  him.  It  was  at  Corinth, 
Mississippi,  a  few  days  before  the  bloody  battle  of  Shiloh.  We  had  some  im 
portant  business,  and  rode  to  his  headquarters.  He  met  us  with  his  usual  cor 
diality,  but  stated  that,  in  consequence  of  very  pressing  matters,  he  would  be 
unable  to  give  us  his  personal  attention,  and  must,  for  once,  refer  us  to  his  adju 
tant-general;  but  that  we  must  not  feel  slighted,  and  he  would  always  be  glad 
to  see  us  hereafter  with  the  same  freedom. 

The  consideration  of  his  manner  and  remarks  amid  the  engrossing  occupation 
of  preparing  that  great  movement  to  Shiloh,  upon  which  he  depended  so  much 
to  retrieve  the  disasters  of  Donelson  and  Nashville,  prove  how  thorough  a  gen 
tleman  he  was,  and  how  kindly  was  his  heart.  He  bade  us  good-morning  with 
a  friendly  grasp  of  the  hand,  and  we  never  spoke  to  him  again. 

That  mighty  struggle  at  Shiloh  came  on.  We  saw  him  once  in  the  dread 
carnage,  flashing  across  the  field,  the  incarnation  of  the  splendid  warrior.  He 
always  rode  large  and  magnificent  horses.  His  favorite  steed  was  a  gray;  and 
when  he  was  mounted  upon  the  noble  animal  he  was  the  Tjeau-ideal  of  a  general. 
His  firm,  graceful  seat  in  the  saddle,  his  majestic  proportions,  his  soldierly 
carriage,  his  handsome  uniform,  his  noble  countenance,  the  radiant  bearing  of 
knightly  chivalry  that  marked  every  movement  and  feature,  all  leave  a  proud 
remembrance  of  gallant  and  striking  manhood,  for  those  to  dwell  upon  who 
knew  and  loved  him. 

He  was  killed  about  twelve  o'clock  in  the  first  day's  fight.  His  death  was 
kept  concealed  from  the  army,  as  it  was  feared  it  would  dampen  their  ardor  and 
chill  their  confidence. 

But  when  it  was  known — near  the  close  of  the  second  day's  battle — it  cast  a 
gloom  that  fell  over  every  heart.  And  coming,  as  it  did,  with  the  dismal  order 
to  retreat,  a  sense  of  heavy  woe  pervaded  every  bosom.  How  that  fight  would 
have  ended  if  he  had  lived,  is  a  matter  of  speculation.  That  he  would  have 
pushed  the  first  day's  advantages  to  the  bitter  end  no  one  doubts.  Our  cavalry 
were  hurtling  resistlessly  upon  the  enemy's  shattered  fragment?,  huddled  on  the 
banks  of  the  river,  when  we  were  inexplicably  and  unwillingly  withdrawn. 
Xight  came.  Beenforcements  strengthened  the  foe.  Unusual  camp  luxuries 
demoralized  our  men;  and  the  next  evening,  crippled,  worn  out,  decimated,  our 
army  straggled  back  to  Corinth,  and  the  golden  chance  was  gone. 

That  stainless  and  imperial  blood  was  shed  only  to  illustrate  a  cause  it  failed 
to  win.  And,  in  coming  days,  when  the  historian  sits  to  write  what  will  be  the 
fair  chronicles  of  the  turbulent  war  of  those  times,  he  will  lovingly  dwell  upon 
no  character  more  shining,  illustrious,  and  exalted — upon  no  hero  more  lumi 
nous  for  chivalry,  patriotism,  genius,  and  sublime  manhood — than  ALBEKT  SID 
NEY  JOHNSTON. 

General  W.  C.  Whitthorne  says,  March,  1876: 

Allow  me  to  say,  as  I  do  from  a  feeling  of  reverence  and  affection  for  the 
memory  of  your  father,  that  he  was  one  of  the  three  great  men  whom  it  has 


730  THE  END. 

been  my  fortune  in  life  to  meet.     His  death  was  the  severest  loss  the  Confed 
eracy  sustained  prior  to  its  ultimate  defeat. 

Mr.  J.  M.  Fairbanks  writes  that  he  was  a  lieutenant  of  engineers  in 
the  Confederate  army,  and  sends  the  following  anecdote  : 

I  was  chief  clerk  in  General  Hardee's  adjutant-general's  office,  and  confi 
dential  secretary  for  General  Hardee.  In  common  with  all  who  came  in  con 
tact  with  your  father,  I  was  inspired  by  the  highest  respect  and  veneration  for 
his  noble  character. 

Just  before  the  main  attack  at  "  Shiloh,"  a  countryman,  who  had  been  in 
tercepted  between  the  lines,  was  placed  in  my  charge,  with  directions  by  Gen 
eral  Hardee  to  conduct  him  to  General  Johnston.  On  reaching  him,  he  asked 
a  few  questions  of  the  man.  "How  many  troops  have  the  enemy?"  "Oh, 
many  thousands,"  replied  the  man.  "  Do  you  think  they  have  100,000  men? " 
asked  the  general.  U0h,  yes,"  was  the  reply.  "They  won't  be  a  mouthful 
for  us !  "  remarked  the  general,  smiling. 

At  that  moment  he  was  watching  with  great  anxiety  the  progress  of  our 
line  of  battle,  across  an  open  field,  expecting  any  moment  when  fire  would  be 
opened  from  the  woods  on  the  other  side.  This  was  the  last  time  I  saw  him 
alive,  and  his  appearance  then  is  stamped  on  my  memory. 

Hon.  Jefferson  Davis  told  the  writer  that  Mr.  Buchanan  asked  him 
if  he  could  advise  him  who  was  the  best  man  to  appoint  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  Utah  Expedition.  He  recommended  General  Johnston. 
"But  if  not  Johnston,  who  then?"  inquired  the  President.  "Persifer 
F.  Smith,  if  his  health  will  allow,"  answered  Mr.  Davis.  "Whom  else 
could  you  recommend,  if  neither  of  these  could  be  sent?"  asked  the 
President.  "  Robert  E.  Lee."  Mr.  Buchanan  then  said,  "  Do  you  and 
General  Scott  ever  by  any  possibility  agree?"  "I  should  not  like  to 
think  that  I  did  not  often  agree  on  military  affairs  with  a  man  of 
General  Scott's  experience,"  replied  Mr.  Davis.  "  Well,"  said  Mr. 
Buchanan,"  you  have  named  the  same  persons  for  this  service,  though 
not  in  the  same  order." 

Judge  William  P.  Ballinger,  of  Galveston,  Texas,  writing  in  1873 
of  General  Johnston,  says : 

His  impression  on  me  was  very  strong  and  lasting.  I  was  a  boy  of  eighteen, 
and  your  father  was  the  first  great  man  I  was  ever  thrown  in  association  with. 
I  saw  a  great  deal  of  him  for  several  years — I  was  his  adjutant  in  Mexico.  Since 
then  I  have  met  a  number  of  the  so-called  great  men  of  the  day.  Very  few  have 
excited  in  me  any  high  degree  of  admiration.  But  I  have  a  veneration  for  your 
father  that  classes  him  with  the  very  loftiest  historical  foau-ideals.  If  I  were  to 
construct  a  Parthenon  for  perfect  nobility,  lofty,  true,  genuine,  pure,  undeviat- 

iug—  • 

"  Standing  four  square 
'Gainst  all  the  winds  that  blow  " — 

his  would  be  the  statue  enshrined. 


FRIENDLY  ESTIMATES.  731 

Colonel  Wharton  J.  Green,  of  North  Carolina,  some  anecdotes  from 
whose  pen  have  already  been  inserted  in  this  memoir,  in  a  letter  to  the 
present  writer  says,  in  regard  to  General  Johnston : 

Portray  him  as  he  was — great,  good,  single-minded,  and  simple.  He  was  the 
devotee  of  duty,  but  disposed  to  soften  its  asperities  to  others.  His  was  a  char 
acter  with  few  counterparts  in  ancient  or  modern  story.  It  has  been  said  that 
the  noblest  eulogy  ever  written  consisted  of  a  single  word — "the  just.'1  All 
who  ever  knew  General  Johnston  will  confirm  that  he  was  as  well  entitled  to 
that  epithet  as  the  old  Athenian,  and,  coupled  with  it,  to  another,  uthe  gen 
erous."  Talleyrand's  saying,  "No  man  is  a  hero  to  his  valet,"  is  true  in  the 
main ;  but  General  Johnston  would  have  been  a  hero  to  his  very  shadow.  Those 
who  knew  him  best  admired  him  most.  His  peerless,  blameless  life  was  long 
enough  for  glory  ;  and  but  one  brief  day,  perhaps  one  hour  only,  too  short  for 
liberty.  One  hour  more  for  him  in  the  saddle, -and  the  Confederate  States 
would  have  taken  their  place  at  the  council-board  of  the  nations. 

Governor  Harris  thus  notes  some  of  the  points  he  had  observed  in 
General  Johnston  in  the  last  half-year  of  his  life : 

From  the  day  that  General  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  assumed  command  of 
the  Department  of  the  West,  in  September,  1861,  to  the  moment  of  his  death, 
I  was  in  almost  constant  intercourse  with  him,  either  in  personal  consultation  or 
correspondence  by  letter  or  telegram. 

Our  official  positions  necessarily  brought  us  in  contact,  and  official  inter 
course  soon  warmed  into  personal  friendship,  and,  on  my  part,  into  decided  ad 
miration  for  the  great  ability,  unselfish  and  self-sacrificing  patriotism,  and  exalted 
chivalry,  of  the  general. 

I  was  with  him  when  the  telegram  announced  the  surrender  of  the  Confed 
erate  forces  at  Donelson,  and  had  occasion  to  admire  the  philosophic  heroism 
with  which  he  met,  not  only  the  disaster,  but  the  unjust  censure  and  complaints 
of  both  army  and  people,  the  coolness  and  energy  with  which  he  set  about  the 
work  of  reorganizing  the  remnant  of  his  army,  and  the  establishment  of  a  new 
and  different  line  of  defense.  I  was  with  him  most  of  the  time  of  his  retreat 
from  Nashville  to  Corinth,  and  was  not  unfrequently  astonished  at  the  coolness, 
vigilance,  and  untiring  energy  with  which  he  struggled  to  overcome  the  numer 
ous  obstacles  and  difficulties  which  surrounded  him. 

The  following  is  an  extract  from  Dr.  Craven's  "  Prison  Life  of  Mr. 
Davis  "  (page  210)  : 

Had  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  lived,  Mr.  Davis  was  of  opinion  our  [the  Federal] 
success  down  the  Mississippi  would  have  been  fatally  checked  at  Corinth.  This 
officer  best  realized  his  ideal  of  a  perfect  commander — large  in  view,  discreet  in 
council,  silent  as  to  his  own  plans,  observant  and  penetrative  of  the  enemy's, 
sudden  and  impetuous  in  action,  but  of  a  nerve  and  balance  of  judgment  which 
no  heat  of  danger  or  complexity  of  manoeuvre  could  upset  or  bewilder.  All 
that  Napoleon  said  of  Dessaix  and  Kleber,  save  the  slovenly  habits  of  one  of 
them,  might  be  combined  and  truthfully  said  of  Albert  Sidney  Johnston. 

President  Davis,  in  speaking  of  him  to  the  writer  in  August,  1862, 
said  his  consistency  of  action  and  conduct  differed  from  any  other  man's 


732  THE  END. 

he  ever  knew.  In  every  other  man  he  had  seen  inconsistency  ;  in  him, 
none.  He  said  his  was  the  only  arm  he  ever  felt  able  to  lean  upon  with 
entire  confidence.  It  was  a  severe  struggle  to  let  him  go  West — he 
wanted  him  as  Secretary  of  War — but  the  West  was  a  field  vast  and 
distant,  where  the  chief  must  act  without  advice  or  aid,  and  he  seemed 
the  only  man  equal  to  it. 

If  allowance  is  to  be  made  for  the  unlimited  confidence  of  Mr.  Davis 
in  General  Johnston,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  admiration  was 
mutual,  and  that  their  friendship  was  founded  on  long  and  intimate 
acquaintance,  and  tried  by  many  tests.  Alfriend,  in  his  "  Life  of  Da 
vis  "  (page  334),  says : 

Few  of  the  eminent  soldiers  who  had  sought  service  under  the  banners  of 
the  Confederacy  had  a  more  brilliant  record  of  actual  service ;  and  to  the  advan 
tages  of  reputation  General  Johnston  added  those  graces  and  distinctions  of 
person  with  which  the  imagination  invests  the  ideal  commander.  He  was  con 
siderably  past  middle  age,  his  height  exceeded  six  feet,  his  frame  was  large  and 
sinewy,  his  every  movement  and  posture  indicated  vigorous  and  athletic  man 
hood.  The  general  expression  of  his  striking  face  was  grave  and  composed,  but 
inviting  rather  than  austere. 

The  arrival  of  General  Johnston  in  Richmond,  early  in  September,  was  a 
source  of  peculiar  congratulation  to  President  Davis.  Between  these  illustrious 
men  had  existed  for  many  years  an  endearment,  born  of  close  association,  com 
mon  trials  and  triumphs,  and  mutual  confidence,  which  rendered  most  auspicious 
their  cooperation  in  the  cause  of  Southern  independence. 

The  late  Prof.  A.  T.  Bledsoe,  a  very  able  and  eminent  writer  and 
thinker,  in  one  of  his  publications,  says  : 

Albert  Sidney  Johnston,  who,  take  him  all  in  all,  was  the  simplest,  bravest, 
grandest  man  we  have  ever  known,  once  said  to  the  present  writer,  "  There  is  no 
measuring  such  a  man  as  Davis ;  "  and  this  high  tribute  had  a  fitting  counterpart 
in  that  which  Davis  paid  Johnston,  wben  discussing  in  the  Federal  Senate  the 
Utah  Expedition.  . 

This  tribute  has  been  already  quoted. 

General  Richard  Taylor,  in  the  advanced  sheets  of  his  "  Reminis 
cences,"  published  March,  1878,  in  the  "Southern  Historical  Society 
Papers,"  says : 

SHILOH. 

Shiloh  was  a  great  misfortune.  At  the  moment  of  his  fall,  Sidney  Johnston, 
with  all  the  energy  of  his  nature,  was  pressing  on  the  routed  foe.  Crouching 
under  the  bank  of  the  Tennessee  River,  Grant  was  helpless.  One  short  hour 
more  of  life  to  Johnston  would  have  completed  his  destruction.  The  second  in 
command — Beauregard — was  on  another  and  distant  part  of  the  field,  and,  before 
he  could  gather  the  reins  of  direction,  darkness  fell  and  stopped  the  pursuit. 
During  the  night  Buell  reached  the  northern  bank  of  the  river  and  crossed  his 
troops.  Wallace,  with  a  fresh  division  from  below,  got  up.  Together  they  ad 
vanced  in  the  morning,  found  the  Confederates  rioting  in  the  plunder  of  captured 


GENERAL  R.  TAYLOR'S  ESTIMATE.  733 

camps,  and  drove  them  back  with  loss.  But  all  this  was  as  nothing  compared 
with  the  calamity  of  Johnston's  death.  Educated  at  West  Point,  Johnston 
remained  in  the  United  States  Army  for  eight  years,  and  acquired  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  details  of  military  duty.  Resigning  to  aid  the  cause  of  the 
infant  Republic  of  Texas,  he  became  her  adjutant-general,  senior  brigadier,  and 
Secretary  at  War.  In  the  war  with  Mexico  he  raised  a  regiment  of  Texans  to 
join  General  Zachary  Taylor,  and  was  greatly  distinguished  in  the  fighting 
around  and  capture  of  Monterey.  General  Taylor,  with  whom  the  early  years 
of  his  service  had  been  passed,  declared  him  to  be  the  best  soldier  he  had  ever 
commanded.  More  than  once  I  have  heard  General  Zachary  Taylor  express  this 
opinion.  Two  cavalry  regiments  were  added  to  the  United  States  Army  in  1854, 
and  to  the  colonelcy  of  one  of  these  Johnston  was  appointed.  Subsequently,  a 
brigadier  by  brevet,  he  commanded  the  expedition  against  the  Mormons  in  Utah. 
Thus  he  brought  to  the  Southern  cause  a  civil  and  military  experience  far  sur 
passing  that  of  any  other  leader.  Born  in  Kentucky,  descended  from  an  honor 
able  colonial  race,  connected  by  marriage  with  influential  families  in  the  West, 
where  his  life  had  been  passed,  he  was  peculiarly  fitted  to  command  Western 
armies.  With  him  at  the  helm,  there  would  have  been  no  Vicksburg,  no  Mis 
sionary  Ridge,  no  Atlanta.  His  character  was  lofty  and  pure ;  his  presence  and 
demeanor  dignified  and  courteous,  with  the  simplicity  of  a  child ;  and  he  at  once 
inspired  the  respect  and  gained  the  confidence  of  cultivated  gentlemen  and  rug 
ged  frontiersmen.  Besides,  he  had  passed  through  the  furnace  of  ignorant 
newspapers,  hotter  than  that  of  the  Babylonian  tyrant.  Commanding  some 
raw,  unequipped  forces  at  Bowling  Green,  Kentucky,  the  accustomed  American 
exaggeration  represented  him  as  at  the  head  of  a  vast  army,  prepared  and  eager 
for  conquest.  Before  time  was  given  him  to  organize  and  train  his  men,  the 
absurdly-constructed  works  on  his  left  flank  were  captured.  At  Fort  Donelson, 
on  the  Cumberland,  were  certain  political  generals,  who,  with  a  self-abnegation 
worthy  of  Plutarch's  heroes,  were  anxious  to  get  away  and  leave  the  glory  and 
renown  of  defense  to  others.  Johnston  was  in  no  sense  responsible  for  the  con 
struction  of  these  forts,  nor  the  assignment  to  their  command  of  these  self- 
denying  warriors,  but  his  line  of  communication  was  uncovered  by  their  fall, 
and  he  was  compelled  to  retire  to  the  southern  bank  of  the  Tennessee  River. 
From  the  enlighteners  of  public  opinion  a  howl  of  wrath  came  forth.  Johnston, 
who  had  just  been  Alexander,  Hannibal,  Caesar,  Napoleon,  was  now  a  miserable 
dastard  and  traitor,  unfit  to  command  a  corporal's  guard !  President  Davis  sought 
to  console  him,  and  the  noblest  lines  ever  penned  by  man  were  written  by  John 
ston  in  reply.  They  even  wrung  tears  of  repentance  from  the  pachyderms  who 
had  attacked  him,  and  will  be  a  text  and  consolation  to  future  commanders  who 
serve  a  country  tolerant  of  an  ignorant  and  licentious  press.  As  pure  gold  he 
came  forth  from  the  furnace,  above  the  reach  of  slander,  the  foremost  man  of 
all  the  South;  and  had  it  been  possible  for  one  heart,  one  mind,  and  one  arm,  to 
save  her  cause,  she  lost  them  when  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  fell  on  the  field  of 
Shiloh.  As  soon  after  the  war  as  she  was  permitted,  the  Commonwealth  of 
Texas  removed  his  remains  from  Xew  Orleans,  to  inter  them  in  a  land  he  had 
long  and  faithfully  served.  I  was  honored  by  a  request  to  accompany  the  coffin 
from  the  cemetery  to  the  steamer,  and  as  I  gazed  upon  it  there  arose  the  feeling 
of  the  Theban  who,  after  the  downfall  of  the  glory  and  independence  of  his 
country,  stood  by  the  tomb  of  Epaminondas. 


734:  THE  EXD. 

The  following  has  been  sent  to  the  writer  from  New  Orleans  : 

No  eulogy  has  .been  composed,  no  tribute  has  been  rendered,  giving  more 
fitting  expression  to  the  lofty  qualities  that  marked  the  illustrious  dead,  when 
living,  than  the  following  beautiful  epitaph,  which  was  found  pasted  on  a  rough 
board  attached  to  the  tomb,  by  a  lady  passing  through  the  St.  Louis  Cemetery 
of  this  city,  and  which  was  first  published  in  the  New  Orleans  Times  : 

IN    MEMORIAM. 

BY   JOHN    B.    S.    DIMITRY,    OF    NEW    ORLEANS. 


BEHIND     THIS     STONE     IS     LAID,     FOR     A     SEASON, 

ALBERT  SIDNEY  JOHNSTON, 

A    GENEEAL   IN   THE   AEMT    OF    THE    CONFEDERATE    STATES, 

Who  fell  at  Shiloh,  Tennessee, 
On  the  sixth  day  of  April, 
Eighteen  hundred  and  sixty-two. 
A  man  tried  in  many  high  offices 
And  critical  Enterprises, 
And  found  faithful  in  all ; 
His  life  was  one  long  Sacrifice  of  Interest  to  Conscience; 

And  even  that  life,  on  a  woful  Sabbath, 
Did  he  yield  as  a  Holocaust  at  his  Country's  need. 
Not  wholly  understood  was  he  while  he  lived  ; 
But,  in  his  death,  his  Greatness  stands  confessed 

In  a  People's  tears. 

Kesolute,  moderate,  clear  of  envy,  yet  not  wanting 

In  that  finer  Ambition  which  makes  men  great  and  pure ; 

In  his  Honor — impregnable ; 

In  his  Simplicity — sublime; 

No  country  e'er  had  a  truer  Son — no  Cause  a  nobler  Champion ; 
No  People  a  bolder  Defender — no  Principle  a  purer  Victim, 
Than  the  dead  Soldier 

"Who  sleeps  here ! 

The  Cause  for  which  he  perished  is  lost — 
The  People  for  whom  he  fought  are  crushed — 
The  Hopes  in  which  he  trusted  are  shattered — 
The  Flag  he  loved  guides  no  more  the  charging  lines ; 
But  his  Fame,  consigned  to  the  keeping  of  that  Time  which, 
Happily,  is  not  so  much  the  Tomb  of  Virtue  as  its  Shrine, 
Shall,  in  the  years  to  come,  fire  Modest  Worth  to  Noble  Ends. 
In  honor,  now,  our  great  Captain  rests  ; 

A  bereaved  People  mourn  him ; 
Three  Commonwealths  proudly  claim  him  ; 

And  History  shall  cherish  him 

Among  those  Choicer  Spirits,  who,  holding  their  Conscience  unmixed  with  blame, 
Have  been,  in  all  Conjunctures,  true  to  themselves,  their  People,  and  their  God. 


A  SON'S  ESTIMATE.  735 

With  the  apology  already  offered  in  the  beginning  of  this  chapter, 
and  with  the  explanation  that  the  writer  does  not  profess  that  his  de 
lineation  is  unbiased,  he  ventures  to  call  attention  to  those  points  in 
General  Johnston's  character  which  struck  him  most  forcibly,  and  in 
the  contemplation  of  which  a  young  man  may  find  his  profit.  Let  this 
estimate  go  merely  as  the  writer's  filial  claim  for  General  Johnston  to 
certain  great  qualities  of  mind  and  soul,  unless  this  biography  has  made 
his  title  to  them  as  clear  as  day.  Wherein  he  is  not  justified  by  the 
facts,  the  reader  will  readily  perceive  that  he  errs,  and  lay  it  to  the 
frailty  of  our  common  humanity. 

There  is,  however,  one  relation  in  which  he  is  entitled  to  speak  with 
authority:  General  Johnston  was  to  him  not  only  a  tender  father,  but  a 
wise  counselor  and  a  safe  friend.  His  whole  conduct  was  marked  by 
kindness,  confidence,  and  unselfish  devotion.  In  all  their  intercourse, 
memory  can  recall  no  angry  word,  no  unkind  act,  not  even  a  harsh 
look,  to  sully  the  untarnished  record  of  mutual  affection.  Such  is  be 
lieved  to  be  the  experience  of  all  his  family. 

He  was  gentle  to  women  and  children  ;  tender  to  the  weak  and 
suffering,  gracious  to  subordinates  and  dependents,  just  and  magnani 
mous  to  equals  and  rivals,  respectful  to  superiors,  and  tolerant  to  all 
men.  Not  envious,  jealous,  or  suspicious ;  yet  so  high  strung  was  his 
spirit  that  he  could  ill-brook  personal  indignity  or  insult.  Such  was 
his  self-respect,  however,  that  he  rarely  had  to  check  a  want  of  respect 
in  others.  It  has  been  seen  with  what  patience  and  fortitude,  indeed 
with  what  serenity,  he  bore  private  griefs  and  public  contumely.  His 
nature,  his  education,  his  philosophy,  his  religion,  had  so  finely  tem 
pered  his  soul  that  at  last  he  had  in  him  no  fear,  except  of  doing 
wrong. 

He  had  no  love  for  and  little  need  of  money,  and  was  generous  and 
liberal  in  its  use.  In  matters  immaterial  he  was  facile  ;  in  things  of 
import,  scrupulous  and  just  ;  and  his  quick  intelligence  never  failed  to 
perceive  the  doubtful  dividing  line. 

Naturally  of  a  high,  courageous,  and  resolute  spirit,  he  found  it 
difficult  to  swerve  from  a  line  of  action  he  had  marked  out ;  and  the 
more  so,  because  his  opinions  were  formed  after  deliberation.  Yet, 
that  his  mental  processes  were  rapid  is  seen  by  the  decision  with 
which  he  acted.  He  was  not  proof  against  the  love  of  glory ;  but  in 
him  it  was  transmuted  to  a  fine  ambition  to  be  and  to  do,  not  simply 
to  seem.  Results  he  left  to  take  care  of  themselves,  if  only  he  could 
do  his  duty.  All  this  came  from  his  love  of  truth,  which  was  with  him 
a  passion.  He  sought  the  truth,  striving  to  know  it,  and  to  live  up  to 
it  in  greater  and  smaller  things.  Hence,  though  perceiving  that  suc 
cess  is  the  world's  test  of  merit,  he  could  square  his  acts  by  another 
standard. 

48 


736  THE  END. 

As  a  general,  his  tactics  were  skillful,  and  his  strategy  was  bold 
and  sagacious.  In  council,  he  was  enterprising,  yet  wary ;  in  assault, 
audacious,  impetuous,  and  unrelenting  ;  in  disaster,  tenacious,  resource 
ful,  and  composed.  While  he  knew  and  regarded  all  the  details  of  his 
profession,  his  skill  in  handling  large  bodies  of  troops  was  remarkable  ; 
and  he  grasped  with  ease  the  broadest  generalizations  of  war.  Time 
will  add  to  his  reputation  as  a  general.  Above  all,  his  life  and  char 
acter  were  self-contained,  perfectly  consistent,  and  complete  in  their 
rounded  fullness. 

He  did  many  great  and  noble  deeds,  and  won  rank,  power,  and  ap 
plause,  without  tarnish  to  his  modesty  and  simplicity.  He  suffered 
much  in  mind,  body,  and  estate,  without  repining;  not  only  with 
patience,  but  in  silence.  Like  some  great  tree,  which  finds  in  earth, 
and  air,  and  storm,  and  sunshine,  nourishment  for  its  growth,  he  drew 
sweetness  and  strength  from  every  element  of  Nature,  and  from  every 
dispensation  of  Providence.  He  was  a  man  to  be  loved,  to  be  rever 
enced,  and  to  be  emulated. 

General  Johnston  dared  to  say  in  the  midst  of  immeasurable  disas 
ters:  "The  test  of  merit  in  my  profession,  with  the  people,  is  success. 
It  is  a  hard  rule,  but  I  think  it  right."  Perhaps,  with  still  wider  scope, 
success  is  the  test  of  merit  in  a  human  life.  But,  even  measured  by 
this  hard  rule,  the  most  adverse  criticism  cannot  pronounce  his  life 
a  failure.  Rejecting  patronage,  standing  on  merit  alone,  inflexible 
in  right,  and  devoted  to  duty,  a  whole  people  regard  him  as  the  very 
pattern  of  a  noble  citizen,  an  able  leader,  a  splendid  soldier,  a  great 
general,  and  an  upright  man.  Millions  wept  for  him.  The  ablest  and 
the  best  wrote  for  him  the  proud  epitaph  that  on  his  arm  rested  the 
sinking  fortunes  of  the  state.  Who  will,  then,  dare  to  say  he  did  not 
achieve  success  ?  If  money,  if  office,  if  luxury,  if  rank,  if  power,  alone 
go  to  make  it  up,  then  he  did  live  in  vain.  But  none  of  these  did  he 
value  highly.  He  won  the  crown  for  which  he  strove — the  approval 
of  the  wise  and  good. 

"  'Tis  only  the  actions  of  the  just 
Smell  sweet  and  blossom  in  the  dust." 

And,  finally,  those  who  loved  him  will  find  consolation  for  his  end, 
in  a  sentiment  borrowed  from  the  civil  law,  that  may  well  be  a  common 
heritage  to  the  South  in  thinking  on  her  martyrs  : 

"  Qui  pro  republica  ceciderint,  in  perpetuum, 
Per  gloriam  vivere  intelliguntur !  " 

"  We  know  that  those  who  for  their  country  die, 
Through  glory  live  again  immortally." 


INDEX. 


A. 

A  BOTTTED  army,  404. 

Abandonment  of  Kentucky,  4S7-495. 

Abattis,  441,  448,  533. 

Abolitionism,  189,  190. 

Abortive  uortie,  454,  4S5. 

Accounts,  173-180. 

Acts  of  the  Apostles.  322. 

Adams,  Daniel  W.,  595,  603,  657. 

Adams,  Wirt,  508,  595,  608. 

Adjutant  of  the  Sixth  Infantry,  21. 

Administration,  Houston's,  74,  passim  ;  LamarX 
93,  passim  (see  Buchanan,  Floyd,  Z.  Taylor)  ; 
military  (see  Second  Cavalry,  Mormons,  Camp 
Floyd,  etc.). 

Administrative  ability  (see  same),  510. 

Advance,  Buell's,  535,  536  ;  Federal,  357-359 ;  Con 
federate,  310-312,  863 ;  at  Shiloh,  551-573. 

Adventures,  perilous,  18,  69, 143. 

Adversity,  159, 165,  484-522. 

Advice  to  Governor  Harris,  499  ;  to  a  filibuster, 
194. 

Affability,  2S3,  726-729. 

Affairs  of  honor,  73-80, 121, 122, 193,  194. 

Affection  for  family,  243. 

Affliction,  182. 

Aide-de-camp,  offer  of  appointment,  17, 

Aids  to  science,  226. 

Alamo,  the,  63,  64. 

Albany,  skirmish  at,  355. 

Alcatraz,  261,  262,  265,  267. 

Alcorn,  J.  T.,  849,  360,  423. 

Alexander,  General,  36-41  ;  E.  B.,  212  ;  T.  L.,  21. 

Alfriend,  Frank,  732. 

Alienation,  popular,  434,  505,  510-514. 

Alignments  at  Shiloh.    (See  Array.) 

All-Souls'-day,  683,  689. 

Alleghany  Mountains,  313. 

Allegiance,  243,  257-259,  272. 

Allen,  Henry  W.,  605. 

Allen,  Captain,  611. 

Allison,  Captain,  618,  619. 

Alternative,  a  dread,  275. 

Ambiguous  oracle,  633  ;  policy,  239. 

Amenities  in  war,  659,  660. 

American  aggressiveness,  114;  prosperity,  153, 190. 

Ammen,  G.,  536,  624-626,  630,  6i6. 


Ampudia,  General,  132, 143, 144 

Anahuac  campaign,  59. 

Ancient  saw  refiled,  873. 

Anderson,  Benjamin  M.,  584  ;  Patton,  573,  595-59T, 
601,  606,  607,  621,  622,  644,  648,  650,  651 ;  Robert, 
36,  303,  804. 

ANECDOTES  :  Spartan  simplicity,  3  ;  rapacity  re 
buked,  4  ;  kindness  to  animals,  8 ;  bootless  rage, 
9 ;  graduating  under  difficulties,  12 ;  chess  vs. 
cards,  14  ;  a  sleigh  for  a  target,  18 ;  angry  mu 
sician,  the,  21  ;  pride  of  Black  Hawk,  31 ;  rebuke 
to  a  blackguard,  46 ;  sense  of  responsibility,  54  ; 
kills  a  puma,  69 ;  impromptu  dueling,  73 ;  a 
peacemaker  on  horseback,  73 ;  coolness  in  danger, 
78 ;  magnanimity,  79 ;  not  a  hostler  in  uniform, 
88 ;  a  big  talk,  89 ;  Indian  diplomacy  and  humor, 
89 ;  Indian  courage  and  cannibalism,  90  ;  an  offi 
cial  death-warrant,  90 ;  the  baby's  footprint,  90 ; 
Indian  fear  of  "  Old  Hickory."  103 ;  stopping  a 
runaway,  113  ;  American  aggressiveness,  114; 
Texan  horsemanship,  131  ;  "  Rough  and  Ready," 
135;  fruitless  oratory,  136  ;  a  Texan  father,  136  ; 
General  Johnston  at  Monterey,  139  ;  a  charge  of 
lancers,  139-141 ;  a  friend  in  need,  140 ;  recon 
ciliation  with  Hamer,  142 ;  a  hair-breadth  escape, 
143 ;  pomp  and  pilfering,  144 ;  a  dangerous  cos 
tume,  144  ;  paternal  generosity,  146  ;  vindication 
of  manual  labor,  143 ;  a  too  luxurious  ancestry, 
150;  plentiful  shooting,  150  ;  the  cunning  wood 
cock,  150  ;  eagle  and  turkey-cock,  151  ;  Rogers 
at  the  Black  Fort,  152;  the  universal  instinct, 
175;  compulsory  testimony,  173;  the  patient  an 
gler,  181 ;  the  murdered  pet,  182 ;  legal  right  to 
be  mean,  1S7 ;  a  bloody  brawl  prevented,  193 ;  a 
filibuster  reclaimed,  194  ;  aids  to  science,  226  ; 
parting  with  army,  243 ;  gift  refused,  243,  244  ; 
nomination  declined,  244-246  ;  his  Texan  citizen 
ship,  246;  patchwork  peace-offering,  246;  the 
Japs,  246;  a  trust  discharged,  264-266;  citizen 
ship,  265 ;  General  Scott's  opinion,  266  ;  miscar 
ried  letter,  268;  self-denial,  2S2;  was  he  a  stage- 
driver  ?  283  ;  an  artful  dodger,  256  ;  a  narrow 
escape,  286;  the  skinned  pant'er,  236,  287;  no- 
lens-volens,  287  ;  prophetic  words,  239 ;  Presi 
dent  Davis's  estimate,  291 ;  Polk  a  born  leader, 
322  ;  Acts  of  the  Apostles,  322;  angels  unawares, 
322 ;  a  lifetime  friendship,  322  ;  estimate  of  char 
acter,  322;  appreciation,  323;  a  long-tailed  kite, 


738 


INDEX. 


326  ;  the  work  in  hand,  826 ;  the  revolutionary 
point.  840 ;  disbanding  volunteers,  340 ;  death  of 
Cleburne,  354 ;  sagacity,  359  ;  Jack  Hays's  revol 
vers,  359  ;  a  pious  old  woman,  362  ;  the  bridge 
saved,  364 ;  a  good  old  saying,  373 ;  "  gone  to 
get  his  musket,"  380 ;  rebuke,  389  ;  lances  and 
red  tape,  389 ;  generals  not  plentiful,  496 ;  remedy 
for  distrust,  512  ;  a  Congressman's  contrition,  512  ; 
how  to  refute  calumny,  515  ;  treatment  of  Floyd 
and  Pillow,  515 ;  Davis  and  Lee,  521 ;  offer  to 
Beauregard,  549 ;  self-reliance,  550 ;  "  This  is  not 
war!"  563  ;  the  council  of  war,  565-572;  "Fire 
low,"  566 ;  "  A  mere  reconnaissance  in  force," 
579  ;  winged  words,  582-584 ;  manufacture  of 
zouaves,  589 ;  Breckinridge  and  Harris,  611 ;  the 
spoils  of  war,  612 ;  the  bayonet,  612  ;  love  your 
enemies,  615  ;  brave  boys,  636 ;  Forrest  on  picket, 
637  ;  the  crisis  of  the  war,  658;  "A  handful  of 
Texas  earth,"  699;  a  villain  rebuked,  720;  the 
secret  of  command,  720  ;  simple  piety,  720,  721 ; 
half  his  blanket,  721 ;  genuine  simplicity,  723 ;  a 
lowly  Christian,  724;  special  providences,  724,  725; 
deliberation,  725;  fair  and  square,  725;  affability, 
726-729 ;  cheerfulness,  730  ;  Scott  and  Davis  al 
most  agree,  730. 

Angels  unawares,  322. 

Angling,  181. 

Angry  musician,  21. 

Animals,  kindness  to,  8. 

Annexation  of  Texas,  128. 

Annoyances,  171. 

Apaches,  2S3. 

Apathy  of  the  South,  334,  337,  338,  343,  351,  410, 
416,  552. 

Appeal  for  Fort  Henry,  416. 

Appeals  for  troops  and  arms.  323-843. 

Appearance,  personal.     (See  Personal  appearance.) 

Appendices,  8C5,  366,  555-557,  661-687. 

Appointments,  9, 13,  21,  69,  71-75,  134,  13fi,  137, 
142,  167-169,  183-185,  203,  229,  292.  (See  Eank.) 

Appreciation,  323. 

Apprehensions,  Federal.  577-579. 

April  3, 1862,  553-553,  574. 

April  4, 1862,  559-566,  574-580. 

April  5, 1362,  562,  566-580. 

April  6, 1862.    (See  Battle  of  Shiloh.) 

April  7, 1862,  643.  (  u  ) 

Archer,  Branch  S.,  62. 

Archives  of  Tennessee,  499. 

Ardor  of  army,  558. 

Arizona,  278,  291. 

Arkansas,  324. 

Armament,  544. 

Armament  efforts,  414,  427. 

Armistead,  L.,  282,  289. 

Arms,  appeals  for,  323-348;  deficiency  in,  309,  329- 
338,  336,  338,  347.  361,  411,  548;  disparity  in,  403- 
405,  528,  548  ;  supply  of,  331-336,  842,"  347,  348, 
502,  559. 

Army  at  Corinth,  534,  537,  539 ;  at  Pittsburg  Land 
ing,  584,  537,  538 ;  enters  Salt  Lake  City,  229  ;  in 
adequate,  484,  548 ;  increase  of,  183 ;  of  invasion, 
529,  530,  534;  severance  of,  435-487,  500-502; 

Array,  Confederate,  at  Shiloh,  572,  573,  601,643; 
Federal,  530,  531,  600,  643 ;  precision  of,  5SO. 


Texan,  69,  70,  73,  74,  31,  82;  of  the  Cumberland 
(see  T.  H.  Van  Home). 

Arrival  at  Corinth,  539 ;  at  Richmond,  291 ;  in  Cor- 
federacy,  290 ;  of  Bueil  at  Pittsburg,  624. 

Artful  dodger,  286. 

Artillerists,  427,  430-432. 

Artillery,  465;  at  Shiloh,  654;  heavy.  (See  Ord 
nance.) 

Assault  on  Fort  Taneria,  137-139 ;  Smith's  at  Don- 
elson,  464. 

Assaults.     (See  Battle  of  Shiloh.) 

Assignment  to  command,  74,  75,  136,  137,  229,  292. 
(See  Bank.) 

Atkinson,  Henry,  18, 19,  21.  27,  33,  35,  45,  50. 

Attack  at  Fishing  Creek,  401,  402 ;  at  Shiloh— ori 
gin,  551-555. 

Austin,  city  of,  113,  114,  170,  136. 

Austin,  John,  59,  60. 

Austin.  Moses,  53. 

Austin,  Stephen  F.,  55,  58,  60,  62,  C3,  100. 

Author's  estimate,  736. 

Authors  standpoint,  the  (Preface),  716,  717,  735. 

Avery,  J.  W.,  728,  729. 

B. 

Bacon,  Albert,  386. 

Bad  Axe,  battle  of,  41. 

Badeau's  "  Life  of  Grant,"  368,  372-376,  421,  422, 
438,  443,  478,  576,  577,  602,  624,  625,  641,  657. 

Bailey,  James  H.,  485, 436,  442, 450,  466,  467. 

Baldwin,  W.  E.,  454,  457,  459,  461. 

Balliuger,  William  P.,  730. 

Barboursville,  skirmish  at,  355. 

Bark  road,  555-558,  572. 

Barksdale,  E.,  699. 

Barren  River,  314,  344,  387,  4S7,  4S3. 

Bartlett,  W.  H.  C.,  11, 12. 

Bate,  William,  592-594. 

Battle,  J.  A.,  355,  401,  403,  610. 

Battle-flags,  604;  battle-song,  604,  606. 

BATTLES  : 

Bad  Axe,  41;  Belmont,  359,  366-378;  Bethel, 
256;  Carthage,  294;  Dover,  457-469  (see  Fort 
Donelson);  Elkhorn,  524,  525;  Fishing  Creek, 
390-405  ;  Fort  Henry,  407^33  (see  Fort  Henry) ; 
Fort  Donelson — the  trenches,  446-448;  gunboats, 
450-454;  Lexington,  295;  Logan's  Cross  Roads 
(see  Fishing  Creek);  Manassas,  254,  255;  Mill 
Springs,  395-406  (see  Fishing  Creek);  Mon 
terey,  137-140;  Oak  Hills  (see  Wilson's  Creek) ; 
Palo  Alto,  132 ;  Pea  Ridge,  524,  525  (see  Elk- 
horn)  ;  Piketon,  358 ;  Resaca  de  la  Palma,  132 ; 
San  Jacinto,  66 ;  the  Neches,  110-112 ;  Wilson's 
Creek,  294,  295. 

BATTLE  OF  SHILOH:  General  Johnston's  prediction, 
489,490;  anticipation  of  it,  506;  strength  of  Fed 
eral  position,  531-535 ;  Beauregard's  report,  543; 
Bragg's  sketch  of  preliminaries,  548,  549;  the 
resolve  to  attack,  551  ;  its  origin,  551,  552  ;  Gen 
eral  Lee's  letter,  551,  552 ;  preparations,  552  ;  at 
tempt  to  employ  negroes,  552  ;  General  John 
ston's  telegram,  554. 

BEFOKE  THE  BATTLE,  558-580;  orders  of  march, 
553-560  ;  enthusiasm  of  troops,  553 ;  army  march 
es,  558,  559  ;  field-map,  559  ;  distribution  of  arms, 


INDEX. 


739 


550:  bad  roads.  559,  560;  skirmish  on  April  4th, 
rCD;  explanation  of  orders,  560;  providential 
storm,  560,  561 ;  under  arms,  561  ;  reckless  fusil 
lade,  561,  562 ;  careless  pickets,  562  ;  first  line  of 
battle,  562  ;  personal  movements  of  General 
Johnston,  562,  563;  morning  of  the  5th,  563; 
'•  This  is  not  war ! "  563 ;  delay,  568  ;  its  causes, 
5G4.  565 ;  rawness  of  army,  564,  565 ;  a  majestic 
presence,  566 ;  encouraging  the  troops,  566 ;  ad- 
dross  to  army,  566  ;  the  council  of  war,  566-572 ; 
Eeauregard  for  retreat,  56T  ;  Johnston's  decision, 
and  reasons,  56T-5T2;  Confederate  array,  572, 
573  ;  Sherman's  theory,  574-531 ;  reconnaissance, 
574 ;  false  security,  574-531 ;  was  it  a  surprise  ? 
575-580 ;  Federal  array,  530, 581 ;  the  opponents,  581 . 

SUNDAY  MORNING. — A  glorious  dawn,  532  ;  ex 
ultation  of  the  commander,  582  ;  the  issue  formu 
lated,  582  ;  map,  5S3  ;  winged  words,  582-584 ; 
chieftain  and  clansmen,  584,  585  ;  valor  and  en 
thusiasm,  535  ;  the  first  gun,  535  ;  the  start,  535, 
536 ;  Beauregard's  summary,  586  ;  difficulties  of 
description,  586 ;  skirmishing,  537 ;  the  first  col 
lision,  587  ;  the  onset,  538  ;  Hildebrand  routed, 
5>3;  Prentiss  driven  back,  589;  the  surprise, 
590,  591:  reinforcements,  591,  592;  Sherman's 
stronghold,  592;  Cleburne's  assault,  592,593;  a 
repulse,  593,  594;  General  Johnston  on  the  right, 
595;  rout  of  Federal  front,  595 ;  Sherman  broken, 
596 ;  Sherman  routed,  597 ;  Confederate  right, 
593 ;  Federal  left  turned,  593  ;  plan  of  battle  dis 
cussed,  509. 

MID-DAY.— New  line  of  battle,  600,  601  ;  second  j 
engagement,  601  ;  Polk  on  the  centre,  601  ;  Con-  \ 
federate  alignment,  601 ;    terrible  fighting,  602  ;   : 
Grant's   personal  movements,   602  ;    Grant  and  ! 
Buell,  602,  603 ;  Federal  left  falls  back,  603 ;  the  | 
combat,  604;  "the hornet's  nest,"  604-606  ;  Wal 
lace  and  Prentiss,  604-606;    Gibson's    assaults,  j 
6<i5;  Anderson's,  Folk's,  and  Cheatham's  assaults,  ! 
606  ;  Hardee  and  Sherman,  606,  607 ;  the  Ken- 
tuckians,  606,  607  ;  Cleburne's  brigade,  607 ;  con 
fusion  there,  607  ;  Confederate  centre  and  right, 
603 ;  Hurlbut's  position,  609,  610  ;  the  Federal  key, 
609,  610  ;  Statham's  attack,  609,  610 ;  stubborn 
resistance,  611;  a  memorable  charge,  611;  Gov 
ernor  Harris's  account,  611  ;  Breckinridge's  rally, 
611 ;    General  Johnston  leads  the   charge,  612 ; 
victory  and  death,  613 ;  Harris's  narrative,  618, 
614  ;  incidents  of  death,  615  ;  Beauregard  in  com 
mand,  616. 

AFTERNOON.— Dislocation  of  commands,  616; 
regularity  in  development  of  plan,  616 ;  Duke's 
comments,  616-618;  map  (third  position),  617  ;  de 
velopment  of  plan,  618 ;  regularity  and  impetu 
osity,  6J.S;  impulse  of  leadership,  618  ;  slaughter, 
613;  momentum  of  success,  619;  the  crisis,  619  ; 
lull  along  the  line,  619 ;  third  engagement,  619  ; 
Ruggles  masses  artillery,  619 ;  Polk  and  Bragg 
against  Wallace  and  Prentiss,  619-622  ;  crushing 
assault— Wallace  killed,  Prentiss  captured,  620- 
622  ;  Bragg's  and  Hardee's  summaries,  622;  the 
field  swept,  621-623  ;  the  rout,  623 ;  the  last  as 
sault,  623-627;  Buell  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  624; 
a  routed  army,  625,  626. 
A  TICTOEY  LOST.— Beauregard' s  theory  of  Shi- 


loh,  627,  637 ;  his  report,  627 ;  fatal  order  to  re 
tire,  627,  628  ;  Jordan's  statements,  628 ;  errors 
corrected,  629,  630 ;  the  evidence— Governor  Har 
ris,  631 ;  Hardee  and  Cleburne,  631 ;  Folk's  re 
port,  631,  632;  Bragg's  report,  632;  Bragg's 
sketch,  633 ;  Jordan's  statement,  634  ;  Withers's 
and  Ruggles's  reports,  634;  Gibson's  and  Gi!- 
mer's  letters,  635;  Duke's  "Life  of  Morgan,*' 
636 ;  Jordan's  "  Life  of  Forrest,"  636  ;  Chalmers's 
account,  687 ;  consequences  of  the  mistake,  638, 
639  ;  a  fruitless  field,  639. 

THE  NIGHT  OF  THE  GTH.— The  withdrawal, 
639  ;  estimated  losses,  639 ;  Folk's  position,  639 ; 
bombardment  and  tempest,  640 ;  Beauregard"  s 
headquarters,  640  ;  reinforcements,  640,  641 ;  the 
respite  improved,  641  ;  Federal  orders  for  attack, 
641,  642;  Buell's  statements,  642;  the  remnant 
of  Grant's  army,  641,  642. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  MONDAY.— Renewal  of  battle, 
643 ;  Federal  alignment,  643  ;  Confederate  right, 
643 ;  the  attack  on  it,  643,  644 ;  the  battle,  644  ; 
individual  heroism,  645;  contradictory  orders, 
646;  Buell's  attack,  646;  battle  at  the  centre, 
647;  attack  by  Grant's  army,  643-651;  Folk's  de 
fense  at  Shiloh  Church,  648,  649 ;  Bragg  resists 
Lew  Wallace,  650;  the  Kentucky  Brigade,  650, 
651  ;  Beauregard  retreats,  651,  652 ;  the  rear 
guard,  653;  abortive  pursuit,  653;  Forrest  re 
pulses  Sherman,  653;  the  artillery,  654;  Rev. 
Robert  Collyer's  account,  654,  655 ;  losses,  655- 
657 ;  the  fiercest  fight  of  the  war,  657 ;  the  con 
sequences,  657,  658 ;  Grant,  Sherman,  and  Buell, 
658 ;  amenities  in  war,  659,  660 ;  end  of  the  cam 
paign,  660,  661. 

APPENDIX. — Beauregard's  report,  661-663  ;  Ap 
pendices,  669-637. 

Baylor,  John  R.,  287,  233. 

Bayonet,  the,  612. 

Beau-ideal  of  a  general,  489. 

Beauregard,  G.  T.,  486,  487,  493,  495,  501,  502,  506, 
525-527,  537-539,  540-543,  549,  551-557  (see  Bat 
tle  of  Shiloh) ;  succeeds  to  command,  614-616. 

Beauregard's  plans,  541,  542 ;  funereal  order,  639 ; 
letter  to  General  Johnston,  501;  to  Bragg,  542; 
advises  retreat,  567-572 ;  report,  543,  586, 661-668 ; 
headquarters,  607;  theory  of  Shiloh  corrected, 
62T-639. 

Bee,  B.  E.,  87,  92. 

Beech  Grove,  398-400,  403,  404. 
i  Before  the  battle,  558-580. 
'  Begging  for  arms,  328-333;  for  troops,  333-343. 

Belief,  religious.    (See  Religion.) 

Belligerent  rights,  311,  312,  877. 

Belmont,  battle  of,  359,  366-378. 

Beltzhoover's  battery,  867-369. 

Benjamin,  J.  P.,  324,  831,  332,  336,  333-348,  336,  387, 
415,  500,  502-505,  516,  540. 

Benton,  Mrs.  T.  H.,  23,  47. 

Bethel  (Tennessee),  254,  530,  542,  556-558. 

Bethel  (Virginia),  battle  of,  256. 

Big  Sandy  River,  390,  392. 

Birds,  147,  150, 151, 175,  220. 

Birge's  sharp- shooters,  447. 

Birth,  1. 

Bishop-soldier,  321. 


740 


INDEX. 


Black  Hawk,  20,  29-45,  50;  war,  25-43. 

Blair,  Frank  P.,  293,  294. 

Blair,  Montgomery,  267,  2GS. 

Bledsoe,  A.  T.,  732. 

Blessings,  national,  153,  190. 

Blind  confidence,  496. 

Blood,  the  first,  at  Shiloh,  5S7. 

Bold  resolve,  400,  620. 

Bombardment  of  Fort  Brown,  132 ;  of  Fort  Henry, 

431,  432;  of  Fort  Donelson,  449-454;  at  Shiloh, 

621,  622,  640. 
Books,  152. 

Border  States,  251-256. 
Boundary  of  Tennessee,  408. 
Bowen,  John  S.,  4S9,  490,  495,  498, 573,  598,  601,  C09, 

610,  647,  657. 
Bowie,  James,  62-64. 
Bowie-knife  and  bayonet,  584. 
Bowles,  the  chief.    (See  Cherokee  War.) 
Bowling  Green,  808-311,  815-317,  334,  344,  349-366, 

379,  887,  421,  425,  485,  4S7,  488,  492-494. 
Boyhood,  2,  3. 
Boyle,  J.  T.,  397. 
Boynton's  "  History  of  the  Navy,"  418 ;  "  Sherman's 

Historical  Eaid,"  420,  582,  533,  578-580. 
Bragg,  Braxton,  330,  513,  518,  525, 539,  540,  543-549, 

552,  553,  556-560.     (See  Battle  of  Shiloh.) 
Bragg's  bold  project,  541,  542 ;  character,  544-548 ; 

change  of  orders,  564,  565 ;  sketch  of  Shiloh,  590, 

633 ;  promotion,  633. 
Brave  boys,  636. 
Breckinridge,  Cabell,  611,  612. 
Breckinridge,  John  C.,  297,  879-381,  888,  494,  EOS, 

549,  556,  557,  559,  560  (see  Battle  of  Shiloh) ;  his 

charge,  608-612. 
Brevet  rank,  229,  232. 
Bridge  saved,  the,  364. 
Bridge-burning,  364,  383. 
Bridger,  James,  211 ;  Fort,  211,  214-217. 
Brigadier-general,  229. 
Brigadier-general,  Texan  Army,  74. 
Bristow,  Benjamin  H.,  619. 
Brothers  and  sisters,  2,  5,  7,  8,  57. 
Brown,  John  C.,  354,  358, 359, 441,  448,  461, 462, 467, 

468,  491. 

Brown,  Joseph  E.,  830. 
Brown,  William  M.,  454. 
Buchanan,  James,  189-191,  201,  207,  208,  221,  222, 

239,  240,  252. 

Buckland,  E.  P.,  560,  574,  578-5SO,  606,  623. 
Buckner,  D.  P.,  329,  330,  500. 
Buckner,  S.  B.,  293,  302,  303,  308-311,  317,  334,  349, 

350,  879,  425,  433,  436-438,  440-442,  447,  453-456, 

460-464,  466,  469-475,  477,  519,  520,  710. 
Buell,  D.  C.,  263,  378,  379,  382,  387,  390,  397,  398, 

406,  420,  425,  443,  499,  527,  523,  534--53S,  551,  554, 

581,  602,  624-626,  641-647,  658. 
Buffalo-hunting,  176. 
Bureau  interference,  336,  338,  840-342. 
Burleson,  Edward,  66,  106-112,  118,  123,  124,  128, 

175. 

Burnet,  David  G.,  63,  92, 100, 101,  109, 110, 113, 123. 
Burnley,  A.  T.,  130,  155,  167-169. 
Burnsville,  530,  559. 
Bursting  of  a  gun,  332. 


Bustamante,  General,  59,  99,  100. 

Butler,  Edward,  378. 

Butler,  William  O.,  1SS-142,  157. 

C. 

Cadet-life,  9-13. 

Cairo,  296,  305,  313,  814,  349,  390,  421,  422. 

Caldwell,  John  W.,  651,  654. 

Calhoon,  360. 

California,  241,  247,  248,  256,  2C1,  2C2. 

Call  for  brigade,  541. 

Camp  Boone,  302 ;  Dick  Eobiuson,  302-304, 307, 314, 
356,  363. 

Camp-diseases,  39,  47,  296,  304,  337,  SCO,  861,  443, 
493. 

Camp  Floyd,  229, 233-243;  Jackson,  253,  2P4., 

Campaign,  Utah,  207,  etc. ;  review  of  Tennessee, 
503,504;  ended,  659,  660. 

Campaigns,  Bragg's,  545,  546 ;  offensive,  528,  530 ; 
offensive-defensive,  542. 

Cannonade,  noisy,  621,  622. 

Capitulation  of  Monterey,  143, 144, 

Captious  conduct,  225. 

Care  of  troops,  218,  220. 

Carefulness,  171,  178,  ISO. 

Carroll,  W.  H.,  864,  365,  368. 

Carter,  S.  P.,  897,  398,  403. 

Carthage,  battle  of,  294. 

Cass,  Lewis,  43,  100. 

Cassville,  624. 

Casualties.    (See  Losses.) 

Cavalry,  383-3S6,  465,  50S,  509,  C60,  C06,  607,  621 ; 
charge,  461,  621 ;  Second,  183,  etc. 

Cedar  Valley,  229,  283. 

Censure,  public,  484.    (See  Eage.) 

Challenge,  75,  122,  121, 193, 194. 

Chalmers,  James  E.,  539,  540,  572,  5S9,  595,  598, 
599,  601,  603,  608,  620,  623,  624,  630,  C37. 

Chalmers,  E.  M.,  721. 

Change  of  orders,  564  ;  of  tactics,  658. 

Chapman,  E.  M.,  721. 

Character  (see  Albert  Sidney  Johnston) ;  of  Braxton 
Bragg,  544-548 ;  John  C.  Breckinridge,  297 ;  S.  B. 
Buckner,  298;  John  B.  Floyd,  455;  J.  F.  Gilmer, 
412,  413;  William  J.  Hardee,  353, 854;  Sam  Hous 
ton,  65,  97;  Felix  Huston,  74,79,  81;  Josiah  S. 
Johnston,  51;  M.  B.  Lamar,  93;  Leonidas  Polk, 
318-322 ;  Humphrey  Marshall,  890  ;  Zachary  Tay 
lor,  45 ;  F.  K.  Zollicoffer,  394,  395,  404,  405. 

Character,  value  of,  169. 

Charge,  a  memorable,  611-613;  cavalry,  461,  C21, 
653;  gallant,  449 ;  of  lancers,  139-141. 

Cheatham,  E.  F.,  67,  526,  557,  558,  564,  573,  595,  C01, 
606,  622.  639,  C4S,  649,  657. 

Checkmate,  60S. 

Cheerfulness,  215,  259,  780. 

Cherokee  War,  98-113. 

Chess,  14,  54, 131. 

Chief  of  staff,  Bragg,  544. 

Chieftain  and  clansmen,  584,  585. 

Children.  25,  36,  51,  53, 146,  147, 149, 151, 155, 180, 
182,  280. 

China  Grove  plantation,  129,  145-169. 

Choice  of  a  profession,  5,  9,  48-50,  54,  55, 154. 

Choice  of  route,  507-510. 


INDEX. 


741 


Cholera,  89,  47. 

Cincinnati  Gazette,  627,  628. 

Citizens,  rights  of,  311,  503. 

Citizenship,  its  price,  246,  266. 

City  of  refuge,  a,  21T. 

Civil  rights,  811,  508. 

CIVIL  WAR  :  Premonitions,  49,  194,  247  ;  causes  of 
the,  249,  250 ;  beginning  of,  251 ;  early  operations, 
254  ;  in  Missouri,  293-296.  (See  Contents  of  vol 
ume.) 

Civilian  prisoners,  826. 

Civilization,  nature  of,  246;  productiveness  of,  45. 

Clanton,  Colonel,  562,  572,  593. 

Clark,  Charles,  323,  3S8,  415,  434,  556,  558,  564,  573, 
596,  603,  639,  657. 

Clark,  William,  23,  23. 

Clarksville,  302,  359,  413, 414,  416,  419,  424,  425,  429, 
433,  434,  4S5,  500. 

Clay,  Henry,  296. 

Cleburne,  P.  R.,  854,  362,  503,  512,  542,  592-594,  596, 
601,  607,  621,  647. 

Climate,  47,  74,  118, 122, 146, 165,  173-175,  211-215, 
225,  226,  243.  (See  Winter.) 

Cobb,  Robert,  courage  of,  451. 

Collecting  troops,  539,  540. 

Collision  at  Shiloh,  5S7. 

Collyers  (Robert)  account  of  Shiloh,  654,  655. 

Colonel  in  Texan  Army,  72,  73. 

Colonel  in  Mexican  War,  134. 

Colonel  of  Second  Cavalry,  135. 

Colonelcy  refused  him,  130. 

Colonization,  58,  99. 

Colorado  Desert,  279-2S3. 

Columbia  (Kentucky),  337,  395,  897. 

Columbia  (Tennessee),  535,  536. 

Columbus  (Kentucky),  296,  305-309,  313,  814,  317, 
313,  324,  825,  349,  359,  366-378,  338,  390,  407,  403, 
411,  412,  415,  421,  422,  425,  455,  437,  526. 

Comanches,  88,  89,  114-113,  191,  192. 

Combined  movement,  534-536. 

Comet,  281-283. 

Command  of  men,  211,  215. 

Command  tendered  Beauregard,  549 ;  devolves  on, 
614-616. 

Commendations,  231. 

Comments  on  Shiloh,  by  Duke,  616,  617. 

Commissary  Department,  218,  503., 

Commissions.    (See  Rank.) 

Communications,  435. 

Composure,  495-498. 

Comte  de  Paris,  310,  540,  544,  554,  594,  599,  657. 

Concentration,  433,  484,  436,  434-436,  500-509,  519, 
5-JO  ;  at  Donelson,  433 ;  at  Corinth,  500-509,  516- 
522,  625,  528,  538-557 ;  at  Corinth— Bragg's  ac 
count,  643,  549 ;  at  Murfreesboro,  504,  505,  508 ; 
final,  539 ;  obstructions  to,  503. 

Conduct  of  life,  119,  154,  155;  in  battle,  112,  141; 
in  family,  149, 151,  243. 

Confederate  Congress,  495,  512,  691-694 ;  Govern 
ment,  250,  251,  254;  tomb,  715;  lines,  807-809, 
312-317. 

Conference  at  Bowling  Green,  437;  at  Donelson, 
470^73  ;  conferences  with  Beauregard,  486,  487, 
500,  543 ;  conference  with  Bragg  at  Monterey, 
562. 


Confidence  at  Shiloh,  567-572 ;  at  Nashville,  blind, 

496. 
Conflict  of  duties,  48,  243,  2CO,  268,  267,  275,  276; 

of  authority,  236-240. 
Conflicting  policies,  221. 
Confusion,  564,  565,  607. 
Congratulations,  378. 
Congress,  Confederate,  512. 
Congressional  inquiry,  512. 
Consequences  of  withdrawal,  633,  639 ;   of  Shiloh, 

656,  657. 

Conservatism,  257,  253. 
Consistency,  10. 
Conspiracy,  261,  268,  269,  271. 
Consultation,  general,  62,  100, 101, 107 ;   at  Donel 
son,  456. 

Contrition,  512 ;  public,  639,  716. 
Conversation,  719,  723  ;  with  Bowen  and  Schaller, 

489;  with  John  C.  Brown,  491;  -with  Edward 

Munford,  490,  491  ;  with  Sam  Tate,  506, 507  ;  with 

W.  C.  Whitthorne,  505. 
Cook,  Colonel,  447. 
Cook,  Louis  P.,  92,  94, 115. 
Cook,  R.  V.,  694-697. 

Cooke,  Philip  St.  George,  210,  211,  214,  215,  230. 
Cooper,  Samuel,  292,  351. 
Cooperation,  plans  of,  434,  455,  519,  520 ;  want  of, 

291,  292. 

Cordova's  rebellion,  105. 
Corinth,  491,  500-509,  530,  531,  534,  533,  539-543, 

653,  660,  661. 

Council  at  Donelson,  469-475;  at  Shiloh,  566-573. 
Council  of  war,  400,  453-456,  469^75,  436,  437,  500. 
Counting  the  cost  of  battle,  657,  653. 
Cradlebaugh,  Judge,  236,  237,  239. 
Credit  system,  270. 
Creed.    (See  Religion.) 
Crisis  of  the  war,  633-639,  653,  717. 
Critical  moment,  a,  463,  609,  610,  619. 
Criticism,  hostile,    231 ;   military,  436 ;  of  Shiloh, 

Collyers,  654,  655 ;  on  Senate,  55. 
Crittenden,  George  Bn  357,  332,  396-406,  504,  508, 

523. 
Crittenden,  Thomas  L.,  803,  835,  387,  536,  531,  624, 

625,  641,  648-646. 
Crooked  policy,  275. 
Crosman,  George  H.,  46,  54,  234. 
Cruft,  Charles,  460,  462,  609. 
Crump's  Landing,  602,  641. 
Crushed,  an  army,  619-626. 
Crushing  coil,  a,  619,  620. 
Cumberland  City,  237-239. 
Cumberland  Gap,  806,  808,  809,  313,  814,  318,  349, 

855,  857. 

Cumberland  Mountains,  503,  509. 
Cumberland  River,  814,  317,  358,  395,  407-416,  487, 

488. 

Gumming.  Alfred,  201,  209,  210,  223-223,  235-233. 
Curtis,  S.  R.,  390,  524,  525. 


D. 

Dancing  with  a  lady,  237. 
Dangerfleld,  William  H.,  55. 
Danites,  200. 


742 


INDEX. 


Darkness,  639. 

Davis,  Garrett,  801. 

Davis,  Jefferson,  8, 11-14,  26,  36,  42,  44,  76,  77, 138- 
144,  183-185,  213,  251,  291,  292,  803,  824,  831,  341, 
342,  378,  496,  505,  510-513,  516-522,  540,  551,  552, 
658,  639,  690,  730-732. 

Dawn  of  Shiloh,  the,  582. 

Dawson's  massacre,  127. 

Deas,  Z.  C.,  603,  643,  644,  657. 

Death,  effect  of  General  Johnston's,  327  ;  how  to 
meet,  122  ;  of  child,  182 ;  of  Edward  Butler,  378  ; 
of  P.  K.  Cleburne,  354;  of  Gladden,  589 ;  of  Gov 
ernor  George  W.  Johnson,  651  ;  of  Albert  Sidney 
Johnston,  609-615,  688-715 ;  of  J.  S.  Johnston,  50, 
51;  of  Ben  McCulloch,  525:  of  Mclntosh,  525; 
of  T.  B.  Monroe,  651  ;  of  Terry,  384  ;  of  wife,  53; 
of  Zollicoffer,  401,  404,  405. 

Death-warrant,  official,  90. 

Debarkation  at  Fort  Henry,  423  ;  at  Pittsburg 
Landing,  528. 

Debatable  ground,  3 CO. 

Debating  societies,  153. 

Debt,  155. 

Decentralization,  503, 

Decision,  important,  566-572. 

Decision  of  character,  566-572. 

Decision  to  leave  Kentucky,  490. 

Decisive  battles  of  the  war,  486,  656. 

Deed,  a  golden,  615. 

Defense,  lines  of,  487-491,  500-509. 

Defense  of  fortified  places.  (See  Columbus,  Fort 
Donelson,  Fort  Henry,  New  Madrid,  Bowling 
Green,  Nashville.) 

Defense  of  Tennessee,  306-310,  343,  345,  355,  387, 
838,  395,  407-432,  435,  486,  487,  490,  491.  (See 
Defense  of  Mississippi  Valley,  of  fortified  places). 

Defense  of  Mississippi  Valley,  291-293,  322-324, 
540. 

Defensive  policy,  355,  338,  895,  400,  484,  4S5,  541, 
542. 

Deficient  armament,  809,  329-333,  336,  338,  347,  361, 
411,  548. 

Dejection,  165, 178. 

Delay,  causes  of,  549,  551,  554,  560,  563-5G5. 

Deliberation,  54,  725. 

Delusions,  Confederate,  255,333;  Federal,  362,  363. 

Delusive  statesmanship,  251. 

Demand  for  General  Johnston's  degradation,  496, 
503,  505,  510-514. 

Democrat,  St.  Louis,  231. 

Democratic  party,  177. 

Demoralization,  435,  496-499,  510,  516,  622-626,  635- 
637 ;  alleged,  627-639. 

Denunciation,  popular,  484,  505,  510-514. 

Department  No.  2,  C.  S.  A.,  292,  293. 

Dependence  on  staff,  413. 

Deployment  at  Shiloh,  562. 

Description  of  a  battle,  difficulties  of,  586. 

Deseret  News,  235. 

Desert,  the,  281-283,  290. 

Desert  journey,  the,  275-291. 

Desert  march,  a,  213-215,  280-283. 

Desertion,  186, 187. 

Desperate  fighting,  459. 

Despotism,  Mexican,  59-61. 


Detachment  of  Floyd,  425. 

Details  of  battle-plan,  553-557. 

Detection  of  robber,  178. 

Detention,  559-565. 

Dick  Eobinson.    (See  Camp  Dick  Eobinson.) 

Difference  of  opinion,  496. 

Difficulties  of  organization,  549. 

Difficulty  of  communication,  395. 

Dignity  of  labor,  148, 156,  159,  161. 

Dilemma,  360,  361,  399,  400. 

Dimitry,  John  B.  8.,  734. 

Diplomacy  (see  Mormons),  296  ;  of  the  sword,  341. 

Disaster,  406. 

Disbanding  volunteers,  340. 

Discharges,  242. 

Discipline,  70, 71,  73,  81, 187,  218, 220,  225,  337,  423- 

425,  508. 

Discouragement,  456. 
Diseases  of  camp,  296,  837,  300,  301,  443. 
Dislike  to  politics,  120, 121. 
Disposition  of  troops,  485. 
Distant  control,  336,  333-342,  353,  354. 
Distribution  of  arms,  559. 
Disunion,  169,  251,  258. 

Divided  responsibility,  453,  454  ;  counsels,  455,  456. 
Dixon,  Joseph,  410-414,  416,  424,  426,  427,  436,  449. 
Doctrine  of  moderation,  163,  104. 
Dodge,  General  James,  37-41. 
Domestic  affections,  48,  53, 155,  243,  247, 
Donelson,  Daniel  S.,  407. 
Donelson,  Fort.    (See  Fort  Donelson.) 
Dougherty,  II.,  370-378. 
Douglass,  K.  II.,  107, 110,  111,  113. 
Downey,  John  G.,  261,  263-205. 
Dragoon  Springs,  284. 

Drake,  E.  L.,  458,  459,  464,  562,  594,  597,  607. 
Dream  dissolved,  a  national,  638. 
Duck  Eiver,  535. 

Duel  with  Felix  Huston,  75-80  ;  averted,  121, 122. 
Dueling,  73,  75, 121, 122, 198. 

Duke,  Basil  W.,  883,  497-499,  5S5,  606,  616-618,  686. 
Duties  as  paymaster,  170;  at  Camp  Floyd,  233. 
Dutifulness,  54, 193,  260-264,  266,  275. 
Duty  to  the  public,  43. 

E. 

Eastport,  gunboat,  417. 

East  Tennessee,  306,  316,  317,  344,  357, 364, 365,  888, 

502,  504. 

Eaton,  N.  J.,  10, 11,  36, 186,  213,  231,  232. 
Echo  Canon,  212. 
Eddyville,  358,  360. 

Education  of  children,  149, 151, 159-161. 
Educational  systems,  94. 
Efforts  to  get  arms  and  troops,  828-348. 
Elections,  presidential,  166, 167 ;  Texas  (see  Texas) ; 

military,  134. 

Elizabethtown,  advance  on,  363. 
Elkhorn,  battle  of,  524,  525. 
Embarrassments,  pecuniary,  129, 180, 153, 159. 
Encouragement,  436. 
End  of  campaign,  659,  660. 
Enforcement  of  law,  236-240. 
Engagement  at  Shiloh,  second,  601. 


INDEX. 


V43 


Engineering.  40S-41T.  (See  Defense  of  fortified 
places,  Defense  of  Tennessee,  J.  P.  Gilmer,  Jo 
seph  Dixon.) 

Enlistments  prevented,  339-841. 

Enthusiasm  of  troops,  55S,  572,  5S5. 

Epidemics,  39,  47,  296,  834,  337,  860,  361,  443,  493. 

Epitaph,  a  classic,  734. 

Equilibrium  of  judgment,  448. 

Equipment  of  troops,  387,  361,  492,  5C5. 

Equivocal  password.  401. 

Errors,  military,  553-555. 

Errors  of  fact,  4S6,  540,  544  ;  corrected,  629-639. 

Escape  from  California,  277-291;  narrow,  286;  of 
commanders,  473;  of  Crittenden,  403,  404;  of 
Grant,  375 ;  of  Lord  and  Moore,  237,  283. 

Estimate  of  character  (see  Albert  Sidney  John 
ston)  ;  President  Davis's,  of  General  Joanston, 
213,  291,  496. 

Estimates,  friendly,  194,  195,  322. 

Evacuation  of  Bowling  Green,  437-495;  of  Colum 
bus,  5-26  ;  of  Nashville,  497-499,  503,  504. 

Evidence  about  Shiloh,  627-639. 

Exchange  of  arms,  549,  621 ;  of  prisoners  (see 
Prisoners). 

Executive  difficulties,  503. 

Exodus  from  Nashville,  497. 

EXPEDITION'S  :  Against  Fort  Henry,  422 ;  McC'ler- 
nand  and  Smith's,  421,  422;  up  the  Tennessee, 
527;  Long's,  57  ;  Magee's,  57  ;  Mier,  127;  Nica 
ragua,  194. 

Expenditures,  119. 

Experience,  164. 

Explanation  of  orders,  560. 

Exploration,  218,  241. 

Exultation,  mistaken,  255. 

Eye  for  country,  177. 

F. 

Fagan,  General,  605. 

Fairbanks,  J.  M.,  730. 

Faith,  158,  183,  243,  290. 

Faithful  slave,  248. 

False  reports,  362,  400,  401,  405. 

False  security,  532-534,  574-581. 

Family,  his,  1-14,  147,  149,  151,  155,  132,  243,  247, 

276. 

Fanaticism,  189-207,  241,  242. 
Fanuin's  massacre,  64. 
Farm  at  St.  Louis,  54. 
Farmer's  life,  52,  54, 122, 123,  156-159: 
Fatal  pause,  463  ;  order  to  retire,   627,  628,  633, 

C39. 

Father,  his,  1,  2. 
Faults  in  tactics,  553-555. 
Fayetteville,  524. 
Federal  base,  539 ;  plans,  317  ;  policy,  207-230  (see 

Mormons  and  Camp  Floyd) ;  rout,  373-376,  5S8, 

595,  597,  598. 
Feint,  361. 

Fiction,  historical,  4S6. 
Fighting,  459-462;  fierce,  871. 372, 402,  602,  612,  613, 

644-649,  657 ;  in  detail,  539. 
Filial  claim,  a,  735,  736. 
Filibusterism,  194. 
Finance,  Texan,  94. 


Fire-arms,  handling,  72;  untimely  discharge  of,  561, 
562. 

Fire-eater,  612,  614,  615. 

"  Fire  low,"  566. 

Firmness  of  Jefferson  Davis,  496,  512. 

First  gun,  the,  535. 

Fisher,  William  S.,  80,  85,  116,  117,  176. 

Fishing,  161,  723. 

Fishing  Creek,  898,  400;  battle  of,  390-405. 

Fleet  at  Belmont,  418,  419,  422;  fresh-water  (nee 
Gunboats,  Fort  Henry,  Fort  Donelson,  and  Shi 
loh). 

Flight  of  citizens,  497. 

Floods,  485,  503-510. 

Florence.  534. 

Flowers,  love  of,  54,  153,  173,  175,  689. 

Floyd,  John  B.,  207,  208,  231,  239,  240,  247,  248, 
408,  409,  425,  429,  433-440,  453-456,  463,  464,  466, 
469-474,  485,  486,  496,  498,  499,  504,  508,  515-520, 
540. 

Flute-playing,  21. 

Fogg,  Major,  401. 

Fontaine,  Edward,  181,  722-725. 

Foote,  Andrew  H.,  418,  421,  430-432,  444,  449,  450, 
452. 

Foote,  Henry  8.,  513. 

Foresight,  419. 

Forrest,  N.  B.,  861,  385,  386,  433,  436,  447,  461,  4G2, 
464,  469,  472-474,  499,  503,  636,  637,  641,  658,  654. 

Fort  Bridger,  211,  215-21T. 

Fort  Brown,  bombardment  of,  132. 

FOET  DONELSON,  809,  849,  359,  390,  407-428, 
433-434;  preparations  for  defense,  433-436;  con 
centration,  434-436;  Federal  strength,  436,444; 
demoralization,  435 ;  military  criticism,  436 ; 
encouragement,  436-433,  453;  skirmish,  438; 
strength  of  position,  436-440 ;  plan  to  abandon, 
437-439;  General  Johnston's  orders,  437,  438, 
453;  vacillation,  438;  Floyd's  explanation,  439; 
Floyd's  plan,  439 ;  General  Johnston's  plan,  439  ; 
defenses  and  topography,  440-442;  Confederate 
troops,  441-443 ;  Federal  troops,  444 ;  design  of 
advance,  443 ;  delay,  444  ;  advance,  444.  Battle 
of  the  Trenches,  446-448;  apathy  of  defenders, 
447 ;  gunboat  disabled,  449 ;  death  of  Dixon,  449. 
Battle  of  the  Chwboats,  450-453 ;  repulse,  453 ; 
important  order,  453 ;  authority  and  responsibil 
ity,  453,  454;  a  quiet  day,  454;  abortive  sortie, 

454  ;  divided  counsels,  455,  463,  464 ;  Federal  re- 
enforcements,    455,    456 ;    exaggerated    reports, 

455  ;  discouragement,  456;  sortie  agreed  on,  456. 
Battle  of  Dover,  457-469;  the  attack,  457,  458; 
Federal  strength,  453 ;  well-matched  antagonists, 
458;  fight  on  the  left,  459,  460;  Brown's  assault, 
461 ;   Hanson's  assault,  461,  462 ;   "Wynn's  road 
cleared,  462 ;  cessation  of  conflict,  463 ;  the  criti 
cal  moment,  463;  recall  of  troops,  464;  Grant's 
advance,  464;  Grant  and  Smith,  465;  assault  by 
Federal  left,  464-469 ;  capture  of  outwork,  466 ; 
close  of  battle,  467-469;   losses,  469,  471,  474; 
Confederate    victory    telegraphed,    469 ;    sortie 
planned,  469 ;  Forrest's  reconnaissance,  469,  470  ; 
council  of  war,  470-473  ;  discussion  of  surrender, 
470-473 ;  escape  of  Floyd  and  Pillow,  472-474 ; 
the  breaking  up,  473-475;   prisoners,  474;   sur- 


INDEX. 


render,  474-477;  consequences,  476;  terms  of 
surrender,  477 ;  Confederate  strength  and  losses, 
478,  479 ;  Federal  strength  and  losses,  482,  483 ; 
value  of  the  fort,  4S5 ;  separation  of  army,  487 ; 
news  of  surrender,  495-497  ;  Congressional  in 
quiry,  513  ;  General  Johnston's  inquiry,  515-520. 
Governor  Johnson's  opinion,  550. 

Fort  Henry,  309,  311,  343,  849,  359,  390,  407-423, 
430-433,  457. 

Fort  Pillow,  325,  527. 

Fortress,  natural,  531. 

Franklin,  B.  C.,  130. 

Fraudulent  land-claims,  94. 

Fredonian  War,  58. 

Fremont,  John  C.,  295,  296,  314,  324-326. 

Frenzy,  popular,  495-499,  510-515. 

Freshets,  409. 

Friend  of  youth,  the,  193. 

Friendly  portraiture,  194,  195. 

Friends,  3,  8, 11, 14, 129. 

Friendship,  loyal,  514,  515,  517,  520,  522. 

Friendship  of  Davis,  496,  512. 

Frontier  defense,  183, 186,  190-192. 

Fruitless  field,  a,  639. 

Furloughs,  230,  241. 

Fry,  Speed  8.,  401. 

Funeral  honors,  659,  660,  6SS-715. 

Fusillade,  reckless,  562,  563. 

G. 

Gaines,  E.  P.,  31,  36. 
Galleher,  John  N.,  727. 
Gardening,  156, 158. 
Garfield,  James  A.,  390,  392-394. 
Garrisons,  414,  429. 
General  C.  8.  A.,  292. 
General  consultation,  62, 100, 101, 107. 
Generous  letters  of  Davis,  517,522. 
Geography,  military,  513,  514 ;  of  Utah,  233-241. 
Gibson,  Eandal  L.,  354,  573,  5S3,  595,  601,  605,  635, 

644,  648,  649. 

Gibson,  General  (Federal),  646-643. 
Gift,  George  W.,  277,  278,  281-237. 
GIFTS  :  To  his  sisters,  15 ;  to  his  children,  146  ; 

to  his  friends,  119,  120 ;  from  L.  Groce,  133 ;  at 

Monterey,  139 ;    declined,  243,  244 ;    of  silver, 

276. 
Gilmer,  J.  F.,  887,  412-417,  426-428,  432,  435,  436, 

440,  452,  473,  507,  567,  569,  570,  635. 
Gilpin,  Henry  D.,  86. 
Gilpin,  Mrs.  Eliza,  15, 16,  273. 
Gladden,  A.  H.,  562, 572,  589,  595,  601,  658. 
Golden  deed,  a,  615. 
Goliad,  massacre  at,  64. 
"  Gone  for  his  musket,"  3SO. 
Gorgas,  J.  G.,  332. 

Government,  American,  153,  256-258. 
Governor  of  Alabama,  829 ;    Arkansas,  334,  340 ; 

Georgia,  830 ;   Mississippi,  334,  340  ;   Tennessee 

(see  I.  G.  Harris). 
Graduation,  12, 13. 
Grand  army  of  invasion,  534-536. 
Grandfather,  1. 
Grant,  U.  8.,  305, 307, 314,  324, 349,  357, 366-378, 390, 

421,  422,  430,  432, 433,  443,  444,  459,  463-467,  436, 


52(5-528,  533,  534,  574-581,  602,  603,  641,  657,  658  ; 

at  Shiloh,  602,  603,  653. 
Grasshoppers,  174. 
Grave,  the,  660,  688-715. 
Graves,  Kice  E.,  447,  448,  460-468. 
Grayson,  P:  W.,  90. 

Great  Bend  of  the  Tennessee,  523-530,  534,  539. 
Great  men,  55, 154. 
Green,  Wharton  J.,  731, 

Green  Eiver,  814,  316,  353  ;  railroad-bridge,  310. 
Gregg,  General,  361. 
Griffin,  Charles,  703. 

Griffin,  John  8.,  129,  261,  268,  271,  276,  278,  279. 
Groce,  Leonard,  69, 133. 
Gunboats,  313,  314,  375,  385,  409,  411,  417-419,  422, 

428,  430-433,  435,  448-450,  621,  622,  027,  628,  632- 

634,  640. 

II. 

Habits,  good,  164, 171. 

Hail-storms,  174. 

Halcyon  days,  25. 

Haldeman,  W.  K,  299,  879. 

Hall,  Warren  D.  C.,  143. 

Halleck,  H.  W.,  378,  382,  390,  420-422,  443,  444,  527, 

528,  534-538,  540, 576. 
Hamburg,  530,  531. 
Haraby,  William  R.,  337. 
Hamer,  General,  139, 142. 
Hamilton,  James,  74, 130, 155. 
Hancock,  George,  53,  121,  129,  130,  132,  134,  185, 

155-157, 167, 168. 
Hancock,  Mary  D.,  53. 
Handling  troops,  550,  555,  603. 
Hanson,  Eoger  W.,  441,  447,  461,  462,  465-468. 
Hardcastle,  A.  W.,  277,  230,  284,  289,  584,  587. 
Hardee,  William  J.,  185-183,  296,  824,  334,  849,  353, 

354,  861,  487,  493,  495,  496,  508,  509,  549,  555,  558, 

560.    (See  Battle  of  Shiloh.) 
Hare,  A.  M..  592,  595. 
Harney,  William  S.,  207,  208,  210,  229. 
Harper's  Weekly,  725,  726. 
Harris,  Abigail,  1. 
Harris,  I.  G.,  253,  302,  321,  323,  324,  332,  334,  340, 

845,  865,  407,  413,  416,  499,  506,  554,  569,  610-616, 

731. 

Hawkins,  T.  T.,  610,  611. 
Haydon,  D.  M.,  317,  544,  586,  539,  595,  615,  688, 

717. 

Hays,  John  C.,  123,  359. 
Hazardous  position,  396,  398,  399. 
Hazen,  General,  646. 
Head,  Colonel,  456,  457,  460,  463,  467. 
Health,  164. 

Heavy  artillery.    (See  Ordnance.) 
Heiman,  Colonel,  428,  430,  442,  447,  448,  456. 
Heintzelman,  General,  708. 
Helm,  Benjamin  H.,  388,  508. 
Helvetti  and  Prime,  397. 
Henderson,  B.  H.,  14. 
Henry,  General,  36-41. 
Henry,  G.  A.,  413,  414. 
Henry,  Fort.    (See  Fort  Henry.) 
Heroism,  individual,  431,  451,  645,  647,  649. 
Heth,  Henry,  237,  238,  243. 
Hildebrand,  J.,  550,  587-591,  653. 


INDEX. 


745 


Ilindman,  T.  C.,  854,  334,  383,  493,  508,  509,  5T2, 534, 
5S7-591,  595,  597,  601,  604,  647. 

Historical  errors,  486. 

Historic  figures,  521,  522. 

Hobbs,  Edward  D.,  86, 158. 

Ilockley,  George  W.,  66,  85,  91. 

Hodge,  George  B.,  879,  494,  508,  573,  610-612. 

Home  again,  247  ;  at  Jefferson  Barracks,  25,  47,  48; 
on  plantation,  144-169. 

"  Home  Guard,"  803. 

Honest  dealing,  725. 

HONORS  TO  THE  DEAD  :  At  New  Orleans,  688,  639  ; 
by  Beauregard,  6S9 ;  President  Davis,  690  ;  Con 
federate  Congress,  691-694  ;  Legislature  of  Tex 
as,  695-699;  at  New  Orleans,  700,  701;  Galves- 
ton,  701-706  ;  official  brutality,  703-711  ;  at  Hous 
ton,  706-711 ;  Austin,  712-714 ;  New  Orleans,  715. 

Hooker,  Joseph,  140,  141. 

Hooper,  William  H.,  235. 

Hopkinsville.  309,  349,  360,  361,  3S6,  333,  434. 

Hoppin's  "  Life  of  Foote,"  418,  422,  426. 

Hornet's  nest,  the,  604-606,  622. 

Horrors  of  war,  448,  449. 

Horsemanship,  133,  612,  719,  729. 

Horse-marines,  335. 

Hospitality,  a  paradox,  152. 

Hostile  correspondence,  75,  76,  121. 

Housekeeping  in  army,  25  ;  on  plantation,  146. 

Houston,  city  of,  706-711,  721. 

Houston,  Sam,  62-71,  74, 80,  82,  83,  85,  89-92,  97,  98, 
100-102, 106,  115,  121-127, 130,  133,  151,  224. 

Howard,  Major,  335. 

Howison,  E.  R.,  376. 

Hume,  F.  C.,  speech  of,  698,  699. 

Hunt,  H..  329,  330,  652. 

Hunt,  W.  E.,  332. 

Hunting  buffalo,  175. 

Hunting  on  the  Brazos,  150. 

Hurlbut,  S.  A.,  531,  591,  592,  595,  593-600,  620,  625, 
643. 

Huston,  Felix,  71,  74-81,  118. 

Hypothetical  strategy,  434,  4S5. 


Identity,  mistake  of,  600. 

Ignored,  commander,  543. 

Ill-health,  Beauregard's,  542,  543,  549,  552. 

Imaginary  plot,  261-274. 

Impersonal  generalship,  543. 

Impetus,  617. 

Importance  of  Corinth.  533. 

Impressment,  417,  508. 

Impulse  of  leadership,  613,  619. 

In  the  .snow-drifts,  213-216. 

Inadequate  forces,  484. 

Incendiarism,  388. 

Indecisive  warfare,  in  Missouri,  293-296,  523. 

Independence  of  judgment,  164,  165;  of  thought, 
151. 

Indian  affairs,  235 ;  character,  26, 116 ;  fights,  37, 33, 
41, 106, 109,  111,  112,116-118, 191 ;  massacre,  285; 
policy  of  United  States,  25,  26 ;  policy  of  Texas, 
83,  89.  98,  etc. ;  treaties,  19,  26,  29,  31,  32,  84, 
83,  89,  98, 101-110, 115,  235,  236  (see  Black-Hawk 


and  Cherokee  Wars) ;  tribes,  19,  27,  28,  88,  98, 
103,  104,  191,  246,  283  ;  Wells,  281. 

Indians,  233,  235,  236.  (See  Comanches,  Cherokees, 
Camp  Floyd,  Utah.) 

Indians,  expedition  against,  19. 

Indignation,  honest,  206,  271-275. 

Infallibility  of  the  successful,  533. 

Infantry,  Lieutenant  of,  13, 18,  33. 

Information  of  the  enemy,  425,  520. 

Injustice  of  President  Houston,  125-127. 

Inroad  of  Zollicoffer,  355-357. 

Instruction  of  troops,  425. 

Insult,  official,  124-127. 

Insurrection,  360,  364,  365. 

Intent  to  attack  Grant,  538. 

Interesting  interviews,  521,  522. 

Interior  lines,  484,  485. 

Invasion,  army  of,  534-537. 

Invasion  of  East  Tennessee,  317  ;  Kentucky,  306 ; 
Mexican,  64,  65,  81,  86-83,  90,  91, 123 ;  of  Texas, 
64,65. 

Island  No.  10,  324,  325, 40T,  526,  527,  537. 

Isolation,  145-160, 165. 

Itinerary,  291. 

luka,  552. 

J. 

Jack,  Patrick  C.,  59. 

Jack,  Thomas  M.,  521,  522,  544,  534,  6SS,  717,  T18, 

Jackson  (Tennessee),  525,  543. 

Jackson,  Andrew,  43,  44,  50,  100, 103. 

Jackson,  Camp,  293,  294. 

Jackson,  C.  F.,  253,  293,  294,  325. 

Jackson,  John  K.,  572, 595, 593,  601, 608, 623, 624, 630. 

Japanese,  the,  246. 

Jefferson  Barracks,  19,  22,  25,  86, 45, 186. 

Johnson,  ADdrew,  253,  264. 

Johnson,  Bushrod  E.,  337,  407,  433,  442,  456-453, 
460,  463,  464,  473, 475,  573,  595,  596,  696,  601,  657. 

Johnson,  George  W.,  331,  382,  492,  514,  550, 551. 

Johnson,  E.  A.,  534. 

Johnston,  Abigail  H.,  1. 

JOHNSTON,  ALBERT  SIDNEY  : 

FAMILY  AND  BOYHOOD,  1-14.  Birth,  1 ;  friends, 
8;  character,  8-5;  anecdote,  4;  education,  4,5; 
Josiah  S.  Johnston,  5-7;  Transylvania,  5,  8;  an 
ecdotes,  9 ;  West  Point,  9-14. 

EARLY  ARMY  LIFE,  14-25.  Chess  w.  cards,  14, 
15;  Washington  society,  15-18;  a  song,  16;  de 
clines  General  Scott's  offer,  17 ;  Sackett's  Harbor, 
18 ;  reckless  act,  18 ;  the  Sixth  Infantry,  18 ;  Jef 
ferson  Barracks,  19-25;  Winnebago  Expedition, 
19,  20 ;  letter- writing,  20  ;  quick  temper,  21 ; 
General  Atkinson,  21;  "Judge  not."  22;  St. 
Louis  society,  22 ;  Henrietta  Preston,  22-25 ; 
marriage,  24 ;  halcyon  days,  25. 

BLACK-HAWK  WAR,  25-45 ;  the  Indian  policy, 
25-27;  Johnston's  journal,  27  (see  Black-Hawk 
War) ;  colonel  of  militia,  36 ;  visit  to  family,  86  ; 
pursuit  of  Indians,  36-41 ;  battle  of  the  Bad  Axe, 
41. 

JEFFERSON  BARRAGES,  45-55.  Crosman's  opin 
ion  of  Johnston,  46,  rebuke  to  blackguardism, 
46;  illness,  47;  family,  47-55;  mental  struggle, 
48;  letters  of  J.  S.  Johnston,  43-50 ;  death  of  J. 
S.  Johnston,  50,  51 ;  Mrs.  Johnston's  illness  and 


746 


INDEX. 


death.  51-53 ;  resigns  commission,  52  ;  a  lady's 
description  of  him,  53,  54;  St.  Louis — depression, 
54,  55 ;  a  new  career,  55. 

TEXAN  REVOLUTION,  56-68. 

As  TEXAN  SOLDIER,  68-92.  Emigrates  to  Texas, 
69 ;  kills  an  American  lion,  69 ;  enlists  as  a  private, 
70;  the  Texan  army,  70,  71 ;  personal  appearance 
and  bearing,  71,  72  ;  rapid  promotion,  72,  73 ;  du 
eling,  73  ;  made  commander  of  army,  74  ;  duel 
with  Felix  Huston,  74-SO  ;  management  of  army, 
81-83;  succumbs  to  wound,  83 ;  President  Sam 
Houston,  83-85 ;  public  policy,  84,  85 ;  wound,  85; 
again  at  the  front,  86 ;  neglect  by  the  Govern 
ment,  87 ;  talk  with  Comanches,  88,  89 ;  anecdotes, 
89,  90;  invasion  from  Mexico,  90,  91;  desperate 
resolve,  91;  Lamar's  administration,  91-123.  . 

SECRETARY  OF  WAR,  92-118.  Views  of  military 
policy,  95-97  ;  Cherokee  "War,  98-113 ;  General 
Johnston's  report,  108-110 ;  battle  of  the  Neches, 
110-113;  a  fugitive  rallied,  113;  foundation  of 
Austin,  113, 114;  the  Comanches,  114-118. 

1840-1845,118-131.  Kestlessness,  118;  mon 
ey-matters,  119 ;  his  generosity,  120 ;  dislike  of 
politics,  120, 121;  hostile  correspondence,  121, 122 ; 
dreams  of  tranquillity,  122  ;  resignation,  128 ; 
politics,  123;  Mexican  invasion,  123;  insult  by 
the  President,  124-127 ;  appeal  to  the  people,  125- 
127;  more  invasions,  127;  a  pledge,  128;  Texas 
history,  128;  annexation,  128,  129;  second  mar 
riage,  129 ;  China  Grove  plantation,  129 ;  private 
business,  129-131 ;  James  Love,  131. 

THE  MEXICAN  WAR,  131-145.  General  Tay 
lor's  letter,  132, 133 ;  General  Johnston  joins  ar 
my,  133  ;  letters,  134,  135  ;  regiment  disbanded, 
135, 136  ;  anecdote,  136;  the  battle  of  Monterey, 
136-141 ;  extraordinary  hazard,  139.  140;  General 
Joseph  Hooker,  140,  141 ;  recommended  as  brig 
adier,  142  ;  the  capitulation,  142-145;  Davis  and 
Johnston,  142-144. 

PLANTATION-LIFE,  145-169.  Retires  from  ar 
my,  145  ;  self-abnegation,  146 ;  description  of 
China  Grove,  146 ;  Texan  scenery,  146, 147 ;  fam 
ily,  147 ;  work,  148 ;  W.  D.  C.  Hall,  148 ;  the 
writer's  reminiscences,  148-152;  anecdotes,  149, 
150 ;  rules  of  conduct,  151 ;  habits  and  views, 
152;  opinions  of  the  war,  153,  154;  poverty  and 
oblivion,  155;  letters,  156-165;  Arcadia  in  the 
swamp,  155-159 ;  views  on  education,  159-165  ; 
the  dignity  of  labor,  161;  patriotism,  161,  162; 
law,  162, 163  ;  moderation,  163. 164  ;  isolation  and 
dejection,  165;  the  Whig  renaissance,  166;  Tay 
lor  elected,  167;  queer  office-seeking,  167,  168. 

PAYMASTER,  169-183.  Duties,  170  ;  the  frontier, 
171-177;  peril  and  care,  171-173;  the  writer's 
reminiscences,  173-179  ;  the  prairies,  173-176 ; 
study  of  Nature,  175 ;  unselfish  labor,  176  ;  men 
tal  habits,  176,  177  ;  political  opinions,  177,  178;  • 
a  robber  detected,  178,  179;  settlement  of  ac 
counts,  179,  180;  family  letters,  180-182;  anec 
dotes,  181,  182;  humility  and  prayer,  182;  the 
stars,  183. 

THE  SECOND  CAVALRY,  183-195.  Increase  of 
army,  183-185  ;  Jefferson  Davis,  183-185;  ap 
pointed  colonel,  185,  186;  recruiting,  186  ;  from 
St.  Louis  to  Texas,  187-189 ;  ill,  1S9 ;  abolition 


ism,  189,  190;  military  administration,  190-193; 
the  friend  of  youth,  193,194;  a  friendly  portrait 
ure,  198-195. 

THE  MORMON  EEBELLION,  195-20(5. 

THE  UTAH  CAMPAIGN,  207-233.  Its  inception, 
207-210  ;  General  Johnston  assigned,  208 ;  army 
orders,  209 ;  arrangements,  210 ;  journey,  210, 
211 ;  Mormon  hostilities,  211 ;  winter,  212 ;  in  the 
snow-drifts,  213-215;  rescue  of  the  army,  213- 
215 ;  Fort  Bridger,  215 ;  tests  of  soldiership,  216, 
217  ;  winter  work,  218-220 ;  the  salt  embassy, 
218,  219 ;  conflicting  policies,  221 ;  Colonel  Kane's 
diplomacy,  221-227 ;  more  salt,  224  ;  the  weather, 
225,  226;  peace  commissioners,  226,  228;  sub 
mission  of  Mormons,  227;  General  Johnston's 
letter,  227;  his  proclamation,  228;  commendation, 
228 ;  movements  of  army,  229  ;  brevet  brigadier- 
general,  229;  general  orders,  230;  commenda 
tion  and  criticism,  231 ;  General  Johnston's  own 
statement,  232. 

CAMP  FLOYD,  233-248.  The  position,  283 ;  du 
ties,  233  -  236 ;  winter-quarters,  234  ;  Indian  af 
fairs,  235,  236 ;  conflict  of  jurisdiction,  286-240  ; 
administration  of  Utah,  241  ;  relieved,  241 ;  per 
sonnel  of  the  army,  242  ;  family  affections,  243  ; 
farewell  to  his  army,  243;  a  gift  declined,  244; 
political  promotion  discussed,  244,  245 ;  his  citi 
zenship  in  Texas,  246 ;  anecdotes,  246 ;  home 
again,  247;  the  crisis  of  I860,  247;  assigned  com 
mand  of  California,  247,  248 ;  manumission,  24S ; 
journey,  248. 

SOUTHERN  CONFEDERACY,  249-256. 

CALIFORNIA,  256-274.  General  Johnston's  ideas 
of  government,  256-260  ;  the  right  of  resistance, 
259  ;  the  alternative  presented,  260,  261 ;  resigns 
and  is  relieved,  261,  262  ;  imaginary  plot,  262;  a 
Blander  refuted,  262-274 ;  General  Buell's  letter, 
263;  Governor  Downey's  statement,  2C4,  265; 
General  Mackall's  letter,  265 ;  incidents  of  resigna 
tion,  266;  attempted  reparation,  267 ;  Hon.  Mont 
gomery  Blair's  letter,  267;  Los  Angeles,  268; 
advice  to  citizens,  268 ;  writer's  recollections,  268, 
269;  General  Johnston's  correspondence,  269- 
274. 

THE  DESERT  JOURNEY,  275-291.  Resignation 
accepted,  275 ;  Impending  war,  275  ;  a  dread  al 
ternative,  275,  276;  a  cherished  gift,  276;  sur 
veillance  and  escape,  277,  278  ;  on  the  road,  279  ; 
the  desert,  280-283 ;  the  comet,  282,  283  ;  Tucson, 
283 ;  the  Pimos  Indians,  283  ;  anecdote,  284 ;  Fed 
eral  troops,  284, 285;  running  the  gantlet,  284,  285 ; 
an  Indian  massacre,  285 ;  the  Rio  Grande,  285- 
287 ;  anecdotes,  286,  287 ;  escape  of  Moore  and 
Lord,  287,  288;  Lynde's  surrender,  287,  288; 
through  Texas,  289 ;  anecdotes,  289  ;  the  journey 
summed  up,  290  ;  a  nation's  suspense,  290  ;  a  na 
tion's  joy,  290 ;  arrival  at  Richmond,  291 ;  itin 
erary,  291. 

SITUATION  IN  THE  WEST,  291-305.  Demand  for 
his  services,  291 ;  orders  and  rank,  292 ;  com 
mand,  292,  293. 

THE  MILITARY  SITUATION  IN  KENTUCKY,  306- 
318.  Arrival  in  Nashville,  306  ;  personal  remi 
niscences,  807  ;  the  defense  of  Tennessee,  307  ; 
General  Johnston's  resources  and  theory,  308; 


INDEX. 


letter  to  the  President,  308,  309 ;  the  Confederate 
line,  309  ;  Zollicoffer  and  Buckner,  309 ;  Buckner 
seizes  Bowling  Green,  810 ;  Federal  alarm,  310, 
311 ;  Confederate  advance,  311  ;  General  John 
ston's  proclamation,  311,  312  ;  considerations  de 
termining  line,  312 ;  the  theatre  of  war,  313,  314  ; 
strength  of  armies,  314,  315 ;  concealment  of 
weakness,  315  ;  General  Johnston's  memoranda, 
816  ;  Federal  plans,  31T  ;  General  Johnston's 
staff,  317.  318. 

GENERAL  POLK  AND  COLUMBUS,  318-327.  Gov 
ernor  Ei/ynolds's  personal  recollections,  325-327. 

EFFORTS  TO  GET  ARMS  AND  TROOPS,  828-343. 
Small  resources  and  powers,  328  ;  begging  for 
arms,  329  ;  scant  results  and  deficient  armament, 
330-333  ;  recruiting  the  army,  333 ;  concentra 
tion,  334;  requisitions  for  troops,  334,  835;  ob 
stacles,  336  ;  Tennessee  troops,  837  ;  condition 
of  troops,  337  ;  embarrassments,  338 ;  twelve 
months'  volunteers,  839-341 ;  distant  control, 
341 ;  difficulties  of  the  Government,  341,  842  ; 
call  for  militia,  343  ;  General  Johnston's  urgency, 
843-348 ;  Southern  Executives,  343-346. 

BOWLING  GREEN,  349-366.  Confederate  army 
in  Kentucky,  349-351  ;  organization,  352,  353 ; 
his  generals,  353,  854;  Zollicoffer's  operations, 
855-357 ;  minor  operations,  358  ;  anecdote,  359  ; 
general  Federal  advance,  359  ;  left  centre  of  line, 
860, 361 ;  delusive  demonstrations,  361-364 ;  Sher 
man  paralyzed,  3C3 ;  East  Tennessee,  364,  365. 

BATTLE  OF  BELMONT,  366-378. 

FALL  CAMPAIGN,  373-3S9.  General  D.  C.  Bu- 
ell,  378;  Kentucky  refugees,  879  ;  John  C.  Breck- 
inridge,  380  ;  Kentucky  provisional  government, 
881,  332;  minor  operations,  382,  388  ;  the  cavalry, 
883-386;  letters  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  386- 
3S8 ;  anecdotes,  389. 

BATTLE  OF  FISHING  CREEK,  390-406.  "Western 
Kentucky,  390 ;  Eastern  Kentucky,  390-393  ; 
General  Zollicoffer,  394,  395  ;  his  operations,  895- 
402;  General  Johnston's  warnings,  396  ;  calm 
ness  in  misfortune,  406. 

FORT  HENRY,  407-433.  River-defenses,  407-433 ; 
General  Johnston's  solicitude,  411,  412  ;  Gilmer, 
412-415  Tilghman,  415.  416 ;  preparations  for  at 
tack  and  defense,  412-430  ;  attack,  430,  431  ;  sur 
render,  432. 

FORT  DONELSON,  433-433.  Movements  of  troops, 
433,  434;  preparations  at  Donelson,  435-443; 
General  Johnston's  orders,  437-439,  453  ;  the 
fighting,  446  ;  Confederate  victory  announced, 
469 ;  surrender,  475.  (See  Fort  Donelson.) 

THE  EETREAT  FROM  BOWLING  GREEN,  484- 
500.  General  Johnston's  strategy  discussed,  484- 
488  ;  conference  at  Bowling  Green,  487 ;  military 
prophecy,  488-490;  plan  of  retreat,  490-493  ;  evac 
uation  of  Bowling  Green,  493-495;  Nashville, 
495-500;  panic  and  mob,  496-498;  evacuation, 
499,  500. 

FROM  MURFREESBORO  TO  CORINTH,  500-522. 
The  change  in  affairs,  500 ;  modification  of  plan, 
501  ;  letter  from  General  Beauregard,  501,  502 ; 
reinforcements,  502,  503;  Johnston's  review  of 
situation,  503,  504;  plan  of  concentration,  505- 
507  ;  reorganization  at  Murfreesboro,  503  ;  retreat 


from  Murfreesboro,  503 ;  Morgan's  first  raids, 
509  ;  the  march,  509,  510  ;  public  fury,  510-514 ; 
President  Davis  and  Congress,  512,  513;  serenity, 
513,  514  ;  steadfast  friends,  514,  515  ;  moral  pow 
er,  515 ;  Floyd  and  Pillow,  516 ;  Davis's  generous 
letter,  517 ;  Johnston's  review  of  Fort  Donelson 
and  campaign,  518-521;  the  test  of  merit,  521; 
Jefferson  Davis  and  Eobert  E.  Lee,  521,  522  ; 
concentration  completed,  522. 

PITTSBURG  LANDING,  522-538.  The  war  in  Mis 
souri,  523-525 ;  Beauregard's  operations,  525-527 ; 
Federal  army  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  527-530; 
topography,  530-532 ;  false  security,  532-534  ; 
Federal  plan,  534 ;  Buell's  movements,  535,  536 ; 
Federal  strength,  537,  538 ;  distances,  538. 

CONCENTRATION  AT  SIIILOH,  533-557.  Strategic 
importance,  533,  539  ;  the  concentration,  539,  540 ; 
the  initiative,  540 ;  Johnston's  objective  point, 
541  ;  Beauregard's  plan  and  letter,  542  ;  Beaure 
gard's  report  of  Shiloh,  543 ;  Van  Dorn,  543,  544 ; 
personal  staff,  544  ;  Braxton  Bragg,  544-549  ; 
Johnston's  offer  to  Beauregard,  549,  550  ;  Gov 
ernor  Johnson's  protest,  550,  551  ;  the  resolve  to 
attack,  551,  552 ;  Lee's  letter,  551,  552 ;  plan  of 
battle,  553;  comments,  553,  554;  Johnston's  tel 
egram,  554 ;  orders,  555-557. 

BATTLE  OF  SHILOH,  558-687.  (For  operations, 
see  Battle  of  Shiloh.) 

PERSONAL  MOVEMENTS  :  April  4th  and  5th, 
562,  563 ;  on  the  field,  565,  566 ;  the  council  of 
war,  567-572 ;  night  and  morning,  582 ;  elation 
at  joining  battle,  582,  583  ;  winged  words,  582- 
584 ;  chieftain  and  clansmen,  584,  585  ;  urging 
the  assault,  587-590;  on  the  left,  593;  directing 
the  advance,  595  ;  on  the  right,  597,  598  ;  fought 
as  planned,  599;  Johnston  and  Polk,  601;  the 
right,  608  ;  checkmate,  608  ;  the  Federal  key, 
609,  610;  a  memorable  charge,  611  ;  General 
Johnston  leads  it,  612  ;  victory,  612;  death,  613  ; 
the  incidents,  613-616. 

GENERAL  JOHNSTON  IN  THE  GRAVE,  688-715. 
From  Shiloh  to  New  Orleans.  688 ;  sepulture  and 
public  sorrow,  688,  639;  General  Beauregard's 
order,  639 ;  President  Davis's  message,  690 :  Con 
federate  Congress,  691-694  ;  Legislature  of  Texas, 
694-699  ;  honors  at  New  Orleans,  700,701;  hon 
ors  at  Galveston,  701-706 ;  official  brutality,  703- 
711 ;  honors  at  Houston,  706-711 ;  at  Austin,  712- 
714 ;  at  New  Orleans,  715. 

THE  END,  715-736.  Not  reckless,  716,  717;  es 
timates  of  character,  by  Colonel  Munford,  716, 
719,  720;  by  General  Preston,  717;  by  Major 
Haydon,  717;  by  Colonel  Jack,  717,  718;  remi 
niscences  of  Eev.  E.  M.  Chapman,  721 ;  of  Eev. 
E.  Fontaine,  722-725  ;  of  Dr.  D.  W.  Yandell, 
725;  description  in  Harper's  Weekly,  725,  726; 
estimate  by  Thomas  F.  McKinney,  726 ;  by  New 
York  Times,  726,  727  ;  by  General  William  J. 
Worth,  727;  reminiscences  of  Eev.- Dr.  Galleher, 
727;  of  Colonel  J.  W.  Avery,  728,  729;  estimate 
by  General  W.  C.  Whitthorne,  729  ;  anecdote  by 
Lieutenant  J.  M.  Fairbanks,  730;  Scott  and  Da 
vis  almost  agree,  730;  estimate  by  Judge  Bal- 
linger,  730;  by  Colonel  W.  J.  Green,  731;  by 
Governor  I.  G.  Harris,  731 ;  by  President  Jeffer- 


748 


INDEX. 


son  Davis,  731,  732;  by  Major  Alfriend,  T32  ;  by 
Prof.  A.  T.  Bledsoe,  732;  by  General  Richard 
Taylor,  732,  733  ;  epitaph  by  John  B=  S.  Dimitry, 
734;  a  filial  estimate,  735,  736;  the  end,  736. 

Johnston,  Archibald,  1 ;  Eliza  A.,  15, 16,  273 ;  Eliza 
Griffin,  129,  146,  155,  157,  261  ;  Henrietta  Pres 
ton,  22-24,  38,  39,  47-53;  John,  1,  2;  John  Har 
ris,  8,  50,  51;  Joseph  E.,  247,  292;  Josiah  8., 
1,  6,  7,  15, 17,  48-51;  J.  Stoddard,  545-547;  Wil 
liam  8.,  51. 

Johnston's  wife  of  Louisiana  (song),  16. 

Jordan,  Thomas,  567,  573,  590,  606,  623,  634,  636, 
639,  640. 

Journey  across  the  Plains,  210,  211 ;  for  health,  52, 
53 ;  perilous,  171, 173 ;  to  join  Taylor,  133 ;  through 
Arizona,  275-291. 

Joy  of  combat,  the,  582-585,  612,  613,  717,  713. 

Junction  with  Polk  projected,  492;  of  Buell  with 
Grant,  535,  536, 551,  554. 

K. 

Kane,  Thomas  L.,  199,  221-226,  236. 

Karnes,  Colonel,  82,  89, 115. 

Keelan,  James,  364. 

Kemper,  Samuel,  57. 

Kentuckians  at  Shiloh,  606,  607,  621,  650-652. 

KENTUCKY  :  In  1790, 1 ;  popular  traits,  5,  296;  poli 
tics,  296-304,  303,  309,  381,  3S2,  392 ;  military  oc 
cupation,  303,  304,  308;  invasion  of,  806,  308; 
troops,  310;  apathy,  351;  geography,  356-35S, 
392;  provisional  government,  831,382,  492;  refu 
gees,  492.  (See  Zollicoffer.) 

Keokuk,  29-35,  44,  45. 

Key,  the  Federal,  609,  610. 

Kindness  to  animals,  8. 

Kirk,  Colonel,  646-648. 

Kite,  the  long-tailed,  326. 

Know-Nothingism,  177. 

Know  thyself,  245. 

Knoxville,  306,  364,  365. 


Labor,  148, 156, 159, 161. 

Laborers  for  army,  343, 410, 416, 417, 423, 424, 552, 553. 

Lack  of  everything,  417. 

Lamar,  M.  B.,  66,  67,  71,  90-94, 106, 120,  123. 

Lancers,  charge  of,  139-141. 

Lances  and  red  tape,  389. 

Last  assault  of  Sunday,  623-626. 

Lauman,  J.  G.,  370-378,  466,  469,  600. 

Laurel  Bridge,  skirmish  at,  355. 

Law,  162, 164. 

Lawless  soldiery,  360. 

Law-making  extraordinary,  361. 

Leader,  a  born,  322. 

Leading  a  charge,  612,  613. 

Lee,  John  D.,  205,  206,  236. 

Lee,  Eobert  E.,  185,  521,  522.  551,  552. 

Legislature  of  Texas,  694-699. 

Letcher,  John,  251,  252. 

LETTERS  from  General  Johnston,  19,  20,  22,  56,  SB, 
86-88,  93, 121, 134,  135, 137, 153-163, 171-173, 177, 
180-182,  188, 193,  212-215,  228,  232,  234,  237,  239- 

.  246,  269-274,  329,  334-336,  338,  350,  851,  359,  386- 
3S3,  412,  425,  426,  500,  503-505,  516-522. 


Letter  of  General  Taylor,  132. 

Letters  of  Davis,  generous,  517,  522. 

Letter- writing,  aversion  to,  20. 

Lexington  (Missouri),  capture  of,  295. 

Liberality,  119, 120, 151,  721. 

Lick  Creek,  530,  531,  556-559,  572,  580,  598. 

Liddell,  St.  John,  346. 

Limits  of  interference,  453,  454. 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  86,  252,  267,  801,  303. 

Lincoln's  election,  247,  250,  254. 

Line  of  battle,  strong,  601 ;  of  retreat,  507-510. 

Lines  of  battle,  554,  562,  572,  573;  of  defense,  487- 
491,  500-509. 

Lipscomb,  Abner,  92, 123. 

Literary  pursuits,  49. 

Little,  Henry,  525. 

Local  interests,  503. 

Location  of  forts,  324,  325,  407-411. 

Logan's  Cross  Eoads,  battle  of,  398-406. 

Long's  expedition,  57. 

Lord  and  Moore's  escape,  287,  288. 

Los  Angeles,  261,  268,  275-278. 

Loss  by  winter  march,  284. 

LOSSES  IN  BATTLE:  Belmont,  375,  376;  Donelson, 
469,  474,  478-483;  Elkhorn,  525;  Fishing  Creek, 
403,  404 ;  Henry,  431,  432 ;  at  Shiloh,  639,  653,  655- 
657  (see  Appendices,  669-687) ;  at  Wilson's  Creek, 
295. 

Louisiana  troops,  294,  295.    (See  Shiloh.) 

Louisville,  24,  51-55,  247,  310,  315. 

Love,  James,  120, 123, 128,  131, 155,  514. 

Love  of  Nature,  173-175. 

Love  your  enemies,  615. 

Lovell,  M.  S.,  337,  425,  502,  503,  539. 

Loyalty,  true,  259. 

Loyalty  of  friendship,  514,  515,  517,  520-522. 

Lynde's  surrender,  287,  288. 

Lyon,  Nathaniel,  293-295. 

M. 

Machine  of  war,  618. 

Mackall,  W.  W.,  265',  487,  540,  541. 

Mackenzie,  Dave,  286. 

Magee's  expedition,  57. 

Magnanimity,  79,  85, 113,  406,  549,  550. 

Magnanimous  offer,  549,  550. 

Magnitude  of  the  war,  333. 

Magoffin,  Beriah,  801-305. 

Mailed  monsters,  418,  451. 

Major-general's  commission,  267. 

Manassas,  battle  of,  254,  255. 

Maney,  Frank,  448,  461,  465 ;  George,  606. 

Manson,  M.  D.,  398. 

Manual  labor,  148,  156, 159, 161. 

Maps,  350,  391,  434,  513,  529,  559,  600. 

Marauding,  508. 

MARCHES  :  Across  the  Plains,  210 ;  Buell's  to  join 
Grant,  585,  536  ;  of  Second  Cavalry,  187,  18S  ; 
pursuit  of  Black  Hawk,  33-42 ;  retreat  from  Bowl 
ing  Green,  493,  494 ;  retreat  from  Nashville,  503, 
504 ;  retreat  from  Murfreesboro,  508-510 ;  to  Cor 
inth,  540;  to  Shiloh,  558-566,  585,  586;  winter 
march  in  Utah,  212-216. 

Marcy,  E.  B.,  214,  218,  230. 

Marks,  A.  S.,  356. 


IXDEX. 


740 


Marmaduke,  John  8.,  354,  5S3,  652. 

Marmont's  "Spirit  of  Military  Institutions,"  4SS. 

Marriage,  first,  23  ;  second,  129. 

Marshall,  Humphrey,  293, 358,  360,  379, 390,  392-394. 

Masked  purpose,  507. 

Massacres,  Indian,  103-103, 115, 117,  2S5 ;  St.  Louis, 
294 ;  San  Antonio,  115-117.  (See  Black  Hawk.) 

Mathematics,  162, 164. 

Mayfleld  (Kentucky),  421. 

Mayfield,  James  S.,  109, 110, 123, 130. 

McArthur,  John,  453-462,  592,  598,  600,  601. 

McCausland,  Colonel,  457,  461. 

McClellan,  George  B.,  255,  256,  378,  421. 

McClernand,  John  A.,  370-378,  421.  444,  447,  458- 
460,  523,  531,  591,  592,  594-596,  600,  601,  606,  607, 
621,  642,  648. 

McClung,  Alexander,  137-139. 

McCook,  General,  363,  366,  393,  535,  536,  641,  643- 
649. 

McCown,  J.  P.,  526,  527. 

McCrary,  George  W.,  vi,  537. 

McCulloch,  Ben,  134,  226-228,  294,  295,  824,  835- 
337,  349,  523-525. 

McDowell,  Irvin,  230,  255. 

McDowell,  J.  A.,  580,  597,  606,  621. 

McIIenry,  John  H.,  619. 

Mcllvaine,  Bishop,  13,  721. 

McKinney,  Thomas  F.,  133, 166,  726. 

McLeod,  Hugh.  67,  11G. 

Mechanism  of  battle,  618. 

Mecklenburg  Declaration,  318. 

Meeting  with  President  Davis,  291. 

Memoirs,  Sherman's,  363. 

Memorandum,  816;  of  conference,  487. 

Memorials,  689-715. 

Memphis,  313,  332,  527,  528. 

Memphis  &  Bowling  Green  Railroad,  539. 

Memphis  &  Charleston  Railroad,  528,  530,  £34,  535, 
539,  661. 

Menace,  361,  362. 

Mc-silla,  285-2S9. 

Meteorology,  174,  175,  138,  225,  226,  281-233. 

Mexican  invasions,  64,  65,  81,  86-91, 123. 

Mexican  politics,  59,  96,  99. 

Mexican  village,  286. 

Mexican  War,  the,  131-145,  153, 162. 

Mickey's,  at,  555-573. 

Mid-day  at  Shiloh,  599. 

Milburn,  421. 

Middle  Tennessee,  534-536. 

Mier  Expedition,  127. 

Milam,  Benjamin  R.,  62, 100. 

Military  conjectures,  337;  crudities,  408;  educa 
tion,  9-14,  257;  infallibility,  533;  journal,  27-45 ; 
jurisdiction,  227,228,233,  236-240;  policy,  views 
on,  84-83,  95,  96,  134,  135,  152-154, 157,  181,  333, 
834,  344-348,  351 ;  situation  in  the  West,  291-296, 
302,  303,  344,  360,  361,  378,  386-390,  420,  421,  425, 
426,  433-435,  484,  485,  500-505,  518-523,  523,  535, 
533,  539,  542. 

Militia.  843.    (See  Troops.) 

Miller.  H.,  620. 

Mill  Springs,  395-406. 

Mina's  revolution.  57. 

Miscalculation,  554. 


Mississippi  Central  Railroad,  539;  river,  824,  527; 
troops  (see  Troops). 

Missouri,  293-296,  824,  523-526 ;  troops  (see 
Troops). 

Mistakes  in  battle,  401,  402. 

Mitchell,  O.,  535-537. 

Mob  at  Nashville,  495-  499. 

Mobile  &  Ohio  Railroad,  539,  651. 

Moderation,  163, 164. 

Momentum  of  success,  618,  619. 

Monday's  battle  at  Shiloh,  643. 

Money-matters,  119, 153,  272. 

Monroe,  Mayor,  688. 

Monroe,  Thomas  B.,  651. 

Monterey,  battle  of,  137-140. 

Monterey  (Tennessee),  528,  531,  543,  555-565. 

Monument  at  New  Orleans,  715. 

Moore,  A.  B.,  829. 

Moore,  David,  587. 

Moore,  Miss  Mollie,  707. 

Moore  and  Lord's  escape,  287,  288. 

Moral  power,  280,  515. 

Morale.  361,  533. 

Morehead,  Charles  A.,  379. 

Morehouse,  Colonel,  76,  77. 

Morgan,  John  H.,  383,  497,  499,  503,  606,  607,  653. 

Morgantown,  358. 

MORMONS  :  Rebellion,  195-246  ;  campaigns  among 
the,  195-246;  rise  of  the  sect,  195-198;  fanat 
icism  and  tyranny,  199-207,  241,  242;  quarrels 
with  Federal  officials,  199,  200,  237-239 ;  oratory, 
199-203,  242 ;  declaration  of  war,  201-203 ;  hostil 
ities,  202,  204,  211,  227 ;  General  Johnston's  opin 
ions,  212, 214, 219-223, 226, 227, 239,  240 ;  diplomacy 
of  Brigham  Young,  218,  219,  222,  223,  226 ;  Fed 
eral  policy,  207-210,  221,  226-223,  239-241 ;  peace 
commissioners,  226-228;  submission,  227 ;  Moun 
tain  Meadow  massacre,  205,  206 ;  orders,  209,  229> 
230 ;  journey  across  the  Plains,  210,  211 ;  in  the 
snow-drifts,  213-216;  Fort  Bridger,  211,  215-227; 
reply  to  Brigham  Young,  218,  219 ;  salt  embassy, 
218,  219,  223,  224;  Kane  and  Cumming,  221-226; 
army  enters  Salt  Lake  City,  229 ;  Camp  Floyd, 
233-243 ;  Indian  affairs,  235 ;  slanders,  285 ;  en 
forcement  of  law,  236-240 ;  geography,  233,  241 ; 
climate,  243.  (See  Joseph  Smith,  Brigham  Young, 
etc.) 

Morrison,  William  R.,  448. 

Morton,  John  P.,  8. 

Morton,  John  W.,  468. 

Mosquitoes,  279. 

Mountaineers,  204,  313. 

Mountains,  Alleghany,  313;   Rocky,  211-217,  225, 

226. 

Mountain  storms,  211-216,  225,  226;  streams,  217. 
Movement  of  troops,  294-296,  305,  309,  310,  346, 349, 
355-364,  867,  363,  363-383,  390-395,  406,  421,  422, 
425,  429,  4a3-446,  493-495,  499,  502-504,  508-510, 
518-530,  535,  536,  539,  540,  554-553. 
Muldrough's  Hill,  315,  316. 
Mulligan,  Colonel,  295. 

Munford,  Edward  W.,  266,  32S,  337,  840,  423-490, 
491,  495,  496,  499,  615,  549,  552,  562,  563,  570,  585, 
607,  608,  615,  683,  716,  717. 
Murfreesboro  to  Corinth,  500-522,  540. 


750 


INDEX. 


N. 

Nashville,  306,  308,  388,  416,  41T,  425,  42G,  485,  48T, 

495-499,  519,  535,  536. 
Nashville,  mob  at,  496-499. 
National  blessings,  158, 190. 
Nature,  study  of,  173-175. 
Nauvoo,  197. 
Navajo  Indians,  283. 
Naval  battle,  430-432,  449-454. 
Navy.    (See  Gunboats.) 
Navy,  predilection  for,  5. 
Neches,  battle  of  the,  110-112. 
Negroes  for  the  army,  343,  410,  416,  417,  423,  424, 

552,  553. 
Nelson,  William,  302,  303,  314,  358,  366,  536,  581, 

602,  625,  626,  641,  643-646,  649. 
New  levies,  539,  540. 
New  Orleans,  688,  689. 
New  Orleans  Picayune,  700. 
News  of  surrender,  495. 
Nicaragua  Expedition,  194. 
Night-march,  280-282,  400-404. 
Night  on  the  battle-field,  639. 
Nolens-volens,  287. 

Nominations  declined,  90, 120-123,  244-246. 
Non-combatants,  393 ;  care  for,  500,  508. 
North  Alabama,  416,  509. 
North  Carolina,  253. 
Northers,  174, 188. 
Number  of  troops.    (See  Strength  of  Armies.) 


O. 

Oak  Hills,  battle  of,  294,  295. 

Objective  point,  538-541. 

Obloquy,  481  505,  510-512. 

Obstacles,  560. 

Obstructions  in  rivers,  410,  412,  414,  416,  423,  435. 

Odium,  popular,  484,  495-499,  505,  510-515. 

Offensive  campaigns,  436,  484,  485,  528,  530. 

Offensive-defensive  plans,  542. 

Offer  of  appointment,  17. 

Offer  to  Beauregard,  549. 

Office-seeking,  90, 123, 167-169, 184,  244-246. 

Official  approbation,  229-281,  496. 

Official  injustice,  125,  238;  rebuke,  415;  report,  108. 

Oglesby,  E.  J.,  367,  368,  458,  461,  462. 

O'Hara,  Theodore,  544,  584, 615,  688. 

"  Old  Hickory,"  fear  of,  103. 

Old  saying  revamped,  373. 

Omniscient  generals,  454. 

Onset  at  Shiloh,  first,  588. 

Opinion  in  the  South,  251. 

Opinions.  (See  Military,  Political,  and  Republi 
can.) 

Oratory  extraordinary,  199-203,  224,  242. 

Orders  (Confederate),  317,  318, 384,339,  351-353,  361, 
378,  412,  433,  434,  437-439,  453,  494,  495,  500,  525, 
526,  555-557,  560 ;  contradictory,  645 ;  change  of, 
564 :  explanation  of,  560 ;  important,  453. 

Orders  (United  States  Government),  209,  229,  230, 
247,  292,  527,  535. 

Ordnance,  323,  332,  414,  418,  431,  432,  435-437,  440, 
450-^52. 


Organization,  73,  81,  82,  218,  220,  234,  323,  351-353, 

361,  492,  508,  544,  548,  549,  565. 
Origin  of  attack  at  Shiloh,  551-555. 
Origin  of  civil  war,  249,  250. 
Ornithology,  147,  150, 151, 175,  220. 
Overweening  confidence,  528,  530. 
Owl  Creek,  530,  531,  555-563,  572,  573,  580,  598,  602, 

607,  650. 


P. 


Pacific  counsels,  194,  268 ;  republic,  261-271. 

Paducah,  305,  307,  808,  824,  890,  403. 

Paintsville,  390-394. 

Palmer,  Colonel,  441,  447,  467, 468. 

Palo  Alto,  battle  of,  132. 

Panic  at  Nashville,  495-498;  prevented,  139-141. 

Paris,  Comte  de.    (See  Comte  de  Paris.) 

Partiality,  806. 

Parties,  Confederate,  251. 

Parting  with  the  army,  243. 

Password,  equivocal,  401. 

Patience,  176,  ISO,  181. 

Patrimony,  15. 

Patriotic  soldier,  a,  548. 

Patriotism,  48, 161, 162,  244-246,  256-258, 321,  822. 

Patronage,  17,  54,  55,  69,  70,  85,  86, 145, 146, 155, 160, 
167-169,  184,  185,  232,  242,  807. 

Paymaster,  167-182. 

Peabody,  Everett,  588,  589. 

Pea  Eidge,  battle  of,  524,  525. 

Pearce,  N.'B.,  294,  295. 

Pecuniary  embarrassments,  129, 130, 17T. 

Pelopidas  at  Belmont,  373. 

People's  war,  306. 

Perilous  adventures,  18,  69,  90,  91,143,  144;  jour 
neys,  170-174,  277-291. 

Perils  of  attack,  552. 

Personal  to  writer,  807 ;  appearance,  71,  72, 326,  327, 
718,  719,  722,  725,  728 ;  document,  a,  543 ;  staff, 
317,  318,  544. 

Pettus,  J.  J.,  334,  335,  344,  345. 

Phelps,  Lieutenant,  419,  422,  432. 

Philanthropy,  its  crimes,  189,  190,  194. 

Philosophy  in  practice,  155. 

Physical  culture,  164, 

Picketing,  careless,  561,  562. 

Picture  of  a  general,  325-327,  488,  489. 

Pierce,  Franklin,  183. 

Piketon,  358,  894 ;  battle  of,  358. 

Pillow,  G.  J.,  296,  302,  823,  324,  859,  367,  369-373, 
433,  435-439,  441,  442,  453-461,  463,  464,  466,  469- 
475,  508,  515-520,  540. 

Pious  old  woman,  a,  362. 

Pittsburg  Landing.    (See  Battle  of  Shiloh.) 

Pimos  Indians,  283. 

Plains,  the,  210. 

Plan,  Beauregard's,  541,  542,  565-572. 

Plan  of  concentration  at  Corinth,  500-509,  516-522, 
525,  528,  538-557. 

Plans  of  Shiloh  (see  Battles,  and  Albert  Sidney  John 
ston)  ;  of  campaign,  Confederate,  307,  308,  312- 
317,  344,  351,  382,  485-493,  518-520;  Federal,  420- 
426,  534-536. 

Plans  of  life,  48,  49,  51-55,  67,  68,  118-120, 123, 129, 


IXDEX. 


751 


145,  146,  148.  153, 160,  261,  272;  of  retreat,  501- 
503,  565-572.  ' 

Plantation -life,  145-169. 

Planter-priest,  320. 

Plausible  appeals,  511,  512. 

Plot,  imaginary,  261-274. 

Plunder,  360,  498,  612. 

Plutarch  in  new  clothes,  373. 

Pocahontas,  298,  324. 

Policy,  views  of  military  (see  Military  Opinions) ; 
of  Texas  (see  Texas). 

Political  generals,  145  ;  life,  thanklessness  of,  49 ; 
opinions,  68,  91-97,  166,  177,  244,  245,  247,  256- 
2(51,  263-272.  ' 

POL-TICS  :  Confederate,  250-256,  323,  339-842,  503, 
511-513;  Federal,  132, 145, 166,  167, 189, 190,  207- 
210,  221,  226-223,  239-241,  244,  245,  247,  249,  250, 
256-261,  270-272;  Kentucky,  296-805,  308,  309, 
•328,  8S1,  832,  892,  492;  Missouri,  293, 294;  Texas, 
61,  62,  67,  91-98, 120,  128,  127, 123,  250,  260  ;  dis 
like  to,  120,  121,  244,245;  in  war,  124,127,130, 
132,  142,  145,  146,  1S4, 185,  849,  503,  511-513. 

Polk,  Lecmidas,  13,  291,  305,  81T-325,  837,  349,  359, 
367-378,  332,  410,  421-425,  429,  487,  525,  526,  539, 
540.  543,  549,  556,  553  (see  Battle  of  Shilob),  721. 

Polk,  Thomas,  313. 

Polk,  William,  313-320. 

Polk,  William  M.,  321,  323. 

Pond,  Preston,  573,  594,  596,  597,  601,  606,  646,  648. 

Pope,  John,  527. 

Popular  appreciation,  290,  291 ;  contrition,  639 ;  rage, 
434,  495-499,  505,  509-514. 

Population  of  the  Alleghanies,  813;  of  the  South, 
252-255, 333-340 ;  of  Texas,  61 ;  of  Utah  (see  Mor 
mons). 

Portents,  2S1-253. 

Porter,  Fitz-Johu,  210,  211,  214,  224,  234,  235,  241, 
269,  270,  272. 

Porter,  Thomas  E.,  447,  443,  461,  465-463. 

Portraiture,  a  friendly,  193-195. 

Posey,  General,  36-41. 

Postponement  of  sortie,  454. 

Pound  Gap,  316,  390-394. 

Poverty,  165,  189. 

Powder,  382. 

Powell,  Lazarus  W.,  226-223. 

Powers  of  a  Confederate  general,  328. 

Prairie-dogs,  175. 

Prairies,  the,  146,  147,  172-175. 

Prayer,  132,  720. 

Precautions,  171, 176, 177,  411,  412. 

Predilection  for  the  navy,  5. 

Pregnant  words,  532-584. 

Preliminary  orders  for  Shiloh,  551,  558. 

Premature  recall  of  troops,  627-639. 

Prentice.  George  D.,  299. 

Prentiss,  B.  M.,  528,  577,  573,  531,  587,  539-591,  598- 
6UO,  604,  606,  619-622,  640,  641. 

Preparations  for  defense  (see  Defense) ;  Northern, 
417,  413;  for  retreat,  487,  492. 

Presence,  71,  72,  326,  327,  T16,  719,  722,  725,  723;  of 
mind,  176,  177. 

Presidency,  Texan,  67,  92,  120,  123.  123. 

Presidential  combinations,  244,  245 ;  elections,  166, 
167,  159,  190,  247. 

49 


Preston.  Henrietta.    (See  Henrietta  Johnston.) 

Preston,  William.  55, 130, 153,  155, 159, 184-1S6, 293, 
379,  420,  505,  515,  549,  569,  534,  5S9,  590,  597,  614, 
615,  640,  688,  690,  717. 

Prestonburg,  392-394. 

Prevision,  419. 

Price,  Sterling,  293-296,  324,  325,  349,  523-525. 

Pride,  honest,  271. 

Prime  and  Helvetti,  397. 

Primitive  plainness,  114. 

Prisoners,  876,  377,  897,  405,  474,  475,  560,  574 ;  citi 
zen,  326;  exchange  of,  376,  377,  405. 

Private  soldiers,  United  States,  242. 

Problem  of  Shiloh,  563. 

Proceedings  of  Congress  on  death,  691-694. 

Proclamations,  125,  223,  233,  252,  311,  312. 

Procrastination,  424. 

Profession,  choice  of,  5,  9, 48-50, 54,  55, 153, 162-164. 

Prohibition  to  attack,  542. 

Project  of  a  colony,  54,  55. 

Promise  kept,  a,  128. 

Promotion  from  the  ranks,  242 ;  in  army  (see  Eank). 

Promptitude  to  act,  544. 

Prophecy  fulfilled,  a,  4S9,  490;  literal,  877;  of  civil 
war,  49, 194. 

Prophetic  words,  289. 

Prophet,  the,  30-32. 

Prophets,  false,  195-206.  (See  Joseph  Smith  and 
Brigham  Young.) 

Protest  against  retreat,  492. 

Protest  of  Governor  Johnson,  550. 

Providence,  158, 182,  260,  500,  561. 

Provisional  government  of  Kentucky,  331,  332. 

Puma,  kills  a,  69. 

Purdy,  542,  556-558. 

Purpose,  aggressive,  551-555,  566-572,  532. 

Pursuit,  403,  406,  653. 

Q. 

Quadrilateral,  a,  530,  531. 
Quarles,  W.  A.,  448,  466-463. 
Quartermaster-general,  246. 
Quarters,  216-220,  233,  234,  895-399. 

E. 

Eage,  public,  4S4,  495-499,  505,  509-514. 

Eaid,  the  first,  509. 

Eailroad  system,  529,  538,  539. 

EAILROADS  :  East  Tennessee  &  Virginia,  317,  3fi4, 
883 ;  Louisville  &  Nashville,  310, 317,  884,  387,  485, 
509;  Memphis  &  Bowling  Green,  381,  332,  433, 
485,  527,  539 ;  Memphis  &  Charleston,  507,  527, 
528,  530,  534,  535,  538,  539,  661 ;  Mobile  &  Ohio, 
527,  661 ;  Nashville  &,  Chattanooga,  506-503,  540 ; 
Texas  &  Pacific,  177;  Union  Pacific,  218,  241, 
484,  505. 

Eains,  untimely,  508-510,  516. 

Eaising  troops,  327-348,  539,  540. 

Eaith,  Julius,  592,  595. 

Eandolph,  negro  cook,  171,  248,  279,  280. 

Eank  in  C.  S.  Army,  292  ;  in  Texan  Army.  69-75 ; 
in  U.  8.  Army,  9,  13,  21,  134,  136, 137,  167, 169, 
185,  229. 

Eank,  relative,  292. 

Eansom,  T.  E.  G.,  591. 


752 


INDEX. 


Rapacity  rebuked,  4. 

Rashness  of  Grant,  523,  530-536. 

Eavages  of  war,  153. 

Bawlins,  General,  581. 

Eawness  of  troops,  523-580,  565. 

Rear-guard  at  Shiloh,  652,  653. 

Eeasons  for  retreat  at  Shiloh,  5CT. 

Rebuke,  power  of,  46,  339. 

Eecall  of  troops,  unfortunate,  464. 

Eeception  at  Nashville,  306;  by  President  Davis,  291. 

Eecornmendations  as  colonel,  130, 132, 1  Si;  as  brig 
adier-general,  142. 

Eeconnaissance  in  force,  5T9. 

Eeconnaissances,  358,  362,  3S4-386,  419,  560,  574. 

Eecruiting,  186,  347,  351,  360. 

Eector,  Governor  H.  M.,  334,  387. 

Eed  Bird,  19,  20. 

Reinforcements,  843,  345,  346,  359,  390,  424-423, 502, 
508,  518,  519,  589,  540  ;  at  Donelson,  434-439,  455, 
456,  519 ;  at  Shiloh,  625-627,  630,  639-643. 

Reflections  on  life  and  death,  122. 

Refuge,  a  city  of,  217. 

Refugees,  217,  879-8S1,  492. 

Refusal  of  appointment,  17. 

Refusing  to  dance,  287. 

Regard  for  non-combatants,  227,  22S,  500,  508. 

Regularity  of  development,  618. 

Eegulars,  U.  8.,  242. 

Religion,  158,  182, 133, 195,  24-3,  720,  721. 

Reminiscences.    (See  Albert  Sidney  Johnston.) 

Remnant  of  Grant's  army,  641,  642. 

Remonstrance  of  Governor  Johnson,  550. 

Removal  of  remains,  694-715. 

Removal  of  stores  from  Nashville,  498,  499,  504.  506, 
507,  516. 

Renewal  of  battle  at  Shiloh,  643. 

Reorganization,  406,  539,  544,  548,  549. 

Reparation,  insufficient,  267. 

Reply  to  Brigham  Young,  219. 

Report  of  Shiloh,  Beauregard's,  543 ;  of  Fort  Henry, 
Gilmer  s,  426-428 ;  of  river-defenses,  Folk's,  410, 
411;  of  peace  commissioners,  228;  of  General 
Johnston,  108. 

Republican  party,  247,  271 ;  opinions,  63,  159-162, 
244,  245,  256-260. 

Repulse  at  "Wild  Cat,  356,  357;  of  gunboats,  450-454, 
of  lancers,  139-141. 

Repulses  at  Shiloh,  593,  594,  596,  605,  606,  610,  624, 
643-653. 

Requisitions  for  troops,  323-343. 

Resaca  de  la  Palma,  battle  of,  132. 

Rescue,  the  penalty  of,  658. 

Rescue  of  army,  215,  624-627,  643-653. 

Resentment,  popular,  484,  495-499,  505,  510-515. 

Reserve  corps,  559. 

RESIGNATIONS  :  as  lieutenant,  52 ;  as  Secretary  of 
"War,  123 ;  as  general,  201-275. 

Resolve  to  attack,  551-555. 

Respect  for  woman,  46,  53,  54,  72. 

Results  of  Donelson,  469,  476. 

Resuscitation,  47. 

Reticence,  10, 151,  247,  326.  327. 

Retire,  order  to,  627,  623,  633,  639. 

Retirement,  rural,  52,  54, 121, 122, 145-169,  261. 

Retirement  from  Mexican  War,  142, 145, 146. 


Retreat  arrested,  361 ;  retreat  from  Belmont,  372- 
375;  from  Bowling  Green,  484-500,518,519,  55<»; 
from  Fishing  Creek,  403-406 ;  from  Murfreesboro, 
500-522 ;  from  Nashville,  498-500,  503,  504,  519, 
550;  route  of,  507-510,  519,  520;  proposed  before 
Shiloh,  565-572;  from  Shiloh,  651-653. 

Reverie,  176. 

Review  of  campaign,  503,  504. 

Revolution,  right  of,  259,  271,  272. 

Revolution,  the  Texan,  62-66. 

Revolutionary  movements  in  Texas,  57-61. 

Revolutionary  point,  the.  340. 

Revolvers,  Jack  Hays's,  859. 

Reynolds,  Thomas  C.,  325. 

Rhetoric,  161, 168,  224. 

Richmond,  at,  291. 

Ridge  road,  555-558. 

Ridley,  A.,  277,  278,  285-289. 

Eight  of  resistance,  259,  271,  272  ;  of  revolution  (see 
Revolution) ;  of  secession,  249,  250,  259. 

Rio  Grande,  the,  2S6-290. 

River-defenses,  496.  (See  Fort  Henry  and  Fort 
Donelson.) 

River-obstructions,  410,  422,  435. 

Rivers,  286-290,  318, 814, 396, 398, 399.  (See  Barren, 
Cumberland,  Green,  Mississippi,  and  Tennessee 
Rivers ;  also  Gunboats,  and  Fort  Henry  and  Fort 
Donelson.) 

Road,  Ridge  or  Bark,  555-558. 

Roads,  bad.  503,  509,  559,  5GO,  564. 

Robbery,  178, 179. 

Rockcastle  Hills,  356. 

Rock  Island,  31. 

Rocky  Mountains,  211-217,  225,  226. 

Rodgers,  John,  418. 

Rogers,  Jason,  40, 134,  152. 

Rousseau,  L.  H.,  299,  302,  315,  646,  647. 

Eout  of  Federal  front,  595;  of  Hildebrand,  533  ;  of 
Sherman,  597 ;  at  Shiloh,  final,  623-626,  635-637. 

Euggles,  Daniel,  589,  640,  562,  564,  573,  619,  620,  622, 
634,  644-646,  650. 

Ruin,  financial,  130. 

Rules  of  conduct,  151. 

Rumor,  false,  400,  401,  405. 

Running  the  gantlet,  284. 

Rural  life,  52,  54,  121,  122.  145-169,  261. 

Rusk,  Thomas  J.,  63,  70,  71,  90,  105,  106,  109-111, 
128, 184. 

Russell.  R.  M.,  595,  596,  601,  C06,  621. 

Russellville,  360,  8S1,  3S2,  425,  429,  433,  434,  485, 
4S6. 

S. 

Sackett's  Harbor,  18. 

Sacs  and  Foxes,  27-45. 

Sagacity,  859. 

Salt  in  diplomacy,  213,  219,  224. 

Salt  Lake  City,  198,  229,  233. 

San  Antonio,  £6,  62-64,  66,  86-91, 115-117,  159-195, 

290. 

San  Antonio  massacre,  116,  117. 
San  Francisco.    (See  California.) 
Sanguine  temper,  a,  848. 
San  Jacinto,  battle  of,  66. 
Santa  Anna,  60-66. 
Saunders,  James  E.,  423,  424. 


IXDEX. 


753 


Savannah  (Tennessee),  528,  534-586,  574,  5T6,  5SO, 
581,  602,  603. 

Scenery,  Texan,  122,  147, 143,  173,  174. 

Schaller,  Frank,  488-490. 

Schemes  of  foreign  adventure,  12. 

Schoepf,  Albin,  356,  358,  363,  364,  397,  393,  400,  403 
406. 

Schools,  3-5. 

Scotch-Irish,  318,  319. 

Scott,  John,  508,  509. 

Scott,  Winfield,  17,  185,  186,  203,  229,  230,  247,  248, 
255,  273,  274,  378,  420,  730. 

Scurry,  E.,  514. 

Sea-coast  defense,  329,  330. 

Secession,  249,  250,  256-261,  263. 

Second  battle  of  Shiloh,  643. 

Second  Cavalry,  183-195. 

Secretary  of  War,  of  Texas,  92-113. 

Secretary  of  War's  report,  95,  96, 108-110. 

Secret  history,  fictitious,  486. 

Secret  of  command,  the,  720. 

Self-complacency  of  success,  560. 

Self-complacent  security,  529, 530,  574-581. 

Self-control,  3,  9, 181,  224,  225,  261,  495,  496,  513,  513, 
516,  720. 

Self-deception,  620. 

Self-denial,  282. 

Self-estimate,  232,  550,  716. 

Self-reliance,  180,  550. 

Sepulture,  633. 

Serenity,  513-515. 

Settlement  of  accounts,  173. 

Seven-years1  war,  a,  189,  333,  340. 

Severance  of  army,  435-487,  500-502. 

Sharp-shooters,  447. 

Shaver,  Colonel  E.  G.,  572,  587-591. 

Shelbyville,  540. 

Sheridan,  Philip  H.,  704. 

Sherman,  Colonel,  of  Texas,  66. 

Sherman,  General  William  T.,  310.  315,  349,  357, 362, 
363,365,366,420,  528,  531-533,  536,574-581,  537- 
594,  601,  602,  607,  621,  623,  641,  642,  648,  649,  C53, 
657,  653. 

Sherman  broken  at  Shiloh,  596. 

Sherman  routed  at  Shiloh,  597. 

Sherman's  "  Historical  Eaid,"  420,  532,  533,  57S-5SO. 

Shermans  "Memoirs,"  420,  531,  532,  575. 

Sherman's  theory  of  Shiloh,  574-581. 

Shiloh  Church,  489, 490, 528, 530, 531, 607.  (See  Bat 
tle  of  Shiloh.) 

Shrinkage  of  force,  493. 

Sickness,  47, 51-53,  74,  81,  83,  85, 165, 170, 189. 

Sickness.  Beauregard's,  542,  543,  549 ;  in  the  army, 
39,  47,  296,  334,  337,  360,  3G1,  443,  493,  660. 

Sigel,  Franz,  295,  524. 

Silence,  the  power  of,  512. 

Simonton,  Colonel,  458,  4o9. 

Simonton,  Mr.,  281. 

Simplicity,  Spartan,  3. 

Simplicity  of  character,  723. 

Sirocco,  281. 

Sisters  and  brothers,  2,  5,  7-9, 15-18,  48-51,  57. 

Situation,  military.    (See  Military  Situation.) 

Skill  with  arms,  72,  76,  150. 

Skinned  pant'er,  287. 


SKIRMISHES  :  At  Albany,  355;  at  Barboursville,  355; 
at  Laurel  Bridge,  355;  at  Eddyville,  358;  at  Fort 
Donelson.  486 ;  at  Jo  Underwood,  362 ;  at  Mill 
Springs,  397;  at  Morgantown,  358;  at  Sacra 
mento,  385,  336;  at  Whippoorwill,  383;  at  Wood- 
bury,  853;  at  Woodsonville,  384,  887;  at  Shiloh 
(cavalry),  560,  562,  574;  beginning  of  Shiloh,  587. 

Slander,  262,  263,  271,  272. 

Slave,  a  faithful,  171,  248,  2T9,  280;  a  dishonest,  178, 
179. 

Slavery,  149, 190, 194,  258.    (See  Slave.) 

Slaves  in  the  army,  343,  410,  416,  417,  423,  424. 

Small  results,  348,  349. 

Smith,  Ashbel,  534,  694,  698,  699,  717. 

Smith,  C.  F.,  210-212,  241,  890,  421,  422,  444,  447, 
448,  463,  465,  466,  527,  528,  631,  532. 

Smith,  E.  Kirby,  185,  518. 

Smith,  Henry,  62,  63. 

Smith,  Joseph,'195-197. 

Smith,  Marshall  J.,  619-621. 

Smith,  Persifer,  229,  730. 

Smith,  Preston,  596,  606. 

Smithland,  314,  403. 

Snake  Creek,  530,  531,  623,  641. 

Snake  Indians,  235,  236. 

Snow-beleaguered,  213. 

Soldiers  weeping,  243,  497. 

Solemn  Declaration,  the,  62, 107. 

Solitude,  145-160, 165. 

Somerset,  395,  897. 

Sorrow,  public,  688. 

Sortie,  abortive,  454 ;  agreed  on,  456 ;  plan  of,  456. 

South  Carrollton,  419. 

Southern  apathy  (see  Apathy) ;  Governors,  253  (see 
Joseph  E.  Brown,  I.  G.  Harris,  C.  F.  Jackson, 
John  Letcher,  B.  Magoffin,  A.  B.  Moore,  J.  J. 
Pettus,  H.  M.  Eector);  Confederacy,  249-256; 
dissensions,  251 ;  population,  252-255. 

Special  pleading,  577 ;  providences,  724,  725. 

Splitting  the  South,  534-536. 

Spoils  of  war,  the,  612. 

Springfield  (Missouri),  523-525. 

Spurrier,  John,  654. 

Squirrel-shooting,  683. 

Staff,  317,  318,  544,  688;  appointment,  17. 

Stage-driver,  or  not  ?  283. 

Stampede,  688. 

Starr,  James  H.,  92,  94, 110, 112, 114. 

Start,  the,  277 ;  at  Shiloh,  585,  586. 

Startling  announcement,  495. 

State  Guard  (Kentucky),  298,  301,  303. 

State  line,  403. 

State  sovereignty,  248-261,  299-312,  329,  407,  403. 

Statham,  Colonel,  508,  557,  559,  573,  598,  601,  609, 
610,  613,  614,  647,  652. 

Steamboat  explosion,  50. 

Stewart,  A.  P.,  415,  526,  527,  573,  595,  596,  598,  601, 
604-606,  621,  (539,  648. 

Stephens,  William  8.,  573,  601. 

Stillman's  defeat,  85, 86. 

St.  Louis,  19,  22-24,  28,  54,  293,  294. 

Stoicism,  155, 165, 166,  215,  281,  282,  495. 

Storms,  560,  561,  640,  653.    (See  Winter  Storms.) 

Strahl,  O.  F.,  595,  596. 

Strategic  point,  538. 


754 


INDEX. 


Strategy,  307-310,  812-317,  349,  855,  357,  359-363, 
882,  887,  388,  890,  397,  419-421,  425,  426,  433-439, 
453,  484-493,  500-507,  516-523,  534-544,  548,  551- 
55S;  after  the  fact,  4S4 ;  the  essence  of,  555. 

Strength  of  armies,  308,  309,  314-316,  837,  338,  344- 
846,  349-351,  359,  860,  863-366,  869,  875,  387,  892, 
398,  899,  411,  422,  423,  425,  428-430,  432,  436,  443, 
448,  453,  478-4S8,  484,  503,  504,  508,  518-520,  524, 
528,  587,  538,  572,  573,  660.  (See  Tables,  Appen 
dices.) 

Strength  of  position,  531-535. 

Stronghold,  a  natural,  580-582,  592,  601,  604-610. 

Stuart,  D.,  580,  592,  598,  600. 

Sturgess,  Major,  293. 

Submarine  batteries,  412,  423,  435. 

Subsistence,  21 T. 

Success  the  test  of  merit,  521,  725. 

Successive  lines  of  battle,  554. 

Sugar  Creek,  524,  525. 

Sugar-planting,  156. 

Sugg,  Colonel,  442,  466-468. 

Suicide,  22. 

Sullen  retreat,  498. 

Summary  of  Shiloh,  Beauregard's,  586. 

Sumner,  E.  V.,  248,  262-265,  278,  274. 

Superior  Federal  force,  528-530. 

Surprise  at  Shiloh,  532,  533,  574-581,  590,  591,  654, 
655. 

Surprise  attempted,  400. 

Surrender  of  Fort  Henry,  432;  Fort  Donelson,  471, 
474,  567;  Island  No.  10,  527;  Nashville,  499; 
Prentiss,  619-622,  628. 

Surveillance,  277. 

Suspense,  290. 

Swampy  country,  146, 147, 165,  530. 

Sweeping  a  field,  621-623. 

Swinton's  "Decisive  Battles,"  486,  656. 

Sympathy  with  youth,  149-151,  155,  173,  175,  176, 
193, 194. 

T. 

Table  of  distances,  533. 
Tables  of  strength  and  casualties,  365,  366,  443,  478- 

483,  537,  538,  669-687. 
Tactical  errors,  553-555. 
Tactics,  608,  655. 
Tappan,  John  C.,  867,  368,  652. 
Tarantula,  the,  133. 
Tate,  Sam,  506. 
Taylor,  Joseph  P.,  167-169. 
Taylor,  IMchard,  732,  733. 
Taylor,  Zachary,  35,  40,  41,  45,  46,  131-144, 152,  154, 

166-169,  733. 

Taylor's  (General  Z.)  recommendations,  132, 142. 
Telegrams,  important,  453,  554,  640. 
Temerity  of  Grant,  528-534. 
Temperance,  119. 
Tenacity,  493. 
Tennessee,  258,  805  (see  Defense  of  Tennessee,  I. 

G.  Harris,  W.  C.  Whitthorne,  Fort  Donelson,  Fort 

Henry,  Nashville,  F.  K.  Zollicoffer,  etc.) ;  Kiver? 

314.  317.    (See  Fort  Henry,  Pittsburg  Landing, 

Shiloh.) 

Terry,  Colonel,  333,  334,  336,  384,  3S5. 
Test  of  manhood,  533. 


Test  of  merit,  the,  521. 
Tests  of  soldiership,  216. 

TEXAS  :  Johnston's  first  interest,  55 ;  early  history, 
56;  revolutionary  movements,  57-61 ;  General  Con 
sultation,  62 ;  revolution,  62-68 ;  Johnston  joins,  67 ; 
elections,  67,  92, 120, 123, 128;  army,  61-67,  69,  70, 
73,  74,  81,  82,  87 ;  poverty,  88 ;  Houston's  military 
policy,  81-90,  92, 123, 124, 127;  politics,  81-98, 120, 
123, 127,  128;  Houston's  Indian  policy,  84,  88,  90. 
98,  100-107;  rangers,  182,  183,  287,  238,832,833, 
884,  885,  508,  514;  riflemen,  134-136;  scenery,  122, 
147, 148, 178, 174;  annexation,  128;  northwestern, 
170;  northers,  174,  188;  Pacific  Railroad,  177; 
frontier,  184;  services  to,  238;  love  for,  128,  246, 
248,  260,  272,  276;  secession  of,  250,  260;  Legisla 
ture  on  his  death,  694,  699;  honors  paid  by  the 
people,  694-715;  Moore's  regiment,  595,  717. 

Thankfulness,  183. 

Thayer,  Colonel,  460-462. 

Theatre  of  war,  292,  293,  306,  312,  313-317,  487-491, 
504. 

Thief  detected,  178. 

Thirst,  281,  282. 

"  This  is  not  war ! "  563. 

Thomas,  George  H.,  185,  803,  304,  315,  817,  349,  356, 
863,  866,  397-406,  586. 

Thompson,  Jacob,  570,  598. 

Thompson,  Jeff,  824,  349. 

Throckmorton,  J.  W.,  694,  712,  713. 

Tilghman,  Lloyd  J.,  302,  361,  408,  409,  411,  415,  416, 
422,  425-432,  486. 

Times,  New  York,  231,  726,  727. 

Tishomingo  County,  416. 

Toga  mrilis,  180. 

Tolerance,  22. 

Tomb,  Confederate,  715. 

Too  late,  503. 

Topography  of  Donelson  and  Henry,  407-411  ;  of 
Northern  Alabama,  503,  509  ;  of  Corinth,  529;  of 
Pittsburg  Landing,  529-531 ;  of  Shiloh  battle-field, 
553,  554,  560. 

Torpedoes,  412,  423,  435. 

Trabue,  B.  P.,  573,598,  601,  606,  621,  643,  650-652. 

Trans-Mississippi  Department,  291-296,  335,  849, 
523-525. 

Transportation,  deficiency  in,  435,  506,  507,  565. 

Transylvania  University,  5,  8. 

Travis,  William  B.,  59,  63,  64. 

Treason,  380. 

Treaties  with  Indians,  19,  26,  29,  31,  82,  84,  88,  89, 
98,  101-110,  115,  235,  236;  with  Mexico,  100, 
104. 

TROOPS:  Care  of,  81-84,  134-136,190,191,  213-220, 
233-235,  492-494 ;  concentration  of,  334,  349,  350 ; 
condition  of,  337;  disbanding,  339,  340;  dispo 
sition  of,  485,  521 ;  militia,  843 ;  number  of  (see 
Strength  of  Armies);  recruiting,  328-348;  time 
of  service,  335-340,  347 ;  United  States  regulars. 
(See  Black-Hawk  War,  Mormons,  Second  Caval 
ry,  Utah.) 

Trust  discharged,  266. 

Tucson,  233,  234. 

Tupelo,  661. 

Turner,  Major,  466,  467. 

Turning-point,  633-639,  658,  717. 


INDEX. 


U. 

Unarmed  troops  refused,  339. 

Uncomplimentary  recognition,  145. 

Under  arms,  561. 

Unexpected  disaster,  406,  495. 

Unfounded  terror,  362. 

Union,  Federal,  249,  250,  257,  253. 

Unionism,  269,  270. 

Unionists,  251,  252,  257,  269,  270,  233,  285,  300-304, 

357,  85S,  360,  379,  3S1. 
University  of  the  South,  320. 
Unselfishness,  549,  550 ;  fatal,  615. 
Utah.    (Set  Mormons.) 
Ute  Indians,  235,  236. 

V. 

Vacillation,  455. 

Valor  and  enthusiasm,  5S5. 

Value  of  good  character,  169. 

Vandalism,  283. 

Van  Dorn,  Earl,  185,  523-525,  543,  544. 

Van  Home,  T.  II.,  302,  810,  317,  366,  397,  398,  404, 
579. 

Verses,  707. 

Victory  and  death,  613. 

Victory  thrown  away,  464,  627. 

Vigilance  enjoined,  412,  415. 

Vigorous  protest,  550. 

Villain  rebuked,  a,  720. 

Vindication,  real,  515,  516. 

Virginia,  252-254. 

Visit  to  Louisiana,  5;  to  Virginia,  52,  53. 

Volunteer  aides,  3 17,  325. 

Volunteers  as  a  private  soldier,  69  ;  in  the  Mexican 
War,  132 ;  disbanding,  340. 

Volunteer  troops.  (See  Black-Hawk  War,  Mexi 
can  War,  and  Confederate  War.) 

Vou  Trebra,  Colonel,  384. 

Vote,  General  Johnston's  only,  166. 

W. 

Wabokieshiek,  30-32. 
Waddell,  B.  B.,  598. 
Walker,  L.  Pope,  539,  540. 
Wallace,  Lewis,  449,  460,  462,  465,  523,  559,  581,  602, 

641,  646,  648,  649. 
Wallace.  W.  H.  L.,447,  458,  461,  462,  528,  577,  581, 

591,  592,  595,  597-601,  604,  606,  619-621,  641,  657. 
Walthall,  E.  C.,  400-403. 
Want  of  arms.    (See  Arms.) 
War,  its  waste,  153. 
War  Department  (U.  S.),  1S8, 20T,  221, 239, 240.  (See 

John  B.  Floyd.) 

War  Department  (C.  S.).    (See  J.  P.  Benjamin.) 
Wars.  (See  Black-Hawk  War,  Cherokee  War,  divil 

War,  Indians,  Mexican  War,  Missouri,  Mormon 

Rebellion,  Texas.) 

Warning  to  Crittenden  and  Zollicoffer,  396. 
Washington,  George,  161, 162. 
Washington  society,  15. 


Water  communications,  484,  4?5. 

Water-courses.    (See  Rivers.) 

Water-shed  of  the  Tennessee,  529. 

Weakley,  Samuel  D.,  416. 

Weakness  of  Confederate  army,  344-346,  423. 

Webb,  James,  92. 

Webster,  J.  D.,  876,  458,  623-626,  630. 

Wedge,  strategic,  534. 

Wells,  Daniel  H.,  202,  204,  219. 

Western  District,  361. 

West  Point,  9-14. 

West  Tennessee,  322-324. 

Whig  party,  166. 

Wharton,  John  A.,  514,  557,  534,  607. 

Wharton,  William  H.,  62. 

Wheeler,  Joseph,  595,  643,  644. 

Whitthorne,  W.  C.,  837,  340,  347,  348,  505,  729. 

Wickham,  Captain,  544,  614,  615,  688. 

Wife,  first  (see  Henrietta  P.  Johnston) ;  second  (see 

Eliza  G.  Johnston). 
Williams,  John  S.,  358,  360,  879. 
Williams,  Samuel  M.,  121. 
Williams,  N.  G.,  600. 

Wild  Cat,  repulse  at,  356, 857 ;  stampede,  863,  3G4. 
Wilderness  of  Kentucky,  356. 
Wilson's  Creek,  battle  of,  294,  295. 
Winged  words,  582-584. 
Winnebagoes,  19,  28. 
Winter  campaigns.    (See  Mormons,  Fishing  Creek, 

Fort  Henry,  Fort  Donelson,  and  following.) 
Winter  storm,  a,  188,  211-216,  449,  493. 
Winter-quarters,  216-220,  233,  234,  395-899. 
Withdrawal  at  Shiloh,  627-689. 
Withers,  Jones  M.,  562,  563,  572,  622,  634,  643,  644. 
Woll's  invasion,  127. 
Wood,  Robert,  509. 
Wood,  S.  A.  M.,  508,  572,  587-591,  643. 
Wood,  T.  J.,  536,  602,  652,  658. 
Woodbury,  558. 
Woodcraft,  177. 
Woodsonville,  8S4,  887. 
Woolley,  Robert  W.,  485,  492,  494,  503,  514. 
Work  at  Bowling  Green,  492. 
Worth,  William  J.,  12, 13, 137-140,  727. 
Worthington,  Thomas,  583,  534,  578. 
Wounds,  78-85,  613-615. 
Wrath,  popular,  484, 495-499,  505,  509-514. 
Wright,  J.  M.,  642. 
Wright,  M.  H.,  832. 
Wynn's  Ferry  road,  456,  462.    (See  Fort  Donelson.) 

Y. 

Yandell,  David  W.,  493,  519,  615,  725. 

Yellow  fever,  170. 

Young,  Brigham,  197-204,  219-224,  241,  242.    (See 

Mormons.) 
Yuma,  280-282. 

Z. 
Zollicoffer,  F.  K.,  806,  309,  816,  31T,  344,  349,  355- 

357,  360,  388,  394-406. 
Zouaves,  the  manufacture  of,  5S9. 


THE    EXD. 


A    NEW 

HISTORY  OF  THE  TOUTED  STATES, 

By  J.  H.  PATTON,  A.  M. 


In  one  large  vol.,  822  pages,  8vo.      Cloth         -        -.  $3.00, 


In  presenting  the  reading  public  this  volume,  the  publishers  hope  to  supply  a  want 
long  felt — that  of  a  popular  History  of  the  United  States,  occupying  a  place  between  the 
documentary  histories,  extending  to  six  or  more  volumes,  and  the  mere  compends  used 
in  schools.  The  former  of  these  are  beyond  the  reach  of  great  numbers  of  intelligent 
general  readers,  while  the  latter  do  not  meet  their  wants. 

Much  labor  has  been  given  to  supply  a  more  than  ordinary  deficiency  in  the  histories 
of  the  War  of  1812,  and  the  War  with  Mexico.  As  to  the  latter,  the  causes  which  led  to  it, 
the  annexation  of  Texas,  the  intrigues,  the  conflicts,  the  results,  are  graphically  given. 


"It  is  the  result  of  careful,  deliberate,  and  extended  research;  it  exhibits  impartial  and  sound 
judgment,  and  is  written  in  an  easy  and  attractive  style,  making  it  a  book  to  be  read  as  well  as  to  be 
preserved  for  constant  reference.''— New  York  Observer. 

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"  The  War  of  1812  is  fully  explained.  The  late  Administrations  and  their  history  are  sketched 
with  remarkable  accuracy  and  candor."—  The  Evening  Post. 

"  An  excellent  history  of  the  United  States  for  family  reading.  The  author  gives  due  weight 
to  the  moral  and  religious  influences  which  have  contributed  to  form  our  national  life,  and  the  tone 
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larger  histories."— New  York  Herald. 

"  The  author,  possessing  a  clear  mind  and  a  good  style,  often  aptly  characterises  men  and  events 
in  a  few  graphic  words."— New  York  Chronicle. 

"  The  author  has  given  a  narrative,  not  merely  of  external  events,  but  of  the  interior  life  and 
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D.  APPLETOX  &  CO.,  549  &  551  Broadway,  New  York. 


HISTORY    OF    ENGLAND 


EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY. 


By  WILLIAM  EDWARD  HdRTPOLE  LECKY, 

Author  of  "History  of  the  Bise  and  Influence  of  the  Spirit  of  Kationalism  in  Europe,"  "History 
of  European  Morals,  from  Augustus  to  Charlemagne,"  etc. 


2  vols.,  12mo.     Cloth,  $5.00. 


"  Xo  more  important  book  has  appeared  of  late  years  than  this  history,  uniting  as  it 
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has  made  his  mark  upon  our  time  by  his  careful  and  fascinating  book,  and  we  have 
reason  to  be  glad  that  while  he  is  still  himself,  and  his  pen  has  a  sharp  point  and  is  held 
with  a  strong  hand,  his  temper  has  gained  gentleness  with  time,  and  his  mind  has  not 
lost  insight  by  laborious  study.  We  congratulate  the  publishers  upon  what  cannot  fail 
to  be  a  great  success,  and  we  wish  them  speed  in  their  task  for  our  sake  and  their  own." 
— New  York  Times. 

"  On  every  ground  which  should  render  a  history  of  eighteenth-century  England  pre 
cious  to  thinking  men,  Mr.  Lecky's  work  may  be  commended.  The  materials  accumu 
lated  in  these  volumes  attest  an  industry  more  strenuous  and  comprehensive  than  that 
exhibited  by  Froude  or  by  Macaulay,  and,  if  its  fruits  are  not  set  forth  with  the  pictorial 
charm  of  the  latter  writer,  they  are  invested  with  more  authority.  Mr.  Lecky's  style  is 
lucid  and  effective,  often  spirited,  sometimes  eloquent.  But  it  is  his  supreme  merit  that 
he  leaves  on  the  reader's  mind  a  conviction  that  he  not  only  possesses  the  acuteness 
which  can  discern  the  truth,  but  the  unflinching  purpose  of  truth -telling." — New  York 
Sun. 

"  The  author  of  these  volumes  has  not  trodden  in  the  beaten  path.  'His  work  is  a 
record  of  the  progress  of  art,  of  manners,  of  belief,  and  of  political  ideas.  Judicial  im 
partiality  is  a  characteristic  of  his  writings." — The  New  York  Churchman. 

"  The  work  will  enrich  any  library.  The  account  of  John  Wesley  in  the  second  vol 
ume  will  be  interesting  to  our  Methodist  readers  ;  and,  if  it  is  not  in  all  details  just,  it  is 
unexpectedly  just  in  the  general  outlines  of  Wesley's  work  and  character.  The  great 
influence  of  the  Wesleyan  movement  is  recognized,  and  especially  the  impetus  it  gave 
(against  Wesley's  wish)  to  nonconformity." — New  York  Methodist. 

"  Mr.  Lecky  belongs  to  the  newer  school  of  thinkers,  who  accept  little  which  does  not 
bring  credentials  that  will  bear  the  test  of  examination,  and  who  do  not  hesitate  to  shock 
conventional  ideas  of  authority.  Not  the  least  attraction  of  this  history  is  the  indepen 
dence  of  thought  in  its  author,  the  conscientious  frankness  of  opinion,  as  well  as  the 
freshness  of  style  which  he  brings  to  its  discussions.  Mr.  Lecky  adds  to  intelligence  and 
fairness  a  remarkable  reasoning  capacity  and  a  rare  degree  of  literary  skill ;  and  his  work 
is  an  invaluable  addition  to  the  higher  literature  of  the  day." — Boston  Gazette. 

D.  APPLETON  &  CO.,  Publishers, 

549  &  331  Broadway,  New  York. 


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